Order Code RL32685
CRS Report for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
Election Reform:
The Help America Vote Act
and Issues for Congress
December 2, 2004
Eric A. Fischer
Senior Specialist in Science and Technology
Resources, Science, and Industry Division
Kevin J. Coleman
Analyst in American National Government
Government and Finance Division
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

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Election Reform: The Help America Vote Act and
Issues for Congress
Summary
In November 2000, the nation faced the unusual circumstance of not knowing
the winner of the election for President for several weeks. The public scrutiny
resulting from that experience exposed a wide range of weaknesses with the
American system of elections. Many of the weaknesses had been known for years
by election administrators, but they had been unsuccessful at drawing sufficient
attention to them to effect the needed changes. In October 2002, Congress enacted
the Help America Vote Act (HAVA, P.L. 107-252), which addressed many of those
weaknesses. It created a new federal agency, the Election Assistance Commission
(EAC), with election administration responsibilities. It set requirements for voting
and voter-registration systems and certain other aspects of election administration,
and it provided federal funding; but it did not supplant state and local control over
election administration.
The establishment of the EAC was delayed for several months beyond the
statutory deadline, and it was initially funded at a fraction of the authorized level. As
a result, many of the tasks assigned to it by HAVA were also delayed. The FY2005
appropriation is close to the authorization. HAVA established several grant
programs for various purposes and Congress has appropriated more than $3 billion
altogether for them through FY2005, although that is about $800 million below
authorized levels. It is uncertain if current levels of funding are sufficient to meet
HAVA goals and requirements. Funding for all major HAVA programs and the EAC
is authorized through FY2005. Whether the 109th Congress considers modifying the
authority or funding of the EAC may depend to a significant degree on the EAC’s
progress in achieving HAVA goals and any problems arising in meeting HAVA
deadlines and preparing for the November 2006 federal election.
One of the innovations in HAVA is the establishment, for the first time, of
federal requirements for several aspects of election administration: voting systems,
provisional ballots, voter information, voter registration, and identification for certain
voters. Most of those requirements do not go into effect until 2006, but they have
begun to influence election administration. Many states have begun changing voting
systems to prepare for meeting them. A controversy has arisen over the reliability
and security of electronic voting, resulting in delays in replacing older voting systems
in some states. The provisional ballot requirement was one of four that went into
effect in 2004 and it has also been somewhat controversial. Detailed studies of these
and other issues raised by the November 2004 election are likely, but they will
probably take several months to perform.
Despite considerable effort by Congress to alleviate difficulties for military and
overseas voters, there remain a number of hurdles to participation. Congress may
consider several options for easing them. Other issues that might be considered are
associated with voting systems standards, remote voting (absentee, early, and
Internet), election personnel, polling places, election security, and the electoral
college. This report will be updated.

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Contents
New Federal Agency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Payments to States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
HAVA 2004 Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
HAVA 2006 Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Military and Overseas Voters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Voting System Standards . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Absentee Ballots . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Early Voting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Internet Voting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Election Personnel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
The Polling Place . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Election Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Electoral College . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

