Order Code RL32347
CRS Report for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator
Budget Request and Plan, FY2005-FY2009
April 9, 2004
Jonathan Medalia
Specialist in National Defense
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

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Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator
Budget Request and Plan, FY2005-FY2009
Summary
Nuclear earth penetrator weapons burrow into the ground some tens of feet
before detonating, greatly increasing their ability to destroy hardened underground
targets. The United States currently has one type of nuclear earth penetrator, the
B61-11 bomb, but that weapon cannot penetrate certain types of terrain in which
hardened underground facilities may be located. Accordingly, the Air Force and the
National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) are studying a more effective
penetrator, the Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator (RNEP).
RNEP is controversial. Congress debated it at length in 2003. In that year, the
Secretary of Defense stated that RNEP was a study. NNSA’s FY2005 budget
document, however, shows RNEP funding increasing sharply after FY2005, for a 5-
year total of $484.7 million, should the weapon proceed beyond the study phase.
NNSA states that no decision has been made to proceed with RNEP and that out-year
figures are shown to meet congressionally-mandated budgeting requirements and are
not a request. There are additional cost elements beyond the $484.7 million, but a
total cost estimate must await completion of a cost study, to be completed in late
FY2006. RNEP requests are subject to congressional approval, rejection, or
modification.
RNEP, if it proceeds, would be considerably more costly than the B61-11
because it must penetrate into much harder terrain than the B61-11 can withstand.
It therefore requires more elaborate design, testing, manufacturing, and certification.
NNSA projected that a feasibility and cost study of RNEP currently under way
would cost $45 million between FY2003 and FY2005, but it now projects a cost of
$71 million between FY2003 and FY2006.
Members of Congress have raised questions about RNEP in 2004 on several
counts: programmatic issues, such as the legality of certain tests planned for the
RNEP study; whether the large increase in the RNEP in the out years was consistent
with legislation requiring congressional approval for RNEP to move beyond the
study phase; and whether there is a military requirement for the weapon.
This report explains the budget request and provides details on the plan. It will
be updated often to track developments. CRS Report RL32130, Nuclear Weapon
Initiatives: Low-Yield R&D, Advanced Concepts, Earth Penetrators, Test Readiness,
by Jonathan Medalia, discusses technical background, history, and issues.

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Contents
Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
The RNEP Budget and Plan, and NNSA’s Explanation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Criticisms, Questions, and Responses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Programmatic Questions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
RNEP Budget and Need for Congressional Approval . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Is There a Military Requirement for RNEP? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

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Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator
Budget Request and Plan, FY2005-FY2009
Background
Nuclear earth penetrator weapons burrow into the ground some tens of feet
before detonating, greatly increasing their ability to destroy hardened underground
targets. The United States has one type of nuclear earth penetrator, the B61-11
bomb, which was accepted into the stockpile in September 2001.1 That weapon,
though, according to an article by several scientists from Los Alamos National
Laboratory, “cannot survive delivery into certain types of terrain in which such
[hardened underground] facilities may be located.”2 The Robust Nuclear Earth
Penetrator (RNEP) is at present a study, begun in May 2003, of modifications to
convert existing B61 or B83 nuclear bombs to an earth penetrator configuration.
While the Air Force is leading the study, the National Nuclear Security
Administration (NNSA) — a semiautonomous agency in the Department of Energy
(DOE) responsible for nuclear warheads — is in charge of studying modifications of
specific warheads.
RNEP is controversial. Supporters argue that it is needed to attack hard and
deeply buried targets (such as leadership bunkers or WMD production facilities) in
countries of concern, thereby deterring or defeating challenges from such nations;
critics assert that RNEP would lower the threshold for use of nuclear weapons and
prompt other nations to develop nuclear weapons to deter U.S. attack. (For technical
background, history, and issues, see CRS Report RL32130, Nuclear Weapon
Initiatives: Low-Yield R&D, Advanced Concepts, Earth Penetrators, Test Readiness.)
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld said in May 2003 that RNEP “is a study. It
is nothing more and nothing less.”3 The plan was that the RNEP study would cost
$15 million a year for FY2003-FY2005. While Congress appropriated the FY2003
request of $15.0 million, the FY2004 request met much criticism. The House
rejected an amendment by Representative Tauscher to transfer funds from RNEP to
conventional means of attacking buried targets. The Senate tabled an amendment by
Senator Dorgan and another by Senator Feinstein to bar funds for RNEP, and adopted
an amendment by Senator Nelson (FL), and a similar amendment by Senator Reed,
1 “B61-11 Enters the Stockpile,” Weapons Insider: A Publication of the Nuclear Weapons
Program, Los Alamos National Laboratory, Sept./Oct. 2001, p. 2.
2 Bryan Fearey, Paul White, John St. Ledger, and John Immele, “An Analysis of Reduced
Collateral Damage Nuclear Weapons,” Comparative Strategy, Oct./Nov. 2003, p. 312.
3 U.S. Department of Defense. “DoD News Briefing — Secretary Rumsfeld and Gen.
Myers.” May 20, 2003. At [http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/2003/
tr20030520-secdef0207.html].

