Order Code RL32392
CRS Report for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
Bosnia and Herzegovina:
Issues for U.S. Policy
May 20, 2004
Steven Woehrel
Specialist in European Affairs
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress
Bosnia and Herzegovina: Issues for U.S. Policy
Summary
The 1995 Dayton Peace Accords, brokered primarily by the United States, ended
the war in Bosnia, which had cost hundreds of thousands of lives and created over
2 million refugees and displaced persons. The Dayton Peace Accords also set up
Bosnia’s current political structure of two semi-autonomous, ethnically-based
“entities” and a weak central government. It resulted in the deployment of a NATO-
led peacekeeping force, which has been charged with providing a secure environment
for the implementation of the peace agreement. A U.N.-appointed High
Representative, created by the Dayton Accords, oversees the civilian implementation
efforts.
In the more than eight years since the accords, the United States and other
countries have scored significant achievements in Bosnia, including sharply reduced
inter-ethnic violence, restored freedom of movement, and the return of many refugees
and displaced persons to their homes. The international community has also helped
Bosnia hold largely free and fair elections and set up many of the institutions of a
modern democratic state. However, these individual successes have not added up
to the accomplishment of the overall goal of international efforts in Bosnia: the
creation of a stable, united Bosnia, able to continue reforms on its own and integrate
into Euro-Atlantic institutions. Almost all progress on reforms and on promoting
greater unity in Bosnia continues to require direct or indirect intervention by
representatives of the international community. Reform efforts continue to be met
by obstructionism or passivity by the nationalist parties that control Bosnian
governments at all levels. Some observers also assert that the cumbersome governing
institutions set up by the Dayton Peace Accords are unworkable.
Supporters of international activism in Bosnia say that the only way to move
forward is to continue to impose reforms when necessary, and that when these
reforms reach a critical mass, they will become self-sustaining. According to critics
of current international policy on Bosnia, international interventionism has led to
dependency and irresponsibility among local elites. This problem is all the more
serious as the international commitment to Bosnia in troops and funding has
gradually decreased in recent years. In addition, critics say, the infringement of
Bosnia’s sovereignty represented by the Office of the High Representative may also
prove to be an obstacle in the country’s path toward European integration, Bosnia’s
ultimate goal.
Another important issue is whether Bosnia is still important to U.S. interests.
Some say that pressing U.S. commitments in other countries and regions argue for
transferring full responsibility for Bosnia to European countries. Others believe that
the United States still has a stake in Bosnia’s stability, as part of building a Europe
“whole and free,” the overarching U.S. objective in the region. They say continued
U.S. involvement in Bosnia may be needed to arrest indicted war criminals, as well
as to make sure that Bosnia is not used as a haven for organized crime or terrorists.
This report will be updated as events warrant.
Contents
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Successes and Remaining Challenges . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Prospects for Stability and Self-Sustaining Reforms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
U.S. Policy Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
SFOR and Partnership for Peace . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
War Crimes and Cooperation with the ICTY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Terrorism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
U.S. Aid . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
List of Figures
Figure 1. Map of Bosnia and Herzegovina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Bosnia and Herzegovina:
Issues for U.S. Policy
Introduction
The 1995 Dayton Peace Accords, brokered primarily by the United States,
ended three years of war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which had cost hundreds of
thousands of lives and created over 2 million refugees and displaced persons. Under
the Dayton Peace Accords, Bosnia-Herzegovina remains an internationally
recognized state within its pre-war borders. Internally, it consists of two semi-
autonomous “entities:” the (largely Bosniak and Croat) Federation of Bosnia-
Herzegovina and the (Bosnian Serb-dominated) Republika Srpska (RS). Under the
accords, the Bosnian Federation received roughly 51% of the territory of Bosnia-
Herzegovina, while the Republika Srpska received about 49%.
Each of the entities has its own parliament and government with wide-ranging
powers, as well as its own armed forces. Each entity may establish “special parallel
relationships with neighboring states consistent with the sovereignty and territorial
integrity” of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Most powers are vested in the entities; the central
government has responsibility for foreign policy, foreign trade and customs policy,
monetary policy and a few other areas. Central government decisions are nominally
taken by a majority, but any of the three main ethnic groups can block any decision
if it views it as against its vital interests. The Federation is further divided into ten
cantons, each of which has control of policy in key areas such as policing and
education.
The Dayton Peace Accords also resulted in the deployment of a NATO-led
peacekeeping force which has been charged with providing a secure environment for
the implementation of the peace agreement. A U.N.-appointed High Representative,
created by the Dayton accords, oversees the civilian peace implementation efforts.
