Order Code RL32520
CRS Report for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
Emergency Management Preparedness
Standards: Overview and
Options for Congress
August 12, 2004
Keith Bea
Specialist in American National Government
Government and Finance Division
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

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Emergency Management Preparedness Standards:
Overview and Options for Congress
Summary
The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (also
referred to as the “9/11 Commission”) identifies gaps in emergency response
capabilities after the attacks of September 11, 2001. While heroic actions that day
saved thousands of people, many lives were lost in part because standard procedures
were not in place, or were not followed, and standardized technologies were not used
by participating agencies. To correct these deficiencies, the 9/11 commission report
includes recommendations that emergency response standards be adopted
nationwide.
The commission report includes three recommendations that focus on
emergency response standards: (1) the adoption and use of emergency response
standards for incident command; (2) mutual aid provisions concerning liability and
indemnification of responders; and (3) private sector preparedness. Members of the
108th Congress may consider legislation germane to these specific recommendations.
In addition, Congress might debate or take action on other matters to improve
emergency management procedures. A considerable amount of information is
available on emergency management; the commission report arguably addresses only
some of the issues that have been raised by others.
Several bills pending before Congress are relevant to an inquiry in this area.
Legislation has been introduced to: (1) authorize or require entities to establish
standards (H.R. 3158, H.R. 3227, H.R. 4830, S. 216, S. 930); (2) condition federal
assistance to state and local governments based upon compliance with standards (S.
1245, S. 2021); or, (3) urge the creation of standards for specific purposes (H.R. 2537
and S. 118 — warning systems, and H.R. 2878 — reporting requirements).
General agreement exists on the intent of the commission’s recommendations
in this policy area — the need to improve the nation’s emergency response
capabilities. The policy debate will likely include the implications and consequences
of adopting the recommendations concerning the establishment and application of
standards, particularly at the federal level. Would federally imposed or endorsed
standards diminish the authority and ability of the states, and their local governments,
to establish operational procedures that best fit the needs of their communities?
Would the imposition of standards through legislation raise unfunded mandate
concerns? What effect might the adoption of such standards have upon the substance
and nature of the intergovernmental partnership in homeland security and emergency
management response efforts? How would existing state authorities in areas other
than standards be affected by congressional action? This report presents background
information on the commission’s findings, on emergency response standards, and on
options Congress might consider to address the problems identified in the
commission’s report. This report will be updated as legislative developments
warrant.

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Contents
9/11 Commission Findings and Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Summary of Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Other Options Related to Emergency Response Standards . . . . . . . . . . 6
Overview of Existing Standards . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Organizations that Establish Standards . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Use of Standards in Accreditation Processes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Issues and Options for Congressional Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Nationwide Adoption of ICS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Federal Mutual Aid Legislation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
ANSI Standards for Private Sector Emergency Preparedness . . . . . . . 18
Additional Issue Areas and Options . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
List of Tables
Table 1. Emergency Management Preparedness Recommendations on Standards
and Related Congressional Action, 9/11 Commission . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Table 2. Components of NFPA 1600 Standards and Selected Explanatory
Material . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

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Emergency Management Preparedness
Standards: Overview and Options for
Congress
9/11 Commission Findings and Recommendations
The majority of the recommendations issued by the National Commission on
Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (also referred to as the “9/11 Commission”
or simply “the Commission”) focus on the need to reform the intelligence community
of the United States.1 In addition, based upon two days of public hearings and
subsequent work by commission staff on the responses at the sites of the attacks in
New York City and Virginia, the report includes recommendations directed at
improving emergency response procedures and capabilities through the adoption and
use of standard modes of organization, legislation, and planning.2
The commission concluded that the responses of civilians, public safety officers,
and administrators were heroic and sustained throughout those horrific events. The
commission also concluded that lapses and procedural deficiencies added to the
tragic events of that day. As summarized by the commission, confusion and tragedy
resulted not only from the immense scale of the attacks (particularly in New York
City), but also from inadequate planning, lack of coordination, and inadequate
technology. Of concern to the commission, these deficiencies were viewed to be
systemic, and were presumed to exist elsewhere in the nation, and accordingly
require attention at the federal level. Summary findings reported by the commission
that bear on these findings include the following:
It is a fair inference, given the differing situations in New York City and
Northern Virginia, that the problems in command, control, and communications
that occurred at both sites will likely recur in any emergency of similar scale.
The task looking forward is to enable first responders to respond in a coordinated
manner with the greatest possible awareness of the situation.3
1 U.S. National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, The 9/11
Commission Report (Washington: GPO, 2004). The report is available online at
[http://www.9-11commission.gov/], visited Aug. 4, 2004.
2 On May 18 and 19, 2004, commission members received testimony from witnesses
familiar with the details of, or were active in the responses to, the sites of the attacks. See
[http://www.9-11commission.gov/hearings/hearing11.htm], visited Aug. 9, 2004.
3 Ibid, p. 315. For details see also pages 8 through 10 of commission staff statement #14,
available at [http://www.9-11commission.gov/hearings/hearing11/staff_statement_14.pdf,
visited] Aug. 9, 2004.

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CRS-2
If New York and other major cities are to be prepared for future terrorist
attacks, different first responder agencies within each city must be fully
coordinated, just as different branches of the U.S. military are. Coordination
entails a unified command that comprehensively deploys all dispatched police,
fire, and other first responder resources.4
The attacks on 9/11 demonstrated that even the most robust emergency
response capabilities can be overwhelmed if an attack is large enough.
Teamwork, collaboration, and cooperation at an incident site are critical to a
successful response .... Preparedness in the private sector and public sector for
rescue, restart, and recovery of operations should include (1) a plan for
evacuation, (2) adequate communications capabilities, and (3) a plan for
continuity of operations .... [T]he lack of a widely embraced private-sector
preparedness standard was a principal contributing factor to this lack of
preparedness.5
On the basis of these and other findings, the commission issued
recommendations to improve the emergency response capabilities of the federal and
state and local governments as well as individuals and the private sector.6 The text
of these recommendations is presented in Table 1, below.
4 Ibid, p. 321-322.
5 Ibid, p. 397-398.
6 Other recommendations pertaining to improving emergency response capabilities address
the issues of communications connectivity and federal funding for state and local
governments. These issues are explored in Congressional Research Service reports
available at [http://www.congress.gov/erp/legissues/html/isdhs6.html], visited Aug. 6, 2004.

