Order Code RL32541
CRS Report for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
Aviation Security-Related
Findings and Recommendations
of the 9/11 Commission
August 24, 2004
Bart Elias
Specialist in Aviation Safety, Security, and Technology
Resources, Science, and Industry Division
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

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Aviation Security-Related Findings and
Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission
Summary
The 9/11 Commission found that al Qaeda operatives exploited known
weaknesses in U.S. aviation security to carry out the terrorist attacks of September
11, 2001. While legislation and administration actions after September 11, 2001
were implemented to strengthen aviation security, the 9/11 Commission concluded
that several weaknesses continue to exist. These include perceived vulnerabilities in
cargo and general aviation security as well as inadequate screening and access
controls at airports.
The 9/11 Commission issued several recommendations designed to strengthen
aviation security by: enhancing passenger pre-screening; improving measures to
detect explosives on passengers; addressing human factors issues at screening
checkpoints; expediting deployment of in-line baggage screening systems;
intensifying efforts to identify, track, and screen potentially dangerous cargo; and
deploying hardened cargo containers on passenger aircraft. In addition to these
specific recommendations, an overarching recommendation for transportation
security policy asserts that priorities should be set based on risk, and the most
practical and cost effective deterrents should be implemented assigning appropriate
roles and missions to federal, state, and local authorities, as well as private
stakeholders.
This report will be updated as needed.

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Contents
Exploited Weaknesses in Aviation Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Legislative Actions Following the 9/11 Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Enhancing Passenger Pre-Screening . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Improving Measures to Detect Explosives on Passengers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Addressing Human Factors Issues at Screening Checkpoints . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Expediting Deployment of In-Line Baggage Screening Systems . . . . . . . . 6
Intensifying Efforts to Identify, Screen, and Track Cargo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Deploying Hardened Cargo Containers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Risk-Based Prioritization as the Basis for Transportation Security Policy . . 9
Strategic Plan for Aviation Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Cooperation and Integration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

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Aviation Security-Related Findings and
Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission
The Intelligence Authorization Act for FY2003 (P.L. 107-306; 116 Stat. 2383)
established the National Commission on Terrorists Attacks Upon the United States
(the 9/11 Commission). The bipartisan 9/11 Commission was charged with the
responsibilities of examining and reporting on the facts and causes of the September
11, 2001 terrorist attacks and presenting its findings, conclusions, and
recommendations for corrective measures to prevent future acts of terrorism to the
President and the Congress. The 9/11 Commission concluded its investigation and
released its final report on July 22, 2004. This CRS report discusses the 9/11
Commission’s findings and recommendations pertaining to aviation security.
Exploited Weaknesses in Aviation Security
The National Commission on Terrorists Attacks Upon the United States (the
9/11 Commission) found that al Qaeda terrorists exploited weaknesses in the aviation
security system to carry out the attacks of September 11, 2001. Weaknesses in
aviation security exploited by the 9/11 terrorists included
! A pre-screening process that focused on detecting potential aircraft
bombers and not potential hijackers;
! Lax checkpoint screening and permissive rules regarding small
knives;
! A lack of in-flight security measures such as air marshals and
reinforced cockpit doors;
! An industry-wide strategy of complying with hijackers in a non-
confrontational manner; and
! A lack of protocols and capabilities for executing a coordinated
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and military response to
multiple hijackings and suicidal hijackers.
The 9/11 Commission found that underlying these specific weaknesses and
vulnerabilities in the aviation system was what they termed a failure of imagination
among senior policymakers and agencies responsible for intelligence, national
defense, and aviation security. The 9/11 Commission concluded that while suicide
hijackings were by no means a far-fetched possibility given al Qaeda’s past methods
and motives, “...these scenarios were slow to work their way into the thinking of
aviation security experts.”1 While some agencies were concerned about hijackings
1 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States. The 9/11 Commission
(continued...)