Since 1997, this official has had the power to fire and take other actions against local
leaders and parties as well as to impose legislation in order to implement the peace
agreement and more generally bring unity and reform to Bosnia. The current holder
of this post is Paddy Ashdown of Great Britain. Ashdown also holds the post of the
European Union’s Special Representative in Bosnia.1
1 The text of the Dayton Peace Accords can be found at the website of the Office of the High
Representative (OHR): [http://www.ohr.int]. For more background on Bosnia’s history,
government structures and other issues, see CRS Report RL30906, Bosnia and Hercegovina
and U.S. Policy, by Steven Woehrel, March 28, 2001.
CRS-2
Figure 1. Map of Bosnia and Herzegovina
Danube
Sava
Prijedor
Bosanki Brod
Bihac
Brcko
Banja
Luka
Tuzla
Serbia
Sarajevo
Gorazde
Mostar
Bosnia and
Herzegovina
International Boundary
National Capital
Inter-Entity
Boundary Line
Adriatic Sea
0
25
50
75 Kilometers
0
25
50
75 Miles
Source: Map Resources. Adapted by CRS. (K.Yancey 5/10/04)
In the more than eight years since the accords, the United States and other
countries have scored significant achievements in Bosnia, including sharply reduced
inter-ethnic violence, restored freedom of movement, and the return of many refugees
and displaced persons to their homes. The international community has also helped
Bosnia hold largely free and fair elections and set up many of the institutions of a
modern democratic state. However, these successes in some areas have not added
up to the accomplishment of the overall goal of international efforts in Bosnia: the
creation of a stable, united Bosnia, able to continue reforms on its own and integrate
with Euro-Atlantic institutions. Almost all progress on reforms and on promoting
greater unity in Bosnia continues to require direct or indirect intervention by
Ashdown and other representatives of the international community. Reform efforts
continue to be met by obstructionism or passivity by the nationalist parties which
control Bosnian governments at all levels. Some observers also assert that the
cumbersome institutions set up by the Dayton Peace Accords are unworkable.
According to critics of current international policy on Bosnia, international
interventionism has led to dependency and irresponsibility among local elites. This
problem is all the more serious as the international commitment to Bosnia in troops
and funding has gradually decreased in recent years. In addition, the infringement of
Bosnia’s sovereignty represented by Office of the High Representative (OHR) may
also prove to be an obstacle in the country’s path toward European integration.
CRS-3
Critics ask how a country lacking all the attributes of sovereignty can hope to join
NATO or the EU one day, or, in the near term, participate meaningfully in such
programs as NATO’s Partnership for Peace program. They wonder if Bosnia can or
should continue to operate indefinitely as a ward of the international community, as
the rest of the region moves, however slowly in some cases, toward European
integration.
Another important issue is whether Bosnia is still important to U.S. interests,
particularly given perhaps more pressing U.S. commitments in other countries and
regions. The United States has invested substantial sums to stabilize Bosnia. From
FY1991 through FY2003, the United States spent over $13.5 billion in incremental
military costs in Bosnia, mainly for the U.S. peacekeeping contingent.2 U.S. aid to
Bosnia over the same period amounted to more than $1.4 billion.3 Some observers
believe that the European Union is now capable of dealing with Bosnia’s remaining
problems on its own. Indeed, the EU already provides the bulk of financial aid and
political guidance to Bosnia, and is expected to take over the military mission there
from NATO at the end of 2004. However, many observers believe that the United
States still has a stake in Bosnia’s stability, as part of building a Europe “whole and
free,” the overarching U.S. objective in the region. Continued U.S. involvement in
Bosnia may be needed to arrest indicted war criminals, as well as to make sure that
Bosnia is not used as a haven for organized crime or terrorists.
Successes and Remaining Challenges
Bosnia has achieved progress on some issues since 1995, but continues to fall
short in many others. One relative success story has been the restoration of freedom
of movement within Bosnia and the gradual return of refugees to their homes.
According to the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), by February
2004, nearly 1 million of the 2.2 million refugees and displaced persons had returned
to their homes, including over 430,000 who returned to areas in which they are an
ethnic minority. Ninety percent of the legal claims of persons wanting to have their
homes returned to them have been resolved. The UNHCR estimates that some
350,000 people want to return to their old homes but have not done so.4
While ethnic relations are sometimes tense, and some acts of violence do occur,
the main obstacle to refugee returns is economic. The war often had the effect of
destroying local industries, along with the jobs that made communities viable. Many
returnees are elderly. Many young people want to leave Bosnia for better
2 See CRS Issue Brief IB94040, Peacekeeping and Related Stability Operations: Issues of
U.S. Military Involvement, by Nina Serafino.
