Order Code RL32264
CRS Report for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
The Budget for Fiscal Year 2005
Updated May 28, 2004
Philip D. Winters
Analyst in Government Finance
Government and Finance Division
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

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The Budget for Fiscal Year 2005
Summary
For fiscal year 2005, the President’s budget request reduces defense spending
from FY2004, increases domestic discretionary spending, most of which goes to
homeland security, leaving the rest to low or no growth, and proposes extending and
making permanent many of the tax cuts adopted in 2001 and 2003. The deficit would
drop from an estimated $521 billion in FY2004 to $364 billion in FY2005. The
Administration’s request shows the deficit falling to $237 billion in FY2009, the last
year in the budget.
The budget proposals did not include estimates of the cost of the war on terror
or reconstruction of Afghanistan and Iraq beyond FY2004 (September 30, 2004), did
not provide estimates of the effect on the deficit or surplus of extending the tax cuts
past FY2009 (which is when most of the effects would occur), and did not provide
a proposal for alternative minimum tax (AMT) relief for the increasingly affected
middle-class taxpayers, beyond the current expiration at the end of FY2005. These
latter omissions, if addressed and accommodated in the future, would increase the
deficit above the estimates in the budget.
The Congressional Budget Office’s (CBO) January 2004 budget report for
FY2005 (the Budget and Economic Outlook: Fiscal Years 2005-2014) estimated the
FY2005 baseline deficit at $362 billion, similar to that proposed by the
Administration. Selected alternative policies included in the CBO report, estimates
for the cost of extending the tax cuts, reforming the AMT, and letting discretionary
spending grow at the rate of gross domestic product (GDP) growth, would increase
the deficit, particularly in the years beyond FY2009.
CBO’s estimates of the Administration’s proposals using CBO’s underlying
assumptions and budget estimating methods, produced a deficit of $358 billion in
FY2005, falling to $258 billion in FY2009. These estimates showed the deficit
climbing slightly after FY2010, moving to $284 billion in FY2014. CBO saw little
chance that the Administration’s proposals should produce a surplus.
The Senate Budget Committee reported its five-year budget resolution
(S.Con.Res. 95) on March 5, 2004. The Senate approved, after restoring or
increasing some funding and including a pay-go restriction, the FY2005 budget
resolution on March 12. On March 17, the House Budget Committee, after a delay
of almost a week, approved its version of the FY2005 budget resolution (H.Con.Res.
393). After rejecting several alternatives, the House cleared the resolution on March
25. The budget resolution conference committee, after one and a half months,
produced a one-year resolution on May 19, containing pay-go constraints through
May 15, 2005. The House passed the resolution (S.Con.Res. 95) on May 20. The
Senate leadership, unsure of passage in the Senate, delayed consideration until early
June.
This report will be updated as events warrant.

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Contents
Background and Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
The Current Situation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Budget Totals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Budget Estimates and Proposals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Uncertainty in Budget Projections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Budget Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Outlays . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Receipts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Deficits and Surpluses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
CBO’s Alternative Policies Not Included in the Baseline . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
The Longer Run . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
The Budget and the Economy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
For Additional Reading . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
CRS Products . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
List of Figures
Figure 1. Uncertainty of CBO’s Projections of the Deficit or Surplus
Under Current Policies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Figure 2. Outlays, FY2003-FY2014 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Figure 3. Receipts, FY2003-FY2014 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Figure 4. Deficit, FY2003-FY2014 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Figure 5. Alternative Deficit Paths, FY2003-FY2014 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
List of Tables
Table 1. Budget Estimates for FY2005 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Table 2. Outlays for FY2004-FY2009 and FY2014 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Table 3. Receipts for FY2003-FY2009 and FY2014 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Table 4. Surpluses/Deficits(-) for FY2005-FY2009 and FY2014 . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Table 5. The Cumulative Budgetary Effects of Policy Alternatives
Not Included in CBO’s Baseline . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

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The Budget for Fiscal Year 2005
Background and Analysis
Presidents generally submit their budget proposals for the upcoming fiscal year
(FY) early in each calendar year. The Bush Administration released its FY2005
budget (The Fiscal Year 2005 Budget of the U.S. Government) on February 2, 2004.
The multiple volumes contained general and specific descriptions of the
Administration’s policy proposals and expectations for the budget for FY2005 and
for the years through FY2009, with limited information on the revenue and
mandatory spending changes through FY2014, and a section on long-term fiscal
issues facing the nation. The full set of budget documents (Budget, Appendix,
Analytical Perspectives, Historical Tables, among several others) contains extensive
and detailed budget information, including estimates of the budget without the
proposed policy changes (current service baseline estimates), historical budget data,
detailed budget authority, outlay and receipt data, selected analysis of specific budget
related topics, and the Administration’s economic forecast. In addition to its
presentation of the Administration’s proposals, the budget documents are an annual
basic reference source for federal budget information, including enacted
appropriations.
The Administration’s annual budget submission is followed by congressional
action on the budget. This usually includes the annual budget resolution,
appropriations, and, possibly, a reconciliation bill (or bills) as required by the budget
resolution. During the months of deliberation on budget legislation, the
Administration often revises its original proposals because of interactions with
Congress and changing circumstances in the economy and the world.
The Current Situation
The conference committee on the FY2005 budget resolution (S.Con.Res. 95)
reported its agreement H.Rept. 108-498 on May 19, one and a half months after its
deliberations began on March 31. The House adopted the resolution the same day.
The Senate leadership, unsure of its ability to have the conference agreement pass the
Senate, delayed consideration until early June. (Press reports indicate that the
resolution may not be brought up in the Senate. Not passing the budget resolution
would change the procedures that Congress can use to pass the legislation needed
to implement a budget for FY2005.)
The House Rules Committee’s resolution (H.Res. 649) providing for
consideration of the conference agreement on the budget resolution included
language placing the budget resolution in effect in the House once the House
approved the conference report.