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Election Reform: The Help America Vote Act
and Issues for Congress
In November 2000, the nation faced the unusual circumstance of not knowing
the winner of the election for President for several weeks. The results in Florida
were contested, and the contest did not end until a decision by the U.S. Supreme
Court.1 The public scrutiny resulting from that experience exposed a wide range of
weaknesses with the American system of elections. Among them were poorly
designed and outdated voting technology; inefficient and poorly administered
registration systems; insufficient professionalism in the election workforce,
especially pollworkers; problems with absentee voting; a confusing array of
administrative procedures across jurisdictions; inadequate funding; problems with
the processes for conducting election audits and recounts; and suspicions among
many of alarming levels of voter fraud and intimidation. Although many
jurisdictions suffered from few if any of these problems, they were sufficiently
prevalent to cause widespread concern after the realization that they could, at least
in some circumstances, have a significant impact on major elections. Many of the
weaknesses had been known for years by election administrators, but they had been
unsuccessful at drawing sufficient attention to them to effect the needed changes.
The situation began changing when several commissions and studies examined
what had happened in Florida and made recommendations for improvements.2 Both
1 Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
2 Major reports included the following: Caltech/MIT Voting Technology Project, Voting:
What Is, What Could Be, July 2001, a privately funded joint effort of the California Institute
of Technology and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology involving faculty and staff
from both institutions; The Constitution Project, Forum on Election Reform, Building
Consensus on Election Reform, August 2001, from a broad-based group of organizations and
experts under the auspices of a nonprofit organization focusing on legal and constitutional
issues; Governor's Select Task Force on Election Procedures, Standards and Technology,
Revitalizing Democracy in Florida, March 2001, a study commissioned by Florida Governor
Jeb Bush; National Association of Secretaries of State, Election Reform Resolution, 6
February 2001, and Resolution on Election Reform Policies & Federal Government, 17 July
2001, from a professional association of state secretaries of state; National Association of
State Election Directors, Federal Election Recommendations, 15 August 2001, from a
professional association of state election directors; National Commission on Election
Standards & Reform, Report and Recommendations to Improve America’s Election System,
May 2001, from the National Association of Counties, an organization representing county
governments, and the National Association of County Recorders, Election Officials, and
Clerks, a professional organization of county administrative officials; The National
Commission on Federal Election Reform, To Assure Pride and Confidence in the Electoral
Process, August 2001, from an independent, privately funded commission cochaired by
(continued...)

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CRS-2
the House and the Senate held several hearings during the first session of the 107th
Congress. Some states made plans or began to replace voting equipment and adopt
other improvements. In December 2001, the House passed H.R. 3295, the Help
America Vote Act. In early 2002, the Senate debated and passed S. 565, the Martin
Luther King, Jr. Equal Protection of Voting Rights Act, after adopting 40
amendments.3 After conference negotiations, a compromise bill, the Help America
Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA, P.L. 107-252) was enacted in October.4 The act created
a new federal agency with election administration responsibilities, set requirements
for voting and voter-registration systems and certain other aspects of election
administration, and provided federal funding; but it did not supplant state and local
control over election administration.
Issues for the 108th Congress included funding, establishment of the new agency,
and implementation by and impacts on the states. Issues for the 109th Congress may
well depend on reactions to problems identified pursuant to the November 2004
Presidential election, but may include funding, reauthorization of HAVA programs,
and the security of voting systems. This report discusses how HAVA addresses those
and other issues raised both in the 2000 and 2004 presidential elections, and their
potential legislative implications.
New Federal Agency
HAVA established a new federal agency, the Election Assistance Commission
(EAC), to replace the Office of Election Administration (OEA) of the Federal
Election Commission and also to perform new functions. The EAC is an
independent, bipartisan federal agency. HAVA authorized funding for it through
FY2005. Members are appointed to four-year terms and may be reappointed once.
The act also established two boards, with broad-based state and local membership,
and a technical committee, to address aspects of voting system standards and
certification. The main duties of the EAC include carrying out grant programs,
providing for testing and certification of voting systems, studying election issues, and
issuing voluntary guidelines for voting systems and the requirements in the act. The
commission does not have any new rule-making authority and does not enforce
HAVA requirements. The law provides for technical support and participation by the
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) in relevant commission
activities.
2(...continued)
Presidents Ford and Carter; National Conference of State Legislatures, Elections Reform
Task Force, Voting in America, August 2001, from an organization serving state lawmakers;
National Task Force on Election Reform, Election 2000: Review and Recommendations by
the Nation's Elections Administrators, August 2001, from a nonprofit organization of
election administrators.
3 For details, see Senate Consideration and Passage of H.R. 3295 (Dodd-McConnell), in
the CRS Election Reform Briefing Book [http://www.congress.gov/brbk/html/eberf27.html].
4 For a side-by-side comparison of provisions in the three versions, see, Comparison of
Conference, Senate, and House Versions of H.R. 3295, in the CRS Election Reform Briefing
Book [http://www.congress.gov/brbk/html/eberf24.html].