3 U.S. Agency for International Development, U.S. Overseas Grants and Loans, July 1,
1945-September 30, 2001, 170; U.S. State Department, SEED Act Implementation Reports,
FY2002 and FY2003.
4 UNHCR Bosnia website, [http://www.unhcr.ba] and transcript of a speech by Ashdown
at the U.N. Security Council, March 3, 2004, from the OHR website [http://www.ohr.int]
CRS-4
opportunities elsewhere, up to two-thirds of them, according to some polls.5 At the
end of 2003, OHR handed over responsibility for refugee issues to the Bosnian
human rights and minorities ministry.
A key focus of international efforts in Bosnia is to strengthen the rule of law.
The rule of law is particularly important in order to break down the parallel structures
connecting nationalist political parties, certain enterprises and organized crime.
Widespread corruption also retards economic development. According to an opinion
poll commissioned by Transparency International, Bosnians view corruption as the
second most serious problem the country faces, after unemployment.6
High Representative Ashdown has undertaken several steps to promote the rule
of law in Bosnia. He pushed through a new criminal code and a criminal procedure
code in 2003, and put into place three High Judicial and Prosecutorial Councils
(HJPCs) to vet about 1,000 judges and prosecutors for integrity and professional
competence, with ethnic representation proportionate to the 1991 pre-war Bosnian
census. The HJPCs also are responsible for disciplinary actions as well as for
appointing new judges and prosecutors. Ashdown is pressing the Bosnian central
parliament to consolidate the three temporary councils into a single, state-level one.
Ashdown also forced the creation of the Bosnian State Court, with special panels
dealing with organized crime. This court has both Bosnian and international judges
and prosecutors.
Until January 2003, police training was conducted by a U.N. police mission in
Bosnia. The mission vetted policemen for their professional qualifications and
participation in war crimes or illegal activity. An EU police mission, which replaced
the UN mission in 2003, is continuing the advisory and training functions of the U.N.
mission. The EU mission is currently studying how to restructure the Bosnian police
to make it more effective and financially sustainable. Ashdown successfully pushed
for the establishment of new central government law enforcement institutions,
including a Ministry of Justice, a Ministry of Security, and a State Information and
Protection Agency (SIPA), charged with dealing with issues such as money
laundering and organized crime, as well as terrorism. However, these institutions do
not function effectively, as they lack resources and sufficient staffing. There have
been a few successes in the area of rule of law. Courts in both entities have
prosecuted several cases against organized crime figures. In March 2004, the
Bosnian State Court handed down a guilty verdict in Bosnia’s biggest human
trafficking case.
Another area key to Bosnia’s future stability is economic reform and poverty
reduction. Here again, the situation is mixed. The International Monetary Fund has
praised Bosnia for its success in establishing macroeconomic stability, including low
inflation and a stable currency, due to a currency board system that pegs the
konvertibilna marka (KM) to the Euro. International officials have pushed through
a law to establish an Indirect Taxation Authority, the first step to introducing a value
5 Tim Judah, “Half-Empty or Half-Full Towns?” Transitions Online, February 5, 2004.
6 “BiH Corruption Moderately Dropping,” Transparency International BiH press release,
March 11, 2004.
CRS-5
added tax system in Bosnia. Rationalizing Bosnia’s tax system is necessary in order
to stimulate economic growth, as well as to provide resources for Bosnia’s
underfunded central government institutions. The international community is
pressing Bosnian leaders to cut back the size and expense of entity and lower level
governments, as the central government’s rule is strengthened.
However, severe economic problems remain. Bosnia is one of the poorest
countries in Europe, with per capita Gross Domestic Product (GDP) about one-half
of the pre-war level. About half of the population lives close to or below the poverty
line.7 According to some experts, Bosnia’s economy may be on the verge of crisis.
Many of Bosnia’s main pre-war industries, including military industries, have
collapsed, and new businesses to replace these lost jobs have not materialized.
According to this view, a substantial part of the economy is dependent on
government spending on oversized government bureaucracies (in part a legacy of the
complicated government structures created by the Dayton Peace Accords) as well as
residual international funding. The public sector accounts for about two-thirds of the
country’s GDP.8
Efforts to stimulate the economy to produce jobs and foreign investment have
only been partially successful. Ashdown has established a “Bulldozer Committee”
composed of OHR officials and Bosnian businessmen to develop specific proposals
to cut through red tape and take other steps to improve the business climate in
Bosnia. Nevertheless, Bosnia still lacks many elements of a suitable legal framework
to encourage domestic and international investors. Moreover, the privatization
process, which is in the hands of the entity governments, remains slow and plagued
by endemic administrative and legal shortcomings, according to the international
officials. Foreign direct investment (FDI) is increasing, in part due to Ashdown’s
efforts, but from a very low base. FDI made up only 5% of GDP in 2003, one of the
lowest percentages in the region. 9
Prospects for Stability and
Self-Sustaining Reforms
A major concern for international policymakers is the long-term impact on
Bosnia of declining international attention and resources. As noted above, most of
the modest reform successes in Bosnia have been initiated and pushed forward by the
international community. International aid has played an important role in keeping
the economy afloat. The nationalist parties in power have often reacted passively on
reform issues, or even engaged in overt or covert obstructionism. Local leaders often
concentrate on political maneuvering and securing resources for political patronage.
