Order Code RL32314
U.S.- Thailand Free Trade Agreement Negotiations
April 1, 2004
Raymond J. Ahearn and Wayne M. Morrison
Specialists in International Trade and Finance
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
*RL32314*
*RL32314*

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U.S.- Thailand Free Trade Agreement Negotiations
Summary
On October 19, 2003 President Bush and Thai Prime Minister Thaskin agreed
to negotiate a bilateral free trade agreement (FTA). The Bush Administration notified
Congress on February 12, 2004 that it intends to begin the negotiations, starting a 90-
day period for consultations with Congress and the private before negotiations can
actually commence. And on March 30, 2004, the two sides announced that the
negotiations would begin on June 28, 2004.
In the notification letter sent to the congressional leadership, U.S. Trade
Representative Robert Zoellick put forth an array of commercial and foreign policy
gains that could be derived from the agreement. The letter states that an FTA would
be particularly beneficial to U.S. agricultural producers who have urged the
administration to move forward, as well as to U.S. companies exporting goods and
services to Thailand and investing there. Mr. Zoellick also alluded to sensitive issues
that will need to be addressed: trade in automobiles, protection of intellectual
property rights, and labor and environmental standards.
As in most FTA negotiations, competing viewpoints on the desirability and
nature of the provisions of the agreement are likely. As background for
congressional oversight of the negotiations, this report examines Thailand’s economy
and trade orientation, discusses the scope and significance of the U.S.-Thai
commercial relationship, and summarizes key negotiating issues.
Thailand’s economy has recovered strongly from the 1997 Asian financial crisis.
With real GDP growth of 6.7% in 2003 and a projected growth of 7%-8% in 2004,
Thailand could overtake China as Asia’s fastest growing economy. With around
20% of Thai exports destined for the U.S. market, the United States is Thailand’s
largest export market. In 2003, Thailand was the United States’ 23rd largest export
market ($5.8 billion) and its 16th largest supplier of imports ($15.2 billion).
Countries that form FTAs agree at a minimum to phase out or reduce tariff and
non-tariff barriers (NTBs) on mutual trade in order to enhance market access between
the trading partners. The U.S.-Thailand FTA is expected to be comprehensive,
seeking to liberalize trade in goods, agriculture, services, and investment, as well as
intellectual property rights. Other issues such as government procurement,
competition policy, environment and labor standards, and customs procedures are
also likely to be on the negotiating table.
The U.S.-Thailand FTA negotiations are of interest to Congress because (1) an
agreement would require passage of implementing legislation to go into effect; (2)
an agreement could increase U.S. exports of goods, services, and investment, with
particular benefits for agricultural exports; (3) an agreement could increase
competition for U.S. import-competing industries such as textiles and apparel and
light trucks, thereby raising the issue of job losses; and (4) an agreement, if
implemented, would establish the second U.S. free trade partner in Asia (Singapore
was the first). This report will be updated as events warrant.

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Contents
Why a U.S.-Thailand FTA? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Thailand’s Economy and Trade Orientation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
U.S.-Thailand Commercial Relations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Issues in the FTA Negotiations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Trade in Goods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Agricultural Trade . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Intellectual Property Rights . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Trade in Services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Investment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Congress and the U.S.-Thailand FTA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
List of Tables
Table 1. Selected Economic Indicators for Thailand’s Economy: 1996-2003 . . 5
Table 2. Thailand’s Major Trading Partners: 2003 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Table 3. U.S. Merchandise Trade with Thailand: 1997-2003 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Appendix A. U.S. Imports from Thailand, Customs Value
by Two-Digit Harmonized System Commodity Codes, 2001-2003 . . . . . . 15
Appendix B. U.S. Exports to Thailand by Two-Digit Harmonized
System Commodity Codes, 2001-2003 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

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U.S.- Thailand Free Trade Agreement
Negotiations
Why a U.S.-Thailand FTA?

The Bush Administration notified Congress on February 12, 2004 that it intends
to begin free trade agreement (FTA) negotiations with Thailand. This notification,
which follows an October 19, 2003 announcement by President Bush and Thai Prime
Minister Thaskin of their agreement to launch negotiations, allows for talks to begin
within 90 days or by mid-May 2004, after required consultations with Congress.
In the notification letter sent to the Speaker of the House and the Senate
Majority Leader, U.S. Trade Representative Robert Zoellick put forth an array of
potential commercial and foreign policy gains that could be derived from the
agreement. At the same time, Mr. Zoellick alluded to sensitive issues that require
attention: trade in automobiles, protection of intellectual property rights, and labor
and environmental standards.1
Zoellick’s letter states that an FTA would be particularly beneficial to U.S.
agricultural producers who have urged the administration to move forward, as well
as to U.S. companies exporting industrial goods and services. For agricultural
producers, by eliminating or reducing Thailand’s high tariffs and other barriers, the
FTA offers the opportunity to significantly increase export sales to Thailand. In
2003, Thailand was the 16th largest market for U.S. farm exports.
The administration also argued that an FTA would help boost U.S. exports of
goods and services in sectors such as information technology, telecommunications,
financial services, audiovisual, automotive, and medical equipment. In 2003, U.S.
companies exported to Thailand $5.8 billion in goods and over $1 billion in services.
Maintaining preferential access for U.S. investors in Thailand is also a top priority
for U.S. business. Given that Thailand is a relatively small economy compared to
the United States (1/100th “the size”), the agreement by itself will have limited
effects on the overall U.S. economy.
From the standpoint of U.S. foreign policy interests, the Administration views
the proposed FTA as strengthening cooperation with Thailand in bilateral, regional,
and multilateral fora. Bilaterally, the FTA is seen as strengthening Thailand’s
position as a key military ally, particularly in the war on terrorism. Regionally, the
FTA is viewed as advancing President Bush’s Enterprise for ASEAN Initiative
(EAI). The goal of the EAI is to negotiate a network of bilateral trade agreements
1Inside U.S. Trade, “USTR Zoellick Notifies Congress of Intent To Negotiate Free Trade
Pact with Thailand,” February 19, 2004.