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and had speculated about various hijack scenarios, there were no specific
constructive actions taken to defend against these possible threats prior to September
11, 2001. Furthermore, the likelihood of a suicide hijacking scenario was greatly
underestimated. The 9/11 Commission also concluded that, before September 11,
2001, congressional oversight of aviation security was lacking while Congress
focused its aviation oversight activities on airport congestion and passenger service.
Regarding Congress’s aviation related activities prior to September 11, 2001, The
9/11 Commission wrote: “Heeding calls for improved air service, Congress
concentrated its efforts on a ‘passenger bill of rights’ to improve capacity, efficiency,
and customer satisfaction in the aviation system. There was no focus on terrorism.”2
Legislative Actions Following the 9/11 Attacks

In the aftermath of September 11, 2001, Congress moved quickly to pass the
Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA, P.L. 107-71). Designed to correct
weaknesses in aviation security exploited by the 9/11 hijackers as well as other
potential vulnerabilities in transportation systems, ATSA established the
Transportation Security Administration (TSA) as a new organization within the
Department of Transportation responsible for security matters in all modes of
transportation. Highlights of ATSA included
! Establishing a federal security screener workforce under TSA at
airports;
! Requiring explosive detection screening of all checked bags;
! Deploying air marshals on all high risk flights; and
! Hardening cockpit doors.
ATSA also gave the TSA broad authority to assess threats to security in all
transportation modes, primarily focusing on aviation, and implement appropriate
security measures. In this regard, ATSA was seen as a comprehensive legislative
vehicle for addressing transportation security with a specific emphasis on aviation
security.
The following year, the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (P. L. 107-296)
established the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and placed the TSA within
this new department. The act also authorized the arming of airline pilots as an
additional measure to protect aircraft against terrorist hijackers. Additional aviation
security measures were included in the most recent FAA reauthorization act, Vision
100 - Century of Aviation Reauthorization Act (P.L. 108-176). Most notably, Vision
100 established an aviation security capital fund to help pay for placing explosive
detection systems (EDS) “in-line” with baggage conveyers and sorting facilities in
an effort to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of checked baggage screening
and expanded the program to arm pilots to include pilots of all-cargo aircraft.
1 (...continued)
Report (New York, NY: W. W. Norton & Co., 2004), p. 344.
2 The 9/11 Commission Report, pp. 85-86.

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Despite these actions, congressional and administration oversight of aviation
security has identified several areas of vulnerability that persist. These include air
cargo operations; general aviation; access controls for airport employees; screener
performance; and possible terrorist attacks using shoulder-fired missiles.
Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission
The 9/11 Commission also recognized many of these vulnerabilities. The 9/11
Commission concluded that “[m]ajor vulnerabilities still exist in cargo and general
aviation security. These, together with inadequate screening and access controls,
continue to present aviation security challenges.”3 Based on these findings, the 9/11
Commission made specific recommendations regarding improvements to airport
passenger and baggage screening, and air cargo security. While the commission
identified potential threats posed by inadequate access controls to secured areas of
airports and general aviation operations, it did not issue any recommendations
pertaining to these risks. Also, while the 9/11 Commission acknowledged concerns
raised by previous and current administrations over possible shoulder-fired missiles
attacks against commercial airliners, it did not make any specific recommendations
regarding this threat.
The 9/11 Commission delineated its recommendations regarding aviation
security in a section titled “A Layered Security System.” As suggested by this title,
the 9/11 Commission concluded that the TSA must implement a multi-layered
security system that takes into consideration the full array of possible terrorist tactics.
The 9/11 Commission noted that these various layers of security must each be
effective in their own right and must be coordinated with other layers in a manner
that creates redundancies to catch possible lapses in any one layer. This conclusion
is consistent with aviation security mandates under ATSA and TSA’s concept of
“concentric rings of security.”4 Since many facets of aviation security have been
addressed through legislation and administration actions since the 9/11 attacks, the
9/11 Commission focused its aviation security recommendations on persisting
vulnerabilities in commercial aviation.
While not all recommendations offered in the 9/11 Commission’s final report
were formally labeled as such, CRS has identified six aviation-specific
recommendations.5 These are: 1) enhancing passenger pre-screening; 2) improving
measures to detect explosives on passengers; 3) addressing human factors issues at
screening checkpoints; 4) expediting deployment of in-line baggage screening
systems; 5) intensifying efforts to identify, track, and screen potentially dangerous
cargo; and 6) deploying hardened cargo containers on passenger aircraft. In addition
to these six aviation-specific recommendations, the 9/11 Commission also issued an
overarching recommendation for transportation security policy to set priorities based
3 Ibid., p. 391.
4 Transportation Security Administration. Budget Estimates: Fiscal Year 2004. March 2003
5 For clarity, multi-part 9/11 Commission recommendations have been separately identified
in this report.

