Order Code RL32541
CRS Report for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
Aviation Security-Related
Findings and Recommendations
of the 9/11 Commission
Updated October 13, 2004
Bart Elias
Specialist in Aviation Safety, Security, and Technology
Resources, Science, and Industry Division
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

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Aviation Security-Related Findings and
Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission
Summary
The 9/11 Commission found that al Qaeda operatives exploited known
weaknesses in U.S. aviation security to carry out the terrorist attacks of September
11, 2001. While legislation and administration actions after September 11, 2001
were implemented to strengthen aviation security, the 9/11 Commission concluded
that several weaknesses continue to exist. These include perceived vulnerabilities in
cargo and general aviation security as well as inadequate screening and access
controls at airports.
The 9/11 Commission issued several recommendations designed to strengthen
aviation security by: enhancing passenger pre-screening; improving measures to
detect explosives on passengers; addressing human factors issues at screening
checkpoints; expediting deployment of in-line baggage screening systems;
intensifying efforts to identify, track, and screen potentially dangerous cargo; and
deploying hardened cargo containers on passenger aircraft. In addition to these
specific recommendations, an overarching recommendation for transportation
security policy asserts that priorities should be set based on risk, and the most
practical and cost effective deterrents should be implemented assigning appropriate
roles and missions to federal, state, and local authorities, as well as private
stakeholders.
In response to the 9/11 Commission’s aviation security-related
recommendations, two bills — H.R. 5121 and H.R. 10 — introduced in the House
contain several provisions to enhance aviation security. Additionally, floor
amendments to S. 2845, the National Intelligence Reform Act of 2004, contain
numerous aviation security provisions, many of which address 9/11 Commission
recommendations related to aviation safety. S. 2845 was passed (96-2) by the Senate
on October 6, 2004. The House passed H.R. 10 on October 8 by a vote of 282-134.
A conference has been requested to resolve numerous differences between H.R. 10
and and S. 2845.
This report will be updated as needed.

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Contents
Exploited Weaknesses in Aviation Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Legislative Actions Following the 9/11 Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Enhancing Passenger Pre-Screening . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Improving Measures to Detect Explosives on Passengers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Addressing Human Factors Issues at Screening Checkpoints . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Expediting Deployment of In-Line Baggage Screening Systems . . . . . . . . 7
Intensifying Efforts to Identify, Screen, and Track Cargo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Deploying Hardened Cargo Containers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Risk-Based Prioritization as the Basis for Transportation
Security Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Strategic Plan for Aviation Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Cooperation and Integration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Congressional Actions in Response to the 9/11 Commission
Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
List of Tables
Table 1. Comparison of 9/11 Commission Recommendations to
H.R. 10 and S. 2845 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

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Aviation Security-Related Findings and
Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission
The Intelligence Authorization Act for FY2003 (P.L. 107-306; 116 Stat. 2383)
established the National Commission on Terrorists Attacks Upon the United States
(the 9/11 Commission). The bipartisan 9/11 Commission was charged with the
responsibilities of examining and reporting on the facts and causes of the September
11, 2001 terrorist attacks and presenting its findings, conclusions, and
recommendations for corrective measures to prevent future acts of terrorism to the
President and the Congress. The 9/11 Commission concluded its investigation and
released its final report on July 22, 2004. This CRS report discusses the 9/11
Commission’s findings and recommendations pertaining to aviation security.
Exploited Weaknesses in Aviation Security
The National Commission on Terrorists Attacks Upon the United States (the
9/11 Commission) found that al Qaeda terrorists exploited weaknesses in the aviation
security system to carry out the attacks of September 11, 2001. Weaknesses in
aviation security exploited by the 9/11 terrorists included
! A pre-screening process that focused on detecting potential aircraft
bombers and not potential hijackers;
! Lax checkpoint screening and permissive rules regarding small
knives;
! A lack of in-flight security measures such as air marshals and
reinforced cockpit doors;
! An industry-wide strategy of complying with hijackers in a non-
confrontational manner; and
! A lack of protocols and capabilities for executing a coordinated
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and military response to
multiple hijackings and suicidal hijackers.
The 9/11 Commission found that underlying these specific weaknesses and
vulnerabilities in the aviation system was what they termed a failure of imagination
among senior policymakers and agencies responsible for intelligence, national
defense, and aviation security. The 9/11 Commission concluded that while suicide
hijackings were by no means a far-fetched possibility given al Qaeda’s past methods
and motives, “...these scenarios were slow to work their way into the thinking of
aviation security experts.”1 While some agencies were concerned about hijackings
1 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States. The 9/11 Commission
(continued...)

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and had speculated about various hijack scenarios, there were no specific
constructive actions taken to defend against these possible threats prior to September
11, 2001. Furthermore, the likelihood of a suicide hijacking scenario was greatly
underestimated. The 9/11 Commission also concluded that, before September 11,
2001, congressional oversight of aviation security was lacking while Congress
focused its aviation oversight activities on airport congestion and passenger service.
Regarding Congress’s aviation related activities prior to September 11, 2001, The
9/11 Commission wrote: “Heeding calls for improved air service, Congress
concentrated its efforts on a ‘passenger bill of rights’ to improve capacity, efficiency,
and customer satisfaction in the aviation system. There was no focus on terrorism.”2
Legislative Actions Following the 9/11 Attacks

In the aftermath of September 11, 2001, Congress moved quickly to pass the
Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA, P.L. 107-71). Designed to correct
weaknesses in aviation security exploited by the 9/11 hijackers as well as other
potential vulnerabilities in transportation systems, ATSA established the
Transportation Security Administration (TSA) as a new organization within the
Department of Transportation responsible for security matters in all modes of
transportation. Highlights of ATSA included
! Establishing a federal security screener workforce under TSA at
airports;
! Requiring explosive detection screening of all checked bags;
! Deploying air marshals on all high risk flights; and
! Hardening cockpit doors.
ATSA also gave the TSA broad authority to assess threats to security in all
transportation modes, primarily focusing on aviation, and implement appropriate
security measures. In this regard, ATSA was seen as a comprehensive legislative
vehicle for addressing transportation security with a specific emphasis on aviation
security.
The following year, the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (P. L. 107-296)
established the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and placed the TSA within
this new department. The act also authorized the arming of airline pilots as an
additional measure to protect aircraft against terrorist hijackers. Additional aviation
security measures were included in the most recent FAA reauthorization act, Vision
100 - Century of Aviation Reauthorization Act (P.L. 108-176). Most notably, Vision
100 established an aviation security capital fund to help pay for placing explosive
detection systems (EDS) “in-line” with baggage conveyers and sorting facilities in
an effort to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of checked baggage screening
and expanded the program to arm pilots to include pilots of all-cargo aircraft.
1 (...continued)
Report (New York, NY: W. W. Norton & Co., 2004), p. 344.
2 The 9/11 Commission Report, pp. 85-86.

