Order Code IB81050
CRS Issue Brief for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
War Powers Resolution:
Presidential Compliance
Updated November 15, 2004
Richard F. Grimmett
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

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CONTENTS
SUMMARY
MOST RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS
United Nations Actions
Former Yugoslavia/Bosnia
Kosovo
Iraq-Post 1991
Haiti
Somalia
Instances Formally Reported
Under the War Powers Resolution
Consultation with Congress
Issues for Congress

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War Powers Resolution: Presidential Compliance
SUMMARY
Two separate but closely related issues
forces had been introduced into hostilities or
confront Congress each time the President
imminent hostilities. Congress invoked the
introduces armed forces into a situation
War Powers Resolution in the Multinational
abroad that conceivably could lead to their
Force in Lebanon Resolution (P.L. 98-119),
involvement in hostilities. One issue concerns
which authorized the Marines to remain in
the division of war powers between the Presi-
Lebanon for 18 months. In addition, P.L.
dent and Congress, whether the use of armed
102-1, authorizing the use of U.S. armed
forces falls within the purview of the congres-
forces concerning the Iraqi aggression against
sional power to declare war and the War
Kuwait, stated that it constituted specific
Powers Resolution. The other issue is whether
statutory authorization within the meaning of
Congress concurs in the wisdom of the action.
the War Powers Resolution. On November 9,
This issue brief does not deal with the
1993, the House used a section of the War
substantive merits of using armed forces in
Powers Resolution to state that U.S. forces
specific cases, but rather with the congressio-
should be withdrawn from Somalia by March
nal authorization for the action and the appli-
31, 1994; Congress had already taken this
cation and effectiveness of the War Powers
action in appropriations legislation. More
Resolution. The purpose of the War Powers
recently, war powers have been at issue in
Resolution (P.L. 93-148, passed over Presi-
former Yugoslavia/Bosnia/Kosovo, Iraq,
dent Nixon’s veto on November 7, 1973) is to
Haiti, and in responding to terrorist attacks
ensure that Congress and the President share
against the U.S. after September 11, 2001.
in making decisions that may get the U.S.
After combat operations against Iraqi forces
involved in hostilities. Compliance becomes
ended on February 28, 1991, the use of force
an issue whenever the President introduces
to obtain Iraqi compliance with U.N. resolu-
U.S. forces abroad in situations that might be
tions remained a War Powers issue, until the
construed as hostilities or imminent hostilities.
enactment of P.L. 107-243, in October 2002,
Criteria for compliance include prior consulta-
which explicitly authorized the President to
tion with Congress, fulfillment of the report-
use force against Iraq, an authority he exer-
ing requirements, and congressional authoriza-
cised in March 2003, and continues to exer-
tion. If the President has not complied fully,
cise for military operations in Iraq.
the issue becomes what action Congress
should take to bring about compliance or to
A longer-term issue is whether the War
influence U.S. policy. A new issue has be-
Powers Resolution is an appropriate and
come congressional authorization of U.N.
effective means of assuring congressional
peacekeeping or other U.N.-sponsored actions.
participation in actions that might get the
For nearly 31 years, war powers and the War
United States involved in war. Some observ-
Powers Resolution have been an issue in U.S.
ers contend that the War Powers Resolution
military actions in Asia, the Middle East,
has not significantly increased congressional
Africa, Central America, and Europe. Presi-
participation, while others emphasize that it
dents have submitted 115 reports to Congress
has promoted consultation and served as
as a result of the War Powers Resolution,
leverage. Proposals have been made to
although only one (the Mayaguez situation)
strengthen, change, or repeal the resolution.
cited Section 4(a)(1) or specifically stated that
None have been enacted to date.
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

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MOST RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
On March 20, 2004, the President reported to Congress “consistent with the War
Powers Resolution,” a consolidated report giving details of multiple on-going United States
military deployments and operations “in support of the global war on terrorism (including
in Afghanistan),” as well as operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, and Haiti. In
this report, the President noted that U.S. anti-terror related activities were underway in
Georgia, Djibouti, Kenya, Ethiopia, Yemen, and Eritrea. He further noted that U.S. combat-
equipped military personnel continued to be deployed in Kosovo as part of the NATO-led
KFOR (1,900 personnel); in Bosnia and Herzegovina as part of the NATO-led SFOR (about
1,100 personnel); and approximately 1,800 military personnel were deployed in Haiti as part
of the U.N. Multinational Interim Force.
On March 2, 2004, the President reported to Congress “consistent with the War Powers
Resolution” that, on February 29, he had sent about “200 additional U.S. combat-equipped,
military personnel from the U.S. Joint Forces Command” to Port-au-Prince, Haiti for a
variety of purposes, including preparing the way for a UN Multinational Interim Force, and
otherwise supporting UN Security Council Resolution 1529 (2004).
BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS
Under the Constitution, war powers are divided. Congress has the power to declare war
and raise and support the armed forces (Article I, Section 8), while the President is
Commander in Chief (Article II, Section 2). It is generally agreed that the Commander in
Chief role gives the President power to repel attacks against the United States and makes him
responsible for leading the armed forces. During the Korean and Vietnam wars, the United
States found itself involved for many years in undeclared wars. Many Members of Congress
became concerned with the erosion of congressional authority to decide when the United
States should become involved in a war or the use of armed forces that might lead to war.
On November 7, 1973, Congress passed the War Powers Resolution (P.L. 93-148) over the
veto of President Nixon.