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on risk and implement the most practical and cost effective deterrents assigning
appropriate roles and missions to federal, state, and local authorities, as well as
private stakeholders.
Enhancing Passenger Pre-Screening
On September 11, 2001, passenger pre-screening consisted of three measures:
the Computer Assisted Passenger Prescreening System (CAPPS), answers to two
security-related questions asked by airline ticketing and gate agents, and the
presentation of photo identification to airline personnel. More than half of the
September 11, 2001 hijackers were identified as “selectees” based on one or more of
these pre-screening techniques. However, there was little consequence to their
selection because, at the time, pre-screening was used solely as a tool to screen for
individuals that might try to bomb a passenger jet using methods similar to those
employed in the bombing of Pan Am flight 103. While the CAPPS system is still in
use, its purpose has since been expanded to screen for possible hijackers as well.
CAPPS is maintained directly by the airlines as part of their security program and
uses computer algorithms to identify “selectees” based on matching passengers’
behaviors (e.g., method of ticket purchase) to hijacker and bomber profiles.
The follow-on to CAPPS, dubbed CAPPS II, has been embroiled in controversy
for the past two years over concerns regarding protection of personal data and civil
liberties. As proposed, CAPPS II would implement a two step process to: 1)
authenticate a passenger’s identity using commercial databases; and 2) check that
name against terrorist watch lists maintained by the federal government. If flagged
by the system, passengers could be either denied boarding or selected for secondary
screening. The 9/11 Commission recommended that improved passenger pre-
screening capabilities should not be delayed while the argument about a successor to
CAPPS continues. The 9/11 Commission further recommended that the prescreening
system should utilize the larger set of watchlists maintained by the federal
government. Both the Homeland Security Appropriations Act for FY2004 (P.L. 108-
90) and Vision 100 directed the Department of Homeland Security to address these
concerns and limited implementation of CAPPS II to system testing until the
Government Accountability Office (GAO) verifies that adequate steps have been
taken to address these concerns. However, in February 2004, the GAO found that the
TSA had adequately addressed only one of the eight concerns regarding CAPPS II
implementation.6 Continued reluctance by the airlines to provide data for testing
CAPPS II due to liability concerns has also stymied progress. The 9/11 Commission
recommended that airlines should be required to supply the information needed to
test and implement passenger pre-screening.
Recent media reports indicate that the CAPPS II program has essentially been
scrapped over privacy concerns, however Secretary of Homeland Security Tom Ridge
has suggested that a new program with a different name might eventually take its
6 U.S. General Accounting Office. Aviation Security: Computer-Assisted Passenger
Prescreening System Faces Significant Implementation Challenges. GAO-04-385, February
2004.

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place.7 In light of the 9/11 Commission recommendation to forge forward with
implementing a passenger pre-screening system and the current lack of progress
toward developing such a system, Congress may renew oversight of the CAPPS II
program or its successor and engage in debate over the best way to proceed.
Improving Measures to Detect Explosives on Passengers
Evidence highlighted by the 9/11 Commission indicated that al Qaeda has had
a keen interest in bombing airliners for some time. The 9/11 Commission’s report
describes Ramzi Yousef’s 1994 bombing of a Phillippines Airlines flight bound for
Tokyo as a precursor to a larger operation – the so-called “Bojinka” plot – to bomb
multiple U.S.-bound airliners over the Pacific ocean. In the Philippines Airlines
bombing, Yousef reportedly assembled an improvised explosive device (IED) in the
airplane’s lavatory and hid it under a seat during the previous flight affixing a digital
watch timer he had invented.
Concerns over IEDs were brought to public attention in December 2001, when
Richard Reid attempted to down a transatlantic flight using explosives concealed in
a shoe. Concerns over IEDs were again raised by the media in October 2003 when
a college student, Nathaniel Heatwole, snuck banned items and materials resembling
plastic explosives aboard passenger jets. While neither of these high profile incidents
was cited in the 9/11 Commission report, the 9/11 Commission acknowledged
persisting weaknesses in the ability to detect explosives on passengers by formally
recommending that the TSA and Congress give priority to improving detection of
explosives on passengers. The 9/11 Commission further recommended that, as a
start, all individuals selected for secondary screening undergo explosives screening.