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CRS-2
with the 10 members of ASEAN. Multilaterally, Thailand plays a key leadership role
in the World Trade Organization (WTO). The current WTO Secretary-General, Dr.
Suphachai Panitchpakdi, is a former Thai Minister of Commerce. An FTA could
encourage Thailand to actively cooperate with the United States in supporting
multilateral trade negotiations under the aegis of the Doha Development Agenda,
particularly in the area of agricultural liberalization.
As for Thailand, similar broad economic and political calculations explain its
interest in an FTA. In economic terms, Thailand is very concerned that its exports
to the United States have been losing market share in recent years to countries such
as Mexico and China. By eliminating U.S. tariff and non-tariff barriers to Thai
exports, an FTA could help increase the competitiveness and market share of Thai
products in the U.S. market. Thailand also does not want to be excluded from FTA
benefits the U.S. has negotiated with other countries, particularly the potential of an
FTA to increase U.S. investment in Thailand. Modernization of the services economy
and diffusion of higher levels of technology, know-how, and labor management skills
are essential for the Thai economy to advance beyond the competition from lower-
wage emerging market economies such as China, Vietnam, and Laos. In addition,
a closer political and economic relationship with the United States could provide
Thailand with more leverage to play a larger role in Southeast Asia.
General opposition to the FTA in both countries is expected from workers and
companies in import-competing industries that bear the brunt of the adjustment costs
of a trade agreement. Despite the welfare gains to society as a whole (e.g. more
efficient resource allocation, lower priced imports, and greater selection of goods),
those industries subject to increased competition face additional pressure to cut costs,
wages, and prices. Some companies may not be able to withstand these pressure and
may be forced out of business, accompanied by a loss of jobs. Under these
circumstances, certain stakeholders, as a matter of self-interest, may oppose trade
agreements that accelerate competition and structural changes in an economy.
Specific opposition in Thailand may arise from concerns in the agricultural and
services sectors. Given that close to 50 percent of the Thai labor force is employed
in agriculture, liberalization of this sector is likely to be contentious. Similarly, in
a number of services sectors, Thai companies may feel they are at a competitive
disadvantage in opening up to U.S. competitors.
Opposition in the United States may arise from groups concerned about the
impact of the trade agreement on labor and environmental standards. Often joined
by anti-globalization activists, these interest groups question whether trade
agreements enhance the social welfare of participating countries. Other issues such
as transparency in government decision-making, human rights, and freedom of the
press could also be raised.
In short, competing viewpoints can be expected on the desirability of an FTA.
As in most FTAs that the United States has negotiated, the distribution of gains and
losses would depend on the details of the provisions.
As background for congressional oversight, this report examines Thailand’s
economy and trade orientation, the scope and significance of the U.S.-Thai

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commercial relationship, and the likely top issues in the negotiations. The report
concludes with a short summary of the Congressional role and interest in the FTA.
Thailand’s Economy and Trade Orientation
Thailand continues to recover from the debilitating effects of the Asian financial
crisis, which hit the Thai economy in July 1997 and subsequently affected several
other East Asian economies.2 The economic crisis in Thailand was characterized by
a significant depreciation of the Baht (which led to a depletion of nearly all of
Thailand’s foreign exchange reserves),3 a decline in the stock market, and a sharp
decline of property prices. The combination of these shocks led to a major economic
downturn. Ten years prior to the 1997 crisis, Thailand had been one of the world’s
fastest growing economies, fueled in large part by exports. After averaging 8.6%
annual growth between 1990 and 1996, Thailand’s real gross domestic product
(GDP) fell by 1.4% in 1997 and then declined by 10.3% in 1998 (see table 1). Trade
also suffered: in 1998, exports fell by 6.7% and imports plunged by 33.0% (in dollar
terms) over 1997 levels. The unemployment rate rose from 1.5% in 1997 to 4.4% in
1998. In addition, Thailand’s per capita GDP on a purchasing power parity (PPP)
basis, a common measurement of a nation’s living standards, plummeted by 12%,
from $6,468 to $5,709 4
Thailand’s economy was stabilized by a $17.2 billion loan from the International
Monetary Fund (IMF), although a number of major Thai banks and corporations were
forced into bankruptcy, largely because much of their short-term debt was in U.S.
dollars.5 Real GDP grew by 4.4% in 1999 and by 4.8% in 2000, but slowed to 2.1%
in 2001. Public dissatisfaction in Thailand with government handling of economic
restructuring brought about the election of a new coalition government in 2001
2For additional information on the Asian financial crisis, see CRS Report 98-434, The Asian
(Global?) Financial Crisis, the IMF, and Japan: Economic Issues, by Dick K. Nanto; and
CRS Report RL30517, Asian Financial Crisis and Recovery: Implications for U.S. Interests,
by Richard Cronin.
3Prior to the crisis, the Thai government attempted to peg its currency (the Baht) to the U.S.
dollar (at around 25 Baht to the dollar). However, speculative pressures on the Baht forced
the government to attempt to maintain the peg through high interest rates and, ultimately,
to use foreign exchange reserves to prop up the currency. Eventually, however, the
government nearly ran out of foreign exchange reserves and was forced to abandon the
currency peg by allowing the currency to float in international markets. This led the Baht
to depreciate sharply (at one point reaching 56 Baht to the dollar in January 1998) and
forced the Thai government to seek international financial assistance.
4PPP measurements attempt to convert foreign currencies into U.S. dollars based on the
actual purchasing power of such currency (based on surveys of the prices of various goods
and services) in each respective country. They thus give a more accurate measurement of
the size of a country’s economy and living standards relative to those in the United States.
5The sharp depreciation of the Baht that occurred in 1997 significantly increased the debt
burden for these institutions as it took more Baht to purchase dollars to make debt payments.
Many such institutions were unable to make their payments and subsequently went
bankrupt.

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CRS-4
(headed by the Thai Rak Thai Party) with Thaksin Shinawatra as Prime Minister. He
launched a series of economic initiatives designed to stabilize the economy, boost
domestic demand, encourage the growth of small and medium-sized businesses, and
improve rural incomes and development.
Thailand’s economy has generally experienced strong growth over the past two
years, and many analysts are projecting strong growth in the near term. Real GDP
increased by 4.8% in 2002. Although the Thai economy (especially the tourist
sector) was negatively affected by the outbreak of Severe Acute Respiratory
Syndrome (SARS) in early 2003, it quickly recovered and grew at a robust 6.7% in
real terms for the full year, boosted in part by strong export growth and consumer
spending.6 Thai officials are forecasting GDP growth of 7%-8% in 2004, with the
possibility of overtaking China as Asia’s fastest growing economy in Asia.7
Unemployment fell from 2.4% in 2002 to 2.2% in 2003, with job growth most
pronounced in manufacturing, construction, wholesale and retail trade, hotels and
restaurants.
Despite optimistic projections for the Thai economy over the next few years,
many economists remain concerned about the relatively slow pace of banking
reforms and the restructuring of non-performing loans, which could potentially spark
another financial crisis in Thailand.8 While Thailand’s public debt fell sharply in
2003, it remains high by international standards. To avoid overheating of the
economy, Thailand’s central bank is taking actions to curb a rising level of consumer-
credit debt.9
6 Thailand’s exports grew by about 17% in 2003.
7 Wall Street Journal, “Thai GDP Expands 7.8%, Its Best Since 1997,” Mar. 9, 2004, p.A14.
8One estimate puts Thailand’s non-performing corporate loans at $42.5 billion, equal to 34%
of GDP. See, “Thailand’s Debt Undertow, Businessweek,” September 23, 2002.
9 Crispin, Shawn W., “Thailand Acts To Slow Down Some Lending,” Wall Street Journal,
March 25, 2004, p. A15.