The War Powers Resolution states that the President’s powers as Commander- in-Chief
to introduce U.S. forces into hostilities or imminent hostilities are exercised only pursuant
to (1) a declaration of war; (2) specific statutory authorization; or (3) a national emergency
created by an attack on the United States or its forces. It requires the President in every
possible instance to consult with Congress before introducing American armed forces into
hostilities or imminent hostilities unless there has been a declaration of war or other specific
congressional authorization. It also requires the President to report to Congress any
introduction of forces into hostilities or imminent hostilities, Section 4(a)(1); into foreign
territory while equipped for combat, Section 4(a)(2); or in numbers which substantially
enlarge U.S. forces equipped for combat already in a foreign nation, Section 4(a)(3). Once
a report is submitted “or required to be submitted” under Section 4(a)(1), Congress must
authorize the use of forces within 60 to 90 days or the forces must be withdrawn. (For
detailed background, see CRS Report RL32267, The War Powers Resolution: After Thirty
Years, and CRS Report RL31133, Declarations of War and Authorizations for the Use of
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Military Force: Background and Legal Implications). It is important to note that since the
War Powers Resolution’s enactment, over President Nixon’s veto in 1973, every President
has taken the position that it is an unconstitutional infringement by the Congress on the
President’s authority as Commander-in-Chief. The courts have not directly addressed this
question.
United Nations Actions
U.N. Security Council resolutions provide authority for U.S. action under international
law. Whether congressional authorization is required under domestic law depends on the
types of U.N. action and is governed by the Constitution, the U.N. Participation Act (P.L.
79-264, as amended), as well as by the War Powers Resolution. Section 8(b) of the War
Powers Resolution exempts only participation in headquarters operations of joint military
commands established prior to 1973.
For armed actions under Articles 42 and 43 of the U.N. Charter, Section 6 of the U.N.
Participation Act authorizes the President to negotiate special agreements with the Security
Council, subject to the approval of Congress, providing for the numbers and types of armed
forces and facilities to be made available to the Security Council. Once the agreements have
been concluded, further congressional authorization is not necessary, but no such agreements
have been concluded. Some Members have sought to encourage negotiation of military
agreements under Article 43 of the U.N. Charter. Questions include whether congressional
approval is required only for an initial agreement on providing peacekeeping forces in
general, or for each agreement to provide forces in specific situations, and how such
approvals would relate to the War Powers Resolution.
Section 7 of the U.N. Participation Act authorizes the detail of up to 1,000 personnel
to serve in any noncombatant capacity for certain U.N. peaceful settlement activities. The
United States has provided personnel to several U.N. peacekeeping missions, such as
observers to the U.N. Truce Supervision Organization in Palestine. In these instances,
controversy over the need for congressional authorization has not occurred because the action
appeared to fall within the authorization in Section 7 of the Participation Act. Controversy
has arisen when forces have been deployed in larger numbers or as possible combatants.
In the 103rd Congress, Members used several vehicles in seeking some control over
future peacekeeping actions wherever they might occur. Both the Defense Appropriations
Act for FY1994, P.L. 103-139 (Section 8153), and for FY1995, P.L. 103- 335 (Section
8103), stated the sense of Congress that funds should not be used for U.N. peacekeeping or
peace enforcement operations unless the President consulted with Congress at least 15 days
in advance whenever possible. Section 1502 of the Defense Authorization for FY1994, P.L.
103-60, required the President to submit by April 1, 1994, a report on multinational
peacekeeping including the requirement of congressional approval for participation and the
applicability of the War Powers Resolution and the U.N. Participation Act.
Along similar lines, the conference report on the Department of State Appropriations
Act for FY1994, H.R. 2519 (P.L. 103-121, signed October 27, 1993), called for the Secretary
of State to notify both Appropriations Committees 15 days in advance, where practicable,
of a vote by the U.N. Security Council to establish any new or expanded peacekeeping
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mission. The Foreign Relations Authorization Act, P.L. 103-236, signed April 30, 1994,
established new requirements for consultation with Congress on U.S. Participation in U.N.
Peacekeeping Operations. Section 407 required monthly consultations on the status of
peacekeeping operations and advance reports on resolutions that would authorize a new U.N.
peacekeeping operation. It also required 15 days’ advance notice of any U.S. assistance to
support U.N. peacekeeping operations and a quarterly report on all assistance that had been
provided to the U.N. for peacekeeping operations. To permit presidential flexibility,
conferees explained, the quarterly report need not include temporary duty assignments of
U.S. personnel in support of peacekeeping operations of less than twenty personnel in any
one case.
The following discussion provides background on major cases of U.S. military
involvement in overseas operations in recent years that have raised War Powers questions.
Former Yugoslavia/Bosnia
The issue of war powers and whether congressional authorization is necessary for U.S.
participation in U.N. action (see above discussion) was also raised by efforts to halt fighting
in the former territory of Yugoslavia, particularly in Bosnia. The United States participated
without congressional authorization in airlifts into Sarajevo, naval monitoring of sanctions,
aerial enforcement of a “no-fly zone,” and aerial enforcement of safe havens.
Because some of the U.S. action has been taken within a NATO framework, action in
Bosnia has raised the broader issue of whether action under NATO is exempt from the
requirements of the War Powers Resolution or its standard for the exercise of war powers
under the Constitution. Article 11 of the North Atlantic Treaty states that its provisions are
to be carried out by the parties “in accordance with their respective constitutional processes,”
inferring some role for Congress in the event of war. Section 8(a) of the War Powers
Resolution states that authority to introduce U.S. forces into hostilities is not to be inferred
from any treaty, ratified before or after 1973, unless implementing legislation specifically
authorizes such introduction and says it is intended to constitute an authorization within the
meaning of the War Powers Resolution. Section 8(b) states that nothing in the Resolution
should be construed to require further authorization for U.S. participation in the headquarters
operations of military commands established before 1973, such as NATO headquarters
operations.
On August 13, 1992, the U.N. Security Council adopted Resolution 770 calling on all
nations to take “all measures necessary” to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance
to Sarajevo. On August 11, 1992, the Senate had passed S.Res. 330 urging the President to
work for such a resolution and pledging funds for participation, but saying that no U.S.
military personnel should be introduced into hostilities without clearly defined objectives.
