Order Code IB10012
CRS Issue Brief for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
Intelligence Issues for Congress
Updated December 9, 2004
Richard A. Best, Jr.
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

CONTENTS
SUMMARY
MOST RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS
International Terrorism
Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
CIA and the Israeli-Palestinian Situation
The Intelligence Community and Iraq
The Intelligence Community and Missile Defense
Kosovo/Operation Allied Force
The 9/11 Investigations
Counterintelligence
LEGISLATION
FOR ADDITIONAL READING


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Intelligence Issues for Congress
SUMMARY
The U.S. Intelligence Community contin-
Intelligence Community leadership and
ues to adjust to the 21st Century environment.
congressional committees have expressed
Congressional and executive branch initiatives
determination to enhance analytical capabili-
have emphasized improved cooperation
ties. A major concern is an imbalance be-
among the different agencies that comprise the
tween resources devoted to collection and
Community by giving greater coordination
those allocated to analysis, with collected data
and managerial authority to the Director of
much exceeding analytical capabilities.
Central Intelligence (DCI). The 9/11 Com-
mission recommended that a new position of
In several regional crisis areas, the role of
National Intelligence Director with even more
the U.S. Intelligence Community is especially
extensive authorities be established. Congress
important. Provisions for U.S. intelligence to
passed intelligence reorganization legislation,
monitor security arrangements between Israe-
S. 2845, on December 7-8, 2004.
lis and Palestinians have been a factor in
efforts to resolve Middle East tensions. Intel-
Growing concerns about transnational
ligence efforts have also been important in
threats, especially terrorism, are leading to
monitoring peace agreements in Bosnia.
increasingly close cooperation between intelli-
gence and law enforcement agencies. The
Intelligence support to military opera-
September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, for
tions continues to be a major responsibility of
which no specific warning was provided, have
intelligence agencies. Intelligence agencies
led to increased emphasis on human intelli-
contributed to the highly effective use of
gence, statutory changes permitting closer
precision-guided munitions during Operation
cooperation between law enforcement and
Iraqi Freedom, but intelligence on Iraqi weap-
intelligence agencies, and to consideration of
ons of mass destruction was to some extent
organizational changes to the Intelligence
inaccurate.
Community.
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

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MOST RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
On December 7, the House passed the Intelligence Reform Act (S. 2845) after several
months of consideration and a lengthy conference. The Senate followed suit on the
following day. The legislation encompasses many of the recommendations of the 9/11
Commission and makes significant structural changes in the Intelligence Community and
creates the position of Director of National Intelligence separate from the Director of the
CIA.
Also on December 7, the House passed the Intelligence Authorization Act for FY2005
(H.R. 4548). The Senate passed the bill on December 8.
BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS
The end of the Cold War, now over a decade past, continues to reverberate throughout
the United States Intelligence Community. After the beginning of the George H.W. Bush
Administration, intelligence agencies have been reduced in size (reportedly by some 30%)
and priorities shifted away from the Soviet Union and its erstwhile allies. Yet the post-Cold
War world has its own complexities — political, economic, and technological — that
continue to require the attention of intelligence agencies. The attacks on the World Trade
Center and the Pentagon on September 11, 2001, dramatically demonstrated the changed
nature of threats facing the United States. Although its budgets have been substantially
increased in recent years, the Intelligence Community continues to be challenged by the
variety of topics on which information is needed, changing technologies that may limit
success in acquiring information, and, not least, by temporary and not-so-temporary needs
for expertise in many different foreign languages.
Changes in the nature of the world beyond U.S. borders, the focus of U.S. intelligence
agencies, have required a shift in the purposes and goals of the Intelligence Community.
Gone is the relentless focus on Soviet submarines, missile silos, and conventional military
capabilities; new threats include terrorism, transfers of weapons of mass destruction (WMD),
and political, ethnic, and social upheavals in a variety of regions. Gone also is the massive
military infrastructure of the Soviet Union that could be observed by overhead imagery
platforms. Intelligence agents must now be able to move beyond contacts with foreign
government officials and tap into political sects and terrorist cells often having no perceptible
infrastructure.
As a result, some observers believe that intelligence agencies may be in for a period of
transition and adaptation exceeding the one that immediately followed the dissolution of the
Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact. In particular, it is argued that the three major “INTs,”
the major intelligence disciplines — signals intelligence (sigint), imagery intelligence
(imint), and human intelligence (humint) — will have to be fundamentally reinvented and
this process will have major technical and organizational ramifications. There will have to
evolve, it is further argued, a coherent community-wide managerial structure that will respect
the varied and changing needs of military and civilian intelligence consumers while keeping
costs within bounds and avoiding unnecessary duplication of effort. Making some of these
changes may not save money, and may even require budgetary growth.
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The events of September 11, 2001, persuaded many observers that there may a need for
a wide-ranging review of the organizational structure of the Intelligence Community. Media
reports in early November 2001 indicated that a review of the Intelligence Community by an
Administration panel, headed by former National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft, would
recommend transferring three major intelligence agencies to the direct control of the DCI and
separating the DCI from day-to-day management of the CIA. The conferees on the FY2002
intelligence authorization bill indicated their conclusion that “today’s intelligence structure
is not suitable to address current and future challenges.” The two intelligence committees
at the conclusion of the Joint Inquiry into the 9/11 attacks recommended the creation of
Cabinet-level intelligence position without managerial responsibilities for the CIA.
(Recommendations of the Final Report of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and
the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence Joint Inquiry into the Terrorist
Attacks of September 11, 2001
, December 10, 2002, pp. 1-2.)
