Order Code IB94040
CRS Issue Brief for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
Peacekeeping and Related Stability Operations:
Issues of U.S. Military Involvement
Updated October 4, 2004
Nina M. Serafino
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

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CONTENTS
SUMMARY
MOST RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS
The Definitional Problem
Current U.S. Military Participation in Peacekeeping
The Bush Administration Policy
Reductions in Bosnia and Kosovo
NATO Peacekeeping and U.S. Operations in Afghanistan
Issues Regarding an Extended U.S. Military “Stabilization” Presence in Iraq
The Recent U.S. Military Presence in Haiti
Apportioning Responsibilities
Suitability and Desirability as a U.S. Military Mission
Debate over U.S. Military Involvement in Nation-Building
Proposals to Improve Civilian Capabilities
Proposals to Improve Other Nations’ Capabilities
Military Capabilities Issue: Readiness vs. Adequacy
The Readiness Debate
Assessing and Adjusting for the Effects of Peacekeeping and Related Operations on
Military Forces
Deployment Strains
Force Adjustments for Peacekeeping and Related Operations
Increasing Use of Reserves in Peacekeeping and Related Operations
Debate Over Force Size
Debate over Army Force Structure and Restructuring Proposals
Current Army Restructuring
NDU 2003 Proposal: New Stabilization and Reconstruction Commands
Dedicated Force Proposals Examined by CBO and the Heritage Foundation

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Peacekeeping: Issues of U.S. Military Involvement
SUMMARY
For over a decade, some Members of
the U.N. took over command of the operation
Congress have expressed reservations about -
on June 1, 2004. In Iraq, an ambiguous situa-
U.S. military involvement in peacekeeping.
tion, U.S. troops are performing tasks that
The Bush Administration’s decision to reduce
have been undertaken in some peacekeeping
the commitment of U.S. troops to interna-
operations, as are a few hundred U.S. troops
tional peacekeeping seems to reflect a major
in Afghanistan. DOD refers to the latter two
concern: that peacekeeping duties are detri-
as “stabilization” or “stability” operations.
mental to military “readiness,” i.e., the ability
of U.S. troops to defend the nations. Others,
The military “readiness” issue has fac-
however, view peacekeeping and related
tored heavily into the debate over
stability operations as a necessary feature of
peacekeeping from the mid-1990s. Some
the United States’ current and possible future
policymakers worry that peacekeeping costs
U.S. military activities. With the U.S.-led
drain funds that DOD uses to prepare its
occupation of Iraq, often referred to as a
forces to defend against a threat to U.S. vital
“stabilization and reconstruction” operation
interests, that peacekeeping deployments
(which manifests some characteristics of a
stress a force whose size is inadequate to
peace operation), concerns about whether U.S.
handle such operations, and that deployed
forces are large enough and appropriately
troops lose their facility for performing com-
configured to carry out that operation over
bat tasks.
several years dominate that debate. These
concerns were heightened by the 9/11 Com-
In the 108th Congress, the readiness issue
mission report, which cited Afghanistan,
has morphed into a capabilities issue, which
where the Administration has limited U.S.
has dominated the debate. With some
involvement in peacekeeping and nation-
policymakers and analysts arguing that the
building, as a sanctuary for terrorists and
uncertainties of the post-September 11 world
pointed to the dangers of allowing actual and
demand a greater U.S. commitment to curbing
potential terrorist sanctuaries to exist.
ethnic instability, a major issue Congress
continues to face is whether to maintain troops
Thousands of U.S. military personnel
abroad in peacekeeping and related roles, and
currently serve in or support peacekeeping
if so, what, if any, adjustments should be
operations. The number of troops serving in
made in order for the U.S. military to perform
U.N. operations has decreased dramatically
peacekeeping and stability missions — in
since the mid-1990s. About 28 U.S.
Afghanistan, Iraq, or elsewhere — with less
servicemembers are serving in five operations
strain on the force, particularly the reserves.
under U.N. control. About 3,500 are serving
Of particular interest is whether the size and
full-time in the Balkans with less than 1,000
configuration of U.S. forces, especially the
in the NATO Stabilization Force (SFOR) in
Army, should be further modified to meet the
Bosnia and some 1,500 with the NATO
requirements of peacekeeping and related
Kosovo Force (KFOR). About 30,000 more
stability operations. Additional issues are
serve in or support peacekeeping operations in
whether to augment civilian and international
South Korea, and roughly 700 serve in the
capabilities in order to take over some of the
Sinai. A few of the 2,000 serving in a U.S.-led
tasks currently performed by U.S. troops.
multinational operation in Haiti remained after
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

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MOST RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
H.R. 10, the 9/11 Recommendations Implementation Act introduced by Representative
Hastert on September 24, 2004, contains provisions to reform U.S. assistance and policy
towards Afghanistan, instructing the President to encourage and support other countries to
participate in expanded international peacekeeping there. On October 1, S. 2845, the Senate
approved an amendment offered by Senator McCain to S. 2845, the National Intelligence
Reform Act of 2004 (known as Collins-Lieberman), that urges the Administration to enhance
security in Afghanistan by a number of means. The amendment would authorize “such sums
as may be necessary” to increase assistance to Afghanistan for many activities, including the
provision of peacekeeping support under Section 515 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961
(as amended). Section 515 authorizes the provision of military evaluation, planning, and
training services by the U.S. military.
BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS
Many questions have been raised in debate over U.S. involvement in international
peacekeeping. These have ranged from the basic question of definition (what is
“peacekeeping” and, more recently, how does it relate to “stabilization,” “peace
enforcement,” “reconstruction” and “nation-building”?) to the broad strategic question (how
and when does it serve U.S. interests?) to related practical questions (which tasks, if any,
must be performed by the U.S. military and which can be delegated to other entities?).
Currently, Congressional attention regarding U.S. military involvement in peacekeeping
focuses on three issues. For many Members, the salient issue is whether there is a need for
the U.S. military to maintain a long-term peacekeeping, or “stabilization and reconstruction”
presence in Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Balkans. The second is the suitability and desirability
of deploying U.S. troops on peacekeeping and related missions in general, and if deployed,
the appropriate role for the military in those situation and the roles that should be taken on
by U.S. civilian or international forces. The third is a two-sided capabilities issue: to what
extent do peacekeeping and related operations impair the U.S. military’s warfighting
capability (“readiness”), and, conversely, to what extent should the U.S. armed forces be
reorganized to perform peacekeeping effectively so as to alleviate undue stress on the forces?