On the same day, the House passed H.Res. 554 urging the Security Council to authorize
measures, including the use of force, to ensure humanitarian relief. Thus, both chambers of
Congress supported action but not by legislation authorizing the use of U.S. forces. For
details of congressional actions relating to Bosnia from 1993 through 1995, see CRS Report
RL32267, The War Powers Resolution: After Thirty Years.
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In late 1995, the issue of war powers and Bosnia was raised again as President Clinton
sent over 20,000 American combat troops to Bosnia as part of a NATO-led peacekeeping
force. In December 1995, Congress considered and voted on a number of bills and
resolutions, but the House and Senate could not come to consensus on any single measure.
Subsequently, President Clinton in December 1996, agreed to provide up to 8,500 ground
troops to participate in a NATO-led follow-on force in Bosnia termed the Stabilization Force
(SFOR). On March 18, 1998, the House defeated by a vote of 193-225, H.Con.Res. 227, a
resolution directing the President, pursuant to section 5(c) of the War Powers Resolution to
remove United States Armed Forces from the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.(H.Rept.
105-442). (For additional information, see CRS Report RS21774: Bosnia and International
Security Forces: Transition from NATO to the European Union in 2004, and CRS Report
RL32267, The War Powers Resolution: After Thirty Years.)
Kosovo
The issue of presidential authority to deploy forces in the absence of congressional
authorization, under the War Powers Resolution, or otherwise, became an issue of significant
controversy in late March 1999 when President Clinton ordered U.S. military forces to
participate in a NATO-led military operation in Kosovo. This action has become the focus
of an on-going policy debate over the purpose and scope of U.S. military involvement in
Kosovo. The President’s action to commit forces to the NATO Kosovo operation also led
to a suit in Federal District Court for the District of Columbia by Members of Congress
seeking a judicial finding that the President was violating the War Powers Resolution and
the Constitution by using military forces in Yugoslavia in the absence of authorization from
the Congress.
The Kosovo controversy began in earnest when on March 26, 1999, President Clinton
notified the Congress “consistent with the War Powers Resolution”, that on March 24, 1999,
U.S. military forces, at his direction and in coalition with NATO allies, had commenced air
strikes against Yugoslavia in response the Yugoslav government’s campaign of violence and
repression against the ethnic Albanian population in Kosovo. Prior to the President’s action,
the Senate, on March 23, 1999, had passed, by a vote of 58-41, S.Con.Res. 21, a non-binding
resolution expressing the sense of the Congress that the President was authorized to conduct
“military air operations and missile strikes in cooperation with our NATO allies against the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro).”
Subsequently, the House voted on a number of measures relating to U.S. participation
in the NATO operation in Kosovo. On April 28, 1999, the House of Representatives passed
H.R. 1569, by a vote of 249-180. This bill would prohibit the use of funds appropriated to
the Defense Department from being used for the deployment of “ground elements” of the
U.S. Armed Forces in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia unless that deployment is
specifically authorized by law. On that same day the House defeated H.Con.Res. 82, by a
vote of 139-290. This resolution would have directed the President, pursuant to section 5(c)
of the War Powers Resolution, to remove U.S. Armed Forces from their positions in
connection with the present operations against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. On April
28, 1999, the House also defeated H.J.Res. 44, by a vote of 2-427. This joint resolution
would have declared a state of war between the United States and the “Government of the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.” The House on that same day also defeated, on a 213-213
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tie vote, S.Con.Res. 21, the Senate resolution passed on March 23, 1999, that supported
military air operations and missile strikes against Yugoslavia. On April 30, 1999,
Representative Tom Campbell and 17 other members of the House filed suit in Federal
District Court for the District of Columbia seeking a ruling requiring the President to obtain
authorization from Congress before continuing the air war, or taking other military action
against Yugoslavia.
The Senate, on May 4, 1999, by a vote of 78-22, tabled S.J.Res. 20, a joint resolution,
sponsored by Senator John McCain, that would authorize the President “to use all necessary
force and other means, in concert with United States allies, to accomplish United States and
North Atlantic Treaty Organization objectives in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia
and Montenegro).” The House, meanwhile, on May 6, 1999, by a vote of 117-301, defeated
an amendment by Representative Istook to H.R. 1664, the FY1999 defense supplemental
appropriations bill, that would have prohibited the expenditure of funds in the bill to
implement any plan to use U.S. ground forces to invade Yugoslavia, except in time of war.
Congress, meanwhile, on May 20, 1999 cleared for the President’s signature, H.R. 1141, an
emergency supplemental appropriations bill for FY1999, that provided billions in funding
for the existing U.S. Kosovo operation.
On May 25, 1999, the 60th day had passed since the President notified Congress of his
actions regarding U.S. participation in military operations in Kosovo. Representative
Campbell, and those who joined his suit, noted to the Federal Court that this was a clear
violation of the language of the War Powers Resolution stipulating a withdrawal of U.S.
forces from the area of hostilities occur after 60 days in the absence of congressional
authorization to continue, or a presidential request to Congress for an extra 30 day period to
safely withdraw. The President did not seek such a 30-day extension, noting instead that the
War Powers Resolution is constitutionally defective. On June 8, 1999, Federal District Judge
Paul L. Friedman dismissed the suit of Representative Campbell and others that sought to
have the court rule that President Clinton was in violation of the War Powers Resolution and
the Constitution by conducting military activities in Yugoslavia without having received
prior authorization from Congress. The judge ruled that Representative Campbell and others
lacked legal standing to bring the suit (Campbell v. Clinton, 52 F. Supp. 2d 34 (D.D.C.
1999)). Representative Campbell appealed the ruling on June 24, 1999, to the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia. The appeals court agreed to hear the case. On
February 18, 2000, the appeals court affirmed the opinion of the District Court that
Representative Campbell and his co-plaintiffs lacked standing to sue the President.