On July 22, 2004, the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United
States (the 9/11 Commission) issued its Final Report detailing the efforts of intelligence
agencies prior to the attacks of September 11, 2001. In addition, the Report included a
number of recommendations regarding the organization of the U.S. Intelligence Community
that are discussed below.
Sigint collection is the responsibility of the National Security Agency (NSA) at Fort
Meade, Maryland. Sigint operations are classified, but there is little doubt that the need for
intelligence on a growing variety of nations and groups that are increasingly using
sophisticated and rapidly changing encryption systems requires a far different sigint effort
than the one prevailing for several decades. In 1998 the House Intelligence Committee
concluded that “very large changes in the National Security Agency’s culture and method of
operations need to take place ... .” Some observers believe that an inevitable restructuring
of NSA will be required at the cost of billions of dollars. The Senate Intelligence Committee
acknowledged that “NSA’s core mission is an essential national capability, and must be
dramatically rejuvenated” but added that some new initiatives already underway will require
“a significant infusion of funds.” Observers credit the current Director of NSA, Lt. Gen.
Michael Hayden, with launching a long-overdue reorganization of the Agency, but adapting
it to changed technological and geopolitical conditions will remain a significant challenge.
Nevertheless, congressional intelligence committees remain concerned about managerial
effectiveness at NSA, as well as disparities between the massive amounts of sigint collected
and the lesser quantities that are analyzed.
A second major intelligence discipline, imagery or imint is also facing profound
changes. Imagery is collected in essentially three ways, satellites, manned aircraft, and
unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). (See CRS Report RL31369, Imagery Intelligence: Issues
for Congress
.) The satellite program that covered the Soviet Union and acquired highly
accurate intelligence concerning submarines, missiles, bombers, and other military targets
is perhaps the greatest achievement of the U.S. Intelligence Community. The demise of the
Soviet Union and experience in the Persian Gulf War have indicated that there is likely to
be a greater number of collection targets than in the Cold War and that more maneuverable
satellites may be required. At the same time, the advent of high-quality commercial satellite
imagery has raised many questions about whether at least some coverage can be obtained less
expensively from the private sector. (See the discussion of India’s nuclear tests below.)
Concern has been widely expressed that imagery architecture is unbalanced and that
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acquiring collection platforms has been emphasized at the expense of analytical and
dissemination efforts.
Imagery as a collection discipline has been affected by the establishment in 1996 of the
National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA) to manage imagery processing and
dissemination to national decision makers and combat commanders. NIMA was renamed
the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) pursuant to the FY2004 Defense
Authorization Act (P.L. 108-136). NGA is composed of agencies and organizations with
disparate backgrounds, including the Defense Mapping Agency, which was never a member
of the Intelligence Community.
Manned aircraft — the U-2 and other aircraft used by the services for tactical
intelligence collection — remain important sources of imagery. The SR-71, which flew at
very high altitudes, has been retired, and no replacement is apparently envisioned. The U-2s,
the earliest of which were procured in the 1950s, are being upgraded with new interception
capabilities and new navigational equipment, but some observers express concern that a
follow-on will not be available because of a questionable assumption that manned aircraft
can be completely replaced with unmanned aerial vehicles.
UAV procurement has been a continuing source of difficulties. Although some UAVs
were used during the Vietnam War, the advantages of these pilotless craft have been more
generally appreciated in the last decade or so when they have been equipped with electro-
optical devices and real-time communications. Since the Persian Gulf War, they have been
widely recognized as relatively inexpensive sources of tactical imagery that do not place the
lives of U.S. personnel at risk; they have been widely used to monitor peacekeeping
operations in Bosnia. UAV procurement efforts, however, have been beset by problems.
Several systems have been canceled after millions of dollars were spent without producing
operational platforms. Despite having been of significant use in the 2003 Iraq campaign, the
UAV effort has been perceived by many in Congress as lacking in focus and being unable
to meet operational requirements. The Global Hawk UAV currently appears to be the most
promising platform for high-altitude, long-endurance unmanned surveillance and
reconnaissance; see CRS Report RL31872, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: Background and
Issues for Congress
, by Elizabeth Bone and Christopher Bolkcom.
A long-standing criticism of the Intelligence Community’s imint effort has been an
imbalance between collection and analysis: that far more imagery is collected than can ever
be evaluated with large quantities remaining “on the cutting room floor.” Intelligence
budgets moreover reflect an emphasis on the procurement of collection systems with fewer
resources allocated to processing and analysis. Some also argue that priority is given to the
concerns of operational military forces rather than to matters of interest to senior political
leaders; for example, it has been alleged that in 1995 imagery analysts were concentrating
on Serb air defenses to an extent that delayed finding evidence of mass grave sites of acute
interest to the State Department. The House intelligence committee has concluded that, “the
emphasis on collection at the expense of downstream activities [i.e., processing and analysis]
permeates the [Intelligence Community] at all levels and in most collection disciplines.”
Intelligence from human contacts — humint — is the oldest intelligence discipline and
the one that is most often written about in the media. (Humint collection is to be
distinguished from covert actions although they may on occasion involve the same agents;
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see CRS Report 96-844, Covert Action: An Effective Instrument of U.S. Foreign Policy?)
The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), which is responsible for most humint collection, had
important successes during the Cold War; disaffected Soviets and others provided invaluable
help in providing information about weapons programs and political intentions that were not
obtainable from any other source. In large measure, targets of U.S. humint collection during
the Cold War were government officials and military leaders. Intelligence agency officials
working under cover as diplomats could approach such potential contacts at receptions or in
the context of routine embassy business. Today, however, the challenge is making contacts
with influential figures in heretofore obscure third world states, clandestine terrorist groups,
or narcotics traffickers who speak a variety of foreign languages. Humint regarding such
sources can be especially important as there may be little evidence of activities or intentions
that can be gathered from imagery and their communications may be carefully limited.
