Order Code 97-1055 F
Updated May 13, 2004
CRS Report for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
Turkmenistan: Recent Developments
and U.S. Interests
Jim Nichol
Analyst in Russian and Eurasian Affairs
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Summary
This report examines Turkmenistan’s halting economic and political reforms under
the authoritarian leadership of President Saparmurad Niyazov. It discusses U.S. policy
and assistance, including support for grassroots democratization and advocacy for
human rights. Basic facts and biographical information are provided. This report may
be updated. Related products include CRS Issue Brief IB93108, Central Asia’s New
States, updated regularly.
U.S. Policy1
According to the Bush Administration, the United
States “has strategic and economic interests in helping
Turkmenistan achieve political stability, independence,
and integration into the global economy.” The United
States promotes security cooperation to combat weapons
and drug smuggling that are sources of arms and funds for
terrorist groups. U.S. aid for “projects that address
significant U.S. interests” is planned for FY2005 to
enhance border security, reduce drug use, improve health
care, and support student and military exchanges (State
Department, Congressional Budget Justification for
Foreign Operations, FY2005). A State Department fact
sheet in November 2003 reported that there had been “a marked downturn in bilateral
relations” because of Turkmenistan’s human rights record. U.S. Ambassador to
Turkmenistan Tracy Jacobson asserted that same month that the main focus of U.S. policy
in the country is supporting democratization and human rights.
1 Sources include Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report: Central Eurasia;
RFE/RL Newsline; Eurasia Insight; Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU); the State Department’s
Washington File; and Reuters and Associated Press (AP) newswires.
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

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Cumulative U.S. aid budgeted for
Basic Facts
Turkmenistan in FY1992-FY2003 was
Area and Population: Land area is 190,359 sq. mi.;
$227.71 million (FREEDOM Support
slightly larger than California. The Kara Kum desert
Act and other agency funding), most
covers about 80% of land area. Population was 6.0
million in 2003 (Economist Intelligence Unit, est.).
involving food aid and training and
Ethnicity: 5.7 million (94.7%) are Turkmen, 109,000
exchanges. The United States also
(1.8%) are Russian, 121,000 (2.0%) are Uzbek, and
facilitated the delivery of Department of
others (2003 Turkmen state data). About 150,000
Defense excess and privately donated
ethnic Turkmen reside elsewhere in the former Soviet
Union, and 3 million or more in Iran and Afghanistan.
commodities worth $45.8 million in
Clans include the Tekke, Ersary, and Yomud.
FY1992-FY2003. Turkmenistan’s lack
Gross Domestic Product: $15.8 billion; per capita
of progress in economic and political
GDP is about $2,633 (EIU, est. for 2003, current market
reforms has been cited by successive
prices).
Administrations as a reason why only
Political Leaders: President and Chairman of the
Cabinet of Ministers: Saparmurad Niyazov; Chairman
limited U.S. aid is provided (compared
of the Mejlis (legislature): Ovezgeldi Atayev; Foreign
to other Central Asian states).
Minister: Rasit Meredov; Minister of Defense:
Estimated U.S. budgeted aid for
Agageldy Mamedgeldiyev.
FY2004 was $8.6 million (FREEDOM
Biography: Niyazov, born in 1940, became the first
Support Act and other foreign aid,
secretary of the Turkmen Communist Party (TCP) in
1985. In 1990 and 1992, he won uncontested presi-
excluding Defense and Energy
dential elections, and a referendum in January 1994
D e p a r t m e n t f u n d s ), an d t h e
extended his term until 2002. In 1999, he was named
Administration requested $9.3 million
president for life. He is president and head of the
for FY2005, including $1.15 million for
government, armed forces, the Democratic Party of
Turkmenistan (DPT, formerly the TCP), the People’s
Foreign Military Financing and
Council, and the State Security Council. He has created
International Military Education and
a “cult of personality,” under which he is termed
Training, and $2.1 million for Peace
“Turkmenbashi,” leader of all Turkmen, “the Eternally
Corps activities. In FY2000, the United
Great.” The national oath includes the phrase “[if] I
States provided Turkmenistan with a
betray .... Turkmenbashi, may my breath stop.” He
claims to have authored a 3-volume moral guide, the
coastal patrol vessel under the Excess
Rukhname, that is required reading in secondary,
Defense Articles grant program.
medical, and military schools and in mosques.
Among congressional action, S.