Although the costs of peacekeeping per se are not as salient an issue as they were
several years ago, when the United States participated in or provided substantial military
assistance to several U.N. peacekeeping operations, the incremental costs (i.e., the costs over
and above the cost of maintaining, training, and equipping the U.S. military in peacetime)
of the larger contingency operations in Iraq and Afghanistan are a continuing concern. Cost
issues are not addressed in this issue brief. For more information on incremental costs,
supplemental appropriations and on attempts to create more efficient methods of funding
contingency operations, see CRS Report 98-823, Military Contingency Funding for Bosnia,
Southwest Asia, and Other Operations: Questions and Answers, and CRS Report RL32141,
Funding for Military and Peacekeeping Operations: Recent History and Precedents. For
information on the cost of U.N. operations, see CRS Issue Brief IB90103, United Nations
Peacekeeping: Issues for Congress.
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The Definitional Problem
“Peacekeeping” is a broad, generic, and often imprecise term to describe the many
activities that the United Nations and other international organizations, and sometimes ad
hoc coalitions of nations or individual nations, undertake to promote, maintain, enforce, or
enhance the possibilities for peace. These activities range from providing election observers,
recreating police or civil defense forces for the new governments of those countries,
organizing and providing security for humanitarian relief efforts, and monitoring and
enforcing cease-fires and other arrangements designed to separate parties recently in conflict.
The definitional problem stems from a semantic dilemma: no single term currently in
use can accurately capture the broad and ambiguous nature of all these types of operations.
Use of any term with the word “peace” conveys the misleading impression that they are
without risk, when, in fact, “peace” operations can place soldiers in hostile situations
resembling war. To further complicate the problem of definition, as the concept of
peacekeeping has become discredited in the United States, the terminology has shifted. For
DOD and many analyses aimed at a DOD audiences, many of these same activities are now
encompassed under the rubrics of “stabilization” and “reconstruction” operations.
The use of the term “peacekeeping” gained currency in the late 1950s, when United
Nations peacekeeping efforts mostly fit a narrower definition: providing an “interpositional”
force to supervise the keeping of a cease-fire or peace accord that parties in conflict had
signed. In 1992, the United Nations began to use a broader terminology to describe the
different types of peacekeeping activities. In particular, it created the term “peace
enforcement” to describe operations in unstable situations where peacekeepers are allowed
to use force because of a greater possibility of conflict or a threat to their safety. (For some
military analysts, there is virtually no difference between peace enforcement operations and
low-intensity conflict, save the existence of a peace plan or agreement that has some degree
of local consent.) Subsequently, U.S. executive branch agencies substituted the term “peace
operations” for “peacekeeping.” Since the early 2000s, the Department of Defense more
often uses the term “stability” operations to refer to peace operations (although the term also
encompasses other non-combat operations, such as counterdrug operations), and undertakes
some peace tasks in the context of reconstruction assistance. Congress has tended to use the
term “peacekeeping,” as does this issue brief.
Current U.S. Military Participation in Peacekeeping
The level of U.S. military participation in peacekeeping is much reduced from the
1990s, if the occupation force in Iraq is excluded. Still, thousands of U.S. military personnel
participate full-time in a variety of activities that fall under the rubric of peacekeeping
operations, most endorsed by the United Nations. Very few U.S. military personnel currently
serve under U.N. command. As of August 31, 2004, 28 U.S. military personnel were serving
in five U.N. peacekeeping or related operations. These operations are located in the Middle
East (2 U.S. military observers or “milobs” in the Sinai operation), Georgia (2 milobs),
Ethiopia/Eritrea (6 milobs), Liberia (7 milobs and 5 troops), and Haiti (6 troops). Other U.S.
forces are deployed in unilateral U.S. operations and coalition operations, most undertaken
with U.N. authority. As of the end of September 2004, roughly 2,500 U.S. troops were
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serving in the two NATO operations in the Balkans, with many others supporting one of
them from Macedonia. (Numbers have fluctuated by the hundreds with troop rotations.)
Roughly 700 serve in the Sinai-based coalition Multilateral Force (MFO), which has no U.N.
affiliation. Additional troops are involved with the U.N. peacekeeping operation in Haiti,
which took over the three-month U.S.-led coalition force on June 1, 2004.
The United States has other troops abroad in operations that are related to, but not
counted as, peacekeeping. Some 30,000 U.S. troops serve in South Korea under bilateral
U.S.-Republic of Korea agreements and U.N. authority. (Although technically
“peacekeeping,” this deployment has long been treated as a standard U.S. forward presence
mission.) On June 7, South Korean officials announced that the United States intended to
withdraw about a third of the 37,000 troops serving at that time by the end of 2005. No U.S.
troops serve in the coalition international peacekeeping operation in Afghanistan although
some 11,000 U.S. troops are present there in other roles (see section on Afghanistan, below),
including a few hundred involved in nation-building activities. As of mid-2004, some
170,000 U.S. troops were involved in Iraq and elsewhere in Operation Iraqi Freedom, often
referred to as a “stability operation.”
The Bush Administration Policy
Despite President Bush’s expressed dislike for open-ended “nation-building” missions
involving U.S. ground forces during his presidential campaign, as president he has been
willing to maintain troops in peacekeeping missions to the extent he deems necessary. (For
a discussion of candidate and president Bush’s statements on peacekeeping, see CRS Report
RL31109, NATO: Issues for Congress, by Paul E. Gallis.) During his Administration, Bush
has sought and achieved substantial reductions in Bosnia and Kosovo and thus far has
resisted calls to provide U.S. troops for the international peacekeeping force in Afghanistan.
In the wake of the coalition invasion of Iraq, the debate over the appropriate role for the
United States military in activities encompassed by the term peacekeeping has again moved
to the forefront. Although the current military occupation of Iraq falls in a gray area that
defies easy definition, with a level of instability that some would define as low-intensity
conflict rather than peace enforcement, many of the activities that the U.S. military has
undertaken there also have been undertaken in past peacekeeping operations. Critics of the
Bush Administration have charged that its disdain for peacekeeping has led it to ignore the
lessons of past operations and to err in its judgment of the number and type of forces
necessary in Iraq, putting the United States and its allies at risk of “losing the peace” there.
Reductions in Bosnia and Kosovo. Bush Administration actions in the Balkans
have been consistent with President-elect Bush’s remarks in early 2001 that he was “in
consultation with our allies” concerning his desire to reduce the U.S. peacekeeping presence
in the Balkans. The Bush Administration quietly sought to minimize forces in the two
NATO Balkans peacekeeping operations through negotiations with U.S. allies, following
established NATO procedures. The U.S. presence in Bosnia has dropped steadily during the
Bush Administration from some 4,200 participating in the NATO Bosnia Stabilization Force
(SFOR) at the beginning of 2001 to under 1,000. (U.S. participation may terminate for the
most part at the end of 2004 if, as planned, the European Union assumes responsibility for
the operation. See CRS Report RS21774, Bosnia and International Security Forces:
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Transition from NATO to the European Union in 2004.) Similarly, the U.S. presence in
Kosovo has dropped from some 5,600 involved in the NATO Kosovo Force (KFOR) in early
2001 to about 1,500. (These numbers can fluctuate by the hundreds due to rotations.) In
both cases, these reductions have taken place in the context of an overall reduction of forces
serving in the NATO peacekeeping missions.
