Order Code IB88090
CRS Issue Brief for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
Nuclear Energy Policy
Updated December 17, 2004
Mark Holt
Resources, Science, and Industry Division
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

CONTENTS
SUMMARY
MOST RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS
Overview of Nuclear Power in the United States
Nuclear Power Research and Development
Nuclear Power Plant Safety and Regulation
Safety
Domestic Reactor Safety
Reactor Safety in the Former Soviet Bloc
Licensing and Regulation
Reactor Security
Decommissioning
Nuclear Accident Liability
Nuclear Waste Management
Federal Funding for Nuclear Energy Programs
LEGISLATION



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Nuclear Energy Policy
SUMMARY
Nuclear energy policy issues facing
and Public Works Committee on May 15,
Congress include questions about radioactive
2003, but no further action was taken.
waste management, research and development
priorities, power plant safety and regulation,
Disposal of highly radioactive waste has
terrorism, and the Price-Anderson Act nuclear
been one of the most controversial aspects of
liability system.
nuclear power. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act
of 1982 (NWPA, P.L. 97-425), as amended in
The Bush Administration has stressed the
1987, requires DOE to conduct detailed physi-
importance of nuclear power in the nation’s
cal characterization of Yucca Mountain in
energy policy. The Administration’s FY2005
Nevada as a permanent underground reposi-
budget request included $412.6 million for
tory for high-level waste. A resolution to
DOE’s Office of Nuclear Energy, Science, and
allow work at Yucca Mountain to proceed
Technology, about the same as the FY2004
despite state objections was signed by the
level. The Consolidated Appropriations Act
President on July 23, 2002 (P.L. 107-200).
for FY2005 (P.L. 108-447) provides $513.3
million for the nuclear energy office, includ-
DOE received $580 million for the waste
ing $50.0 million for designing and licensing
program for FY2004, and the Administration
new commercial reactors and about $34 milli-
requested $880 million for the program for
on for nuclear technology to produce hydro-
FY2005, a 50% increase. The Administration
gen. (All FY2005 figures exclude an 0.8%
also proposed that $749 million of the
across-the-board reduction.)
FY2005 request be offset by a longstanding
fee on nuclear power, so that the net appropri-
A conference agreement reached
ation would be only $131 million. Because
November 17, 2003, on omnibus energy
legislation to enact the proposed offset did not
legislation (H.R. 6) would have provided tax
pass, the House voted to provide only the re-
credits for electricity generated by new nuclear
quested $131 million net appropriation in the
power plants and authorized funding for a
FY2005 Energy and Water Development
demonstration reactor in Idaho to produce
appropriations bill (H.R. 4614). Disagreement
hydrogen. The conference agreement also
over nuclear waste stymied Senate action on
would have extended Price-Anderson cover-
the energy and water funding bill, and confer-
age for new commercial reactors and new
ees on the consolidated appropriations mea-
DOE nuclear contracts through the end of
sure compromised by providing approximately
2023. The bill did not pass, but a two-year
level funding of $577.0 million.
Price-Anderson extension for DOE contrac-
tors was included in the FY2005 defense
Whether progress on nuclear waste
authorization act (P.L. 108-375).
disposal and other congressional action will
revive the U.S. nuclear power industry’s
The September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks
growth will depend primarily on economic
on the United States raised questions about
considerations. Natural gas- and coal-fired
nuclear power plant security. Reactor security
power plants currently are favored over nu-
provisions were included in the conference
clear reactors for new generating capacity.
agreement on H.R. 6, as well as in a bill (S.
However, some electric utilities are seeking
1043) approved by the Senate Environment
approval of sites for possible new reactors.
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

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MOST RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
President Bush signed the Consolidated Appropriations Act for FY2005 on December
8 (P.L. 108-447), providing $513.3 million for Department of Energy (DOE) nuclear energy
research and development — including advanced reactors, fuel cycle technology, nuclear
hydrogen production, and facility management. That funding level is about $100 million
above the FY2004 appropriation and the Administration’s request.
The Administration proposed an $880 million budget for DOE’s civilian nuclear waste
program for FY2005, a 50% increase. The Administration also proposed that $749 million
of the FY2005 waste program budget be offset by a longstanding fee on nuclear power, so
that the net appropriation would be only $131 million. Because legislation to enact the
proposed offset did not pass, the House voted to provide only the requested $131 million net
appropriation in the FY2005 Energy and Water Development appropriations bill (H.R.
4614). Disagreement over nuclear waste stymied Senate action on the energy and water
funding bill, and conferees on the consolidated appropriations measure compromised by
providing approximately level funding of $577.0 million.
Nuclear waste program officials announced November 22 that submission of a license
application for DOE’s planned Yucca Mountain, Nevada, waste repository would be delayed
until 2005. The delay follows a July 9 ruling by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia Circuit that overturned a key aspect of the Environmental Protection Agency’s
(EPA’s) regulations for the planned repository. The three-judge panel ruled that the 10,000-
year compliance period was too short, but it rejected several other challenges to the rules.
EPA is currently revising the regulations to comply with the court decision.
DOE announced November 4 that it would award $13 million to help two industry
consortia pursue combined construction and operating licenses for new nuclear power plants.
The proposed license applications would be the first for new U.S. nuclear power plants in
more than 25 years. However, the consortia are not committing to construct the plants if the
licenses are granted.
A two-year extension of Price-Anderson Act liability coverage for DOE nuclear
contractors was included in the FY2005 defense authorization bill (P.L. 108-375) signed by
the President October 28.
BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS
Overview of Nuclear Power in the United States
The U.S. nuclear power industry, while currently generating about 20% of the nation’s
electricity, faces an uncertain long-term future. No nuclear plants have been ordered in the
United States since 1978 and more than 100 reactors have been canceled, including all
ordered after 1973. No units are currently under active construction; the Tennessee Valley
Authority’s (TVA’s) Watts Bar 1 reactor, ordered in 1970 and licensed to operate in 1996,
was the most recent U.S. nuclear unit to be completed. The nuclear power industry’s
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troubles include high nuclear power plant construction costs, public concern about nuclear
safety and waste disposal, and regulatory compliance costs.
High construction costs are perhaps the most serious obstacle to nuclear power
expansion. Construction costs for reactors completed since the mid-1980s ranged from $2-
$6 billion, averaging more than $3,000 per kilowatt of electric generating capacity (in 1997
dollars). The nuclear industry predicts that new plant designs could be built for less than half
that amount if many identical plants were built in a series, but such economies of scale have
yet to be demonstrated.
Nevertheless, all is not bleak for the U.S. nuclear power industry, which currently
comprises 103 licensed reactors at 65 plant sites in 31 states. (That number excludes TVA’s
Browns Ferry 1, which has not operated since 1985; the TVA Board decided May 16, 2002,
to spend about $1.8 billion to restart the reactor by 2007.) Electricity production from U.S.
nuclear power plants is greater than that from oil, natural gas, and hydropower, and behind
only coal, which accounts for more than half of U.S. electricity generation. Nuclear plants
generate more than half the electricity in six states. The 797 billion kilowatt-hours of nuclear
electricity generated in the United States during 2003 was more than the nation’s entire
electrical output in 1963, when the first of today’s large-scale commercial reactors were
being ordered.
Average operating costs of U.S. nuclear plants dropped substantially during the past
decade, and costly downtime has been steadily reduced. Licensed commercial reactors
generated electricity at an average of more than 87% of their total capacity in 2003,
according to industry statistics.1
Thirty commercial reactors have received 20-year license extensions from the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission (NRC), giving them up to 60 years of operation. License extensions
for 16 more reactors are currently under review, and many others are anticipated, according
to NRC (see website at [http://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/licensing/renewal/
applications.html]).
Industry consolidation could also help existing nuclear power plants, as larger nuclear
operators purchase plants from utilities that run only one or two reactors. Several such sales
have occurred, including the March 2001 sale of the Millstone plant in Connecticut to
Dominion Energy for a record $1.28 billion. The merger of two of the nation’s largest
nuclear utilities, PECO Energy and Unicom, completed in October 2000, consolidated the
operation of 17 reactors under a single corporate entity, Exelon Corporation.
Existing nuclear power plants appear to hold a strong position in the ongoing
restructuring of the electricity industry. In most cases, nuclear utilities have received
favorable regulatory treatment of past construction costs, and average nuclear operating costs
are currently estimated to be competitive with those of fossil fuel technologies.2 Although
1 “2003 Nuclear Generation Would Have Been Record — in 2000,” Nucleonics Week, February 12,
2004, p. 1.
2 Energy Information Administration. Nuclear Power: 12 percent of America’s Generating
(continued...)
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eight U.S. nuclear reactors were permanently shut down during the 1990s, none has been
closed since 1998, and recent reactor sales could indicate greater industry interest in nuclear
plants that previously had been considered marginal. Despite the shutdowns, annual U.S.
nuclear electrical output increased by about one-third from 1990 to 2003, according to the
Energy Information Administration. The increase resulted primarily from reduced downtime
at the remaining plants, the startup of five new units, and reactor modifications to boost
capacity.
A spike in fossil fuel prices and shortages of electricity during 2000-2001 helped
encourage at least three nuclear operating companies to consider building new commercial
nuclear reactors. Entergy, Dominion Resources, and Exelon have chosen sites in
Mississippi, Virginia, and Illinois, respectively, for possible future nuclear units and filed
early site permit applications with NRC (see [http://www.nrc.gov/reactors/new-licensing/
esp.html]) in fall 2003. The Department of Energy (DOE) is assisting the site-selection
efforts as part of a program to encourage construction of new commercial reactors by 2010.
A conference agreement reached November 17, 2003, on omnibus energy legislation
(H.R. 6) would have provided tax credits for electricity produced from as much as 6,000
megawatts of new nuclear generating capacity and authorized about $1.1 billion for a
demonstration reactor in Idaho to produce both electricity and hydrogen. The House
approved the conference report November 18, 2003, but a Senate filibuster blocked further
action.
Global warming that may be caused by fossil fuels — the “greenhouse effect” — is
cited by nuclear power supporters as an important reason to develop a new generation of
reactors. An air pollution bill introduced April 9, 2003, by Senator Carper (S. 843) would
have provided potentially valuable emissions allowances to owners of incremental nuclear
power capacity. On May 19, 2003, New Hampshire became the first state to provide
emissions credits for incremental nuclear generating capacity. But the large obstacles noted
above must still be overcome before electric generating companies will risk ordering new
nuclear units. (For more on the outlook for nuclear power, see CRS Report RL31064,
Nuclear Power: Prospects for New Commercial Reactors.)
Nuclear Power Research and Development
For nuclear energy research and development — including advanced reactors, fuel cycle
technology, and nuclear hydrogen production — Congress appropriated $513.3 million for
FY2005, about $100 million above the Administration’s request and the FY2004
appropriation. The total includes $124.3 million from Other Defense Activities and Naval
Reactors for management of the Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory
(INEEL), which is being transferred to the nuclear energy program from DOE’s
environmental management program. (FY2005 figures do not include an 0.8% across-the-
board reduction.)
2 (...continued)
Capacity, 20 percent of the Electricity. July 17, 2003. See [http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/nuclear/
page/analysis/nuclearpower.html].