2305 (introduced on April 8, 2004) authorizes annual appropriations of $1 billion for
FY2005-FY2009 to support economic and political development in the Greater Middle
East and Central Asia, including support for citizens who advocate reforms. The Defense
Authorization Act for FY2005 (S. 2229; introduced on March 24, 2004) calls for not more
than $150 million for upgrading airspace controls in “key countries” of Central Asia to
create “a permissive and controlled air corridor from Europe through the Caucasus to
Central Asia and Afghanistan.” S.J.Res. 3, approved by the Senate on May 1, 2003, calls
for the Central Asian states to accelerate democratic reforms and fulfill their human rights
obligations, and calls for the President, the Secretary of State, and the Secretary of
Defense to press the government of Turkmenistan to respect due process and fair trials
and to release democratic activists and their family members from prison.
Contributions to the Campaign Against Terrorism
Immediately after 9/11, the Turkmen foreign ministry stated that Turkmenistan’s
policy of neutrality and its friendship with the Taliban precluded cooperation in a U.S.-led
military campaign. After Russia’s President Vladimir Putin acceded to an expanded U.S.
military presence in Central Asia, however, Turkmen President Niyazov on September
24, 2001, gave his consent for ground transport and overflights to deliver humanitarian

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aid to support U.S.-led anti-terrorism efforts in Afghanistan because “evil must be
punished.” Turkmenistan also permitted refueling privileges for humanitarian flights.
Nonetheless, the foreign ministry still argued that Turkmenistan was “neutral” because
it was not permitting military basing or the “transport of arms” through Turkmenistan.
During an August 2002 visit, U.S. Central Command head Tommy Franks thanked
Niyazov for permitting up to 40% of humanitarian aid sent to Afghanistan since 9/11 to
transit the country. Before the U.S.-led coalition launched actions in Iraq, Niyazov made
contradictory statements, but in April 2003, he endorsed Saddam’s removal and called for
establishing “democracy” in Iraq to safeguard the interests of ethnic Turks living there.
Foreign Policy and Defense
Turkmenistan’s “neutral” foreign policy is enshrined in its constitution. Niyazov has
declared that Turkmenistan’s “open door” or “permanent neutrality” policy precludes
joining political or military alliances and entails good relations with East and West. The
U.N. General Assembly in 1995 recognized Turkmenistan’s neutrality. Turkmenistan has
pursued close ties with both Iran and Turkey. In addition to trade ties with Iran,
Turkmenistan is also interested in cultural ties with the approximately one million
Turkmen residing in Iran. Turkmenistan supports some of Russia’s policies in the region
while endeavoring, where possible, to reduce Russian influence. In 1992, the two states
signed a Friendship and Cooperation Treaty containing security provisions. Russia
objects to Turkmen efforts to reduce dependence on existing natural gas export routes that
transit Russia. Although Turkmenistan joined the post-Soviet Commonwealth of
Independent States (CIS), it did not sign the Collective Security Treaty and Niyazov has
refused to sign other CIS agreements viewed as violating Turkmen sovereignty and
neutrality. Relations with Uzbekistan have been volatile. Both states vie for regional
influence and argue over water sharing. After a November 2002 coup attempt against
Niyazov, he accused Russia and Uzbekistan of colluding with the plotters, and both
Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan mobilized troops along their borders (see CRS Report
RS21384, Turkmenistan’s Attempted Coup). Russia, especially, has tried to maintain
economic ties with Turkmenistan (see below, Energy). Relations with Azerbaijan are
contentious, particularly regarding ownership of offshore oil fields.
Turkmenistan’s armed forces number 29,000, including ground, air, and naval/coast
guard forces (The Military Balance 2003-2004). Other forces include police troops
(2,000), security (2,500), a presidential guard (2,000), and border troops (12,000)
(Jane’s). It inherited a sizable arsenal from the Soviet Union, but many air and ground
craft may be inoperable. Turkmenistan has replaced its higher officer corps with ethnic
Turkmen and has replaced almost all lower echelon officers from Russia. Troops are
expected to grow their own food, earn money by picking cotton, and otherwise work
twenty days of each month on economic projects. Large-scale conscription is used not
only for military needs but to form “labor armies” that work with no pay in the energy
or agriculture sectors. Ukraine reportedly has provided four patrol boats, two radar
systems, small arms, and refurbishment for Mig-29s as part of barter for gas. In April
2003, Niyazov continued a purge of the military by firing the first deputy defense
minister, accusing him of conspiring in the coup attempt and illicit arms sales. Perhaps
indicating the underlying reason for the purge, Niyazov stated that he was taking virtually
total control over military activities. In late 1999, Russia’s 1,000 border troops in
Turkmenistan pulled out at Turkmenistan’s request (some “special border troops”
reportedly remain). In early 1995, Turkmenistan became the first Central Asian state to

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join NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PFP). Turkmen officers have participated in or
observed several PFP exercises.