Efforts to promote Bosnia’s unity through the strengthening of state-level institutions
have also met with indifference or opposition. Under international pressure, new
7 USAID FY2005 Budget Justification to Congress, Annex III: Europe and Eurasia, 49.
8 Discussions with U.S. and European Balkan experts, March 2004.
9 European Commission, “Commission Staff Working Paper: Bosnia and Herzegovina,
Stabilization and Association Agreement 2004,” March 30, 2004.
CRS-6
institutions have proliferated, often without the funding or staffing to make them
effective.
Analysts have therefore expressed concern about the sustainability of Bosnia’s
reforms and the country’s long-term unity. According to some analysts, part of the
problem is due to the shortcomings of the Dayton constitution. They say the
governing structures set up by Dayton are too complex, with too many layers of
government that are too expensive and not accountable to the people. Various
proposals have been made for simplifying the structure, including eliminating the
entities to create a unitary state, or a system of cantons within a more conventional
federation.10
Another problem is that while Bosniaks overwhelmingly favor a united Bosnia,
Serbs, and to a lesser extent Croats, do not. For example, a State Department-
sponsored opinion poll in the Republika Srpska (RS) last year, found that 69%
favored RS independence from Bosnia. Another poll from the same source found
that former Bosnian Serb leader and indicted war criminal Radovan Karadzic is the
most popular politician in the RS. The poll also noted that the main nationalist
parties in Bosnia have maintained and even increased their support at the expense of
non-nationalist parties. On the other hand, 55% of Bosnian Serbs expect that,
notwithstanding their wishes, Bosnia will remain a single state. The poll found that
41% of Bosnian Croats favor remaining part of Bosnia, while 54% favor
independence or union with Croatia. Interestingly, Bosnian Croat support for Bosnia
has sharply increased since 1999, at the same time as Croatian governments have
publicly renounced territorial claims on Bosnia.11
Ashdown and previous High Representatives have tried to exhort local leaders
to take “ownership” of reforms, without much success. The international community
also tried to influence the domestic political scene by helping non-nationalist parties
win elections and form government coalitions. However, these efforts were not very
successful, due to the heterogeneity of the coalitions and the continued popularity of
nationalist groups, which successfully play on the fears of people and still have
effective patronage networks.
After the victory of the three major nationalist parties in the October 2002
general elections, Ashdown has tried to work with the new nationalist leaders on
reform issues, but has also jumped into the middle of the Bosnian political system
himself, campaigning under the slogan “Jobs and Justice.” He has intervened
actively in the making of laws and continues to fire and take other actions against
obstructionist politicians and parties. His moves have angered Bosnian leaders at
times, but there has been little public protest against his actions. Indeed, an October
2003 State Department-sponsored opinion poll indicated little public awareness of
the “Jobs and Justice” program. According to the same poll, Ashdown is supported
10 For one such proposal see European Stability Initiative, “Making Federalism Work: A
Radical Proposal for Practical Reform,” ESI website [http://www.esiweb.org].
11 “Bosnian Political Mood Hits Post-Dayton Low,” State Department Office of Research,
September 22, 2003 and “Bosniaks and Bosnian Croats Support, Serbs Oppose Unified
State,” State Department Office of Research, October 2, 2003.
CRS-7
by two-thirds of Bosniaks, but is opposed by two-thirds of Bosnian Croats and 94%
of Serbs.12
Bosnian critics of Ashdown charge that he has neglected the non-nationalist
opposition, which could have been his natural allies. Now, they charge, he is at a
political dead-end — partnered with ruling nationalist elites with little interest in
reform, and an opposition too weak and disenchanted to serve as a viable
alternative.13 Ashdown has replied that he has had to work with whomever the
Bosnian people elect as their leaders. Some analysts support Ashdown’s actions,
saying that however paradoxical it may seem, interventionism is needed in the short
term to provide the basis for a self-sustaining Bosnia.14 On the other hand, other
experts are concerned that local institutions cannot develop as long as OHR continues
its active, and some critics say undemocratic, intervention in Bosnian affairs. They
suggest that the development of responsible democratic local institutions should take
priority, and that OHR’s use of its powers should be more limited and more
accountable to the Bosnian people.15
Possibly acting in the international community’s favor in the long run is the
slowly increasing realization of Bosnian politicians that it is in their own interest to
promote Bosnia’s integration into the European Union. The 2003 EU summit in
Thessaloniki, Greece, held out the prospect of Bosnia and other countries in the
region joining the EU when they are ready. The problem with possible EU
membership as a motivating factor is that it may be too distant to have as powerful
an effect as it has had in Central Europe. Earlier this year, the EU warned that
Bosnia has not fully implemented any of the 16 measures set by an EU feasibility
study before it can begin negotiations on a Stabilization and Association agreement,
a first step in the long road to EU membership. Bosnia’s central government has set
a goal of EU membership by 2009, although most observers view this goal as
unrealistic at present.