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CRS-5
Table 1. Selected Econom ic Indicators for Thailand’s Economy:
1996-2003
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
Average Exchange
25
31
41
38
40
44
43
41
Rate (Baht per U.S.$)
R ea l G D P G ro wth (% )
5.9
-1.4
-10.3
4.4
4.8
2.1
4.8
6.7
GD P ($b illions )
182
151
112
123
123
116
127
142
GD P (billions
397
391
349
370
389
404
431
471
($P PP )*
Per Capita GDP
6,623
6,468
5,709
5,981
6,229
6,460
6,850
7,370
($PPP )*
Exp orts ($billions)
56.0
58.4
54.5
58.5
69.8
65.4
68.8
80.2
Impo rts ($billions)
72.2
63.3
42.4
49.9
62.2
61.8
64.2
75.0
Annual FDI flows
2.3
3.9
7.3
6.2
3.4
3.8
3.3
1.5
($billions)
Public Debt as a % of
16.7
31.8
40.2
51.6
54.2
50.0
51.6
46.6
G D P ( %)
Official
1.5
1.5
4.4
4.2
3.6
3.3
2.4
2.2
Un emp loyme nt
R ate (% )
**PPP data a re me asuremen ts of foreign data in national currencies converted into U.S. dollars based
on a comparable level of purchasing power these data would have in the United States. Prices for
goods and services are generally lower in Thailand than in the United States, and hence, the PPP
measurement of Thailand’s GDP is significantly higher than GDP data expressed in nominal U.S.
dollars.

Source s: Thailand ’s Custo ms D epa rtmen t, Ban k of T hailand , and the Eco nom ist Intelligenc e Unit
(EIU ).
Thailand’s economy is heavily dependent on international trade. The shares of
exports and imports in GDP have each risen to over 50%, compared with around
40% in 1997. Manufactured goods account for about 75% of Thailand’s exports and
imports. The largest export items include office machines and telecommunications
equipment (25% in 2001), other consumer goods (10%), textiles and clothing (8%)
and other semi-manufactures (8%). Agricultural products account for about 18% of
Thai exports. The largest categories of Thai imports are machines and
telecommunications equipment (22%) and non-electrical machinery (10%).
Agricultural imports account for just under 8% of total imports.10
Thailand’s top trading partners in 2003 were Japan, the United States, the
European Union (EU), and China (see table 2). With around 17.0% of Thai exports
destined for the U.S. market, the United States is Thailand’s largest export market.
On the import side, the United States, with an import share of 9.5%, is the third
largest supplier after Japan and the European Union.
Foreign direct investment (FDI) is an important source of employment and new
technologies and processes. The cumulative level of FDI in Thailand at the end of
10 World Trade Organization, “Trade Policy Review: Thailand,” WT/TPR/S/123, October
15, 2003, p.8 [hereafter cited as the WTO Trade Policy Review - Thailand].

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2003 was about $31 billion. Portfolio investment in Thailand is also important, with
an estimated $17 billion in 2001. Japan is the largest foreign investor in Thailand,
followed by the United States. Most FDI inflows are in manufacturing and services.
Thailand has virtually no FDI in agriculture.11
Annual FDI flows to Thailand have been relatively flat over the past few years,
and in 2003, FDI in Thailand declined by more than half, caused in part by a shift in
FDI to China.
Table 2. Thailand’s Major Trading Partners: 2003
($ billions)
Total Trade
Exports
Imports
Trade Balance
Japan
29.5
11.4
18.1
-6.7
United States
20.7
13.6
7.1
6.5
European Union
19.3
11.8
7.5
4.3
China
11.7
5.7
6.0
-0.3
Singapore
9.0
5.8
3.2
2.6
Th ailand ’s
155 .2
80.2
75.0
5.2
World Trade
Source: Bank of Thailand.
Thailand, as a member of the WTO, supports multilateral trade liberalization.
As a member of the Asian Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum, Thailand
is also committed to “open regionalism” as a means of achieving free and open trade
and investment by 2020. As a party to the Association of South-East Asian Nations
(ASEAN), Thailand also engages in regional trade liberalization and since 2002 has
actively negotiated a network of preferential trading arrangements with countries
such as Australia, Bahrain, China, and India. While the provisions of these
agreements vary considerably from one to the other, none are expected to be as
comprehensive as the planned U.S.-Thailand FTA. Relying on an “early harvest”
mechanism, Thailand and China, for example, agreed to tariff reductions on fruits
and vegetables, but don’t expect a full FTA to enter into force until 2010.
U.S.-Thailand Commercial Relations
The United States and Thailand maintain extensive commercial ties. Thailand
affords the United States preferential treatment vis-a-vis other countries for certain
types of investment under the U.S.-Thailand Treaty of Amity and Economic
Relations of 1966. The American Chamber of Commerce estimates that the United
States is the second largest foreign investor in Thailand (after Japan), with
cumulative investment at $20 billion. U.S.-invested firms in Thailand employ over
11 WTO Trade Policy Review - Thailand, pp. 11-12.