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Issues. The establishment of the EAC was delayed for more than nine months
beyond the statutory deadline of February 25, 2003,5 and funding for the commission
for FY2004 was less than one-fifth the authorized level of $10 million. As a result,
the commissioners did not hold their first public meeting until March 2004 and the
EAC was significantly limited in its ability to provide assistance to states in
preparation for the November 2004 election. It also had to delay beginning many of
the tasks assigned to it by HAVA. It has, however, held several additional public
meetings and hearings on issues such as the security of electronic voting systems and
best practices in election administration. It released a recommended set of best
practices for local election administrators in August.6 The EAC boards and technical
committee have also met, and the agency has been distributing payments to states
(see below). In the continuing resolution, H.J.Res. 107, that provided federal funding
until November 20, the EAC was permitted to expend funds at an annual rate
corresponding to a fiscal year appropriation of $7.8 million, and to expend them at
a higher rate “...to reflect the agency activities associated with...” the November 2
federal election. The FY2005 omnibus appropriations bill (H.R. 4818) would
provide $14 million, with $2.8 million to be transferred to NIST to fund its HAVA
activities.7 Whether the 109th Congress considers modifying the authority or funding
of the EAC may depend to a significant degree on progress in achieving HAVA goals
and any problems arising in meeting the 2006 HAVA deadlines (see below) and in
preparations for the November 2006 federal election.
Payments to States
HAVA established several grant programs for various purposes.8 Payments to
states authorized by HAVA include $650 million to improve election administration
and to replace punchcard and lever-machine voting systems and $3 billion over three
years to meet requirements established by the act (see below). The first program was
fully funded and all payments have been made. The second was funded at close to
the $2.4 billion authorized through FY2004. Other programs include $100 million
to make polling places accessible to persons with disabilities, and $10 million per
year to state protection and advocacy systems to ensure electoral participation by
persons with disabilities. Those programs have been funded at substantially less than
the levels authorized. HAVA also provided $20 million in grants for research and
$10 million for pilot programs to improve voting technology, although none of those
5 For a listing of all HAVA deadlines, see Help America Vote Act: Implementation Time
L i n e , i n t h e C R S E l e c t i o n R e f o r m B r i e f i n g B o o k
[http://www.congress.gov/brbk/html/eberf31.html].
6 Election Assistance Commission, “Best Practices in Administration, Management and
Security in Voting Systems and Provisional Voting: A Tool Kit for Election Administrators
and Stakeholders,” August 9, 2004, [http://www.eac.gov/bp].
7 HAVA does not include specific funding authorizations for NIST’s activities in support
of the EAC.
8 For more detail, see CRS Report RS20898, Elections Reform: Overview and Issues,, 2
September 2004; and Overview and Implementation of the Help America Vote Act, in the
CRS Election Reform Briefing Book [http://www.congress.gov/brbk/html/eberf4.html].

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CRS-4
funds have been appropriated.9 Three small programs to encourage student
participation in the voting and election process were established by the act, and they
have been at least partially funded.
Issues. The remaining authorization for payments to help states meet the
HAVA requirements — $600 million for FY2005 — was not requested by the
administration10 and the FY2005 omnibus (H.R. 4818) contains no funding for them.
Two factors that may be contributing to this funding uncertainty are (1) the
continuing controversy over the security and reliability of the electronic voting
systems promoted by HAVA’s accessibility requirements (see below) and (2) delays
in the distribution of HAVA requirements payments ($945 million in FY2003-4
funds remained to be disbursed as of October 22, 200411). Whether current levels of
payments to states are sufficient to fund HAVA requirements is uncertain. Funding
for all major HAVA programs and the EAC is authorized only through FY2005.
Reauthorization may therefore be an issue facing the 109th Congress.
HAVA 2004 Requirements
One of the innovations in HAVA is the establishment, for the first time, of
federal requirements for several aspects of election administration: voting systems,
provisional ballots, voter information, voter registration, and identification for certain
voters. Most of those requirements do not go into effect until 2006. However, four
have already gone into effect.12 (1) Any voter not listed as registered must be offered
and permitted to cast a provisional ballot. This is a separate ballot that is set aside
along with relevant information about the voter so that election officials can
determine whether the person is entitled to vote. (2) Any ballots cast during a court-
ordered extension of polling hours must be provisional. (3) A sample ballot and
other voter information must be posted at the polling place on election day. (4) First-
time voters who register by mail must provide specified identification either when
submitting their registration or when voting.
Issues. The provisional ballot requirement has been somewhat controversial,
although broader use of such ballots was called for by all the major reports stemming
from the 2000 election controversy (see above) and was included in both the original
House- and Senate-passed versions of HAVA. States vary in how this requirement
is implemented, and some of those interpretations have already been subject to
litigation.13 In some states a ballot is counted at least for some contests even if cast
9 Although the EAC’s total FY2005 appropriation is $4 million above the authorized level
of $10 million, all but $800,000 of that excess is designated for other activities.
10 The administration requested $40 million for FY2005 for requirements payments.
11 Election Assistance Commission, “HAVA Title II Requirements Payments Processed by
the EAC as of October 22, 2004,”
[http://www.eac.gov/docs/HAVA%20Req.%20Paymts.%2010-22-04.pdf].
12 A fifth requirement, for statewide computerized voter registration lists, also went into
effect in 2004, but most states obtained a waiver until 2006.
13 For a detailed discussion of state implementation and issues, see CRS Report RL32653,
(continued...)