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Despite these actions, congressional and administration oversight of aviation
security has identified several areas of vulnerability that persist. These include air
cargo operations; general aviation; access controls for airport employees; screener
performance; and possible terrorist attacks using shoulder-fired missiles.
Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission
The 9/11 Commission also recognized many of these vulnerabilities. The 9/11
Commission concluded that “[m]ajor vulnerabilities still exist in cargo and general
aviation security. These, together with inadequate screening and access controls,
continue to present aviation security challenges.”3 Based on these findings, the 9/11
Commission made specific recommendations regarding improvements to airport
passenger and baggage screening, and air cargo security. While the commission
identified potential threats posed by inadequate access controls to secured areas of
airports and general aviation operations, it did not issue any recommendations
pertaining to these risks. Also, while the 9/11 Commission acknowledged concerns
raised by previous and current administrations over possible shoulder-fired missiles
attacks against commercial airliners, it did not make any specific recommendations
regarding this threat.
The 9/11 Commission delineated its recommendations regarding aviation
security in a section titled “A Layered Security System.” As suggested by this title,
the 9/11 Commission concluded that the TSA must implement a multi-layered
security system that takes into consideration the full array of possible terrorist tactics.
The 9/11 Commission noted that these various layers of security must each be
effective in their own right and must be coordinated with other layers in a manner
that creates redundancies to catch possible lapses in any one layer. This conclusion
is consistent with aviation security mandates under ATSA and TSA’s concept of
“concentric rings of security.”4 Since many facets of aviation security have been
addressed through legislation and administration actions since the 9/11 attacks, the
9/11 Commission focused its aviation security recommendations on persisting
vulnerabilities in commercial aviation.
While not all recommendations offered in the 9/11 Commission’s final report
were formally labeled as such, CRS has identified six aviation-specific
recommendations.5 These are: 1) enhancing passenger pre-screening; 2) improving
measures to detect explosives on passengers; 3) addressing human factors issues at
screening checkpoints; 4) expediting deployment of in-line baggage screening
systems; 5) intensifying efforts to identify, track, and screen potentially dangerous
cargo; and 6) deploying hardened cargo containers on passenger aircraft. In addition
to these six aviation-specific recommendations, the 9/11 Commission also issued an
overarching recommendation for transportation security policy to set priorities based
3 Ibid., p. 391.
4 Transportation Security Administration. Budget Estimates: Fiscal Year 2004. March 2003
5 For clarity, multi-part 9/11 Commission recommendations have been separately identified
in this report.

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CRS-4
on risk and implement the most practical and cost effective deterrents assigning
appropriate roles and missions to federal, state, and local authorities, as well as
private stakeholders.
Enhancing Passenger Pre-Screening
On September 11, 2001, passenger pre-screening consisted of three measures:
the Computer Assisted Passenger Prescreening System (CAPPS), answers to two
security-related questions asked by airline ticketing and gate agents, and the
presentation of photo identification to airline personnel. More than half of the
September 11, 2001 hijackers were identified as “selectees” based on one or more of
these pre-screening techniques. However, there was little consequence to their
selection because, at the time, pre-screening was used solely as a tool to screen for
individuals that might try to bomb a passenger jet using methods similar to those
employed in the bombing of Pan Am flight 103. While the CAPPS system is still in
use, its purpose has since been expanded to screen for possible hijackers as well.
CAPPS is maintained directly by the airlines as part of their security program and
uses computer algorithms to identify “selectees” based on matching passengers’
behaviors (e.g., method of ticket purchase) to hijacker and bomber profiles.
The follow-on to CAPPS, dubbed CAPPS II, has been embroiled in controversy
for the past two years over concerns regarding protection of personal data and civil
liberties. As proposed, CAPPS II would implement a two step process to: 1)
authenticate a passenger’s identity using commercial databases; and 2) check that
name against terrorist watch lists maintained by the federal government. If flagged
by the system, passengers could be either denied boarding or selected for secondary
screening. The 9/11 Commission recommended that improved passenger pre-
screening capabilities should not be delayed while the argument about a successor to
CAPPS continues. The 9/11 Commission further recommended that the prescreening
system should utilize the larger set of watchlists maintained by the federal
government. Both the Homeland Security Appropriations Act for FY2004 (P.L. 108-
90) and Vision 100 directed the Department of Homeland Security to address these
concerns and limited implementation of CAPPS II to system testing until the
Government Accountability Office (GAO) verifies that adequate steps have been
taken to address these concerns. However, in February 2004, the GAO found that the
TSA had adequately addressed only one of the eight concerns regarding CAPPS II
implementation.6 Continued reluctance by the airlines to provide data for testing
CAPPS II due to liability concerns has also stymied progress. The 9/11 Commission
recommended that airlines should be required to supply the information needed to
test and implement passenger pre-screening.
Recent media reports indicate that the CAPPS II program has essentially been
scrapped over privacy concerns, however Secretary of Homeland Security Tom Ridge
has suggested that a new program with a different name might eventually take its
6 U.S. General Accounting Office. Aviation Security: Computer-Assisted Passenger
Prescreening System Faces Significant Implementation Challenges. GAO-04-385, February
2004.

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place.7 In light of the 9/11 Commission recommendation to forge forward with
implementing a passenger pre-screening system and the current lack of progress
toward developing such a system, Congress may intensify its oversight of the Secure
Flight program, the successor to CAPPS, and engage in debate over the best way to
proceed. H.R. 10 contains a provision that would require the TSA to take over
responsibility for prescreening from the airlines withing 180 days on enactment and
begin testing of the system by November 1, 2004. This measure is in line with
administration plans for the testing and roll-out of the Secure Flight program.
Improving Measures to Detect Explosives on Passengers
Evidence highlighted by the 9/11 Commission indicated that al Qaeda has had
a keen interest in bombing airliners for some time. The 9/11 Commission’s report
describes Ramzi Yousef’s 1994 bombing of a Phillippines Airlines flight bound for
Tokyo as a precursor to a larger operation — the so-called “Bojinka” plot — to
bomb multiple U.S.-bound airliners over the Pacific ocean. In the Philippines
Airlines bombing, Yousef reportedly assembled an improvised explosive device
(IED) in the airplane’s lavatory and hid it under a seat during the previous flight
affixing a digital watch timer he had invented.
Concerns over IEDs were brought to public attention in December 2001, when
Richard Reid attempted to down a transatlantic flight using explosives concealed in
a shoe. Concerns over IEDs were again raised by the media in October 2003 when
a college student, Nathaniel Heatwole, snuck banned items and materials resembling
plastic explosives aboard passenger jets. While neither of these high profile incidents
was cited in the 9/11 Commission report, the 9/11 Commission acknowledged
persisting weaknesses in the ability to detect explosives on passengers by formally
recommending that the TSA and Congress give priority to improving detection of
explosives on passengers. The 9/11 Commission further recommended that, as a
start, all individuals selected for secondary screening undergo explosives screening.

