Order Code RS21230
Updated August 5, 2004
CRS Report for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
Homeland Security: Navy Operations —
Background and Issues for Congress
Ronald O’Rourke
Specialist in National Defense
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Summary
Potential Navy homeland security roles include defending the United States against
ballistic or cruise missile attack, defending U.S. naval bases and naval computer
networks against attack, searching for terrorists at sea, and assisting civil authorities in
responding to terrorist attacks. The Navy’s role in homeland security raises several
potential issues for Congress. This report will be updated as events warrant.
Background
Navy and Coast Guard in Maritime Homeland Security. Navy and Coast
Guard officials agree that the Coast Guard should be the lead federal agency for maritime
homeland security operations because it is better suited in terms of equipment, training,
and linkages to civilian federal law-enforcement agencies, and because of its dual status
as both an armed service and a law enforcement agency. Navy and Coast Guard officials
agree that the Navy’s role should be to support the Coast Guard, particularly in areas, like
air defense, where the Coast Guard has little or no capability. Navy officials believe that
the Navy, while contributing to maritime homeland security operations, should remain
primarily focused on deploying naval forces overseas to provide a forward defense against
threats to the United States.1
Navy Concept for Homeland Security Operations. Navy officials view
homeland security as comprising homeland defense activities and civil support operations
(also called military assistance to civil authorities, or MACA). The Navy’s homeland
security approach includes three elements:
! forward-deployed naval forces, which Navy officials believe play critical
roles in deterring, detecting, and defending against threats to homeland
security before they can come close to the United States;
1 For more on Coast Guard homeland security operations, see CRS Report RS21125, Homeland
Security: Coast Guard Operations — Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O’Rourke.
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

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! naval forces operating in support of the Coast Guard and the North
American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) to provide
capabilities for defending against sea and air threats in the vicinity of the
continental United States; and
! naval forces providing support to civil authorities to respond to domestic
crises, particularly in populated coastal areas.
Navy and Department of Defense officials in 2003 and 2004 have spoken about
creating a maritime analog to the North American Air Defense Command (NORAD) to
help support maritime homeland security awareness and operations.2
In its report (H.Rept. 108-106 of May 16, 2003) on the FY2004 defense
authorization bill (H.R. 1588), the House Armed Services Committee encouraged closer
consultation between the Commandant of the Coast Guard and the DoD Joint Chiefs of
Staff “on issues relating to the defense of our nation, both overseas and at home.” (Page
346).
Potential Homeland Security Threats Relating to the Navy. Potential
homeland security threats that could relate to the Navy include attacks on the U.S.
homeland by ballistic missiles or cruise missiles, particularly those that are launched from
or fly over the seas, and so-called “asymmetric” attacks by terrorists or other parties on
U.S. naval bases and installations and on ports and coastal areas using aircraft, truck or
car bombs, mortars, suicide belt bombs, boat bombs, large commercial cargo ships,
swimmers, limpet mines, and sea mines. These attacks could employ either conventional
high explosives or nuclear, radiological, chemical, or biological weapons. “Cyberwar”
attacks on naval computer networks are an additional homeland security threat of interest.
Ballistic Missiles. The Administration’s vision for missile defense includes the
use of Navy systems (i.e., ship-based radars and interceptor missiles) as part of its overall
architecture for defending the United States against ballistic missile attacks.3
Cruise Missiles. In the event of a cruise missile threat to the United States, a
potential Navy role would be to intercept surface ships, submarines, and aircraft flying
over the seas that are armed with land-attack cruise missiles before they come within
launch range of the United States, and shoot down cruise missiles flying over the seas
toward the United States. Navy systems for shooting down enemy anti-ship cruise
missiles could be adapted and incorporated into a potential land-based system for shooting
down land-attack cruise missiles (or aircraft) flying toward the United States. Some
2 See, for example, Christopher J Castelli, “DOD Develops Homeland Defense Strategy,
Advocates ‘Maritime NORAD,’” Inside the Navy, August 2, 2004: 1; Robert A. Hamilton,
“Navy’s Top Officer Calls For A Global Naval Force,” New London (CT) Day, Oct. 28, 2003;
Gidget Fuentes, “Maritime NORAD Command Urged,” Defense News, Feb. 9, 2004: 16. See
also, Malina Brown, “DoD Must Extend U.S. Maritime Perimeter To Better Deter Attack,” Inside
the Navy, Oct. 27, 2003; Malina Brown, “ Navy, Coast Guard Leaders Call For A Global
Maritime Partnership,” Inside the Navy, Nov. 3, 2003.