(Campbell v. Clinton, 203 F.3d 19 (D.C. Cir. 2000). On May 18, 2000, Representative
Campbell and 30 other Members of Congress appealed this decision to the United States
Supreme Court. On October 2, 2000, the United States Supreme Court, without comment,
refused to hear the appeal of Representative Campbell thereby letting stand the holding of
the U.S. Court of Appeals. (Campbell v. Clinton, cert. denied, 531U.S. 815 Oct. 2, 2000).
On May 18, 2000, the Senate defeated by, a vote of 47-53, an amendment to S. 2521, the
Senate’s version of the Military Construction Appropriations Act, FY2001, that would have,
among other things, terminated funding for the continued deployment of U.S. ground combat
troops in Kosovo after July 1, 2001 unless the President sought and received Congressional
authorization to keep U.S. troops in Kosovo. (For detailed discussion of major issues see
CRS Report RL31053, Kosovo and U.S. Policy; CRS Report RL30352, War Powers
Litigation Since the Enactment of the War Powers Resolution).
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Iraq-Post 1991
During the week of October 3, 1994, Iraq began sending two additional divisions to join
regular forces in southern Iraq, close to the border of Kuwait. On October 8 President
Clinton responded by sending about 30,000 additional U.S. forces and additional combat
planes to join the forces already in the Gulf area. He said the United States would honor its
commitment to defend Kuwait and enforce U.N. resolutions on Iraq. Congress recessed on
October 8 until November 29, 1994, so it did not discuss the issue of congressional
authorization. On October 28 President Clinton reported to Congress that by October 15
there were clear indications that Iraq had redeployed its forces to their original location. On
November 7 the Defense Department announced 7,000 of the U.S. forces would be
withdrawn before Christmas.
Earlier, three continuing situations in Iraq since the end of Desert Storm brought about
the use of U.S. forces and thus raised war powers issues. The first situation resulted from
the Iraqi government’s repression of Kurdish and Shiite groups. U.N. Security Council
Resolution 688 of April 5, 1991, condemned the repression of the Iraqi civilian population
and appealed for contributions to humanitarian relief efforts. The second situation stemmed
from the U.N. cease-fire resolution of April 3, 1991, Security Council Resolution 687, which
called for Iraq to accept the destruction or removal of chemical and biological weapons and
international control of its nuclear materials.
The third situation was related to both of the earlier ones. On August 26, 1992, the
United States, Britain, and France began a “no-fly” zone, banning Iraqi fixed wing and
helicopter flights south of the 32nd parallel and creating a limited security zone in the south,
where Shiite groups are concentrated. After violations of the no-fly zones and various other
actions by Iraq, on January 13, 1993, the outgoing Bush Administration announced that
aircraft from the United States and coalition partners had attacked missile bases in southern
Iraq and that the United States was deploying a battalion task force to Kuwait to underline
the U.S. continuing commitment to Kuwait’s independence. On January 6, 1993, the United
States gave Iraq an ultimatum to remove newly deployed missiles in the no-fly zone. On
January 19, 1993, President George H.W. Bush reported to Congress that U.S. aircraft on
December 27, 1992, had shot down an Iraqi aircraft that had entered the no-fly zone and had
undertaken further military actions on January 13, 17, and 18.
President Clinton said on January 21, 1993, that the United States would adhere to the
policy toward Iraq set by the former Bush Administration, and on January 22, 23, April 9 and
18, June 19, and August 19, 1993, U.S. aircraft fired at targets in Iraq after pilots sensed Iraqi
radar or anti-aircraft fire directed at them. A number of such incidents occurred while planes
patrolled the no-fly zone. On June 6, 1994, President Clinton reported that over the previous
two years, the northern no-fly zone had deterred Iraq from a military offensive in the northern
zone. Iraqi forces had responded to the no-fly zone in the south, he reported, by continuing
to use land-based artillery to shell marsh villages. In addition, Iraq was conducting a large
search and destroy operation and razing and burning marsh villages, in violation of U.N.
Security Council Resolution 688. Until Iraq fully complied with all relevant U.N. Security
Council resolutions, he reported, the United States would maintain sanctions and other
measures designed to achieve compliance.
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A war powers issue for years was whether the use of U.S. force in Iraq in the period
after the early 1991 Desert Storm conflict had been authorized by Congress. P.L. 102-1
authorized the President to use U.S. armed forces pursuant to U.N. Security Council
Resolution 678 to achieve implementation of previous Security Council Resolutions;
Security Council Resolution 687 was adopted after this. On August 2, 1991, the Senate
adopted an amendment to the Defense Authorization bill supporting the use of all necessary
means to achieve the goals of Resolution 687. Senator Dole said the amendment was not
intended to authorize the use of force by the President, and that in his view in the current
circumstances the President required no specific authorization from Congress. As enacted,
Section 1095 of P.L. 102-190 states the sense of Congress that it supports the use of all
necessary means to achieve the goals of Security Council Resolution 687 as being consistent
with the Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution. The bill also
included an amendment by Senator Pell supporting the use of all necessary means to protect
Iraq’s Kurdish minority, consistent with relevant U.N. resolutions and authorities contained
in P.L. 102-1 (Section 1096 of P.L. 102-190.)
In addition to these continuing situations, on June 28, 1993, President Clinton reported
to Congress that on June 26 U.S. naval forces had launched a Tomahawk cruise missile strike
on the Iraqi Intelligence Service’s main command and control complex in Baghdad and that
the military action was completed. He said the Iraqi Intelligence Service had planned the
failed attempt to assassinate former President Bush during his visit to Kuwait in April 1993.