What would be the impact of reduced international intervention in Bosnia’s
political system and a decrease in economic assistance, particularly if reforms are
slowed as a result? It appears unlikely that the situation could explode into conflict
again in the near future, perhaps most importantly because the geopolitical situation
in the region has changed. Bosnia’s civil war was in part the playing out of the
designs of nationalist leaders in Croatia and Serbia on Bosnian territory. According
to a State Department sponsored opinion poll, about a third to slightly less than one-
half of the three main ethnic groups believes that a return to fighting could occur
12 “Bosnian Views Diverge on the International Community,” State Department Office of
Research, October 8, 2003.
13 Mirsad Bajtarevic and Nerma Jelacic, “Ashdown Celebrates Lonely Anniversary,” IWPR
Balkan Crisis Report, no. 490, April 2, 2004.
14 International Crisis Group, “Bosnia’s Nationalist Governments: Paddy Ashdown and the
Paradoxes of State Building,” July 22, 2003, from the ICG website
[http://www.crisisweb.org].
15 See Gerald Knaus and Felix Martin, “Travails of the European Raj: Lessons from Bosnia
and Herzegovina,” Journal of Democracy, July 2003, 60-74.
CRS-8
within the next few years. Only about one-tenth are “very concerned” about such an
outcome.16
The downfall of nationalist regimes in Serbia and Croatia in 2000 reduced
concerns about a partition of Bosnia, as new democratic regimes in both countries put
domestic reforms and improving relations with the West over past nationalist projects
to redraw borders. The comeback of the nationalist HDZ party in Croatia and
nationalist forces in Serbia in 2003 have caused some concern. However, the HDZ
government has shown no interest in carving up Bosnia again, knowing that to do so
would put an end to achieving its main foreign policy goal, joining Euro-Atlantic
institutions. Similar views are held by leaders in Serbia, although some voices have
raised the possibility of a partition of Bosnia if Kosovo is permitted to become
independent from Serbia. The Serbian political scene remains unsettled, and a
victory by the ultranationalist Radical Party in future elections could conceivably
pose a danger to Bosnia’s future.
On the other hand, even if a poor, disunited, unreformed Bosnia could be
nominally stable, it still might also present problems. The weakness of its
institutions could provide an environment conducive to organized crime activities
such as trafficking in weapons, drugs and persons, as well as the operations of
terrorist groups, which could threaten U.S. and European interests.
U.S. Policy Issues
SFOR and Partnership for Peace
Due in part to the improving security situation in Bosnia and the need to shift
troops to the war on terrorism and other responsibilities, the NATO-led SFOR has
undergone deep reductions in recent years. By the end of this year, NATO’s role in
Bosnia is expected to shift from peacekeeping to reforming Bosnia’s armed forces
and other tasks. The European Union is planning to take over peacekeeping duties.
The EU force would use NATO’s planning capabilities and other assets, under what
is known as the “Berlin Plus” formula. The proposed EU force would reportedly
consist of about 7,000 troops.
In December 2004, NATO defense ministers agreed to reduce the size of SFOR
from under 12,000 (including about 1,800 U.S. troops) to 7,000 (of which about
1,000 would be U.S. soldiers, if U.S. troops continue to make up about 15% of the
total force). During a visit to Croatia in February 2004, Secretary of Defense Donald
Rumsfeld said that at the end of 2004, “if the situation is right, NATO will complete
its work [in Bosnia], and the EU will take over a new role in Bosnia, which is less
military and more police in its orientation...NATO would keep a headquarters in
Bosnia for the purpose of assisting with defense reform, and to assist with the
16 “Bosniaks and Bosnian Croats Support, Serbs Oppose Unified State,” State Department
Office of Research, October 2, 2003.