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“The benefits of nuclear power as a clean, reliable, and affordable source of energy are
a key to economic and environmental underpinnings of the U.S.,” according to DOE’s budget
justification. However, opponents have criticized DOE’s nuclear research program as
providing wasteful subsidies to an industry that they believe should be phased out as
unacceptably hazardous and economically uncompetitive.
In urging a funding increase, the House Appropriations Committee had declared the
Administration’s request inadequate to achieve DOE’s stated goal of transforming INEEL
— to be renamed Idaho National Laboratory — into the nation’s leading center for nuclear
power research.
Within the nuclear energy budget, the Consolidated Appropriations Act for FY2005
(P.L. 108-447) provides $50.0 million for the Nuclear Power 2010 program, which “is
focused on resolving the technical, institutional, and regulatory barriers to the deployment
of new nuclear power plants by 2010,” according to the DOE budget justification. The
Administration had sought $10.2 million for the program, about half the FY2004
appropriation and a third of the FY2003 level.
According to the DOE budget justification, the Nuclear Power 2010 program “will
enable an industry decision by 2005 to deploy at least one new advanced nuclear power plant
in the U.S.” The initiative includes site approval, reactor design certification, license
applications, detailed design work, and development of improved construction techniques.
DOE will pay up to half the cost of these activities. The program is currently helping three
utilities seek NRC approval for potential nuclear reactor sites in Illinois, Mississippi, and
Virginia.
The next stage of the Nuclear Power 2010 program will test the “one step” licensing
process for new nuclear power plants established by the Energy Policy Act of 1992 (P.L.
102-486). Under the new licensing process, NRC would issue a combined construction and
operating license (COL) for a new nuclear power plant before construction began, rather
issuing only a construction permit first and then an operating license after the plant had been
built. As discussed in the next section, the legislation establishing COLs drew strong
opposition from nuclear critics. Three industry consortia applied to DOE in March and April
of 2004 for funding of 50% of their COL costs:
! Dominion Resources is leading a consortium that is seeking $250 million
over six years for a COL for an advanced Canadian-designed ACR-700
reactor. The proposed reactor would be located at Dominion’s existing
North Anna plant in Virginia, where the company is seeking an NRC early
site permit (ESP) with DOE assistance. The $500 million total cost would
include “first of a kind” design and engineering work, to the level of detail
necessary for firm construction cost estimates.
! A consortium called NuStart Energy Development, which includes Exelon
and several other major nuclear utilities, is requesting $400 million over
seven years for a COL for “passively safe” Westinghouse or General Electric
reactor designs. Various sites are under consideration, including two in the
ESP program. First-of-a-kind design cost are included in the $800 million
estimate.
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! TVA is leading a consortium that requested $2 million to study the
feasibility of building a General Electric Advanced Boiling Water Reactor
(ABWR) at the site of TVA’s uncompleted Bellefonte nuclear plant in
Alabama. Because the ABWR already has received NRC standard design
certification and has been constructed in other countries, first-of-a-kind
design work would not be needed.
According to news reports, the Dominion team will receive an initial DOE award of $9
million, NuStart will be granted $4 million, and, for the ABWR feasibility study, TVA will
receive more than $2 million.3 However, members of the various consortia have stressed that
they are not making a commitment to construct a new reactor, even if they receive a COL.
The House Appropriations Committee had voted to cut the Nuclear Power 2010
program to $5.0 million in FY2005, contending that NRC should not issue new reactor
licenses “in the absence of a repository for spent nuclear fuel.” As discussed in a later
section, the Administration’s funding request for DOE’s waste repository program created
considerable friction with the House Appropriations panel and contributed to the absence of
a Senate markup.
The Consolidated Appropriations Act includes $40.0 million for the Generation IV
Nuclear Energy Systems Initiative, which focuses on more-advanced reactors that could be
deployed in the longer term. The conference level is about the same as the amount approved
by the House and $10 million above the Administration request.
The Generation IV program is focusing on six advanced designs that could be deployed
after 2010: two gas-cooled, one water-cooled, two liquid-metal-cooled, and one molten-salt
concept. Some of these reactors would use plutonium recovered through reprocessing of
spent nuclear fuel. The Administration’s May 2001 National Energy Policy report contends
that plutonium recovery could reduce the long-term environmental impact of nuclear waste
disposal and increase domestic energy supplies. However, opponents contend that the
separation of plutonium from spent fuel poses unacceptable environmental risks and, because
of plutonium’s potential use in nuclear bombs, undermines U.S. policy on nuclear weapons
proliferation.
The development of plutonium-fueled reactors in the Generation IV program is closely
related to the nuclear energy program’s Advanced Fuel Cycle Initiative (AFCI), for which
Congress provided $68.0 million for FY2005 — about the same as the FY2004 level and the
amount approved by the House. The Administration had proposed cutting the program to
$46.3 million. According to the budget justification, AFCI will “develop advanced,
proliferation-resistant nuclear fuel cycle technologies” that could reduce the long-term hazard
of spent nuclear fuel and recover additional energy. Such technologies would involve
separation of plutonium, uranium, and other long-lived radioactive materials from spent fuel
for re-use in a nuclear reactor or for transmutation in a particle accelerator. The program
3 Harrison, Tom. “Two Reactor Consortia Awarded DOE Funding.” NuclearFuel. November 8,
2004. p. 1.
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includes longstanding DOE work on electrometallurgical treatment of spent fuel from the
Experimental Breeder Reactor II (EBR-II) at INEEL.
In support of President Bush’s program to develop hydrogen-fueled vehicles, DOE
requested $9.0 million in FY2005 for the Nuclear Hydrogen Initiative, nearly a 50% increase
from the FY2004 level. The full funding request was approved. According to DOE’s budget
justification, the program will investigate the use of high-temperature nuclear reactors to
make hydrogen from water in a thermochemical process. According to DOE, “preliminary
estimates . . . indicate that hydrogen produced using nuclear-driven thermochemical or high-
temperature electrolysis processes would be only slightly more expensive than gasoline” and
result in far less air pollution.
