Order Code IB91141
CRS Issue Brief for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
North Korea’s Nuclear
Weapons Program
Updated September 28, 2004
Larry A. Niksch
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress
CONTENTS
SUMMARY
MOST RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS
Background to the Six Party Talks
The Six Party Talks
Bush Administration Policy
North Korea’s Counter-Strategy
Status of the Talks
North Korea’s Nuclear Program
International Assistance
North Korea’s Delivery Systems
State of Nuclear Weapons Development
Diplomatic Background to the Agreed Framework and Amending Agreements
The Agreed Framework: Provisions, Implementation, Costs, Future Issues
U.S. Objectives: Primacy to the Freeze of North Korea’s Nuclear Program
Benefits to North Korea
Light Water Nuclear Reactors
Oil at No Cost
Diplomatic Representation
Lifting the U.S. Economic Embargo
U.S. Nuclear Security Guarantee
North Korean Obligations Beyond the Freeze of the Nuclear Program
Inspections and Broader Nuclear Obligations
Disposition of Fuel Rods from the Five Megawatt Reactor
Dismantlement of Nuclear Installations
Role of Congress
FOR ADDITIONAL READING
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North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons Program
SUMMARY
North Korea’s decisions to restart nuclear
Korea takes visible steps to dismantle its
installations at Yongbyon that were shut down
nuclear programs and makes concessions on
under the U.S.-North Korean Agreed Frame-
other military issues; (3) assembling an inter-
work of 1994 and withdraw from the Nuclear
national coalition to apply diplomatic and
Non-Proliferation Treaty create an acute
economic pressure on North Korea; and (4)
foreign policy problem for the United States.
planning for future economic sanctions and
Re-starting the Yongbyon facilities opens up
military interdiction against North Korea
a possible North Korean intent to stage a
through a Proliferation Security Initiative.
“nuclear breakout†of its nuclear program and
China, South Korea, and Russia have criti-
openly produce nuclear weapons. North Ko-
cized the Bush Administration for not negoti-
rea’s actions follow the reported disclosure in
ating directly with North Korea, and they
October 2002 that North Korea is operating a
voice opposition to economic sanctions and to
secret nuclear program based on uranium
the use of force against Pyongyang. China
enrichment and the decision by the Korean
and Russia increasingly have expressed sup-
Peninsula Energy Development Organization
port for North Korea’s position in six party
(KEDO) in November 2002 to suspend ship-
talks. China has facilitated six party talks, but
ments of heavy oil to North Korea. North
the talks have made little progress.
Korea claims that it has nuclear weapons and
that it has completed reprocessing of 8,000
The crisis is the culmination of eight
nuclear fuel rods. U.S. officials in 2004 stated
years of implementation of the 1994 Agreed
that North Korea probably had reprocessed
Framework, which provides for the shutdown
most or all of the fuel rods and may have
of North Korea’s nuclear facilities in return
produced 6-8 atomic bombs from them.
for the annual delivery to North Korea of
500,000 tons of heavy oil and the construction
The main objective of the Bush Adminis-
in North Korea of two light water nuclear
tration is to secure the dismantling of North
reactors. The United States pledged to issue a
Korea’s plutonium and uranium-based nuclear
nuclear security guarantee to North Korea as
programs. Its strategy has been: (1) terminat-
North Korea complied with its 1992 safe-
ing the Agreed Framework; (2) withholding
guards agreement with the International
any U.S. reciprocal measures until North
Atomic Energy Agency.
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress
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MOST RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
Amidst rising pressure from China, South Korea, and even Japan, the Bush
Administration issued a detailed settlement proposal at the six party talks on North Korea’s
nuclear programs in June 2004. This was the first U.S. proposal since the talks began in
April 2003. The U.S. proposal called for a quick dismantlement of North Korea’s plutonium
and uranium enrichment programs following a three-month “preparatory period.†During
the preparatory period, North Korea would declare its nuclear facilities and materials,
suspend their operation, allow effective international inspections including a return of the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and negotiate the steps to be taken in
dismantlement. In return, South Korea and Japan would supply North Korea with heavy oil.
North Korea would receive a “provisional multilateral security assurance†from the United
States and the other participants in the six party talks. The United States and North Korea
would begin talks over U.S. economic sanctions and North Korea’s inclusion on the U.S. list
of terrorist-supporting countries. The participants in the talks also would begin a study of
North Korea’s energy needs. After North Korea completed dismantlement, it would receive
a permanent security guarantee, and permanent solutions to its energy problems would be
undertaken. After an initial mixed response to the Administration’s proposal, North Korea
turned decidedly negative by August 2004; and North Korea rejected proposals to hold six
party “working level†talks in August or September. Despite their urgings that the United
States issue a comprehensive proposal, the other participating governments in the talks, even
Japan and South Korea, failed to speak positively about the proposal or endorse it, which
undoubtedly encouraged North Korea to move toward rejection.
BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS
Background to the Six Party Talks
The Bush Administration asserted on October 16, 2002, that North Korea had revealed
to U.S. Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly in Pyongyang on October 5, 2002, that it had
a secret nuclear weapons program based on uranium enrichment. The program is based on
the process of uranium enrichment, in contrast to North Korea’s pre-1995 nuclear program
based on plutonium reprocessing. North Korea reportedly began a secret uranium
enrichment program in the early 1990s with the assistance of Pakistan. North Korea
provided Pakistan with intermediate range ballistic missiles in the late 1990s.