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CRS-2
The House Appropriations Committee is expected shortly to begin its work on
the 13 regular appropriations for the upcoming fiscal year.
Budget Totals
Table 1 contains budget estimates for FY2005 from the Congressional Budget
Office (CBO), the Administration (the Office of Management and Budget, OMB),
and as they become available, revisions produced by OMB and CBO during the year,
and data from congressional budget deliberations. Differences in totals occur
because of differing underlying economic, technical, and budget-estimating
assumptions and techniques as well as differences in policy assumptions. Most often,
policy-generated dollar differences between various Administration and
congressional proposals and underlying assumptions for an upcoming fiscal year are
often relatively small compared to the budget as a whole. These small differences
may grow over time, sometimes substantially, producing widely divergent budget
paths. Budget estimates should be expected to change over time from those
originally proposed or estimated by the President or Congress.
Table 1. Budget Estimates for FY2005
(in billions of dollars)
Deficit(-)/
Receipts
Outlays
Surplus
CBO, BEO Baseline, 1/04
$2,049
$2,411
$-362
OMB, Budget Proposals, 2/04
2,036
2,400
-364
OMB, Budget Modified Current Services, 2/04
2,037
2,397
-360
OMB, Budget Traditional Current Services, 2/04
2,048
2,442
-393
CBO, Revised Baseline, 3/8/04
2,050
2,414
-363
CBO, EPP, 3/8/04
2,029
2,384
-356
Senate, FY05 Budget Resolution S.Con.Res. 95, 3/12/04
2,026
2,367
-341
House, FY05 Budget Resolution H.Con.Res. 393, 3/25/04
2,030
2,406
-377
Conf., FY05 Budget Resolution S.Con.Res. 95, 5/19/03
2,027
2,405
-367
B&E Outlook — The Budget and Economic Outlook, CBO.
EPP — CBO’s estimates of the President’s proposals.
The war on terrorism, the 2001 recession and the early slowness of the
economic recovery, changes in policies (tax cuts; spending increases), and changes
in the technical assumptions in the underlying budget-economic relationships, all
contributed to the severe deterioration in the budget outlook since January 2001,
when large and growing surpluses were expected throughout the forecast period
(through FY2011).
Budget Estimates and Proposals
CBO’s first budget report for FY2005, the Budget and Economic Outlook:
Fiscal Years 2005-2014 (January 2004), contained baseline estimates and projections

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CRS-3
for FY2004 through FY2014.1 CBO’s report showed that, under baseline
assumptions, the budget would remain in deficit through FY2013 ( $16 billion). The
baseline showed a small surplus ($13 billion) in FY2014. Under the baseline
assumptions, the provisions of the Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation
Act of 2001 (EGTRRA; P.L. 107-16, June 2001) would expire as scheduled on or
before the end of calendar year 2010. After calendar 2010 (from a part of FY2011
through FY2014), the baseline experiences a revenue surge, which drives down the
deficit.
The revised CBO baseline (March 8, 2004) projected a slightly deteriorated
outlook for the budget. Mostly from technical changes since the January estimates,
the deficit no longer disappears over the 10-year period. In FY2014, CBO’s revised
baseline projections have a deficit of $15 billion instead of the previous surplus of
$13 billion.
President Bush’s FY2005 budget called for extending and making permanent
a large number of the tax cuts adopted in 2001 and 2003. The Treasury’s estimates
of the tax proposals produced a $213.3 billion revenue reduction (from
Administration baseline estimates) between FY2005 and FY2009 and a $1,240.2
revenue billion reduction between FY2005 and FY2014. The Joint Committee on
Taxation (JCT) estimated (March 3, 2004) that the President’s tax proposals would
reduce receipts by $226.7 billion between FY2005 and FY2009 and by $1,402.4
billion between FY2005 and FY2014.
The budget shows total mandatory outlays rise by $53.5 billion from FY2004
to FY2005. Discretionary defense outlays fall by $3.4 billion from FY2004 to
FY2005. Nondefense domestic discretionary spending rises by $8.0 billion from
FY2004 to FY2005. Net interest, driven by the increases in debt that are themselves
driven by the large deficits, rises by $21.6 billion between FY2004 and FY2005.
The Administration also modified its presentation of its current services baseline
estimates. Instead of closely following the directions for constructing baseline
estimates in the Deficit Control Act, the Administration’s FY2005 current services
baseline assumes the extension of certain tax provisions (that by current law are
scheduled to expire), excludes the future cost of one time events, such as the FY2004
emergency funding, and includes an adjustment to the calculation of federal pay. For
FY2005, the Administration’s modified current services deficit estimate is $33
billion smaller than the traditional baseline estimate. By FY2009, the
Administration’s modified estimated baseline deficit is $60 billion smaller than the
traditional baseline deficit estimate.
The Administration’s estimates do not extend beyond FY2009 except for
cumulative proposed revenue changes and cumulative proposed mandatory spending
changes, which are both shown for the period FY2005 through FY2014.
1 Baseline estimates are not meant to be predictions of future budget outcomes, but instead
are designed to provide a neutral measure against which to compare proposed policy
changes. In general they project current policy into the future. Discretionary spending is
increased by the rate of inflation.

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CRS-4
CBO’s baseline estimates (the Budget and Economic Outlook: Fiscal Years
2005-2014) show FY2005 with a deficit of $477 billion. By FY2009, the baseline
deficit estimate has fallen to $268 billion. Under the baseline assumptions, the CBO
estimates increase discretionary spending at the rate of inflation, do not include
extending the tax cuts, and allow the alternative minimum tax (AMT) relief to expire
as scheduled. As CBO itself points out, the baseline estimates are not designed as
predictions of the budget’s future outcome. They provide a neutral benchmark
against which proposed policy changes can be measured.
CBO includes the estimated budgetary cost of selected policy alternatives.
These include extending expiring tax provisions (a $496 billion five-year increase in
the deficit), reform the alternative minimum tax (a $376 billion five-year increase in
the deficit), and several alternative assumptions about the growth rate of discretionary
spending (including defense) that range from a freeze (a $257 billion five-year
decrease in the deficit) to annual growth of 6.9% (a $590 billion increase in the
deficit.2