Political and Economic Developments
Turkmenistan is the most authoritarian of the Central Asian states, according to the
State Department. Turkmenistan’s May 1992 constitution set up a “secular democracy”
embracing a presidential system of rule, and granted Niyazov overwhelming powers to
rule by decree as head of state and government, although other provisions called for a
balance of powers between executive, legislative, and judicial branches. The constitution
includes an impressive list of individual rights (though not freedom of the press), but
emphasizes that the exercise of rights must not violate public order or damage national
security. It created a People’s Council (Khalk Maslakhaty) with mixed executive and
legislative powers, consisting of the president, ministers, the fifty legislators of the
Supreme Council (Mejlis), “people’s representatives,” and others. The Khalk Maslakhaty
serves as a forum and rubber stamp for the president’s policy initiatives. Resurrecting
pre-Soviet customs, a Council of Elders, hand-picked by Niyazov, was also created to
advise the president and choose presidential candidates. The Mejlis routinely supports
presidential decrees and has little legislative initiative. The court system retains its basic
Soviet-era structure and functions.
The most recent election of the 50-member Mejlis was held on December 12, 1999.
Niyazov rejected a role for parties, stating that partisanship could lead to clan rivalries.
Prior to the race, Niyazov stepped up his repression of political and religious dissidents.
The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) refused to send
monitors, citing the government’s control over the electoral process. Changes to the
Constitution were introduced in late December 1999 during a joint meeting of the Mejlis,
the Khalk Maslakhaty, and Niyazov’s National Revival Movement, to include naming
Niyazov president for life. The State Department termed the life term “a further step
backward on the path toward democracy.” On April 6, 2003, 65 “people’s
representatives” to the Khalk Maslakhaty and 5,535 members of local legislative councils
were elected. Reportedly, 144 candidates contested for the Khalk Maslakhaty seats and
56,323 for the local seats. The Central Electoral Commission reported a Soviet-era 99.8%
turnout. The State Department reported that diplomats found polling stations mostly
empty and that the use of mobile ballot boxes and family voting was prevalent.
Niyazov has proclaimed that no one over 70 years of age should be president, so he
will step down and a “democratic” presidential election will be held at the end of the
decade. In August 2003, the Khalk Maslakhaty unanimously elected Niyazov its “lifetime
speaker,” perhaps signifying that he will rule from this post after “retiring” as president.
Niyazov also had the Khalk Maslakhaty approve amendments to the constitution making
it the supreme legislative and executive body and greatly expanding its size. Niyazov
explained that it would be harder for coup plotters to take over such a large body.
In 2001, Niyazov granted extra powers to the National Security Committee (NSC;
a successor to the Soviet-era KGB), a major pillar of his rule, to oversee the defense and
foreign ministries. However, he launched purges of the NSC and defense and interior
ministries in 2002-2003. In the wake of the coup attempt, Niyazov in December 2002
created an advisory State Security Council composed of defense and security officials.
There are increasing reports of demonstrations and other popular unrest in Turkmenistan.

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Exile opposition groups are being joined by more and more former officials who flee
Turkmenistan. Such groups include the United Democratic Opposition, headed by former
foreign minister Avdy Kuliyev, and the People's Democratic Movement, headed by
former foreign minister Boris Shikhmuradov (convicted for leading the 2002 coup attempt
and serving a life sentence). Both groups have warned that the United States should be
careful in forging closer ties with Central Asia so that it is not perceived by the region’s
peoples as propping up authoritarian regimes.
According to most observers, Turkmenistan’s humans rights record is extremely
poor. According to the State Department’s Country Reports on Human Rights Practices
for 2003, the human rights situation in Turkmenistan deteriorated markedly after an
alleged coup attempt against President Saparamurad Niyazov in November 2002 and
continued to worsen in 2003. Numerous, systematic violations of due process, including
arbitrary arrest and torture were cited. The government severely restricted freedom of
speech and assembly. It completely controlled radio and local television and censored all
newspapers and access to the Internet. No parties other than the Democratic Party
(formerly the Communist Party) were permitted to operate legally. Niyazov argued on
U.S. television in November 2003 that parties should not be composed of “unsatisfied”
and “offended people or mercenaries.” New laws that took effect at the end of 2003
threatened the legality and activities of many domestic and international non-
governmental organizations. Ethnic Russians, Uzbeks, and other non-Turkmen faced
increased discrimination that led over half to leave within the past few years.