Contacts with such persons usually cannot be made in the course of embassy business
or in diplomatic receptions; in many cases contacts between a U.S. embassy and terrorist
figures or narcotics smugglers would be unacceptable to either side. Placing U.S.
intelligence officials in foreign countries under “non-official cover” in businesses or other
private capacities is possible, but it presents significant challenges to the agencies.
Administrative mechanisms are vastly more complicated; special arrangements have to be
made for pay, allowances, retirement, and healthcare. The responsibilities of operatives
under non-official cover to the parent intelligence agency have to be reconciled with those
to private employers, and there is an unavoidable potential for many conflicts of interest or
even corruption. Any involvement with terrorist groups or smugglers has an inevitable
potential for major embarrassment to the U.S. government and, of course, physical danger
to those immediately involved.
Responding to allegations in the early-1990s that CIA agents may have been involved
too closely with narcotics smugglers and human rights violators in Central America, the then-
DCI, John Deutch, established guidelines in 1995 (which remain classified) to govern the
recruitment of informants with unsavory backgrounds. Although CIA officials maintain that
no proposal for contacts with persons having potentially valuable information was
disapproved, there is a widespread belief that the guidelines served to encourage a “risk
averse” atmosphere at a time when information on terrorist plans, from whatever source, is
urgently sought. Section 903 of the USA Patriot Act (P.L. 107-56), enacted October 26,
2001, expressed the sense of Congress that intelligence officials “should be encouraged, and
should make every effort, to establish and maintain intelligence relationships with any
person, entity, or group” to acquire information on terrorist groups. The FY2002 Intelligence
Authorization Act (P.L. 107-108) directed the DCI to rescind and replace the guidelines, and
July 2002 press reports indicated that they had been replaced.
Another problem is the availability of personnel trained in appropriate languages. Cold
War efforts required a supply of linguists in a relatively finite number of foreign languages,
but in recent years the Intelligence Community has needed experts in a wider range of more
obscure languages and dialects. Various approaches have been considered: use of civilian
contract personnel, military reservists with language qualifications, and substantial bonuses
for agency personnel who maintain their proficiency. The House Intelligence Committee has
called for consideration of the establishment of a new Intelligence Community language
training facility and for language proficiency requirements for intelligence analysts.
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A fourth INT, measurement and signatures analysis — masint — has received greater
emphasis in recent years. A highly technical discipline, masint involves the application of
more complicated analytical refinements to information collected by sigint and imint sensors.
It also includes spectral imaging by which the identities and characteristics of objects can be
identified on the basis of their reflection and absorption of light. A key problem has been
retaining personnel with expertise in masint systems who are offered more remunerative
positions in private industry.
In the current geopolitical environment, another category of information, open source
information — osint (newspapers, periodicals, pamphlets, books, radio, television, and
Internet websites) — is increasingly important. Whereas the Soviet Union was a tightly
closed society with access difficult to come by, most (but not all) countries of interest today
are far more open in their media. A much greater proportion of information can thus be
obtained without the use of human agents or sophisticated collection platforms. At the same
time, requirements for translation, dissemination, and systematic analysis may even have
increased, given the multitude of different areas and the volume of materials. Most observers
believe that intelligence agencies should be more aggressive in using osint; some believe that
the availability of osint may even reduce the need for certain collection efforts. The
availability of osint also raises questions regarding the need for intelligence agencies to
undertake collection, analysis, and dissemination of information that could be directly
obtained by user agencies.
The widespread use of computers and new communications systems means that
although there is a greater need for coordinating the INTs at the Washington level,
intelligence products are used at many different levels of government and that quite low-level
users can access information from Washington-area agencies. In addition, there has been
increased availability of tactical intelligence collectors — sigint systems, aircraft and UAVs
— that are operated by military commanders who are also the immediate recipients of the
information acquired. Some observers express concern about excessive emphasis on tactical
intelligence, arguing that national priorities may be downgraded. Others note, however, that
organizational structures, traditionally focused on providing information from each “INT”
to the Washington agency in charge of that “INT” (a practice known as “stovepiping”) do not
adequately serve current needs of military commanders. Observers suggest that there will
be increasing needs to share national and tactical intelligence and for organizational and
individual flexibility.
Another issue is funding. Some alternatives to current platforms and procedures may
produce cost savings, but observers suspect that they may be outweighed by increases found
necessary in other areas. (On acquisition programs, see CRS Report RL32508, Intelligence,
Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) Programs: Congressional Oversight Issues
.)
Satellites will remain high-cost programs, greater numbers of UAV systems and human
collectors will have to be supported and trained. Observers generally expect that intelligence
activities will probably continue to absorb some 10% of the defense budget in any given year.
It is uncertain whether such percentages will be adequate to accommodate major changes in
NSA’s operations, the acquisition of additional imagery platforms, and a reorganized humint
effort.
Although much of the restructuring that arguably is required could be accomplished by
executive branch initiative, Congress remains responsible for appropriations and for
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oversight. In recent years Congress has emphasized the need for expanded humint
capabilities and has insisted upon a major role in the acquisition of new imagery collection
platforms. Other concerns and directives are undoubtedly expressed in the classified annexes
to intelligence authorization bills. Even if Congress and the leadership of the Intelligence
Community concur on the need for major changes in these and other areas, ensuring the
reorienting of long-established organizations is a difficult task. In addition to
recommendations for reorganizing executive branch intelligence agencies, the 9/11
Commission, describing current congressional oversight of intelligence agencies as
“dysfunctional,” urged that Congress establish new arrangements (a joint committee or a
combined authorization and appropriations committee) to deal with intelligence issues.