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to require congressional authorization to start development engineering (discussed
below) or later phases of RNEP. (The Nelson amendment became Section 3117 of
P.L. 108-136, the FY2004 National Defense Authorization Act.) Congress reduced
the FY2004 appropriation to $7.5 million.
In response to this reduction, NNSA plans to spend almost all of the $7.5
million to study the B83 as an RNEP candidate, and little on the B61 study.4 The
B83 study is being conducted by Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, in
Livermore, CA, and Sandia National Laboratories’ Livermore branch; the B61 study
is the responsibility of Los Alamos National Laboratory, Los Alamos, NM, and
Sandia National Laboratories’ headquarters facility in Albuquerque, NM.
The RNEP Budget and Plan,
and NNSA’s Explanation
Congress required NNSA — and required DOE before NNSA was created —
to provide a five-year budget projection (current year plus four out-years) in the
National Defense Authorization Acts for FY1997 (P.L. 104-201, Sec. 3155), FY2000
(P.L. 106-65, Sec. 3253), and FY2001 (P.L. 106-398, Sec. 3154 and 3155). The
FY2005 budget cycle is the first in which NNSA presented the out-year projection
along with the current request. For RNEP, the projected figures are: FY2005
(request), $27.6 million; FY2006, $95.0 million; FY2007, $145.4 million; FY2008,
$128.4 million; and FY2009, $88.4 million, for a five-year total of $484.7 million.5
The FY2005 request also presented a plan for RNEP. All figures for FY2005-
FY2009 are subject to congressional approval, rejection, or modification.
The research program for FY2003-FY2009 is currently estimated to cost $498.3
million — $6.1 million spent for FY2003, $7.5 million appropriated for FY2004, and
$484.7 million, as noted, for FY2005-FY2009. If RNEP proceeds through
development and production, additional costs would include the cost to complete
production engineering and the cost to manufacture components to convert the
selected weapon into an earth penetrator. Further, there would be a division of labor
between NNSA and the Air Force, with NNSA responsible for the penetrator case
and the Air Force responsible for the guidance unit (tail assembly, guidance
computer, etc.) The foregoing figures exclude Air Force costs.
NNSA cannot provide an estimate of the total program cost at this time. Current
work on RNEP is a study of feasibility, design definition, and cost of two candidate
weapons for conversion to RNEP. The study will generate data to support a choice
of one of these designs (assuming that at least one is shown to be feasible). Cost will
depend, for example, on the complexity of design, manufacture, and certification, and
4 Information provided by NNSA staff, Feb. 10, 2004.
5 U.S. Department of Energy. Office of Management, Budget, and Administration/CFO.
FY 2005 Congressional Budget Request. vol. 1, National Nuclear Security Administration.
DOE/ME-0032, Feb. 2004, p. 63. The RNEP budget is available under “Directed Stockpile
Work” at [http://www.mbe.doe.gov/budget/05budget/index.htm].