The initial U.S. response was to secure a decision by the Korean Peninsula Energy
Development Organization (KEDO) in November 2002 to end shipments of heavy oil to
North Korea, which had been carried out under the U.S.-North Korean Agreed Framework
of 1994. By their own admission, Bush Administration officials were surprised by the
intensity of North Korea’s moves in late December 2002 to re-start plutonium-based nuclear
facilities at Yongbyon and expel officials of the International Atomic Energy Agency placed
there under the Agreed Framework to monitor the shutdown. North Korea re-started the
five megawatt nuclear reactor shut down under the Agreed Framework. North Korea also
announced that it would re-start the plutonium reprocessing plant that operated up to 1994,
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and it later asserted that it had reprocessed 8,000 nuclear fuel rods, which had been in storage
since 1994, into nuclear weapons grade plutonium (U.S. intelligence reportedly has been
unable to verify the exact state of reprocessing but U.S. officials stated in late 2004 that
North Korea probably had reprocessed most or all of the 8,000 fuel rods). North Korea
withdrew from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in January 2003. It justified its
action by citing the U.S.-initiated cutoff of heavy oil shipments in December 2002 and by
charging that the Bush Administration planned a “pre-emptive nuclear attack†on North
Korea.
After October 2002 North Korea issued several threats including a resumption of long-
range missile tests, the proliferation of nuclear materials to other countries, and the testing
of a nuclear weapon. Re-starting the Yongbyon facilities opens up a possible North Korean
intent or option to stage a “breakout†of its nuclear program by openly producing nuclear
weapons through reprocessing the 8,000 fuel rods. According to estimates by nuclear experts
and reportedly by U.S. intelligence agencies, if North Korea reprocessed the fuel rods, as it
claims, it could produce four to six atomic bombs. Such a nuclear breakout would diminish
considerably any prospect of ending North Korea’s nuclear program diplomatically.
Production of weapons-grade plutonium also would add substance to North Korea’s threat
to export nuclear materials. (See CRS Report RS21391, North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons:
How Soon an Arsenal?)
The Six Party Talks
Bush Administration Policy. The Bush Administration’s policy response to North
Korean actions since October 2002 is based on two factors within the Administration. First,
President Bush has voiced profound distrust of North Korea and its leader, Kim Jong-il.
Second, there are divisions over policy toward North Korea among factions within the Bush
Administration. An influential coalition consists of Pentagon officials and advisers around
Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld, officials of Vice President Cheney’s office, and proliferation
experts in the State Department and White House led by Undersecretary of State John
Bolton. They reportedly oppose negotiations with North Korea, favor the issuance of
demands for unilateral North Korean concessions on nuclear and other military issues, and
advocate an overall U.S. strategy of isolating North Korea diplomatically and through
economic sanctions and bringing about a collapse of the North Korean regime. A second
faction, mainly in the State Department, is led by Secretary of State Powell and is composed
of officials with experience on East Asian and Korean issues. This faction believes that the
Administration should attempt negotiations before adopting more coercive measures, and
they reportedly doubt the effectiveness of a strategy to bring about a North Korean collapse.
The Administration’s proposal at the six party talks in June 2004 represents a major
shift in the Administration’s approach since the talks began in April 2004. Prior to this
proposal, the Administration’s policy on the nuclear issue contained three elements: (1) a
demand for unilateral concessions, (2) the avoidance of direct negotiations with North Korea,
and (3) the isolation of North Korea internationally. In demanding unilateral concessions,
the Administration called on North Korea to commit to and take concrete measures to realize
the “complete, verifiable, irreversible dismantlement†of its nuclear programs, both the
plutonium program and the secret uranium enrichment program. This demand has become
known as “CVID.†The Administration also asserts that North Korea must follow
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procedures similar to those being implemented by Libya, which has revealed details of its
weapons of mass destruction and has turned over the weapons and related materials to the
United States, other governments, and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).
The Bush Administration eschewed substantive bilateral negotiations with North Korea.
The Administration stated that it would discuss ways to improve U.S.-North Korean relations
only after North Korea accepts CVID and takes concrete measures to implement it. The
Administration also refused to make any detailed settlement proposals, asserting that North
Korea must first agree to CVID. In the June 2004 proposal, the Administration altered this
linkage and substituted the term “comprehensive denuclearization†for CVID.
Administration officials have spoken often since early 2003 about the objective of
“isolating†North Korea. There are two components of the Administration’s isolation goal.
One is to isolate North Korea from any diplomatic support from other governments over the
nuclear issue and create a bloc of governments demanding that North Korea accept CVID.
The second component is the creation of a broad coalition of governments willing to impose
economic sanctions on North Korea if North Korea rejects CVID. In May 2003, President
Bush proposed a Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) aimed at interdicting exports of
weapons of mass destruction and illegal drugs by proliferator countries. The United States
and over ten other countries are planning measures to interdict North Korean sea and air
traffic. The Administration reportedly has drafted plans for economic sanctions, including
cutting off financial flows to North Korea from Japan and other sources and interdicting
North Korean shipments of missiles and other weapons to the Middle East and South Asia.
The aim of the PSI would be to constrict sharply North Korean foreign exchange earnings,
which are a major source of sustenance to the North Korean political elite and the North
Korean military. Advocates of the PSI believe that such financial pressure could produce
internal pressures within the regime that would result in either a North Korean capitulation
to U.S. demands or the collapse of the Pyongyang regime. The Administration is pressuring
several countries to cease purchases of North Korean missiles.
In early 2003, the Administration proposed multilateral talks as the diplomatic focus.
After a U.S.-North Korea-China meeting in April 2003, an agreement was reached for six
party talks, including China, South Korea, Russia, and Japan. Two plenary sessions of six
party talks were held in August 2003 and February 2004; a six party working group meeting
was held in May 2004. The Administration has viewed several roles for the six party talks.
The talks help the Administration avoid bilateral negotiations with North Korea. Until the
June 2004 meeting, the Administration limited direct contact with North Korean delegates.
It has issued no detailed U.S. settlement proposals, stressing that it would not discuss
substantive issues until North Korea commits to CVID. U.S. negotiators at the six party talks
were constrained to speaking from a limited script stressing CVID. They refused to answer
questions from North Korean delegates concerning the U.S. position on the nuclear issue.
This also changed at the June 2004 meeting. U.S. delegates met with North Korean
counterparts reportedly for nearly two hours.