On September 5, 1996, President Clinton reported to Congress on U.S. military actions in
Iraq to obtain compliance with U.N. Security Council Resolutions, especially in light of
attacks by Iraqi military forces against the Kurdish-controlled city of Irbil. U.S. actions
ordered by the President included extending the no-fly zone in southern Iraq from 32 to 33
degrees north latitude, and conduction cruise missile attacks from B-52H bombers and ships
in the USS Carl Vinson Battle Group against fixed, surface-to- air missile sites, command
and control centers, and air defense control facilities south of the 33rd parallel in Iraq. Except
for the report of June 28, 1993, Presidents Bush and Clinton did not cite the War Powers
Resolution in the above reports. They submitted them “consistent with” P.L. 102-1, which
requires the President to submit a report to the Congress at least once every 60 days on the
status of efforts to obtain compliance by Iraq with the U.N. Security Council resolution
adopted in response to the Iraq aggression.
Starting in 1998 through the end of the Clinton Administration, Iraq’s refusal to permit
U.N. weapons inspection teams to have access to various Iraqi sites, and Iraqi threats to U.S.
aircraft policing the “no-fly zones” resulted in U.S. military action on numerous occasions
against Iraqi military forces and targets in the “no-fly zones.” President Clinton chose to
report these actions under the requirements of P.L. 102-1, rather than the War Powers
Resolution. In early February 2001, President G.W. Bush authorized U.S. aircraft, to attack
Iraqi radar installations in Southern Iraq believed to threaten allied forces enforcing the “no-
fly zone.” Additional bombings of Iraqi sites were authorized and took place from the
summer of 2001 into March 2003. Such actions, when reported in the past, were done under
P.L. 102-1. In a report to Congress on January 20, 2003, pursuant to P. L. 107-243, President
Bush stated that information required to be reported regarding actions taken against Iraq
required by section 3 of P.L. 102-1 would in the future be included in the reports required
by P.L. 107-243. On March 19, 2003, President Bush directed U.S. Armed Forces to
commence combat operations against Iraq to enforce its disarmament. Congressional
authorization for such an action was provided for in P.L. 107-243 signed into law on October
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16, 2002. Since he announced the end of major combat operations against Iraq on May 1,
2003, the President has made periodic reports on the current situation in Iraq “consistent
with” P. L. 107-243, which have become the equivalent of reports to Congress envisioned
by the War Powers Resolution. For the most recent of these reports to Congress see House
Document 108-180, 108th Congress, 2nd session, April 21, 2004. (For further related
information, see CRS Report RL31701, Iraq: U.S. Military Operations, and CRS Report
RL31339, Iraq: U.S. Regime Change Efforts and Post-Saddam Governance.)
Haiti
On July 3, 1993, Haitian military leader Raoul Cedras and deposed President
Jean-Bertrand Aristide signed an agreement at Governors Island providing for the restoration
of President Aristide on October 30. The United Nations and Organization of American
States took responsibility for verifying compliance. Because the Haitian authorities did not
comply with the agreement, on October 13, 1993, the U.N. Security Council voted to restore
sanctions against Haiti. On October 20, President Clinton submitted a report “consistent
with the War Powers Resolution” that U.S. ships had begun to enforce the U.N. embargo.
Some Members of Congress complained that Congress had not been consulted on or
authorized the action. On October 18, 1993, Senator Dole said he would offer an amendment
to the Defense Appropriations bill (H.R. 3116) which would require congressional
authorization for all deployments into Haitian waters and airspace unless the President made
specified certifications. Congressional leaders and Administration officials negotiated on
the terms of the amendment. As enacted, Section 8147 of P.L. 103-139 stated the sense that
funds should not be obligated or expended for U.S. military operations in Haiti unless the
operations were (1) authorized in advance by Congress, (2) necessary to protect or evacuate
U.S. citizens, (3) vital to the national security and there was not sufficient time to receive
congressional authorization, or (4) the President submitted a report in advance that the
intended deployment met certain criteria.
On May 6, 1994, the U.N. Security Council adopted Resolution 917 calling for
measures to tighten the embargo. On June 10, 1994, President Clinton announced steps
being taken to intensify the pressure on Haiti’s military leaders that included assisting the
Dominican Republic to seal its border with Haiti, using U.S. naval patrol boats to detain
ships suspected of violating the sanctions, a ban on commercial air traffic, and sanctions on
financial transactions. As conditions in Haiti worsened, President Clinton stated he would
not rule out the use of force, and gradually the use of force appeared certain. Many Members
continued to contend congressional authorization was necessary for any invasion of Haiti.
On July 31, the U.N. Security Council authorized a multinational force to use “all necessary
means to facilitate the departure from Haiti of the military leadership ... on the understanding
that the cost of implementing this temporary operation will be borne by the participating
Member States” (Resolution 940, 1994).
On August 3, the Senate adopted an amendment to the Department of Veterans
appropriation, H.R. 4624, by a vote of 100-0 expressing its sense that the Security Council
Resolution did not constitute authorization for the deployment of U.S. forces in Haiti under
the Constitution or the War Powers Resolution, but the amendment was not agreed to in
conference. President Clinton said the same day that he would welcome the support of
Congress but did not agree that he was constitutionally mandated to obtain it. On September
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15, 1994, in an address to the Nation, President Clinton said he had called up the military
reserve and ordered two aircraft carriers into the region. His message to the military dictators
was to leave now or the United States would force them from power. The first phase of
military action would remove the dictators from power and restore Haiti’s democratically
elected government. The second phase would involve a much smaller force joining with
forces from other U.N. members which would leave Haiti after 1995 elections were held and
a new government installed.
While the Defense Department continued to prepare for an invasion within days, on
September 16 President Clinton sent to Haiti a negotiating team of former President Jimmy
Carter, former Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Colin Powell, and Senate Armed Services
Committee Chairman Sam Nunn. Again addressing the Nation on September 18, President
Clinton announced that the military leaders had agreed to step down by October 15, and
agreed to the immediate introduction of troops from the 15,000 member international
coalition beginning September 19. He said the agreement was only possible because of the
credible and imminent threat of multinational force. He emphasized the mission still had
risks and there remained possibilities of violence directed at U.S. troops, but the agreement
minimized those risks. He also said that under U.N. Security Council resolution 940, a
25-nation international coalition would soon go to Haiti to begin the task of restoring
democratic government. Also on September 18, President Clinton reported to Congress on
the objectives in accordance with the sense expressed in Section 8147 (c) of P.L. 103-139,
the FY1994 Defense Appropriations Act.