An advanced reactor that would demonstrate co-production of hydrogen and electricity
— the Next Generation Nuclear Plant (NGNP) — is allocated $25.0 million from DOE’s
Generation IV program by the final FY2005 funding bill. “The conferees expect the
Department to submit a budget in fiscal year 2006 that is consistent with the goal of
demonstrating hydrogen production and electricity generation by 2015 at the Idaho National
Laboratory,” according to the statement of managers of the conference committee.
DOE sought no new funding specifically for the Nuclear Energy Research Initiative
(NERI), which provides grants for research on innovative nuclear energy technologies.
Instead, according to the budget justification, NERI projects were to be pursued at the
discretion of individual nuclear R&D programs. NERI received an appropriation of $11
million for FY2004. New funding also was not requested for the Nuclear Energy Plant
Optimization program (NEPO), which received $2.9 million in FY2004. The program
supports cost-shared research by the nuclear power industry on ways to improve the
productivity of existing nuclear plants. Although the House Appropriations Committee
agreed to provide no new funding for NERI and NEPO, the final bill included $2.5 million
for each program.
Nuclear Power Plant Safety and Regulation
Safety
Controversy over safety has dogged nuclear power throughout its development,
particularly following the March 1979 Three Mile Island accident in Pennsylvania and the
April 1986 Chernobyl disaster in the former Soviet Union. In the United States, safety-relat-
ed shortcomings have been identified in the construction quality of some plants, plant
operation and maintenance, equipment reliability, emergency planning, and other areas. In
a relatively recent example, it was discovered in March 2002 that leaking boric acid had
eaten a large cavity in the top of the reactor vessel in Ohio’s Davis-Besse nuclear plant. The
corrosion left only the vessel’s quarter-inch-thick stainless steel inner liner to prevent a
potentially catastrophic loss of reactor cooling water. Davis-Besse remained closed for
repairs and other safety improvements until NRC allowed the reactor to restart in March
2004.
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NRC’s oversight of the nuclear industry is an ongoing issue; nuclear utilities often
complain that they are subject to overly rigorous and inflexible regulation, but nuclear critics
charge that NRC frequently relaxes safety standards when compliance may prove difficult
or costly to the industry.
Domestic Reactor Safety. In terms of public health consequences, the safety record
of the U.S. nuclear power industry in comparison with other major commercial energy
technologies has been excellent. In more than 2,500 reactor-years of operation in the United
States, the only incident at a commercial power plant that might lead to any deaths or injuries
to the public has been the Three Mile Island accident, in which more than half the reactor
core melted. Public exposure to radioactive materials released during that accident is
expected to cause fewer than five deaths (and perhaps none) from cancer over the following
30 years. A study of 32,000 people living within 5 miles of the reactor when the accident
occurred found no significant increase in cancer rates through 1998, although the authors
note that some potential health effects “cannot be definitively excluded.”4
The relatively small amounts of radioactivity released by nuclear plants during normal
operation are not generally believed to pose significant hazards, although some groups
contend that routine emissions are risky. There is substantial scientific uncertainty about the
level of risk posed by low levels of radiation exposure; as with many carcinogens and other
hazardous substances, health effects can be clearly measured only at relatively high exposure
levels. In the case of radiation, the assumed risk of low-level exposure has been extrapolated
mostly from health effects documented among persons exposed to high levels of radiation,
particularly Japanese survivors of nuclear bombing in World War II.
The consensus among most safety experts is that a severe nuclear power plant accident
in the United States is likely to occur less frequently than once every 10,000 reactor-years
of operation. (For the current U.S. fleet of about 100 reactors, that rate would yield an
average of one severe accident every 100 years.) These experts believe that most severe
accidents would have small public health impacts, and that accidents causing as many as 100
deaths would be much rarer than once every 10,000 reactor-years. On the other hand, some
experts challenge the complex calculations that go into predicting such accident frequencies,
contending that accidents with serious public health consequences may be more frequent.
Reactor Safety in the Former Soviet Bloc. The Chernobyl accident was by far
the worst nuclear power plant accident to have occurred anywhere in the world. At least 31
persons died quickly from acute radiation exposure or other injuries, and thousands of
additional cancer deaths among the tens of millions of people exposed to radiation from the
accident may occur during the next several decades.
According to a 2002 report by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD), the primary observable health consequence of the accident has been
a dramatic increase in childhood thyroid cancer. About 1,000 cases of childhood thyroid
cancer were reported in certain regions surrounding the destroyed reactor — a rate that is as
4 Talbott, Evelyn O., et al. “Long Term Follow-Up of the Residents of the Three Mile Island
Accident Area: 1979-1998.” Environmental Health Perspectives. Published online October 30,
2002. [http://ehp.niehs.nih.gov/docs/2003/5662/abstract.html]
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much as a hundred times the pre-accident level, according to OECD. The death rate for
accident cleanup workers also rose measurably, the organization reported. The OECD report
estimated that about 50,000 square miles of land in Belarus, Ukraine, and Russia were
substantially contaminated with radioactive cesium from Chernobyl.5
Licensing and Regulation
For many years a top priority of the nuclear industry was to modify the process for
licensing new nuclear plants. No electric utility would consider ordering a nuclear power
plant, according to the industry, unless licensing became quicker and more predictable, and
designs were less subject to mid-construction safety-related changes required by NRC. The
Energy Policy Act of 1992 (P.L. 102-486) largely implemented the industry’s licensing goals,
but no plants have been ordered.
