Order Code RL32522
CRS Report for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
U.S. Anti-Terror Strategy and the
9/11 Commission Report
August 12, 2004
Raphael Perl
Specialist in International Relations
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress
U.S. Anti-Terror Strategy and the
9/11 Commission Report
Summary
On July 22, 2004 the 9/11 Commission released its final report. The report calls
for changes to be made by the executive branch and Congress to more effectively
protect our nation in an age of modern terrorism and provides forty-one concrete
recommendations.
This paper addresses the components of the Administration’s 2003 National
Strategy for Combating Terrorism and the potential impact, if any, of key
recommendations of the 9/11 Commission on the strategy.
Generally, the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission as they relate to
strategy content and implementation appear consistent with, and supportive of, the
National Strategy. Few question the 9/11 Commission Report’s overarching premise
that U.S. counter-terrorism structure, strategy, and implementation can be improved.
Some, however, see certain Commission recommendations as incomplete, if not
flawed. They suggest that the Commission is often focused on the “last war” and not
a future one and suggest that the Commission consciously avoids tackling some of
the more complex, yet pressing issues. For example, the Commission, as its first
recommendation, stresses the need for identifying and prioritizing terrorist
sanctuaries with a focus on failed states. Some assert, however, that terrorists are
increasingly returning to their politically stable home countries for sanctuary where
they blend into local communities, where their training camps are in civilian housing
complexes, and where their bomb factories are in private residences. Although a
number of the Commission’s recommendations fall within the category of preventing
the growth of Islamic extremism, none addresses directly the issue of confronting
incitement to terrorism when promoted, countenanced, or facilitated by the action
— or inaction — of nation states.
Also at issue is the pace at which refinement, or restructuring, of the intelligence
community should proceed at a time when the nation perceives itself at war with
terror. Some question to what degree major organizational changes might reduce
operational efficiency in the short term and how this compares to any long-term
benefits inherent in more dramatic reform.
With terrorists able to change targets, tactics, and weapons on short notice,
many argue that a successful counterterrorism strategy and institutional structures
will need similar flexibility. The degree to which such flexibility will be built into
strategy, and into any new institutional structures recommend by the 9/11
Commission, is yet to be determined.
This report will not be updated.
Contents
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
National Strategy for Combating Terrorism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Strategy Elements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
The 9/11 Commission Report . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Issues Regarding the 2003 National Strategy and the 9/11 Commission Report . . 8
U.S. Anti-Terror Strategy and the
9/11 Commission Report
Introduction
Central to a global strategy for combating terrorism is defining the threat and
understanding who the enemy is. “Terrorism” as a generic concept is too vague and
amorphous to design a strategy against. Moreover, terrorism, though often perceived
as a threat, is perhaps better characterized as a tactic or a process. An important
point made by the 9/11 Commission is that the strategic threat faced by the United
States and its allies is from an enemy consisting of certain groups and with a specific
ideology and with stated objectives. In the words of the Commission: “The enemy
goes beyond al Qaeda to include the radical ideological movement, inspired in part
by al Qaeda, that has spawned other terrorist groups and violence. Thus our strategy
must match our means to two ends: dismantling the al Qaeda network and, in the
long term, prevailing over the ideology that contributes to Islamist terrorism.”1
A comprehensive national anti-terror strategy must address many issues.
Included are the appropriate roles for military force, law enforcement, intelligence,
diplomacy, economic development, education, promotion of social and political
equality, and nation and institution building within the context of policies promoting
national security. Tactically, in the short term, how does one employ the wide
portfolio of tools available to policymakers to reduce pressing and immediate
threats? Strategically, in the long term, how does one win “hearts and minds”? In
addition, a strategy ideally attracts allies. How does one both maximize international
“buy-in” and national effectiveness?
The National Strategy for Combating Terrorism addresses these issues2. The
recommendations of the 9/11 Commission, as they relate to strategy content and
implementation, appear consistent with, and supportive of, the National Strategy.3
1 The 9/11Commission Report, Executive Summary, p.16- 17.
[http://www.gpoaccess.gov/911/index.html].
2 [http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/02/20030214-7.html]
3 Note, that in contrast to the 9/11 Commission’s recommendations, the National Strategy
does not deal with the issue of government organizational structure to combat terrorism.