Implementation of changes enacted in 1996 has been a difficult process. In May 1998,
Joan Dempsey, a career intelligence official, was confirmed by the Senate to fill the newly
established position of Deputy DCI for Community Management. She resigned, however,
in mid-2003; her replacement, Larry C. Kindsvater, was not confirmed by the Senate until
July 2004. Two other positions designated as requiring Senate confirmation were filled
without formal Senate action as a result of an understanding reached between the
Administration and the Senate Intelligence Committee.
For budgetary purposes, intelligence spending is divided between the National Foreign
Intelligence Program (NFIP), which covers Washington-based agencies and Tactical
Intelligence and Related Activities (TIARA) (also known as intelligence-related activities),
which covers programs supporting the operating units of the armed services, and the Joint
Military Intelligence Program (JMIP), which covers programs, not-necessarily tactical, that
are of primary concern to the Defense Department. Jurisdiction over these programs is
somewhat different in the House and the Senate, but in both chambers members of both
intelligence and armed services committees are involved in oversight efforts.
For a number of years some Members have sought to make public total amounts of
intelligence and intelligence-related spending; floor amendments for that purpose were
defeated in both chambers during the 105th Congress. In response, however, to a lawsuit
filed under the Freedom of Information Act, DCI Tenet stated on October 15, 1997 that the
aggregate amount appropriated for intelligence and intelligence-related activities for FY1997
was $26.6 billion. He added that the Administration would continue “to protect from
disclosure any and all subsidiary information concerning the intelligence budget.” In March
1998, DCI Tenet announced that the FY1998 figure was $26.7 billion. Figures for FY1999
and subsequent years have not been released and the executive branch has thus far prevailed
against legal efforts to force release of intelligence spending figures. On May 23, 2000, the
House voted 175-225 to defeat an amendment calling for annual release of an unclassified
statement on aggregate intelligence spending. Some have suggested that if intelligence
spending totals were made public it would no longer be necessary to “hide” intelligence
programs within the Defense Department budget; national programs at least could be broken
out and consolidated under the DCI and the two intelligence committees. Others contend
that the current system ensures that national intelligence programs are closely related to
military operations and are considered in conjunction with defense programs.
A significant concern continues to be the need to provide intelligence support to
operating military forces. In 1997, the House intelligence committee noted that “intelligence
is now incorporated into the very fiber of tactical military operational activities, whether
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forces are being utilized to conduct humanitarian missions or are engaged in full-scale
combat.” The Persian Gulf War demonstrated the importance of intelligence from both
tactical and national systems, including satellites that had been previously directed almost
entirely at Soviet facilities. There were, nonetheless, numerous technical difficulties,
especially in transmitting data in usable formats and in a timely manner. Many of these
issues have since been addressed with congressional support, but even in the Iraq war of
2003 significant technical and organizational challenges remained.
The House intelligence committee has given special attention to weaknesses in analysis,
expressing concern about “a largely inexperienced workforce; lack of language skills and
limited in-country familiarity ... and a predominant focus on current intelligence that is
eroding the [Intelligence Community’s] ability to conduct comprehensive strategic analysis.”
The bureaucratic tendency to emphasize current intelligence over long-term analysis has been
noted for many years. It has been enhanced by the shift from enduring targets such as the
Soviet Union to the disparate and fluctuating concerns of the post-Cold War period. The
House committee has advocated the establishment of core groups of analysts to undertake
research-oriented projects aimed at assessing strategic issues. It further expressed support
for a civilian intelligence reserve program that would utilize the expertise of former
intelligence officials, as well as civilian experts and linguists.
The Intelligence Community’s failure to provide advance notice of India’s nuclear tests
in May 1998 produced searching reviews of analytical efforts and capabilities both in the
executive branch and Congress. The initial review, undertaken by Admiral David Jeremiah,
former vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has not been made public, but in a press
conference Admiral Jeremiah described his conclusions. Although the Indian government
that took office in late March 1998 had indicated its intention to “exercise the option to
induct [sic] nuclear weapons,” most observers believed that India would conduct a lengthy
assessment prior to undertaking tests. Admiral Jeremiah concluded that “both the
intelligence and policy communities had an underlying mindset going into these tests that the
BJP [the party heading the new Indian government] would behave as we behave.” The
Indians also undertook various efforts to mask their intentions and to hide their test
preparations. The Intelligence Community provided more detailed information on the
follow-on Pakistani tests.
Admiral Jeremiah called for more rigor in analysts’ thinking and urged that outside
experts be brought into the analytical process. There is, he maintained, a need for “greater
collaboration and coordination of intelligence agencies and disciplines.” There is also, he
pointed out, an imbalance between the vast quantities of imagery collected and limits on
numbers of analysts. “In everyday language, that means there is an awful lot of stuff on the
cutting room floor at the end of the day that we have not seen.” In essence, Jeremiah
concluded that the DCI needs to ensure greater coordination among intelligence agencies in
regard both to collection and analysis. DCI Tenet accepted Jeremiah’s recommendations.
Appreciating that no system can prevent any future intelligence surprise or “failure,” many
observers believe that inadequate coordination may have contributed significantly to the
inability to monitor Indian nuclear efforts more closely. (See CRS Report 98-672, U.S.
Intelligence and India’s Nuclear Tests: Lessons Learned
, by Richard A. Best, Jr.)