The Administration also views the six party talks as giving it a vehicle to secure support
from China, South Korea, Japan, and Russia — North Korea’s immediate neighbors — for
the U.S. demand that North Korea agree to total dismantlement of its nuclear programs. U.S.
officials have spoken of creating a five versus one situation in the six party talks, thus
isolating North Korea. This in turn would lay the groundwork for the participation of China,
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South Korea, Japan, and Russia in sanctions against North Korea if North Korea rejected
CVID — sanctions through the United Nations Security Council and/or the Proliferation
Security Initiative. Throughout 2003, Administration officials expressed a view that North
Korea would isolate itself through its provocative actions in reopening its plutonium nuclear
program and its threats to proliferate nuclear materials and test nuclear weapons and missiles.
The Far Eastern Economic Review of September 11, 2003, cited two U.S. officials as
asserting that “it’s worse now for North Korea than it has been — this isolation†and that
“we’re letting them dig their own grave.†U.S. officials were “convinced that Pyongyang’s
[provocative] statements [at the August six party meeting] were pushing its opponents closer
together.â€
The Administration has placed special emphasis on China’s role in the six party talks.
U.S. officials praise China’s role in hosting the meetings in Beijing. They state that China
should exert diplomatic pressure on North Korea to accept CVID. Some Administration
officials express the view that China can be persuaded to join the United States in sanctions
against North Korea even to the extent of creating an internal crisis within the North Korean
regime. The importance of China is pointed up by the mutual defense treaty China has with
North Korea and China’s role in supplying North Korea with an estimated 90 % of its oil and
40% of its food.
However, from the start of multilateral talks, the other participants have voiced
criticisms of the Administration’s positions. China, Russia, and South Korea have criticized
the Administration for not negotiating directly with North Korea, and they have urged the
Administration to propose detailed settlement proposals on the nuclear issue. They have
asserted that the Administration should spell out the reciprocal measures it would take if
North Korea agreed to dismantle its nuclear programs. They also have expressed opposition
to economic sanctions, and only Japan has joined the PSI. Moreover, by the beginning of
2004, the Administration faced a sophisticated North Korean diplomatic strategy, which
changed the atmosphere of the six party talks to one more favorable to North Korea.
North Korea’s Counter-Strategy. In the summer of 2003, in the wake of the
perceived U.S. military victory in Iraq and negative international reactions to North Korea’s
restarting of the plutonium program and threats, the North Korean leadership appeared
worried that they faced international isolation and much heavier U.S. pressure. From that
point, there has emerged a multifaceted North Korean diplomatic strategy backed by a
concerted propaganda campaign aimed primarily at strengthening Pyongyang’s position in
the six party talks and weakening the U.S. position. A lead component of North Korea’s
strategy has been to threaten that it would abandon the six party talks, thus playing on the
psychological fears of the other parties. After each of the Beijing meetings, North Korea
criticized the meetings, criticized the U.S. position, and warned that it saw no usefulness in
the meetings and likely would not participate further. North Korea also apparently has
employed this threat to demand that China, the host of the talks, provide it with financial
subsidies and increased shipments of food and oil as “payment†for North Korean agreement
to attend future sessions of the six parties in Beijing.
But with these repeated threats, North Korea has made a series of proposals: first, a
formal U.S.-North Korean non-aggression pact, later modified to a formal U.S. guarantee
that the United States would not attack North Korea; second, a “freeze†of North Korea’s
plutonium program; and third, retention by North Korea of a “peaceful†nuclear program.
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North Korean proposals also have called for extensive concessions by the United States and
Japan, including removal of North Korea from the U.S. list of terrorist-supporting states,
supply of electricity, several billion dollars in “compensation†from Japan, restoration of
shipments of heavy oil and construction of the two light water nuclear reactors under the
1994 Agreed Framework, and an end to U.S. economic sanctions and U.S. interference in
North Korea’s economic relations with other countries.
While purposefully keeping its proposals vague regarding content and its own
obligations, North Korea has engaged in a concerted propaganda campaign to promote its
proposals. Propaganda, aimed especially at South Korea, Russia, and China has asserted that
a U.S. guarantee of non-aggression is necessary to prevent the Bush Administration from
carrying out a plot to stage an “Iraq-like†unilateral attack. Pyongyang’s propaganda organs
have contended that a “freezeâ€of plutonium facilities is a logical “first stage†in a settlement
process. The propaganda organs have employed enticing captions, such as “simultaneous
actions,†“action versus action,†“simultaneous package deal,†“bold concessions,†and “non-
interference in our economic development.â€
Another element in North Korea’s counter-strategy has been a campaign to deny that
it has a uranium enrichment (HEU) program. From the summer of 2003, North Korean
propaganda organs have escalated steadily denials of an HEU program and denials that North
Korean officials admitted to an HEU program to Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly in
October 2002. North Korean officials have stressed this denial to visiting foreign
delegations. North Korean propaganda organs have compared U.S. claims of an HEU
program to the perceived erroneous U.S. claims of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, and
they have demanded that the United States provide evidence of its claim.
Finally, North Korea has moderated its threats. It continues to assert that it is
strengthening its “nuclear deterrent,†including reprocessing of nuclear fuel rods; but it
justifies this as necessary to deter a “Iraq-like†attack by the United States. Pyongyang has
ceased its threats to proliferate nuclear materials and test nuclear weapons and long-range
missiles. It has issued statements that it would not proliferate nuclear materials. However,
Iranian and Pakistani testing of missiles based on North Korean technology and components
appear to constitute “surrogate testing†that benefits North Korea. Moreover, there are
longstanding reports of nuclear cooperation between North Korean and Iran and possibly
with Libya.