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National Strategy for Combating Terrorism
Framework
On February 14, 2003, the White House released the National Strategy for
Combating Terrorism, a 30-page interagency document.4 The intent of the strategy
is to stop terrorist attacks against the United States, its citizens, its interests, and U.S.
friends and allies around the world, as well as to create an international environment
inhospitable to terrorists and their supporters.
The strategy emphasizes that all instruments of U.S. power — diplomatic,
economic, law enforcement, financial, information dissemination, intelligence, and
military — are to be called upon in combating international terrorism. The strategy
fits into the wider strategic concept of “defense-in-depth,” which projects four
concentric rings of defense against terrorist attacks against the United States5.
The National Strategy for Combating Terrorism is designed to complement
other elements of the National Security Strategy6 including sub-strategies for
homeland security, weapons of mass destruction, cyberspace, critical infrastructure
protection, and drug control. While the National Strategy for Homeland Security7
focuses on preventing terrorist attacks within the United States, the National Strategy
for Combating Terrorism focuses on identifying and defusing threats before they
reach U.S. borders. Incorporated in the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism
is a strong preemptive component, a strong focus on reducing proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction, and a defense-in-depth framework.
While pre-emption and military force remain important components, the strategy
recognizes that the war on terror will not be won on the military battlefield and gives
policy emphasis to strategic long-term policy components. Earlier Bush
Administration draft versions of the strategy had placed even heavier emphasis on
international law enforcement cooperation as a policy pillar.
4 [http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/02/20030214-7.html]
5 The outermost ring consists of diplomatic, military, and intelligence organizations,
operating mostly overseas. One goal of these organizations is to help pre-empt attacks on
the U.S. homeland. In the 2003 plan, organizations such as the Customs Service,
Immigration and Naturalization Service, and the Coast Guard — all of which are now
incorporated into the Department of Homeland Security — constituted the next ring, which
focuses on U.S. borders and the goods and people that cross them. The next ring includes
federal, state, and local law enforcement, “first responders” such as the fire service, and the
National Guard. These operate for the most part within U.S. borders and are responsible for
protecting towns and cities. Private citizens, who are being asked to report suspicious
activity and take preventive action to reduce vulnerability to perilous situations, are part of
this ring also. The final ring includes the private sector and federal agencies that play a key
role in safeguarding the facilities that comprise critical physical infrastructures (e.g.,
transportation, financial, telecommunications, and energy systems).
See [http://usinfo.state.gov/ei/Archive/2003/Dec/31-646035.html]
6 [http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdf]
7 [http://www.whitehouse.gov/homeland/book/nat_strat_hls.pdf]
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The strategy details a desired end state where the scope and capabilities of
global terrorist organizations are downscaled to such an extent that they become
localized, unorganized, unsponsored, and rare enough that they can be almost
exclusively dealt with by criminal law enforcement. To accomplish this mission,
emphasis is placed on international action by “working with the willing, enabling the
weak, persuading the reluctant, and compelling the unwilling.”8 One aspect of the
strategy is that economic development is formally enumerated as an important factor
in reducing conditions that terrorists exploit. The strategy also raises the priority of
using information programs to de-legitimize terrorism.
Strategy Elements
The Administration’s 2003 National Strategy for Combating Terrorism is
founded on four pillars — defeating, denying, diminishing, and defending.
! Together with U.S. allies, defeating terrorists by attacking their
sanctuaries; leadership; command, control, and
communications; material support; and finances. Components
include (1) identifying and locating terrorists by making optimal use
of all intelligence sources, foreign and U.S., and (2) destroying
terrorists and their organizations by capture and detention, use of
military power, and through employment of specialized intelligence
resources, as well as international cooperation to curb terrorist
funding;
! Denying terrorists state sponsorship, support, and
sanctuary/safehavens. A central strategy objective is to ensure that
other states take action against such elements within their sovereign
territory. Elements include (1) tailoring strategies to induce
individual state sponsors of terrorism to change policies; (2)
promoting international standards for combating terrorism; (3)
eliminating sanctuaries; and (4) interdicting terrorist ground, air,
maritime, and cyber traffic, in order to deny terrorists access to arms,
financing, information, WMD materials, sensitive technology,
recruits, and funding from illicit drug activities;
! Diminishing underlying conditions that terrorists exploit, by
fostering economic, social, and political development, market-
based economies, good governance, and the rule of law.