Current screening technologies and procedures offer limited capabilities to
detect explosives carried on passengers. While carry-on items and sometimes shoes
are x-rayed and may be subjected to secondary chemical trace detection screening
methods, passengers are typically only screened by metal detectors. New technology
offers the capability to detect bomb-making chemicals on individuals using trace
detection methods. These systems are being operationally tested in various
transportation settings including ongoing field tests at five airport sites: T.F. Green
State Airport, Providence, RI; Greater Rochester International Airport, NY; San
Diego International Airport, CA; Tampa International Airport, FL; and
Gulfport-Biloxi International Airport, MS . Other possible methods for detecting
explosives on passengers involve body scan imaging using low dose x-ray
backscatter or other techniques. Body scan technology is considered somewhat more
controversial because it renders a nude image of the scanned individual which is
regarded by some as overly intrusive. Alternative methods to these technologies
7 Mimi Hall and Barbara DeLollis. “Plan to collect flier data canceled.” USA Today, July
14, 2004.

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CRS-6
include the use of bomb-sniffing dogs and physical searches of individuals. In light
of the 9/11 Commission recommendation, Congress may debate whether and how to
implement and fund an initiative for screening passengers using the most effective
means available. (See CRS Report RS21920, Detection of Explosives on Airline
Passengers: Recommendation of the 9/11 Commission and Related Issues)
Addressing Human Factors Issues at Screening Checkpoints
The 9/11 Commission also recommended that the TSA conduct a human factors
study to understand problems in screener performance and set attainable objectives
for improving performance at screening checkpoints. Screener performance
deficiencies were highlighted by a recent DHS Inspector General’s audit that found
poor screener performance among both federal and contract screeners during covert
testing at screening checkpoints.8 The TSA has launched several initiatives to
address these concerns. For example, the TSA has greatly expanded the use of threat
image projection (TIP), a system that tests screener on-the-job performance by
projecting images of threat objects on x-ray monitors. Using data from TIP,
researchers can assess certain human performance needs in aviation security. The
TSA is also examining ways to improve the recurrent training of screeners.
Key human factors issues are likely to include screener selection and training,
fitness for duty, and human interaction with screening technologies. While the TSA
maintains a small cadre of human factors researchers and some ongoing research in
this area is being conducted by universities and contractors, research on aviation
security human factors and funding for these activities pales in comparison to human
factors research programs in the Department of Defense and FAA’s safety-related
human factors activities. Also, there presently is a lack of a comprehensive strategic
plan for addressing human factors in aviation security.
In light of this recommendation and persisting concerns over screener
performance, Congress may conduct oversight to identify areas where TSA’s human
factors research efforts may not be adequately addressing concerns over passenger
and baggage screening performance. Congress may also consider whether to task the
National Academy of Sciences or some other independent body with examining
human factors needs in aviation security. While the National Academy of Sciences
did address human factors in its 1999 assessment of aviation security technologies,
it has not conducted a focused study of human factors needs in the aviation security
system and has not examined this issue since the terrorist attacks of September 11,
2001.9 H.R. 10 contains a provision that would require the TSA to conduct human
factors studies to improve screener performance as part of a pilot program to examine
next-generation checkpoint screening technologies.

8 Statement of Clark Kent Ervin, Inspector General, U.S. Department of Homeland Security.
Before the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, Subcommittee on Aviation, U.S.
House of Representatives, April 22, 2004
9 National Research Council. Assessment of Technologies Deployed to Improve Aviation
Security: First Report. Publication NMAB-482-5. Washington, DC: National Academy
Press, 1999.

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CRS-7
Expediting Deployment of In-Line Baggage Screening
Systems
The 9/11 Commission recommended that the TSA expedite installation of in-
line baggage screening systems. Therefore, Congress may debate the adequacy of
current funding for this activity. While Vision 100 authorizes up to $500 million
annually to be deposited into the aviation security capital fund, only $250 million was
appropriated in FY2004 and requested in FY2005 for this activity. Since the total
cost of integrating EDS equipment at all passenger airports is estimated to exceed $4
billion, it may take several years to complete integration of baggage screening
systems given current funding levels. Letters of intent (LOIs) issued to airports by
the TSA were established as a vehicle to leverage limited federal funding by
stretching obligations over several years. LOIs were created in appropriations
legislation as a means for TSA to convey to airports its intent to obligate future funds
for the purpose of EDS integration. However, the TSA has, thus far, implemented
LOIs by reimbursing airports for expenses as they are incurred. This approach could
further slow the progress of integrating EDS systems at airports.
The 9/11 Commission also recommended that “[b]ecause the aviation industry
will derive substantial benefits from [in-line EDS] deployment, it should pay a fair
share of the costs.”10 However, defining that fair share has been a significant point
of contention. Airlines already indirectly pay the federal share of EDS integration
because the first $250 million annually, all that was budgeted in FY2004 for this
activity, must come directly from aviation security fees paid by the airlines and their
passengers. Airports pay a portion of the costs too, albeit a much smaller one. Under
the scheme adopted by Vision 100, large and medium-sized airports contribute 10%
of the cost while small airports contribute 5%. However, the TSA has proposed to
reduce the federal obligations for these programs and increase the local share to 25%
at large and medium-sized airports and 10% at small airports, a proposal that airports
obviously oppose. The 9/11 Commission did not specifically say what they would
consider to be a more equitable contribution from industry, however their
recommendation implies that they believe industry is not paying its fair share under
the current scheme.
Congress may continue debate over the equity of cost-sharing for EDS
integration in light of this recommendation. The House homeland security
appropriations bill (H.R. 4567) as reported included language to limit the federal
share for airport security projects to 75% at large and medium hubs and 90% at all
other airports, however, this language was stricken by a point of order during floor
debate.
Legislation introduced in the House (H.R. 5121) seeks to double the amount
collected in aviation security fees that must be designated for aviation security capital
fund from $250 million annually to $500 million annually for FY2005 through
FY2007. H.R. 5121 also seeks to increase the TSA’s flexibility to meet checked
baggage security screening requirements by allowing it to enter into multi-year
contracts, not to exceed 10-years, with airports or third party vendors to provide EDS
imaging capabilities. While most of the aviation security-related provisions of H.R.
10 The 9/11 Commission Report, p. 393.