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CRS-3
Table 1. Emergency Management Preparedness
Recommendations on Standards and Related Congressional
Action, 9/11 Commission
Text of recommendation
Summary statements of
congressional options
“Emergency response agencies
(A) Condition federal homeland
nationwide should adopt the Incident
security funding upon accreditation
Command System (ICS). When
of units of governments;
multiple agencies or multiple
(B) urge or require DHS to evaluate
jurisdictions are involved, they should
the capability of units of government
adopt a unified command. Both are
in terms of ICS attainment;
proven frameworks for emergency
(C) require that funds be
response. We strongly support the
conditioned based on criteria or
decision that federal homeland security
indicators of need;
funding will be contingent, as of
(D) monitor use of ICS through new
October 1, 2004, upon the adoption and
planning mechanisms in process in
regular use of ICS and unified command
DHS;
procedures. In the future, the
(E) mandate that DHS assess
Department of Homeland Security
conditions under which ICS is best
should consider making funding
used; or,
contingent on aggressive and realistic
(F) take no action and allow
training in accordance with ICS and
administrators to decide. See page
unified command procedures.”
15 of this report.
“Congress should pass legislation to
(A) Enact the recommended
remedy the long-standing
legislation;
indemnification and liability
(B) assess the necessary scope of
impediments to the provision of public
such legislation;
safety mutual aid in the National Capital
(C) evaluate the impact of federal
Region and where applicable throughout
legislation on the Emergency
the nation.”A
Management Assistance Compact
(EMAC); or
(D) evaluate the deficienies of
EMAC or other mutual aid
agreements. See page 18 of this
report.

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CRS-4
Text of recommendation
Summary statements of
congressional options
“We endorse the American National
(A) Enact legislation requiring that
Standards Institute’s recommended
companies receiving federal
standard for private preparedness. We
contracts adopt the standards
were encouraged by Secretary Tom
through the Federal Acquisition
Ridge’s praise of the standard, and urge
Regulation (FAR);
the Department of Homeland Security to
(B) authorize funds to extend the
promote its adoption. We also
existing accreditation processes to
encourage the insurance and
private companies;
credit-rating industries to look closely at
(C) approve incentives for
a company’s compliance with the ANSI
companies to adopt the ANSI
standard in assessing its insurability and
preparedness standards; or,
creditworthiness. We believe that
(D) take no action unless a mandate
compliance with the standard should
imposing the standard on the private
define the standard of care owed by a
sector is funded. See page 19 of
company to its employees and the
this report.
public for legal purposes. Private-sector
preparedness is not a luxury; it is a cost
of doing business in the post-9/11
world. It is ignored at a tremendous
potential cost in lives, money, and
national security.”
Source: The 9/11 Commission Report, pp. 397-398.
A The second recommendation (concerning mutual aid agreements) is not highlighted as a
recommendation, but is included in the discussion of findings on page 397 of the report. It is included
here as a recommendation for Congress as the phrase “Congress should pass legislation ...” serves as
such.
Summary of Issues
The recommendations of the 9/11 Commission in Table 1 share a common
attribute — the assumption that the adoption of standard procedures and guidelines
will improve the capabilities of individuals, businesses, and public agencies to
respond to catastrophes and enhance the safety of individuals and communities after
a disaster occurs. Congress is expected to consider actions on the recommendations.
Some may view the recommendations to be the tip of an iceberg that indicates the
need for congressional action on a wide range of matters. Many other emergency
response issues became apparent on September 11th and could be the subject of
congressional examination and action.
This report provides background information on the emergency preparedness
and response topics raised in the commission’s report. It also explores other options
that Congress may choose to consider with regard to those recommendations.
Summary information on the issues that underlie the recommendations follows.

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CRS-5
Adoption of the Incident Command System.
! “Emergency response agencies throughout the nation should adopt
the Incident Command System (ICS).” The ICS has been applied for
decades to minimize operational difficulties as multiple agencies
respond to disaster sites. Terrorist attacks pose a particular danger
to responders, as secondary explosions, small arms fire, or chemical
weapons may be used specifically to kill officials or impair rescue
efforts. One issue is whether past principles that have guided ICS
operations might endanger the lives or welfare of first responders
and recovery specialists, and whether ICS has limitations for certain
types of public agencies limited by size, finances, or geographic
characteristics. An attendant concern is the degree to which unified
command structures would accommodate, or might fail to
accommodate, the range of needs and capabilities of responding
agencies. For example, if a terrorist attack suddenly shifts the need
for resources, local agencies and concerned citizens might be
concerned that they would lack sufficient authority to set priorities
and respond as needed under a unified command structure.
Mutual Aid.
! “Congress should pass legislation to remedy indemnification and
liability impediments to mutual aid in the National Capital Region
and other areas.” Almost all of the states (including Virginia,
Maryland, and the District of Columbia) have incorporated
provisions of the Emergency Management Assistance Compact
(EMAC) into their statutory codes. EMAC establishes a framework
under which standard procedures and operational policies are agreed
upon by the states to facilitate the provision of mutual aid when
emergencies occur, including a provision which ensures that when
officers or employees of one state render aid in another in emergency
situations, they are treated as agents of the requesting state for tort
and immunity purposes. [EMAC does not address indemnification.]
In addition, many states have adopted mutual aid compacts that
address liability concerns.7 Given the liability protection that EMAC
provides to signatory states, including those in the National Capital
Region, if Congress considers such legislation, it might examine its
impact on EMAC-based agreements among the states, and whether
increased federal action in this area is warranted.
7 State emergency management mutual aid agreements that have been enacted into law by
the states, as well as liability protection provisions for those rendering emergency aid, have
been identified for the states. For a summary see the “Mutual Aid” and “Other” categories
of information in: CRS Report RL32287, Emergency Management and Homeland Security
Statutory Authorities in the States, District of Columbia, and Insular Areas: A Summary, by
Keith Bea, L. Cheryl Runyon, and Kae M. Warnock. For summaries of and citations to the
mutual aid agreements and liability provisions enacted by each state see the individual
profile reports cited in Table 1 of RL32287.