Current screening technologies and procedures offer limited capabilities to
detect explosives carried on passengers. While carry-on items and sometimes shoes
are x-rayed and may be subjected to secondary chemical trace detection screening
methods, passengers are typically only screened by metal detectors. New technology
offers the capability to detect bomb-making chemicals on individuals using trace
detection methods. These systems are being operationally tested in various
transportation settings including ongoing field tests at five airport sites: T.F. Green
State Airport, Providence, RI; Greater Rochester International Airport, NY; San
Diego International Airport, CA; Tampa International Airport, FL; and
Gulfport-Biloxi International Airport, MS . Other possible methods for detecting
explosives on passengers involve body scan imaging using low dose x-ray
backscatter or other techniques. Body scan technology is considered somewhat more
controversial because it renders a nude image of the scanned individual which is
regarded by some as overly intrusive. Alternative methods to these technologies
include the use of bomb-sniffing dogs and physical searches of individuals. In light
of the 9/11 Commission recommendation, Congress may debate whether and how to
implement and fund an initiative for screening passengers using the most effective
7 Mimi Hall and Barbara DeLollis. “Plan to collect flier data canceled.” USA Today, July
14, 2004.

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means available. (See CRS Report RS21920, Detection of Explosives on Airline
Passengers: Recommendation of the 9/11 Commission and Related Issues)
Addressing Human Factors Issues at Screening Checkpoints
The 9/11 Commission also recommended that the TSA conduct a human factors
study to understand problems in screener performance and set attainable objectives
for improving performance at screening checkpoints. Screener performance
deficiencies were highlighted by a recent DHS Inspector General’s audit that found
poor screener performance among both federal and contract screeners during covert
testing at screening checkpoints.8 The TSA has launched several initiatives to
address these concerns. For example, the TSA has greatly expanded the use of threat
image projection (TIP), a system that tests screener on-the-job performance by
projecting images of threat objects on x-ray monitors. Using data from TIP,
researchers can assess certain human performance needs in aviation security. The
TSA is also examining ways to improve the recurrent training of screeners.
Key human factors issues are likely to include screener selection and training,
fitness for duty, and human interaction with screening technologies. While the TSA
maintains a small cadre of human factors researchers and some ongoing research in
this area is being conducted by universities and contractors, research on aviation
security human factors and funding for these activities pales in comparison to human
factors research programs in the Department of Defense and FAA’s safety-related
human factors activities. Also, there presently is a lack of a comprehensive strategic
plan for addressing human factors in aviation security.
In light of this recommendation and persisting concerns over screener
performance, Congress may conduct oversight to identify areas where TSA’s human
factors research efforts may not be adequately addressing concerns over passenger
and baggage screening performance. Congress may also consider whether to task the
National Academy of Sciences or some other independent body with examining
human factors needs in aviation security. While the National Academy of Sciences
did address human factors in its 1999 assessment of aviation security technologies,
it has not conducted a focused study of human factors needs in the aviation security
system and has not examined this issue since the terrorist attacks of September 11,
2001.9

Expediting Deployment of In-Line Baggage Screening
Systems
The 9/11 Commission recommended that the TSA expedite installation of in-
line baggage screening systems. Therefore, Congress may debate the adequacy of
8 Statement of Clark Kent Ervin, Inspector General, U.S. Department of Homeland Security.
Before the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, Subcommittee on Aviation, U.S.
House of Representatives, April 22, 2004
9 National Research Council. Assessment of Technologies Deployed to Improve Aviation
Security: First Report. Publication NMAB-482-5. Washington, DC: National Academy
Press, 1999.