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CRS-5
outside the voter’s home precinct.14 In other states, provisional ballots are counted
only if they are cast in the home precinct.15 If the policy governing provisional ballots
is unclear to voters or pollworkers in a jurisdiction, a voter might be unintentionally
disenfranchised, for example by inadvertently voting in the wrong precinct.
Provisional ballots may be especially at issue in some close contests, where the
outcome may not be known until provisional ballots are processed, which can take
several days and may be subject to litigation. Congress could consider modifying this
requirement to clarify its applicability to federal contests for ballots that are cast
outside the home precinct. Also, provisional balloting may become less important
once states have implemented the requirement for computerized registration lists (see
below).
The voter-identification requirement was the subject of some controversy in the
Senate debate on HAVA, causing a delay of several weeks in floor action.16 It does
not, however, appear to have been particularly controversial in implementation so far.
However, nineteen states have broader identification requirements, and some of these
have been controversial.17
HAVA 2006 Requirements
Beginning January 1, 2006, voting systems used in federal elections must
provide for error correction by voters (either directly or via voter education and
instruction), manual auditing for the voting system, accessibility to disabled persons
(at least one fully accessible machine per polling place) and alternative languages,
and must meet federal machine error-rate standards.18 Systems must also maintain
voter privacy and ballot confidentiality, and states are required to adopt uniform
standards for what constitutes a vote on each system. Also, states using voter
registration must employ computerized, statewide voter registration systems that are
13(...continued)
State Election Laws: Overview of Statutes Providing for Provisional Ballot Tabulation.
14 This approach can help ensure, for example, that a voter who is detained at work on
election day until just before the polls close can vote at the nearest polling place rather than
risk arriving at the home polling place after it has closed. It may also help a properly
registered voter who inadvertently goes to the wrong polling place and is unable to obtain
information from the central election office about where the correct polling place is located,
for example because of busy phone lines.
15 This can help to reduce problems in counting ballots and may also reduce the risk of
certain kinds of fraud.
16 See Fischer and Coleman, Senate Consideration.
17See electionline.org, Election Preview 2004: What’s Changed, What Hasn’t and Why,
October 2004, available at [http://www.electionline.org].
18 For details, see Voting Technology, in the CRS Election Reform Briefing Book
[http://www.congress.gov/brbk/html/eberf6.html].