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on the number of units produced. Until the study is completed, NNSA will not have
enough data to provide an estimate of the total cost of the RNEP program.
NNSA stated, though, that the RNEP project will cost much more than the B61-
11 conversion.6 (Figures for the B61-11 are not yet available.) RNEP will be more
costly for several reasons.7 The B61-11 was a minimal change, mainly inserting the
nuclear explosive package from an older B61 bomb into a new penetrator case. In
contrast, RNEP is intended to penetrate terrain that the B61-11 cannot, so RNEP will
face a deceleration force much greater than that intended for any other nuclear
weapon. While the nuclear explosive package is to remain unchanged, many
nonnuclear components must be redesigned, at considerable cost, to withstand this
high stress. The stress and redesign would make it more difficult, and thus more
costly, to certify the performance of RNEP than the B61-11 without nuclear testing.
Several technical difficulties, advances, and uncertainties also make the cost of
RNEP and B61-11 hard to compare:
! The B61-11 conversion was done in the field. NNSA built the
conversion kits and provided them to the Air Force. Air Force
personnel then installed the kits at Air Force bases. (The cost of
conversion is not included in NNSA’s total.) In contrast, should
RNEP proceed, NNSA would convert existing weapons (B61 or B83
bombs) to RNEPs at NNSA facilities.
! RNEP could draw on the experience gained with conventional
penetrating weapons. In particular, the enhanced guided bomb unit-
28 (EGBU-28) is, like RNEP, in the 5,000-pound class.8 EGBU-28
has an inertial navigation system aided by a global positioning
system navigation system for all-weather delivery.9 It is said to be
highly accurate.10 However, components for nuclear weapons must
meet special standards for qualification. Accordingly, NNSA and
the Air Force indicate that at a minimum there would be some
modifications to the EGBU-28 guidance system. It is possible that
a different system would be used.
6 Information provided by NNSA staff, Apr. 9, 2004.
7 Information provided by NNSA staff, Apr. 8, 2004.
8 Information on RNEP provided by NNSA staff, Apr.1, 2004. Information on EGBU-28
from U.S. Air Force. Materiel Command. “Edwards B-2 Test Program Drops Live 5,000-
Pound Weapons.” AFMC News Service Release 0833, Aug. 20, 2003. By 2nd Lt. Brooke
Davis, Air Force Flight Test Center Public Affairs.
9 U.S. Department of Defense. Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,
Technology, and Logistics. Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Future
Strategic Strike Forces. Feb. 2004, p. 5-5.
10 “Enhanced Guided Bomb Unit (EGBU)-28,” GlobalSecurity.org, Apr. 21, 2003.

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! The Air Force stated that the B-2 bomber would carry RNEP.11 An
Air Force officer reportedly said, “There were no physical
modifications done on the B-2 rotary launcher assembly” to enable
it to carry the EGBU-28. “There was only a small software change
... to integrate the weapon onto the B-2.”12 It is too early to say what
modifications, if any, the B-2 would require in order to carry RNEP.
! The RNEP would require various tests to develop and validate its
ability to penetrate. Lessons learned from developing the EGBU-28,
other conventional penetrating weapons, and the B61-11 should
accelerate progress on RNEP and might reduce costs that would
otherwise be incurred.
By way of background, the Departments of Defense and Energy agreed years
ago to a formal set of phases by which modified nuclear weapons move through
research, development, production, deployment, and retirement, often called the
Phase 6.X process. The key phases for RNEP are: Phase 6.2, feasibility study and
option down select; Phase 6.2A, design definition and cost study; Phase 6.3,
development engineering, in which the nuclear weapons laboratories produce a
completed warhead design; and Phase 6.4, production engineering, in which the
design is adapted for production and a system to manufacture the weapon is created.
NNSA stated the performance targets for RNEP are as follows:
! FY2005: “Complete 56% of scheduled RNEP Phase 6.2/6.2A activity.”
Further, “In FY2005, subsystem tests and a full system test of the
proposed design will be completed.”
FY2006: “Complete 100% of scheduled RNEP Phase 6.2/6.2A activity.”
FY2007: “Report results of RNEP Phase 6.2/6.2A to Nuclear Weapons Council [a joint
Department of Defense (DOD)-DOE agency that coordinates nuclear weapon programs]
Obtain, if applicable, RNEP Phase 6.3 appropriate authorization. Complete initial 25% of
scheduled RNEP Phase 6.3 activity (if authorized).”
FY2008: “Complete 65% of RNEP Phase 6.3 activity (if appropriately authorized).”
FY2009: “Complete 100% of scheduled RNEP Phase 6.3 activity (if authorized). Complete
15% of scheduled RNEP Phase 6.4 activity (if appropriately authorized).”13
The FY2005 request document therefore seems to cast serious doubt on
assertions that RNEP is only a study. However, NNSA Administrator Linton Brooks
stated:
We included funds in our out-year budget projections to comply with legislative
requirements for five-year budget projections. The out-year projections are
placeholders in the event the President decides to proceed with development and
11 Information provided by U.S. Air Force, Apr. 7, 2004.
12 “Edwards B-2 Test Program Drops Live 5,000-Pound Weapons.”
13 Department of Energy, FY 2005 Congressional Budget Request, vol. 1, p. 69, 70, 76.