Nuclear plant licensing under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (P.L. 83-703; U.S.C.
2011-2282) had historically been a two-stage process. NRC first issued a construction permit
to build a plant, and then, after construction was finished, an operating permit to run it. Each
stage of the licensing process involved complicated proceedings. Environmental impact
statements also are required under the National Environmental Policy Act.
Over the vehement objections of nuclear opponents, the Energy Policy Act provides a
clear statutory basis for one-step nuclear licenses, which would combine the construction
permits and operating licenses and allow completed plants to operate without delay if
construction criteria are met. NRC would hold preoperational hearings on the adequacy of
plant construction only in specified circumstances. DOE’s Nuclear Power 2010 initiative
(discussed above) proposes to pay up to half the cost of at least one combined construction
and operating license for an advanced reactor.
A fundamental concern in the nuclear regulatory debate is the performance of NRC in
issuing and enforcing nuclear safety regulations. The nuclear industry and its supporters have
regularly complained that unnecessarily stringent and inflexibly enforced nuclear safety
regulations have burdened nuclear utilities and their customers with excessive costs. But
many environmentalists, nuclear opponents, and other groups charge NRC with being too
close to the nuclear industry, a situation that they say has resulted in lax oversight of nuclear
power plants and routine exemptions from safety requirements.
Primary responsibility for nuclear safety compliance lies with nuclear plant owners, who
are required to find any problems with their plants and report them to NRC. Compliance is
also monitored directly by NRC, which maintains at least two resident inspectors at each
nuclear power plant. The resident inspectors routinely examine plant systems, observe the
performance of reactor personnel, and prepare regular inspection reports. For serious safety
violations, NRC often dispatches special inspection teams to plant sites.
In response to congressional criticism, NRC has begun reorganizing and overhauling
many of its procedures. The Commission is moving toward “risk-informed regulation,” in
5 OECD Nuclear Energy Agency. Chernobyl: Assessment of Radiological and Health Impacts.
2002.
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which safety enforcement is guided by the relative risks identified by detailed individual
plant studies. NRC began implementing a new reactor oversight system April 2, 2000, that
relies on a series of performance indicators to determine the level of scrutiny that each
reactor should receive. However, the Union of Concerned Scientists has questioned the
validity of the individual plant studies on which risk-informed regulation is based.
Reactor Security
Nuclear power plants have long been recognized as potential targets of terrorist attacks,
and critics have long questioned the adequacy of the measures required of nuclear plant
operators to defend against such attacks. All commercial nuclear power plants licensed by
NRC have a series of physical barriers to accessing the operating reactor area, and are
required to maintain a trained security force to protect them. Following the September 11,
2001, terrorist attacks NRC activated its Emergency Response Center and advised all plant
operators to go to the highest level of security alert. It also began a “top-to-bottom” review
of its security requirements.
A key element in protecting nuclear plants is the requirement that simulated terrorist
attack exercises, monitored by NRC, be carried out to test the ability of the plant operator to
defend against them. The severity of attacks to be prepared for are specified in the form of
a “design basis threat” (DBT). After more than a year’s review, on April 29, 2003, NRC
changed the DBT to “represent the largest reasonable threat against which a regulated private
guard force should be expected to defend under existing law.” The details of the revised
DBT were not released to the public.
Several legislative proposals have been introduced in the 108th Congress, and one, the
Nuclear Infrastructure Security Act of 2003 (S. 1043) was reported out on May 15, 2003, by
the Senate Environment and Public Works Committee. The conference report on omnibus
energy legislation, H.R. 6, would have required a presidential study of security threats to
nuclear facilities and periodic “force on force” security exercises. (For details see CRS
Report RS21131, Nuclear Power Plants: Vulnerability to Terrorist Attack.)
Decommissioning
When nuclear power plants end their useful lives, they must be safely removed from
service, a process called decommissioning. NRC requires nuclear utilities to make regular
contributions to special trust funds to ensure that money is available to remove radioactive
material and contamination from reactor sites after they are closed. Because no full-sized
U.S. commercial reactor has yet been completely decommissioned, which can take several
decades, the cost of the process can only be estimated. Decommissioning cost estimates
cited by a 1996 DOE report, for one full-sized commercial reactor, ranged from about $150
million to $600 million in 1995 dollars. Disposal of large amounts of low-level waste,
consisting of contaminated reactor components, concrete, and other materials, is expected
to account for much of those costs.
Consolidation of the nuclear industry has raised questions about the tax treatment of
decommissioning funds when a commercial reactor is sold. The conference report on H.R.
6 specified that dedicated nuclear decommissioning funds could be transferred to new reactor
owners without incurring additional tax liabilities. The provision was also included in a
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foreign sales tax bill (S. 1637) approved by the Senate May 11, 2004, but was dropped from
the final version.
Nuclear Accident Liability
Liability for damages to the general public from nuclear incidents is addressed by the
Price-Anderson Act (primarily Section 170 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 42 U.S.C.
2210). The act was up for reauthorization on August 1, 2002, and it was extended for
commercial reactors through December 31, 2003, by the FY2003 omnibus continuing
resolution (P.L. 108-7). Even without an extension, existing reactors would continue to
operate under the current Price-Anderson liability system, but new reactors would not be
covered. Price-Anderson coverage for DOE nuclear contractors was extended through
December 31, 2004, by the National Defense Authorization Act for FY2003 (P.L. 107-314).
A further two-year extension for DOE contractors was approved by Congress on October 9,
2004, as part of the Ronald W. Reagan National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2005 (P.L. 108-375).
