Order Code RL31718
CRS Report for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
Qatar: Background and U.S. Relations
Updated March 17, 2004
Jeremy M. Sharp
Middle East Policy Analyst
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress
Qatar: Background and U.S. Relations
Summary
In recent years, the ruler of Qatar, Shaikh Hamad bin Khalifa Al-Thani, has
embarked upon a limited course of political liberalization and aligned Qatar firmly
with the United States. In 1992, Qatar and the United States concluded a Defense
Cooperation Agreement that has been progressively expanded. In April 2003, the
Bush Administration announced that the U.S. Combat Air Operations Center for the
Middle East will be moved from Prince Sultan Airbase in Saudi Arabia to Qatar’s
Al-Udeid airbase, which served as a logistics hub for U.S. operations in Afghanistan
under Operation Enduring Freedom, as well as a key center for Operation Iraqi
Freedom. Camp As-Sayliyah, the largest pre-positioning facility of U.S. equipment
in the world, served as the forward command center for CENTCOM personnel during
Operation Iraqi Freedom. Qatar also has assisted the United States in the war on
terrorism by stepping up its efforts to prevent Al Qaeda from engaging in money
laundering. With the third largest proven gas reserves in the world, U.S. companies,
such as ExxonMobil, have worked to increase trade and economic ties with Qatar.
Qatar has the highest per capita income of any country in the Middle East.
As part of Qatar’s experiment with limited political liberalization, the Qatari
monarchy started Al Jazeera, the Arab world’s first all-news network. In a national
referendum in April 2003, Qatari voters approved a new constitution that provides
for a partially elected national assembly and grants women the right to vote and run
for office. This report will be updated when significant changes occur. For further
information, see CRS Report RL31889, The Al-Jazeera News Network: Opportunity
or Challenge for U.S. Foreign Policy in the Middle East, and CRS Report RL31533,
The Persian Gulf: Issues for U.S. Policy, 2003.
Contents
Domestic Political Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Economic Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Human Rights and Political Liberalization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Foreign Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Gulf States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Iraq . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Arab-Israeli Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
February 2004 Assassination in Doha . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Defense and Regional Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
U.S.-Qatari Relations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
War on Terrorism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
List of Figures
Figure 1. Qatar and Its Neighbors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Figure 2. Country Map of Qatar . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
List of Tables
Chiefs of State and Cabinet Members of Qatar . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Qatar: Background and U.S. Relations
Domestic Political Structure
Qatar, a small peninsular state bordering
Figure 1. Qatar and Its Neighbors
Saudi Arabia in the Persian Gulf, is a
constitutional monarchy governed by the Al-
Thani family and headed by the Emir, Shaikh
Hamad bin Khalifa Al-Thani.1 The country
gained full independence from Britain on
September 3, 1971. The Emir is head of the
executive branch and appoints members of
the Al-Thani family and other notables to a
governing Council of Ministers (cabinet),
which is headed by the monarch’s brother,
Prime Minister Abdallah bin Khalifa Al-
Thani. The country’s newly approved
constitution (April 2003) stipulates that the
rule of the state is hereditary within the Al-
Thani family and that future successors to the
throne follow the line of the Emir’s male
offspring.2 The constitution also states that
legislative authority reside in the hands of a 45-member Advisory Council (Majlis
al-Shura), two-thirds of which is directly elected and one-third appointed by the Emir
from among ministers or others.3 The Advisory Council has oversight authority over
the Council of Ministers and can propose legislation and review budgets. The
constitution also empowers the Advisory Council to issue motions of no-confidence
against a government minister; the motion must be approved by two-thirds of the
Advisory Council. Women have the right to vote in elections and can run for office.
1 The term “Shaikh” (or Sheikh or Shaykh) is an honorific title, which can mean a ruler, a
tribal leader, or a venerable religious figure. It should be pronounced with a long A (as in
“say”), not a long E (as in “see”). The term “Emir” (or Amir), often translated as prince, can
also mean a monarch or a ruler in the Gulf region.
2 The constitution was approved in a nation-wide referendum in which 96.6% of the voters
(68,987) approved the constitution and only 3.3.% opposed it (2,145).
3 Prior to the establishment of a partially elected national assembly, Qatar had a fully-
appointed, 35-member advisory council that could only make recommendations to the
Council of Ministers. Qatar’s old Provisional Constitution provided for a modified electoral
procedure in choosing members of the Council and a three-year term; nevertheless, the
Council remained appointive in practice, and terms of the Council members were extended
in three or four-year increments since 1975.
CRS-2
Council members serve four-year terms. National elections for the new Advisory
Council will most likely take place in early 2004.
On June 27, 1995, in a bloodless palace coup, Shaikh Hamad replaced his
father, Shaikh Khalifa, who had ruled Qatar for 23 years. The former ruler had been
living out of the country in Cannes, France most of the time and had turned over
many routine affairs of state to his son, Shaikh Hamad, then crown prince and
commander of the small armed forces. The ruling Al-Thani family rallied behind the
new ruler, who quickly consolidated control. In February 1996, supporters of Shaikh
Khalifa unsuccessfully attempted a counter-coup.4 The coup attempt prompted
Shaikh Hamad to initiate civil proceedings against his father to retrieve an alleged
$3-$12 billion of state assets supposedly in his possession. Saudi Arabian mediation
facilitated an out-of-court settlement, and the Emir and his father have reconciled,
although the former Emir has not returned to Qatar.