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CRS-7
200,000 Thai nationals.12 Major sectors for U.S. FDI in Thailand include petroleum,
banking, electronics, and the automotive industry. In recent years, U.S. auto
companies have invested heavily in Thailand.13
In 2003, Thailand was the United States’ 23rd largest export market ($5.8
billion) and its 15th largest supplier of imports ($15.1 billion). U.S. exports to
Thailand increased by 20.2% (over 2002 levels), while U.S. imports from Thailand
rose by 2.6% to (see table 3). However, while imports from Thailand were 17.5%
higher than 1997 levels, U.S. exports to Thailand in 2003 were 20.6% lower than
they were in 1997.14
Table 3. U.S. Merchandise Trade with Thailand: 1997-2003
($millions)
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
U.S . Exp orts
7,357
5,233
4,984
6,643
5,995
4,859
5,842
U.S . Imports
12,595
13,434
14,324
16,389
14,729
14,799
15,181
U.S. Trade Balance
-5,238
-8,201
-9,340
-9,747
-8,733
-9,940
-7,336
Source: U.S. International Trade C ommission DataWeb .
Top U.S. exports to Thailand in 2003 were electrical machinery (23% of the
total), machinery (19%), aircraft (13%), optical and medical equipment (4%) and
miscellaneous grains and fruit (3%). Top U.S. imports from Thailand in 2003
included electrical machinery (22%), machinery 16%), precious stones (7%), knit
apparel (6%), woven apparel 6%), prepared meat and fish (5%), and rubber (5%).
(See Appendix A and B for a detailed commodity breakdown of U.S. exports and
imports to Thailand).
Thai-U.S. economic relations continue to deepen, as Thailand reforms its
economy and lowers its trade barriers. Still, a number of contentious issues persist.
On the Thai side, government officials have expressed disappointment with the
United States for failing to take a more active role in rescuing the Thai economy
during the serious economic crisis in 1997. More recently, Thai officials have
sharply criticized U.S. agricultural policies, especially the farm bill that was enacted
in 2002 (The Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002, P.L.107-171), arguing
that it heavily subsidizes U.S. farmers, giving them an unfair competitive advantage
12American Chamber of Commerce in Thailand, Press Release, October 22, 2003.
13In October 2003, Ford Motor Company and its affiliate, Mazda Motor Company,
announced plans to invest $500 million in Thailand to boost production of its current auto
joint venture, Auto Alliance Thailand. This would be in addition to the $500 million the
companies initially invested in 1995. Source, Automotive Intelligence News, October 15,
2003.
14Major U.S. imports from Thailand include include clothing and apparel, office machines
and parts (i.e., computer equipment), and telecommunications and sound and reproducing
apparatus and equipment. Major U.S. exports to Thailand include electrical machinery and
parts, transport equipment (mainly aircraft), and office machines and parts.

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CRS-8
over Thai farmers, especially in regard to rice. Thai officials further argue that the
farm bill has undermined efforts in the WTO for more liberalized trade in agricultural
products. Thailand has participated in two WTO dispute resolution cases against the
United States: U.S. anti-dumping subsidy offsets (the “Byrd Amendment”), and U.S.
restrictions on shrimp imports (that were in place in order to protect sea turtles).
More recently, Thai officials are concerned about a pending U.S. antidumping
investigation alleging that producers in Thailand and five other countries are selling
shrimp in U.S. markets below their cost of production.15
Although the United States has not filed any cases against Thailand in the WTO,
it has raised a number of issues with Thailand over its trade regime. The most
prominent complaints include high trade barriers (especially on agricultural
products, automobiles, alcoholic beverages, and electronic products), inadequate
protection of U.S. intellectual property rights (IPR), and non-transparent customs
rules and procedures.
Issues in the FTA Negotiations
Countries that form FTAs agree at a minimum to phase out tariff and non-tariff
barriers (NTBs) on mutual trade in goods in order to enhance market access between
trading partners. Most U.S. FTAs, including NAFTA and agreements with Chile and
Singapore, are more comprehensive. Because any U.S.- Thailand FTA is likely to
be based on the Singapore model, no sector, product, or functional issue can expect
to be excluded from the liberalization process. This approach is favored by many
Members of Congress. As a result, the agreement is likely to cover trade in goods
and services, agriculture, investment, and intellectual property rights, as well as other
issues such as government procurement, competition policy, and customs procedures.

Trade in Goods
Tariffs are the major barrier to liberalized trade in goods. Thailand’s reliance
on import licensing, opaque customs procedures, and excise taxes are also likely to
be issues.
Thailand’s simple average applied tariff rate of about 13% for non-agricultural
imports provides a relatively high level of protection.16 Many Thai tariff rates are
much higher than the average and tend to be applied to imports competing with
locally produced products. These include tariffs on autos and auto parts, alcoholic
beverages, fabrics, footwear and headgear, and some electrical appliances. For
example, the tariff on passenger cars and sport utility vehicles is 80%, the tariff on
motorcycles 60%, and the tariff on completely knocked down (CKD) auto kits 33%.
Tariffs on fabrics range from 25%-40%.
15Crispin, Shawn W. Asian Wall Street Journal, “Thai Shrimp Spat Could Grow,” January
15, 2004.
16 WTO Trade Policy Review - Thailand, p.73.

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CRS-9
Beyond cuts in tariffs, market access for U.S. goods could be improved by
reducing excessive paperwork and and undue processing delays in Thai customs
procedures. In addition, import licensing requirements on various items remains
opaque and can sometimes serve as a quantitative restriction.
U.S. tariffs imposed on Thai non-agricultural exports are relatively low,
averaging around 2-3%, but U.S. tariffs on some items such as textiles and apparel
and light trucks are much higher. Thai concerns may also focus on U.S. trade remedy
measures, such as use of antidumping and countervailing duty procedures to protect
U.S. industry.
Agricultural Trade
The United States and Thailand are important trading partners in agricultural
products, but the U.S. market is more important for Thailand than the Thai market
is for U.S. exporters. The United States is the second largest market for Thai
agricultural exports and Thailand is the fourth largest supplier of U.S. agricultural
imports. At the same time, even though the United States has been the largest
supplier of Thailand’s agricultural imports, Thailand ranks only as the 16th largest
market for U.S. agricultural exports.17
The total value of bilateral farm trade was about $1.2 billion in 2002 with the
U.S. running a $377 million deficit. The major Thai exports to the United States are
processed seafood, frozen shrimp, rubber, rice, tapioca, sugar, and fruits and
vegetables. Major Thai imports from the U.S. are oil seeds, cotton, cereals (especially
wheat), soybean oil and cake.18
Thai-U.S. agricultural trade is more restricted than trade in manufactured goods.
Both countries impose higher tariffs on agricultural products than on manufactured
goods. The Thai average MFN applied tariff on agricultural products is about 24
percent compared to about 7% for the United States.19
More than 43% of the Thai tariff lines for agricultural products have applied
rates exceeding 20%, compared to only 1.3% of the U.S. tariff lines. Consumer-
ready products, meats, fresh fruits and vegetables face tariffs ranging from 40-60%.
Excise taxes and surcharges, licensing fees, and labeling and certification standards
can further boost the tax burden considerably.20
17 Thailand Development Research Institute (TDRI), “Impact of Thailand- U.S. Free Trade
Agreement,” December 2003, 132pp. This study was jointly funded by the Thailand-U.S.
Business Council [based in Bangkok], the American Chamber of Commerce in Thailand,
and the U.S.-ASEAN Business Council. The study is available on the US - ASEAN
Business Council: [http://us-asean.org/us-thai-fta/USTFTA-TDRIstudy.pdf] Hereafter, this
report is referred to as the TDRI study.
18 TDRI Study, p. 43.
19 TDRI Study, p.44.
20 TDRI Study, p. 55.