The Administration argues that extending the tax cuts is still needed to ensure
the economy continues its recovery and that to do otherwise would result in a tax
increase. Extending the tax cuts becomes increasingly expensive over time and
pushes the entire deficit reduction effort onto the spending side of the budget.
Uncertainty in Budget Projections
All budget estimates and projections are inherently uncertain. Their dependence
on assumptions that are themselves subject to substantial variation over short time
periods makes budget estimates and projections susceptible to fairly rapid and
dramatic changes. The last couple of years have demonstrated this volatility. The
original proposals and estimates for FY2002, made in early 2001, dramatically
changed over the 20 to 21 months of congressional and presidential action on the
budget. (The budget estimates in the OMB and CBO budget documents for five to
10 years in the future are subject to even greater variability.)
The early 2001 estimates for FY2002 estimated a surplus of $231 billion to
$313 billion. The year ended on September 30, 2002 with a deficit of $158 billion.
The September 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States, the legislation adopted in
response, the bursting of the stock market bubble, the weak economy, and a shift in
underlying budget relationships, all contributed to a large change in the year’s budget
outcome from the originally proposed or estimated amounts. There is little reason
to expect this uncertainty to diminish in current or future budget projections.3
2 As CBO states, “The 6.9 percent rate of growth is the historical average from 1999 through
2004, excluding $87 billion in supplemental appropriations for FY2004.” CBO, Budget
and Economic Outlook: Fiscal Years 2005-2014, Jan. 2004, p. 6.
3 Some things are known with certainty about the direction of future spending and receipts.
Demographics can partly determine the shape of future budgets. The upcoming retirement
of the baby boom generation will rapidly drive higher the spending for Social Security and
Medicare as well as other federal spending or tax breaks for the elderly in the next decade.
(continued...)

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CRS-5
Information in appendix A (The Uncertainties of Budget Projections) of CBO’s
budget report, The Budget and Economic Outlook: Fiscal Years 2005-2014 (January
2004), indicates how greatly the budget outcome can be altered, especially over time,
by changes in economic and the related technical factors that underpin the budget
estimates. The chapter contains a discussion of optimistic and pessimistic alternative
scenarios for CBO’s baseline projection. The optimistic scenario assumes more
favorable economic and budget conditions than the baseline while the pessimistic
scenario assumes less favorable conditions than the baseline. CBO estimates that the
10-year cumulative optimistic and pessimistic baseline surpluses or deficits would
be $8 trillion apart. According to CBO, two-thirds of the growth in the difference
occurs in the last five years of the estimates. Figure 1 is from CBO. It represents the
most likely budget outcomes clustered in the center, in the darkest part, of the figure.
The lightest color, towards the edge of the graph, represents the less likely outcomes.
The entire fan in FY2009 represents the range within which the budget balance has
a 90% chance of occurring.
Figure 1. Uncertainty of CBO’s Projections of the Deficit or Surplus
Under Current Policies
The President’s budget includes, in the chapter, “Comparison of Actual to
Estimated,” in the Analytical Perspectives volume of the budget, similar information.
The Administration used budget data from FY1982 to FY2003 to produce statistical
measures of the differences between the estimated and actual surpluses or deficits
over these years. According to the Administration’s calculations, there is a 90%
chance that the FY2009 budget will have a deficit or a surplus that falls within $500
billion above or below the Administration’s currently proposed deficit for that year.
This produces a range of outcomes from a deficit of approximately $740 billion to
3 (...continued)
Because virtually all those who will become eligible for these benefits are alive today,
estimating the growth in these programs is relatively straightforward.

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CRS-6
a surplus of approximately $260 billion, within which the deficit or surplus is most
likely to fall.
Budget projections are very dependent on the underlying assumptions about the
direction of the economy and expected future government policy and how these
interact along with other factors (such as changing demographics) that affect the
budget. Any deviation from the assumptions used in the budget estimates, such as
faster or slower economic growth, higher or lower inflation, differences from the
existing or proposed spending and tax policies, or changes in the technical
components of the budget models can have substantial effects on changing the
budget outcomes from earlier budget estimates and projections.
Budget Action
CBO and the Administration released their first budget reports for FY2005, in
late January and early February 2004. CBO’s report provided baseline estimates for
fiscal years 2004 through 2014. OMB’s documents provided estimates for FY2004
through FY2009 with a few instances of cumulative estimates for fiscal years 2004
through FY2014 (these were limited to revenues and mandatory spending and
provided no data for the individual fiscal years after FY2009). The budget also
lacked detailed data on program or account spending beyond FY2005. The Analytical
Perspectives volume of the President’s budget provided current services baseline
estimates for the years through FY2009.
On March 8, 2004, CBO released slightly revised baseline estimates in its
report, An Analysis of the President’s Budgetary Proposals for Fiscal Year 2005.
The report recalculated the Administration’s proposals using CBO’s underlying
assumptions and estimating techniques. CBO also extended the projections through
FY2014. The CBO re-estimates produced smaller deficits in FY2004 and FY2005
than in the President’s budget.
By late February and early March 2004, the House and Senate Budget
Committees began discussing the budget resolution for FY2005. The Senate Budget
Committee (SBC) reported its version of the FY2005 budget resolution on March 5.
The Senate considered the resolution (S.Con.Res. 95) the week of March 8 and, after
amending the committee-adopted resolution, approved it on March 12.
The House Budget Committee (HBC) approved its version of the FY2005
budget resolution (H.Con.Res. 393; H.Rept. 108-441) on March 19, a week later than
originally planned. Disagreements within the committee majority over components
of the resolution delayed its consideration. The House approved the resolution, after
rejecting several proposed alternatives, on March 25. The House substituted the text
of H.Con.Res. 393 for the text of S.Con.Res. 95 on March 29 to facilitate the
conference on the resolution.
A conference committee began its efforts to resolve the resolutions’ differences
on March 31. The most difficult issue became the pay-go differences in the House
and Senate resolutions. The House resolution required offsets for proposed increases