Emphasis includes (1) partnering with the international community
to alleviate conditions leading to failed states that breed terrorism;
and (2) using public information initiatives to de-legitimize
terrorism; and
! Defending U.S. citizens and interests at home and abroad to
include protection of physical and cyber infrastructures.
8 [http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/02/20030214-7.html], Introduction.
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Inherent in these four pillars are the following components:
First and foremost is an intelligence component. Counterterrorism requires
sound intelligence. Since 9/11, the United States has sought to identify and
implement measures designed to better merge domestic with foreign intelligence9.
Increasingly, U.S. counter-terrorism strategy incorporates a law enforcement
component, subject, however, to restrictions found in the Posse Comitatus Act and
the Homeland Security Act that limit involvement of the military in domestic law
enforcement10. Central to the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism is law
enforcement cooperation. For example, since September 11, 2001, the FBI has
initiated cooperative programs with Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia and
other nations aimed at apprehending suspected terrorists and has shared expertise and
technology with the law enforcement agencies of these nations. An increasingly
important component of law enforcement cooperation involves curbing terrorist
financing11.
U.S. counterterrorism policy also has a strong economic component with both
defensive and preemptive characteristics. On the defensive side much attention is
being given to minimize disruption of the American economy by protecting
economic infrastructures. A major function of the Department of Homeland Security
[DHS] is to assess the vulnerability of critical infrastructures. Supporting such
efforts is a growing use of risk analysis and threat matrices.
On the preemptive side of the economic component, since 9/11, combating
global terrorism has become one of the top priorities of U.S. foreign assistance.12
The Bush Administration has launched a new foreign aid program, the Millennium
Challenge Account which would increase foreign economic assistance starting in
FY2004 to a level which would be $5 billion higher by FY2006. Currently, U.S.
economic aid worldwide totals $12.87 billion. Aid would go to countries that have
demonstrated sound development practices and over time the new aid would be
limited to countries with a per capita annual income of less than $2,975. For
9 For example, The USA Patriot Act was passed and signed, the interagency Terrorist Threat
Integration Center (TTIC) was formed, as was the 9/11 Commission.
10 See CRS Report RS21012, Terrorism — Some Legal Restrictions on Military Assistance
to Domestic Authorities Following a Terrorist Attack, by Charles Doyle and Jennifer Elsea,
and CRS Report RS20590, The Posse Comitatus Act and Related Matters: A Sketch, b y
Jennifer Elsea.
11 See CRS Report RS21902, Terrorist Financing: the 9/11 Commission Recommendation,
by Martin A. Weiss, and CRS Report RL32499, Saudi Arabia: Terrorist Financing Issues,
by Alfred Prados and Christopher Blanchard.
12 [http://www.congress.gov/brbk/html/ebter85.html]. In addition to aid to Afghanistan
and Pakistan, the U.S. has provided roughly $ 14 billion to 24 other “front-line” states in the
global war on terror since September 11, 2001.
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FY2004, Congress appropriated $994 million for this account; the FY2005 budget
proposes $2.5 billion with a commitment for $5 billion in FY2006.13
Also evident is a growing counter-drug component. In the wake of the events
of September 11th, the international community has placed emphasis on curbing
financing of terrorist groups, and has dramatically enhanced efforts to limit and seize
sources of terrorist funding14. This has spawned renewed focus on the narcotics trade
as a source of funding for such groups. Even in instances where groups do not
actively work together, the synergy of their separate operations and shared efforts at
destabilization pose an increasing threat.15
In addition, there is a military component. This military component is
reflected in the war in Iraq;16 U.S. operations in Afghanistan; deployment of U.S.
forces around the Horn of Africa, to Djibouti, and the former Soviet Republic of
Georgia; and ongoing military exercises in Colombia. The U.S. is also undergoing
a shift in overseas base locations to tactically support a more flexible strategy
allowing for extended global military reach.17
On the home front, U.S. policy increasingly has a homeland security focus.