Under Price-Anderson, the owners of commercial reactors must assume all liability for
nuclear damages awarded to the public by the court system, and they must waive most of
their legal defenses following a severe radioactive release (“extraordinary nuclear
occurrence”). To pay any such damages, each licensed reactor must carry financial
protection in the amount of the maximum liability insurance available, which was increased
by the insurance industry from $200 million to $300 million on January 1, 2003. Any
damages exceeding that amount are to be assessed equally against all covered commercial
reactors, up to $95.8 million per reactor (most recently adjusted for inflation on August 20,
2003). Those assessments — called “retrospective premiums” — would be paid at an annual
rate of no more than $10 million per reactor, to limit the potential financial burden on reactor
owners following a major accident. Including two that are not operating, 105 commercial
reactors are currently covered by the Price-Anderson retrospective premium requirement.
For each nuclear incident, the Price-Anderson liability system currently would provide
up to $10.9 billion in public compensation. That total includes the $300 million in insurance
coverage carried by the reactor that suffered the incident, plus the $95.8 million in
retrospective premiums from each of the 105 currently covered reactors, totaling $10.4
billion. On top of those payments, a 5% surcharge may also be imposed, raising the total
per-reactor retrospective premium to $100.6 million and the total available compensation to
about $10.9 billion. Under Price-Anderson, the nuclear industry’s liability for an incident
is capped at that amount, which varies depending on the number of covered reactors, the
amount of available insurance, and an inflation adjustment that is made every five years.
Payment of any damages above that liability limit would require congressional approval
under special procedures in the act.
The Price-Anderson Act also covers contractors who operate hazardous DOE nuclear
facilities. The liability limit for DOE contractors is the same as for commercial reactors,
excluding the 5% surcharge, except when the limit for commercial reactors drops because
of a decline in the number of covered reactors. Because the most recent adjustments have
raised the commercial reactor liability limit to a record high, the liability limit for DOE
contractors is currently the same as the commercial limit, minus the surcharge, or $10.4
billion. Price-Anderson authorizes DOE to indemnify its contractors for the entire amount,
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so that damage payments for nuclear incidents at DOE facilities would ultimately come from
the Treasury. However, the law also allows DOE to fine its contractors for safety violations,
and contractor employees and directors can face criminal penalties for “knowingly and
willfully” violating nuclear safety rules.
Extending the Price-Anderson Act is a key provision in the current omnibus energy bill,
H.R. 6. The conferees on H.R. 6 approved a Price-Anderson extension for commercial
reactors and DOE contractors through December 31, 2023. The total retrospective premium
for each reactor would be set at the current level of $95.8 million and the limit on per-reactor
annual payments raised to $15 million, with both to be adjusted for inflation every five years.
For the purposes of those payment limits, a nuclear plant consisting of multiple small
reactors (100-300 megawatts, up to a total of 1,300 megawatts) would be considered a single
reactor. Therefore, a power plant with six 120-megawatt pebble-bed modular reactors would
be liable for retrospective premiums of up to $95.8 million, rather than $574.8 million. The
liability limit on DOE contractors would be set at $10 billion per accident, also to be adjusted
for inflation, under the conference agreement.
Although DOE is generally authorized to impose civil penalties on its contractors for
violations of nuclear safety regulations, Atomic Energy Act §234A specifically exempts
seven non-profit DOE contractors and their subcontractors. Under the same section, DOE
automatically remits any civil penalties imposed on non-profit educational institutions
serving as DOE contractors. The conference agreement on H.R. 6 would eliminate the civil
penalty exemption for future contracts by the seven listed non-profit contractors and DOE’s
authority to automatically remit penalties imposed on all non-profit educational institutions
serving as contractors. However, the bill would limit the civil penalties against a non-profit
contractor to the amount of management fees paid under that contract.
The House-passed version of H.R. 6 would have authorized the federal government to
sue DOE contractors to recover at least some of the compensation that the government had
paid for any accident caused by intentional DOE contractor management misconduct. Such
cost recovery would have been limited to the amount of the contractor’s profit under the
contract involved, and no recovery would be allowed from nonprofit contractors. However,
the conference agreement does not include that provision. The conferees did include a House
provision to prohibit Price-Anderson indemnification of contracts related to nuclear facilities
in countries found to sponsor terrorism.
The Price-Anderson Act’s limits on liability were crucial in establishing the commercial
nuclear power industry in the 1950s. Supporters of the Price-Anderson system contend that
it has worked well since that time in ensuring that nuclear accident victims would have a
secure source of compensation, at little cost to the taxpayer. However, opponents contend
that Price-Anderson subsidizes the nuclear power industry by protecting it from some of the
financial consequences of the most severe conceivable accidents.
Because no new U.S. reactors are currently planned, missing the deadline for extension
will have little short-term effect on the nuclear power industry. However, any new DOE
contracts signed during Price-Anderson expiration would have to use alternate
indemnification authority.
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Nuclear Waste Management
One of the most controversial aspects of nuclear power is the disposal of radioactive
waste, which can remain hazardous for thousands of years. Each nuclear reactor produces
an annual average of about 20 tons of highly radioactive spent nuclear fuel and 50-200 cubic
meters of low-level radioactive waste. Upon decommissioning, contaminated reactor
components are also disposed of as low-level waste.
The federal government is responsible for permanent disposal of commercial spent fuel
(paid for with a fee on nuclear power) and federally generated radioactive waste, while states
have the authority to develop disposal facilities for commercial low-level waste. Spent fuel
and other highly radioactive waste is to be isolated in a deep underground repository,
consisting of a large network of tunnels carved from rock that has remained geologically
undisturbed for hundreds of thousands of years.
The Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 (NWPA, P.L. 97-425) as amended, names
Nevada’s Yucca Mountain as the sole candidate site for a national geologic repository.
