Order Code 97-690 F
Updated May 26, 2004
CRS Report for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
Kyrgyzstan: Recent Developments
and U.S. Interests
Jim Nichol
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Summary
This report examines faltering reforms and other challenges to Kyrgyzstan’s
independence that have raised U.S. concerns. It discusses U.S. policy and assistance for
democratization and other programs. Basic facts and biographical information are
provided. This report may be updated. Related products include CRS Issue Brief
IB93108, Central Asia’s New States, updated regularly.
U.S. Policy 1
According to the Bush Administration, the United
States wants Kyrgyzstan to democratize, develop free
markets, become integrated into the global economy,
remain at peace with its neighbors, and provide for the
welfare of its citizens. U.S. aid aims to enhance
Kyrgyzstan’s sovereignty and integrity and its ability to
protect human rights, prevent proliferation, halt
trafficking in narcotics and persons, and combat
transnational crime and terrorism. Kyrgyzstan provides
“crucial support for coalition forces” for Operation
Enduring Freedom (OEF), Operation Iraqi Freedom,
and the Global War on Terrorism, “most notably in hosting the Ganci Coalition Airbase”
(State Department, FY2005 Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations).
Kyrgyzstan has been a “dependable and outspoken ally in the global war on terrorism”
(Patterns of Global Terrorism 2003).
Cumulative U.S. humanitarian and technical budgeted assistance to Kyrgyzstan for
FY1992-FY2003 was $697.35 million (FREEDOM Support Act and other Agency funds),
with Kyrgyzstan ranking third in such aid per capita among the new independent states
1 Sources include Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report: Central Eurasia;
RFE/RL Newsline; Eurasia Insight; International Monetary Fund (IMF); the State Department’s
Washington File; and Reuters and Associated Press (AP) newswires.
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

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of the former Soviet Union. The
Kyrgyzstan: Basic Facts
United States also facilitated the deliv-
Area and Population: Land area is 77,415 sq. mi.;
ery of Department of Defense excess
about the size of South Dakota. Population is 5.05
and privately donated commodities
million (International Monetary Fund, 2003 est.).
worth $202.4 million in FY1992-
Ethnicity: 65.7% Kyrgyz; 11.7% Russians; 13.9%
FY2003. Estimated aid for FY2004
Uzbeks, 1% Uighurs; 0.4% Germans, and others
(FREEDOM Support Act and other
(Kyrgyz Statistical Comt., 2001 est.). Ethnic Uzbeks
foreign aid, excluding Defense and
are a majority in southern Kyrgyzstan. About
420,000 ethnic Kyrgyz reside elsewhere in the former
Energy Dapartment aid) was $43.2
Soviet Union and 170,000 in China.
million. The Administration’s FY2005
Gross Domestic Product: $1.9 billion; per capita
request for $39.5 million in foreign aid
GDP is about $376 (IMF, 2003 est., current prices).
for Kyrgyzstan is planned primarily
Political Leaders: President: Askar Akayev; Prime
for local and national democratization,
Minister: Nikolay Tanayev; Chairman of Assembly of
judicial reform, and law enforcement
People’s Representatives: Altay Borubayev;
equipment and training to combat drug
Chairman of the Legislative Assembly: Abdygany
trafficking, organized crime, and ter-
Erkebayev; Foreign Minister: Askar Aytmatov;
rorist financing. The Administration
Defense Minister: Lt. Gen. Esen Topoyev.
states that Kyrgyzstan “has been a
Biography: Akayev was born in 1944 and trained as
leader within Central Asia in develop-
a physicist. In 1987, he was elected vice president of
the Kyrgyz Academy of Sciences, later becoming its
ing democratic institutions,” although
president. In 1990, he became a member of the Soviet
there have been setbacks, and it re-
Communist Party Central Committee. In 1990, ethnic
quests funding for FY2005 to help the
riots in Osh region led to demands for the ouster of
country prepare for free and fair legis-
the Kyrgyz Communist Party (KCP) head. When the
lative and presidential elections. Since
Kyrgyz Supreme Soviet met in October 1990, it
Akayev has stated that he will abide
rebuffed the KCP head’s bid to become president and
by constitutional term limits and not
elected Akayev. In October 1991, Akayev was
run for re-election, the Administration
reaffirmed as president in an uncontested popular
hopes that the 2005 presidential race
vote, and was re-elected in 1995 and 2000.
will become “a model for peaceful,
democratic transfer of executive
power in the region” (Congressional Budget Justification).