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Congress approves. No decision will be made until the study is completed. The
law is clear that beginning 6.3 engineering development requires Congressional
approval.14
The legislation that he referred to is P.L. 108-136, FY2004 National Defense
Authorization Act, Section 3117, which states:
The Secretary of Energy may not commence the engineering development phase
(phase 6.3) of the nuclear weapons development process, or any subsequent
phase, of a Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator weapon unless specifically
authorized by Congress.
An NNSA manager responsible for the program stated that, if out-year funds
were not included in the FY2005 budget, NNSA would face two choices that it
deems unsatisfactory: (1) By the time the budget for one fiscal year is submitted, the
budget for the next fiscal year is largely fixed; without the placeholder, a decision to
proceed with RNEP could not be implemented until the second fiscal year. (2)
Alternatively, without the placeholder, a decision to proceed with RNEP could be
implemented promptly only by taking the needed funds out of other programs. The
budget projection reflects costs that might be expected if RNEP proceeds to Phases
6.3 and 6.4. The official emphasized that no decision has been made on whether or
not to proceed with those phases pending completion of the Phase 6.2/6.2A study.15
The RNEP study was initially projected to cost $45 million — $15 million a
year for FY2003-FY2005. The numbers, however, have changed for each year. For
FY2003, delay in submission of a DOD study required by the FY2003 National
Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 107-314, Sec. 3146) delayed the start of NNSA’s
RNEP study; as a result, $6.1 million was spent of the $15.0 million appropriated.
For FY2004, Congress cut the RNEP appropriation to $7.5 million. For FY2005, the
request is $27.6 million, vs. the $15.0 million originally planned. Finally, FY2006,
not FY2005, will be the last year of the RNEP study; NNSA estimates the FY2006
request at $30 million. The four-year total is about $71 million.
Owing to the uncertainties of the program, NNSA could not, as of early March
2004, project an RNEP budget for FY2007-FY2009. Indeed, a purpose of the
6.2/6.2A study is to provide a firm estimate of the cost of the project in Phase 6.3 and
beyond. Thus no firm estimate is likely for some time. There is likely to be a
schedule disconnect between submission of the FY2007 request, which in the normal
course of the budget process would occur in early February 2006, and completion of
the Phase 6.2/6.2A study, which will probably occur several months later, late in
FY2006. It is unclear how NNSA would propose to handle a possible FY2007
request for 6.3 funds for RNEP.
14 Letter from Linton F. Brooks, Administrator, NNSA, to Honorable Ellen O. Tauscher,
Mar. 17, 2004.
15 Telephone interview, Feb. 10, 2004.