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CRS-10
U.S. fruit growers estimate lost sales of up to $25 million annually from the
combined effect of Thailand’s high tariffs and surcharge.21 Other U.S. exports that
could benefit from liberalization include meat and dairy products, sugar, alcoholic
beverages, and tobacco. U.S. tariff rates that Thailand may want to see reduced
include vegetables and fruits with tariff rates exceeding 10%, pineapples with a tariff
rate of 29%, and fish and fish products with a tariff rate of 26%. In addition,
Thailand, which is the third largest exporter of sugar, will likely want to see a
substantial liberalization of U.S. quotas.22
Since agricultural barriers are higher than non-agricultural barriers,
liberalization could boost trade more in agricultural products than in manufactured
goods. U.S. farm groups estimate that potential U.S. agricultural exports to Thailand
could increase by around $300 million annually if Thailand’s tariffs and other trade-
distorting measures were substantially reduced.23 Similar large increases in Thai
agricultural exports to the United States can be expected if substantial liberalization
occurs.
Intellectual Property Rights
Deficiencies in Thai protection of intellectual property (patents, copyrights, and
trademarks) have been a longstanding U.S. concern. The USTR’s 2003 "Special 301"
report noted that Thailand had recently taken a number of measures to improve IPR
protection, but stated that the United States was concerned with the “explosion of
copyright piracy within its borders.”24 The International Intellectual Property Rights
Alliance (IIPA) estimates that IPR piracy in Thailand cost U.S. firms $160 million
in 2002.25
While Thailand has taken positive steps to curtail the open sale of pirated media
products (video, audio, and software), U.S. IPR stakeholders maintain that it has not
adopted a rigorous regime to crack down on pirated optical disc production or its
export. They argue that copyright and optical media legislation pending in the Thai
parliament contain particular deficiencies. U.S. manufacturers are pushing for an
amendment that would require an optical disc facility to prove its copyright
authorization to receive a production license.26
U.S. IPR stakeholders lobbied hard to see Thailand make more progress on the
pending legislation before the FTA negotiations were formally announced. In
deference to these concerns, U.S. Trade Representative Zoellick, in announcing the
21 Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, 2002 National Trade Barriers Report, p. 373.
22 BNA, International Trade Reporter, “Thai Minister Calls on United States To Resist
Special Interests in FTA Talks,” April 1, 2004.
23 Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, 2002 National Trade Barriers Report, p. 373.
24USTR, Special 2003 IPR Report, May 1, 2003.
25IIPA, 2003 Special 301 Report, Thailand, available at www.iipa.com.
26Inside U.S. Trade, “Bush Announces FTA with Thailand As It Puts G-21 At Distance,”
October 24, 2003.

---

CRS-11
intention to begin negotiations, recognized their “... concerns about the deficiencies
in Thailand’s protection of intellectual property and in its customs regime.
Addressing these issues, as well as other areas such as strengthening measures
against the production of illegal optical discs, will be essential for the successful
conclusion of these negotiations.”27
Trade in Services
Services such as commerce (wholesale and retail trade), transportation,
telecommunications, and finance account for a growing share of economic activity
in Thailand. In 2002, services accounted for about 55% of GDP and about 40% of
employment. A large share of foreign investment goes into services, especially in
finance and retail trade.28
U.S. negotiating objectives are likely to include improvements in access for U.S.
providers of financial, telecommunications, and professional services, and other
sectors. Liberalization of these sectors is likely to be accompanied by improvements
in Thailand’s regulatory environment, as well as capacity to oversee and insure
effective competition.
In pursuing these objectives, U.S. negotiators are likely to insist on according
greater market access across each other’s entire services sector, subject to a few
exceptions that must be in writing. This so-called negative list approach was used in
the Singapore FTA and is supported by many Members of Congress. Exceptions in
the Singapore agreement deal with sectors that usually require government
certification or licenses (lawyers, accountants) involve government institutions
(airports, provision of social security, public hospitals, government corporations), or
involve national policy (atomic energy).29
Major financial institutions in Thailand include the central bank, commercial
banks, finance companies, securities companies, and insurance companies.
Following the 1997 Asian financial crisis, Thailand increasingly deregulated and
liberalized access of foreign firms to its financial sector. For example, foreign equity
limits were relaxed for ten years to allow foreign ownership of up to 100%
(previously 25%) in commercial banks and finance companies. However, new capital
invested in these companies after the ten-year period must be provided by domestic
investors until foreign-held equity share falls to 49%. Other restrictions concerning
the number branches foreign banks may operate, as well as limits on the number of
expatriate professionals that can be employed, could also be raised in the
negotiations. Similarly, in the area of brokerage services, foreign firms are allowed
to own shares greater than 49% of Thai securities firms only on a case-by-case
basis.30
27 Statement available the Office of the United States Trade Representative website.
28 WTO Trade Policy Review - Thailand, p. 77.
29 The U.S.-Singapore Free Trade Agreement, CRS Report RL31789, p. 13.
30 Office of the United States Trade Representative, 2002 Trade Barriers Report, p. 378.