Status of the Talks. North Korea clearly occupied a stronger position in the
February 2004 plenary session of the six party talks and in the six party working group
meeting in May 2004. Much of these meetings were taken up with North Korea’s proposals
for a nuclear freeze and retention of a peaceful nuclear program. U.S. negotiators claimed
that the other four participants supported CVID; but China and Russia expressed sympathy
and/or support for Pyongyang’s proposals of a U.S. non-aggression guarantee, nuclear
freeze, and North Korean retention of a “peaceful nuclear program.†China has asserted that
the goal of the talks should be to eliminate North Korea’s “nuclear weapons†rather than its
nuclear programs. Since late 2003, Russia and China have voiced doubts that North Korea
has an HEU program, and they have not challenged North Korea’s denial strategy; in June
2004, a top Chinese official openly challenged the U.S. claim. The official echoed North
Korea’s challenge to the United States to present evidence of an HEU program. Many
experts believe that Russia and China have direct knowledge of the HEU program but that
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they both believe that a settlement of the nuclear issue should omit the HEU program
(concentrating on the plutonium program) and leave it the subject of future negotiations.
Reportedly, China and Russia have taken this approach in their bilateral dealings with North
Korea. Moreover, North Korea has succeed in extracting more fuel, food, and financial
subsidies (at least $50 million) from China in bargaining over North Korea’s participation
in the talks.
The Bush Administration modified its policy in certain areas in an effort to counter
North Korean strategy and the attitudes of China and Russia but with minimum success.
President Bush responded to Chinese urgings in October 2003 and offered to propose a
multilateral security guarantee to North Korea. In the February 2004 six party meeting, the
Administration reportedly said that if North Korea accepted CVID, it was prepared to discuss
multilateral security assurances, North Korea’s energy needs, outside assistance to help North
Korea dismantle its nuclear programs, diplomatic relations, and a Korean peace treaty. The
Administration attempted to use the reported “confession†of A.Q. Khan, Pakistan’s nuclear
czar, to rebuff North Korea’s denial campaign regarding the HEU program; Khan reportedly
confessed that he had transferred technology and components of an HEU program to North
Korea. This attempt, however, did not change the Chinese and Russian positions. Khan’s
“confession†is based on second hand information; Khan has made no public statement.
North Korea has termed it a coerced confession at the instigation of the United States. In the
February session of the six party talks, the Administration expressed support for a three part
proposal of South Korea: (1) North Korean commitment to CVID and the U.S. offer of a
security guarantee; (2) a freeze of all North Korean nuclear programs, including the HEU
program, and South Korean delivery of energy to North Korea; and (3) dismantlement of
North Korean nuclear programs and settlement of other issues. In supporting the South
Korean proposal, the Bush Administration laid down a caveat that dismantlement must
follow quickly the establishment of a freeze. China and Russia offered to assist South Korea
in supplying energy to North Korea. North Korea to date has not responded to the South
Korean proposal and has warned South Korea to cease diplomatic cooperation with the
United States — a possible indication that North Korean leaders believe the proposal
presents problems for them.
In short, the Administration’s goal of creating a five versus one situation in the six-party
talks remained distant. North Korea has established a fairly strong diplomatic position in the
talks with its proposals and propaganda campaign. China and Russia increasingly tilt toward
North Korea’s agenda. By June 2004, China had stepped up its criticism of the Bush
Administration. South Korea pressed the Bush Administration to issue a proposal similar
to the South Korean proposal of February 2004 and alter the CVID terminology. In late May
2004, Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi asserted directly to President Bush that the United
States needed to put forward a detailed proposal at the talks. Pressure from these countries
and the lack of progress toward U.S. goals at the talks appear to be major factors behind the
Administration’s decision to issue the proposal of June 23,2004. However, the aftermath
of the proposal has been disappointing to the Administration. North Korea moved from an
initial mixed response to the proposal to a rejectionist stance by August 2004. Pyongyang
also was resisting further six party meetings, apparently until the U.S. presidential election
of November 2004. North Korea no doubt was encouraged to adopt these rejectionist
positions by the absence of positive responses or endorsements of the Administration’s
proposal from the other participants in the six party talks — even from U.S. allies, Japan and
South Korea. Pyongyang’s motives are not totally clear, but it seems intent on weakening
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or “killing†the June 23, 2004, U.S. proposal as a basis for future negotiations. North Korea
may calculate that a success of such a “kill†strategy would limit the options of either a Bush
or Kerry administration following the U.S. election.
North Korea’s Nuclear Program
Most of North Korea’s plutonium-based nuclear installations are located at Yongbyon,
60 miles of the North Korean capital of Pyongyang. They are the facilities covered by the
1994 U.S.-North Korean Agreed Framework The key installations are:
! An atomic reactor, with a capacity of about 5 megawatts that began
operating by 1987: it is capable of expending enough uranium fuel to
produce about 7 kilograms of plutonium annually — enough for the
manufacture of a single atomic bomb annually. North Korea in 1989 shut
down the reactor for about 70 days; U.S. intelligence agencies believe that
North Korea removed fuel rods from the reactor at that time for reprocessing
into plutonium suitable for nuclear weapons. In May 1994, North Korea
shut down the reactor and removed about 8,000 fuel rods, which could be
reprocessed into enough plutonium for 4-6 nuclear weapons. North Korea
started operating the reactor again in February 2003.
! Two larger (estimated 50 megawatts and 200 electrical megawatts)
atomic reactors under construction at Yongbyon and Taechon since
1984: According to U.S. Ambassador Robert Gallucci, these plants, if
completed, would be capable of producing enough spent fuel annually for
200 kilograms of plutonium, sufficient to manufacture nearly 30 atomic
bombs per year.
! A plutonium reprocessing plant about 600 feet long and several stories
high: The plant would separate weapons grade Plutonium-239 from spent
nuclear fuel rods for insertion into the structure of atomic bombs or
warheads. U.S. intelligence agencies reportedly detected North Korean
preparations to restart the plutonium reprocessing plant in February and
March 2003. According to press reports, the CIA estimated in late 2003 that
North Korea had reprocessed some of the 8,000 fuel rods. In January 2004,
North Korean officials showed a U.S. nuclear expert substances, which he
concluded was reprocessed weapons-grade plutonium.