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CRS-6
ANSI Emergency Preparedness Standards.
! “The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) should promote
adoption of ANSI standards for emergency preparedness by the
private sector.” Like other ANSI standards, the emergency
preparedness standards recommended for adoption are voluntary,
i.e., they are not mandated to be adopted. The commission report
urges DHS to take action to promote the adoption of these standards
by the private sector. The appropriate federal role for Congress or
DHS in encouraging the private sector to adopt such standards is an
issue.
Other Options Related to Emergency Response Standards. In
addition to the recommendations of the 9/11 commission, there are other options
Congress might consider.
! Review of existing federal authorities for emergency response.
Federal statutes provide authority for executive branch actions in the
event of emergencies. Congress might evaluate whether the
authorities should be revised.
! Emergency responder and civilian health. Civilians and first
responders in New York City reportedly have experienced severe
health problems since September 11, 2001.8 Congress might
consider options related to monitoring the health of such responders.
Overview of Existing Standards
Public safety organizations, analysts, and professional associations have
collaborated for years to develop emergency response standards to improve the
efficiency of response agencies, eliminate obstacles that might impede or prevent the
delivery of assistance after a disaster, and satisfy public and fiduciary agent concerns.
This section of the report introduces, and provides references to, standards and
related processes directly relevant to the two commission recommendations presented
in Table 1, above.
Organizations that Establish Standards. Two non-federal organizations
have developed or endorsed emergency preparedness standards. The activities of
both entities are described first. In addition, at least one federal authority, the
Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), has established standards
for emergency response actions. A summary of these organizations’ activities
follows.
8 The Centers for Disease Control and the National Institute for Occupational Safety and
Health of the Department of Health and Human Services are conducting a baseline screening
study to establish a database of health problems encountered by individuals who worked at
the site of the World Trade Center collapse in the aftermath of the attack. See
[http://grants.nih.gov/grants/guide/rfa-files/RFA-OH-04-004.html], visited Aug. 12, 2004.

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CRS-7
American National Standards Institute. The American National
Standards Institute (ANSI) is a private, non-profit organization “that administers and
coordinates the U.S. voluntary standardization and conformity assessment system.”9
A “Homeland Security Standards Panel” (ANSI-HSSP) has been established to
facilitate the development of standards related to homeland security needs. The task
before the panel is summarized as follows.
Established by ANSI in February 2003, the ANSI-HSSP has as its scope to
catalog, promote, accelerate and coordinate the timely development of consensus
standards within the national and international voluntary standards systems
intended to meet identified homeland security needs, and communicate the
existence of such standards appropriately to governmental units and the private
sector. The Panel will initially focus its activities on responding to the most
immediate standards needs of DHS.10
According to information distributed by ANSI, in a letter dated January 23,
2004, the 9/11 Commission asked ANSI to “develop a consensus on a ‘National
Standard for Preparedness’ for the private sector.11 In workshops held in the early
months of 2004, ANSI-HSSP served as the forum for discussions among private and
public sector representatives on the improvement of private sector emergency
preparedness and business continuity plans. Participants “concluded that a high-
level, voluntary standard applicable to all businesses regardless of industry, size, or
location, [was] needed to establish a common framework for emergency
preparedness.”12
Discussions in the workshop focused on the 2004 edition of the
Disaster/Emergency Management and Business Continuity Programs standard acted
upon by the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) in late 2003 and made
effective February 5, 2004.13 ANSI subsequently proposed to the 9/11 Commission
that NFPA 1600 “be accepted as the common framework for private-sector national
preparedness;” the 9/11 Commission endorsed the proposal. ANSI-HSSP also
developed recommendations for enhancements to NFPA 1600 that have been
9 For information see [http://www.ansi.org/about_ansi/overview/overview.aspx?menuid=1],
visited Aug. 5, 2004.
10 For information on the panel, including meeting schedules and areas of interest, see
[http://www.ansi.org/standards_activities/standards_boards_panels/hssp/overview.aspx?
menuid=3#overview], visited Aug. 5, 2004.
11 This information based on a telephone conversation with Matthew Deane, Secretary for
ANSI-HSSP, and the text of the document titled “Recommendation to the National
Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States,” transmitted to CRS. For
information on the standard and the process used in establishing the standard, see
[http://www.ansi.org/news_publications/news_story.aspx?menuid=7&articleid=729], visited
Aug. 5, 2004.
12 Ibid.
13 For background on the development of NFPA 1600 see National Fire Protection
Association, NFPA 1600 Standard on Disaster/Emergency Management and Business
C o n t i n u i t y P r o g r a m s 2 0 0 4 E d i t i o n , a v a i l a b l e a t
[http://www.nfpa.org/PDF/nfpa1600.pdf?src=nfpa], p.1600-1, visited Aug. 5, 2004.

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CRS-8
submitted to its technical committee for consideration and has recommended that a
“national implementation strategy” be developed that involves the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) and other agencies to support use of the standard.
In addition to the effort conducted thus far by ANSI-HSSP for the 9/11
Commission, ANSI has received a contract from DHS to conduct a large scale effort
to build a database of standards for “products, processes, systems, services and
training programs that relate to homeland security.”14
National Fire Protection Association. The National Fire Protection
Association (NFPA) is a voluntary professional association that, for over 100 years,
has developed standards related to fire prevention and firefighting.15 The NFPA 1600
standard recommended by ANSI that is the subject of the 9/11 Commission’s
endorsement is based upon work that has been conducted for over a decade. The
NFPA Technical Committee on Disaster Management developed NFPA 1600,
Standard on Disaster/Emergency Management and Business Continuity Programs
on the basis of work completed on the antecedent document, Recommended Practice
for Disaster Management, initially produced in 1995. The 2000 edition of NFPA
1600 expanded the “recommended practice” to a standard by incorporating
provisions related to emergency management and business continuity programs to
ease the consequences of a disaster. The 2004 edition retains the basic features of the
2000 standard.16
NFPA 1600 sets out criteria that enable administrators to evaluate existing
programs to improve disaster and emergency management and business continuity
programs. The standard includes five sub-categories — administration, a reserved
section, definitions, program management, and program elements. Table 2 of this
report presents summary information on the components of standards within these
sub-categories. The complete text of the standard should be referred to for further
information.
1 4 For more information on the standards database project see
[http://www.ansi.org/news_publications/news_story.aspx?menuid=7&articleid=718], visited
Aug. 5, 2004.
1 5 F o r b a c k g r o u n d a n d i n f o r m a t i o n o n N F P A s e e
[http://www.nfpa.org/catalog/home/AboutNFPA/NFPAOverview/NFPAOverview.asp,
visited] Aug. 5, 2004.
16 Information taken from “Origin and Development of NFPA 1600” in NFPA 1600
Standard on Disaster/Emergency management and Business Continuity Programs 2004
Edition, p. 1600-1.