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CRS-6
accurately maintained.19 Also, beginning in 2007, all new voting systems purchased
with requirements payments must be fully accessible for persons with disabilities.
Issues. Even though none of these requirements are currently in effect, they
have begun to influence election administration. Many states have begun changing
voting systems to prepare for meeting them. For example, both Maryland and
Georgia have adopted statewide direct-recording electronic (DRE) voting systems,
which meet the error-correction and accessibility requirements of HAVA and
facilitate meeting the standard for what constitutes a vote. However, a separate
controversy has arisen over the reliability and security of DREs, resulting in both a
slowing of acquisition of those systems by states such as Ohio, and, in the case of
Nevada, the adoption of a requirement for a paper ballot produced parallel to the
electronic ballot and available for inspection by the voter before the ballot is cast.20
While HAVA does require a paper record that can be used for manual audit of a
voting system, it does not require paper ballots. In light of the controversy about
DREs, some modifications to that provision were proposed in the 108th Congress.21
Since many states are still using voting systems such as punchcards, lever
machines, and central-count optical scan, that have been shown to exhibit problems
with voter error,22 such problems may continue to be of concern in close elections in
such jurisdictions. However, with substantial amounts of HAVA funding remaining
to be spent, most problematic voting systems might be replaced by 2006.
States that have not yet established uniform standards for what constitutes a vote
on a given voting system could be involved in controversies reminiscent of those in
Florida in the 2000 presidential election in the event of recounts. The decisive
outcomes and margins of victory in major federal races in the November 2004
election, however, prevented recounts that might change the outcome of a federal
contest. While some analyses have raised questions about the integrity of results in
some cases, the consensus among most observers appears to be that any problems
that might have occurred were not of a magnitude sufficient to affect the outcomes.23
Given the unusually large number of new voters who registered in 2004 and the
closely contested presidential election, some issues associated with voter registration
have arisen. Among them are questions about the validity of new registrations,
19 This was a 2004 requirement that was extendable to 2006, and most states opted to delay
implementation.
20 See CRS Report RL32139, Election Reform and Electronic Voting Systems (DREs):
Analysis of Security Issues.
21 CRS Report RL32526, Electronic Voting Systems (DREs): Legislation in the 108th
Congress.
22 See CRS Report RL30773, Voting Technologies in the United States: Overview and Issues
for Congress. While this report precedes the development of HAVA, it discusses issues
associated with voting system performance that arose from the 2000 presidential election
and formed the basis for several of the voting system requirements in the act.
23 See, for example, the studies cited by the Caltech-MIT Voting Technology Project,
available at [http://www.vote.caltech.edu/Election2004.html].

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CRS-7
concerns about various kinds of fraud and abuse, and the impacts of attempts to
challenge the validity of voters’ registrations at polling places.
Detailed studies of these and other issues raised by the November 2004 election
are likely, but they will probably take several months to perform. The utility of those
studies will depend to a significant degree on the kinds and quality of the data
provided by election jurisdictions. Those jurisdictions vary in what data they collect
and make publicly available. While the EAC is responsible under HAVA for
performing research on various aspects of election administration, it has no authority
to ensure that the necessary data are provided by jurisdictions. If those data prove
difficult for the EAC to obtain, Congress might wish to consider providing the
agency with the authority needed to acquire them.
Military and Overseas Voters
After the 2000 election, both the Defense Authorization Act of 2002 and HAVA
amended the Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act of 1986
(UOCAVA) to improve the voting process for members of the military, their family
members, and Americans living overseas. Just before the November 2004 election,
the President signed the Ronald W. Reagan National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2005 (P.L. 108-375), which included provisions to ease the use of the
federal write-in ballot, a substitute under certain conditions for the states’ regular
absentee ballots.24
Issues. Despite considerable effort by Congress to alleviate difficulties for
military and overseas voters, there remain a number of hurdles to participation. The
most prominent are timing and the reliance on military and overseas mail to receive
and return registration and ballot applications and the ballots themselves. Some states
permit returning voting materials by facsimile (fax), but privacy concerns have been
raised about this option. The Defense Authorization Act for 2005 expanded the use
of the federal write-in ballot to those in the military who are not deployed abroad but
are away from their voting jurisdiction because they are on active duty. Nonetheless,
delays in printing absentee ballots because of late-occurring primaries, delays in
sending out ballots from the states, and delays with the mail are inherent problems.
The 2004 primary and general elections demonstrated that difficulties continue,
particularly when large numbers of troops are deployed, which may prompt
congressional attention in the 109th Congress. There are few options to fix timing
problems, but Congress could consider requiring an information campaign well in
advance of the election to alleviate the glut of registration and ballot applications that
typically arrive within two months of election day. And while each state was required
to designate a single office to administer the law, an additional requirement for a
hotline telephone number could ease difficulties for individual voters. Expanded use
of the federal blank ballot without restrictions could eliminate the problem of waiting
for the state absentee ballot, but would limit voting to federal offices only unless a
state decided otherwise.
24 See CRS Report RS20764, The Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act:
Background and Issues.