NATO Peacekeeping and U.S. Operations in Afghanistan. For some time,
the Bush Administration has maintained that no U.S. troops would participate in
peacekeeping operations in the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), despite calls
by some analysts for a U.S. role. With about 6,500 troops contributed by some 35 NATO
and non-NATO nations as of June 2004 (according to the latest figures on the NATO
website), ISAF patrols Kabul and its immediate surrounding areas under a U.N. Chapter VII
authorization. NATO assumed command of ISAF on August 11, 2003, just over 18 months
after ISAF was formed in January 2002 as an ad hoc coalition operation of some 5,000
troops from 18 nations under British command. In the face of a deteriorating security
situation in the countryside, on October 13, 2003, the U.N. Security Council Resolution 1510
authorized ISAF to expand its operations beyond Kabul and it environs. The total foreign
military presence in Afghanistan still falls short of what some analysts have judged would
be desirable, even though in addition to gradual troop increases over 2003-2004 NATO has
augmented personnel especially for the October 2004 elections.
The United States has some 11,000 soldiers deployed in Afghanistan, according to
DOD, most in continuing combat (hunting Al Qaeda), but others in support, training, and
reconstruction missions. U.S. troops provide some assistance to the ISAF, i.e., logistical,
intelligence, and quick reaction force support, but they do not engage in ISAF peacekeeping.
U.S. troops do, however, provide training and assistance for the formation of an Afghani
national military force, an activity which some analysts label “nation-building.”
Hundreds of U.S. troops have been involved since December 2002 in the establishment
and operation of Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), which were designed to create
a secure environment for aid agencies involved in reconstruction work in areas outside
Kabul. Each team includes 60-100 U.S. military personnel (Special Forces and civil affairs
reservists) and civilians. As of September 2004, the United States operates 13 PRTs. On
January 6, 2004, ISAF (by now under NATO) marked the beginning of its operations outside
Kabul when it took over the German-led PRT in Konduz. All told, ISAF now controls five
PRTs, some of which have satellites. New Zealand is in charge of yet another. Although the
U.S. military role in PRTs is not identified as “peacekeeping,” its objectives — enhancing
security, extending the reach of the central government, and facilitating reconstruction — are
similar to those of peacekeeping operations. Some analysts consider it “nation-building.”
Thus far, the PRTs have not proven controversial in Congress, although some humanitarian
organizations have taken issue with them. (For more on PRTs, see CRS Report RL30588,
Afghanistan: Current Issues and U.S. Policy; the entry on Afghanistan Reconstruction in the
on-line CRS Foreign Operations Appropriations Briefing Book (apfor37); and the section on
nation-building below.)
Issues Regarding an Extended U.S. Military “Stabilization” Presence in
Iraq. U.S. troops in Iraq are engaged in a wide variety of activities in Iraq, the most visible
of which are counterinsurgency (i.e., combat) operations but some of which are generally
classified as peacekeeping and related stability operations. The type of activities undertaken
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by U.S. troops varies from area to area, and some commanders have noted that their troops
are doing a mix of both types of operations. (However, counterinsurgency techniques
include humanitarian and political activities which are also carried out in peace operations.)
In the face of what many analysts have perceived as a continuing climate of general
lawlessness and insecurity, some critics argue that the United States should deploy a greater
number of troops, particularly military police, to provide greater stability. Many argue that
an extensive force will be needed for several years to perform a wide spectrum of tasks,
particularly providing continuing peacekeeping duties such as providing basic security while
Iraqi police and military forces are reconstituted. (In testimony before the House Armed
Services Committee on January 28, 2004, the U.S. Army Chief of Staff, General
Schoomaker, said that he envisions a U.S. military presence in Iraq for another four years.
The deployment is straining U.S. forces, however, as the June 2, 2004 “stop loss”
announcement that soldiers would not be allowed to retire within 90 days of deploying to
Iraq or Afghanistan, and the subsequent announcement to withdraw a third of U.S. soldiers
from Korea, are attributed to difficulties in maintaining a sufficient number of troops in Iraq.
Although the Bush Administration has hoped that NATO would take over Iraq, news reports
indicate that the earliest this might occur would be after elections that may occur at the end
of 2004 or early 2005. (See CRS Report RL31701, Iraq: U.S. Military Operations, for more
information on the U.S. military presence there.)
The Recent U.S. Military Presence in Haiti. After international efforts to resolve
a political crisis in Haiti failed, the United Nations Security Council authorized a multilateral
force to provide assistance to the Haitian police in establishing a secure environment and to
facilitate humanitarian assistance for a period of three months. Some 200 U.S. Marines, the
first contingent of a U.S.-led four-member coalition force, landed in Haiti on February 29,
2004. By early April, the force had grown to 3,700 troops, of which 2,000 were Americans.
Of those roughly 1,600 were Marines, with additional troops from the Army providing
communications and headquarters (HQ) support, Coast Guard personnel patrolling the waters
off Haiti, and a number of Special Operations Forces. (Information provided by the U.S.
Marine Corps, April 8, 2004.) Some U.S. forces remained after the U.N. took command of
the operation on June 1, 2004, six of whom were under U.N. control as of August 31, 2004.
Apportioning Responsibilities
Suitability and Desirability as a U.S. Military Mission
Some analysts question whether military forces in general and U.S. military forces in
particular are, by character, doctrine, and training, suited to carry out peacekeeping
operations, and by extension, the related “stabilization” and “reconstruction” tasks of other
post-combat environments. One reason given is that military forces cultivate the instincts
and skills to be fighters, while the instincts and skills needed for peacekeeping are those
inculcated by law enforcement training. (In some peacekeeping operations, however, the
military’s training to work in highly-disciplined units and employ higher levels of force are
seen as inculcating skills necessary for effective performance.) Another reason is that
peacekeeping requires a different approach than combat operations. Many senior U.S.
military planners hold that successful military action requires “overwhelming” force. U.S.
troops are taught to apply “decisive” force to defeat an enemy. Most peacekeeping tasks,
however, require restraint, not an “overwhelming” use of force.
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As the military has gained more experience with peacekeeping missions and analyzed
their requirements, and as some officers and analysts have begun to look more favorably on
peacekeeping as a mission, many assert that to be a good peacekeeper, one must first be a
good soldier. (“Peacekeeping is not a job for soldiers, but only soldiers can do it,” states the
Army field manual on peace operations, FM 100-23, in a quote attributed to former U.N.
Secretary General Dag Hammarskjold.) In part this argument is based on the recognition that
troops in peacekeeping operations need military and combat skills to respond to
unanticipated risks, in part it is based on the judgment that the most credible deterrent to
those “spoilers” who would disrupt the peace is a soldier well-trained for combat. U.S.
military participation in peacekeeping has become regarded more favorably by military
officers who have found that although combat skills deteriorate (“degrade”), peace operations
can enhance other non-combat skills necessary for combat operations. A recent Heritage
Foundation report, Post-Conflict Operations from Europe to Iraq by James Jay Carafano,
published in July 2004, argues that the armed services should create schools designed to
teach concepts and practices needed for post-conflict missions.