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CRS-9
Table 2. Components of NFPA 1600 Standards and Selected
Explanatory Material
Component or element
Explanatory descriptions
1. Administration
1.1 – Scope of the standard
1.1 – Private and public entities have unique
establishes common criteria for
needs and capabilities; programs designed
disaster/emergency programs.
accordingly.
2. Reserved for Referenced
not applicable
Publications
3. Definitions
See NFPA for details.
See NFPA for details.
4. Program management:
4.1 – Documentation of goals,
4.1 – Policy should include mission statement,
objectives, plans, procedures.
enabling authority.
4.2 – Identification of program
4.2 – Position description for coordinator should
coordinator with authority.
be written.
4.3 – Establishment of advisory
4.3 – Characteristics and authority of advisory
committee.
committee members are identified.
4.4 – Establishment of
4.4 – Evaluation based on program management
performance objectives for
components and program elements and periodic
program evaluation.
review of objectives.
5. Program elements:
5.1 – Program should address all
5.1 – Management phases include mitigation,
phases of disaster management.
preparedness, response, and recovery.
5.2 – Compliance with legal
5.2 – Include periodic review of authorities and
authorities.
suggested revisions.
5.3 – Identification of hazards and
5.3 – Use suggested means for identifying
vulnerabilities.
hazards and conducting risk assessments.
5.4 – Development of hazard
5.4 – Components of such strategies are
mitigation strategy.
identified.
5.5 – Identification of means to
5.5 – The categories of resources are identified,
allocate resources.
along with organizations.
5.6 – Composition of mutual aid
5.6 – Identifies the types of such agreements and
agreements.
some characteristics and components.
5.7 – Development of plans and
5.7 – Attributes of plans and the processes to be
identification of elements.
followed are identified.
5.8 – Development of means to
5.8 – Incident management system that includes
control response and recovery
procedures to facilitate control of disaster area
operations.
should be developed.
5.9 – Establishment of warning
5.9 – Protocols should be tested and include
procedures.
interoperability testing.
5.10 – Development and
5.10 – Procedures are to be established to
implementation of operational
minimize property damage, assess damages, and
procedures.
provide for continuity of operations.
5.11 – Identification of logistical
5.11 – The capabilities of facilities and
resources and facilities to support
associated resources should meet expected
response efforts.
needs.

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CRS-10
Component or element
Explanatory descriptions
5. Program elements (cont.):
5.12 – Assessment of training
5.12 – Training and curriculum should comply
needs and development of
with applicable regulations and records
curriculum.
maintained.
5.13 – Evaluation of procedures
5.13 – Corrective actions should be taken to
and exercises.
address deficiencies.
5.14 – Development of procedures
5.14 – Public information capabilities should
to provide information.
identify communication modes.
5.15– Development of finance and
5.15 – Framework should allow for flexibility
administration procedures.
and means of expediting requests.
The entire NFPA 1600 document comprises 40 pages. However, a relatively
small portion of NFPA 1600 identifies standards; most of the document contains
references to organizations and related information sources, including other NFPA
standards for specific activities.17
Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA).18 The
Hazardous Waste Operations and Emergency Response standard (HAZWOPER) is
a federal regulation issued by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration
(OSHA) that specifies standards for employees responding to a hazardous materials
incident, including public safety personnel.19 Congress directed OSHA to develop
the regulation in 1986, after finding OSHA’s actions on hazardous material response
to a 1980 authorization deficient.20
The HAZWOPER regulation took effect in March 1990 and addresses several
elements of hazardous materials response. It identifies the types organizations and
operational activities that must comply with the standards, precautionary actions to
be taken when hazardous materials are removed from a site, training requirements,
elements of an emergency response plan (lines of authority, site security, and
evacuation), and medical evaluations of responders, among other matters.
Appendices to the regulation provide specifications on test methods for personal
17 For brief statements of required program components see Ibid, pp. 1600-4 through 1600-7.
Explanatory information on some, but not all components is presented in Annex A, pp.
1600-7 through 1600-12. The remainder of the document comprises lists of organizations
(pp. 1600-12 through 1600-25 and pp. 1600-26 through 1600-36) and references to
supporting documents (pp. 1600-25, 26 and pp. 1600-36 through 1600-38).
18 Summary of HAZWOPER standard primarily derived from: CRS Report RL31680,
Homeland Security: Standards for State and Local Preparedness, by Ben Canada.
19 29 CFR 1910.120. Implementation guides have been developed pursuant to the
HAZWOPER regulations. See, for example: David M. Einolf, HAZWOPER Incident
Command; A Manual for Emergency Responders (Rockville, MD: Government Institutes,
1998) and Incident Command (Alsip, IL: North Central Environmental and Industrial Safety
Training Center, 1995).
20 The 1986 directive is found in Title I of the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization
Act of 1986 (SARA, P.L. 99-499), 42 U.S.C. 9601-9675. The 1980 authorization is found
in Title I of the Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation Liability and
Recovery Act of 1980 (P.L. 96-510).