Satellite photographs reportedly also show that the atomic reactors have no attached
power lines, which they would have if used for electric power generation.
Persons interviewed for this study believe that North Korea developed the two reactors
and the apparent reprocessing plant with its own resources and technology. It is believed that
Kim Jong-il, the son and successor of President Kim Il-sung who died in July 1994, directs
the program, and that the military and the Ministry of Public Security (North Korea’s version
of the KGB) implement it. North Korea reportedly has about 3,000 scientists and research
personnel devoted to the Yongbyon program. Many have studied nuclear technology (though
not necessarily nuclear weapons production) in the Soviet Union and China and reportedly
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Pakistan. North Korea has uranium deposits, estimated at 26 million tons. North Korea is
believed to have one uranium producing mine.
North Korea’s secret uranium enrichment program appears to date from at least 1996.
Hwang Jang-yop, a Communist Party secretary who defected in 1997, has testified that North
Korea and Pakistan agreed in the summer of 1996 to trade North Korean long-range missile
technology for Pakistani uranium enrichment technology. The Clinton Administration
reportedly learned of it in 1998 or 1999, and a Department of Energy report of 1999 cited
evidence of the program. In March 2000, President Clinton notified Congress that he was
waiving certification that “North Korea is not seeking to develop or acquire the capability
to enrich uranium.†The Japanese newspaper, Sankei Shimbun, reported on June 9, 2000,
the contents of a “detailed report†from Chinese government sources on a secret North
Korean uranium enrichment facility inside North Korea’s Mount Chonma. Reportedly,
according to a CIA report to Congress, North Korea attempted in late 2001 to acquire
“centrifuge-related materials in large quantities to support a uranium enrichment program.â€
The CIA estimated publicly in December 2002 that North Korea could produce two atomic
bombs annually through uranium enrichment beginning in 2005; other intelligence estimates
project a bomb producing capability between 2005 and 2007. Administration officials have
stated that they do not know the locations of North Korea’s uranium enrichment program,
but U.S. intelligence agencies reportedly have extensive information on North Korea’s
accelerated overseas purchases of equipment and materials for the uranium enrichment
program since early 1999.
International Assistance
Knowledgeable individuals believe that the Soviet Union did not assist directly in the
development of Yongbyon in the 1980s. The U.S.S.R. provided North Korea with a small
research reactor in the 1960s, which also is at Yongbyon. However, North Korean nuclear
scientists continued to receive training in the U.S.S.R. up to the demise of the Soviet Union
in December 1991. East German and Russian nuclear and missile scientists reportedly were
in North Korea throughout the 1990s. Since 1999, reports have appeared that U.S.
intelligence agencies had information that Chinese enterprises were supplying important
components and raw materials for North Korea’s missile program.
North Korea’s Delivery Systems
North Korea succeeded by 1998 in developing a “Nodong†missile with a range
estimated at up to 900 miles, capable of covering South Korea and most of Japan. North
Korea reportedly deployed nearly 100 Nodong missiles by 2003. On August 31, 1998,
North Korea test fired a three stage rocket, apparently the prototype of the Taepo Dong-1
missile; the third stage apparently was an attempt to launch a satellite. U.S. intelligence
estimates reportedly concluded that such a missile would have the range to reach Alaska,
Guam, and the Northern Marianas Commonwealth. Media reports in early 2000 cited U.S.
intelligence findings that, without further flight tests, North Korea could deploy an
intercontinental ballistic missile that would be capable of striking Alaska, Hawaii, and the
U.S. west coast. Japan’s Sankei Shimbun newspaper reported on August 6, 2003, that North
Korea and Iran were negotiating a deal for the export of the long-range Taepodong-2 missile
to Iran and the joint development of nuclear warheads. U.S. officials reportedly told
Japanese counterparts in July 2003 that North Korea was close to developing nuclear
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warheads for its missiles. They claimed in September 2003 that North Korea had developed
a more accurate, longer-range intermediate ballistic missile that could reach Okinawa and
Guam (site of major U.S. military bases) and that there was evidence that North Korea had
produced the Taepo-dong 2 that could reach Alaska, Hawaii, and the U.S. west coast.
Reports in mid-1994 indicated that North Korea was close to completing underground
missile bases for the advanced intermediate range missiles.
These projections led the Clinton Administration to press North Korea for new talks
over North Korea’s missile program. In talks held in 1999 and 2000, North Korea demanded
$1 billion annually in exchange for a promise not to export missiles. U.S. negotiators
rejected North Korea’s demand for $1 billion but offered a lifting of U.S. economic
sanctions. This laid the ground for the Berlin agreement of September 1999 in which North
Korea agreed to defer further missile tests in return for the lifting of major U.S. economic
sanctions. President Clinton formalized the lifting of key economic sanctions against North
Korea in June 2000. North Korea continued the moratorium, but it in effect used Pakistan
and Iran as surrogates in testing intermediate range missiles based on North Korean
technology. (See CRS Report RS21473, North Korean Ballistic Missile Threat to the United
States.)
State of Nuclear Weapons Development
A CIA statement of August 18, 2003, estimated “that North Korea has produced one or
two simple fission-type nuclear weapons and has validated the designs without conducting
yield-producing nuclear tests.†The New York Times, December 10, 2003, quoted “a senior
administration official†that North Korea had added to its arsenal of nuclear weapons and
nuclear materials in 2003. North Korea’s approximately 70 day shutdown of the five
megawatt reactor in 1989 gave it the opportunity to remove nuclear fuel rods, from which
plutonium is reprocessed. The U.S. Central Intelligence Agency and the Defense Intelligence
Agency reportedly estimated in late 1993 that North Korea extracted enough fuel rods for
about 12 kilograms of plutonium — sufficient for one or two atomic bombs. The CIA and
DIA apparently based their estimate on the 1989 shutdown of the five megawatt reactor.