Following the recommendation of Energy Secretary Abraham, President Bush on February
15, 2002, recommended to Congress that DOE submit an application to NRC to construct
the Yucca Mountain repository. As allowed by NWPA, Nevada Governor Guinn submitted
a “notice of disapproval” (or “state veto”) to Congress April 8, 2002. The state veto would
have blocked repository construction at Yucca Mountain if a congressional resolution
approving the site had not been enacted within 90 days of continuous session. The House
passed a Yucca Mountain approval resolution (H.J.Res. 87) on May 8, 2002, by a 306-117
vote. The Senate approved the resolution by voice vote July 9 (following a 60-39 vote to
consider S.J.Res. 34, the Senate version of the resolution), and the President signed it July
24, 2002 (P.L. 107-200).
The Bush Administration proposed an FY2005 budget of $880 million for the DOE
civilian nuclear waste disposal program, a 50% boost over FY2004. The Administration also
proposed that $749 million of the program’s FY2005 spending be offset by the longstanding
nuclear waste fee on commercial reactors, so that the net appropriation would be only $131
million. The House Energy and Commerce Committee approved a bill (H.R. 3981) on June
24, 2004, to provide most of the Administration’s proposed funding offset. A bill introduced
November 4, 2003, by Representative Shimkus (H.R. 3429) would also change the budget
treatment of payments to the Nuclear Waste Fund so that they would offset appropriations
to the waste program.
Because legislation to enact the proposed nuclear waste funding offset did not pass,
however, the House voted to provide only the requested $131 million net appropriation in
the FY2005 Energy and Water Development Appropriations Bill (H.R. 4614). Disagreement
over nuclear waste funding has stymied Senate action on the funding measure. Ultimately,
conferees on the Consolidated Appropriations Act for FY2005 provided $577.0 million for
the nuclear waste program — approximately level funding from the previous year.
DOE contends that funding for the waste program must average $1.3 billion per year
between FY2005 and FY2010 to meet the current 2010 target date for shipping nuclear waste
to Yucca Mountain. According to a May 24, 2004, letter from DOE to the House
Appropriations Committee, a funding level of $131 million would have forced layoffs of
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70% of the program’s 2,400-person workforce and caused “an indefinite delay” in opening
the Yucca Mountain repository.
Nuclear waste program officials announced November 22, 2004, that submission of a
license application for the repository would be delayed until 2005. The delay follows a July
9. 2004, ruling by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit that
overturned a key aspect of the Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA’s) regulations for
the planned repository. The three-judge panel ruled that the 10,000-year compliance period
was too short, but it rejected several other challenges to the rules. EPA is currently revising
the regulations to comply with the court decision.
Further delays in the nuclear waste program could prove costly under a settlement
announced August 10, 2004, between the Department of Justice and Exelon Corporation,
which had filed a breach-of-contract suit over DOE’s failure to begin accepting spent fuel
by 1998 as required by NWPA. Under the settlement, Exelon is to be reimbursed from the
federal Judgment Fund for its spent fuel storage costs caused by the waste program delays.
Exelon estimates that it will receive $300 million if DOE begins accepting waste by 2010
as currently scheduled, and up to $600 million if waste acceptance does not begin until 2015.
Funding for the nuclear waste program comes from two sources. Under the FY2005
budget request, $749.0 million would have been appropriated from the Nuclear Waste Fund,
which consists of fees paid by nuclear utilities, and $131.0 million from the defense nuclear
waste disposal account, which pays for disposing of high-level waste from the nuclear
weapons program in the planned civilian repository. However, as noted above, the
Administration proposed that the $749 million appropriated from the Nuclear Waste Fund
be offset by nuclear waste fee collections. The Administration also proposed that DOE’s
Office of Radioactive Waste Management (OCRWM), which runs the Yucca Mountain
Project, take over management of DOE defense and research waste that is currently under
another program, bringing the total FY2005 funding request for OCRWM to $907.5 million.
However, those transfers were rejected.
(For further details, see CRS Issue Brief IB92059, Civilian Nuclear Waste Disposal.)
Federal Funding for Nuclear Energy Programs
The following tables summarize current funding for DOE nuclear fission programs and
NRC. The sources for the funding figures are Administration budget requests and committee
reports on the Energy and Water Development Appropriations Acts, which fund all the
nuclear programs. President Bush submitted his FY2005 funding request February 2, 2004.
The FY2005 Energy and Water Development Appropriations bill (H.R. 4614, H.Rept. 108-
554) was passed the House June 25, 2004. Disagreement over nuclear waste funding helped
block a Senate markup of the bill. Energy and Water funding was included in the
Consolidated Appropriations Act for FY2005 (P.L. 108-447).
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Table 1. Funding for the Nuclear Regulatory Commission
(budget authority* in millions of current dollars)
FY2003
FY2004
FY2005
FY2005
FY2005
Approp.
Approp.
Request
House
Final***
Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Reactor Safety
276.4
307.0
435.1
— **

Nuclear Materials Safety
60.0
65.8
100.3


Nuclear Waste Safety
70.4
72.3
118.1


International Nuclear Safety
5.2
5.8
9.2


Management and Support
165.8
167.9
— *


Inspector General
6.8
7.3
7.5
7.5
7.5
TOTAL NRC BUDGET
584.6
626.1
670.3
670.3
670.3
AUTHORITY
Offsetting fees
526.3
545.6
541.2
541.2
541.2
Net appropriation
58.3
80.5
129.2
129.2
129.2
* For the FY2005 request, management and support is divided among the functional program areas.
** Subcategories not specified.
*** Excludes 0.8% across-the-board reduction.
Table 2. DOE Funding for Nuclear Activities
(budget authority in millions of current dollars)
FY2003 FY2004
FY2005
FY2005
FY2005
Approp Approp
Request
House
Final***
Nuclear Energy (selected programs)
University Reactor Assistance
18.0
22.9
21.0
24.0
24.0
Nuclear Energy Plant Optimiz.