3 For more, see CRS Report RL31111, Missile Defense: The Current Debate, coordinated by
Steven A. Hildreth.

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observers have called for strengthening U.S. capabilities for defending the homeland
against air and cruise missile attacks.
Asymmetric Attacks on Naval Bases, Cities, and Ports. A primary Navy
homeland security role is to defend the Navy’s domestic installations against asymmetric
attacks. An additional role is to support the Coast Guard and NORAD in defending U.S.
cities and ports against such attacks.
Cyberwar Attacks on Naval Computer Networks. Navy officials state that
they are incorporating strong defenses against cyberwar attacks into both new naval
computer networks and existing “legacy” naval computer systems.
Recent and Current Navy Homeland Security Operations.
Immediate response to September 11 Attacks. In response to the terrorist
attacks of September 11, 2001, the Navy placed its installations on the highest state of
alert and deployed numerous ships to the waters off the East and West coasts of the
United States. On the East Coast, the aircraft carriers John F. Kennedy and George
Washington, along with several cruisers and destroyers equipped with the Aegis air
defense system, were deployed to the New York area to help protect the city against
potential follow-on airborne attacks. The 1,000-bed naval hospital ship Comfort was also
sent to New York, where it supported the disaster-response effort in lower Manhattan for
more than two weeks. Additional Aegis-equipped ships were deployed to help protect
Washington, DC against potential attacks. On the West Coast, several Aegis-equipped
cruisers and destroyers, along with additional non-Aegis destroyers and frigates and
support ships, were deployed to protect cities and ports against potential air and surface
attacks. Additional ships patrolled the waters off Hawaii.
Assistance to Coast Guard in U.S. Coastal Patrols. In November 2001, the
Navy assigned 6 of its 13 Cyclone-class patrol craft, which previously had been used
primarily for drug-interdiction or special warfare operations, to coastal patrol and escort
operations. In January 2002, the Navy expanded the operation to include all 13 Cyclone-
class craft. The 170-foot craft are crewed by 28 Navy personnel but embark a detachment
of up to 8 Coast Guard law enforcement officers. The operations of these craft release
Coast Guard cutters and patrol craft for other operations. In preliminary deliberations on
its proposed FY2004 budget, the Navy reportedly had considered decommissioning the
13 craft because their operations supported “a Homeland Defense Mission rather than a
core Navy mission.” The Navy, however, decided against this option in its final
deliberations on the FY2004 budget.4 Under a lease transfer agreement, the Coast Guard
will acquire 5 of the craft; the transfer is to be completed by October 1, 2004.5 The Navy
has also assigned 300 additional personnel to the National Maritime Intelligence Center
(NMIC), at Suitland, MD, which acts as a focal point for information on potential
maritime security threats.
4 Malina Brown, “Navy Decides Against Decommissioning 13 Cyclone Patrol Craft,” Inside the
Navy, Feb. 10, 2003; Christopher J. Castelli, “Coast Guard: Ships Needed For Homeland
Defense May Not Be Funded,” Inside the Navy, Oct. 14, 2002.
5 Stacey Byington, “Pascagoula To Be New Homeport For Former Navy PCs,” Navy NewsStand
(www.news.navy.mil), June 18, 2004.

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Searching for Terrorists at Sea. A dozen or more commercial cargo ships
reportedly are owned or managed by people with ties to Al Qaeda.6 In addition, Al Qaeda
terrorists are believed to have used commercial cargo containers loaded on other ships to
smuggle themselves over long distances. Since late November 2001, forward-deployed
U.S. Navy ships and aircraft, along with naval forces from about a dozen other countries,
have been patrolling sea areas such as the Northern Arabian Sea, the Persian Gulf, and the
Mediterranean Sea in search of shipments of Al Qaeda weapons and supplies, goods
intended to finance Al Qaeda operations, and Al Qaeda members attempting to flee
Afghanistan by sea via Pakistan and Iran. Merchant ships and fishing vessels in these
areas are frequently queried, and sometimes stopped and searched.