U.S. forces entered Haiti on September 19, 1994. On September 21, President Clinton
reported “consistent with the War Powers Resolution” the deployment of 1,500 troops, to be
increased by several thousand. (At the peak in September there were about 21,000 U.S.
forces in Haiti.) He said the U.S. presence would not be open-ended but would be replaced
after a period of months by a U.N. peacekeeping force, although some U.S. forces would
participate in and be present for the duration of the U.N. mission. The forces were involved
in the first hostilities on September 24 when U.S. Marines killed ten armed Haitian resisters
in a fire-fight.
On October 3, 1994, the House Foreign Affairs Committee reported H.J.Res. 416
authorizing the forces in Haiti until March 1, 1995, and providing procedures for a joint
resolution to withdraw the forces. In House debate on October 6 the House voted against the
original contents and for the Dellums substitute. As passed, H.J.Res. 416 stated the sense
that the President should have sought congressional approval before deploying U.S. forces
to Haiti, supporting a prompt and orderly withdrawal as soon as possible, and requiring a
monthly report on Haiti as well as other reports. This same language was also adopted by
the Senate on October 6 as S.J.Res. 229, and on October 7 the House passed S.J.Res. 229.
President Clinton signed S.J.Res. 229 on October 25, 1994 (P.L. 103-423).
After the U.S. forces began to disarm Haitian military and paramilitary forces and
President Aristide returned on October 15, 1994, the United States began to withdraw some
forces. On March 31, 1995, U.N. peacekeeping forces assumed responsibility for missions
previously conducted by U.S. military forces in Haiti. By September 21, 1995, President
Clinton reported the United States had 2,400 military personnel in Haiti as participants in the
U.N. Mission in Haiti (UNMIH), and 260 U.S. military personnel assigned to the U.S.
Support Group Haiti. On December 5, 1997, President Clinton stated that he intends to keep
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some military personnel in Haiti, even though United Nations peacekeeping forces were
withdrawing. The Pentagon stated that U.S. military personnel in Haiti would be about 500,
consisting mainly of engineering and medical units, with a combat element responsible for
protecting the U.S. contingent. On March 2, 2004, the President reported to Congress
“consistent with the War Powers Resolution” that, on February 29, he had sent about “200
additional U.S. combat-equipped, military personnel from the U.S. Joint Forces Command”
to Port-au-Prince, Haiti for a variety of purposes, including preparing the way for a UN
Multinational Interim Force, and otherwise supporting UN Security Council Resolution
1529 (2004). For further information on Haiti, see CRS Report RL32294, Haiti:
Developments and U.S. Policy Since 1991 and Current Congressional Concerns.
Somalia
In Somalia, the participation of U.S. military forces in a U.N. operation to protect
humanitarian assistance, which began in December 1992, became increasingly controversial
as fighting and casualties increased and objectives appeared to be expanding. On October
7, 1993, President Clinton announced that all U.S. forces would be withdrawn by March 31,
1994, and most forces left by that date. The remaining 58 Marines, who had remained to
protect U.S. diplomats, were withdrawn September 15, 1994.
A major issue for Congress was whether to authorize U.S. action in Somalia. On
February 4, 1993, the Senate passed S.J.Res. 45 to authorize the President to use U.S. armed
forces pursuant to U.N. Security Council Resolution 794. S.J.Res. 45 stated it is intended
to constitute the specific statutory authorization under Section 5(b) of the War Powers
Resolution. On May 25, 1993, the House amended and passed S.J.Res. 45. The amendment
authorized U.S. forces to remain for one year. S.J.Res. 45 was then sent to the Senate for its
concurrence, but the measure did not reach the floor.
As sporadic fighting resulted in the deaths of Somali and U.N. forces, including
Americans, controversy over the operation intensified. On September 9, 1993, the Senate
adopted an amendment to S. 1298, the Defense Authorization Bill, expressing the sense of
Congress that the President by November 15, 1993, should seek and receive congressional
authorization for the continued deployment of U.S. forces to Somalia. It asked that the
President consult with Congress and report the goals, objectives, and anticipated jurisdiction
of the U.S. mission in Somalia by October 15, 1993. On September 29, the House adopted
a similar amendment to its bill, H.R. 2401. On October 7, the President consulted with
congressional leaders from both parties for over two hours on Somalia policy and also
announced that U.S. forces would be withdrawn by March 31, 1994.
On October 15, 1993, the Senate adopted an amendment by Senator Byrd to H.R. 3116,
the Defense Department Appropriations Act for FY1994, cutting off funds for U.S. military
operations in Somalia after March 31, 1994, unless the President obtained further spending
authority from Congress. The Senate approved the use of military operations only for the
protection of American military personnel and bases and for helping maintain the flow of
relief aid by giving the U.N. forces security and logistical support. The amendment, which
became Section 8151 of P.L. 103-139, required U.S. forces in Somalia to remain under the
command and control of U.S. commanders. In addition, on November 9, 1993, the House
adopted H.Con.Res. 170, using Section 5(c) of the War Powers Resolution to direct the
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President to remove forces from Somalia by March 31, 1994; sponsors stated it was a
non-binding measure, and the Senate did not act on the measure. The Defense
Appropriations Act for FY1995 (P.L. 103-335, signed September 30, 1994) prohibited the
use of funds for the continuous presence of U.S. forces in Somalia, except for the protection
of U.S. personnel, after September 30, 1994.
On November 4, the U.N. Security Council decided to end the U.N. mission in Somalia
by March 31, 1995. On March 3, 1995, U.S. forces completed their assistance to United
Nations forces evacuating Somalia.