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CRS-11
equipment, types and levels of protective gear, compliance and training curriculum
guidelines, and reference sources. The regulation specifies the levels of knowledge,
skills, and abilities that emergency responders must possess at specified competency
levels.
A number of HAZWOPER provisions were based on NFPA standards for
hazardous materials response. The HAZWOPER standard has served as the basis of
some federal agencies’ response practices, including those of the Environmental
Protection Agency and the U.S. Coast Guard.
Use of Standards in Accreditation Processes. Two systems are in use
to assess the capabilities of agencies and the quality of emergency preparedness
programs. The Emergency Management Accreditation Program (EMAP) consists of
a tool that may be used to evaluate emergency management programs. The National
Emergency Management Baseline Capability Assurance Program (NEMB-CAP),
administered by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) within the
Department of Homeland Security, is used to assess the emergency response
capabilities of state and local governments and tribal organizations.
Emergency Management Accreditation Program. The Emergency
Management Accreditation Program (EMAP) is an incorporated, nonprofit
organization administered through the Council of State Governments and jointly
sponsored by national organizations concerned with the improvement of state and
local emergency management capabilities.21 The EMAP process enables state and
local emergency management agencies to conduct evaluations of their emergency
response capabilities. As summarized by EMAP administrators:
By offering consistent standards and a process through which emergency
management programs can demonstrate compliance, EMAP will strengthen
communities’ capabilities in responding to all types of hazards, from tornadoes
and earthquakes to school violence and bioterrorism. Accreditation is voluntary
and is not tied to any type of funding. Its intent is to encourage examination of
strengths and weaknesses, pursuit of corrective measures, and communication
and planning among different sectors of government and the community.22
The standards used in the EMAP process are derived from NFPA 1600 and “are
essentially the same as those listed in NFPA 1600—training based upon an
assessment of need, focus on building awareness and skills, identification of
frequency and scope of training, incident management training, and record
21 Organizations involved in the EMAP process include the National Emergency
Management Association (NEMA, comprised of state officials), the International
Association of Emergency Managers (IAEM, comprised of local officials), the Federal
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), and others. Staff support for EMAP is provided
by NEMA and funded primarily from FEMA. For details on EMAP see
[http://www.emaponline.org/What/Background/Description_Full.cfm], visited Aug. 5, 2004.
22 See [http://www.emaponline.org/What/Background/Description_Full.cfm], visited Aug.
5, 2004.

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CRS-12
keeping.”23 As part of the process, evaluators examine the components of a
jurisdiction’s emergency management program against the EMAP standard. As an
example of the type of information sought in EMAP evaluations, crisis
communications and public information components should include procedures for
communication with the public before and after a disaster, the support of joint
information centers, and protocols for communicating with the media, legislators,
and others.24
National Capability Assurance. The Federal Emergency Management
Agency (FEMA) of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security administers the
National Emergency Management Baseline Capability Assurance Program (NEMB-
CAP) “to establish a baseline measurement of the nation's emergency management
capabilities and to help the emergency management community at all levels to
improve its ability to prepare for and respond to emergencies and disasters of all
kinds.”25 NEMB-CAP uses the EMAP process and “associated assessment
processes” in evaluating the emergency management capabilities of state and local
governments and tribal organizations.
Issues and Options for Congressional Action
The findings and recommendations of the 9/11 Commission concerning
emergency preparedness standards include several facets that might be considered
appropriate for congressional action. These include the three presented in Table 1
of this report, as follows:
! adoption of the Incident Command System (ICS) nationwide and
encouragement of training in ICS procedures by conditioning federal
funding on such actions;
! congressional approval of legislation to remedy indemnification and
liability impediments to mutual aid agreements;
! promotion of the ANSI standards for private preparedness by the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS).
Nationwide Adoption of ICS. The 9/11 Commission report found that a
unified command structure on September 11, 2001, could have resolved some of the
23 Email communication of July 23, 2004, with William Waugh, Department of Public
Administration and Urban Studies, Georgia State University, 2004 member of the EMAP
commission.
24 See the deconstructed standards for component 3-13.1, “Crisis Communication, Public
Education, and Information,” presented in an Excel spreadsheet program at
[http://www.emaponline.org/EMAP/Registered/Awareness/EMAP%20Devolve_Revised
_1003.xls], visited Aug. 5, 2004.
25 See [http://www.fema.gov/preparedness/baseline.shtm], visited Aug. 5, 2004.

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CRS-13
problems encountered in New York City that day.26 The difficulty fire commanders
experienced communicating with their units, the lack of knowledge about the
availability of “self-dispatched” responders, the failure to integrate the work of 911
operators and fire dispatchers, and the lack of coordination with dispatched units at
the site of the attack are situations capable of being addressed through ICS and
associated training.27
The ICS framework was developed in the 1970s after a series of California
wildfires led some to observe recurring problems when more than one agency
responded to the fires. These problems included inconsistent terminology and plans,
inflexibility in responding to the shifting demands posed by a moving disaster, and
a dearth of adequate facilities. ICS is generally recognized to be an appropriate
framework to address these and other problems as the classification level of the
disaster may fluctuate, requirements of responders adjusted, functions added or
subtracted, and units assigned as needed.28 Five components comprise ICS:
command, planning, operations, logistics, and finance/administration.
For decades, many emergency management officials have debated, refined, and
adopted ICS. The reach and complexity of the attacks of September 11, 2001,
stimulated renewed interest in ICS, and related systems, even before 9/11
Commission examined the issue. The Homeland Security Act of 2002 mandated that
the Secretary of DHS build a “national incident management system” (NIMS) to
respond to disasters and attacks.29 Subsequently, President Bush issued a presidential
directive that required that the Secretary prepare a NIMS that must include, among
other features, “a core set of concepts, principles, terminology, and technologies
covering the incident command system.”30
During the course of its investigation the commission concluded that the
confusion and losses of September 11, 2001, indicated the need for widespread
adoption of a unified command system. The report also noted, however, that the
conditions of the tragedy in New York City differed in important respects from those
26 See The 9/11 Commission Report, p. 321
27 Refer to pages 8 and 9 of Commission Staff Statement #14 at [http://www.9-
11commission.gov/hearings/hearing11/staff_statement_14.pdf], visited Aug. 9, 2004.
28 Under HAZWOPER regulations, for example, the incident commander assesses the need
for resources under the following four levels: Level A, the highest degree of skin and
respiratory protection of responders; Level B, the highest level of respiratory protection and
a lower degree of skin protection; Level C, a lower level of respiratory protection but a
comparable level of skin protection; and Level D, the lowest level of protection required.
See Incident Command (Alsip, IL: North Central Environmental and Industrial Safety
Training Center, 1995), p. 4-6.
29 Sec. 502(5) of P.L. 107-296, 6 U.S.C. 312(5).
30 U.S. President (George W. Bush), “Management of Domestic Incidents,” Homeland
Security Presidential Directive-5, Sec. 15, Feb. 28, 2003, available at
[http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nspd/hspd-5.html], visited Aug. 12, 2004.