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CRS-8
5121 were incorporated into H.R. 10, neither of these measures were included in
H.R. 10.
Intensifying Efforts to Identify, Screen, and Track Cargo
The 9/11 Commission recommended that the TSA needs to intensify its efforts
to identify suspicious cargo, and appropriately screen and track potentially dangerous
cargo in aviation as well as in maritime operations. Stemming from
recommendations of the Aviation Security Advisory Committee (ASAC), a standing
committee of aviation stakeholders, the TSA unveiled a strategic plan for cargo
security in November 2003. That plan consists a multi-layered risk-based approach
with four key strategic objectives: 1) enhancing shipper and supply chain security;
2) identifying elevated risk cargo through pre-screening; 3) identifying technology
for performing targeted air cargo inspections; and, 4) securing all-cargo aircraft
through appropriate facility security measures.11 Goals of the plan include pre-
screening all cargo shipments in order to determine their level of relative risk;
working with industry and federal partners to ensure that 100% of items considered
to pose an elevated risk are inspected; developing and ensuring that new information
and technology solutions are deployed; and, implementing operational and regulatory
programs that support enhanced security measures.12 The 9/11 Commission
recommendations seem to imply that it concurs with TSA’s overall approach as
outlined in this strategic plan but feels that progress toward achieving these
objectives must be accelerated, and perhaps, augmented. Since the 9/11 Commission
recommendation provides no specific guidance on how to intensify the identification,
tracking, and screening of cargo, Congress may further scrutinize TSA’s efforts on
cargo security and further debate approaches to air cargo security.
Recent debate in Congress over air cargo security has focused on the level of
physical screening or inspection of cargo needed to adequately mitigate the risks
posed by cargo placed on passenger aircraft. While proposals have been offered to
require 100% physical screening or inspection of all cargo placed on passenger
aircraft, Congress has thus far supported TSA’s plan to, instead, implement a risk-
based approach that relies heavily on the known-shipper program and database to
assess shipments placed aboard passenger aircraft. Both H.R. 10 and S. 2845 contain
measures to improve the screening and tracking of cargo. S. 2845 would specifically
require the TSA to double the amount of air cargo screened within one year. (see
CRS Report RL32022, Air Cargo Security).
11 Transportation Security Administration. Air Cargo Strategic Plan. November, 2003.
12 There has been considerable confusion regarding the terms screening and inspection as
they pertain to air cargo, and presently no statutory or regulatory definitions of these terms
exist. In general, the TSA refers to screening as a vetting process, such as the use of a
known-shipper database, to assess the level of risk associated with a cargo shipment. TSA
uses the term inspections, on the other hand, to refer to physical scrutiny of cargo though
any of several available means such as canine teams, hand searches, or the use of x-ray
equipment or explosives detection systems. In this report, the term pre-screening has been
used in place of what TSA commonly calls screening to avoid confusion since this does not
refer to a physical screening process.

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Deploying Hardened Cargo Containers
In addition to these measures to improve cargo security, the 9/11 Commission
specifically recommended the deployment of at least one hardened cargo container
on every passenger aircraft that also hauls cargo to carry suspicious cargo. The
National Research Council examined this very concept in 1999 and concluded it
would cost $125 million to acquire a sufficient number of hardened containers.13
They also estimated that the annual industry-wide cost of lost revenue due to reduced
aircraft revenue payload and increased fuel burn would total $11 million. Thus, even
if a proposal were made to federally fund this initiative, passenger airlines may
oppose it because it would increase operational costs.
It is likely that opponents of deploying hardened cargo containers would also
argue that, if recommended initiatives are implemented to improve the identification,
tracking, and screening of cargo, then hardened cargo containers are not needed. On
the other hand, proponents of deploying hardened cargo containers may argue that
doing so creates a redundant layer of defense, analogous to a hardened cockpit door,
that is consistent with the overarching goal of establishing a multi-layered security
system with built-in redundancies.
However, using just one hardened cargo container per passenger aircraft still
leaves the system open to potential vulnerabilities that are directly tied to the
effectiveness of measures to conduct risk-based assessments of cargo and flag
suspicious cargo. For this reason, the TSA currently requires that all cargo from
shippers that have not been properly vetted and verified through the known-shipper
program be carried in all-cargo airplanes and not aboard passenger airplanes. While
TSA is working on expanding its capabilities to detect high risk cargo, it is unclear
how this system could be adapted to assign risk levels that would permit certain
suspect cargo to travel in hardened cargo containers on board passenger airplanes.
Also, from a policy standpoint, it is unclear what criteria could be used to permit
shipment of suspicious cargo on passenger aircraft in hardened cargo containers
instead of offloading that shipment from passenger aircraft altogether. Congress may
debate whether deployment of hardened cargo containers could provide an effective
layer of security to protect against potential cargo bombings. A key policy issue in
this debate is likely to be the possible implications of allowing suspicious cargo to
travel on passenger aircraft even if they are secured in hardened cargo containers.
H.R. 10 contains a provision that would require TSA to carry out a pilot
program to evaluate the use of blast-resistant containers for carrying baggage and
cargo on passenger airliners. While S. 2845 does not contain a similar provision,
legislation passed by the Senate on May 9, 2003 (S. 165), would require the DHS in
coordination with the FAA to submit a report evaluating blast-resistant cargo
container technology.
Risk-Based Prioritization as the Basis for Transportation
Security Policy
13 National Research Council. Assessment of Technologies Deployed to Improve Aviation
Security: First Report.

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In addition to the aviation specific recommendations discussed above, the 9/11
Commission also issued an overarching recommendation that risk-based priorities
for protecting all transportation assets be established. Based on this assessment of
risks, the 9/11 Commission recommended that TSA select the most practical and cost
effective approaches for implementing defenses of transportation assets and develop
a plan, budget, and funding to implement this effort. The plan, according to the 9/11
Commission, should assign roles and missions to federal, state, and local authorities,
as well as to private stakeholders.
Strategic Plan for Aviation Security. The risk-based approach to aviation
security is nothing new and has been viewed for some time as the principal policy
tool for allocating limited resources. What is lacking, however, is a unified strategic
plan for aviation security. To some extent, ATSA has set the strategy for aviation
security following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. The TSA’s initial
focus was on meeting the mandates of ATSA, particularly deploying air marshals and
federal screeners. Now that TSA has achieved some level of normal operations, it
should be better poised to focus on developing a more formal strategy for national
aviation security policy. Based on TSA’s strategic approaches to date, particularly
in addressing air cargo security needs, it is likely that a risk-based multi-layered
approach to aviation security will form the core of future aviation security policy.
This appears to be largely in step with what the 9/11 Commission is recommending.
In light of the 9/11 Commission recommendation, Congress may consider whether
to formally task the TSA with developing a national strategy for aviation security that
addresses funding needs, budgetary implications, and the appropriate roles of federal,
local, and state authorities, and industry stakeholders. While some may argue that
such a plan already exists in various TSA program plans and budget documents,
others may argue that a more formal strategic planning document for aviation
security needs to be developed.
Cooperation and Integration. While aviation security relies extensively on
cooperation and the integration of shared responsibilities, challenges persist in
defining roles and allocating resources for state and local participation and industry
involvement. At airports, the local role is defined in the airport security program
which is tailored for each airport location. Physical security of the airport site is
ultimately the role of local jurisdictions carried out by airport operators, while TSA
maintains the overall role of security oversight and enforcement as well as direct
responsibility for passenger screening. The role of local governments, and in some
cases state authorities, in aviation security often involves both law enforcement
support for airport site security and law enforcement presence at screening
checkpoints. Passenger air carriers must also participate in security through
procedures and training for controlling access to aircraft and secured areas of
airports, carrying out security inspections of aircraft, and so on. In air cargo and
general aviation, security measures rely heavily on the direct participation of aircraft
owners and operators, while the federal role is one of oversight and enforcement of
aviation security requirements.
While implementing aviation security already involves federal, state, local, and
industry participation, what appears to be lacking is a unified plan or strategy for:
assigning roles and missions to each stakeholder based on careful consideration of