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current funding for this activity. While Vision 100 authorizes up to $500 million
annually to be deposited into the aviation security capital fund, only $250 million
was appropriated in FY2004 and requested in FY2005 for this activity. Since the
total cost of integrating EDS equipment at all passenger airports is estimated to
exceed $4 billion, it may take several years to complete integration of baggage
screening systems given current funding levels. Letters of intent (LOIs) issued to
airports by the TSA were established as a vehicle to leverage limited federal funding
by stretching obligations over several years. LOIs were created in appropriations
legislation as a means for TSA to convey to airports its intent to obligate future funds
for the purpose of EDS integration. However, the TSA has, thus far, implemented
LOIs by reimbursing airports for expenses as they are incurred. This approach could
further slow the progress of integrating EDS systems at airports.
The 9/11 Commission also recommended that “[b]ecause the aviation industry
will derive substantial benefits from [in-line EDS] deployment, it should pay a fair
share of the costs.”10 However, defining that fair share has been a significant point
of contention. Airlines already indirectly pay the federal share of EDS integration
because the first $250 million annually, all that was budgeted in FY2004 for this
activity, must come directly from aviation security fees paid by the airlines and their
passengers. Airports pay a portion of the costs too, albeit a much smaller one. Under
the scheme adopted by Vision 100, large and medium-sized airports contribute 10%
of the cost while small airports contribute 5%. However, the TSA has proposed to
reduce the federal obligations for these programs and increase the local share to 25%
at large and medium-sized airports and 10% at small airports, a proposal that airports
obviously oppose. The 9/11 Commission did not specifically say what they would
consider to be a more equitable contribution from industry, however their
recommendation implies that they believe industry is not paying its fair share under
the current scheme. Congress may continue debate over the equity of cost-sharing
for EDS integration in light of this recommendation.
Intensifying Efforts to Identify, Screen, and Track Cargo
The 9/11 Commission recommended that the TSA needs to intensify its efforts
to identify suspicious cargo, and appropriately screen and track potentially dangerous
cargo in aviation as well as in maritime operations. Stemming from
recommendations of the Aviation Security Advisory Committee (ASAC), a standing
committee of aviation stakeholders, the TSA unveiled a strategic plan for cargo
security in November 2003. That plan consists a multi-layered risk-based approach
with four key strategic objectives: 1) enhancing shipper and supply chain security;
2) identifying elevated risk cargo through pre-screening; 3) identifying technology
for performing targeted air cargo inspections; and, 4) securing all-cargo aircraft
through appropriate facility security measures.11 Goals of the plan include pre-
screening all cargo shipments in order to determine their level of relative risk;
working with industry and federal partners to ensure that 100% of items considered
to pose an elevated risk are inspected; developing and ensuring that new information
10 The 9/11 Commission Report, p. 393.
11 Transportation Security Administration. Air Cargo Strategic Plan. November, 2003.

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and technology solutions are deployed; and, implementing operational and regulatory
programs that support enhanced security measures.12 The 9/11 Commission
recommendations seem to imply that it concurs with TSA’s overall approach as
outlined in this strategic plan but feels that progress toward achieving these
objectives must be accelerated, and perhaps, augmented. Since the 9/11 Commission
recommendation provides no specific guidance on how to intensify the identification,
tracking, and screening of cargo, Congress may further scrutinize TSA’s efforts on
cargo security and further debate approaches to air cargo security.
Recent debate in Congress over air cargo security has focused on the level of
physical screening or inspection of cargo needed to adequately mitigate the risks
posed by cargo placed on passenger aircraft. While proposals have been offered to
require 100% physical screening or inspection of all cargo placed on passenger
aircraft, Congress has thus far supported TSA’s plan to, instead, implement a risk-
based approach that relies heavily on the known-shipper program and database to
assess shipments placed aboard passenger aircraft (see CRS Report RL32022, Air
Cargo Security).
Deploying Hardened Cargo Containers
In addition to these measures to improve cargo security, the 9/11 Commission
specifically recommended the deployment of at least one hardened cargo container
on every passenger aircraft that also hauls cargo to carry suspicious cargo. The
National Research Council examined this very concept in 1999 and concluded it
would cost $125 million to acquire a sufficient number of hardened containers.13
They also estimated that the annual industry-wide cost of lost revenue due to reduced
aircraft revenue payload and increased fuel burn would total $11 million. Thus, even
if a proposal were made to federally fund this initiative, passenger airlines may
oppose it because it would increase operational costs.
It is likely that opponents of deploying hardened cargo containers would also
argue that, if recommended initiatives are implemented to improve the identification,
tracking, and screening of cargo, then hardened cargo containers are not needed. On
the other hand, proponents of deploying hardened cargo containers may argue that
doing so creates a redundant layer of defense, analogous to a hardened cockpit door,
that is consistent with the overarching goal of establishing a multi-layered security
system with built-in redundancies.
12 There has been considerable confusion regarding the terms screening and inspection as
they pertain to air cargo, and presently no statutory or regulatory definitions of these terms
exist. In general, the TSA refers to screening as a vetting process, such as the use of a
known-shipper database, to assess the level of risk associated with a cargo shipment. TSA
uses the term inspections, on the other hand, to refer to physical scrutiny of cargo though
any of several available means such as canine teams, hand searches, or the use of x-ray
equipment or explosives detection systems. In this report, the term pre-screening has been
used in place of what TSA commonly calls screening to avoid confusion since this does not
refer to a physical screening process.
13 National Research Council. Assessment of Technologies Deployed to Improve Aviation
Security: First Report.