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CRS-14
that occurred at the Pentagon.31 Since the National Response Plan (NRP) and NIMS
will incorporate the ICS approach, it is likely that DHS and state and local
governments will become increasingly adept at using and participating in an ICS
controlled response.
While the level of awareness and acceptance of the ICS standard appears greater
than in years past, few appear to disagree with the conclusion of the 9/11
Commission that action should be taken to ensure that it is adopted throughout the
nation. In considering the recommendation, however, Congress might elect to review
several issues, including the following.
! The appropriate role of Congress, or an executive branch agency
such as DHS, in encouraging or mandating the method by which
state and local governments train and manage emergency response
operations. Most of the disasters that occur throughout the United
States are managed by local government officials, notably fire and
law enforcement units. Some might contend that the imposition of
the ICS system, as set out in the National Incident Management
System (NIMS), signals federal involvement in an arena traditionally
administered by state or local governments. Such individuals might
argue that such an approach could lead to practices and decisions
that may result in inefficiencies, more bureaucracy, or an erosion of
state authority guaranteed under the Tenth Amendment of the U.S.
Constitution.32 Others might argue that the national threat posed by
catastrophic terrorist attacks, or other disasters, requires a more
integrated response capability that can only be built with federal
involvement.33
! ICS might be a challenge for small jurisdictions with few resources
that can be allocated to prepare for a multi-agency response. Small
or lower-income communities would likely be overwhelmed by a
significant terrorist attack, and often find their resources stretched to
respond to lesser events. If such communities are required to adopt
ICS principles as a condition of receiving federal funds, some may
contend that they are ill-equipped to spend time and effort meeting
the federal requirement, particularly if federal funding terminates
and the community is faced with funding the enhanced capabilities
on its own. The caution developed by one source appears
applicable.
31 See The 9/11 Commission Report, p. 315.
32 For example, see William C. Nicholson, “The New (?) Federal Approach to
Emergencies,” Homeland Protection Professional, vol. 2, Aug. 2003, p. 8.
33 One summary of the application of ICS to the wildfires that burned thousands of acres
noted that both local and out-of-state firefighters were not familiar with ICS protocol and
procedures. See Sandra Sutphen, “California Wildfires: How Integrated Emergency
Management Succeeds and Fails,” in Richard T. Sylves and William L. Waugh, Jr., Disaster
Management in the U.S. and Canada (Springfield, IL.: Charles C. Thomas, Pub., 1996), p.
182.

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CRS-15
A caveat should be entered here: ICS approaches incident control
from the task, tactical, and strategic perspectives of the fire service
and appears to assume a large, well-organized, and probably urban
fire department. The system may not be appropriate for local
governments with small or mid-sized fire departments and may
require considerable refitting for nonfire emergency activities.
Regardless of the size of the community, the ICS application should
be flexible enough to allow for local differences in organization,
politics, and needs. ICS should therefore be reviewed for
applicability before it is adopted.34
! The ICS framework may help as well as hinder spontaneous and
creative responses by volunteers. Following the attacks in New
York City on September 11, 2001, thousands of volunteers arrived
at the site to provide any assistance possible. Many arrived without
skills or without a connection to one of the many voluntary
organizations that traditionally provide disaster assistance. The
surge of people to a disaster scene adds to the complexity of the
event and creates additional demands on professional responders.
Conversely, the positive effect volunteers have in helping victims as
well as responders is well documented. The positive and negative
impacts of ICS on spontaneous volunteer responses, both those
initiated on impulse and those associated with some training could
be investigated.35 In addition, formal volunteer efforts could be part
of that analysis. Community Emergency Response Teams (CERTs)
represent one method by which the efforts of volunteers can be
systematically brought into the response process.36
In light of these concerns and cautions, Congress may explore the following
options:
! fully endorse the recommendation of the 9/11 Commission regarding
the ICS system by enacting legislation that would require the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to condition homeland
security funding for all state and local governments on adoption of
and training associated with ICS procedures;
34 Thomas E. Drabek and Gerard J. Hoetmer, editors, Emergency Management: Principles
and Practice for Local Government, (Washington: International City Management
Association, 1991), p. 277.
35 For related research see James Kendra and Tricia Wachtendorf, “Creativity in Emergency
Response to the World Trade Center Disaster,” and Seana Lowe and Alice Fothergill, “A
Need to Help: Emergent Volunteer Behavior after September 11th,” both in: Beyond
September 11th: An Account of Post-Disaster Research, available at
[http://www.colorado.edu/hazards/sp/sp39/], visited Aug. 10, 2004.
36 For example, see Colin A. Campbell, “CERT’s Growth Spurt,” Homeland Protection
Professional, vol. 3, July 2004: pp. 30-38.