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CRS-11
logistics and costs; and adopting a systems approach to define how each element
contributes to the overall security strategy.
In light of the 9/11 Commission recommendation, Congress and the TSA may
consider ways to improve the strategic planning, resource allocation, and integration
of federal, state, local, and private-sector resources for aviation security. Congress
and the TSA may also consider how the specific strategies and approaches to aviation
security may be integrated with an overarching transportation security strategy that
encompasses rail, maritime, and highway security as well and addresses logistics,
funding, and resource allocation to meet security needs in all modes of transportation.
H.R. 10 requires the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to prepare and update
a transportation security plan and modal security plans including a modal plan for
aviation to: set risk-based priorities; select the most practical and cost-effective
methods for protecting aviation assets; and assign roles and missions to Federal,
State, regional, and local authorities, and aviation stakeholders.
Congressional Actions in Response to the 9/11
Commission Recommendations
Since the release of the 9/11 Commission report, Congress has given
considerable attention to the recommendations contained in the report. The Senate
Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation held a hearing on the 9/11
Commission recommendations regarding transportation security on August 16, 2004,
and the House Subcommittee on Aviation held a hearing reviewing the aviation
security recommendations of the 9/11 Commission.
Legislation has been introduced in the House to address the specific
recommendations of the 9/11 Commission as well as other perceived aviation
security needs. On September 22, 2004, Representative Don Young of Alaska
introduced H.R. 5121, a bill designed to further protect the U.S. aviation system from
terrorist attacks. Several aviation security-related provisions of H.R. 5121 were
incorporated into H.R. 10, the “9/11 Recommendations Implementation Act”, which
was introduced in the House on September 24, 2004. These provisions directly
address all but one of the 9/11 Commission recommendations pertaining to aviation
security to varying degrees and include numerous miscellaneous provisions
pertaining to aviation security that were not formally or specifically recommended
by the 9/11 Commission. The one 9/11 Commission recommendation not addressed
in the provisions incorporated into H.R. 10 was the recommendation to expedite
deployment of in-line baggage screening systems. Two provisions in H.R. 5121
aimed at addressing this recommendation by increasing the deposits in the Aviation
Security Capital Fund from aviation security fees from $250 million to $500 million
and allowing TSA to enter into multi-year contracts for EDS imaging were not
incorporated into H.R. 10. Additionally, floor amendments to H.R. 10 seek to:
provide TSA security screeners, along with other individuals in border and
transportation security roles, with access to law enforcement intelligence
information; require the DHS to initiate rulemaking to require prescreening of
international passengers before departure; and permits the DHS to take actions aimed
at expediting installation and use of advanced in-line baggage screening equipment
at airports.

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CRS-12

On October 5 , 2004, the Senate agreed to include two amendments pertaining
to aviation security into S. 2845, the National Intelligence Reform Act of 2004. Prior
to these floor actions, this primary Senate vehicle for addressing recommendations
of the 9/11 Commission was silent regarding matters to enhance aviation security.
S.Amdt. 3711, offered by Senator Hutchison, contains several provisions that
primarily address air cargo security while S.Amdt. 3712, offered by Senator
Rockefeller, contains numerous provisions that have the intent of improving aviation
security. Air cargo security provisions in S.Amdt. 3711 are similar to provisions in
S. 165, which was passed by the Senate on May 9, 2003. S.Amdt. 3712, as
submitted, is similar to a bill (S. 2393) introduced on May 6, 2004. In addition to
these two amendments, additional amendments have been incorporated into S. 2845
that address international air cargo threats, TSA’s future needs for information
technology and communications capabilities, and watchlist criteria to address privacy
and civil liberties concerns regarding the passenger prescreening process.
As compared to H.R. 10, S. 2845 contains more specific mandates regarding
security measures for air cargo and general aviation. While the 9/11 Commission
specifically recommended actions to intensifying efforts to screen, and track air
cargo, the 9/11 Commission made no specific recommendations regarding general
aviation security, although it acknowledged that this was an area of continued
concern. Table 1 below provides a listing of the aviation security-related provisions
in H.R. 10 and S. 2845 as amended along with the corresponding 9/11 Commission
recommendations identified by CRS.

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CRS-13
Table 1. Comparison of 9/11 Commission Recommendations to H.R. 10 and S. 2845
9/11 Commission
Recommendation
H.R. 10
S. 2845
Enhancing Passenger
Section 2173. Next Generation Airline Passenger
S.Amdt. 3712 (Sec. 2). Aircraft Charter Customer
Prescreening
Prescreening
Precreening
Directs the TSA to begin testing the next generation passenger
Would require the DHS to establish procedures within one
prescreening system by November 1, 2004. Directs the TSA to
year of enactment under which charter operators of aircraft
assume the function of passenger prescreening — comparing
weighing more than 12,500 pounds may provide the names of
passenger name records (PNRs) to “automatic selectee” and “no
new charter customers to the TSA for comparison against a
fly lists”, and ultimately to the consolidated and integrated
comprehensive, consolidated database of known or suspected
terrorist watch list — within 180 days of the completion of
terrorists and their associates. The procedures are to be
system testing.
implemented in such a manner that the charter operator will
only receive a reply from the TSA as to whether the charter
Requires the TSA to: develop procedures for passengers
request is granted or denied, and the individual denied the
delayed or denied boarding to appeal a determination that they
charter will been provided opportunity to consult the TSA and
pose a security threat and correct erroneous information in the
resolve any erroneous information that may have resulted in
prescreening system; ensure that the system does not generate
the denial.
large numbers of false positives; create an internal oversight
board; establish safeguards to reduce opportunities for abuse of
S.Amdt. 3712 (Sec. 3). Aircraft Rental Customer
the system; implement security measures to protect the system
Precreening
from unauthorized access; adopt policies for oversight of
system use and operation; and ensure there are no privacy
Would require the DHS to establish procedures within one
concerns associated with the technological architecture of the
year of enactment under which operators of aircraft weighing
system. Requires the Government Accountability Office
more than 12,500 pounds may provide the names of
(GAO) to report on the adequacy of TSA’s steps to address
prospective aircraft renters to the TSA for comparison against
these requirements within 90 days after TSA assumes
a comprehensive, consolidated database of known or suspected
responsibility for passenger prescreening.
terrorists and their associates. Provides privacy safeguards
similar to those outlined for charter customer prescreening.
Requires airlines to provide PNR data to the TSA for system
implementation within 60 days of the completion of system
testing.

