Order Code RS20851
Updated March 22, 2004
CRS Report for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
Naval Transformation: Background and
Issues for Congress
Ronald O’Rourke
Specialist in National Defense
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Summary
The Department of the Navy (DoN) has several efforts underway to transform U.S.
naval forces to prepare them for future military challenges. The Navy has organized
these efforts under a conceptual framework called Sea Power 21. Key elements of naval
transformation include a focus on operating in littoral waters, network-centric
operations, use of unmanned vehicles, reducing end-strength requirements, directly
launching and supporting expeditionary operations ashore from sea bases, new kinds of
naval formations, and new ship-deployment approaches. Naval transformation poses
several potential issues for Congress. This report will be updated as events warrant.
Background
This report focuses on the transformation of U.S. naval forces – the Navy and the
Marine Corps, which are both contained in the Department of the Navy (DoN). For an
overview of defense transformation in general, as well as references to CRS products on
other specific aspects of defense transformation, see CRS Report RL32238.1
What is defense transformation? The Bush Administration has identified
transformation as a major goal for the Department of Defense, and has stated that defense
programs will be assessed in terms of their potential for contributing to defense
transformation. But what is defense transformation?
Defense transformation can be defined as large-scale, discontinuous, and possibly
disruptive changes in military weapons, organization, and concepts of operations (i.e.,
approaches to warfighting) that are prompted by significant changes in technology or the
emergence of new and different international security challenges. In contrast to
incremental or evolutionary military change brought about by normal modernization
1 CRS Report RL32238, Defense Transformation: Background and Oversight Issues for
Congress, by Ronald O’Rourke. Washington, 2004. (February 24, 2004) 40 pp.
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

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efforts, defense transformation is more likely to feature discontinuous or disruptive forms
of change.
Some military analysts believe that recent new technologies – including advanced
information technologies (IT) for networked operations, distributed sensors, unmanned
vehicles, and precision-guided munitions – have set the stage for a new defense
transformation. They also believe that U.S. military forces must transform themselves if
they are to be adequately prepared for 21st-Century military challenges, particularly so-
called asymmetric challenges, in which adversaries avoid competing head-on against
current U.S. military strengths.
One key asymmetric challenge, analysts believe, is the need to counter so-called anti-
access or area-denial capabilities – capabilities intended to prevent U.S. forces from
gaining access to the ports, airfields, bases, staging areas, and littoral (near-shore) sea
areas that the United States now depends on to mount military operations in distant
military theaters. Systems for countering U.S. naval forces in littoral areas could include
submarines, mines, anti-ship cruise missiles, air-defense systems, and potentially weapons
of mass destruction. Another key asymmetric challenge, analysts believe, is the need to
counter transnational terrorist networks.
Navy Sea Power 21 Framework. DoN has organized its transformation efforts
under a conceptual framework called Sea Power 21, which is built around three main
components:
! Sea Strike, which refers to the ability of naval forces to project precise
and persistent offensive power from the sea;
! Sea Shield, which refers to the ability of naval forces to not only defend
themselves at sea, but to contribute to homeland defense, project an
overland defensive shield to help protect overseas U.S. allies and friends,
and provide a sea-based theater and strategic defense against ballistic
missiles; and
! Sea Basing, which refers to the ability of naval forces to operate at sea,
as sovereign entities, free from concerns of access and political
constraints associated with using land bases in other countries.
These three components are to be supported and bound together by ForceNet, the
Navy’s overall architecture for combining the various computer networks that U.S. naval
forces are now fielding into a master computer network for tying together U.S. naval
personnel, ships, aircraft, and installations. An additional part of Sea Power 21 is a
Global Concept of Operations under which various types of naval formations are to be
used for forward presence, crisis response, and warfighting operations.2
DoN Transformation Centers, Exercises, and Experiments. Many DoN
transformation activities efforts take place at the Navy Warfare Development Command
(NWDC), which is located at the Naval War College at Newport, RI, and the Marine
Corps Warfighting Laboratory (MCWL), which is located at the Marine Corps Base at
Quantico, VA. These two organizations generate ideas for naval transformation and act
2 For a detailed description of the Sea Power 21 framework, see Clark, Vern. Sea Power 21,
Projecting Decisive Joint Capabilities. U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, October 2002: 32-41.