South Korean and Japanese intelligence estimates reportedly are higher: 16-24
kilograms (Japan) and 7-22 kilograms (South Korea). These estimates reportedly are based
on the view that North Korea could have acquired a higher volume of plutonium from the
1989 reactor shutdown and the view of a higher possibility that North Korea removed fuel
rods during the 1990 and 1991 reactor slowdowns. Russian Defense Ministry analyses of
late 1993 reportedly came to a similar estimate of about 20 kilograms of plutonium, enough
for 2 or 3 atomic bombs.
There also is a body of analysis suggesting that North Korea could produce more
nuclear weapons from a given amount of plutonium than standard intelligence estimates have
believed. State Department and U.S. intelligence estimates of the plutonium/bomb
production ratio are close to the IAEA standard that a non-nuclear state would need about
eight kilograms of plutonium to produce a nuclear bomb. However, IAEA spokesman,
David Kyd, stated in August 1994 that Agency officials have known for some time that the
eight kilogram standard was too high. He said that the IAEA retained it because of the
wishes of member governments.
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A report of the National Resources Defense Council used North Korea as a standard
non-nuclear state and concluded that a non-nuclear state with “low technology†could
produce a one kiloton bomb (a small atomic bomb “with the potential to kill tens of
thousands of peopleâ€) with three kilograms of plutonium. A non-nuclear state with “medium
technology†could produce a one kiloton bomb with 1.5 kilograms of plutonium.
Before the Natural Resources Defense Council released the report, the U.S. Department
of Energy in January 1994 lowered its mean estimate of plutonium required for a small
atomic bomb from eight to four kilograms. Secretary of Defense Perry suggested in July
1994 that, with a higher level of technology, North Korea could produce more nuclear
weapons with a given amount of plutonium: “If they had a very advanced technology, they
could make five bombs out of the amount of plutonium we estimate they have.â€
Russian intelligence agencies also reportedly have learned of significant technological
advances by North Korea towards nuclear weapons production. On March 10, 1992, the
Russian newspaper Argumenty I Fakty (Arguments and Facts) published the text of a 1990
Soviet KGB report to the Soviet Central Committee on North Korea’s nuclear program. It
was published again by Izvestiya on June 24, 1994. The KGB report asserted that
“According to available data, development of the first nuclear device has been completed at
the DPRK nuclear research center in Yongbyon.†The North Korean Government, the report
stated, had decided not to test the device in order to avoid international detection.
Additionally, there are a number of reports and evidence that point to at least a middle
range likelihood that North Korea may have smuggled plutonium from Russia. In June 1994,
the head of Russia’s Counterintelligence Service (successor to the KGB) said at a press
conference that North Korea’s attempts to smuggle “components of nuclear arms productionâ€
from Russia caused his agency “special anxiety.†U.S. executive branch officials have
expressed concern in background briefings over the possibility that North Korea has
smuggled plutonium from Russia. One U.S. official, quoted in the Washington Times, July
5, 1994, asserted that “There is the possibility that things having gotten over the
[Russia-North Korea] border without anybody being aware of it.†The most specific claim
came in the German news magazine Stern in March 1993, which cited Russian
Counterintelligence Service reports that North Korea had smuggled 56 kilograms of
plutonium (enough for 7-9 atomic bombs) from Russia.
According to press reports in late 2002, the CIA concluded that North Korea
accelerated its uranium enrichment program in the 1999, 2000, and 2001. According to U.S.
News and World Report, September 1, 2003, the CIA estimated that North Korea could
produce a uranium-based atomic weapon by the second half of 2004.
Diplomatic Background to the Agreed Framework and Amending
Agreements
North Korea had signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1985. In a
denuclearization agreement signed in December 1991, North Korea and South Korea pledged
not to possess nuclear weapons, not to possess plutonium reprocessing or uranium
enrichment facilities, and to negotiate a mutual nuclear inspection system. In January 1992,
North Korea signed a safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA), which requires North Korea to report all nuclear programs to the IAEA and gives
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the IAEA the right to conduct a range of inspections of North Korean nuclear installations
and programs. In 1992, North Korea rebuffed South Korea regarding implementation of the
denuclearization agreement, but it did allow the IAEA to conduct six inspections during June
1992-February 1993.
In late 1992, the IAEA found evidence that North Korea had reprocessed more
plutonium than the 80 grams it had disclosed to the Agency. In February 1993, the IAEA
invoked a provision in the safeguards agreement and called for a “special inspection†of two
concealed but apparent nuclear waste sites at Yongbyon. The IAEA believed that a special
inspection would uncover information on the amount of plutonium which North Korea had
produced since 1989. North Korea rejected the IAEA request and announced on March 12,
1993, an intention to withdraw from the NPT.
The NPT withdrawal threat led to low and higher level diplomatic talks between North
Korea and the Clinton Administration. North Korea “suspended†its withdrawal from the
NPT when the Clinton Administration agreed to a high-level meeting in June 1993.
However, North Korea continued to refuse both special inspections and IAEA regular
inspections of facilities designated under the safeguards agreement. In May 1994, North
Korea refused to allow the IAEA to inspect the 8,000 fuel rods, which it had removed from
the five megawatt reactor. In June 1994, North Korea’s President Kim Il-sung reactivated
a longstanding invitation to former U.S. President Jimmy Carter to visit Pyongyang. Kim
offered Carter a freeze of North Korea’s nuclear facilities and operations. Kim took this
initiative after China reportedly informed him that it would not veto a first round of
economic sanctions, which the Clinton Administration had proposed to members of the U.N.
Security Council. According to former Defense Secretary William Perry, the Pentagon also
developed a contingency plan to bomb the Yongbyon nuclear facilities if North Korea began
to reprocess the 8,000 fuel rods into weapons-grade plutonium. The Clinton Administration
reacted to Kim’s proposal by dropping its sanctions proposal and entering into a new round
of high-level negotiations with North. This negotiation led to the Agreed Framework of
October 21, 1994.