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Voting System Standards
In addition to voting system requirements, HAVA requires the EAC to develop
voluntary guidelines for voting systems to replace the Federal Voluntary Voting
Systems Standards (VSS) developed by the Federal Election Commission in
collaboration with the National Association of State Election Directors (NASED) and
first issued in 1990. They were developed for both computer hardware and software
and have been adopted in whole or in part by most states. A voluntary certification
program for voting systems was also developed to verify their conformance with the
VSS. HAVA gives responsibility for establishing testing and certification procedures
to the EAC, with NIST playing an advisory role.25
Issues. The delays and funding uncertainties experienced by the EAC have
raised concerns about the timely development of the new guidelines. While HAVA
stipulates that the most recent version of the VSS, last revised in 2002, will serve as
the guidelines until new ones are developed, the VSS have been widely criticized
with respect to their scope, approach, and effectiveness. For example, the DREs for
which significant security weaknesses have been identified had been certified as
conforming to the VSS.26 Some observers believe that voluntary standards cannot
ensure sufficient quality of voting systems, while others are concerned that
mandatory standards would reduce the flexibility of state and local governments to
respond to their specific needs and of manufacturers to respond to changes in the
market place and to take advantage of new technological innovations. The FY2005
omnibus would provide funding specifically to support NIST’s HAVA activities, and
the joint explanatory statement accompanying the bill stresses the importance of
standards development.27
Absentee Ballots
No federal standards exist with respect to absentee ballots, although the EAC
is required to conduct a study of absentee voting under HAVA. Voters in many states
can request an absentee ballot only for specific reasons that would prevent the voter
from casting a ballot in person. But according to the National Conference of State
Legislatures (NCSL), 26 states allow any voter to request such a ballot, sometimes
called “no fault” absentee voting. Oregon conducts its elections entirely by mail —
all registered voters receive their ballots through the Postal Service. While the
percentage of votes cast by absentee or mail ballot has been increasing in recent
elections, some observers have expressed concerns that the method is more
vulnerable to certain kinds of fraud and coercion of voters than is balloting at the
polling place. Absentee ballots are perhaps the classic example of the legacy of state-
by-state election administration. Eligibility, types of ballots used, deadlines for
25 See Federal Voting Systems Standards and Guidelines, in the CRS Election Reform
Briefing Book [http://www.congress.gov/brbk/html/eberf12.html].
26 See CRS Report RL32139 and CRS Report RL32526.
27 The EAC is required to report by March 2, 2005, on its FY2005 plans for research and
standards activities and resources.

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CRS-9
submission, and counting procedures and deadlines vary widely by state, and no
uniform approach exists with any single element of absentee voting.
Issues. Absentee voting is on the increase and some voters reportedly cast
absentee ballots in 2004 to avoid using a DRE at the polling place to cast a ballot. It
is not clear whether Congress will take any action with respect to absentee ballots.
If Congress does act on the issue, legislative remedies would likely focus on
establishing uniform procedures for sending out absentee ballots, counting methods
and deadlines, and eligibility.
Early Voting
In some states, voters may cast a ballot in person before election day through an
early voting program. There are many approaches, and the number of states using
early voting is growing. According to the NCSL, 23 states have some form of it,28
whereas 13 states offered early voting in 2000. In some states, a voter can cast a
ballot at multiple locations in the jurisdiction before election day, while in other
states, the voter must visit the election official’s office to do so. The days and hours
for voting vary as well.
Issues. Some observers have criticized early voting as distorting to the
electoral process and being open to certain kinds of fraud and abuse. One
disadvantage concerns late-occurring developments or issues in a campaign about
which an early voter might have no knowledge. Also, because early voting is a form
of remote voting, as opposed to casting a ballot at an assigned precinct, a greater
possibility of committing fraud arguably exists. Proponents argue that early voting
can increase turnout and lessen the risk of certain kinds of distortions. The increase
in the number of states offering early voting suggests that the trend will continue, and
the 109th Congress may consider legislation to require all states to establish early
voting programs.
Internet Voting
A Defense Department program to allow those in the military and their family
members abroad to vote over the Internet was cancelled for 2004 after a report that
noted it could be prone to tampering that might affect the election outcome. The
2004 program was to be an expanded version of a pilot program in 2000 in which 84
voters cast ballots over the Internet. As many as 100,000 voters might have cast
ballots under the program in 2004. Arizona’s Democratic party conducted a primary
in 2000 in which approximately 40% of voters cast ballots over the Internet, although
computer problems and access issues emerged after the voting.29
Issues. Internet voting may continue on a limited basis for certain types of
elections, such as Arizona’s Democratic primary in 2000, or on an experimental
basis, but security concerns are paramount. Given the emergence of security issues
28 In addition, seven states that do not offer early voting offer no-excuse absentee voting.
29 See CRS Report RS20639, Internet Voting.