Questions also arise as to whether peacekeeping is a desirable mission for U.S. forces.
On the one hand, some point out that as representatives of the sole world “superpower,” U.S.
troops are particularly vulnerable to attempts to sabotage peacekeeping operations by those
who want to convince potential followers of their power by successfully engaging U.S.
forces. On the other, analysts note that other countries are often reluctant to commit forces
if the United States does not.
Debate over U.S. Military Involvement in Nation-Building. In the wake of U.S.
military action in Iraq, the question of continued U.S. military involvement has been framed
in terms of whether the U.S. military should do “nation-building.” Like peacekeeping,
nation-building is not a precise term, but rather one that is used for both a concept and a
variety of activities. On one level, nation-building is used to refer to the concept of creating
(or a decision to create) a democratic state, often in a post-conflict situation. The term is
also used, however, to refer to any of the range of activities that militaries or civilians
undertake to advance that goal. (A recent RAND report, America’s Role in Nation-Building
from Germany to Iraq, uses the term to encompass the full range of activities undertaken by
the United States, including by its military forces, in operations that have been variously
known as an occupation, peacekeeping, peace enforcement, stabilization, and reconstruction.)
As most often used when referring to the U.S. military, nation-building refers to a range
of activities to assist civilians beyond providing security and humanitarian aid in emergency
situations. These can include projects such as the repair, maintenance, or construction of
economic infrastructure, such as roads, schools, electric grids, and heavy industrial facilities,
and of health infrastructure, such as clinics and hospitals, and water and sewage facilities.
They can also include the provision of a variety of services, such as medical services to
refugee and impoverished populations, and training and assistance to police, the military,
the judiciary, and prison officials as well as other civil administrators.
During the early to mid-1990s, the U.S. military was involved in several peacekeeping
operations with significant nation-building components, especially Somalia and Haiti. In
Somalia, besides assisting in the delivery of humanitarian aid, the U.S. led-UNITAF was
engaged in road and bridge building, well-digging, and the establishment of schools and
hospitals. In Haiti, in the absence of civilian personnel, the U.S. military became involved
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in revamping the police, judicial, and prison systems as part of their primary task of
establishing security. These two experiences, which are often regarded as failed or at best
inconclusive experiments, stigmatized peacekeeping and nation-building for many Members
as an inefficient use of military resources.
Nevertheless, some policymakers and analysts continue to assert the need for military
involvement in such tasks, particularly in the absence of other personnel able to undertake
such in the immediate aftermath of major combat. Nation-building tasks are often viewed
as essential elements in stabilizing post-conflict situations because they provide the physical
and organizations infrastructure populations need to help re-establish normal lives. Such
activities are also viewed as enhancing the legitimacy and extending the presence of weak
central governments as they try to assert control in such situations, and as reassuring local
populations of the friendly intent of foreign military forces. Sometimes, involvement in such
activities may enable armed forces to make more informed judgments about the security
situation in an area. Some analysts view U.S. military nation-building as an essential
element in the U.S. toolkit to respond to the 9/11 Commission’s recommendation (p. 367)
to use all elements of national power “to keep possible terrorists insecure and on the run...”
In immediate post-conflict situations, or extremely dangerous environments, military
forces may be the only personnel available to perform such tasks. In hostile environments,
armed forces may be needed to provide security for relief workers providing such assistance.
(A Heritage Foundation analyst argues that basic post-conflict tasks, such as providing
security and related logistics for the reestablishment of civilian government and authority,
must be done by the military, although he argues against the use of the U.S. military for
peacekeeping, and broader “nation-building” tasks. See Post Conflict and Culture:
Changing America’s Military for 21st Century Missions, October 22, 2003, available through
[http://www.heritage.org].)
In less problematic circumstances, however, some argue that the use of the military for
such tasks can be detrimental to humanitarian and reconstruction tasks. Such critics feel that
the use of troops for such purposes can detract from a sense of returning normality and
establishment of civilian control. Where military and civilians are delivering assistance in
the same areas, some civilians feel that the military presence confuses the civilian role, and
makes them targets of armed opponents. In Afghanistan, humanitarian groups have charged
that U.S. soldiers were endangering their workers by wearing civilian dress while
undertaking humanitarian activities; some have viewed the U.S. military as “inadequately
prepared” for its rural reconstruction efforts there. (Combat role strains relations between
America’s military and its NGOs. Humanitarian Affairs Review. Summer 2003, p. 29).
Many have urged that the U.S. military not undertake such projects in Iraq.
Proposals to Improve Civilian Capabilities
Several proposals to build civilian capabilities to perform nation-building tasks,
especially rule of law tasks, in peacekeeping operations have been advanced. Among the
arguments made in their favor are that they could relieve stress on military forces. Three
such bills have been introduced in the second session of the 108th Congress: the Stabilization
and Reconstruction Civilian Management Act of 2004, S. 2127, introduced on February 25,
2004, by Senators Lugar and Biden; and its companion measure, H.R. 3996, introduced on
March 18, 2004, by Representative Schiff; and the International Security Enhancement Act
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of 2004, H.R. 4185, introduced on April 21, 2004, by Representative Dreier. S. 2127/H.R.
3996 and H.R. 4185 each propose changes in the structure of the National Security Council
(NSC) and the State Department to enhance planning and coordination of stabilization and
other contingency operations, the creation of a corps of permanent civilian employees and
contractors to deploy rapidly to such operations, enhanced training, and new funding
mechanisms. A related bill, the United States Assistance for Civilians Affected by Conflict
Act of 2004, H.R. 4058, with proposals to improve contingency planning and coordination,
was introduced on March 30, 2004, by Representative Hyde.
There are several key differences between S. 2127/H.R. 3996 and H.R. 4185, although
the difference on a key component of both proposals, a civilian overseas emergency response
capability, may have little practical effect. S. 2127/H.R. 3996 has a more specific proposal
for such a capability, proposing a Readiness Response Corps of up to 250 new permanent
personnel, and a Response Readiness Reserve roster of at least 500 people (from active or
retired federal, state, or local government service ranks, non-governmental organizations,
contractor firms) trained and available as needed to support the Corps. H.R. 4185 provides
for a Civilian Overseas Contingency Force of paid volunteers for pre-conflict stabilization
and post-conflict reconstruction, but does not specify a number. In addition, H.R. 4185
provides for the establishment of a new International Contingency Training Center, while S.
2127/H.R. 3996 calls only for the creation of a stabilization and reconstruction curriculum.