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CRS-14
9/11 Commission
Recommendation
H.R. 10
S. 2845
Requires the screening of the following individuals against
S.Amdt. 3712 (Sec. 4). Report on Rental and Charter
records in the consolidated terrorist watch list: those receiving
Customer Prescreening Procedures
FAA certificates (e.g., pilots, mechanics, dispatchers); those
seeking access credentials to secured areas of airports or the air
Requires the DHS to provide Congress with a report on the
operations area (AOA) of an airport. Requires the
feasibility of expanding prescreening to rental and charter
establishment of a timely and fair process to review and correct
aircraft weighing less than 12,500 pounds. The analysis
erroneous information of individuals who appeal a finding that
should focus on the risks posed by such aircraft and the impact
they pose a threat to aviation security.
of prescreening procedures on rental and charter commerce.
S. Amdt 3915. Terrorist Screening Center
Requires the DHS to report on criteria used for placing
individuals on the consolidated watch list and standards for
information accuracy. Requires DHS to establish a process for
removing the names of individuals erroneously placed on the
“Automatic Selectee” and “No Fly” lists. Requires the Privacy
and Civil Liberties Oversight Board, in cooperation with the
GAO, to report on the impact of these lists on privacy and civil
liberties including recommendations to minimize the adverse
effects of these lists on privacy, discrimination, due process,
and other civil liberties, and the implications of using these
lists in other transportation modes.
Improving Measures to
Section 2174.
S.Amdt. 3712 (Sec. 8). Explosive Detection Systems
Detect Explosives on
Deployment and Use of Explosive Detection Equipment at
Passengers
Airport Screening Checkpoints
(c) Portal Detection Systems: Authorizes an additional $250
million for research and development of portal detection
Directs TSA to give priority to developing, testing, and
systems or similar devices for detecting biological,
deploying technologies to detect non-metallic weapons and
radiological, and explosive material. Requires the DHS to
explosives carried on individuals. Directs TSA to provide a
establish a pilot program at up to 10 airports to evaluate these

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CRS-15
9/11 Commission
Recommendation
H.R. 10
S. 2845
strategic plan to Congress within 90 days of enactment on the
systems.
optimal utilization and deployment of explosive detection
systems to screen individuals and carry-on items at airport
screening checkpoints.
S.Amdt. 3712 (Sec. 17). Screening Devices to Detect
Section 2177.
Chemical and Plastic Explosives
Airport Checkpoint Screening Explosives Detection
Requires the DHS to report on efforts and needs to address
Creates a new “Checkpoint Screening Security Fund” that
detecting explosives, including chemical and plastic
would be funded at a level of $30 million per year in FY2005
explosives, on passengers and in carry-on bags.
and FY2006. The fund would receive $30 million in deposits
from aviation security fees collected after the first $500 million
of these fees are deposited into the Aviation Security Capital
Fund as described in Section 3 of the bill. Requires the DHS to
ensure that the fee structure imposed in FY2005 and FY2006
will guarantee deposits of at least $30 million into the
“Checkpoint Screening Security Fund.” This fund is to be
designated for equipment to improve explosives detection at
screening checkpoints.
Addressing Human
Section 2178.
Factors Issues at
Next Generation Security Checkpoint
Screening Checkpoints
Would require the TSA to develop a pilot program to test,
integrate, and deploy next generation checkpoint screening
technology at five or more airports. Requires human factors
studies to improve screener performance as part of this pilot
program.
Expediting Deployment
S.Amdt. 3712 (Sec. 6). Improved Air Cargo and Airport
of In-Line Baggage
Security
Screening Systems

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CRS-16
9/11 Commission
Recommendation
H.R. 10
S. 2845
(c) Authorization for Expiring and New LOIs: authorizes $150
million each year in fiscal years 2005-2007 to fund airport
security projects that have received letters of intent (LOIs).
Allows LOI reimbursements to span over a period not to
exceed 10 years.
S.Amdt. 3712 (Sec. 8). Explosive Detection Systems
Requires the DHS to estalish a schedule to replace explosive
trace detection systems with in-line explosive detection system
equipment as soon a practicable where appropriate.
Authorizes an additional $100 million for research and
development of next-generation EDS equipment. Requires the
DHS to develop a plan and guidelines for implementing
improved EDS equipment.
Intensifying Efforts to
Section 2176. Air Cargo Screening Technology
S.Amdt. 3711
Screen, and Track
Cargo
Requires the TSA to develop technology to better identify,
Requires the screening, inspection, or implementation of other
track, and screen air cargo.
means to ensure the security of cargo transported in passenger
and all-cargo aircraft. Requires the DHS to develop a strategic
plan for air cargo security. Mandates a pilot program for
evaluating cargo screening measures. Requires
implementation of a system for regular inspections of air cargo
shipping facilities and allows the DHS to increase the number
of inspectors to carry out these inspections. Requires the
creation of an industry-wide known-shipper database pilot

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CRS-17
9/11 Commission
Recommendation
H.R. 10
S. 2845
program. Requires the DHS to conduct random audits and
inspections of security at freight forwarder(indirect air carrier)
facilities and ensure compliance with security standards.
Requires the DHS to implement a security program for all-
cargo operators covering: security of the cargo operations and
acceptance areas; access to aircraft; and security of cargo
shipments. Under this program, background checks would be
required for all employees accessing the air operations area,
and flight crews and persons carried aboard all-cargo aircraft
would be screened.
S.Amdt. 3712 (Sec. 6). Improved Air Cargo and Airport
Security
Authorizes an additional $200 million each year in fiscal years
2005-2007 for improving cargo security on passenger and all-
cargo aircraft. Establishes a grant program for next-
generation air cargo security technology and authorizes $100
million each year in fiscal years 2005-2007 for this purpose.
Requires annual reports for fiscal years 2005-2007 detailing
the progress and status of deployment and installation of next-
generation air cargo security technology and grants issued for
this purpose.
S.Amdt. 3712 (Sec 7). Air Cargo Security Measures
Requires the DHS, in consultation with the DOT, to develop
and implement a plan for cargo security for passenger and all-
cargo operations based on the recommendations of the Cargo
Security Working Group of the Aviation Security Advisory
Committee, a stakeholder advisory group to TSA. Requires

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CRS-18
9/11 Commission
Recommendation
H.R. 10
S. 2845
the TSA to promulgate regulations to evaluate freight
forwarders (indirect air carriers) and ground handling agents,
including background checks and terrorist watchlist checks of
employees of these organizations. Requires the TSA to
evaluate the increased used on canine teams to inspect air
cargo including targeted inspections of high risk items.
Requires the DHS to double the amount of air cargo screened
or inspected within one year of enactment as compared to
levels at the end of FY2004.
Requires the TSA, in coordination with the FAA, to require
all-cargo aircraft to use barrier, such as a hardened cockpit
door, to prevent unauthorized access to the flight deck from a
cargo compartment. Requires physical screening of all
persons and their effects transported on all-cargo aircraft
within one year of enactment. Requires searches of all-cargo
aircraft at the beginning of each day and that all-cargo aircraft
be secured or sealed or access stairs removed when
unattended.
S. Amdt 3910. Report on International Air Cargo Threats
Requires the DHS, in consultation with the FAA and the
Department of Defense, to report on current procedures to
address explosive, incendiary, chemical, biological, or nuclear
threats on all-cargo aircraft in-bound to the United States and
provide an analysis of the potential for establishing secure
facilities along established international air routes for diverting
and securing suspect all-cargo aircraft.