Contributions to Campaign Against Terrorism
The Kyrgyz government declared its support for the war on terrorism almost
immediately after the September 11, 2001 attacks on the United States and agreed to
provide information on terrorists. President Akayev stressed that the terrorist threat to
Central Asia emanating from Afghanistan had increased, and on September 25, 2001,
stated that he had approved a U.S. request to use Kyrgyz airspace for counter-terrorist
operations in Afghanistan. In late November 2001, it was reported that U.S. combat
aircraft were to be deployed in Kyrgyzstan. Reportedly, Uzbekistan’s restrictions on
flights from its airbases were a major spur to this U.S. decision. At the same time,
Akayev reportedly granted Russian requests for the use of airfields and other means to
facilitate Russian aid deliveries to Afghanistan. The U.S. military repaired and upgraded
the air field at the Manas international airport (the U.S. facilities were named after the late
New York firefighter Peter J. Ganci), and war support to Afghanistan began in March
2002. The Defense Department reported in October 2003 that the airbase was the
“primary hub” for trans-shipping personnel, equipment, and supplies to Afghanistan. In
early 2004, the airbase hosted about 1,100 troops from the United States, Denmark, Italy,
the Netherlands, South Korea, and Spain. The Administration may be considering asking

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Kyrgyzstan for long-term access to military facilities for emergency training and staging
by rapid-reaction forces. Such access might involve no permanent or a very limited U.S.
military presence (Washington Post, March 25, 2004).
Just after U.S.-led coalition forces began ground operations in Iraq in late March
2003, Kyrgyzstan’s Legislative Assembly (lower chamber) issued a statement calling for
the United States to cease “gross violations” of international law. Although Kyrgyz
Foreign Minister Aytmatov told Vice President Cheney during a June 2003 U.S. visit that
Kyrgyzstan was ready to send peacekeepers to Iraq and Afghanistan, in April 2004 the
presidential spokesman and the defense minister announced that Kyrgyzstan had no plans
to send peacekeepers to either country.
Foreign Policy and Defense
Akayev’s 1999 foreign policy concept called for close relations with ancient “silk
road” route countries, including China, former Soviet republics, and Turkey, Iran, India,
and Pakistan, including because landlocked Kyrgyzstan must rely on its neighbors for
access to world markets. Kyrgyzstan has also pursued good relations with Western states
in its search for aid. Cultivating good ties with China, Akayev joined leaders from
Russia, Kazakhstan, and Tajikistan in 1996 and 1997 in signing agreements with China
on demarcating and demilitarizing the former Soviet-Chinese border. Kyrgyzstan’s
cession to China of a small mountainous border area fueled protests by many people in
Kyrgyzstan and calls that the government not make the same “mistake” in border talks
with Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. Many in Kyrgyzstan are concerned that China’s
economic and population growth in bordering areas threatens the country. Kyrgyzstan’s
relations with Uzbekistan have been marked by trade, border, and other disputes.
Akayev has stressed close relations with Russia. Reasons include hoped-for
economic and trade benefits and security ties to alleviate concerns about Chinese and
Uzbek intentions. While relying on security ties with Russia, Kyrgyzstan has pursued
ancillary (and perhaps partly countervailing) security ties with the United States, NATO,
and China that Akayev in December 2003 hailed as creating “comprehensive” security.
Kyrgyzstan and Russia concluded a Friendship and Cooperation Treaty in 1992, and
Kyrgyzstan signed the Commonwealth of Independent States’ (CIS) Collective Security
Treaty (CST) in 1992 and 1999. These and other agreements call for cooperation with
Russia in training and defense. Several hundred Russian border troops (most reportedly
were Kyrgyz citizens) guarded the Chinese border until 1999, when Russia handed over
control to Kyrgyzstan, citing costs and other reasons. However, Russia reversed its
pullout with the signing of a 15-year military basing accord with Kyrgyzstan in September
2003 for use of the Soviet-era Kant airfield near Kyrgyzstan’s capital of Bishkek. The
base hosts about 20 aircraft and 300-700 troops that are said to be units of a CST rapid
deployment force and is a scant 20 miles from the Ganci airbase. Although the purpose
of the base ostensibly is to combat regional terrorism and defend southern CIS borders,
Putin stressed that the base “enshrines our military presence in Kyrgyzstan,” appearing
to underline that the base also counters U.S. and NATO security influence. The CIS Anti-
Terrorist Center (ATC) — a body created largely at Putin’s urging to facilitate
cooperation between Russia’s Federal Security Service and other CIS intelligence bodies
— set up a regional “branch” in Bishkek after 9/11.

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Kyrgyzstan’s armed forces numbered about 10,900 ground, air force, and air defense
troops. There are also about 5,000 border guards (The Military Balance 2003-2004).