Congress remains concerned with the potential for abuses by intelligence agency
personnel and has addressed the question of whistleblower protection for officials working
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in intelligence agencies who may not be covered by other whistleblower legislation. The
FY1999 Intelligence Authorization Act established procedures by which an intelligence
agency official (or contractor) who seeks to provide information to Congress with respect to
an urgent concern would first report such concern to the inspector general of his or her
agency. The IG in turn would forward the information to the agency head within 14 days.
The agency head would then forward it to the congressional intelligence committees within
seven days. If the IG does not transmit the information (or does so inaccurately) the
complainant could forward it to the intelligence committees directly if the agency head is
notified. The conference report noted that “an intelligence committee Member or staff
employee receiving such complaints or information must abide by the rules of the
intelligence committees.”
Congress also remains concerned about intelligence support provided to the
government’s counter-narcotics effort. The Explanatory Statement accompanying the
FY1998 intelligence authorization conference report expressed concern about funding the
National Drug Intelligence Center (NDIC) through the National Foreign Intelligence Program
inasmuch as NDIC functions within the Department of Justice. Nonetheless, NDIC funding
has continued to be incorporated in defense authorization and appropriation acts. FY2004
intelligence authorization legislation provided NDIC with $47.1 million.
Other provisions of the FY2001 intelligence authorization bill would have established
criminal penalties for the unauthorized disclosure of properly classified information.
Previous legislation established penalties only for disclosure of specific types of classified
material, such as codes and cryptographic devices and information related to nuclear
programs. Proponents of the provision maintained that recent leaks of highly sensitive
intelligence information have not only risked the loss of valuable collection capabilities but
also jeopardized important security interests. Critics argued that the provisions in H.R. 4392
were overly broad and would preclude the type of leaks that in the past have ultimately
benefitted the public. The bill was vetoed by President Clinton on November 4, 2000, and
another version (H.R. 5630) with the unauthorized disclosure provisions deleted was enacted
on December 27, 2000, as P.L. 106-567.
Consideration was given to including similar provisions in FY2002 legislation, but
Attorney General Ashcroft requested that the Administration be given time for a thorough
interagency study of the need for legislation to provide additional protections against
unauthorized disclosures of classified information. Accordingly, FY2002 intelligence
authorization legislation provided that such a review be conducted by the executive branch
and a reported submitted to Congress by May 1, 2002. The Bush Administration ultimately
concluded that further legislation is unnecessary.
International Terrorism. Terrorism has emerged as a top intelligence priority
especially since September 2001. Major increases in personnel and funding have been
directed towards international terrorism. The Joint Inquiry by the two intelligence
committees and other investigations, including the 9/11 Commission may lead to significant
changes in the organization of the Intelligence Community. There has also been greater
emphasis on the role of humint in counterterrorism. See CRS Report RL31292, Intelligence
to Counter Terrorism: Issues for Congress
.
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Since such terrorist threats are often dealt with in law enforcement channels, greater
cooperation between intelligence and law enforcement agencies has been encouraged in
recent years. This cooperation has raised a number of difficult issues: potential duplication
of effort, the use of information obtained by intelligence agencies in court trials, the danger
that the methods of covert intelligence collectors might be used routinely in law enforcement
cases, and the undermining of legitimate foreign policy and defense initiatives. (For
additional background, see CRS Report RL30252, Intelligence and Law Enforcement:
Countering Transnational Threats to the U.S.
)
Concern that information from both law enforcement and intelligence agencies may not
be reaching those responsible for dealing with international terrorist threats has grown since
the incidents of September 11, 2001. Much information about Osama bin Laden and the Al
Qaeda network was accumulated for trials of individuals connected with the 1993 World
Trade Center attack and an aborted January 2000 attack on the Los Angeles airport. Critics
argue that much of this information was not made available to intelligence agencies, and
some of that which was available may not have been thoroughly exploited. Further, some
argue that information available to intelligence agencies was not shared with the law
enforcement agencies that could have apprehended (because of immigration violations) some
of those involved in the September 11 attacks. The USA Patriot Act (P.L. 107-56) was
designed to facilitate the greater sharing of information available to law enforcement
agencies (including grand jury testimony) with the Intelligence Community in accordance
with guidelines to be established by the executive branch. The Justice Department
announced the completion of the guidelines on September 23, 2002.
Department of Homeland Security (DHS). DHS includes an Information
Analysis and Infrastructure Protection component that is responsible for analyzing
information provided by intelligence and law enforcement agencies. The new Department
will not itself engage in collecting intelligence but will receive analyses and, to some as yet
unknown extent, unanalyzed information from other intelligence and law enforcement
agencies. On the basis of its threat analysis, the Homeland Security Department would effect
or recommend necessary measures to protect the U.S. public and infrastructures. In January
2003, the Administration announced plans to create a Terrorist Threat Integration Center
(TTIC) under the DCI. TTIC commenced operations on May 1, 2003 and performs a number
of analytical functions earlier assigned to DHS; its reports and analyses are made available
to DHS. (See CRS Report RS21283, Homeland Security: Intelligence Support.)
CIA and the Israeli-Palestinian Situation. The accord between Palestinian and
Israeli leaders (the “Wye River Memorandum”) signed in Washington on October 23, 1998,
provided for a Trilateral Security Committee of high-ranking Israeli, Palestinian, and U.S.
officials to oversee the implementation of the agreement and coordinate efforts to combat
terror and terrorist organizations. The accord assumed that CIA officials would continue
liaison efforts, which were ongoing for several years, to improve communications between
the two sides on security matters and to enhance the professionalism of Palestinian security
forces. With the deterioration of Israeli-Palestinian relations in the spring of 2001, the CIA
role was reduced. DCI Tenet visited the region, but CIA-sponsored meetings between Israeli
and Palestinian security officials were unproductive.