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in voting in recent years, particularly those raised with respect to the use of DREs in
polling places, enthusiasm for Internet voting has consequently declined. Efforts in
the Defense Department to facilitate Internet voting are the most likely prospect for
the immediate future, although the future status of that program is unknown.
Election Personnel
There are roughly 9,000 election jurisdictions in the United States, ranging in
size from small rural jurisdictions with fewer than a thousand voters to large
metropolitan jurisdictions with several million.30 For many jurisdictions, the
administration of periodic elections is unlikely to be considered as high a priority as
more regular needs such as schools and roads. Funding and personnel vary, with
some jurisdictions having large, well-funded operations and others very small efforts
with part-time staffing.
According to the EAC, a federal election requires a total of about 2 million
pollworkers nationwide.31 Most pollworkers are older citizens, many retired and
elderly. They are usually required to work on election day from before polls open to
well after they close, often a span of 14 hours or more. They are usually either
unpaid or they receive only a small stipend. HAVA established two small programs
to recruit college and high school students to work at the polls but has no other
specific provisions regarding pollworkers.
Issues. The level of training and expertise varies substantially among election
administrators, and some observers believe that election administration needs to be
more strongly developed as a profession, with concomitant expectations about
expertise, certification, and adherence to professional codes of conduct.32 The age
and number of pollworkers is also of concern to many, especially in an election with
high turnout. Many jurisdictions have apparently expressed concerns that recruiting
enough pollworkers has become more difficult.33 An insufficient workforce at the
polling place, or pollworkers who are insufficiently or improperly trained, especially
if they are using new equipment, may lead to errors that can create problems for
voters or even impact the outcome of an election. While HAVA requires states to
submit plans to the EAC that describe, among other things, their plans for education
and training of election officials and pollworkers with respect to meeting HAVA
requirements, it does not specify expectations or require EAC guidance for that
education and training. Should Congress decide to address issues relating to election
personnel, it could establish a specific program to fund training of election officials
and pollworkers, or it might require the EAC to establish a program to accredit
30 For example, in 2000, Petroleum County, Montana, had 443 registered voters and Los
Angeles County, California had 4,075,037 (source: electionline.org).
31 Election Assistance Commission, “U.S. Election Assistance Commission Pushes Poll
Worker Initiative,” Media Advisory, 21 October 2004.
32 Some have also suggested that election officials be officially nonpartisan to avoid the
appearance of conflict of interest, whereas others believe such an approach to be ineffective
or unnecessary in many cases.
33 Election Assistance Commission, “Poll Worker Initiative.”