CRS-9
handling of indicted war criminals...”17 Current NATO plans call for a headquarters
consisting of 200 to 250 military personnel under U.S. command.18
U.S. and EU officials believe the proposed EU role in Bosnia could serve as a
precedent for a similar handoff of responsibilities in Kosovo, although widespread
anti-Serb violence in Kosovo in March 2004 may make this a more uncertain
prospect in the near term. On the other hand, it is unclear whether the EU successor
force will have the credibility that SFOR enjoyed partly due to the U.S. presence.
Bosniaks in particular have viewed the United States as their best ally among leading
Western nations, dating back to the perceived U.S. role in helping to put an end to
the war by permitting the Bosniaks to arm themselves. In contrast, European
countries are viewed less favorably, in part due to the perceived failures of the
European-led U.N. Protection Force (UNPROFOR) during the war. Some observers
claim that many European troops in KFOR were much less effective than U.S. troops
during the March 2004 riots in Kosovo, due at least in part to the restrictive rules of
engagement they had received from their governments.19 Some observers say the
United States should retain troops in Bosnia, because the Europeans by themselves
may not be able to ensure the country’s stability.20
An important focus of U.S. and international efforts in Bosnia is to promote
defense reforms that will permit Bosnia to join NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PFP)
program. Bosnia and Serbia and Montenegro are the only two European countries
that are not members of PFP. SFOR, OHR and Western governments have pressed
Bosnia to undertake defense reforms that will permit Bosnia to be admitted as a PFP
member by the NATO summit in Istanbul in June 2004. These reforms include the
unification of Bosnia’s two armies under a single command structure, including a
Minister of Defense and Chief of Staff. The army would not be unified at lower
levels, however. It would eventually comprise three 4,000-man brigades (down from
the current 22,000 men in both entity armies combined). One brigade would be
Bosniak, another would be Serb, and the third Croat.21 The supreme command of
this force would be held by Bosnia’s collective presidency, which also is composed
of one Bosniak, one Serb and one Croat.
It is an open question whether Bosnia will undertake all of the necessary reforms
by June 2004. The Bosnian parliament has passed the legislation needed to create the
new command structure. It approved a new defense minister in March 2004, after
two previous Bosnian Serb-nominated candidates for Defense Minister were rejected
by Ashdown due to their questionable conduct during the war. In March 2004,
17 State Department transcript of Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld’s press availability
with Croatian Prime Minister Ivo Sanader, February 8, 2004.
18 Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Newsline, Part II, May 10, 2004.
19 Discussion with a Serbian official, May 2004.
20 “Holbrooke to Bush: Keep Troops in Bosnia,” Associated Press, February 12, 2004. For
more on SFOR and the possible EU follow-on force, see CRS Report RS21774, Bosnia and
International Security Forces: Transition from NATO to the European Union in 2004, by
Julie Kim.
21 RFE-RL, February 5, 2004.
CRS-10
Ashdown, SFOR commander U.S. Maj. Gen. Virgil Packett, and other key
international officials in Bosnia warned Bosnian leaders that their country will not
be invited to join PFP in June unless “urgent” steps are made toward necessary
reforms. They said that Bosnian leaders lack the “political will” to move forward,
expressed as “residual obstructionism.” Reforms that are needed include nominating
qualified candidates for state-level defense institutions, providing these institutions
with adequate funding, and harmonizing current entity-level defense laws with the
new Bosnia-wide Law on Defense.22 Bosnia must also cooperate with the
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in order to become
a member of the PFP program.
War Crimes and Cooperation with the ICTY
An important focus of current U.S. and international efforts in Bosnia is to
apprehend indicted war crimes suspects and transfer them to the ICTY, particularly
former Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic and former army chief Ratko Mladic.
The Bosnian government and the two entity governments are required by the Dayton
Peace Agreement to fully cooperate with the ICTY. According to ICTY chief
prosecutor Carla Del Ponte, the Federation has largely cooperated with the ICTY,
but the RS has not. RS officials have not arrested a single indicted war criminal
since the peace accords were signed. Indeed, some of them have allegedly assisted
indictees to evade capture. Therefore, the arrest of war criminals thought to be
hiding in the RS has been left almost entirely to SFOR and agents of Western
governments.
The United States and its allies are motivated in their search for war criminals
by a desire for justice as well as a belief that the arrest and transfer of these two men
and other war criminals would deal a serious blow to those forces obstructing
reforms in Bosnia. However, this task has been complicated by uncertainty over the
whereabouts of Mladic and Karadzic. According to press reports, Mladic is living in
Serbia, and is therefore outside the jurisdiction of SFOR. Karadzic reportedly lives
mainly in Bosnia, repeatedly moving within the Republika Srpska to evade capture,
but may also live at times in Serbia and Montenegro. In recent years, U.S. officials
have said that SFOR’s mission in Bosnia would not be completed until Karadzic and
Mladic are in The Hague. However, the United States and its NATO allies are
expected to withdraw SFOR by the end of the year, while Karadzic and Mladic
remain at large. Both a proposed EU successor force and a NATO headquarters unit
would participate in developing intelligence for the possible seizure of war crimes
suspects, although the actual seizures themselves would likely be carried out by
specially-trained teams based outside of Bosnia.