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However, using just one hardened cargo container per passenger aircraft still
leaves the system open to potential vulnerabilities that are directly tied to the
effectiveness of measures to conduct risk-based assessments of cargo and flag
suspicious cargo. For this reason, the TSA currently requires that all cargo from
shippers that have not been properly vetted and verified through the known-shipper
program be carried in all-cargo airplanes and not aboard passenger airplanes. While
TSA is working on expanding its capabilities to detect high risk cargo, it is unclear
how this system could be adapted to assign risk levels that would permit certain
suspect cargo to travel in hardened cargo containers on board passenger airplanes.
Also, from a policy standpoint, it is unclear what criteria could be used to permit
shipment of suspicious cargo on passenger aircraft in hardened cargo containers
instead of offloading that shipment from passenger aircraft altogether. Congress may
debate whether deployment of hardened cargo containers could provide an effective
layer of security to protect against potential cargo bombings. A key policy issue in
this debate is likely to be the possible implications of allowing suspicious cargo to
travel on passenger aircraft even if they are secured in hardened cargo containers.
Risk-Based Prioritization as the Basis for Transportation
Security Policy
In addition to the aviation specific recommendations discussed above, the 9/11
Commission also issued an overarching recommendation that risk-based priorities
for protecting all transportation assets be established. Based on this assessment of
risks, the 9/11 Commission recommended that TSA select the most practical and cost
effective approaches for implementing defenses of transportation assets and develop
a plan, budget, and funding to implement this effort. The plan, according to the 9/11
Commission, should assign roles and missions to federal, state, and local authorities,
as well as to private stakeholders.
Strategic Plan for Aviation Security. The risk-based approach to aviation
security is nothing new and has been viewed for some time as the principal policy
tool for allocating limited resources. What is lacking, however, is a unified strategic
plan for aviation security. To some extent, ATSA has set the strategy for aviation
security following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. The TSA’s initial
focus was on meeting the mandates of ATSA, particularly deploying air marshals and
federal screeners. Now that TSA has achieved some level of normal operations, it
should be better poised to focus on developing a more formal strategy for national
aviation security policy. Based on TSA’s strategic approaches to date, particularly
in addressing air cargo security needs, it is likely that a risk-based multi-layered
approach to aviation security will form the core of future aviation security policy.
This appears to be largely in step with what the 9/11 Commission is recommending.
In light of the 9/11 Commission recommendation, Congress may consider whether
to formally task the TSA with developing a national strategy for aviation security that
addresses funding needs, budgetary implications, and the appropriate roles of federal,
local, and state authorities, and industry stakeholders. While some may argue that
such a plan already exists in various TSA program plans and budget documents,
others may argue that a more formal strategic planning document for aviation
security needs to be developed.

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Cooperation and Integration. While aviation security relies extensively on
cooperation and the integration of shared responsibilities, challenges persist in
defining roles and allocating resources for state and local participation and industry
involvement. At airports, the local role is defined in the airport security program
which is tailored for each airport location. Physical security of the airport site is
ultimately the role of local jurisdictions carried out by airport operators, while TSA
maintains the overall role of security oversight and enforcement as well as direct
responsibility for passenger screening. The role of local governments, and in some
cases state authorities, in aviation security often involves both law enforcement
support for airport site security and law enforcement presence at screening
checkpoints. Passenger air carriers must also participate in security through
procedures and training for controlling access to aircraft and secured areas of
airports, carrying out security inspections of aircraft, and so on. In air cargo and
general aviation, security measures rely heavily on the direct participation of aircraft
owners and operators, while the federal role is one of oversight and enforcement of
aviation security requirements.
While implementing aviation security already involves federal, state, local, and
industry participation, what appears to be lacking is a unified plan or strategy for:
assigning roles and missions to each stakeholder based on careful consideration of
logistics and costs; and adopting a systems approach to define how each element
contributes to the overall security strategy. In light of the 9/11 Commission
recommendation, Congress and the TSA may consider ways to improve the strategic
planning, resource allocation, and integration of federal, state, local, and private-
sector resources for aviation security. Congress and the TSA may also consider how
the specific strategies and approaches to aviation security may be integrated with an
overarching transportation security strategy that encompasses rail, maritime, and
highway security as well and addresses logistics, funding, and resource allocation to
meet security needs in all modes of transportation.

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