In the final stages of negotiations of the Wye Accord, Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu
pressed President Clinton to pardon Jonathan Pollard, a former Navy Intelligence analyst,
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who was convicted of spying on behalf of Israel in 1986. Subsequent Israeli leaders have also
pressed Pollard’s case. Media reports indicate that many Intelligence Community officials
strongly oppose any presidential pardon and opposition has been expressed by some
Members of both intelligence committees. (See CRS Report RS20001, Jonathan Pollard:
Background and Considerations for Presidential Clemency
.)
The Intelligence Community and Iraq. The Baath regime in Iraq presented major
challenges to intelligence agencies. U.S. intelligence agencies supported the efforts of U.N.
inspectors charged with determining Iraqi compliance with U.N. resolutions requiring Iraq
to end any programs for the acquisition or deployment of weapons of mass destruction, but
such efforts were resisted by the Iraqi government. The Iraq Liberation Act of 1998 led to
funding for covert assistance to opposition elements in legislation, but intelligence agency
officials were skeptical of providing aid to the groups working against Saddam Hussein.
(See CRS Report RL31339, Iraq: U.S. Efforts to Change the Regime, by Kenneth Katzman;
also, CRS Report RL32379, Iraq: Former Regime Weapons Programs, Human Rights
Violations, and U.S. Policy
, by Kenneth Katzman.)
The attack on the Iraqi regime launched in March 2003 by the United States, the United
Kingdom, and other countries was based on thorough intelligence preparation. Intelligence
supported the extensive use of precision-guided munitions that targeted key Iraqi military and
command facilities but limited civilian casualties.
Subsequent to the fall of Saddam Hussein’s regime, questions have been raised about
the extent and accuracy of U.S. intelligence reports concerning Iraqi weapons of mass
destruction (WMD). The inability thus far to locate anticipated stocks of chemical and
biological weapons has led some observers to argue that prewar intelligence estimates were
inaccurate and unreliable. Others point out that the Intelligence Community’s October 2002
report, Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction Programs, carefully noted Iraq’s previous use
of WMD, its ongoing WMD programs, and its unwillingness to document the destruction of
WMD stocks in accordance with U.N. resolutions. Few observers contest these factors, but
intelligence judgments regarding the existence of specific inventories of WMD products —
and the interpretation and use of these judgements by policymakers — are under dispute. On
July 7, 2004, the Senate Intelligence Committee released its highly critical review of the
Intelligence Community’s analytical efforts regarding Iraq. The review faulted analysts for
failing to convey the ambiguities of the evidence that they relied on in judging that Iraq had
an active and growing WMD program.
On February 11, 2004, President Bush by Executive Order 13328 created a Commission
on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass
Destruction. The Commission, co-chaired by former Senator Charles S. Robb and retired
Federal Judge Laurence H. Silverman, is to assess the capabilities of the Intelligence
Community to collect, analyze, and disseminate intelligence regarding WMD. It addition,
the Commission is to look specifically at intelligence regarding Iraqi WMD prior to
Operation Iraqi Freedom and to compare prewar assessments with the findings of the Iraq
Survey Group. The Commission is to report by March 31, 2005.
The Intelligence Community and Missile Defense. A key Cold War-era
intelligence mission that endures in the post-Cold War era is collection targeted at foreign
missile capabilities, especially those capable of delivering WMD. As noted above, the
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unanticipated North Korean testing of the Taepo Dong 1 missile raised questions about
intelligence collection capabilities. In addition, the July 1998 report of the Commission to
Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States (known as the Rumsfeld
Commission) concluded: “A new strategic environment now gives emerging ballistic missile
powers the capacity, through a combination of domestic development and foreign assistance,
to acquire the means to strike the U.S. within about five years of a decision to acquire such
a capability (10 years in the case of Iraq). During several of those years, the U.S. might not
be aware that such a decision had been made. Available alternative means of delivery can
shorten the warning time of deployment nearly to zero.” Although more pessimistic than
much-criticized Intelligence Community estimates, this assessment underscored the vital
importance of intelligence efforts in this area, especially given its key role in the debate over
missile defense systems.
Kosovo/Operation Allied Force. The highly successful air strikes against Serbian
military targets, the centerpiece of Operation Allied Force, taxed U.S. intelligence
capabilities. Intelligence enabled NATO to use precision munitions to destroy Serbian
targets with no NATO combat casualties and with relatively limited losses of civilian lives.
Nonetheless, some observers suggest that difficulties in relaying targeting data, the need for
communications “work arounds,” and escalating requirements for additional aircraft reflected
a serious failure in the years after the Persian Gulf War to address increased requirements for
imagery collection platforms for use in conjunction with precision-guided munitions.
In addition to uncertainties about the future government satellite programs, critics note
that DOD has been unable to acquire significant numbers of unmanned aerial vehicles
(UAVs) as a result of the managerial problems that have long been subjects of congressional
censure. Further, they cite the absence of plans for follow-ons to U-2 aircraft, first developed
in the Eisenhower Administration, as well as a limited inventory of JSTARS aircraft with
ground-radar capabilities. UAV procurement remains a high priority despite losses of several
platforms in Afghan operations.
According to official accounts, the mistaken attack on the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade
on May 7, 1999, resulted from the use of outdated maps and databases. The Yugoslav
Federal Directorate of Supply and Procurement, a military supply facility, was the intended
target, but it was confused with a nearby and similarly-sized building that was actually
China’s embassy. Although embassies were on “no-strike” lists for Operation Allied Force,
along with hospitals, churches, and mosques, U.S. databases did not reflect the location of
the current Chinese Embassy in Belgrade. Secretary of Defense William Cohen subsequently
announced several steps to prevent future targeting errors; the State Department will be
responsible for reporting to the Intelligence Community whenever embassies move or new
embassies are built, new procedures for developing target information, including procedures
for updating maps will be established, and the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) and the
National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency will establish new rapid response procedures for
updating critical databases for no-strike targets.