Proposals in both bills regarding the creation of new government offices for managing
civilian input to stabilization and post-conflict operations may well have been mooted by the
creation of a new State Department office, announced September 28, 2004, of the Office of
the Coordinator of Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) reporting directly to the
Secretary of State. (H.R. 4185 would have established such an office at the Undersecretary
level.) According to the State Department, the mission of the new office, which is headed
by Ambassador Carlos Pascual, is to “lead and coordinate U.S. government planning, and
institutionalize U.S. capacity, to help stabilize and reconstruct societies in transition from
conflict or civil strife so they can reach a sustainable path toward peace, democracy and a
market economy.” It is also charged with developing policy options for countries at risk and
leading U.S. contingency planning regarding them. S/CRS will respond to crises at the
direction of the Secretary of State, in support of the responsible regional bureau, to ensure
a coordinated interagency civilian response to humanitarian needs and in the “nation-
building” areas of law enforcement, economic reconstruction, the creation of viable justice,
penal and other government institutions, and the development of civil society, among others.
The extent to which the new Coordinator’s office can supplement and replace DOD
capabilities in the post-combat period will depend on many factors, including the extent to
which it is provided funding. The Senate version of the FY2005 Foreign Operations
Appropriations bill (S. 2812 as incorporated into H.R. 4148 on September 23, 2004) would
establish a new Conflict Response Fund, with an initial appropriation of $20 million, to
enable the State Department to respond more effectively to potential and ongoing conflicts
and to post-conflict situations.
Proposals to Improve Other Nations’ Capabilities
The Bush Administration has proposed a five-year, $661 million Global Peace
Operations Initiative (GPOI) to assist other, largely African, nations to train and equip some
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75,000 military forces to participate in peacekeeping operation. Some funds would be
provided to develop European constabulary (i.e. police with military skills) capabilities for
deployment. (In the June 2004 summit meeting, the G-8 countries adopted proposals for the
enhancement of international peacekeeping capabilities that appear to build on GPOI.)
Legislation thus far in 2004 displays mixed Congressional reactions to the proposals.
The House version of the FY2005 DOD authorization bill, H.R. 4200, as passed May 20,
2004, contains no funding for GPOI, but Section 1213 requests a Presidential report on it.
The House Armed Services Committee (HASC) report, H.Rept. 108-491, on the bill notes
that the President’s FY2005 budget request did not contain GPOI funding (of which 80%
would be from DOD and the rest from the Department of State). The HASC expressed
concern that providing authority would divert funds from U.S. troops. It also stated that the
Administration requested authority to exempt GPOI from Title 22 U.S.C. human rights and
foreign policy constraints that restrict the countries eligible for such training and types of
training that can be provided. The Senate Armed Services Committee version, S. 2400,
contains no funding authorization and an amendment (S.Amdt. 3200) submitted by Senator
Inhofe was not acted upon during floor action in June. The amendment sought to authorize
$100 million for FY2005 to enhance other nations’ capability to participate in international
peacekeeping or peace enforcement operations. Although there is no appropriation for GPOI
in the DOD FY2005 appropriations law (H.R. 4613/P.L. 108-287, signed August 5, 2004),
the Senate version of the FY2005 Foreign Operations Appropriations bill (S. 2812 as
incorporated into H.R. 4818) would authorize the transfer of funds from the Department of
Defense to the State Department to support GPOI. A DOD official says that the Secretary
of Defense has stated his willingness to transfer funds from the Operations and Maintenance
account for GPOI if DOD were authorized to fund it.
Military Capabilities Issue: Readiness vs. Adequacy
Congressional debate over U.S. military capabilities to perform peacekeeping operations
has taken two different forms. During the 1990s, critics of the commitment of U.S. military
personnel to peacekeeping operations drove the readiness debate. As the U.S. military was
increasingly called upon to perform peacekeeping and other non-combat missions — at the
same time as it was downsized significantly — many Members questioned whether U.S.
military forces could perform their “core” war-fighting mission to protect U.S. vital interests
if they engaged extensively in other activities. Opponents of such commitments, particularly
in areas they regarded as irrelevant to key U.S. interests, argued that they impaired the
military’s capability or “readiness” to defend the nation. Today, those who view
peacekeeping operations as a necessary, albeit not primary, role for U.S. armed forces,
particularly the army, have reframed the debate, arguing that the U.S. military should be
adequately structured and sized to perform such operations without putting undue stress on
individual soldiers and units.
The Readiness Debate
There is some difference of opinion concerning the importance of the readiness, which
was always a subjective and ambiguous concept. Peacekeeping (and all other operations
other than war) is directly related to the readiness problem, if viewed strictly in terms of the
readiness ratings that are calculated periodically. That is because the standards that are used
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to measure “readiness” only measure the military’s combat preparedness; that is, its ability
to fight and win wars. These standards measure the availability of a unit’s personnel, the
state of a unit’s equipment, and the performance of a unit’s members on tests of their
wartime skills. When the military deploys large numbers of personnel to peacekeeping
operations, scores on these measures can decline, as they did in the latter half of the 1990s.
There were a variety of reasons for such declines, some of were addressed by changes
in military practices. First, military personnel cannot continue to practice all their combat
skills when participating in peace operations; second, the U.S. military has been deployed
for peacekeeping operations at the same time that the size of the force, particularly the army,
has been reduced substantially; third, funds for training and equipment have been diverted
in the past to fund peacekeeping operations; and fourth, units were disrupted by the
deployment of an individual or a small number of individuals to a peacekeeping operation.
Whether a potential or actual “degradation” of readiness ratings is important depends
on one’s perspective on the utility of readiness measures, which measure only readiness for
combat. Those who believe that peacekeeping and related operations are significant missions
and important to U.S. national security have argued that readiness standards should also
measure, or otherwise account for, performance of peacekeeping tasks.
If one looked at the larger “readiness” problem, that is the perception that U.S. military
personnel were overworked, that military equipment was in poor shape, that there were
rampant shortages of spare parts, and that the military could not recruit and retain needed
personnel, the relationship of peacekeeping to readiness was less pronounced, according to
some analysts. Some have argued that the readiness problem was exaggerated or non-
existent, given the successful combat performances of U.S. troops in Afghanistan in 2001
and in Iraq in 2003. Others have argued that peacekeeping was responsible to some extent
for this larger readiness problem, but there were many contributing factors, such as the strong
economy and the advanced age of equipment and spare parts. The area in which
peacekeeping most affected readiness is the stress that frequent deployments placed on
certain troops — the so-called increase in operational tempo (optempo), i.e., the pace of a
unit’s activities and personnel tempo (perstempo), i.e., the rate of deployments.
Assessing and Adjusting for the Effects of Peacekeeping and
Related Operations on Military Forces
The military’s ability to perform peacekeeping operations while retaining its
preparedness to fight wars depends on several factors. Most salient among them are the size
of the force, the numbers of troops devoted to specific tasks (force structure), the size, length,
and frequency of deployments (operational tempo), and opportunities for training in combat
skills while deployed on peacekeeping and related operations.