In April and May 2004, U.S. Pacific Command mentioned the idea of forming a
regional maritime security iInitiative to guard against maritime terrorist incidents in the
vital shipping lanes of Southeast Asia, such as the Strait of Malacca.7 Some governments
in the region reportedly balked at the idea of U.S. assistance in defending the area against
maritime terrorism threats.8 In June 2004, DOD said its proposal had been misreported,
but continued to press for increased security measures in the area.9 In July 2004,
Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore initiated joint naval patrols of the Strait of Malacca.10
Security at U.S. Navy Bases and Facilities. Following the October 2000 Al
Qaeda terrorist boat-bomb attack on the Navy destroyer Cole in the harbor of Aden,
Yemen, the U.S. Navy began taking actions to improve security around U.S. Navy ships
in foreign harbors and at Navy installations in the United States.11 Actions taken include
increased perimeter security on land at Navy installations and the establishment of
security zones in the waters around naval bases that are patrolled by Navy and Coast
Guard patrol boats. The Navy has also reduced the amount of advance information it
provides about arrivals and departures of Navy ships to and from U.S. ports, and about
the current locations of Navy ships overseas.
6 See, for example, John Mintz, “15 Freighters Believed To Be Linked To Al Qaeda,”
Washington Post, Dec. 31, 2002: A1.
7 See, for example, Richard Halloran, “Navy Launches Vast Maritime Security Plan,”
Washington Times, May 10, 2004: 15.
8 John Burton and Shawn Donnan, “US Plan To Guard Strait Of Malacca Not Welcome,” London
Financial Times, Apr. 6, 2004; Ellen Nakashima and Alan Sipress, “Singapore Goes It Alone In
Maritime Security Drill,” Washington Post, June 2, 2004: 12; “Muslim Nations Reject US Help
To Police Vital Oil Route,” Wall Street Journal, June 3, 2004.
9 “Rumsfeld: Asia Maritime Security Plan ‘Misreported,’” New York Times on the Web, June 3,
2004; Greg Jaffe, “Rumsfeld To Push For Security Of Key Strait In Asia,” Wall Street Journal,
June 4, 2004: 4; “Malaysia, U.S. To Discuss Port Security,” New York Times on the Web, June
6, 2004; “Seaborne Terrorism Is A Serious Threat: Fargo,” Taipei Times, June 24, 2004: 5.
10 Victor Mallet, “Tripartite Action To Beat Malacca Piracy,” Financial Times, June 30, 2004;
“Anti-Piract Drive In Malacca,” BBC News, July 20, 2004; Sebastian Berger, “Waterway
Patrolled In Hunt For Terrorists,” (UK) Daily Telegraph, July 21, 2004; Leo Lewis, “Navies Join
Forces For War On Pirates,” London Times, July 21, 2004.
11 For a review of the attack on the Cole, see CRS Report RS20721, Terrorist Attack on USS
Cole: Background and Issues for Congress, by Raphael Perl and Ronald O’Rourke.

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Although this report focuses on the Navy, it can also be noted that the Marine Corps
restructured its 4th Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) into an antiterrorist organization
that can, among other things, assist in port-security operations. The 4th MEB
(Antiterrorist) combines the resources of existing units — the Marine Corps Security
Force Battalion, the Marine Security Guard Battalion, and the Marine Corps Chemical
and Biological Incident Response Force (CBIRF) — with a newly created Marine
Antiterrorism Battalion. In April 2002, the 4th MEB (Antiterrorism) conducted a joint
port-security exercise with the Coast Guard.
Issues for Congress
The Navy’s current and potential contributions to homeland security operations
raises several potential issues for Congress, including the following:
Definition of Navy Role. Is the Navy’s role in homeland security sufficiently
defined, particularly in terms of how the Navy should contribute to homeland security
through forward (i.e., overseas) operations vs. operations close to the United States?
Changes in Law, Regulations, and Other Areas. What changes in law or
regulations, or in Navy policies and procedures, doctrine, organization, training,
equipment, and command and control arrangements, will be needed to facilitate the
Navy’s emerging role in homeland security?