The Agreed Framework: Provisions, Implementation,
Costs, Future Issues
U.S. Objectives: Primacy to the Freeze of North Korea’s Nuclear
Program
The heart of the Agreed Framework was a U.S. commitment to provide North Korea
with a package of nuclear, energy, economic, and diplomatic benefits; in return North Korea
would halt the operations and infrastructure development of its nuclear program. The Agreed
Framework committed North Korea to “freeze its graphite-moderated reactors and related
facilities†with the freeze monitored by the IAEA. Ambassador Robert Gallucci, who
negotiated for the United States, stated that “related facilities†include the plutonium
reprocessing plant and stored fuel rods. According to Gallucci, the freeze includes a halt to
construction of the 50 and 200 megawatt reactors and a North Korean promise not to refuel
the five megawatt reactor. The Agreed Framework also committed North Korea to store the
8,000 fuel rods removed from the five megawatt reactor in May 1994 “in a safe manner that
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does not involve reprocessing in the DPRK [North Korea].†Clinton Administration
officials reportedly said that a secret “confidential minute†to the Agreed Framework
prohibits North Korea from construction of new nuclear facilities elsewhere in North Korea.
Gallucci and other officials emphasized that the key policy objective of the Clinton
Administration was to secure a freeze of North Korea’s nuclear program in order to prevent
North Korea from producing large quantities of nuclear weapons grade plutonium through
the operations of the 50 and 200 megawatt reactors and the plutonium reprocessing plant at
Yongbyon. Gallucci referred to the prospect of North Korea producing enough plutonium
annually for nearly 30 nuclear weapons if the 50 and 200 megawatt reactors went into
operation. The Administration’s fear was that North Korea would have the means to export
atomic bombs to other states and possess a nuclear missile capability that would threaten
Japan and U.S. territories in the Pacific Ocean.
Benefits to North Korea
Light Water Nuclear Reactors. North Korea was to receive two light water
reactors (LWRs) with a generating capacity of approximately 2,000 megawatts. The Agreed
Framework set a “target date†of 2003. The United States was obligated to organize an
international consortium arrangement for the acquisition and financing of the reactors. The
Clinton Administration and the governments of South Korea, Japan, and other countries
established in March 1995 the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO)
to coordinate the provision of the LWRs. After the groundbreaking at the reactor site in
August 1997, KEDO officials changed the estimated completion date from 2003 to 2007;
other experts predicted a much later date. North Korean obstructionism and provocative
military acts toward South Korea and bureaucratic problems resulted in some of the delay;
but U.S. officials have acknowledged off the record that the Clinton Administration was in
no hurry to move the project along. The laying of the foundation for the LWRs occurred in
August 2002.
Oil at No Cost. Prior to the construction of light water reactors, the Agreed
Framework committed the United States to provide North Korea 500,000 metric tons of
heavy oil to North Korea annually until the first of the two light water reactors becomes
operational. The oil shipments continued until KEDO’s decision in November 2002 to
cancel future shipments because of North Korea’s secret uranium enrichment program.
Diplomatic Representation. The United States and North Korea announced in the
Agreed Framework an intention to open liaison offices in each other’s capital and establish
full diplomatic relations if the two governments make progress “on issues of concern to each
side.†By April 1995, most technical arrangements for liaison offices were completed.
However, North Korea displayed reluctance to finalize arrangements, and talks over liaison
offices waned. Ambassador Gallucci asserted that a full normalization of diplomatic
relations would depend on a successful resolution of non-nuclear military issues, especially
the heavy deployment of North Korean conventional military forces along the demilitarized
zone separating North and South Korea and North Korea’s program to develop and sell to
other governments longer range missiles. In October 1999, William Perry, the
Administration’s Special Adviser on North Korea, cited normalization of diplomatic
relations as one of the benefits which the United States could offer North Korea for new
agreements on nuclear and missile issues.
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Lifting the U.S. Economic Embargo. The Agreed Framework specifies that within
three months from October 21, 1994, the two sides will reduce barriers to trade and
investment, including restrictions on telecommunications services and financial transactions.
This required the Clinton Administration to relax the U.S. economic embargo on North
Korea, which the Truman Administration and Congress put in place during the Korean War.
On January 20, 1995, the Administration announced initial measures, including permission
for telecommunications links with North Korea, permission for U.S. citizens to use credit
cards in North Korea, permission for American media organizations to open offices in North
Korea, permission for North Korea to use U.S. banks in financial transactions with third
countries, and permission for U.S. steel companies to import magnesite from North Korea.
North Korea pressed the Clinton Administration to end all economic sanctions. North Korea
complained loudly that these measures failed to meet the commitment stated in the Agreed
Framework. In U.S.-North Korean talks in September 1999, the United States agreed to end
a broader range of economic sanctions in exchange for a North Korean moratorium on future
missile testing. President Clinton ordered the end of most economic sanctions in June 2000.
Since then, North Korea has not met with a single American firm to talk about trade and/or
investment opportunities and has rejected an offer from the American Chamber of
Commerce in Seoul to send a business delegation to Pyongyang.
U.S. Nuclear Security Guarantee. Article III of the Agreed Framework states that
“Both sides will work together for peace and security on a nuclear-free Korean peninsula.â€
Under that heading, it states, “The U.S. will provide formal assurances to the DPRK against
the threat or use of nuclear weapons by the U.S.†While the language is not totally clear on
the timing of the U.S. delivery of a formal nuclear security guarantee, it seems to imply that
this would come when North Korea had dismantled its nuclear program or at least had
advanced dismantlement to a considerable degree.
North Korean Obligations Beyond the Freeze of the Nuclear
Program
North Korea’s immediate obligation was to freeze its existing nuclear installations. The
Agreed Framework alluded to certain other obligations for Pyongyang. Ambassador Gallucci
and other Clinton Administration officials were more specific in describing these. They
disclosed the existence of a secret minute that the Administration and North Korea concluded
in conjunction with completion of the Agreed Framework. North Korea, however, has not
acknowledged such a secret minute.