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CRS-16
! endorse the recommendation, in part, by enacting legislation that
would require DHS to condition homeland security funding for state
and local governments that adopt the ICS framework and attain
minimum accreditation status through EMAP or NEMB-CAP;
! consider the recommendation as guidance to be given to DHS in
evaluating the emergency response capabilities of state, local, and
tribal governments under NEMB-CAP;
! mandate that federal funds be conditioned upon adoption and
implementation of ICS, so long as applicants meet specified criteria
or indicators of need, such as population size, history of disasters
and a track record of management problems, or vulnerability to
terrorist attack;
! through its oversight mechanisms, monitor the application of ICS as
the new procedures set out in NIMS and the NRP are implemented;
! through legislation or report language, mandate that DHS evaluate
the advantages and disadvantages of nationwide adoption of ICS,
and report to Congress by a specified date; or,
! take no action and allow DHS, state emergency management
officials, and local officials to design the approach most appropriate
to the nation’s and local areas’ safety.
Federal Mutual Aid Legislation. The 9/11 Commission report includes the
finding that “a serious obstacle to multi-jurisdictional response has been the lack of
indemnification for mutual-aid responders in areas such as the National Capital
Region.”37 The report continues that federal and state emergency management
officials should develop “a regional focus” and promote mutual aid agreements, and
that federal legislation is needed to address “long-standing indemnification and
liability impediments” to mutual aid emergency response in the Washington, D.C.
area “and where applicable throughout the nation.”38
Relatively little support is offered by the commission for the recommendation
that Congress enact legislation to rectify indemnification and liability impediments.39
37 The 9/11 Commission Report, p. 397.
38 Ibid.
39 To the extent found, references in the report and the pertinent staff statement evoked
positive aspects of mutual aid at the Pentagon. For example, Staff Statement #14 noted that
“Local, regional, state and federal agencies immediately responded to the Pentagon attack
.... Regional mutual aid, as in Northern Virginia, could become a formal joint response plan
with neighboring jurisdictions working together ....” See pp. 5,6. By comparison, the report
noted that a lack of coordination hampered the response in New York City. However no
references could be found in the report or staff statements indicating that indemnification
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CRS-17
Some may contend that this statement is given a lower status than the formal
recommendations as it is presented as a statement in a paragraph, not a bolded
recommendation.40 To assist Congress in more fully evaluating the 9/11 Commission
report, this statement is examined as a commission recommendation here.
Emergency management mutual aid agreements have been negotiated and
approved by the states for years.41 Of greatest significance, the Emergency
Management Assistance Compact (EMAC), approved by Congress in 1996, is the
primary mutual aid agreement that facilitates the provision of emergency response
aid among signatory states.42
EMAC establishes a framework under which standard procedures and
operational policies are agreed upon by the states to facilitate the provision of mutual
aid when emergencies occur. Article VI of EMAC includes a provision which
ensures that when officers or employees of one state render aid in another in
emergency situations, they are treated as agents of the requesting state for tort and
immunity purposes. The text of the article follows.
Officers or employees of a party state rendering aid in another state pursuant to
this compact shall be considered agents of the requesting state for tort liability
and immunity purposes. No party state or its officers or employees rendering aid
in another state pursuant to this compact shall be liable on account of any act or
omission in good faith on the part of such forces while so engaged or on account
of the maintenance or use of any equipment or supplies in connection therewith.
Good faith in this article shall not include willful misconduct, gross negligence,
or recklessness.43
EMAC does not provide for indemnification of officers or employees held liable for
acts or omissions not accomplished in good faith.44
39 (...continued)
and liability impediments obstructed the response in New York City. It is appropriate to
note, however, that New York and five other states were not EMAC participants until after
September 11, 2001. It is possible that the commission staff found that the absence of the
liability protection offered through EMAC impeded response efforts from other states, but
failed to include that finding in the report.
40 This statement is considered a recommendation in this CRS report as the 9/11 commission
report uses the phrase “Congress should ....”
41 For a summary of state emergency management mutual aid agreements see CRS Report
RL32287 Emergency Management and Homeland Security Statutory Authorities in the
States, District of Columbia, and Insular Areas: A Summary, by Keith Bea, L. Cheryl
Runyon and Kae M. Warnock. For citations to emergency management mutual aid
agreements adopted by each state see the “Mutual Aid” section of each state profile listed
in Table 1 of report RL32287.
42 For information on EMAC see CRS Report RS21227 The Emergency Management
Assistance Compact (EMAC): An Overview, by Keith Bea.
43 P.L. 104-321, 110 Stat. 3880.
44 Liability protection statutes ensure that individuals or organizations that take certain
(continued...)

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CRS-18
Through EMAC or specific provisions enacted into law, many states have
adopted mutual aid compacts that address liability concerns. For example,
Washington, D.C., Virginia, and Maryland, the sovereign entities within the National
Capital Region, have incorporated EMAC into their statutory codes, in addition to
other mutual aid provisions.45 Given the liability protection that EMAC provides to
signatory states, including those in the National Capital Region, Congress might
consider the following options:
! act upon the recommendation and enact federal legislation that
specifically protects emergency responders from liability concerns
and provides indemnification;
! assess the need to identify a limited scope of the legislation, i.e.,
whether the legislation should reach beyond the provisions of Article
VI of EMAC, should solely address the issue of indemnification or
extend other protections, or exceed the recommendation of the 9/11
Commission by authorizing, for example, the use of disaster relief
funds to reimburse states and municipalities for costs associated with
providing mutual aid;46
! assess the impact of such legislation on EMAC-based agreements
among the states, and the consequences of increased federal action
in an area that has historically been addressed among the states; or,
! evaluate the areas in which existing mutual aid agreements,
including EMAC, have proven deficient and could benefit from
federal action.
ANSI Standards for Private Sector Emergency Preparedness. The
9/11 Commission report endorsed the emergency management standards
recommended by ANSI; those standards are based upon NFPA 1600. According to
the commission, the adoption of such standards is essential, since the private sector
owns and manages the majority of the critical infrastructure in the United States.
Private civilians at their places of employment may be the first responders to the
44 (...continued)
action cannot be sued. Indemnification statutes, by comparison, provide for government
reimbursement of individuals and organizations for payments for which they are held liable.
45 See D.C. Code Ann. §7-2332, §7-2206; Virginia Code §44-146.28:1, §44-146.14(b);
Maryland Criminal Procedure Code §2-105(e).
46 Congress appropriates disaster relief funds to DHS to pay for the costs associated with the
Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, 42 U.S.C. 5121 et seq.
For background see CRS Report RL32242, Emergency Management Funding for the
Department of Homeland Security: Information and Issues for FY2005, by Keith Bea,
Shawn Reese, Wayne Morrissey, Frank Gottron, and C. Stephen Redhead.