The 9/11 Investigations. In the aftermath of September 11, 2001, there was
extensive public discussion of whether the attacks on the Pentagon and World Trade Center
represented an “intelligence failure.” On July 17, 2002, the House Intelligence Committee
Subcommittee on Terrorism and Homeland Security released an unclassified summary of its
investigation of ways to improve counterterrorism and homeland security capabilities. The
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findings were discussed further in a September 5, 2002 hearing before the House Armed
Services Committee, Special Oversight Panel on Terrorism.
In addition the two intelligence committees undertook a joint investigation of the
September 11 attacks. Public hearings by the resulting “Joint Inquiry” began on September
18, 2002 with testimony from representatives of families of those who died in the attacks.
Eleanor Hill, the Inquiry Staff Director also summarized the Inquiry’s findings: “ ... the
Intelligence Community did have general indications of a possible terrorist attack against the
United States or U.S. interests overseas in the spring and summer of 2001 and promulgated
strategic warnings. However, it does not appear to date that the Intelligence Community had
information prior to September 11 that identified precisely where, when and how the attacks
were to be carried out.” Former policymakers and senior CIA and FBI officials also testified.
The two intelligence committees published the findings and conclusions of the Joint
Inquiry on December 11, 2002. (The full report was subsequently released some months
later as H.Rept. 107-792/S.Rept. 107-351.) The committees found that the Intelligence
Community had received beginning in 1998 and continuing into the summer of 2001 “a
modest, but relatively steady, stream of intelligence reporting that indicated the possibility
of terrorist attacks within the United States.” Further findings dealt with specific terrorists
about whom some information had come to the attention of U.S. officials prior to September
11 and with reports about possible employment of civilian airliners to crash into major
buildings. The Inquiry also made systemic findings highlighting the Intelligence
Community’s lack of preparedness to deal with the challenges of global terrorism,
inefficiencies in budgetary planning, the lack of adequate numbers of linguists, a lack of
human sources, and an unwillingness to share information among agencies.
Separately, the two intelligence committees submitted recommendations for
strengthening intelligence capabilities. Most significantly, they urged the creation of a
Cabinet-level position of Director of National Intelligence (DNI) separate from the position
of director of the CIA. The DNI would have greater budgetary and managerial authority over
intelligence agencies in the Defense Department than currently possessed by the DCI. The
committees also expressed great concern with the reorientation of the FBI to counterterrorism
and suggested consideration of the creation of a new domestic surveillance agency similar
to Britain’s MI5. Senator Shelby, the vice chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee
in the 107th Congress, submitted extensive additional views detailing his concerns with the
functioning of intelligence agencies as currently organized.
Provisions for establishing an independent commission on the 2001 terrorist attacks
were included in the FY2003 Intelligence Authorization Act (P.L. 107-306). Former New
Jersey Governor Thomas H. Kean was named to serve as chairman, with former
Representative Lee H. Hamilton serving as vice chairman. Widely publicized hearings were
held in spring 2004 with Administration and outside witnesses providing different
perspectives on the role of intelligence agencies prior to the September 11, 2001, attacks.
The principal recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Report address perceived lack
of authorities of the current position of DCI; the Commission recommended establishing a
National Intelligence Director (NID) to manage the national intelligence program and
oversee the agencies that contribute to it. The NID would annually submit a national
intelligence program budget and, when necessary, forward the names of nominees to be
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heads of major intelligence agencies to the President. Lead responsibility for conducting and
executing paramilitary operations would be assigned to DOD and not CIA. The Commission
also recommended that Congress pass a separate annual appropriations act for intelligence
that would be made public. The NID would execute the expenditure of appropriated funds
and make transfers of funds or personnel as appropriate.
On August 27, 2004, President Bush addressed key recommendations of the 9/11
Commission in signing several executive orders to reform intelligence. In addition to
establishing a National Counterterrorism Center, the orders provide new authorities for the
DCI until legislation is enacted to create a National Intelligence Director, strengthen the
sharing of terrorism information, and establish a Board on Safeguarding Americans’ Civil
Liberties.
Several legislative proposals would establish a position of National Intelligence
Director, separate from a CIA Director (see CRS Report RL32600, Comparison of 9/11
Commission Recommended Intelligence Reforms, Roberts Draft Bill, H.R. 4104, S. 190, S.
1520, S. 6, H.R. 4584, Current Law
, and CRS Report RL32601, Comparison of 9/11
Commission Recommended Intelligence Reforms, S. 2845, S. 2774, H.R. 5024,
Administration Proposal, H.R. 10, Current Law
). The Senate passed S. 2845 on October 16,
2004; the House had passed H.R. 10 on October 8, 2004. Efforts by the resulting conference
committee to reach agreed-upon text focused on the issue of the authorities of the proposed
Director of National Intelligence in regard to the budgets and operations of the major
intelligence agencies in the Defense Department, especially the National Security Agency,
the National Reconnaissance Office, and the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency. (See
CRS Report RL32506, The Position of Director of National Intelligence: Issues for
Congress
, and CRS Report RL32515, Intelligence Community Reorganization: Potential
Effects on DOD Intelligence Agencies
.) Conferees finally reached agreement in early
December, and the Conference Report on S. 2845 (H.Rept. 108-796) was approved by the
House on December 7, 2004, and by the Senate on December 8, 2004.