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CRS-7
in mandatory spending; the Senate resolution required offsets for both mandatory
spending increases and revenue reductions. After a month and a half of efforts, the
conference committee reported (H.Rept. 108-498) an agreement. The agreement
reduced the resolution’s coverage to one year from the five-year coverage in the
resolutions adopted by the House and Senate. The pay-go rules were limited to the
one year of the resolution and would expire on May 15, 2005. The reconciliation
instructions in the agreement incorporated the cost ($22.9 billion revenue reduction
and $4.6 billion in outlay increases) of extending three popular tax cuts, the marriage
penalty relief, the increased child care credit, and the expanded 10% tax bracket that
expire this year. The resolution accommodated another $27.7 billion in additional
tax cuts that were not included in the reconciliation instructions.
The House passed the conference resolution on May 19. The House Rules
Committee resolution allowing consideration of the conference resolution (H.Res.
649) included a provision putting the budget resolution, once adopted by the House,
in effect for the House. This provides guidance to the Appropriations and other
committees that must adopt legislation to implement the FY2005 budget.
Unsure that it had enough votes to adopt the resolution, the Senate leadership
delayed Senate consideration of the conference agreement until early June. Press
reports have indicated that the budget resolution may not clear the Senate, when and
if it is presented for debate.
A lack of a budget resolution for the year changes the processes by which budget
legislation (appropriations, tax cuts) will wend its way through Congress. The House
put in place instructions (through H.Res. 649) to treat the budget resolution
conference agreement as in effect once it passed the House. This provides a cap for
discretionary spending ($821 billion, excluding a $50 billion reserve for Afghanistan
and Iraq) and allocations of that amount among the 13 appropriation subcommittees.
In the Senate, the lack of a resolution leaves the appropriators without a discretionary
spending cap or the allocations for the Appropriations subcommittees. In addition,
the lack of tax-cut reconciliation instructions leaves tax cut legislation in the Senate
open to amendment. For the House, the lack of Senate approval of the budget
resolution would require a separate vote on a debt limit increase (which will be
needed sometime this calendar year) instead of being “deemed” passed by the House
with adoption of the budget resolution by Congress.

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CRS-8
Outlays
The Administration’s FY2005 budget proposed $2,400 billion in outlays for
FY2005, rising to $2,853 billion in FY2009, the last year forecast in the President’s
budget. The Administration modified its method of calculating its current services
baseline in this year’s budget.4 Under its modified assumptions, FY2005 baseline
outlays are $2,397 billion, rising to $2,847 billion in FY2009. Under the traditional
method of calculating the baseline, current services baseline outlay estimates would
rise from $2,442 billion in FY2005 to $2,952 billion in FY2009. The modified
current services baseline estimates, when compared to the proposals, show smaller
changes than between the proposal and the standard current services baseline
estimates.
Table 2. Outlays for FY2004-FY2009 and FY2014
(in billions of dollars)
FY2003
FY2004
FY2005
FY2006
FY2007
FY2008
FY2009
FY2014
CBO Baseline, 1/26/04
$2,158 a
2,294
2,411
2,525
2,652
2,783
2,912
3,616
President’s FY05 Budget, 2/2/04
2,319
2,400
2,473
2,592
2,724
2,853
—
President’s FY05. Current Services, 2/2/04
2,319
2,397
2,468
2,583
2,715
2,847
—
Pres.’s FY05 Trad. Current Services, 2/2/04
2,319
2,442
2,550
2,676
2,815
2,952
—
CBO, Revised Baseline, 3/8/04
2,296
2,414
2,528
2,658
2,791
2,924
3,635
CBO, EPP, 3/8/04
2,295
2,384
2,482
2,593
2,722
2,853
3,600
Senate, FY05 Budget Resolution, 3/12/04
2,295
2,367
2,469
2,582
2,698
2,815
—
House, FY05 Budget Resolution, 3/25/04
2,295
2,407
2,492
2,591
2,711
2,845
—
Conf., FY2005 Budget Resolution, 5/19/04
2,338
2,405
2,479
2,602
2,725
2,853
—
a. Actual outlays for FY2003.
EPP — CBO’s estimates of the President’s proposals.

The Administration’s proposals, if adopted, would (under Administration
estimates) raise outlays $81 billion (3.5%) above the Administration’s proposed
FY2004 level and $3 billion (0.1%) above its FY2005 current services baseline
outlay estimate.5 The difference between the current services baseline outlay
estimate and the proposed outlay amount for FY2005 measures the “cost” of the
Administration’s proposed policies. The year-to-year change (the $81 billion
increase) combines the effects of policy changes from year to year with the relatively
automatic growth in large parts of the budget. These automatic increases include
cost-of-living adjustments, growth in populations eligible for program benefits, and
inflation driven increases. The President’s budget does not include estimated costs
of continued action in Afghanistan or Iraq after the end of FY2004. The
Administration has indicated it will present a proposal for funding later in the year.
4 The current services baseline estimates like CBO’s baseline estimates are designed to
provide “a neutral benchmark against which policy proposals can be measured.” The
modified baseline used this year assumes emergencies are one-time only, that federal pay
adjustment assumptions reflect the (usual) January 1 start of inflation adjusted raises rather
than October 1, and the debt service changes resulting from these (and revenue related)
modifications.
5 The FY2005 outlay proposals would be $42 billion (1.7%) below the traditional
formulation of the baseline.