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as clearinghouses and evaluators of transformation ideas generated in other parts of DoN.
NWDC and MCWL oversee major exercises, known as Fleet Battle Experiments (FBEs)
and Advanced Warfighting Experiments (AWEs), that are intended to explore new naval
concepts of operation. The Navy and Marine Corps also participate with the Army and
Air Force in joint exercises aimed at testing transformation ideas.
Key Features of Naval Transformation. Table 1 below summarizes several
key features of U.S. naval transformation.
Table 1. Key Features of U.S. Naval Transformation
Previous U.S. naval forces
Transformed U.S. naval forces
Plan for stand-alone, mid-ocean operations
Plan for joint operations in littoral waters
against Soviet naval forces
against regional adversaries
Platform-centric operations
Network-centric operations
Manned platforms only
Significant use of unmanned vehicles
Manpower-intensive ships; people treated
Ships with smaller (i.e., “lean,” optimal)
as a “free good”
crews; cost of personnel fully recognized
Bases, logistic “piles” established ashore to
Expeditionary operations launched and
support expeditionary operations
supported directly from sea bases
Primary formations are carrier battle groups
Use of new naval formations, such as
and amphibious ready groups
expeditionary strike groups
Traditional ship-deployment cycles
New, more flexible ship-deployment cycles
Traditional business practices
Streamlined, reformed practices
Focus on Littoral Operations. In late 1992, with the publication of a Navy
document entitled ... From the Sea, the Navy formally shifted the focus of its planning
away from the Cold War scenario of countering Soviet naval forces in mid-ocean waters
and toward the post-Cold War scenario of operating in littoral (near-shore) waters to
counter the land- and sea-based forces of potential regional aggressors.
This shift in planning focus has led to numerous changes for the Navy in concepts
of operation, training, and equipment over the last 12 years. Among other things, it
moved the focus of Navy planning from a geographic environment where it could expect
to operate primarily by itself to one where it would need to be able to operate effectively
in a joint manner, alongside other U.S. forces. It also led to an increased emphasis on
amphibious warfare, mine warfare, and defense against diesel-electric submarines and
small surface craft. The Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) program is a key current Navy effort
intended to improve the Navy’s ability to operate in heavily defended littoral waters.3
3 For more on the LCS program, see CRS Report RS21305, Navy Littoral Combat Ship (LCS):
Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O’Rourke. Washington, 2004. (Updated
periodically) 6 pp; and CRS Report RL32109, Navy DD(X) and LCS Ship Acquisition Programs:
(continued...)

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Network-Centric Operations. The concept of network-centric operations, also
called network-centric warfare (NCW), is a key feature of transformation for all U.S.
military services. The concept, which emerged in the late 1990s, involves using computer
networking technology to tie together personnel, ships, aircraft, and installations in a
series of local and wide-area networks capable of rapidly transmitting critical information.
Many in DoN believe that NCW will lead to changes in naval concepts of operation and
significantly increase U.S. naval capabilities and operational efficiency. Key NCW
efforts include the Navy’s Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC) network, the Naval
Fires Network (NFN), the IT-21 investment strategy, and the above-mentioned ForceNet
effort. A related program is the Navy/Marine Corps Intranet (NMCI).4
Unmanned Vehicles. Many analysts believe that unmanned vehicles (UVs) will
be another central feature of U.S. military transformation. Perhaps uniquely among the
military departments, DoN in coming years will likely acquire UVs of every major kind
– air, surface, underwater, and ground. Widespread use of UVs could lead to significant
changes in the numbers and types of ships that the Navy procures in the future, in naval
concepts of operation, and in measurements of naval power. The LCS is to deploy
various kinds of UVs as a principal means of defeating enemy anti-access/area-denial
systems in heavily defended littoral waters. Unmanned air vehicles (UAVs) and
unmanned combat air vehicles, or UCAVs (which are UAVs that carry weapons), if
implemented widely, could change the shape naval aviation. Unmanned underwater
vehicles (UUVs) and UAVs could significantly expand the capabilities of Navy
submarines.5
Reduced End-Strength Requirements. The Navy is implementing a variety
of steps to substantially reduce the number of uniformed Navy personnel required to carry
out functions both ashore and at sea. Under current plans, active Navy end strength is to
decline from 382,235 in FY2003 to 357,400 by FY2009.
Reductions in personnel requirements ashore are to be accomplished through
organizational streamlining and reforms, and the transfer of jobs from uniformed
personnel to civilian DoN employees. Reductions in personnel requirements at sea are
to be accomplished by retiring older, crew-intensive ships and by introducing new classes
of ships designed to be operated by crews substantially smaller than those required by
today’s designs. New ship designs are to take particular advantage of new technologies
for automated ship operation and damage control. Since personnel-related costs are a
major contributor to total ship life-cycle cost, designing and procuring ships with so-
called “lean” or optimal crewing could lead to significant savings over time. Acquiring
ships with significantly smaller crews could lead to significant changes in Navy practices
3 (...continued)
Oversight Issues and Options for Congress, by Ronald O’Rourke. Washington, 2004. (Updated
periodically) 95 pp.
4 For a discussion of NCW, CEC, NFN, IT-21, ForceNet, and NMCI, see CRS Report RS20557,
Navy Network-Centric Warfare Concept: Key Programs and Issues for Congress, by Ronald
O’Rourke. Washington, 2003. 6 pp. (Updated periodically)
5 For more on naval unmanned vehicle programs, see CRS Report RS21294, Unmanned Vehicles
for U.s. Naval Forces: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O’Rourke. Washington,
2003. (Updated periodically) 6 pp.