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CRS-12
Thailand’s communications market is characterized by limited competition and
relatively high prices. While Thailand has committed to open up telecommunications
services to direct foreign competition by January 2006, the reform process has
lagged. Although the Thai Government has allowed foreign participation in the
telecommunications sector since 1989, the market is still dominated by two state-
owned companies: the Communications Authority of Thailand, which controls
international services, and the TOT Corporation and Public Company Limited,
which controls domestic services. A few private sector companies have been awarded
concessions by the Thai government to provide wireless and fixed-line services.
Pending establishment of a National Telecommunications Commission to serve as
an independent regulator, deregulation and full liberalization of the
telecommunications market is likely to be difficult.31
Liberalization of other services such as legal, construction, architecture,
engineering, and accounting are also likely to be U.S. negotiating objectives. Various
Thai laws currently make it very difficult for foreign-owned companies and nationals
to operate in these industries.32
Investment
The United States has an investment agreement with Thailand under the 1966
Treaty of Amity and Economic Relations (AER). The treaty accords the same rights
to U.S. and Thai citizens and companies to own and operate in each other’s territory
with the exception of professional services and several sectors such as
communications, transportation, and depository banking.
Initially, the AER provided few benefits to U.S. investors because Thailand at
the time had few laws and regulations restricting foreign investment. Over time,
however, Thailand instituted new laws and regulations that limited foreign nationals’
operations in Thailand. As a result, the legal treatment accorded by the 1966 treaty
became preferences extended only to U.S. investors. Consequently, the AER came
to violate Thailand’s WTO obligations to accord equal treatment to all member
states. Thailand received an exemption from the WTO for ten years, but the
exemption expires in January 2005.
The FTA negotiations may consider ways to construct a bilateral investment
agreement that is WTO-consistent but still retains current privileges for U.S.
companies and nationals. With over 1200 U.S. companies currently taking advantage
of the rights protected by the AER, the issue could become a top priority for the U.S.
business community.33
31 WTO Trade Policy Review - Thailand, p. 84.
32 Office of the United States Trade Representative, 2002 Trade Barriers Report, pp. 377-
378.
33 TDRI Study, p. 103.

---

CRS-13
U.S. negotiators may also make establishment of a special investor-state dispute
mechanism a priority objective. Such a mechanism could ensure neutral and binding
third-party resolution of disputes involving foreign investors and the host country.
Thailand’s plans for reforming and privatizing a number of state-owned
companies continues to be a matter of great interest to foreign investors. The Thai
government’s plan to overhaul state-owned telecommunications, energy, and
transport companies has encountered widespread opposition from labor unions,
causing indefinite delays in planned share offerings of the Electricity Generating
Authority of Thailand, Thailand’s largest state-owned company.34
Congress and the U.S.-Thailand FTA
The U.S.-Thailand FTA negotiations are of interest to Congress because (1) an
agreement would require passage of implementing legislation to become operational;
(2) an agreement could increase U.S. exports of goods, services, and investment; (3)
an agreement could increase competition for U.S. import-competing industries such
as textiles and apparel and pick-up trucks; and (4) if an agreement is implemented,
Thailand would become the second Asian FTA partner (the first was Singapore) for
the United States.
Under the Trade Promotion Authority (TPA) of the Trade Act of 2002, the
President has the authority to negotiate FTAs that can only be approved or rejected,
not amended, by Congress. Five bilateral agreements are currently operational(Israel,
NAFTA, Jordan, Chile, and Singapore). Negotiations have been completed on three
others (Australia, Central America, and Morocco). Negotiations are on-going for
Bahrain, South African Customs Union, and the Dominican Republic. In addition
to the Thailand FTA, negotiations are expected to start this year with Panama,
Columbia, and Peru.
Before negotiations for the FTA are launched, the Administration must consult
with the Congressional Oversight Group, the Senate Finance Committee, the House
Ways and Means Committee and other committees with jurisdiction over issues
included in the negotiation. Additional consultations are required for aspects of the
negotiations relating to agriculture, fisheries, and textiles.
Many Members of Congress support an aggressive FTA strategy because of the
potential to open foreign markets further to U.S. exports and investment. While the
Administration’s policy of negotiating multiple FTAs has not been very
controversial, some Members have expressed concerns that the Administration’s
criteria for deciding on FTA partners has relied too heavily on foreign policy
considerations. In the case of Thailand, however, the same Members welcomed the
34 Crispin, Shawn W. “Thailand’s Drive to Privatize Hits A Few Hurdles,” Wall Street
Journal, March 11, 2004, p. 7.

---

CRS-14
announcement of the Thailand FTA because Thailand represents a large market that
offers significant commercial gains, particularly to U.S. agricultural producers.35
In support of the negotiations, a U.S.- Thailand Free Trade Agreement Business
Coalition and a congressional caucus were launched on March 23, 2004. Corporate
co-chairs of the business coalition are FedEx, General Electric, New York Life
International, Time Warner, Qualcomm Inc., and Unocal Corporation. Co-chairs of
the congressional caucus are Representatives Jim Ramstad (R-MN) and William
Jefferson (D-LA) in the House and Senators Gordon Smith (R-OR) and Max Baucus
(D-MT) in the Senate.
At the same time, some congressional concern has surfaced in regard to
automotive trade, centered on the impact that a reduction of the current 25% U.S.
tariff on pick-up trucks could have on imports and U.S. jobs. Thailand is the world’s
second largest producer of pick-up trucks, and both Japan and U.S. automakers have
operations there.
Senators George Voinovich (R-OH) and Carl Levin(D-MI), co-chairs of the
Senate Auto Caucus, in a November 12, 2003 letter, urged the Bush Administration
to retain the 25% tariff out of concern that its elimination would open the door for
Japan to export trucks from Thailand to the United States. A similar letter was
signed by the chairs of the House Auto Caucus, Representatives Dale Kildee (D-MI)
and Fred Upton (R-MI).36
A different approach to this concern is embodied in S. Con. Res. 90 introduced
by Senators Levin and Voinovich on February 23, 2004 and H. Con. Res 366,
introduced February 24, 2004 by Representatives Kildee, Quinn, and Levin. Because
Japan and other countries could benefit from bilateral concessions agreed to between
the United States and Thailand, the resolutions maintain that negotiations affecting
access to the U.S. automotive market should only take place if all major automobile
producing countries participate.
Other members of Congress may wish to consider how a U.S.-Thai FTA could
affect U.S. commercial relations in Asia in general, particularly in light of the trend
among Asian countries for bilateral trade agreements. China’s growing economic role
in Asia and its quest for new markets, materials, and trade deals is pushing almost
every other major Asian country, including Japan and South Korea, to consider FTAs
with each other.37 Given the increased competition, the U.S.-ASEAN Business
Council in a recent report calls for a vigorous timetable for the U.S.-Thai FTA talks
and designation of the next ASEAN country with which the United States will seek
35 Inside U.S. Trade, “Bush Announces FTA with Thailand As It Puts G-21 At Distance.”
October 24, 2003.
36Inside U.S. Trade, “U.S. Seeks Thailand FTA Despite Opposition On IPR; Autos May
Pose Problem,” February 20, 2004.
37 The Economist, “Why Asian countries are Racing to Sign Bilateral Trade Deals with Each
Other,” February 28, 2004, pp. 39-40.