The Department of Homeland Security was the biggest reorganization of the federal
government in America’s history, incorporating 22 government agencies and some
179,000 people into a single organization charged with coordinating the nation’s
domestic response to terrorism. The budget of the new department is roughly equal
in amount to 10% of the nation’s defense budget. For FY2003, approximately 44%
of federal law enforcement positions and 48% of federal law enforcement funding
were transferred to DHS.18
Central to the U.S. Government approach to combating terrorism is globalizing
threat reduction and counter-proliferation of WMD and delivery systems. On
May 31, 2003, President Bush proposed a Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI)
aimed at keeping WMD materials out of the hands of terrorists and rogue nations.19
13 See CRS Report RL32427, Millennium Challenge Account: Implementation of a New U.S.
Foreign Aid Initiative by Larry Nowels.
14 On May 14, 2004, Ministers from 33 nations announced reauthorization for 8 more years
of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), the group that coordinates the global fight
against terrorist finance and money laundering.
15 See CRS Issue Brief IB88093, Drug Control: International Policy and Approaches, by
Raphael Perl.
16 Note, however, that although some see the Iraq war as anti-terrorism connected, others
vehemently disagree.
17 See CRS Issue Brief IB10119, Terrorism and National Security: Issues and Trends, by
Raphael Perl.
18 Note that the Department of Justice and more specifically the FBI, organizations with
important homeland security functions, were not merged into DHS.
19 See [http://www.state.gov/t/np/rls/fs/32725.htm]
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Since then, 16 nations have pledged their cooperation in interdicting shipments of
weapons of mass destruction-related materials.20
The 9/11 Commission Report
On July 22, 2004, the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the
United States [“9/11 Commission”] issued its final report.21 Included are forty-one
recommendations for changing the way the government is organized to combat
terrorism and how it prioritizes its efforts. Many of the Commission’s
recommendations are consistent with elements of the Administration’s February 14,
2003 National Strategy for Combating Terrorism22, such as diplomacy and counter-
proliferation efforts, preemption, intelligence and information fusion, winning hearts
and minds — including not only public diplomacy, but also policies that encourage
development and more open societies, law enforcement cooperation, and defending
the homeland.23
The 9/11 Commission’s recommendations generally fall into the categories of
(1) preemption [attacking terrorists and combating the growth of Islamic terrorism];
(2) protecting against and preparing for attacks; (3) coordination and unity of
operational planning, intelligence and sharing of information; (4) enhancing, through
centralization, congressional effectiveness of intelligence and counter-terrorism
oversight, authorization, and appropriations; (5) centralizing congressional oversight
and review of homeland security activities; and (6) increasing FBI, DOD, and DHS
capacity to assess terrorist threats and their concomitant response strategies and
capabilities. The report specifically recommends confronting openly problems in the
U.S.- Saudi relationship, read by some to include such issues as terrorist financing
and the issue of ideological incitement. The report also recommends sustaining aid
to Pakistan and Afghanistan, which are perceived to be vital geo-strategic allies in
the global war on terror.
Prominent in the report are specific recommendations calling for (1) creation of
a more unified congressional committee structure for oversight, authorization, and
appropriations involving intelligence and counterterrorism (e.g., a joint committee
or separate committees in each chamber — possibly combining authorizing and
appropriating authorities); (2) creation of a single principal point of congressional
oversight and review for homeland security; (3) creation of a position of National
Intelligence Director (NID) in the Office of the President; and (4) creation of a
20 See CRS Report RS21881, Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), by Sharon Squassoni.
21 [http://www.gpoaccess.gov/911/index.htmlm].
Note that many of the Commission’s findings are consistent with generic findings
contained in a series of pre-9/11 reports, such as the June 5, 2000 congressionally mandated
report of the bi-partisan National Commission on Terrorism; see CRS Report RS20598,
National Commission on Terrorism Report: Background and Issues for Congress, by
Raphael Perl.
22 [http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/02/20030214-7.html].
23 See also: [http://usinfo.state.gov/ei/Archive/2003/Dec/31-646035.html].
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National Counterterrorism Center. The National Intelligence Director would exercise
some degree of control of intelligence agencies across the federal government,
propose and execute a unified intelligence budget, and serve as principal intelligence
adviser to the President.24 The National Counterterrorism Center, in the view of the
Commission, should be the central office for intelligence gathering, analysis, and
overall counterterrorism operations.