Coordination With and Support For Coast Guard. What steps have the
Navy and Coast Guard taken, or are planning to take, to improve coordination in maritime
homeland security operations? Have the two services reached agreement on command
relationships, doctrine, and tactics for maritime homeland security operations, particularly
for instances involving ships approaching the United States that may pose a threat,
possibly involving weapons of mass destruction, that Coast Guard forces might not be
sufficient to counter? Are the two services conducting sufficient joint training in
maritime homeland security operations? Is the Navy’s idea for creating a maritime analog
to NORAD compatible with the Coast Guard’s concept for creating improved maritime
domain awareness (MDA)? To what degree, if any, are the two concepts contradictory
or redundant? Are Navy and Coast Guard systems sufficiently interoperable to reach
desired levels of coordination? Is the Navy providing the right numbers and kinds of
ships to assist the Coast Guard in performing maritime homeland security operations?
Is the Navy providing adequate funding for the enhancement of Coast Guard national
defense mission equipment?12
Coordination with Other Agencies. Other agencies with which the Navy might
have to achieve closer coordination for homeland security include NORAD, Northern
Command (NORTHCOM), the Department of Homeland Security (or DHS, which
includes, among other entities, the Federal Emergency Management Agency, or FEMA),
12 For more on various aspects of Navy-Coast Guard coordination, see Malina Brown, “Navy,
Coast Guard Redefining Relationship In Post-Sept. 11 World,” Inside the Navy, Mar. 8, 2004;
Chris Strohm, “Military Explores Greater Role In Maritime Security,” GovExec.com, Mar. 3,
2004; Malina Brown, “Navy, Coast Guard Need Work On Providing Backup Forces In A Crisis,”
Inside the Navy, Nov. 17, 2003.

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and the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). Potential questions here are analogous
to those listed above for coordination with the Coast Guard.
Intelligence Coordination. What steps has the Navy taken to improve its ability
to receive intelligence from, and provide intelligence to, other agencies involved in
homeland security operations? Are there any organizational issues that need to be
resolved to achieve desired levels of sharing? Is the Navy budgeting adequately for
improving Navy capabilities in this area?
Ballistic and Cruise Missile Defense. Does DoD’s program for developing
systems to protect the United States against ballistic missiles place too little, too much,
or about the right amount of emphasis on sea-based systems? What is the potential for
incorporating Navy anti-ship cruise missile defense technology into a system for
defending the United States against land-attack cruise missiles?
Security at U.S. Navy Installations. Has the Navy taken adequate steps to
improve security at naval installations in the United States? Is the Navy conducting
sufficient testing of these measures? Have lessons learned from the attack on the Cole
been adequately incorporated into policies and procedures for protecting Navy
installations? What new technologies or systems are under development that may
improve future Navy capabilities for protecting its installations? Is the Navy budgeting
adequately for improving installation security?
Cyberwar Attacks on Naval Computers. Potential questions here are
analogous to those listed above for security at U.S. Navy installations.
Impact on Navy Forward Deployments. Navy officials have acknowledged
that using Navy ships for homeland security operations close to the United States could
affect training and maintenance schedules for ships preparing to deploy overseas. To
what degree will operations close to the United States affect the Navy’s ability to maintain
forward-deployed naval forces overseas? What steps is the Navy taking to accommodate
operations close to the United States while also maintaining overseas deployments?
Impact on Navy End-Strength Requirements. The Navy is expanding and
upgrading its Master-at-Arms force, which helps to guard Navy ships and shore
installations from terrorist attacks. The force is to be expanded from about 1,700
personnel to about 9,000 over the next few years. Is this expansion too small, too large,
or about right? How will these and potential other additions of Navy personnel for
homeland security operations be managed within the Navy’s end-strength limits (i.e., the
limits on the number of active-duty and reserve personnel the Navy is allowed to have at
the end of the fiscal year)?13 What reductions in other Navy personnel does the Navy plan
to make to absorb the increased need for personnel for homeland security operations?
Role of Navy Reserves. What are the Navy’s plans for integrating naval reserve
personnel into the Navy’s homeland security efforts, and are these plans correct?
13 For FY2003, the Navy’s end-strength limits are 373,800 active-duty and 85,900 reserve
personnel. The Navy is proposing to reduce its active-duty end strength to 357,400 by FY2009.

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