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CRS-19
9/11 Commission
Recommendation
H.R. 10
S. 2845
Deploying Hardened
Section 2175. Pilot Program to Evaluate Use of Blast-
Cargo Containers
Resistant Cargo and Baggage Containers.
Would require TSA to carry out a pilot program to evaluate the
use of blast-resistant containers for carrying baggage and cargo
on passenger airliners. Provides financial assistance to cover
increased costs to air carriers as incentives to volunteer for the
pilot program. Requires the TSA to report to Congress on the
results of the pilot program within one year of enactment.
Authorizes $2 million to carry out the pilot program.
CRS has identified the following bills that contain similar
provisions: S. 165, H.R. 2144, H.R. 5054.
Risk Based
Section 2172. Transportation Security Strategic Planning
Prioritization: Strategic
Plan for Aviation
Requires the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to
Security
prepare and update a transportation security plan and modal
security plans. The modal plan for aviation should, at a
minimum: set risk-based priorities; select the most practical and
cost-effective methods for protecting aviation assets; assign
roles and missions to Federal, State, regional, and local
authorities, and aviation stakeholders; establish a mitigation and
recovery plan for the aviation system in the event of a terrorist
attack; and establish a threat matrix showing layers of security
to protect against each threat.
Requires the DHS to report to Congress 180 days after
enactment and annually thereafter on the transportation security
plan.

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CRS-20
9/11 Commission
Recommendation
H.R. 10
S. 2845
Miscellaneous aviation
Section 2171. Provision for the Use of Biometric or Other
S.Amdt. 3711 (Sec. 7). Passenger Identification
security provisions not
technology
Verification
linked to specific 9/11
Commission
Requires issuance of guidance for the use of biometric
Permits the DHS to implement a program as soon as
recommendations
technology for airport access control systems including
practicable using identification verification technologies, such
comprehensive technical and operational requirements;
as identification document and biometric scanners, for
performance standards; lists of products and vendors that meet
screening passengers.
such standards; procedures for implementation; and descriptions
of best practices for using biometrics in airport access control
systems.
S. Amdt 3712 (Sec. 1). Improved Pilot Licences
Requires establishing a biometric credential for federal, state,
Requires that the FAA develop tamper-resistant, photo
and local law enforcement officers seeking to carry a weapon on
identification pilot licences that uses either a digital
board an aircraft and procedures to use the credential to verify
photograph, a biometric, or other unique identifier for
the identity of such an officer.
validation of authenticity. Permits the use of designees to
carry out the implementation of issuing new pilots licences and
The bill authorizes such sums as may be necessary for these
authorizes $50 million in FY2005 for creating the licensing
activities. The bill also expands grant authority to airports to
system.
include projects to implement biometric technologies and
increases authorization of funds in FY2005 to $345 million
S. Amdt 3712 (Sec. 5). Aviation Security Staffing
(currently set at $250 million).
Requires the DHS to develop standards for screener staffing to
The provisions of this section are identical to provisions in H.R.
provide adequate security and minimize security-related
4914.
passenger delay within 90 days of enactment. Requires the
GAO to conduct an expedited analysis of these standards as
Section 2179.
soon as practicable after they are produced. Requires the DHS
Penalty for Failure to Secure Cockpit Door
and the GAO to report to Congress within 120 days after
enactment regarding the standards and efforts to increase
Would authorize imposing a civil penalty on an airline not to
effectiveness and efficiency of the screening process with a
exceed $25,000 for each violation of requirements to secure the
target average delay time of 10 minutes or less.

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CRS-21
9/11 Commission
Recommendation
H.R. 10
S. 2845
cockpit door during operation of the aircraft.
S. Amdt 3712 (Sec. 9) Air Marshal Program
Makes technical corrections to give the DHS, instead of the
Requires DHS to report on the potential for cross-training of
Department of Transportation (DOT) and the Federal Aviation
individuals who serve as air marshals and any need for
Administration (FAA), authority to impose such fines as well as
contingency funding of air marshal operations. Authorizes an
penalties for unauthorized carriage or attempts to carry a
additional $83 million in FY2005-FY2007 for air marshal
concealed dangerous weapon on board an aircraft.
deployment.
Section 2180. Federal Air Marshal Anonymity
S. Amdt 3712 (Sec. 10) TSA-Related Baggage Claim Issues
Study
Requires continued development of procedures to protect the
identity of Federal Air Marshals by November 1, 2004.
Requires the DHS, in consultation with the DOT to report on
the system to address claims related to baggage loss, damage,
Section 2181. Federal Law Enforcement In-Flight
or theft attributable to baggage security measures and make
Counterterrorism Training
recommendations to improve airline involvement in the
baggage screening and handling process.
Would provide training for in-flight counterterrorism
procedures and tactics to be made available to federal law
S. Amdt 3712 (Sec. 11). Report on Implementation of GAO
enforcement officers who fly while on duty.
Homeland Security Information Sharing
Recommendations
Section 2182. Federal Flight Deck Officer Weapon Carriage
Pilot Program
Requires DHS to report on its efforts to implement
recommendations in GAO Report GAO-03-760.
Would require the TSA to implement a pilot program allowing
Federal Flight Deck Officers (FFDOs) to carry their firearms on
S. Amdt 3712 (Sec. 12). Aviation Security Research and
their persons within 90 days of enactment. Requires TSA to
Development
report to Congress on the results of the pilot program with
respect to safety within one year of initiating the pilot program.
Authorizes an additional $20 million for research and
development of biometric technology applications for aviation
Sec. 4101. International Agreements to Allow Maximum
security and authorizes $1 million to establish centers of
Deployment of Federal Flight Deck Officers
excellence in biometrics.