Instances Formally Reported
Under the War Powers Resolution
Presidents have submitted 115 reports to Congress as a result of the War Powers
Resolution. Of these, President Ford submitted 4, President Carter one, President Reagan 14,
President George H.W. Bush 7, President Clinton 60, and President George W. Bush 29. For
a summary of the 111 reports submitted by the Presidents from 1975-2003, see CRS Report
RL32267, The War Powers Resolution: After Thirty Years. The following is a summary of
reports submitted by President Bush George W. Bush since January 2004.
(112) On January 22, 2004, the President reported to Congress “consistent with the War
Powers Resolution” that the United States was continuing to deploy combat equipped
military personnel Bosnia and Herzegovina in support of NATO’s Stabilization Force
(SFOR) and its peacekeeping efforts in this country. About 1,800 U.S. personnel are
participating.
(113) On February 25, 2004, the President reported to Congress “consistent with the
War Powers Resolution” that, on February 23, he had sent a combat-equipped “security
force” of about “55 U.S. military personnel from the U.S. Joint Forces Command” to Port-
au-Prince, Haiti to augment the U.S. Embassy security forces there and to protect American
citizens and property in light of the instability created by the armed rebellion in Haiti.
(114) On March 2, 2004, the President reported to Congress “consistent with the War
Powers Resolution” that on February 29 he had sent about “200 additional U.S. combat-
equipped, military personnel from the U.S. Joint Forces Command” to Port-au-Prince, Haiti
for a variety of purposes, including preparing the way for a UN Multinational Interim Force,
and otherwise supporting UN Security Council Resolution 1529 (2004).
(115) On March 20, 2004, the President reported to Congress “consistent with the War
Powers Resolution,” a consolidated report giving details of multiple on-going United States
military deployments and operations “in support of the global war on terrorism (including
in Afghanistan),” as well as operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, and Haiti. In
this report, the President noted that U.S. anti-terror related activities were underway in
Georgia, Djibouti, Kenya, Ethiopia, Yemen, and Eritrea. He further noted that U.S. combat-
equipped military personnel continued to be deployed in Kosovo as part of the NATO-led
KFOR (1,900 personnel); in Bosnia and Herzegovina as part of the NATO-led SFOR (about
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1,100 personnel); and approximately 1,800 military personnel were deployed in Haiti as part
of the U.N. Multinational Interim Force.
Consultation with Congress
Section 3 of the War Powers Resolution requires the President “in every possible
instance” to consult with Congress before introducing U.S. armed forces into situations of
hostilities and imminent hostilities, and to continue consultations as long as the armed forces
remain. A review of instances involving the use of armed forces since passage of the
Resolution, listed above, indicates there has been very little consultation with Congress under
the Resolution when consultation is defined to mean seeking advice prior to a decision to
introduce troops. Presidents have met with congressional leaders after the decision to deploy
was made but before commencement of operations.
One problem is the interpretation of when consultation is required. The War Powers
Resolution established different criteria for consultation than for reporting. Consultation is
required only before introducing armed forces into “hostilities or into situations where
imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances,” the
circumstances triggering the time limit. A second problem is the meaning of the term
consultation. The executive branch has often taken the view that the consultation
requirement has been fulfilled when from the viewpoint of some Members of Congress it has
not. The House report on the War Powers Resolution said, “... consultation in this provision
means that a decision is pending on a problem and that Members of Congress are being
asked by the President for their advice and opinions and, in appropriate circumstances, their
approval of action contemplated.” A third problem is who represents Congress for
consultation purposes. The House version specifically called for consultation between the
President and the leadership and appropriate committees. This was changed to less specific
wording in conference, however, to provide some flexibility. Some Members have
introduced proposals to specify a consultation group.
Issues for Congress
An immediate issue for Congress when the President introduces troops into situations
of potential hostilities is whether to invoke Section 4(a)(1) of the War Powers Resolution and
trigger a durational limit for the action unless Congress authorizes the forces to remain. If
Congress concurs in a President’s action, application of the Resolution may be desirable
either to legitimize the action and strengthen it by making clear congressional support for the
measure or to establish the precedent that the Resolution does apply in such a situation. On
the other hand, some may believe it is preferable to leave the President more flexibility of
action than is possible under the Resolution. Or some may not wish to have a formal vote
on either the issue of applying the Resolution or the merits of utilizing armed forces in that
case. If Congress does not concur in an action taken by a president, the Resolution offers a
way to terminate it.
A longer-term issue is whether the War Powers Resolution is working or should be
amended. Some contend that it has been effective in moderating the President’s response
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to crisis situations because of his awareness that certain actions would trigger its reporting
and legislative veto provisions. Or they suggest that it could be effective if the President
would comply fully or Congress would invoke its provisions. Others believe it is not
accomplishing its objectives and suggest various changes. Some have proposed that the
Resolution return to the original Senate-passed version, which would enumerate
circumstances in which the President needed no congressional authorization for use of armed
forces (namely to respond to or forestall an armed attack against the United States or its
forces or to protect U.S. citizens while evacuating them) but prohibit any other use or any
permissible use for more than 30 days unless authorized by Congress. Others would replace
the automatic requirement for withdrawal of troops after 60 days with expedited procedures
for a joint resolution authorizing the action or requiring disengagement. Still others would
repeal the Resolution on grounds that it restricts the President’s effectiveness in foreign
policy or is unconstitutional.
Several Members have suggested establishing a consultative group to meet with the
President when military action is being considered. Senators Byrd, Nunn, Warner, and
Mitchell introduced S.J.Res. 323 in 1988 and S. 2 in 1989 to establish a permanent
consultation group of 18 Members consisting of the leadership and the ranking and minority
members of the Committees on Foreign Relations, Armed Services, and Intelligence. The
bill would permit an initial consultative process to be limited to a core group of 6 Members
— the majority and minority leaders of both chambers plus the Speaker of the House and
President pro tempore of the Senate. On October 28, 1993, House Foreign Affairs Chairman
Lee Hamilton introduced H.R. 3405 to establish a congressional consultative group
equivalent to the National Security Council.