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CRS-9
As shares of GDP, the Administration’s proposals would reduce outlays from
19.9% of GDP in FY2005 to 19.4% of GDP in FY2009. CBO’s estimate of the
President’s outlay proposals has them falling slightly from 19.7% of GDP in FY2005
to 19.6% of GDP for the fiscal years 2006 through 2010, before rising to 19.9% of
GDP in FY2014. These levels are below both the average from FY1980 through
FY2003 (21.1% of GDP) or the average from FY1990 through FY2003 (20.2% of
GDP). CBO’s revised baseline estimates show outlays rising from 20.0% of GDP
in FY2005 to 20.1% of GDP in FY2009 and remains at that level through FY2014.
Using one of CBO’s alternative scenarios for spending, one that assumes outlays
grow at the rate of GDP growth rather than the slower rate of inflation, outlays would
equal 20.1% of GDP in FY2005, rising to 21.0% of GDP in FY2009 and to 21.9%
of GDP in FY2014. Figure 2 shows CBO’s revised (March 2004) outlay baseline
estimates and the CBO’s estimate of the Administration outlay proposals as shares
of GDP.
The major components of
Figure 2. Outlays, FY2003-FY2014
federal spending show
(as percentages of GDP)
21%
different patterns of change in
the President’s budget.
20%
Mandatory spending grows
from 10.9% of GDP in 19%
FY2005 to 11.0% in FY2009.
The large deficits and resulting 18%
growth in debt-held-by-the-
17%
public drives net interest
outlays higher. Net interest 16%
CBO Estimate of Administration's Proposal
grows from 1.5% of GDP in
CBO Revised Baseline
FY2005 to 2.0% in FY2009. 15%
Defense spending, in spite of
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Fiscal Year
t h e A d m i n i s t r a t i o n ’ s
proposals, falls from 3.7% of
GDP in FY2005 (4.0% in FY2004) to 3.3% in FY2009. The 3.3% is a smaller share
of the economy than in all but four years (FY1997 through FY2001) since World
War II. Nondefense discretionary spending falls from 3.9% of GDP in FY2005 to
3.1% in FY2009.
CBO’s estimates of the President’s proposals show mandatory spending
growing from 10.7% of GDP in FY2005 to 11.1% in FY2009 to 11.9% in FY2014.
Net interest rises from 1.5% of GDP in FY2005 to 2.0% in FY2009 to 2.1% in
FY2014. CBO’s estimates of defense spending show similar patterns to those of the
Administration, with defense outlays continuing to fall as shares of GDP to 3.1% of
GDP in FY2014. Nondefense spending falls from 3.8% of GDP in FY2005 to 3.2%
in FY2009 to 2.6% in FY2014.6
Defense spending averaged 3.8% of GDP from FY1990 through FY2003;
nondefense discretionary spending averaged 3.6% of GDP for the same years.
6 The President’s budget forecast data through FY2009; CBO extended discretionary
spending through FY2014 by increasing it at the rate of inflation after FY2009.

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CRS-10
Mandatory spending averaged 10.2% of GDP from FY1990 through FY2003; net
interest averaged 2.7% of GDP over the same period.
Receipts
The Administration’s FY2005 budget proposed extending and making
permanent many of the tax cuts adopted in 2001 and 2003 that would otherwise
expire (as scheduled) over the next five or six years. These plus other proposals
would reduce receipts by an estimated $213 billion over FY2005 to FY2009 period
and by $1,240 billion over the FY2005 to FY2014 period.7 CBO’s estimate of these
proposals put the cost at $181 billion for the FY2005 through FY2009 period and
$1,299 billion for the FY2005 through FY2014 period.8
Table 3. Receipts for FY2003-FY2009 and FY2014
(in billions of dollars)
FY2003
FY2004
FY2005
FY2006
FY2007
FY2008
FY2009
FY2014
CBO Baseline, 1/31/03
$1,782 a
$1,817
$2,049
$2,256
$2,385
$2,506
$2,644
$3,629
President’s F054 Budget, 2/2/04
1,798
2,036
2,206
2,351
2,485
2,616
—
President’s FY04 Current Services 2/2/04
1,791
2,037
2,215
2,354
2,497
2,636
—
Pres.’s FY05 Trad. Current Services, 2/2/04
1,791
2,048
2,245
2,384
2,527
2,681
—
CBO, Revised Baseline, 3/8/04
1,817
2,050
2,255
2,384
2,505
2,643
3,620
CBO, EPP, 3/8/04
1,817
2,029
2,212
2,351
2,469
2,595
3,311
Senate, FY05 Budget Resolution, 3/12/04
1,817
2,026
2,217
2,359
2,481
2,615
—
House, FY05 Budget Resolution, 3/25/04
1,817
2,029
2,220
2,350
2,476
2,609
—
Conf., FY05 Budget Resolution, 5/19/04
1,821
2,027
2,235
2,383
2,503
2,640
—
a. Actual receipts for FY2003.
EPP = CBO’s estimates of the President’s proposals.
Receipts would grow from an estimated $2,036 billion in FY2005 to $2,616
billion in FY2009. These increases follow three years of falling receipts from their
peak in FY2000 ($2,025 billion) through FY2003 ($1,782 billion) and an expected
small increase in FY2004 ($1,798 billion). The Administration expects receipts to
exceed the FY2000 dollar level in FY2005.
7 These estimates are from the Treasury’s General Explanations of the Administration’s
Fiscal Year 2005 Revenue Proposals. The President’s budget showed a $175 billion
revenue reduction (from baseline estimates) for the FY2005-FY2009 period and a $1,122
billion reduction for the FY2005-FY2014 period. The Treasury’s estimates were produced
after the release of the President’s budget reflecting modifications to the proposals and
adjustments to the estimates. See also the CRS Report RS21420, President Bush’s 2003 Tax
Cut Proposal: A Brief Overview, and the CRS Issue Brief IB10110, Major Tax Issues in the
108th Congress for more information on the proposals.
8 These amounts from CBO do not include the outlay effects of the extensions or other
proposals.