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According to NNSA, the study’s cost has grown for several reasons.16 The $45
million did not take into account the need for participation in the study by the
production plants (Y-12 Plant and Kansas City Plant) that would make RNEP
components, or by Pantex Plant, which would convert existing weapons into RNEPs;
their participation adds approximately $9 million. NNSA has imposed additional
project management requirements that add approximately $3.5 million. The rest of
the increase comes from (1) refinements of cost estimates due to better definition of
the requirements of the study, (2) inflation, (3) a requirement for an independent
review of the weapons under consideration,17 and (4) a decision to address new
requirements such as surety (safety, security, and use control) in the proposed draft
Military Characteristics.18 NNSA states that no additional subsystem or full-scale sled
track testing will be performed as part of the Phase 6.2/6.2A study beyond those tests
noted below, nor will the production plants be authorized to begin any production
development activities in Phase 6.2/6.2A. Regarding surety, DOE requires that any
modification of a nuclear weapon includes looking for ways to increase its surety.19
An NNSA source reports, “NNSA and the Air Force are committed to exploring
ways to increase surety in a cost effective manner, consistent with DOE and military
requirements.”20
Criticisms, Questions, and Responses
Critics have reacted to the RNEP budget projection and plan. Representative
Tauscher, in a letter to NNSA Administrator Linton Brooks, stated that “This is the
first notice that we have received of a significantly ramped up activity,” and that “the
planning and budgeting for further steps in the 6.X process in the next five years
speaks to a clear intent to develop these modified nuclear weapons at a time when the
feasibility study has not been completed and the Department of Defense has not
16 NNSA amplified on information in this paragraph on Apr. 1, 2004.
17 For most nuclear weapons in the past, the two nuclear design laboratories (Lawrence
Livermore National Laboratory and Los Alamos National Laboratory) would offer
competing designs. DOE would select one design at the end of Phase 2 or 6.2, and designers
from the other laboratory, at that laboratory’s expense, would review the winning design.
For RNEP, with two designs carried through Phase 6.2A, NNSA plans to form an
Independent Review Team of representatives from Livermore, Los Alamos, and Sandia
National Laboratories who were not directly involved with the design of either RNEP
candidate. This team would review both designs and identify any items that would prevent
either candidate design from proceeding to Phase 6.3.
18 “Military Characteristics” are contained in a DOD document that presents NNSA with
detailed requirements for the performance of a nuclear weapon to be designed. Military
Characteristics might include requirements for a weapon to have a certain maximum weight,
to be able to penetrate certain geologies, to have a specified type of fuzing, and to be
compatible with the electrical system of a particular aircraft.
19 U.S. Department of Energy. Order DOE O 452.1B, “Nuclear Explosive and Weapon
Surety Program,” approved Aug. 6, 2001, Section 4(f).
20 Information provided Mar. 22, 2004.

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submitted a request for this weapon.”21 Steven Aftergood of the Federation of
American Scientists argued that there are not five-year budgets for every research
program that might lead to development. He reportedly said, “If they had
placeholders for every funding scenario, they’d have to request an infinite amount of
money .... This is an expression of intent to move ahead with an expanded
program.”22 Another critic, Jay Coghlan, director of Nuclear Watch of New Mexico,
was quoted as saying, “The present administration is definitely seeking to expand
U.S. nuclear capabilities — while at the same time it denounces any kind of effort by
others to do the same.”23
Programmatic Questions. The following paragraphs present questions
from Representative Tauscher’s letter, responses from Administrator Brooks,24 and
additional information based on discussions with staff from NNSA, Los Alamos
National Laboratory, and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. Representative
Tauscher wrote:
For FY 2005 the budget request describes the RNEP activities as including
“subsystems tests and full system test of the proposed design.” Such activities
appear to go beyond research activities and may be interpreted to fall into 6.3
activities. In your view, why are such activities consistent with legislation
passed by Congress last year? What specific activities would be associated with
the initial year of 6.3 work on the RNEP in FY 2007?
Administrator Brooks responded:
The “subsystem and full system tests of the proposed design” refer to impact
tests to be performed on surrogate penetrator bodies at Sandia National
Laboratories’ sled track facility. These tests are consistent with the definition
and requirements for a Phase 6.2 feasibility study. We need to understand
whether the penetrator bodies are survivable to ground penetration in the
required geologies before feasibility can be assessed.
The context of this question is that the FY2004 National Defense Authorization
Act, P.L. 108-136, section 3117, requires specific congressional authorization before
starting Phase 6.3 or subsequent phases of RNEP. NNSA indicated that one type of
physical test (as distinct from a computer simulation) is planned as part of the
6.2/6.2A study: a series of “sled track tests” at Sandia National Laboratories. Some
would be done as full system tests, in which the various components of an RNEP
would be assembled in a penetrator body (a strong, heavy, pointed metal case)
21 Letter from Representative Ellen Tauscher to Linton Brooks, Administrator, National
Nuclear Security Administration, March 8, 2004, available from Rep. Tauscher's website
at [http://www.house.gov/tauscher/03-08-04.htm].
22 Paul Richter, “Questions Raised about Bomb Plan,” Los Angeles Times, Mar. 11, 2004:
12.
23 Jeff Tollefson, Santa Fe New Mexican.com, Mar. 11, 2004.
24 Letter from Linton F. Brooks, Administrator, NNSA, to Honorable Ellen O. Tauscher,
Mar. 17, 2004.