Thus far, however, executive branch officials and congressional leaders, who
themselves have varying opinions, have been unable to find mutually acceptable changes in
the War Powers Resolution. President Clinton, in Presidential Decision Directive 25 signed
May 3, 1994, supported legislation to amend the Resolution along the lines of the Mitchell,
Nunn, Byrd, and Warner proposal of 1989, to establish a consultative mechanism and also
eliminate the 60-day withdrawal provisions. Although many agreed on the consultation
group, supporters of the legislation contended the time limit had been the main flaw in the
War Powers Resolution, whereas opponents contended the time limit provided the teeth of
the Resolution. The difficulty of reaching consensus in Congress on what action to take is
reflected in the fact that in the 104th Congress, only one measure, S. 5, introduced January
4, 1995, by then Majority Leader Dole was subject of a hearing. S. 5, if enacted, would have
repealed most of the existing War Powers Resolution. An effort to repeal most of the War
Powers Resolution in the House on June 7, 1995, through an amendment to the Foreign
Assistance and State Department Authorization Act for FY1996-97 (H.R. 1561) by
Representative Hyde, failed (201-217). Other than these instances, no other War Powers
related legislation was even considered during the 104th Congress.
On March 18, 1998, the House defeated H.Con.Res. 227, a resolution that would have
directed the President, pursuant to section 5(c) of the War Powers Resolution to remove
United States Armed Forces from the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina (H.Rept. 105-
442). It was the hope of Representative Tom Campbell, its sponsor, that passage of the
resolution could lead to a court case that would address the constitutionality of the War
Powers Resolution. On March 31, 1998, the House passed a Supplemental Appropriations
bill (H.R. 3579) that would ban use of funds appropriated in it for conduct of offensive
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operations against Iraq, unless such operations were specifically authorized by law. This
provision was dropped in the conference with the Senate. On June 24, 1998, the House
passed H.R. 4103, the Defense Department Appropriations bill for FY1999, with a provision
by Representative Skaggs that banned the use of funds appropriated or otherwise made
available by this act “to initiate or conduct offensive military operations by United States
Armed Forces except in accordance with the war powers clause of the Constitution (Article
1, Section 8), which vests in Congress the power to declare and authorize war and to take
certain specified, related actions.” The Skaggs provision was stricken by the House-Senate
conference committee on H.R. 4103. No further War Powers-related actions were taken by
Congress by the adjournment of the 105th Congress.
During the 106th Congress, efforts were made to force the President to seek
congressional authority for military operations in Kosovo, leading to votes in the House and
Senate on that issue. Subsequently, Representative Tom Campbell and others sued the
President in Federal Court in an effort to clarify congressional-Executive authority in this
area. A Federal District Court and an Appeals Court refused to decide the case on the merits,
instead holding that the plaintiffs lacked standing to sue. On October 2, 2000, the United
States Supreme Court, let stand the holding of the U.S. Appeals Court (see discussion above
under Kosovo).
During the first session of the 107th Congress, the Congress passed S.J.Res. 23, on
September 14, 2001, in the wake of the terrorist attacks against the World Trade Center in
New York City, and the Pentagon building in Arlington, Virginia. This legislation, titled the
“Authorization for Use of Military Force,” passed the Senate by a vote of 98-0; the House
of Representatives passed it by a vote of 420-1. This joint resolution authorizes the President
“to use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons
he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on
September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons, in order to prevent any
future acts of international terrorism against the United States by such nations, organizations
or persons.” Congress further declared in the joint resolution that “Consistent with section
8(a)(1) of the War Powers resolution,” the above language is “intended to constitute specific
statutory authorization within the meaning of section 5(b) the War Powers Resolution.”
S.J.Res. 23 further stated that “Nothing in this resolution supersedes any requirement of the
War Powers Resolution.” President George W. Bush signed S.J.Res. 23 into law on
September 18, 2001 (P.L. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224).
During the second session of the 107th Congress, the Congress passed H.J.Res. 114, the
Authorization for the Use of Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002 (P.L. 107-243 ). On
October 16, 2002, President Bush signed this legislation into law. This statute authorizes the
President to use the armed forces of the United States
as he determines to be necessary and appropriate in order to (1) defend the national
security of the United States against the continuing threat posed by Iraq; and (2) enforce
all relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions regarding Iraq.
Prior to using force under this statute the President is required to communicate to Congress
his determination that the use of diplomatic and other peaceful means will not “adequately
protect the United States ... or ... lead to enforcement of all relevant United Nations Security
Council resolutions” and that the use of force is “consistent” with the battle against terrorism.
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The statute also stipulates that it is “intended to constitute specific statutory authorization
within the meaning of section 5(b) of the War Powers Resolution.” It further requires the
President to make periodic reports to Congress “on matters relevant to this joint resolution.”
Finally, the statute expresses Congress’ “support” for the efforts of the President to obtain
“prompt and decisive action by the Security Council” to enforce Iraq’s compliance with all
relevant Security Council resolutions.
P.L. 107-243 clearly confers broad authority on the President to use force. The authority
granted is not limited to the implementation of previously adopted Security Council
resolutions concerning Iraq but includes “all relevant ... resolutions.” Thus, it appears to
incorporate resolutions concerning Iraq that may by adopted by the Security Council in the
future as well as those already adopted. The authority also appears to extend beyond
compelling Iraq’s disarmament to implementing the full range of concerns expressed in those
resolutions. The President’s exercise of the authority granted is not dependent upon a finding
that Iraq was complicit in the attacks of September 11, 2001. Moreover, the authority
conferred can be used for the purpose of defending “the national security of the United States
against the continuing threat posed by Iraq. On March 19, 2003, President Bush used the
authority granted in P.L. 107-243 by launching a military attack against Iraq. The President
continues to use that authority for on-going military operations in Iraq.
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