In March 2003, the government reinstated an exit visa requirement for all citizens
wishing to travel outside the country. These moves triggered a U.S. presidential report
to Congress in August 2003 that Turkmenistan was violating the freedom of emigration
provisions of the Trade Act of 1974 (the so-called Jackson-Vanik provisions), but a
waiver was issued. Niyazov dismissed these U.S. concerns in November 2003, asserting
that the visa aimed to prevent criminals and terrorists from fleeing justice and that anyone
who wanted to leave Turkmenistan only had to tell the authorities. In January 2004,
however, he lifted the exit visa requirement. The State Department’s 2004 International
Religious Freedom Report lists Turkmenistan as a state that is hostile toward minority or
non-approved religions, and it warns that religious freedom deteriorated in Turkmenistan
during the past year (the report did not, however, mark Turkmenistan for possible
sanctions). A law on religion passed in October 2003 bans faiths that violate “civil
harmony” and gives Niyazov the ultimate authority to legalize or ban faiths. In May
2004, Niyazov repealed parts of the law criminalizing unregistered religious activities.
In December 2003, U.S. and Russian emissaries joined others to approve an unusual U.N.
General Assembly resolution urging Turkmenistan to implement human rights reforms
as suggested by the OSCE and to permit prison visits. The United States also joined in
approving a resolution in the U.N. Human Rights Commission in April 2004 criticizing
human rights conditions in Turkmenistan.
Turkmenistan’s GDP growth was 12.4%, down from 21.6% the year before
(Economist Intelligence Unit est.). The main sources of GDP growth were oil, gas, and
cotton production. Turkmenistan is among the world’s top ten in cotton production, and
agriculture accounts for over 50% of employment. The public sector accounts for about
75% of GDP. According to the World Bank, Turkmenistan’s underlying fiscal position
has weakened over the years as public sector deficits have ballooned (including subsidies
for consumer goods and industry and agriculture). Consumer inflation rates eased from

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nearly 1,000% in 1995-1996 to 9.5% in 2003 (Economist Intelligence Unit est.). Niyazov
has boosted wages, but wage arrears are high. This, and wage payments in goods keep
down inflation. Poverty and unemployment are widespread and may be growing,
although some necessities of life are provided free or at low cost. Some observers allege
that government corruption is exacerbated by official involvement in drug trafficking. A
Development Strategy through the year 2020 was approved by the Khalk Maslikhaty in
August 2003. Days before the session, Niyazov ordered that many of the targets be
recalculated, and called for energy targets to reflect glowing foreign press
prognostications. He declared that the strategy will bring Turkmenistan up to the par of
Western states in terms of wealth and the quality of life. In May 2004, Niyazov hailed the
meeting of plan targets and ordered the government to pay wage arrears and consider
doubling wages. Mismanagement and corruption in the banking sector appear ongoing,
despite frequent purges. In April 2004, Niyazov ordered banks to make no loans that
might not be paid back.
The U.S. Department of Energy in August 2003 reported estimates of between 0.5
and 1.7 billion barrels of proven oil reserves and 71 trillion cubic feet (tcf) of proven
natural gas reserves in Turkmenistan (which is less than 1% of the proven oil reserves and
less than 4% of the proven gas reserves in the Persian Gulf). In the late 1980s,
Turkmenistan was the world’s fourth largest natural gas producer. It is now largely
dependent on Russian export routes, and gas and oil production remain below the levels
of the Soviet period, held back by aging infrastructure, inadequate investment, and export
disputes. In 1993, Russia had halted Turkmen gas exports to Western markets through
its pipelines, diverting Turkmen gas to other Eurasian states that had trouble paying for
the gas. In 1997, Russia cut off these shipments because of transit fee arrears and other
problems. After this, Turkmenistan was forced to agree to terms offered by Russia’s
natural gas firm Gazprom (or its subsidiary Itera).
Appearing resigned to getting less than the world market price, Niyazov signed two
accords. He signed a 4-year accord with Ukraine in 2002 to supply it over 60 billion
cubic feet of gas (bcf) per year; this compares with yearly exports that have been about
35-38 bcf. In 2003, he signed the second accord, a 25-year accord with Russia to supply
it 200 bcf of gas in 2004 (about 12% of production), rising to 2.8 tcf in 2009. The results
would perhaps then tie up a large part of Turkmenistan’s production. Both these accords
call for Turkmenistan to accept 50% of payments in goods and services.
Seeking alternative export routes, Turkmenistan in December 1997 opened the first
pipeline from Central Asia to the outside world beyond Russia, a 125-mile pipeline
linkage to Iran’s pipeline system, but disputes have limited the amount of gas sent to Iran.
Some oil is also sent to Iran in a swap arrangement. In November 1999, Turkmenistan,
Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey signed a framework accord on a trans-Caspian gas
pipeline. Contention between Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan over shipment quotas for this
planned pipeline and other problems led Turkmenistan to reject participation. The United
States had advocated building such a pipeline since Turkmenistan could transport some
of its gas through routes not controlled by Russia and Iran. The United States also
endorses Turkmenistan’s proposal to build a gas pipeline through Afghanistan to
Pakistan, but investment remains elusive.

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