Deployment Strains. The increased “optempo” demanded by peacekeeping takes
time from necessary maintenance, repairs, and combat training, and can shorten the useful
life of equipment. The “perstempo” problem is regarded as particularly severe for the Army.
For several years, the Army was deploying the same units over and over to peacekeeping
operations, and the pace of deployment was viewed as too demanding, affecting morale by
keeping personnel away from families for too long, and, some argue, affecting recruitment.
In one of the first publicly-available studies of peacekeeping stresses, in March 1995 the
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GAO reported (GAO/NSIAD-95-51) that increased deployments due to peacekeeping
together with reduced force structure taxed certain Navy and Marine Corps units, and
“heavily”stressed certain Army support forces (such as quartermaster and transportation
units) and specialized Air Force aircraft critical to the early stages of an major regional
contingency (MRC) to an extent that could endanger DOD’s ability to respond quickly to an
MRC. A July 2000 GAO report (GAO/NSIAD-00-164) found shortages in forces needed for
contingency operations, including active-duty civil affairs personnel, Navy/Marine Corps
land-based EA-6B squadrons, fully- trained and available Air Force AWACS aircraft crews,
and fully-trained U-2 pilots.
The Army has taken steps to deal with some of its problems by the realignment and
better management of its resources, as has the Air Force. In recent years, the army has
addressed perstempo strains by limiting deployments to six months (although this was
overridden by deployments to Iraq), and including national guard and reserve units among
those on the roster to serve in Bosnia, thus attempting to reduce the optempo of combat duty
units. The Air Force, since 1999, has established Air Expeditionary Units that deploy under
a predictable rotation system in an attempt to reduce the stresses of deployment to enforce
no-fly zones over northern and southern Iraq and to meet other disaster and humanitarian
assistance demands as they arise. In some cases, however, these solutions may generate other
problems. For instance, the Army’s attempts to relieve the stresses of frequent deployments
on its active forces by instead deploying reservists may have, some analysts worry, affected
Guard and Reserve personnel recruitment and retention. (See section on the use of reserves,
below.) Some analysts suggest, however, that continued improvements in resource
management could ease stresses. Others prefer to change force size or structure.
Force Adjustments for Peacekeeping and Related Operations
The appropriate size and structure for the military depends largely on the types of wars
that it is expected to fight and the range of missions that it is expected to perform. A decade
and a half after the end of the Cold War, U.S. policymakers are still debating how best to
define the future threats to U.S. security and the appropriate configuration of U.S. military
force to counter them. Since the early 1990s, many defense analysts, military officers, and
policymakers have questioned whether the military, especially the Army, is appropriately
sized and structured to perform all the tasks assigned to it. As the deployment strains, noted
in the GAO reports cited above, became evident, many Members have argued that the U.S.
military is too small and too stretched to take on peacekeeping operations. In response, some
urged that the United States reduce or eliminate such missions, others urged changes in the
force to better accommodate peacekeeping missions. The Iraq occupation has intensified this
debate. (See the Heritage Foundation’s Reducing the Stress on an Overstretched Force by
Jack Spencer, August 1, 2003, arguing for the more effective use of uniformed personnel and
a reduction of peacekeeping commitments before increasing the number of U.S. troops.)
Increasing Use of Reserves in Peacekeeping and Related Operations.
Over the past decade, but especially since 9/11, the U.S. military has increasingly called upon
Army, Air Force, and Navy reserve forces and National Guardsmen for peacekeeping and
related operations. (These forces are known collectively as “the reserve,” “reservists,” and
“the reserve component.”) These deployments have raised issues regarding the appropriate
division of labor between active and reserve forces, and the extent to which reserve forces
can be used without jeopardizing their ability to recruit and retain qualified personnel.
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Until recently, the increasing use of involuntary call-ups of reservists for peacekeeping
operations was considered a desirable trend by many analysts. These call-ups were necessary
to deploy adequate numbers of personnel with specialized skills required in post-conflict
operations, and to relieve over-taxed active duty combat personnel. In 2000, the Reserve
Component began taking over operations in the Balkans; since then National Guardsmen
have assumed leadership roles in U.S. contingents, and Army reservists and guardsmen have
comprised a large part of those contingents. (National Guard generals have commanded the
U.S. Bosnia SFOR contingent since October 2000, and a National Guard general was
appointed commander of the U.S. KFOR contingent in March 2003.) A December 2002
report from the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, Review of
Reserve Component Contributions to National Defense, recommended that reserve
components could “assume a larger role in peacekeeping operations” and “shoulder a greater
load” in the transitional and final stages of “smaller-scale contingency” operations. The
National Guard also provides the battalions that perform peacekeeping duties in the Sinai.
With the call-ups in 2003 for duty in Iraq, on top of the post-September 11, 2001 call-ups for
homeland defense, many policymakers perceive that the reserves have been too stretched to
remain viable if they continued to be deployed at current rates.
The potential effect of repeated mobilizations on recruitment and retention has been a
longstanding area of concern, even before the post-September 11, 2001 call-ups. The call-
ups for duty related to homeland security, Afghanistan, and Iraq, and the extension of the
tours of reservists in Iraq to one year, announced in the fall of 2003, has intensified concerns.
In July 2003, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld directed a “rebalancing” of active and reserve
forces in order to reduce reliance on the reserve component during the first 15 days of a
“rapid response operation” and to limit reserve mobilization, especially for high demand
units, to once every six years. (See section on Current Army Restructuring, below. Plans for
further restructuring reserve forces are being developed and are expected to be announced
in July 2004.) Although DOD officials had stated that reserve recruitment has held steady,
on January 20, 2004, Lt. General James R. Helmly said that prohibiting reservist resignations
and retirements while their units were deployed was “masking” problems that must be
addressed “‘to prevent a recruiting-retention crisis.” (Washington Post, January 21, 2004)
Debate Over Force Size. Concerns that the United States does not have sufficient
military forces to maintain a presence in Iraq and Afghanistan over the next year has given
new prominence to the issue of force size. The size of the U.S. military is controversial in
large part because the basic cost of each additional soldier is high, averaging some $100,000
per year for an active duty troop, according to a recent CBO estimate. Since the mid-1990s,
some policymakers and military experts have suggested that 520,000 to 540,000 troops
would be an appropriate size for the Army if it were to prevail in the scenario involving two
major theater wars which was then the standard for sizing force structure and also to engage
in peacekeeping missions. (For the 14 years after the end of the Vietnam War in 1975
through the year of the end of the Cold War in 1989, the Army had averaged some 778,000,
with fluctuations. As of February 29, 2004, there were 492,882 active-duty Army personnel,
almost 13,000 more than the 480,000 authorized level because of provisions allowing for
temporary increases in special circumstances.) Other policymakers would prefer further cuts
in personnel in order to conserve funds for modernizing equipment and weapons systems.