Inspections and Broader Nuclear Obligations. The Agreed Framework
contained a clause which the Administration claims constitutes a North Korean obligation
to allow the IAEA to conduct the special inspection of the two suspected nuclear waste sites
at Yongbyon in conjunction with the delivery of equipment for the light water reactors. The
Agreed Framework stated: “When a significant portion of the LWR [light water reactor]
project is completed, but before delivery of key nuclear components, the DPRK will come
into full compliance with its safeguards agreement with the IAEA, including taking all steps
that may be deemed necessary by the IAEA, following consultations with the Agency, with
regard to verifying the accuracy and completeness of the DPRK’s initial report on all nuclear
material in the DPRK.†Ambassador Gallucci contended that North Korea must accept a
special inspection before the key nuclear components of the first light water reactor are
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delivered to North Korea, if the IAEA still wishes to conduct a special inspection. However,
North Korean descriptions of its obligations omitted reference to special inspections.
The Agreed Framework stated, “The DPRK will remain a party to the Treaty on the
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and will allow implementation of its [1992]
safeguards agreement under the Treaty.†Gallucci stated in congressional testimony that the
Agreed Framework did not restrict the right of the IAEA to invoke special inspections if it
discovered any new North Korean nuclear activities. Gallucci said that the Agreed
Framework only restricted the IAEA with respect to the two suspected nuclear waste sites
and the nuclear installations and the stored fuel rods at Yongbyon and Taechon. He stressed
that any new North Korean nuclear program would fall immediately under the IAEA-North
Korea safeguards agreement and that North Korea must place it under IAEA safeguards.
Failure to do so, he said, would constitute a violation of the Agreed Framework. Thus, North
Korea’s secret uranium enrichment program violated this clause of the Agreed Framework.
In the Agreed Framework, North Korea pledged to “consistently take steps to implement
the [1991] North-South Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.â€
North Korea thus extended its obligations to South Korea in the North-South
denuclearization agreement to the United States. This clause of the Agreed Framework also
is relevant to North Korea’s secret uranium enrichment program, since the North-South
denuclearization agreement specifically prohibits uranium enrichment.
Disposition of Fuel Rods from the Five Megawatt Reactor. Following Kim
Il-sung’s offer of a nuclear freeze to former President Carter, Administration officials
stressed the importance of securing North Korean agreement to the removal to a third country
of the 8,000 fuel rods which North Korea removed from the five megawatt reactor in May
1994. However, the Administration abandoned the objective of securing an immediate
removal of the rods after the negotiations started in September 1994. It also gave up support
for the IAEA’s attempts to inspect the fuel rods in order to gain information on the amount
of weapons grade plutonium that North Korea secured from the five megawatt reactor prior
to 1994. The Agreed Framework provided for the storage of the rods in North Korea under
IAEA monitoring and a North Korean promise not to reprocess plutonium from the rods. It
also provided for subsequent talks on the “ultimate disposition†of the rods.
Dismantlement of Nuclear Installations. The Agreed Framework states that
“Dismantlement of the DPRK’s graphite-moderated reactors and related facilities will be
completed when the LWR project is completed.†North Korea’s proposal at the 2003 Beijing
talks in effect would continue the linkage between dismantlement and completion of the light
water reactors. The Bush Administration wants dismantlement much earlier in a settlement
process.
Role of Congress
Congress has voiced much skepticism regarding the Agreed Framework, but its actions
have given the Administration flexibility in implementing U.S. obligations. Congress has
played three roles. First, there have been numerous oversight hearings. Second, Congress
included in the Omnibus Appropriations bill for FY1999 (H.R. 4328) the requirement that
the President certify progress in negotiations with North Korea over the nuclear, missile, and
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other issues before the Administration could allocate money to KEDO operations. President
Clinton issued two such certifications in 1999 and 2000; in 2000, he said that he could not
certify that North Korea was not engaged in uranium enrichment. President Bush notified
Congress in March 2002 that he could not certify that North Korea was abiding by the
Agreed Framework, but he waived restricting money for KEDO. H.R. 4328 also called on
the President to name “a very senior presidential envoy†as “North Korea Policy
Coordinator†to conduct a review of U.S. policy and direct negotiations with North Korea.
This resulted in President Clinton’s appointment of William Perry as a special adviser and
the issuance of the Perry report in October 1999. The Bush Administration, however,
terminated the senior envoy position. Third, Congress considered and approved
Administration requests for funds to finance implementation, including the heavy oil
shipments.
On October 20, 1994, President Clinton sent a letter to North Korean leader, Kim
Jong-il, stating that he “will use the full powers of my office†to carry out U.S. obligations
related to light water reactors and alternative energy (oil). President Clinton added that if
contemplated arrangements for light water reactors and alternative energy were not
completed, he would use the powers of his office to provide light water reactors and
alternative energy from the United States “subject to the approval of the U.S. Congress.â€
In early 2003, Congress accepted the Bush Administration’s proposal to continue
funding the administrative costs of KEDO. The Consolidated Appropriations Act for
FY2003 (H.J.Res. 2) appropriated $5 million for KEDO. In April 2003, the House of
Representatives passed amendments to the Energy bill (H.R. 6) that effectively would end
U.S. involvement in the construction of the light water reactors in North Korea. H.R. 6
prohibits the transfer of U.S. nuclear materials and technology to North Korea, bars other
countries from transferring U.S.-based nuclear technology to North Korea, requires the U.S.
delegate to KEDO to vote against approval of any foreign reactor design for North Korea,
and prohibits U.S. government indemnity insurance for any U.S. company seeking to
participate in the LWR project.
FOR ADDITIONAL READING
CRS Issue Brief IB98045. Korea: U.S.-South Korean Relations — Issues for Congress.
CRS Report RS21391. North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons: How Soon an Arsenal?
CRS Report RS21473. North Korean Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States.
CRS Report RL31696. North Korea: Economic Sanctions.
CRS Report RL31785. U.S. Assistance to North Korea.
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