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CRS-22
9/11 Commission
Recommendation
H.R. 10
S. 2845
Encourages the President to aggressively pursue international
S. Admt 3712 (Sec. 13). Perimeter Access Technology
agreements allowing FFDOs on flights to international
destinations.
Authorizes $100 million for airport perimeter security
measures.
Section 2183.
Registered Traveler Program
S. Admt 3712 (Sec. 14). Bereavement Fares
Requires that the TSA expedite implementation of the
Requires air carriers to offer bereavement fares to the public
registered traveler program.
that, to the greatest extent possible, should be provided at the
lowest fare offered by a carrier for a requested flight.
Section 2184.
Wireless Communication
S. Admt 3712 (Sec. 15). Review and revision of prohibited
items
Requires the TSA in coordination with the FAA to study the
viability of providing wireless technologies or other methods to
Requires the TSA to review and revise its list of prohibited
provide discrete communication with the pilot in cases of
items and explicitly prohibits butane lighters to be carried by
security or safety incidents in the cabin. TSA is directed to
airline passengers.
consider readily available technology in conducting the study
and must report the results of the study to Congress within 180
S. Amdt 3712 (Sec 16). Report on Protecting Commercial
days of enactment.
Aircraft from the Threat of Man-Portable Air Defense
Systems
Section 2185. Secondary Flight Deck Barriers
Requires the DHS to prepare a report on protecting
Requires the TSA to file a report to Congress within six months
commercial aircraft from Man-Portable Air Defense Systems
of enactment regarding the costs and benefits of using
(MANPADS). The report is to include information on:
secondary flight deck barriers and a recommendation as to
terrorist access to MANPADS; DHS efforts to protect
whether such barriers should be mandated for all air carriers.
commercial aircraft from MANPADS: and an assessment of
the effectiveness and feasability of equipping commercial
Section 2186. Extension
airliners with counter-MANPADS systems. The report is to
also include a justification for the schedule for Phase II of the
Would extend authorization for appropriations of such sums as
counter-MANPADS development program; an assessment of

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CRS-23
9/11 Commission
Recommendation
H.R. 10
S. 2845
may be necessary for aviation security through FY2006.
alternative aircraft-based and ground based technical
approaches to protect aircraft against MANPADS; discussion
Section 4102.
of contractor liability issues for counter-MANPADS
Federal Air Marshal Training
development and deployment; and the strategy for deploying
counter-MANPADS systems; plans to expedite technology
Would allow the Bureau of Immigration and Customs
deployment if intelligence data indicates a need to do so; a
Enforcement, after consultation with the Department of State, to
description of DHS efforts to assess the vulnerability of
provide air marshal training to law enforcement personnel of
domestic and foreign airports to MANPADS attacks; and a
foreign countries. Foreign officers sent for air marshal training
description of cooperative efforts between the DHS and the
must be checked against the consolidated and integrated
FAA to certify the airworthiness of aircraft-based counter-
terrorist watchlists and reasonable fees may be collected to
MANPADS technologies.
offset the costs of this training.
S.Amdt. 3712 (Sec. 18). Reports on the Federal Air
Section 2187.
Marshals Program
Perimeter Security
Requires the DHS to provide a classified report on the number
Requires TSA to submit a report to Congress on airport
and composition of the Federal Air Marshal Service (FAMS),
perimeter security within 180 days of enactment examining the
the percentage of flights covered by FAMS, and attrition rate
feasibility of access control technologies and procedures,
for FAMS.
including biometrics and other identification methods, best
practices for perimeter access control techniques, and an
S.Amdt. 3712 (Sec. 19). Security of Air Marshal Identity
assessment of the feasibility of screening all individuals
entering airport secured areas and strengthening background
Requires the DHS to designate individuals whom air marshals
checks for secured area access.
should be required to identify themselves to and prohibits any
procedures, rules, regulations, or guidelines from exposing the
Section 4103.
identity of an air marshal to anyone other than those
Man-Portable Air Defense Systems (MANPADS)
designated.
Would require the President to urgently pursue international
S.Amdt. 3712 (Sec. 20). Security Monitoring Cameras for
treaties to limit the availability, transfer, and proliferation of
Airport Baggage Handling Areas
MANPADS.

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CRS-24
9/11 Commission
Recommendation
H.R. 10
S. 2845
Encourages the President to enter into agreements that, at a
Requires funding assistance, subject to the availability of
minimum, would: limit licensing agreements for manufacture of
funds, for installing security cameras to deter theft from check
MANPADS to countries willing to enter into non-proliferation
baggage that occurs in areas not open to public view and
agreements; prohibit unlicenced export of MANPADS or
authorizes appropriations of such sums as may be necessary
MANPADS components; and prohibits re-export or re-transfer
for this purpose.
without consent of the government approving the original
export or transfer.
S. Amdt 3757. TSA Field Office Information Technology
and Telecommunications Report
Encourages the President to continue to pursue international
diplomatic and cooperative efforts to assure the destruction of
Requires the DHS to report on current telecommunications and
excess, obsolete and illicit stockpiles of MANPADS.
information technology equipment and capabilities at TSA
sites and provide an assessment of current and future
Requires the President to transmit a report to Congress
telecommunications and information technology needs at these
containing a detailed description of administration efforts to
sites.
address GAO recommendations regarding nonproliferation of
MANPADS within 180 days on enactment. The Secretary of
State is to brief appropriate committees on an annual basis
thereafter on the status of such efforts.
Requires the FAA to establish a process for conducting
airworthiness and safety certification of counter-MANPADS
systems for commercial aircraft by the completion of Phase II
of the DHS Counter-MANPADS development and
demonstration program. Requires FAA to expedite safety and
airworthiness certification of counter-MANPADS systems
certified as effective missile defense systems by DHS. Requires
FAA to report to Congress within 90 days of issuing the first
airworthiness and safety certification of a missile defense
system and annually thereafter until December 31, 2008
providing details of all such airworthiness and safety
certifications issued for missile defense systems.

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CRS-25
9/11 Commission
Recommendation
H.R. 10
S. 2845
Encourages the President to pursue programs to reduce the
number of MANPADS available worldwide for trade,
proliferation, and sale, and requires a report to Congress on
these efforts within 180 days of enactment and annually
thereafter.
Requires the DHS to report on plans to secure airports and
protect arriving and departing aircraft from MANPADS attacks
including the status of vulnerability assessments, intelligence
sharing on MANPADS threats, response to intelligence
indicating a high threat level of MANPADS attack within the
U.S., and the feasibility and effectiveness of implementing
public education and neighborhood watch programs.
The provisions of this section are identical to those in H.R.
4056.
Two related bills, H.R. 580 and S. 311, would require equipping
all air carrier turbojet aircraft used in scheduled service with
missile defense systems.
H.Amdt. 787. Integrating Security Screening Systems and
Enhancing Information Sharing by Department of
Homeland Security
Would provide individuals who conduct security screening and
carry out other similar border and transportation security
functions to obtain the appropriate clearances and have access
to law enforcement and intelligence information
Requires DHS to report on: DHS entities involved in

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CRS-26
9/11 Commission
Recommendation
H.R. 10
S. 2845
intelligence data collection, analysis, or sharing; DHS
intelligence systems and databases; and any existing overlap or
duplication of effort regarding this.

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