On November 6, 2003, retired Lt. Gen. Theodore G. Stoup Jr., a vice president of the
Association of the United States Army (AUSA), testified before the House Armed Services
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Committee that the active army should be increased by some 40,000 over the next few years.
In the November 2003 edition of AUSA’s Army Magazine, retired General Frederick J.
Kroesen argued that the Army should add 100,000 troops: 50,000 “to spell the overworked,
overcommitted aviation, military police, engineer, signal, medical, special operations forces
and other high demand units,” and 50,000 to train replacements. On January 28, 2004,
Secretary of State Rumsfeld invoked emergency powers to authorize the Army to increase
temporarily by 30,000. (For information on legislation, see CRS Report RS21754, Military
Forces: What is the Appropriate Size for the United States?) On June 3, 2004, presidential
candidate John Kerry said that he would expand the active duty Army by 40,000 troops.
Debate over Army Force Structure and Restructuring Proposals. Size is not
the only consideration, and some would argue it is but a secondary consideration, for
providing the capabilities needed for military operations and relieving stress on the armed
forces. For several years, analysts have advanced proposals to restructure U.S. Army forces
to increase capabilities for peacekeeping. Despite the “small-scale contingency missions”
that became a staple of the 1990s and many argue will constitute a sizable proportion of
future missions, the Army has retained its traditional structure. This structure has been built
around warfighting divisions of 9,000 - 17,000 (although the number of active duty Army
divisions was cut from 18 to ten during the 1990s). Divisions are currently divided into three
brigades of combat forces, and separate units of support personnel. (Support personnel
include “combat support” such as artillery, air defense artillery, engineer, military police,
signal, and military intelligence, and “combat service support” such as supply, maintenance,
transportation, health.) Other support forces are found “above” the division level in the
Army’s four corps or elsewhere in the active or reserve force.
For the most part, proposals for reform have centered on an increase in the number of
personnel in “low-density, high-demand” units, i.e., those most heavily taxed by
peacekeeping, which are now stressed by “stability” operations in Iraq, and which to this
point have been concentrated in the reserve component. For several years, many military
analysts have suggested that the overall force might be restructured to include more of the
specialities needed for peacekeeping (which some also regard as in short supply for
warfighting or war termination periods), and in units sized for peace operations. Civil
affairs, psychological operations (PSYOPS), and military police units have been frequently
mentioned as specialties that are particularly needed in peace operations, but are in short
supply in the active military. As the Army performed increasing numbers of small-scale
contingency missions, analysts noticed that such operations were built around one or two
maneuver brigades (of 2,000+ to 3,000+ troops) with command and support elements drawn
from divisional HQ and elsewhere in the Army. As a result, some analysts recommended
that the development of “maneuver brigades that are prepared for rapid deployment and
autonomous operations.” (RAND, Assessing Requirements for Peacekeeping, Humanitarian
Assistance, and Disaster Relief,1998, accessible through [http://www.rand.org] pp 133-134).
Current Army Restructuring. Beginning in mid-2003, the Army has undertaken
a restructuring of the Army’s active force and a “rebalancing” of positions between the Army
active and reserve forces that eventually will involve some 100,000 positions. (Testimony
of the Army Chief of Staff, General Schoomaker, before the House Armed Services
Committee (HASC), January 28, 2004.) Of these, some 10,000 positions were shifted in
2003, another 20,000 are to be shifted in 2004, and 20,000 more changes are scheduled for
FY2005. (Testimony of DOD Secretary Rumsfeld before the HASC, February 4, 2004.) The
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primary reason stated for these changes is to improve the Army’s warfighting capacity.
Nevertheless, the changes are also viewed as enhancing the Army’s ability to carry out a
broader range of missions — including peacekeeping and related stability operations, as well
as homeland defense — with less stress on both the active and reserve force. Three elements
of the current restructuring reflect changes that have been proposed to make forces more
adept at such operations, and have implications for their conduct. These are:
— The internal restructuring of divisions to make the Army more mobile (i.e., rapidly
deployable or “expeditionary”) and versatile. The Army has begun to reconfigure the first
of its ten divisions in order to make the brigade, instead of the division or corps, the Army’s
primary unit of organization for conducting combat operations. This reconfiguration will
incorporate into combat brigades many or all of the support services necessary to make the
brigade more self-sufficient on the battlefield. At the same time, the number of combat
brigades in each division will increase from three to four. (The newly configured brigades
are referred to as “units of action.”) Some divisions may maintain additional support
personnel in separate brigades to be used for “stabilization” tasks in immediate post-conflict
situations. The formation of these brigades seems similar to RAND’s1998 recommendation
for rapidly deployable and autonomous maneuver brigades for peacekeeping (see above).
— The increase in the active Army of high demand/low intensity support personnel
in order to support this restructuring and to reduce reliance on and use of the reserve
component (as discussed in the section on reserves, above). This increase involves the
relocation of such positions from the reserves to the active force, as well as a reshuffling of
positions within the active force. For instance, at the start of the restructuring, only one of
the Army’s 25 civil affairs (CA) battalions was in the active force, while the others were in
the Army Reserve. (Combat battalions range in size from 600 to 900 troops, while civil
affairs units are somewhat smaller.) Many CA battalions are now being moved to the active
force, although the primary capability will still reside in the Reserve. Besides CA, specialities
being increased in the active forces that are especially relevant to peacekeeping and related
operations are military police, special operations forces, and certain engineer and
transportation capabilities. (General Schoomaker, January 28, 2004 HASC testimony.) The
Army is attempting to do this without increasing force size by converting certain combat
positions (such as heavy artillery) and other low-demand specialities into support positions.

— Plans also call for the creation of a few thousand new reserve positions, including
positions needed for peacekeeping and related operations, especially military police.
The effect of these changes on the Army’s ability to perform functions from combat to
peacekeeping and related operations is open to debate. While some criticize the reforms as
short-term measures primarily geared to deal with the demands of several more years in Iraq
rather than with the combat realities of future battlefields, others might look at them as
insufficient if the Army is to possess the types of forces necessary to carry out peacekeeping
and related stability operations as an inevitable component of its future missions.
NDU 2003 Proposal: New Stabilization and Reconstruction Commands.
The Center for Technology and National Security Policy at the National Defense University
(NDU) released, in November 2003, a proposal to redesign the U.S. government’s structures
for planning, organizing, and carrying out stability and reconstruction operations. A major
focus of Transforming for Stabilization & Reconstruction Operations (accessible through
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[http://www.ndu.edu/ctnsp/home.html]), is a proposal for greater integration of civilian and
military capabilities. On the military side, this would require the creation of two new joint
(i.e., composed of members from all military services) “Stabilization and Reconstruction”
commands, one with two permanent HQ units located in the active-duty force, the other
located in the reserves but with an active duty HQ unit. Battalion-sized units would be
assigned on a rotating basis to the commands, and would be maintained at a readiness level
for immediate deployment. (The study estimates the number of troops necessary for a small
stabilization and reconstruction contingency operation at 5,000; for a medium-sized
operation at 15,000; and for a large operation at 30,000.) The study also proposed a
reorganization of military forces to consolidate specialized high demand personnel needed
for such operations and to transfer some of them from reserve to active duty status. The high
demand specialties the report mentioned were military police, civil affairs, construction
engineering, medical, and psychological operations (psyops) personnel.