In the meantime, SFOR has stepped up its efforts this year to try to apprehend
the two men. In a strategy that appears similar to that undertaken in 2003 to capture
Saddam Hussein in Iraq, SFOR has arrested several persons who are suspected of
assisting Karadzic to avoid capture, including a former Bosnian Serb defense
minister. Others have been removed from their posts by Ashdown, including high-
22 “BiH Failing to Meet Requirements for PfP, OHR press release, March 12, 2004, OHR
website, [http://www.ohr.int].
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ranking Bosnian Serb police officers, and Mirko Sarovic, a senior official of the
Serbian Democratic Party, formerly headed by Karadzic and now a ruling party in the
Republika Srpska. Ashdown has frozen the assets of these and other persons
suspected of helping war criminals. The United States has also added them to a list
of persons who are barred entry into the United States and whose U.S. assets are
frozen. In a March 2004 speech to the Republika Srpska parliament, U.S. war crimes
envoy Pierre-Richard Prosper warned that in addition to these steps, the RS could
face expanded political and economic sanctions if it does not cooperate with the
Tribunal. In April 2004, Ashdown blocked state funding to the nationalist Serbian
Democratic Party (SDS), charging that the SDS had helped to finance Karadzic’s
efforts to avoid arrest. Skeptics have noted that most SDS funding does not come
from the state, but from state-owned firms run by SDS supporters.23
The United States is also offering a $5 million reward to anyone providing
information leading to the capture of Karadzic or Mladic. Del Ponte claimed that
Karadzic had narrowly escaped capture during an SFOR raid in the Bosnian Serb city
of Pale in February 2004. Subsequent SFOR raids have failed to capture Karadzic,
including a raid on April 1, 2004 that resulted in severe injuries to a Serbian
Orthodox priest and his son. International critics of SFOR say that it has failed to
develop much useful intelligence on the whereabouts of war criminals and does not
coordinate sufficiently with the ICTY and other international organizations in
Bosnia.24
In addition to pursuing Karadzic and Mladic, the United States and the
international community have also promoted efforts to have war criminals tried by
local courts. This policy is part of the international “completion strategy” for the
ICTY, adopted in U.N. Security Council Resolution 1503 in August 2003. The
resolution calls for the ICTY to complete its investigations by 2004, its trials by
2008, and all appeals by 2010.
In October 2003, international donors held a conference on the establishment
of a war crimes chamber in the state court of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The United
States contributed $5 million and said it would contribute an additional $5 million
in 2004. The court is expected to hear its first cases in late 2004. However, it is
unclear how effective the new court will be. Bosnian courts have tried a few war
crimes cases so far, but have been criticized for long delays, insufficient protection
for witnesses, and ethnic bias. Recognizing this fact, the court will have international
judges and prosecutors working with their Bosnian counterparts for the first few
years, similar to Bosnian courts currently charged with prosecuting high-profile
organized crime cases. However, the court will have to depend on local police forces
to assist its work. Domestic war crimes prosecutions will also depend on Ashdown’s
efforts to improve Bosnia’s judicial system, including by dismissing corrupt and
ineffective prosecutors and judges, as well as imposing tougher criminal laws.
23 Institute for War and Peace Reporting (IWPR), Balkan Crisis Report No. 492, April 16,
2004.
24 IWPR Balkan Crisis Report No. 490. April 2, 2004.
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Terrorism
Since the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, the main focus of U.S. foreign
policy has been the war on terrorism. Terrorism has also become an important focus
of U.S. policy toward Bosnia, which has been a haven for Al Qaeda and other
terrorist groups, although it has not played as important a role in this regard as other
European countries such as Spain, Germany and Britain. One way in which Bosnia
is different from other countries in Europe is the role of several thousand Islamic
fundamentalist fighters during the 1992-1995 war in Bosnia. Most left Bosnia at U.S.
insistence after the deployment of the NATO-led peacekeeping force in December
1995. However, a few stayed and became Bosnian citizens by marrying Bosnian
women. Perhaps more troublesome have been Al Qaeda ties among some Islamic
charities and humanitarian organizations that proliferated during and after the war.