Mirroring Commission recommendations, on August 2, 2004, President Bush
urged Congress to create the position of a National Intelligence Director — a position
separate from that of CIA Director — to be appointed by the President with the
advice and consent of the Senate, and to serve at the pleasure of the President. The
Director would serve as the President’s principal intelligence advisor, overseeing and
coordinating the foreign and domestic activities of the intelligence community. The
President also announced plans to establish a National Counter-Terrorism Center —
a move envisioned as building on the analytical work of the Terrorist Threat
Integration Center. The new center is envisioned as serving as a central knowledge
bank for information about known and suspected terrorists and would be charged
with coordinating and monitoring counter-terrorism plans and activities of all
government agencies, and preparing the daily terrorism threat report for the President
and senior officials.25
Some, however, are concerned that a newly created National Intelligence
Director (NID), as an integral part of the President’s team, might be more vulnerable
to political pressure.26 Central to this debate is a desire to maintain the independence
of objective intelligence from administration policy goals.27 As the proposed
National Intelligence Director would have access to both domestic and foreign
intelligence, another concern is the overall power wielded by the proposed position
and its potential for abuse.28
24 Note that the prickly issue of the extent of the NID’s authority over agencies, and their
budgets is as of yet undetermined. See CRS Report RL32506, The Position of Director of
National Intelligence: Issues for Congress, by Alfred Cumming.
25 [http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/08/print/20040802-2.html].
26 Conversation with Peter Probst, Vice-President and Director of Research for the Center
for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence, August 8, 2004. For purposes of
historical assessment, note that examples of a close relationship between the Director of
Central Intelligence (DCI) and the White House are arguably documented in Plan of
Attack by Bob Woodward. New York : Simon & Schuster, 2004, 467 p. See also: CRS
Report RS21696, U.S. Intelligence and Policymaking: The Iraq Experience, by Richard
Best.
27 See press release of Senator Carl Levin, “The Intelligence Community Was Only Half
the Problem,” July 15, 2004. [http://levin.senate.gov/newsroom/release.cfm?id=224062]
28 See generally, August 4, 2004 hearing of the House Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence on the September 11 Commission Recommendations.
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Issues Regarding the 2003 National Strategy and
the 9/11 Commission Report
Given the potential access by terrorists to weapons of mass destruction,
designing effective responses to terrorism may well be the greatest challenge facing
governments today. Bedeviling policymakers is how to combat effectively this
growing global phenomenon with sufficient intelligence support and at a sustainable
level of economic, social, and political cost. Inherent in this policy debate are two
overarching issues: (1) how to ensure protection of civil liberties while enhancing
security, and (2) how to deal with the seemingly unending costs of enhancing
security.29 Critical to both these issues is the development of a methodology to
measure the adequacy of antiterrorism efforts, an issue not addressed in the 2003
National Strategy, or in the 9/11 Commission report recommendations.
In this regard, some raise concern that creation of positions or structures in
government where domestic and foreign intelligence are coordinated or fused — such
as the 9/11 Commission’s proposed National Intelligence Director and National
Counter-Terrorism Center — will result in encroachments on civil liberties. Clearly
as a nation, they say, the United States does not seek to defend freedom abroad and
ignore it at home. On the other hand, others counter that providing security in today’s
increasingly borderless world is a basic responsibility of governments to their
citizenry. Without intelligence gathering and analysis that adequately detects an
increasingly intertwined continuum of threats of both foreign and domestic origin,
they say, policymakers may find themselves at a major disadvantage in
implementing strategies to counter such threats.
Concern also exists over the potential for seemingly limitless economic costs
of security associated with homeland defense. No sizeable nation can afford the cost
of fortifying every square inch of its territory from terror attacks, so as the 9/11
Commission recommends, both strategy and implementation policies must wisely
prioritize allocation of resources for counterterrorism and homeland defense30.