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organizations that create and administer certification programs for election
administrators, as it is required to do for testing laboratories (Sec. 231(b)).
The Polling Place
The Help America Vote Act requires posting voting information at each polling
place; mandates disability access to voting in all polling places through the use of at
least one voting device that provides the same privacy and independence as for other
voters; and requires voters who have registered by mail and have not voted in the
jurisdiction to provide one of a number of acceptable forms of identification (see the
discussion of these requirements in HAVA 2004 Requirements and HAVA 2006
Requirements above). Jurisdictions vary in the number and kinds of polling places
used for an election. HAVA provides grants to improve the accessibility of polling
places but does not establish new requirements.
Issues. Provisional voting and voter identification requirements could continue
to generate some controversy if state legislatures revisit these topics, insofar as
HAVA left the specific details of implementation to the states. With respect to both
topics, states could ease or tighten voter identification requirements generally and the
procedures for the use of provisional ballots. Challenging a voter’s eligibility at the
polling place emerged as an issue in the 2004 election, although HAVA is silent on
this issue and state laws vary considerably with respect to who may challenge and
under what circumstances. In some states, no challenges may be made except by a
poll worker, while in others, partisan workers may be admitted to the polling place
to observe the voting and may challenge a voter’s eligibility. The number,
distribution, and condition of polling places has also sometimes been an issue. It
could potentially be addressed by establishing requirements such as a maximum
number of registered voters or a maximum geographic area covered by a polling
place.
Election Security
The current security environment has raised concerns that terrorist attacks or
other events might disrupt an election and even affect the outcome.34 Questions have
been raised about both postponement of elections and enhancement of security. The
executive branch does not currently have authority to set or change the times of
elections, a power reserved for Congress under the Constitution, although Congress
may be able to delegate such authority. Either Congress or the states might also pass
legislation in response to a terrorist attack that would change the timing of any
elections that were affected. Some states have enacted statutes providing for the
temporary postponement of elections. Many state statutes also grant the Governor
the power to suspend certain state laws during an emergency.35 Those statutes might
34 For an overview, see CRS Report RL32654, Safeguarding Federal Elections from
Possible Terrorist Attack: Issues and Options for Congress.
35 For discussion of state emergency management provisions, see CRS Report RL32287,
Emergency Management and Homeland Security Statutory Authorities in the States, District
of Columbia, and Insular Areas: a Summary. This report also contains links to reports that
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also be able to be used to postpone the general presidential election in the state
during an emergency. However, actual postponement of elections has occurred in
relatively few cases over the last 150 years.
It is generally the responsibility of state and local governments to provide
security at polling places. A guide for state election-security planning recommends
establishment of planning teams and preparation for a range of possible scenarios.36
Reactions of state and local officials varied for the November 2004 election, with
some making as few visible changes as possible and others increasing police
presence or even moving polling places.
Issues. Whether Congress considers actions to safeguard elections may
depend on events associated with future U.S. elections or those in other countries.
Among the options are to take no legislative action, to explicitly delegate authority
to the executive branch to the extent permitted by the Constitution, to provide
mechanisms for improved coordination, and to encourage early and absentee voting.
All these options have some potential benefits but also significant potential
disadvantages.
Electoral College
The President and the Vice President are elected indirectly by the electoral
college, according to a compromise design that balanced equal representation from
each of the states against population differences. The U.S. Constitution, in Article II,
Section 1, Clause 2, as amended by the 12th Amendment, together with a series of
implementing federal statutes, provides the broad framework through which electors
are appointed and by which they cast votes for President and Vice President.37
Issues. Nearly since its inception, the electoral college has engendered calls
for reform. Among the criticisms are the possibility that no candidate achieves a
majority of electoral college votes, resulting in election by the House of
Representatives (as occurred in 1824); the election of a President and Vice President
who win a majority in the electoral college, but do not win the popular vote (as
happened in 1824, 1876, 1888, and 2000); the assignment of electoral votes, said to
give less populous states an advantage because a state’s vote equals the number of
members of the House of Representatives (based on population) and the Senate (not
based on population); and a perceived advantage for ethnic voters, whereby the
concentrations of such voters in large states are said to benefit because of a tendency
to vote as a group for a single candidate, thus increasing their comparative influence.
35(...continued)
profile provisions of each state.
36 National Association of Secretaries of State and others, Overview: Election Security
Planning for States, 24 September 2004, available at
[http://www.nass.org/Security%20Planning%20Guide.pdf].
37 For a detailed discussion of the electoral college and reform, see CRS Report RL30804,
The Electoral College: An Overview and Analysis of Reform Proposals, and CRS Report
RL32611, The Electoral College: How It Works in Contemporary Presidential Elections.

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In recent years, heightened interest in reforming the electoral college tends to
coincide with closely contested elections wherein the possibility exists that the
electoral college winner does not win the popular vote. Despite the circumstances
of the 2000 election which focused national attention on the electoral college vote,
reform efforts after the election addressed election administration and voting issues,
rather than reform of the electoral college. Reform proposals can be expected in the
109th Congress, as they are routinely introduced in nearly every Congress, but the
results from the 2004 election suggest that a public mandate for changing or
abolishing the electoral college has yet to emerge.

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