Most of the troops are ethnic Kyrgyz conscripts, though some officers are Russians. A
defense development plan approved in August 2002 called for creating a small and mobile
army trained in mountain warfare to combat terrorists. Kyrgyzstan joined NATO’s
Partnership for Peace (PFP) in 1994 and has participated in many PFP exercises in the
United States, Central Asia, and elsewhere.
A reported 800 guerrillas belonging to the terrorist Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan
(IMU) and to rogue groups from Tajikistan invaded Kyrgyzstan in July-August 1999,
taking Japanese geologists and others as hostages and occupying several Kyrgyz villages.
They allegedly aimed to create an Islamic state in south Kyrgyzstan as a springboard for
jihad in Uzbekistan. Kyrgyzstan received urgent air support from Uzbekistan and
Kazakhstan and expelled the invaders in October 1999. The incursion illustrated ties
between terrorists in Central Asia, Russia (Chechnya), and Afghanistan, and the need for
Kyrgyzstan to bolster its defenses. A reported 500 IMU and other insurgents again
invaded southern Kyrgyzstan (others invaded Uzbekistan) in August 2000, taking U.S.
tourists as hostages and causing thousands of Kyrgyz to flee. Uzbekistan provided air and
other support, but Kyrgyz forces were largely responsible for defeating the insurgents by
late October 2000. The State Department designated the IMU as a Foreign Terrorist
Organization in September 2000. According to the State Department, the IMU did not
invade the region in the weeks before 9/11, in part because Al Qaeda had secured IMU
aid for Taliban fighting against the Afghan Northern Alliance. Although much of the
IMU has been decimated by U.S.-led coalition operations in Afghanistan, the IMU has
continued some activities in Kyrgyzstan. In 2002 and 2003, the IMU set off bombs in
Bishkek and Osh. Kyrgyzstan arrested the bombers in May 2003, allegedly before they
were able to carry out a plan to bomb the U.S. Embassy. In November 2003, Kyrgyzstan
arrested others who allegedly had targeted U.S. interests (Patterns of Global Terrorism
2003). Kyrgyzstan also has jailed dozens of members of the Hizb ut-Tahrir Islamic
extremist group and of the Eastern Turkestan Liberation Organization, which calls for
independence for China’s Xinjiang region.
Political and Economic Developments
President Akayev has orchestrated frequent constitutional changes to preserve and
enhance his powers. A new constitution approved in 1993 established a presidential
system with separation of powers and expansive human rights guarantees. Akayev held
an October 1994 referendum (an illegitimate process under the constitution) to approve
constitutional amendments to weaken the legislature. He argued that the constitution was
too “idealistic” since “people are not prepared for democracy,” and that a “transitional
period” was needed. The amendments created a bicameral legislature called the Jogorku
Kenesh (Supreme Council), consisting of a Legislative Assembly that served continuously
and represented “all people,” and an Assembly of People’s Representatives that met in
regular sessions and represented regional interests. Only after the referendum were
detailed constitutional provisions published. Akayev spearheaded another constitutional
referendum in February 1996 to give him greater powers to veto legislation, dissolve the
legislature, and appoint all but the prime minister without legislative confirmation, while
making impeachment more difficult, along the lines of Russia’s Constitution. According
to the State Department, the referendum was marked by fraudulent voting. Despite these
restrictions on its powers, the legislature increasingly asserted itself in law-making and

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oversight. Moving to further weaken it, Akayev held a referendum in October 1998 to
restrict its influence over bills involving the budget or other expenditures, limit a
legislator’s immunity from removal and prosecution, increase the size of the Legislative
Assembly to 60, and decrease the size of the Assembly of People’s Representatives to 45.
Despite these successive limitations on its powers, the legislature continues to display a
degree of independence by overriding presidential vetoes, criticizing government policies,
and voting on confidence in the prime minister and cabinet.
Kyrgyzstan’s most recent February 2000 Legislative Assembly election was a
setback for democratization, according to the U.S. State Department. Observers from the
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) criticized the disqualifica-
tion of prominent opposition parties and candidates, the pro-government composition of
electoral boards, harassment of opposition candidates, and irregularities in vote-counting.
The OSCE concluded that the October 29, 2000, presidential election was a further
setback to democratization, though it hailed the democratic sentiments of many election
officials and voters as promising for the future. Kyrgyzstan’s Central Electoral
Commission (CEC) registered six candidates for the race, including incumbent President
Akayev, but disqualified major opposition and other prospective candidates. Akayev
officially won 74.5% of 1.46 million votes cast. Irregularities included media bias, ballot
box-stuffing, and fraudulent vote-counting, according to the OSCE.