Complicating these efforts, governments and terrorists may be fighting
“different” wars. Policymakers often view success against terrorism in terms of
minimizing physical damage — death, injury, and destruction of property — and
concentrate their energy and resources in this area. On the other hand, terrorists,
while seeking physical damage, may also view success in abstract or ideological
29 For a variety of material relating to the 9/11 Commission Report, see the CRS website
[http://www.crs.gov/products/browse/is-terrorism.shtml]. For the 9/11 Commission report
see:[http://www.gpoaccess.gov/911/index.html]. Note that the 9/11 Commission
recommendation on p. 391-392 of the 9/11 Report refers to “hard choices” in allocating
limited resources and refers to use of “risk based” priorities for evaluating and identifying
transportation assets needing protection. Moreover, the recommendation on p.396 begins
with the wording “Homeland security assistance should be based strictly on assessment of
risks and vulnerabilities.” Such recommendations are based, however, on the premise that
threat based vulnerability assessment methodologies exist, or can be developed, which are
able to assess terrorist risk.
30 See 9/11 Commission recommendations on pages 391-992, and 396.
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terms. For example, what is the impact of an action on recruitment? How does it
affect government policies or the stability of the government in power? What is the
impact of an act of terrorism on the economy of a nation or on global economic
networks? What is the impact on behavioral patterns of a target population? Might
the public pressure government to pursue policies that appease terror? The question
arises, how long can democratic governments pursue policies that pressure terrorists
if such policies are seen as bringing on terrorist retaliation? Breaking or weakening
this political will is likely to be a central terrorist goal.
Some well thought out strategies promote holding the line on terrorism or
setting it back. But a potential danger in formalized strategies such as the National
Strategy for Combating Terrorism31 is that the strategy may rigidly dictate the
response instead of the threat dictating the response — as the threat is often rapidly
evolving. One option for policymakers charged with combating terrorism is to
design flexibility into strategies, organizational structures, and funding utilization.
While strategies or changes in governmental organizational structures such as
those recommended for the intelligence community by the 9/11 Commission may
accelerate success against global terrorism, other factors are equally critical as well.
Strong national leadership and a high quality of rank-and-file personnel and
technology are central, as is the strong political will of leadership and the general
population. Hence, one potential pitfall of relying on strategies and reforms
involving restructuring of government organizations is that a focus on implementing
strategies or administrative changes may overshadow other important factors such as
quality of personnel and technology. In particular, this human factor may warrant
more attention in an environment where organizations may feel pressed to find
personnel to fill a plethora of newly created counter-terror related positions.
Few question the 9/11 Commission Report’s overarching premise that U.S.
counter-terrorism structure, strategy, and implementation are important, but there
are various disparate views on its recommendations. At the crux of the policy debate
is the wisdom of what some see as rushing into reform in the heat of an election year
on complex issues vital to national security. On the other hand, others suggest not
enough has been accomplished since 9/11 to keep pace with the rising threat of
international terrorism, and given the gravity of the threat, changes in organizational
structure, strategy, and tactics — long overdue — must be implemented without
delay. Yet others see the Commission’s recommendations simply as fine-tuning, or
“piggy-backing,”on efforts already being implemented by the Bush Administration
in keeping with its February 14, 2003 National Strategy for Combating Terrorism.32
Also at issue is the pace at which refinement, or restructuring, of the intelligence
community should proceed at a time when the nation perceives itself at war with
terror. Some question to what degree major organizational changes might reduce
31 [http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/02/20030214-7.html]
32 [http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/02/20030214-7.html]. Creation of the
DCI- led Terrorist Threat Integration Center [TTIC], in an effort to enhance intelligence
sharing, is one notable example of a Bush Administration initiative.
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operational efficiency in the short term and how this compares to any long term
benefits inherent in more dramatic reform.33
Overall, the 9/11 Commission recommendations share many features of the
Administration’s National Strategy for Combating Terrorism. The theme of using
a portfolio of “all elements of national power” resounds in both documents. Both
documents emphasize the core importance of timely and actionable intelligence.