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CRS-15
an FTA.38 Accordingly, U.S. trade strategy toward the ten-nation ASEAN grouping,
which is the third largest market for U.S. exports, could be an important
congressional consideration.
38 BNA: International Trade Reporter, “Business Group Call on U.S. Government to
Strengthen Trade Links with ASEAN,” March 11, 2004.

---

CRS-16
Appendix A. U.S. Imports from Thailand, Customs Value by
Two-Digit Harmonized System Com modity Codes, 2001-2003
(Millions of U.S. Dollars)
HS
Commodity Description
2001
2002
2003
Total
14,727.2
14,792.9
15,180.7
85
Electrical Machinery
3,024.4
3,275.7
3,349.9
84
Machinery
2,522.0
2,596.1
2,356.0
71
Precious Stones, Metal
850.5
899.5
1,000.8
61
Knit Apparel
992.3
940.1
900.2
62
Woven Apparel
847.1
807.6
841.9
16
Prepared Meat, Fish, etc.
749.5
758.7
772.9
40
Rubber
555.9
650.8
762.7
03
Fish and Seafood
867.0
587.1
651.7
94
Furniture and Bedding
310.6
398.0
420.0
39
Plastic
201.1
214.6
336.0
90
Optical, Medical Instruments
384.0
367.1
311.0
64
Footwear
314.5
279.8
285.3
95
Toys and Sports Equipment
270.9
254.8
265.2
20
Preserved Food
150.4
163.9
208.1
73
Iron/Steel Products
169.0
178.6
193.6
91
Clocks and Watches
83.2
76.6
165.3
44
Wood
161.0
177.1
160.1
98
Special Other
98.1
109.6
155.3
42
Leather Art; Saddlery; Bags
381.0
233.5
154.0
63
Miscellaneous Textile Articles
137.0
145.4
144.9
10
Cereals
106.5
95.0
132.5
87
Vehicles, Not Railway
97.6
122.1
131.8
69
Ceramic Products
133.3
123.0
128.4
76
Aluminum
144.5
113.9
116.5
99
Other Special Improvement Provisions
111.2
109.6
112.0
25
Salt; Sulfur; Earth, Stone
109.9
119.2
98.2
21
Miscellaneous Food
59.0
71.8
76.9
70
Glass and Glassware
58.3
53.3
63.1
83
Miscellaneous Articles of Base Metal
34.0
43.1
55.5
55
Manmade Staple Fibers
53.3
60.8
53.6
52
Cotton and Yarn, Fabric
71.7
71.2
49.0
19
Baking Related
32.5
39.6
47.7
72
Iron and Steel
30.0
58.9
42.5
48
Paper, Paperboard
31.7
34.9
38.0

---

CRS-17
HS
Commodity Description
2001
2002
2003
27
Mineral Fuel, Oil, etc.
84.6
25.8
37.2
74
Copper and Articles Thereof
38.2
36.6
34.2
23
Food Waste; Animal Feed
22.4
25.8
33.8
96
Miscellaneous Manufacturing
35.9
35.5
33.7
17
Sugars
30.4
21.3
29.4
22
Beverages
16.7
24.1
29.3
08
Edible Fruit and Nuts
19.4
20.0
26.2
34
Soap, Wax, etc; Dental Preparations
19.5
21.4
24.8
24
Tobacco
25.4
14.6
23.9
49
Books, Newspapers; Manuscripts
22.5
21.7
23.5
54
Manmade Filament, Fabric
29.7
27.1
22.9
67
Artificial Flowers, Feathers
29.0
23.7
22.1
32
Tanning, Dye, Paint, Putty
18.1
18.0
17.2
05
Other of Animal Origin
22.9
21.0
16.8
33
Perfumery, Cosmetic, etc.
8.9
8.9
15.8
82
Tool, Cutlery, of Base Metals
7.9
9.5
15.3
41
Hides and Skins
12.0
13.1
13.2
68
Stone, Plaster, Cement, etc.
11.0
16.1
13.1
57
Textile Floor Covering
11.2
11.2
11.3
56
Wadding, Felt, Twine, Rope
9.1
9.2
10.0
06
Live Trees and Plants
8.1
7.5
9.2
58
Special Woven Fabric, etc.
7.8
9.5
8.6
30
Pharmaceutical Products
2.0
3.7
8.6
38
Miscellaneous Chemical Products
7.1
7.9
8.3
59
Impregnated Textile Fabrics
7.0
7.5
8.2
92
Musical Instruments
7.5
8.2
7.9
09
Spices, Coffee, and Tea
15.6
4.4
7.8
35
Albumins; Mod Starch; Glue
7.9
8.6
7.6
11
Milling; Malt; Starch
7.1
7.9
7.5
65
Headgear
6.1
5.7
6.4
18
Cocoa
2.8
5.5
6.3
13
Lac; Vegetable Sap; Extract
5.2
3.0
6.3
29
Organic Chemicals
6.6
5.6
6.2
12
Miscellaneous Grain, Seed, Fruit
6.8
6.8
5.9
60
Knit, Crocheted Fabric
9.5
7.0
5.7
81
Other Base Metals, etc.
16.4
8.7
5.0
50
Silk; Silk Yarn, Fabric
5.8
5.1
4.7
28
Inorganic Chemicals; Rare Earth
0.9
15.5
4.4

---

CRS-18
HS
Commodity Description
2001
2002
2003
66
Umbrella, Walking-sticks, etc.
6.6
4.9
4.0
07
Vegetables
5.0
5.6
3.1
97
Art and Antiques
3.3
3.5
2.9
04
Dairy, Eggs, Honey, etc.
2.0
6.0
2.7
46
Straw, Esparto
1.5
1.6
1.9
14
Other Vegetable
0.6
0.6
1.3
88
Aircraft, Spacecraft
1.7
1.1
1.0
15
Fats and Oils
0.7
0.8
0.9
80
Tin and Articles Thereof
1.0
1.0
0.9
36
Explosives
0.08
0.9
0.9
26
Ores, Slag, Ash
0.7
0.5
0.8
86
Railway; Traffic Sign Equipment
0.4
0.2
0.4
01
Live Animals
0.1
0.04
0.3
37
Photographic/Cinematographic
0.5
0.3
0.2
53
Other Vegetable Textile Fiber
0.2
0.4
0.2
79
Zinc and Articles Thereof
0.02
0.1
0.2
51
Animal Hair and Yarn, Fabric
0.02
0.04
0.05
75
Nickel and Articles Thereof
0.09
0.08
0.04
47
Wood Pulp, etc.
0.2
0.1
0.03
45
Cork
0.1
0.1
0.03
89
Ships and Boats
1.5
1.0
0.03