4.8
2.9
0
0
2.5
Nuclear Energy Research Initiative
17.4
6.6
0
0
2.5
Nuclear Power 2010
31.6
19.6
10.2
5.0
50.0
Generation IV Nuclear Systems
16.9
27.7
30.5
40.5
40.0
Nuclear Hydrogen Initiative
2.0
6.4
9.0
9.0
9.0
Advanced Fuel Cycle Initiative
57.3
66.7
46.3
68.0
68.0
Nuclear R&D Infrastructure*
104.1
111.7
112.8
114.3
114.3
Total, Nuclear Energy
375.4
404.8
412.6
463.8
513.3
Civilian Nuclear Waste
457.0
576.6
880.0
131.0
577.0
Disposal**
* Funded under “other defense activities.”
** Funded by a 1-mill-per-kilowatt-hour fee on nuclear power, plus appropriations for defense waste
disposal. Administration proposes direct offset of $749 million in FY2005, for net appropriation of
$131 million. Proposed transfers from other programs would increase FY2005 budget to $907.5
million.
*** Excludes 0.8% across-the-board reduction.
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LEGISLATION
H.R. 6 (Tauzin)
Includes extension of Price-Anderson Act nuclear liability system and reauthorization
of nuclear R&D programs. Introduced April 7, 2003; referred to multiple committees.
Incorporates H.R. 39, H.R. 238, H.R. 1531, H.R. 1644. Passed by House April 11, 2003, by
vote of 247-145. Senate version, with text of H.R. 4 from the 107th Congress, passed July
31, 2003, by vote of 84-14. Conference report passed House November 18, 2003. Senate
cloture motion failed, 57-40, on November 21, 2003.
H.R. 238 (Boehlert)
Energy Research, Development, Demonstration, and Commercial Application Act of
2003. Authorizes appropriations for nuclear energy research programs. Introduced January
8, 2003; referred to Committee on Science and Committee on Resources. Incorporated into
H.R. 6.
H.R. 330 (H. Wilson)
Price-Anderson Amendments Act of 2003. Extends Price-Anderson Act nuclear
accident liability system for 15 years and increases liability limits. Introduced January 8,
2003; referred to Committee on Energy and Commerce.
H.R. 1644 (Barton)
Energy Policy Act of 2003. Includes extension of Price-Anderson Act nuclear liability
system and reauthorization of nuclear R&D programs. Introduced April 7, 2003; referred
to multiple committees. Reported by Committee on Energy and Commerce April 8, 2003
(H.Rept. 108-65, Part 1).
H.R. 3429 (Shimkus)
Changes the funding mechanism for the Department of Energy Civilian Radioactive
Waste Management Program. Introduced November 4, 2003; referred to Committee on
Energy and Commerce. Subcommittee on Energy and Air Quality held hearing March 25,
2004.
H.R. 3981 (Barton)
Reclassifies fees paid into the Nuclear Waste Fund as offsetting collections. Introduced
March 17, 2004; referred to Committee on Energy and Commerce. Approved by Committee
June 24, 2004, by vote of 29-19 (H.Rept. 108-594).
H.R. 4614 (Hobson)
Energy and Water Development Appropriations for FY2005. Includes funding for
nuclear energy research and waste management. Ordered reported as an original measure by
House Committee on Appropriations June 18, 2004 (H.Rept. 108-554). Passed House June
25, 2004, by vote of 370-16. Included in Consolidated Appropriations Act for FY2005,
signed December 8, 2004 (P.L. 108-477).
S. 6 (Daschle)
Comprehensive Homeland Security Act of 2003. Includes provisions from S. 131 on
nuclear facility security. Introduced January 7, 2003; referred to Committee on Judiciary.
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S. 14 (Domenici)
Energy Policy Act of 2003. Provides federal assistance for new nuclear power plants,
authorizes nuclear research funding, and extends Price-Anderson Act indefinitely.
Introduced April 30, 2003; placed on Senate calendar. Identical to S. 1005, reported by
Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee May 6, 2003 (S.Rept. 108-43). Senate
debate began May 6, 2003.
S. 131 (Reid)
Nuclear Security Act of 2003. Requires the federal government to study a wide variety
of security threats to nuclear facilities and determine which threats would come from
enemies of the United States and therefore be the responsibility of the federal government
and which threats should be guarded against by nuclear power plant owners. NRC would be
required to review the security and emergency response plans at all nuclear power plants and
other major nuclear facilities. An NRC employee is to be stationed at each nuclear facility
as a “federal security coordinator.” Introduced January 9, 3003; referred to Committee on
Environment and Public Works.
S. 156 (Voinovich)
Price-Anderson Amendments Act of 2003. Extends Price-Anderson Act nuclear
liability coverage for new commercial nuclear power plants through August 1, 2012.
Introduced January 14, 2003; referred to Committee on Environment and Public Works.
Ordered reported by committee April 9, 2003; amended to include nuclear power plant
security provisions.
S. 843 (Carper)
Clean Air Planning Act of 2003. Provides emissions allowances for incremental
nuclear power capacity. Introduced April 9, 2003; referred to Committee on Environment
and Public Works.
S. 1043 (Inhofe)
Nuclear Infrastructure Security Act of 2003. Requires NRC to issue new regulations
for “design basis threat” that nuclear power plant security must be able to defeat. Introduced
May 12, 2003; referred to Committee on Environment and Public Works. Ordered reported
May 15, 2003.
S. 2095 (Domenici)
Includes same extension of Price-Anderson Act nuclear liability system as in H.R. 6
conference report. Introduced February 12, 2004, and placed on the Senate legislative
calendar.
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