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CRS-19
scene of an attack, and should be assured that adequate preparedness measures have
been taken47
ANSI has traditionally operated on the basis that the standards adopted by the
organization are voluntary. If the recommendation is adopted, consumers and
government officials recognize that a company or product in compliance with ANSI
standards meets specified levels of quality and safety.
According to a staff statement issued by the 9/11 Commission, many witnesses
at a hearing held in November, 2003, testified that “the private sector remains largely
unprepared for a terrorist attack,” and “the lack of a widely embraced private sector
preparedness standards was a principal contributing factor to this lack of
preparedness.”48 The 9/11 Commission concluded that private preparedness plans
should consist of three components — evacuation plans, communications
capabilities, and continuity of operations plans.
The Commission report does not include a recommendation for Congress on this
issue; instead, the report urges DHS to promote adoption of the standard and
encourages private sector action through insurance and credit-rating actions.
Members of the Commission may have concluded that congressional action might
not be appropriate because legislation might involve a discussion of whether the
Unfunded Mandates Reform Act (UMRA) provisions would be at issue.49 UMRA
established mechanisms to limit federal imposition of unfunded mandates on other
levels of government (called “intergovernmental mandates”) and on the private
sector. The statute allows points of order to be raised against proposed legislation
that impose mandates that cost the private sector $117 million or more if the
legislation does not include new budget authority, or meet other conditions.50
Among the options that might be considered by Congress in this area are the
following:
! require that, in order for private companies that wish to do business
with the federal government be certified as a “responsible source”
under the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR), they must adopt
the ANSI standards;51
47 The 9/11 Commission Report, p. 398.
48 See 9/11 Commission Staff Statement #14, Crisis Management, p. 3, available at
[http://www.9-11commission.gov/hearings/hearing11/staff_statement_14.pdf], visited Aug.
12, 2004.
49 P.L. 104-4, 2 U.S.C. 658(5), (7).
50 For background on UMRA see CRS Report RS20058, Unfunded Mandates Reform Act
Summarized, by Keith Bea and Richard S. Beth.
51 Under FAR, such companies must meet certain compliance requirements. For example,
pursuant to the Drug-Free Workplace Act of 1988 (P.L. 100-690), companies must agree to
provide a drug-free workplace to employees. Congress could enact legislation that similarly
required that companies meet the ANSI emergency preparedness standard. For the FAR
(continued...)

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CRS-20
! enact legislation which authorizes funds that would extend existing
accreditation processes, either or both EMAP and NEMB-CAP, to
the private sector, bringing to the companies the resources necessary
to fully assess their emergency preparedness capabilities;
! approve incentives for the private sector to adopt the ANSI
standards, perhaps through the use of business tax write-offs or
conditioning the receipt of federal assistance such as Small Business
Administration loans; or
! take no action.
Additional Issue Areas and Options
The 9/11 Commission focused on broad policy areas, notably the intelligence
failures related to the attacks. The emergency management issues considered by the
commission were limited to those observed during the immediate response to the
attacks. While the work of the commission has raised awareness of emergency
response issues, it arguably has identified only the tip of the iceberg of a vast area of
public policy. The devastation of September 11 made evident a number of issues,
deficiencies, and problems that might be explored by Congress. These include the
following.
! Authorities and triggers for federal action. Both the attack on the
Pentagon and in New York City resulted in explosions. The Stafford
Act authorizes the President to issue a major disaster declaration,
and therefore dedicate the full range of federal resources, in the
event of fires or explosions “regardless of cause.”52 Some terrorist
attacks, however, may involve the dispersal of chemical weapons,
prolonged small arms fire in different locations, cyber-attacks, or
other causal agents that are not covered by existing law. To a certain
extent, the President may use the authority under the National
Emergencies Act to expedite federal assistance and coordinate
response. At issue may be the adequacy of existing emergency
response authorities and triggers and whether there is a need to
establish legislative standards for presidential or other executive
actions.53
! Emergency responder and civilian health. Some have contended
that the air was so full of pollutants in downtown Manhattan on
51 (...continued)
r e g u l a t i o n s e e S u b p a r t 2 3 . 5 , “ D r u g - F r e e W o r k p l a c e , ” a t
[http://www.arnet.gov/far/current/pdf/FAR.book.pdf], visited Aug. 5, 2004.
52 42 U.S.C. 5122(2).
53 For background on the National Emergencies Act see CRS Report RS21017, Terrorist
Attacks and National Emergencies Declarations, by Harold C. Relyea.

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CRS-21
September 11, 201, that it could have been declared a site for federal
assistance under major environmental laws. The adequacy of
existing laws, and the need for standards for measuring threats to
responders and civilians might be considered by Congress.54
! Emergent or spontaneous actions. Disaster research indicates that
the behavior of responders and civilians at the scene of a catastrophe
does not resemble the horrified mass of people running away and
trampling each other (as often represented in movies) but concerned
and committed individuals willing to sacrifice to help others. The
effect of federal policy on informal emergency response activities
might be examined. As summarized by one team of researchers,
“Creative action as exhibited by emergency response personnel and
groups after the attacks yielded not only positive results but also
conflicts and challenges, not unlike those documented in prior
studies of the convergence phenomenon after disasters, in which
volunteers, opportunists, and others converge on the scene, adding
an element of uncontrollability that can complicate emergency
operations, safety, and security.”55
Conclusion
The report by the 9/11 Commission has stimulated discussion throughout the
nation on a range of issues, primarily concerned with intelligence reform, associated
with the attacks of 2001. Recommendations in the section “Protect Against and
Prepare for Terrorist Attacks” concern the capabilities of the public and private
sectors to adequately prepare for and respond to further attacks. Those pertinent to
the adoption or use of emergency management standards have been discussed in this
report.
The Commission’s recommendations on the use of such standards will likely
generate congressional deliberation. While most observers believe some of the
recommendations have merit and may lead to improved protection and response
capabilities, it may also be argued that adoption of the recommendations may impact
long-standing practices, including constitutional protections for the states. For
example, the existing intergovernmental partnership involved in emergency
management requires the full participation of state, local and tribal governments.
Therefore, in acting on the recommendations, it is likely that Congress will debate
and consider the ramifications on that partnership. It is possible that the federal role
in emergency management could grow in certain areas, presaging more active federal
involvement and control. It is also possible that Congress may take action that
54 See sections on public health studies and environmental hazard assessment in: CRS
Report RL31464 Federal Disaster Policies After Terrorists Strike: Issues and Options for
Congress, coordinated by Keith Bea.
55 Natural Hazards Research and Applications Information Center, Public Entity Risk
Institute, and Institute for Civil Infrastructure Systems, Beyond September 11th: An Account
of Post-Disaster Research (Boulder, CO: University of Colorado, 2003), p. 6, available at
[http://www.colorado.edu/hazards/sp/sp39/], visited Aug. 9, 2004.

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stimulates and maintains non-federal resources and capabilities by encouraging DHS
and the states to evaluate the current use of standards. On the other hand, Congress
might take no action on some or all of the recommendations, allowing the private
sector and the state and local governments to develop mechanisms for improving
emergency response capabilities.

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