Al Qaeda used a few of them for planning attacks in Bosnia and elsewhere. Some
Al Qaeda operatives in Bosnia reportedly have had connections to members of
Bosnia’s intelligence service, another legacy of Bosniak wartime cooperation with
Islamic militants. In 2003, six former Federation officials were investigated for their
role in helping to establish a terrorist training camp in Bosnia with Iran’s help during
the mid-1990s.25
The issue of terrorism has been politicized in Bosnia to some extent, as each
ethnic group has used the label “terrorist” to define its adversaries. Some Bosnian
Serb officials have alleged that Bosniaks were harboring Islamic terrorists. However,
it should be stressed that Bosnian opposition to terrorism has been remarkably broad,
despite the still-deep ethnic divide in the country. The United States enjoys a strong
reservoir of support in Bosnia, especially among Bosniaks, for bringing peace to the
country and providing post-war aid. In addition, Bosniaks are known in the Muslim
world as particularly secular and European in outlook. This has often caused friction
between foreign Islamic extremists and many ordinary Bosniaks. Efforts by foreign
Islamists to recruit Bosniaks into their organizations have met with limited success.
Some Bosniaks also fear that the terrorists will give Bosnia a bad name in Europe,
thereby hindering their ability to travel there, and setting back Bosnian efforts to join
European institutions in the long run.26
In general, the Bosnian constitution gives domestic powers to fight terrorism to
the entities, while the central government deals with international efforts to fight
terror. Bosnian efforts to fight terrorism are hampered by the weakness and
inefficiency of its government institutions, which have created an environment in
which crime and corruption have flourished. One example of this corrupt
environment was the 2002 sale of arms from Bosnia to Saddam Hussein’s Iraq.
Ashdown’s efforts to strengthen state-level institutions and the rule of law may
increase the effectiveness of Bosnia’s fight against terrorism. With help from the EU
and United States, Bosnia has deployed a State Border Service throughout virtually
25 Patterns of Global Terrorism 2003, available from the State Department website at
[http://www.state.gov/].
26 Colin Woodward, “In Rebuilt Bosnia, No Terror Toehold,” Christian Science Monitor,
March 24, 2004, 1.
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all of the country’s territory. Ashdown is also pushing for implementation of
legislation to increase the effectiveness of the State Information and Protection
Agency, which is charged with combating terrorism, organized crime, trafficking and
smuggling of weapons of mass destruction. However, as with other issues,
Ashdown’s efforts have been slowed by local politicians opposed to an increase in
central government power. The 2003 State Department report on Patterns of Global
Terrorism said that Bosnia’s commitment to the fight against terrorism has slowed
since the victory of nationalist forces in Bosnia’s October 2002 elections. On the
other hand, the report notes that the Federation Financial Police has continued to
shut down NGOs and bank accounts linked to terrorists.27
The presence of SFOR and other international officials on Bosnia’s territory has
also helped in the fight against terrorism. NATO troops and intelligence services can
work with their Bosnian counterparts and independently track down and arrest
suspected terrorists. The powerful influence exercised by international officials in
Bosnia gives the United States more freedom to arrest and deport terrorists than in
many other countries, which might object on civil liberties or other grounds.
However, the delivery of five suspected terrorists in January 2002 by the Bosnian
government to SFOR was criticized by some Bosnian legal experts as a violation of
the rule of law. After SFOR’s withdrawal at the end of this year, a NATO
headquarters in Bosnia will continue to play a role in anti-terrorist efforts in Bosnia,
as will the EU successor force to SFOR.
U.S. Aid
U.S. aid to Bosnia has declined gradually in recent years, after an initial post-
war surge to deal with urgent humanitarian and reconstruction needs. The United
States is the largest bilateral donor to Bosnia, although the European Union and the
World Bank are the largest donors overall. U.S. aid has shifted to programs to help
Bosnia develop democratic institutions and a free market economy. From Bosnia’s
independence in 1992 through FY2001, the United States provided $1.35 billion in
aid. The United States provided $65 million in aid for Bosnia in funding under the
SEED program in FY2002 and $50 million in FY2003. In FY2004, the
Administration budgeted $44.7 million in SEED aid to Bosnia and has requested $41
million for FY2005. U.S. aid programs focus on such issues as strengthening the
country’s legal system, supporting small and medium-sized businesses, and making
refugee returns sustainable, through infrastructure repair, strengthening utility
companies and helping refugees become economically more self-sufficient.28
27 2003 State Department Patterns of Global Terrorism report.
28 U.S. Agency for International Development, U.S. Overseas Grants and Loans, July 1,
1945-September 30, 2001, 170; U.S. State Department, SEED Act Implementation Reports,
FY2002 and FY2003, and USAID FY2005 Budget Justification to the Congress, Annex III:
Europe and Eurasia.