Seeking more presidential powers, Akayev in 2002 formed a Constitutional Council
composed of government and civil society representatives to propose amendments, which
were then passed on to an Expert Group of officials and scholars to finalize. As occurred
in Kazakhstan, the government-led group axed many Council suggestions and added
many others without public input, according to the State Department. A February 2,
2003, referendum on the amendments was deemed “highly flawed” by the State
Department, because of multiple voting, manipulated ballot counting, and forged results.
The amended constitution boosts presidential powers at the expense of legislative powers.
Also as in Kazakhstan, former presidents now have immunity from prosecution and
cannot be detained, searched, or interrogated. Two controversial provisions were
removed on January 21, one giving the president absolute veto power over legislation and
the other eliminating the right of citizens to appeal to the Constitutional Court. The
amendments create a 75-member unicameral legislature after its next election in 2005.
The 2004 constitutional changes eliminate party list voting in legislative elections, a
provision many of the 43 registered parties fear as threatening their ability to gain seats
and hence to survive politically. Also of potential harm to democratization, a new
election code was signed into law in January 2004 that the OSCE stated does “not
establish a legal framework that provides for democratic elections.” The code does not
ensure that electoral commissions are impartial, that monitoring is permitted at all stages
of the electoral process, and that voting and tabulation are transparent. Despite the
limitations of the code, the United States urges that upcoming elections be free and fair
( Supporting Democracy and Human Rights, 2004).
Kyrgyzstan’s human rights record was poor and worsened in some areas during
2003, according to the State Department’s Country Reports on Human Rights Practices
for 2003. However, compared to other Central Asian states, Kyrgyzstan has a less
objectionable record, some observers argue. Security forces at times beat and mistreated
detainees and there were “many cases” of arbitrary arrest or detention. Human rights
advocates, oppositionists, and disfavored religious minorities sometimes were targeted

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for police abuse. The government reported that 20% of prison inmates die each year,
primarily from disease and malnutrition, but prison conditions improved slightly during
2003. Some police were held responsible for abuses. Also, a governmental Ombuds-
man’s Office established in 2002 appeared in a few cases to defend human rights. Ar
Namys (Honor) Party head Feliks Kulov was the only political prisoner, according to the
State Department. In April 2004, rumors appeared that Kulov would be released during
a prospective amnesty, but he was not, and a protest by his supporters was suppressed.
There were several independent newspapers and television and radio stations.
Government control over publishing and distribution at times was used to harass print
media. Reporters were at times physically attacked or more often sued for libel (a
criminal offense). Foreign media outlets mostly operated freely. The government
permitted a private printing press supported by the U.S. Administration and Congress to
begin operating in November 2003. The government sometimes harassed Christian
groups or Islamic groups viewed as extremist. The June 2003 Trafficking in Persons
Report listed Kyrgyzstan as having problems with trafficking for prostitution and labor,
but the government has taken some moves to discourage such trafficking, such as
legislating criminal penalties.
Foreign assistance has been a significant factor in Kyrgyzstan’s budget, contributing
by 2004 to public foreign debts of $1.77 billion. The Paris Club of government lenders
eased Kyrgyzstan’s debt payment burden in 2002 and will probably do so again in 2005.
The IMF calls for Kyrgyzstan to limit future borrowing so that it can service its debt.
Kyrgyz GDP stopped declining in 1995 and grew 5.2% in 2003, led by increases in gold
mining, agriculture and food processing, electricity production, and services. Inflation
increased in 2003 to 2.7%. The poverty rate has slowly declined in recent years, but over
one-third of Kyrgyz still live in poverty, making the country among the poorest in the
world, according to the World Bank. Akayev and the IMF in 2001 launched an initial
three-year, $100 million poverty reduction program. Agriculture accounts for the largest
portion of GDP (about 40%) and employs much of the workforce. Gold mining is the
major industry and accounted for over one-third of export revenues ($259.6 million of
$734 million) in 2003. Increased drug trafficking and other crime in recent months led
Akayev in April 2004 to warn that “criminals have penetrated the state,” particularly the
Interior (police) Ministry. Crime and endemic corruption stifle economic growth and
private foreign investment. Kyrgyzstan leads Central Asia in the privatization of most
farms, industries, housing, and retail outlets. Kyrgyzstan has surplus hydroelectric energy,
rare earth mineral reserves, and tourism potential that could aid its development, and is
a major wool producer. U.S. technical assistance contributed to Kyrgyzstan’s admission
into the World Trade Organization in late 1998.

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