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for recruiting, training, and otherwise managing its personnel. Current ship-acquisition
programs related to this goal include the LCS, the DD(X) destroyer,6 and the CVN-21
aircraft carrier.7
Sea Basing. Separate from its use as the name of one of the three main
components of the Sea Power 21 conceptual framework, DoN is using the term sea basing
in a second and somewhat more specific way, to refer to a new operational concept under
which expeditionary operations aimed at an inland objectives would be launched,
directed, and supported directly from a base at sea, without necessarily establishing an
intermediary land base ashore. Under the sea basing concept, functions previously
conducted from the intermediary land base, including command and control, fire support,
and logistics support, would be relocated to the sea base, which is to be formed by a
combination of amphibious and sealift-type ships.
The sea basing concept of operations responds to a central concern of transformation
advocates – that fixed overseas land bases in the future will become increasingly
vulnerable to enemy anti-access/area-denial weapons such as theater-range ballistic
missiles. Although the sea basing concept originated with the Navy and Marine Corps,
the two services see it as a concept that can be applied to joint operations involving the
Army and Air Force. The office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) has expressed interest
in the concept.8
A key program related to sea basing is the Maritime Prepositioning Force of the
Future (MPF[F]), which would replace the Corps’ current maritime prepositioning ships
with new-design sealift-type ships capable of supporting expeditionary operations in this
new manner. Implementing the sea basing concept might also affect the San Antonio
(LPD-17) class amphibious ship program and the program for replacing some of today’s
Tarawa [LHA-1] class amphibious assault ships, called the LHA(R) program.
New Kinds of Naval Formations. The Navy in the past has relied on carrier
battle groups (CVBGs) and amphibious ready groups (ARGs) as its standard ship
formations. As mentioned earlier, as part of its new Global Concept of Operations, the
Navy plans to begin using new kinds of naval formations – such as expeditionary strike
groups, or ESGs (i.e., amphibious ships combined with surface combatants, attack
submarines, and land-based P-3 maritime patrol aircraft), surface strike groups (SSGs),
and modified Trident SSGN submarines carrying cruise missiles and special operations
forces9 – for forward presence, crisis response, and warfighting operations.
6 For more on the DD(X) destroyer, see CRS Report RS21059, Navy DD(X) Future Surface
Combatant Program: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O’Rourke. Washington,
2004. (Updated periodically) 6 pp., and RL32109, op cit.
7 For more on the CVN-21, see CRS Report RS20643, Navy CVN-21 Aircraft Carrier Program:
Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O’Rourke. Washington, 2004. (Updated
periodically) 6 pp.
8 For a longer description of the sea basing concept, see Corbett, Art. Sea Basing: What’s New?
U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, November 2002: 34-39.
9 For more on the modified Trident submarines, see CRS Report RS21007, Navy Trident
(continued...)

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New Ship-Deployment Approaches. The Navy is beginning to experiment
with new ship-deployment approaches – such as more flexible deployment lengths and
long-duration deployments with crew rotation – that are intended to improve the Navy’s
ability to respond to emergencies and increase the amount of time that ships spend in
deployed status over their life cycles. Key efforts in this area include the Fleet Response
Plan (FRP) and the Sea Swap experiment.10
Improved Business Practices. DoN is pursuing a variety of initiatives to
improve its processes and business practices so as to generate savings that can be used to
help finance Navy transformation. Under the Sea Power 21 framework, these efforts are
referred to collectively as Sea Enterprise.
Issues for Congress
In assessing current DoN transformation efforts, potential questions for Congress
include the following:
! Are current DoN transformation efforts inadequate, excessive, or about
right?
! Does DoN have an adequate roadmap for guiding its transformation
efforts?
! Is DoN placing too much or too little emphasis on certain components of
transformation?
! Is DoN achieving a proper balance between transformation and
potentially competing program goals, such as maintaining near-term
readiness and near-term equipment procurement?
! Are DoN transformation efforts adequately coordinated with those of the
Army and Air Force?
! Is there sufficient consensus on the definition of transformation, and over
which programs or efforts might qualify as transformational?
! Is the term transformation being abused as an all-purpose tool for
justifying or opposing certain programs?
! Is the Administration using the term transformation in part to cloud
potential issues pertaining to its defense plans, or to keep Congress off
balance as it conducts oversight of those plans?
9 (...continued)
Submarine Conversion (SSGN) Program: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald
O’Rourke. Washington, 2004. (Periodically updated) 6 pp.
10 For more on new naval formations and new ship-deployment approaches, see CRS Report
RS20338, Navy Ship Deployments: New Approaches – Background and Issues for Congress, by
Ronald O’Rourke. Washington, 2003. (Periodically updated) 6 pp.

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