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CRS-11
As shares of GDP, receipts would also rise over the FY2005 through FY2009
period, from 16.9% of GDP in FY2005 to 17.8% of GDP in FY2009.9 The ratio
remains below the FY1980 to FY2003 receipt average of 18.5% of GDP for the
FY2005 through FY2009 period. CBO’s estimates of the Administration’s proposals
show revenues rising from 16.8% of GDP in FY2005 (up from the 15.8% of GDP in
FY2004) to 17.9% of GDP in FY2009 to 18.3% of GDP in FY2014. The CBO
estimates of the President’s proposals and the CBO baseline are shown in Figure 3.
The Administration
Figure 3. Receipts, FY2003-FY2014
arbitrarily reduced its
(as percentages of GDP)
FY2004 and FY2005 receipt 21%
estimates by $20 billion and
20%
$15 billion respectively, “in
the interest of cautious and 19%
prudent forecasting.”10 The
downward adjustment for 18%
“uncertainty,” as the budget
indicates, increases the 17%
estimated deficits for both
16%
CBO Estimate of Administration's Proposal
years by $20 billion (in
CBO Revised Baseline
FY2004) and by $15 billion 15%
(in FY2005).
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Fiscal Year
The Administration’s
proposal extends the current relief from the alternative minimum tax (AMT) for
many in the middle class for one year. Without a further extension, a growing
number of middle class taxpayers will find themselves subject to the AMT.
Preliminary estimates indicate that the AMT, which affected a little over 600,000
taxpayers in 1997, will, with the effects of inflation and legislative changes, grow
to 33 million taxpayers in 2010.11 CBO estimates that providing extended or
permanent AMT relief would reduce receipts by $148 billion between FY2005 and
FY2009 and by $376 billion between FY2005 and FY2014.
9 The FY2005 ratio rises from the FY2004 level of 15.7% of GDP, a level not even neared
since FY1950, when it was 14.4% of GDP and the nature of federal spending and receipts
was very different than it is now.
10 OMB, Budget of the U.S. Government for Fiscal Year 2003, February 2004, Analytical
Perspectives, p. 239.
11 See the CRS Report RL30149, The Alternative Minimum Tax for Individuals, by Gregg
A. Esenwein, for a discussion of the AMT issue.

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CRS-12
Deficits and Surpluses
Surpluses and deficits are the residuals left after Congress and the President set
policies for spending and receipts. Surpluses reduce federal debt held by the public
which leads to lower net interest payments; deficits increase government debt held
by the public, increasing net interest payments (assuming no change in interest rates).
Reducing the deficit and eventually reaching a balanced budget or generating and
keeping a surplus (the government had its first surplus in 30 years in FY1998) was
a major focus of the budget debates in the late 1980s and throughout the 1990s.

The President’s FY2005 budget proposals included a deficit of $521 billion in
FY2004 falling to $364 billion in FY2005. The deficit falls to an estimated $237
billion in FY2009, which fulfills the Administration’s claim of reducing the deficit
by half (starting from the FY2004 estimated deficit). Most of the deficit’s fall occurs
from FY2004 to FY2006, after which it shows relatively little change (in dollars).
Table 4. Surpluses/Deficits(-) for FY2005-FY2009 and FY2014
(in billions of dollars)
FY2003 FY2004
FY2005
FY2006
FY2007
FY2008
FY2009
FY2014
CBO Baseline, 1/26/04
-375 a
-477
-362
-269
-267
-278
-268
13
President’s F05 Budget, 2/2/04
-521
-364
-268
-241
-239
-237
—
President’s FY04 Current Services 2/2/04
-528
-360
-253
-229
-218
-211
—
Pres.’s FY05 BEA Current Services, 2/2/04
-528
-393
-305
-292
-288
-271
—
CBO Revised Baseline 3/8/04
-477
-363
-273
-274
-286
-281
-15
CBO EPP 3/8/04
-478
-356
-270
-242
-252
-258
-289
Senate, FY05 Budget Resolution, 3/12/04
-477
-341
-252
-223
-217
-200
—
House, FY05 Budget Resolution, 3/25/04
-478
-378
-272
-240
-236
-235
—
Conf., FY05 Budget Resolution, 5/19/04
-474
-367
-255
-194
-186
-174
—
a. Actual deficit for FY2003.
EPP = CBO’s estimates of the President’s proposals.
CBO’s estimates of the President’s proposals put the FY2004 deficit at an
estimated $478 billion and the FY2005 deficit at an estimated $356 billion. They
show the FY2009 deficit at an estimated $258 billion, implying, in CBO’s forecast,
that the deficit will not quite be reduced by half as the Administration shows. Figure
4 shows CBO’s baseline deficit estimates and its estimates of the deficit resulting
from the Administration’s policies, both as shares of GDP.

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CRS-13
CBO’s January 2004
baseline estimates had the
Figure 4. Deficit, FY2003-FY2014
budget returning to surplus in
(as percentages of GDP)
0%
FY2014 ($13 billion). CBO’s
baseline revisions in March
-1%
2004 showed a slight
worsening of the budget
outlook (because of technical -2%
factors) that eliminated the
expectation of a surplus -3%
throughout its 10-year
forecast. A small deficit of -4%
CBO Estimate of Administration's Proposal
$15 billion would remain in
CBO Revised Baseline
FY2014. This result occurs -5%
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
in spite of the increase in
Fiscal Year
receipts expected after the
scheduled expiration (in law)
Figure 5. Alternative Deficit Paths,
of many of the tax cuts
FY2003-FY2014
adopted in 2001 and 2003.
(as percentages of GDP)
0%
CBO Revised Baseline
CBO’s Alternative
Policies Not Included -1%
CBO Rev. Baseline Incorp.
Selected Alt. Budget Policies
in the Baseline
-2%
CBO’s January 2004
budget report included -3%
estimates of the “budgetary
effects of policy alternatives -4%
not included in CBO’s
baseline.” The alternatives -5%
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
are policies that seem likely
Fiscal Year
to be enacted or seriously
debated. They include
extending expiring tax provisions, the reform of the AMT, and four variations on the
growth of discretionary spending, including increasing it at the growth rate of
nominal GDP; increasing it at the average rate of discretionary spending growth from
FY1999 through FY2004 (excluding the $87 billion FY2004 supplemental from the
average); raising it at the rate of inflation after FY2004 (and excluding the $87 billion
FY2004 supplemental from the calculation); and freezing discretionary spending at
the FY2004 spending level (including the FY2004 supplemental).
The alternatives that reduce receipts or increase spending are all fairly costly
when compared to CBO’s baseline, running from $148 billion for AMT reform over
FY2005 through FY2009 to $590 billion for increasing discretionary spending at its
average historical growth rate for the same years. These amounts do not include the
higher interest costs associated with larger deficits and debt. Freezing discretionary
spending would reduce spending by an estimated $237 billion for the FY2005
through FY2009 period, while increasing discretionary spending by the rate of
inflation would save an estimated $379 billion in spending over the same years. The

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CRS-14
numbers become substantially larger over the 10-year period, FY2005 through
FY2014. The amounts for these alternatives for the five- and 10-year periods are
shown in Table 5 (reproduced from a CBO table). Figure 5 presents the CBO
baseline deficit and the baseline adjusted for the costs of extending the tax cuts,
reforming the AMT, and increasing discretionary spending at the rate of GDP growth
(shown as percentages of GDP).