---

CRS-19
Appendix B. U.S. Exports to Thailand by Two-Digit Harmonized
System Com modity Codes, 2001-2003
(Millions of U.S. Dollars)
HS
Commodity Description
2001
2002
2003
Total
5,989.4
4,860.2
5,841.7
85
Electrical Machinery
1,957.8
1,332.1
1,319.4
84
Machinery
1,001.3
921.3
1,089.0
88
Aircraft, Spacecraft
560.7
231.9
782.1
90
Optical, Medical Instruments
208.5
190.1
226.4
39
Plastic
174.7
194.1
210.6
12
Miscellaneous Grain, Seed, Fruit
131.5
116.6
183.9
29
Organic Chemicals
161.8
150.3
177.0
71
Precious Stones, Medals; Coins
111.5
144.3
174.0
52
Cotton and Yarn, Fabric
106.1
126.4
157.1
98
Special Other
149.2
130.0
136.4
72
Iron and Steel
6.8
28.4
97.0
23
Food Waste; Animal Feed
93.9
101.3
78.5
38
Miscellaneous Chemical Products
96.5
97.5
75.0
41
Hides and Skins
72.6
60.3
70.0
47
Wood Pulp, etc.
51.6
63.8
69.7
33
Perfumery, Cosmetic, etc.
35.9
47.0
63.0
31
Fertilizers
57.7
40.5
56.5
10
Cereals
57.7
63.8
55.6
87
Vehicles, Not Railway
143.9
57.5
49.3
70
Glass and Glassware
131.2
75.0
44.4
28
Inorganic Chemicals; Rare Earth
48.2
41.5
43.8
27
Mineral Fuel, Oil, etc.
53.4
39.4
39.6
73
Iron/Steel Products
27.6
28.2
39.2
48
Paper, Paperboard
48.5
54.4
37.5
30
Pharmaceutical Products
45.3
35.9
37.0
32
Tanning, Dye, Paint, Putty
23.8
28.3
34.0
03
Fish and Seafood
23.0
22.0
33.7
56
Wadding, Felt, Twine, Rope
3.9
7.6
32.3
34
Soap, Wax, etc.; Dental Preparations
25.5
28.0
30.5
40
Rubber
21.7
23.5
30.3
44
Wood
25.1
31.4
26.7
76
Aluminum
41.1
31.3
26.5
21
Miscellaneous Food
12.8
19.0
25.3
16
Prepared Meat, Fish, etc.
11.9
12.6
17.0

---

CRS-20
HS
Commodity Description
2001
2002
2003
20
Preserved Food
15.4
17.1
16.8
08
Edible Fruit and Nuts
11.4
12.1
16.2
49
Book and Newspaper; Manuscripts
8.7
12.3
15.9
54
Manmade Filament, Fabric
10.9
13.0
15.5
25
Salt; Sulfur; Earth, Stone
15.9
15.0
13.2
95
Toys and Sports Equipment
11.9
15.8
12.6
35
Albumins; Mod Starch; Glue
9.7
12.5
12.3
24
Tobacco
23.1
22.1
11.7
94
Furniture and Bedding
13.1
9.5
11.5
82
Tool, Cutlery, of Base Metals
12.3
12.5
10.3
13
Lac; Vegetable Sap; Extract
8.6
8.2
10.0
04
Dairy, Eggs, Honey, etc.
10.0
17.3
8.8
83
Miscellaneous Articles of Base Metals
6.9
8.0
8.1
01
Live Animals
4.5
7.5
8.0
17
Sugars
4.6
7.3
7.0
68
Stone, Plaster, Cement, etc.
4.6
7.0
6.2
74
Cooper and Articles Thereof
4.9
6.2
6.1
96
Miscellaneous Manufacturing
7.8
8.3
5.7
59
Impregnated Textile Fabrics
6.5
5.3
5.5
93
Arms and Ammunition
8.1
4.8
5.3
64
Footwear
4.6
3.8
5.2
55
Manmade Staple Fibers
5.8
4.5
4.4
18
Cocoa
1.0
4.0
4.0
69
Ceramic Products
2.4
2.4
3.8
81
Other Base Metals, etc.
3.8
0.7
3.4
37
Photographic/Cinematographic
2.6
4.0
3.2
19
Baking Related
4.0
3.3
3.2
02
Meat
2.5
2.8
3.0
36
Explosives
2.3
2.8
3.0
60
Knit, Crocheted Fabric
1.7
2.8
2.6
61
Knit Apparel
0.8
0.8
2.5
89
Ships and Boats
0.2
0.6
2.5
92
Musical Instruments
1.8
2.0
2.4
22
Beverages
2.5
3.3
2.2
15
Fats and Oils
1.6
1.4
2.2
63
Miscellaneous Textile Articles
1.8
2.6
2.0
05
Other of Animal Origin
4.9
6.6
1.9
07
Vegetables
1.1
1.3
1.6

---

CRS-21
HS
Commodity Description
2001
2002
2003
42
Leather Art; Saddlery; Bags
1.7
1.0
1.6
75
Nickel and Articles Thereof
0.9
0.7
1.5
86
Railway; Traffic Sign Equipment
9.0
1.8
1.5
57
Textile Floor Covering
0.7
0.6
1.4
09
Spices, Coffee, and Tea
1.0
1.0
1.2
58
Special Woven Fabric, etc.
2.5
2.8
1.2
62
Woven Apparel
1.0
0.7
1.0
26
Ores, Slag, Ash
0.3
0.6
0.9
11
Milling; Malt; Starch
2.5
1.0
0.6
51
Animal Hair and Yarn; Fabric
0.9
0.7
0.5
97
Art and Antiques
0.7
0.2
0.3
45
Cork
0.02
0.03
0.3
91
Clocks and Watches
0.4
0.4
0.3
65
Headgear
0.3
0.2
0.2
78
Lead
0.1
0.3
0.2
46
Straw, Esparto
0.05
0.08
0.1
43
Fur Skin and Artificial Fur
0.06
0.04
0.09
06
Live Trees and Plants
0.004
0.02
0.08
79
Zinc and Articles Thereof
0.04
0.02
0.06
80
Tin and Articles Thereof
0.2
0.1
0.05
67
Artificial Flowers, Feathers
0.008
0.06
0.04

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CRS-22

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