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without a guidance system or fissile materials.25 This assembly would be mounted
on a sled that is sent down a track at high speed and slammed into a large concrete
block to test how well the components withstand the deceleration required of an earth
penetrator weapon. This type of test is included in the 6.2/6.2A study because NNSA
deems it essential to assess feasibility. In turn, a successful demonstration of
feasibility is a necessary condition for the weapon to proceed to Phase 6.3. In
preparation for the full system tests, a number of subsystem sled tests will be
conducted, in which candidate RNEP components are slammed into a water target.
These tests are scheduled to start in the third quarter of FY2005, and will be held at
Sandia’s sled track, located at Kirtland Air Force Base in Albuquerque, NM.
More advanced tests would be conducted in Phase 6.3. In one type, “vibration
flyaround tests,” a mock-up of the weapon would be mounted on an aircraft and
flown to validate that the weapon would not be damaged by the vibration of the
aircraft and to determine the weapon’s aerodynamic stability. In this test, the device
would not be released. Another type of test, which would occur later in the
development process once the guidance system was developed, would involve
dropping a mock-up of the weapon from an aircraft. Both types of test would use
surrogate material (a heavy metal) instead of fissile materials. Other tests would
probably be conducted as well, but it is too early in the process to say which tests
would be conducted when.
Representative Tauscher also asked:
With regard to the Annual Performance Results and Targets, what technical,
military, and other criteria would the NNSA consider and what decisions would
be made before it requests legislative authorization to begin 6.3 work? Who is
involved in the determination to begin 6.3 work and why does the budget indicate
that this might happen in FY 2007? Similarly, what criteria would the NNSA use
to base its decision to go from phase 6.3 to 6.4 in FY 2009?
Administrator Brooks replied:
The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) does not make the
decision to proceed to Phase 6.3 or subsequent phases. If NNSA and the Air
Force agree that the Phase 6.2/6.2A study results support proceeding to Phase 6.3
engineering development, the Nuclear Weapons Council (NWC) could consider
whether to proceed further. If the NWC recommends going forward, NNSA
would move beyond the study stage only if the President approves and funds are
authorized and appropriated by the Congress.
He further stated that the criteria NWC would use in this decision include “the
feasibility and military utility of the design definition, and the projected cost and
schedule established in the Phase 6.2/6.2A Study,” and that “If RNEP does proceed
to 6.3, the President and Congress will make a separate decision on whether to
proceed to Phase 6.4, Production Engineering.”
25 Information provided Mar. 11 and 12, 2004.

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To support a decision to move RNEP to Phase 6.3, NNSA would address cost,
schedule, and feasibility, while the Air Force would address military requirements.
As a hypothetical example, NNSA might say that an RNEP would have a specified
cost, could be ready by a certain date, and would have certain characteristics (weight,
accuracy, depth of penetration, etc.) The Air Force might decide not to proceed if the
penetration ability was too low or if a nonnuclear alternative existed, or it might
recommend proceeding if the proposed RNEP was the only way to accomplish what
it considered a critical military mission. The decision to request congressional
approval would be worked through the Nuclear Weapons Council and ultimately be
made by the President. The decision on whether or not to proceed with Phase 6.3 is
projected to occur in FY2007 because the Phase 6.2/6.2A study is expected to
conclude late in FY2006.
RNEP Budget and Need for Congressional Approval. For many
Members, the 5-year cost of RNEP as presented in the FY2005 budget document
came as a surprise not only in the amount, but also in what appeared to be an intent
contrary to legislation barring Phase 6.3 or greater work on RNEP without
congressional authorization. Senator Domenici said:
I was surprised to see that the request — that nearly $500 million is provided for
the Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator in the out year funding. ... The department
[DOE] should not assume such large sums in its budget without
congressional approval or direction. ... I want it explained to this
committee unequivocally what we are doing and what we are authorizing,
and what we are not doing and what we are not authorizing, because
nobody on this committee is voting to do this. We’re voting to study it if
it wins, but not to do it. To study it is a small amount of money. To do it
is a lot of money.26
Senator Reid said to NNSA Administrator Linton Brooks:
I am a little concerned, maybe even put off by the notion that you’ve included a
half a billion dollars in your out year spending plan as what you call a place
holder for bunker busting, pending White House and congressional decisions.
I’m not sure that we can allow this to go forward. This is a large place holder.
Many remain unconvinced that this is an appropriate path.27
Senator Kennedy said to Secretary of Energy Spencer Abraham:
... you’re rushing ahead with the nuclear weapons, including the mini-nukes and
the nuclear bunker busters. I’ll give you a chance to be able to explain how this
program, which was $45 million two years ago is now up to almost $.5 billion.
26 U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Appropriations. Subcommittee on Energy and
Water Development. Hearing on the FY2005 budget of the National Nuclear Security
Administration. Mar. 23, 2004, p. 2. Transcript by Federal News Service, Inc.
27 Ibid., p. 5.