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CRS-15
Table 5. The Cumulative Budgetary Effects of Policy
Alternatives Not Included in CBO’s Baseline
(Billions of dollars)
Total,
Total,
2005-2009
2005-2014
Policy Alternatives That Increase the Deficit or Reduce the Surplusa
Extend Expiring Tax Provisionsb
Effect on the deficit or surplus
EGTRRA and JGTRRA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
-155
-1,233
Partial expensing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
-285
-440
Other . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
-56
-195
Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
-496
-1,868
Debt service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
-57
-363
Reform the Alternative Minimum Taxc
Effect on the deficit or surplus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
-148
-376
Debt service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
-14
-93
Increase Discretionary Appropriations by the Growth Rate of Nominal GDP After 2004
Effect on the deficit or surplus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
-342
-1,360
Debt service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
-31
-258
Increase Discretionary Appropriations by 6.9 Percent a Year After 2004d
Effect on the deficit or surplus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
-590
-2,682
Debt service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
-51
-475
Policy Alternatives That Reduce the Deficit or Increase the Surplus
Increase Discretionary Appropriations (Excluding supplemental appropriations for 2004)
by the Rate of Inflation After 2004e
Effect on the deficit or surplus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
379
880
Debt service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
42
227
Freeze Total Discretionary Appropriations at the 2004 Level ($876 billion)
Effect on the deficit or surplus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
257
1,117
Debt service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
23
203
Memorandum
Total Deficit (-) or Surplus in CBO’s January 2004 Baseline
-1,443
-1,893
Note: EGTRRA = Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001; JGTRRA = Jobs and Growth
Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003; * = between -$500 million and $500 million.
a. Negative amounts indicate an increase in the deficit or a reduction in the surplus.
b. This estimate does not include the effects of extending the increased exemption amount for the alternative
minimum tax, which expires in 2004. See the policy alternative for the alternative minimum tax.
c. This alternative assumes that the exemption amount for the AMT, which was increased through 2004 in
JGTRRA, is extended at its higher level and, together with the AMT tax brackets, is indexed for inflation
after 2004. The estimates are shown relative to current law. If this alternative was enacted jointly with the
extension of expiring tax provisions, an interactive effect would occur that would make the combined
revenue loss greater than the sum of the two separate estimates by about $173 billion (plus about $16
billion in debt-service costs) over the 2005-2014 period.
d. The 6.9 % rate of growth is the historical average from 1999 through 2004, excluding $87 billion in
supplemental appropriations for 2004 enacted in November [2003]. In this alternative, however, those
supplemental appropriations are included in total budget authority for 2004 and are extended through
2014.
e. This alternative does not extend the $87 billion in supplemental appropriations enacted in November [2003]
but includes the outlays resulting from them.
Source: Reproductions of a portion of a CBO table, Congressional Budget Office; Joint Committee on Taxation.
CBO, Budget and Economic Outlook: Fiscal Years 2005-2014, Jan. 2004, p. 6-7.

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CRS-16
The Longer Run
Over a longer time period, one beginning in the next decade and lasting for
decades into future, both CBO and the Administration indicate (in their respective
budget documents) that they expect, under existing policies and assumptions, that
demographic pressures will produce large and persistent deficits. CBO states
The aging of the baby-boom generation will cause a historic shift in the
United States’ fiscal position in the decades beyond CBO’s projection period.
Over the next 30 years, the number of people ages 65 and older will double...
costs per enrollee in federal health care programs are likely to continue growing
much faster than inflation. CBO projects that [these factors] will cause federal
spending for Social Security, Medicare, and Medicaid combined to increase
(even under moderate growth assumptions) by more than two-thirds as a share
of the economy — from more than 8 percent of GDP in 2004 to over 14 percent
in 2030 and almost 18 percent in 2050.
Those budgetary pressures will ultimately require choices involving some
combination of a substantial reduction in the growth of federal spending, an
increase in taxation — possibly to levels unprecedented in the United States —
and a dramatic boost in federal borrowing.... economic growth alone is unlikely
to bring the nation’s longer-term fiscal position into balance — making reform
of programs for the elderly or substantial tax increases (or both) necessary.12
OMB echoed the CBO comments in the President’s budget documents. The
document included the comments that
Social Security and Medicare are critical programs for ensuring the
financial security and health of elderly Americans ... Unless these programs are
reformed however, over the long run they will overwhelm the rest of the budget
and place an unsustainable burden on future generations.
Although projections of the budget over the next few decades and beyond
are subject to enormous uncertainty, fundamental forces are at work that will
create serious fiscal problems if left unaddressed.
The main source of the long-run fiscal problem is demographics. As
Americans live longer and the birth rate falls, the ratio of workers to retirees is
decreasing....
Because the Nation’s two largest entitlement programs, Social Security and
Medicare, are based in large part on the principle that current workers pay the
benefits of retirees, these programs are heavily influenced by this decline in the
ratio of workers to retirees.... In the next several decades, however, the impact
of lower birth rates and longer life expectancy will begin to take a visible toll on
both Social Security and Medicare....
The result of this demographic shift is a steady worsening of the finances
of the Social Security and Medicare programs....13
12 CBO, The Budget and Economic Outlook: Fiscal Years 2005-2014, Jan. 2004, p. 8-9.
13 OMB. Budget of the United States Government for Fiscal Year 2005, Feb. 2004, p.38-39.