Dedicated Force Proposals Examined by CBO and the Heritage
Foundation. Options which call for dedicating troops solely to peacekeeping missions
have long been considered problematic for a variety of reasons. The U.S. military has
resisted the concept of dedicated peacekeeping units, fearing that they might divert resources
from the rest of the force and might well become substandard as good soldiers would not
choose to make a career of secondary missions. Nevertheless, the idea of creating dedicated
forces within the U.S. military was examined by the CBO in 1999, and recently been revived
by some who argue that the United States must remain committed for several years to
peacekeeping in the Balkans and Iraq, and eventually in Afghanistan. The July 2004
Heritage Foundation report, Post-Conflict Operations from Europe to Iraq, argues that the
United States should not only reorganize and retrain existing combat forces to better equip
them to perform occupation tasks and assist other nations in improving post-conflict
capabilities, but also “build organizations and supporting programs [within the armed forces]
specifically designed to conduct post-conflict duties. (p. 8) Another option would be to
establish a separate peacekeeping force, distinct from the current military service branches,
although this might prove quite costly.
In a 1999 study that some analysts find still relevant to today’s choices, the
Congressional Budget Office examined four hypothetical options for restructuring U.S.
forces to perform peace operations with less stress. (Making Peace While Staying Ready for
War: The Challenges of U.S. Military Participation in Peace Operations, December 1999,
accessible through [http://www.cbo.gov.]) Three examined dedicating forces to such
operations, at current or increased force levels. The fourth proposal, increasing the number
of support personnel essential to such operations by converting an existing active-duty
division into support units, resembles part of current Army restructuring. (CBO judged that
this option would increase the Army’s readiness for peace operations without relying on
reservists and enhance the Army’s capability and readiness to conduct conventional war by
alleviating a shortage of support units in the active Army force. CBO calculated that while
this would be costly to implement, it would save money over the long run.) Although the
precise number of personnel that the Army eventually will shift into support services as part
of current restructuring is not known, it may eventually equal or exceed the size of a division.
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DOD Incremental Costs of Peacekeeping and Security Contingency Operations, FY1991-FY2005
(Budget authority in millions of current year dollars)
FY1991-
FY2004
FY2005
Operation
FY1995
FY1996
FY1997
FY1998
FY1999 FY2000 FY2001 FY2002
FY2003
TOTALS
FY1994
(est.)
Request
AREAS OF ONGOING OPERATIONS
Southwest Asia/Iraq
Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF)
38,322.0
38,322.0
50,188.3
NA
Provide Comfort/Northern Watch
634.9
138.2
88.9
93.1
136.0
156.4
143.7
148.6
1,372.4
626.2
11,023.3
—
—
Southern Watch/Air Expeditionary Force
1,048.9 468.4
576.3
597.3
1,497.2
954.8
755.4
963.5
Desert Strike/Intrinsic Action/Desert Spring
—
—
—
102.7
5.6
13.8
239.8
261.6
Vigilant Warrior
—
257.7
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
257.7
—
—
Desert Thunder (Force Buildup 11/98)
—
—
—
—
—
43.5
—
—
—
—
43.5
—
—
Desert Fox (Air Strikes, 12/98)
—
—
—
—
—
92.9
—
—
—
—
92.9
—
—
UNIKOM (UN/Iraq Observer Group)
32.4
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
32.4
—
—
Total Southwest Asia/Iraq
1,716.2
864.3
665.2
793.1
1,638.8
1,261.4 1,138.9 1,373.5
1,372.4
38,948.2
49,771.8
50,188.3
NA
Afghanistan (Operation Enduring Freedom, OEF)
15,788.1
15,788.1
7,980.0
436.9
Former Yugoslavia (Bosnia)
IFOR/SFOR/Joint Forge
2,231.7
2,087.5
1,792.8
1,431.2 1,381.8 1,213.4
932.9
742.2
13,586.8
868.7
768.4
Other Former Yugoslavia Operations*
436.6
347.4
288.3
195.0
169.9
155.4
101.3
79.4
Total Bosnia
436.6
347.4
2,520.0
2,282.5
1,962.7
1,586.6 1,483.1 1,292.6
932.9
742.2
13,586.8
868.7
768.4
Former Yugoslavia (Kosovo)
Balkan Calm (Observer Mission, Pre-Air War)
34.6
—
—
—
—
34.6
—
—
Eagle Eye (Air Verification, 10/98-03/99)
20.3
—
—
—
—
20.3
—
—
Noble Anvil (Air War)
1,891.4
—
—
—
—
1,891.4
—
—
Joint Guardian (KFOR)
1,044.5 1,803.1 1,383.9
938.2
590.4
4,886.2
726.1
669.7
Sustain Hope (Refugee Assistance)
141.6
—
—
—
—
141.6
—
—
Total Kosovo
3,132.4 1,803.1 1,383.9
938.2
590.4
7,848.0
726.1
669.7
Korea Readiness*
69.7
90.9
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
160.6
—
—
COMPLETED OPERATIONS (Includes Haiti, Somalia, Rwanda, Angola, Cambodia, Western Sahara, East Timor, and Liberia)
Subtotal Completed Operations
1,867.0
591.2
86.9
—
—
1.5
56.8
—
—
3.1 2,606.5
4.9

—
GRAND TOTALS
4,089.5
1,893.8
3,272.1
3,075.6
3,601.5
5,981.9 4,481.8 4,050.0
3,243.5
56,072.0
89,761.8
59,768.0
NA
Source: Defense Finance and Accounting System data through FY2002; Office of the Secretary of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2005 Budget Estimates: Justification for Component Contingency Operations
and the Overseas Contingency Operations Transfer Fund, for FY2003, FY2004, and FY2005.
Notes: This chart consists of DOD incremental costs involved in U.S. support for and participation in peacekeeping and in related humanitarian and security operations, including U.S. unilateral operations
(including OIF in Iraq and OEF in Afghanistan, which are combat/occupation operations), NATO operations, U.N. operations, and ad hoc coalition operations. U.N. reimbursements are not deducted.
Some totals do not add due to rounding. Other Former Yugoslavia operations include Able Sentry (Macedonia), Deny Flight/Decisive Edge, UNCRO (Zagreb), Sharp Guard (Adriatic). Provide Promise
(humanitarian assistance), Deliberate Forge. Because Korea Readiness has long been considered an on-going peacetime function of U.S. troops, DOD only counts above-normal levels of activity there
as incremental costs. NA=Not Available.
CRS-16

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