Counterintelligence. Allegations that U.S. classified information regarding missile
warhead design may have been provided to Chinese officials by a scientist at the Los Alamos
National Laboratory (part of the Energy Department) led to charges of lax security especially
in regard to visits by foreign nationals. An Intelligence Community damage assessment,
released in April 1999, concluded that China obtained by espionage classified U.S. nuclear
weapons information that “probably accelerated” its program to develop future nuclear
weapons. According to the assessment, China obtained at least basic design information on
several modern U.S. nuclear reentry vehicles, including the Trident II (W88). A report of the
Select Committee on U.S. National Security and Military/Commercial Concerns with the
People’s Republic of China concluded that U.S. information accelerated Chinese nuclear
weapon modernization and “helped the PRC in its efforts to fabricate and successfully test
its next generation of nuclear weapons designs. These warheads give the PRC small, modern
thermonuclear warheads roughly equivalent to current U.S. warhead yields.”
(For additional details, see CRS Report RL30143, China: Suspected Acquisition of U.S.
Nuclear Weapon Data, by Shirley A. Kan and CRS Report RL30220, China’s Technology
Acquisitions: Cox Committee’s Report — Findings, Issues and Recommendations
. For more
recent developments, see CRS Report RL30569, Department of Energy: Status of Legislated
Security and Counterintelligence Measures
, by Jonathan Medalia.)
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LEGISLATION
(Note: Intelligence organization bills are discussed in CRS Report RL32506, The
Position of Director of National Intelligence: Issues for Congress
, and CRS Report
RL32635, H.R. 10 (9/11 Recommendations Implementation Act) and S. 2845 (National
Intelligence Reform Act of 2004): A Comparative Analysis.
)
P.L. 108-177, H.R. 2417 (Goss). Intelligence Authorization Act for FY2004.
Introduced June 11, 2003; referred to the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence;
reported June 18, 2003. Passed House, amended, June 27, 2003. Conference report (H.Rept.
108-381) filed, November 19, 2003. Passed House, November 20, 2003. Passed Senate,
November 21, 2003. Signed into law December 13, 2003.
H.R. 4104 (Harman). To establish the Director of National Intelligence. Introduced
April 1, 2004; referred to the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence.
H.R. 4548 (Goss). Intelligence Authorization Act for FY2005. Introduced June 14,
2004; reported June 16, 2004. Passed House, amended, June 23, 2004. Conference Report
(H.Rept. 108-798) approved, December 7, 2004.
H.R. 4584 (Goss). To Improve the Organization and Operation of the Intelligence
Community. Introduced June 16, 2004; referred to the Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence.
S. 6 (Daschle). To enhance Homeland Security. Introduced January 7, 2003; referred
to the Committee on the Judiciary.
S. 113 (Kyl). Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act Amendment. Introduced January
9, 2003. Passed Senate, amended, May 8, 2003.
S. 190 (Feinstein). To establish the Director of National Intelligence. Introduced
January 16, 2003; referred to the Select Committee on Intelligence.
S. 1025 (Roberts). Intelligence Authorization Act for FY2004. Introduced May 8,
2003 from Select Committee on Intelligence with report; referred to Committee on Armed
Services; reported by Armed Services Committee, June 26, 2003. Passed Senate, amended,
July 31, 2003 (text substituted for H.R. 2417).
S. 1520 (Graham of Florida). To Reorganize and Improve the Leadership of the
Intelligence Community. Introduced July 31, 2003; referred to the Select Committee on
Intelligence.
S. 2386 (Roberts). Intelligence Authorization Act for FY2005. Introduced May 5,
2004 with written report (S.Rept. 108-258); referred to Committee on Armed Services;
reported by Armed Services Committee, July 8, 2004 (S.Rept. 108-300); passed Senate
(amended), October 11, 2004. Conference Report (H.Rept. 108-798) approved, December
8, 2004.
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FOR ADDITIONAL READING
U.S. Commission on the Role and Capabilities of the United States Intelligence Community,
Preparing for the 21st Century: An Appraisal of U.S. Intelligence, March 1, 1996.
U.S. Congress. House of Representatives. Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence.
Report of the U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and U.S. House Permanent
Select Committee on Intelligence, Joint Inquiry into Intelligence Community Activities
Before and After the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001.
December 2002. 107th
Congress, 2nd session (H.Rept. 107-792). [Also, S.Rept. 107-351]
——Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004. June 18, 2003. 108th Congress, 1st
session (H.Rept. 108-163).
——Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004. November 19, 2003. 108th
Congress, 1st session. Conference Report (H.Rept. 108-381).
——IC21: Intelligence Community in the 21st Century. Staff Study. April 9, 1996. 104th
Congress.
——Subcommittee on Terrorism and Homeland Security. Counterterrorism Intelligence
Capabilities and Performance Prior to 9-11. July 2002.
U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Armed Services. Intelligence Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2004. June 26, 2003. 108th Congress, 1st session. (S.Rept. 108-80).
U.S. Congress. Senate. Select Committee on Intelligence. Authorizing Appropriations for
Fiscal Year 2004 for Intelligence and Intelligence-Related Activities of the United
States Government, the Community Management Account, and the Central Intelligence
Agency Retirement and Disability System
. May 8, 2003. 108th Congress, 1st session.
(S.Rept. 108-44).
——Report of the Select Committee on Intelligence on the U.S. Intelligence Community’s
Prewar Intelligence Assessments on Iraq. July 9, 2004. 108th Congress, 2d session.
(S.Rept. 108-301).
U.S. Department of Justice, Commission for Review of FBI Security Programs, A Review
of FBI Security Programs, March 2002.
U.S. National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States. The 9/11
Commission Report, July 2004.
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