Both emphasize a need for pre-emptive strategy, for attacking terrorists and their
organizations, for international cooperation, for foreign economic assistance, for
winning hearts and minds, for strengthening counter-proliferation efforts, for
attacking terrorist financing, for denying sanctuaries, and for border security.34
Pursuit of government policies that draw potential recruits away from terrorist
agendas is a core recommendation of the 9/11 Commission report.35
Some, however, see certain Commission recommendations as incomplete, if not
flawed. They suggest that the Commission is often focused on the “last war” and not
a future one, and liken the Commission’s recommendations to picking the “low
hanging fruit on the tree while avoiding going after the higher — more difficult to
reach, yet richer — clusters.”36 For example, the Commission, as its first
recommendation, suggests identifying and prioritizing terrorist sanctuaries with a
focus on failed states. Some assert, however, that terrorists increasingly return to
their politically stable home countries for sanctuary where they blend into local
communities, where their training camps are in civilian housing complexes, and
where their bomb factories are in private residences. In another recommendation, the
Commission suggests that vigorous efforts to track terrorist financing remain front
and center, yet does not address the prickly, and growing, issue of use of the hawalah
system by terrorist networks.37
33 Moreover, some observers suggest that the 9/11 Commission’s recommendations have
failed to take into account substantial changes and reforms in the intelligence community
since 9/11, a charge rejected by the Commission. See Statement of Dr. Mark Lowenthal
before the House Permanent Select committee on Intelligence, August 4, 2004, p.3.
[http://intelligence.house.gov/media/pdfs/lowenthalTestimony080404.pdf]
See also: remarks of Acting Director of Central Intelligence, John E. McLaughlin, to Fox
News, 18 July 2004.
[http://odci.gov/cia/public_affairs/press_release/2004/pr07192004.html]
34 Note that it is widely recognized that terrorists are especially vulnerable to law
enforcement activity while in transit. To exploit this vulnerability, targeting travel is given
special emphasis in the 9/11 Commission’s recommendations.
35 See generally 9/11Commission recommendations under the heading “Prevent the
Continued Growth of Islamist Terrorism”, pp.374-383 of the Commission Report.
36 Conversation with Peter Probst, Vice-President and Director of Research for the Center
for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence, August 8, 2004.
37 CRS/Probst conversation, August 8, 2004. Note that Commission indicates that an
important purpose of targeting terror financing is to gather information on terror networks
and coalitions and to raise the costs of raising money (in terms of financial expenditures and
organizational energy) to al Qaeda and other groups. Moreover, the Report (p.283) suggests
that if al Qaeda is replaced by smaller decentralized groups, the assumption that terrorists
(continued...)
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A number of the Commission’s recommendations fall within the category of
preventing the growth of Islamist extremism and both the 2003 National Strategy and
the 9/11 Commission Report to a large degree equate the terrorist threat with al
Qaeda and affiliated groups. However, a valid question is the degree to which, if at
all, such a single-minded approach detracts attention from individuals or groups with
other motivations that may soon appear on the horizon. Another issue central to
combating Islamist extremism, not addressed in the 2003 National Strategy or the
9/11 Commission recommendations, is that of confronting incitement to terrorism
when promoted, countenanced, or facilitated by the action, or inaction, of nation
states.38
Although, the 2003 National Strategy and the 9/11 Commission both support
the use of foreign assistance as a means of taking away fertile breeding ground for
the nurturing of terrorist groups, the question of a correlation between standard of
living levels and terrorism is open to debate.39 Nevertheless, there is a growing
recognition in U.S. anti-terrorism strategy that poverty can breed ignorance and
despair and that despair can be exploited to support terrorist goals.40
37 (...continued)
need a financial support network may become outdated. Another benefit of targeting
financing, not mentioned in the report, is that it may prove useful as a coalition building
tool.
38 See generally, Commission recommendations pages 374-379 and specifically the
recommendation relating to the U.S. relationship with Saudi Arabia, p.374.
39 The question arises, to what degree is it economically sustainable — for even the richest
nations — to raise world standard of living levels to a plateau where social, ethnic, religious,
economic, or political grievances do not vent themselves in terrorist movements or acts?
Note also that Usama bin Ladin can hardly be characterized as poor, nor can many of his
major financial supporters.
40 See “Expert Sees More Proactive U.S. Policy Against Terrorism”, U.S. Department of
State, International Information Programs, July 2, 2002.
[http://usinfo.state.gov/topical/pol/terror/02070204.htm]