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... Why are we going ahead and are going to be requesting $.5 billion from
Congress on new nuclear weapons, the bunker buster?28
In a colloquy, Senator Warner expressed his concern on the RNEP budget and
Secretary Abraham offered an explanation:
Senator Warner: Let’s talk about the Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator. And I
was looking at the out years, and particularly 2006, looking at a fairly substantial
increase. And I bring to your attention the fact ... in 2004, the Department of
Energy — we put in the legislation — may not proceed to the engineering
development phase three or to subsequent phases without a specific authorization
from Congress. And can you correlate that substantial ‘06 bump up with this
statutory provision, which I hope will remain?
Secretary Abraham: The statutory provision, Mr. Chairman, would, of course,
govern any decision to move from a stage of research or preliminary inquiry to
the engineering phase. We are required to provide five-year budgets, however,
so that people can look down the road and make a proper sort of assessment of
what potential expenses will be.29
Is There a Military Requirement for RNEP? Another concern is that there
is no military requirement for RNEP.
Senator Reed: ... Is there a specific military requirement for the RNEP today?
Secretary Abraham: It was the conclusion of the Nuclear Posture Review that a
threat that needed to be addressed in the 21st century in the immediate period
ahead of us would be hard, deeply buried targets. A number of approaches to
dealing with that were then asked to be researched. This is just one of them. It’s
a threat that rose to the level of being included in that review.
Senator Reed: There’s no doubt about the threat. But it’s your opinion that the
position of the administration is there is a specific military requirement for the
RNEP, not for a device to counter deeply buried targets, but for the RNEP? Is
that your position?
Secretary Abraham: No. The position of the administration is that we should
inquire about or that we should make inquiries and investigate a variety of
approaches to dealing with the hard, deeply buried target. Whether or not this
approach is feasible is the first question. And the second is whether or not it’s
preferable to other approaches that would involve conventional weapons. And
we have not completed the first phase of that inquiry, let alone the second.30
28 U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Armed Services. Hearing on the FY2005
Department of Energy defense-related activities budget request. Mar. 23, 2004, p. 15.
Transcript by Federal News Service, Inc.
29 Ibid., p. 8.
30 Ibid., p. 18.

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NNSA has further stated that the term “requirement” has been used in two
senses.31 Before DOD or NNSA start a concept study, there is a perceived need for
a capability. This type of need used to be called a “requirement,” but DOD now uses
the term “desired capabilities and characteristics.” In the case of RNEP, this
perceived need has reportedly been documented in classified form. An unclassified
document dealt more generally with defeat of hard and deeply buried targets.32
“Requirement” is also used for a specific weapon as applied to the acquisition
process. According to NNSA, DOD “will not have an acquisition requirement before
there is a well defined system or component for them to acquire. In the nuclear
weapon life cycle, that will not occur until the completion of the Phase 2A/6.2A
study.
31 NNSA provided the information in this paragraph on April 1, 2004.
32 U.S. Departments of Defense and Energy. Report to Congress on the Defeat of Hard
and Deeply Buried Targets, Submitted by the Secretary of Defense in Conjunction with the
Secretary of Energy in Response to Section 1044 of the Floyd D. Spence National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001, PL 106-398, July 2001, 24 p.

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