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CRS-17
The short-term budget outlook can change as it is buffeted by economic or
policy changes. As indicated by CBO and OMB, the long-term budget outlook,
while still buffeted by economic and policy changes is expected to be dominated by
the effects that the retirement of the baby boom generation, beginning in large
numbers within a decade, will have on spending for Social Security, Medicare,
Medicaid, and other programs for the elderly. Not only will these programs be
affected, but their constant growth will put great stress on the rest of the budget, the
government’s ability to finance its obligations, and the ability of the economy to
provide the resources needed. The tax cuts and spending increases of the last few
years did not produce the grim fiscal future, but they appear to have made the
solution more difficult.
The Budget and the Economy
The budget and the economy affect each other unequally. Small economic
changes have a more significant effect on the budget than the effect large policy
changes have on the economy. The worse-than-previously-expected economic
conditions that lasted from 2001 into 2003, played a substantial role, directly and
indirectly, in the deterioration of the budget outlook over those years. The rebound
from that slower-than-normal growth results, according to CBO, in expectations of
faster than normal growth in 2004 and 2005. For the period 2006 through 2014,
CBO projects that real gross domestic product (GDP) will grow about as fast as
potential GDP.14
Under governmental policies that are in fiscal balance, a return to economic
growth that is close to the growth of potential GDP, should reduce or eliminate a
deficit or produce a surplus. In both the President’s budget and in CBO’s budget
reports, the budget remains in deficit (or barely reaches surplus in FY2014 in CBO’s
January budget report) throughout the forecast period. The lack of fairly rapid
reduction or elimination of the deficit during a time of normal economic growth
implies that the budget has a fiscal imbalance and that the current policies of the
government are producing outlays that are too large or receipts that are too small to
produce a balanced budget or one in surplus.
The positive budget outlook forecast in early 2001 was substantially based on
the favorable future economic conditions that were then expected, along with
government policies that would continue producing surpluses. That outlook
extended the expected overall improvement in the budget situation that had occurred
since the early 1990s. Much of the improvement in the 1990s had come from strong
and sustained economic growth (and the rest from policy changes to reduce the
deficit). When those favorable economic conditions faltered, so did the string of
positive forecasts for the budget outlook. What good economic conditions give, bad
economic conditions can take away. The unexpectedly lengthy economic weakness
into 2003, the start of a recession in March 2001, the lengthy fall in the stock market,
the policy responses to the September 2001 terrorist attacks, along with negative
14 Potential GDP represents an estimate of what GDP would be if both labor and capital
were as fully employed as is possible.

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CRS-18
changes in the technical components of the budget estimates, raised outlays, reduced
receipts (beyond policy changes), and eliminated the previously expected surpluses.
For Additional Reading
U.S. Congressional Budget Office. The Budget and Economic Outlook: Fiscal
Years 2005-2014. Washington, January 26, 2004.
——An Analysis of the President’s Budgetary Proposals for Fiscal Year 2005.
Washington, March 2004.
U.S. Council of Economic Advisors. The Economic Report of the President.
Washington, GPO, February 2004.
U.S. Office of Management and Budget. The Budget of the United States
Government for Fiscal Year 2005. Washington, GPO, February 2, 2004.
CRS Products
CRS Electronic Briefing Book, Taxation,
[http://www.congress.gov/brbk/html/ebtxr1.shtml]
CRS Report RL30973. 2001 Tax Cut: Description, Analysis, and Background, by
David L. Brumbaugh, Jane G. Gravelle, Steven Maguire, Louis Alan Talley, and
Bob Lyke.
CRS Report RL31414. Baseline Budget Projections: A Discussion of Issues, by
Marc Labonte.
CRS Report 98-560. Baselines and Scorekeeping in the Federal Budget Process, by
Bill Heniff, Jr.
CRS Report RS20095. The Congressional Budget Process: A Brief Overview, by
James V. Saturno.
CRS Report RL30297. Congressional Budget Resolutions: Selected Statistics and
Information Guide, by Bill Heniff Jr.
CRS Report 98-511. Consideration of the Budget Resolution, by Bill Heniff, Jr.
CRS Report RL30239. Economic Forecasts and the Budget, by Brian W. Cashell.
CRS Report RL31235. The Economics of the Federal Budget Deficit, by Brian W.
Cashell.
CRS Report RS21752. Federal Budget Process Reform: A Brief Overview, by Bill
Heniff, Jr. and Robert Keith.

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CRS-19
CRS Report 95-543. The Financial Outlook for Social Security and Medicare, by
Geoffrey Kollmann and Dawn Nuschler.
CRS Report RS21684. FY2004 Consolidated Appropriations Act: Reference Guide,
by Robert Keith.
CRS Report RS21136. Government Spending or Tax Reduction: Which Might Add
More Stimulus to the Economy?, by Marc Labonte.
CRS Report RL31728. House Rules Changes Affecting the Congressional Budget
Process in the 108th Congress (H.Res. 5), by Bill Heniff, Jr.
CRS Report RL30839. Income Tax Cuts, the Business Cycle, and Economic
Growth: A Macroeconomic Analysis, by Marc Labonte and Gail Makinen.
CRS Issue Brief IB10110. Major Tax Issues in the 108th Congress, Coordinated by
David Brumbaugh.
CRS Report 98-720. Manual on the Federal Budget Process, by Robert Keith and
Allen Schick.
CRS Report RS21756. The Option of Freezing Non-defense Discretionary Spending
to Reduce the Budget Deficit, by Gregg Esenwein and Philip Winters.
CRS Report RL30708. Social Security, Saving, and the Economy, by Brian W.
Cashell.
CRS Report RS21126. Tax Cuts and Economic Stimulus: How Effective Are the
Alternatives?, by Jane Gravelle.
CRS Report RL31134. Using Business Tax Cuts to Stimulate the Economy, by Jane
Gravelle.

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