Shaikh Hamad, at age 53,5 has been described as representative of an emerging
new generation in Gulf leadership. Like King Abdullah II of Jordan, Shaikh Hamad
is British-educated, with degrees from Cambridge University and Sandhurst Military
Academy. As part of his modernizing agenda, Shaikh Hamad helped establish the
CNN-style satellite news network, Al-Jazeera in 1996. In a major departure from his
more conservative-minded father, Shaikh Hamad has borrowed heavily from foreign
banks in order to modernize Qatar’s energy infrastructure. Shaikh Hamad and his
younger generation of advisers have pressed for social, political, and economic
liberalization. Qatar also has invested heavily in education reform. In October 2003,
Sheikha Mozah, the wife of Sheikh Hamad, helped launch Qatar’s new “Education
City,” a new campus that offers degrees from several U.S. universities including
Weill Cornell Medical College, Texas A&M University, Virginia Commonwealth
University, and Carnegie Mellon University. Qatar recently hired the RAND
Corporation to evaluate and recommend reform options for Qatar’s educational
system. RAND also is monitoring the progress of reform in Qatar’s schools.
In November 2002, Qatar established diplomatic ties with the Holy See. Qatar
plans to grant the Roman Catholic Church and other Christian denominations
designated plots of land for the building of churches. Qatar does not ban alcohol,
which is available in licensed premises such as the bars of major hotels and clubs.
Qatar, like Saudi Arabia, officially adheres to the Wahhabi brand of Sunni Islam;
however, in contrast with Saudi Arabia, Wahhabi tenets are not strictly enforced.
4 Some Qataris believe that Saudi Arabia supported Shaikh Khalifa in his attempt to return
to power in Qatar. See, Craig S. Smith, “A Tiny Gulf Kingdom Bets its Stability on Support
for U.S.,” The New York Times, October 24, 2002.
5 In 1997, the Emir underwent kidney transplant surgery. Since then, there have been no new
reports regarding the Emir’s health.
CRS-3
Economic Overview
Oil and natural gas production is the mainstay of Qatar’s robust economy, which
has experienced an average annual growth rate of 9% over the last 5 years.6 Japan,
South Korea, and Singapore are the leading importers of oil from Qatar. Qatar
Petroleum (QP), the state-owned oil company, has increased its output significantly
from 593,000 barrels per day (b/d) in 1999 to over 854,000 b/d in 2002.7 Qatar is
aiming to produce about 1,000,000 b/d by 2004. However, with oil reserves likely to
be exhausted by 2020 at current production rates, Qatar is rapidly moving to exploit
its natural gas reserves.8 As part of a long-term development strategy, Qatar has
tapped international financial markets and invited foreign investment in recent years
in order to finance the expansion of its liquified natural gas (LNG) production.9 Qatar
intends to expand its yearly LNG output, which is not subject to OPEC production
quotas, from 4.5 million tons per annum in 2002 to 14 - 18 million tons per annum
by 2010. Although Qatar’s LNG industry has low capitol costs due to government
investment, it has high operational costs, requiring Qatar to develop economies of
scale in order to be more competitive with established LNG exporters such as
Indonesia and Nigeria.10
Qatar has signed several agreements with U.S. energy companies
(ConocoPhillips and ExxonMobil) and other international companies to develop
facilities to export LNG to the United States, the UK, Spain, Italy, South Korea,
Taiwan, and India. Qatar also is in the midst of building the largest gas to liquids
(GTL) plant in the world. Under Project Dolphin, Qatar is planning to build
underwater pipelines to export natural gas to Kuwait, Oman, and the U.A.E. Qatari
government officials estimate that by 2007, gas revenue will outstrip oil income for
the first time.11
6 Moin A. Siddiqi, “A 21st Century Success Story,” The Middle East, June 1, 2002.
7 Qatar is the smallest oil producing member of OPEC. Revenues from petroleum exports
account for 60-70% of government revenues.
8 With proved oil reserves of 3.7 billion barrels, Qatar has far less oil than the major Persian
Gulf producers, such as Kuwait (96.5 billion barrels), Iraq (112 billion barrels), and Saudi
Arabia (252 billion barrels). However, Qatar has the third largest natural gas reserves behind
Russia and Iran. Qatar’s supply of natural gas doubled almost overnight in 2002, when
surveyors discovered new gas deposits in Qatar’s north field.
9 Qatar’s government has a 60-70% stake in two joint partnerships with foreign firms,
including ExxonMobil (USA), TotalFinaElf (France), KoGas (South Korea), and Matsui
(Japan).
10 Interview with Qatari executives at Ras Laffan, Qatar’s LNG industrial city, January 14,
2003.
11 “Squaring the Circle,” The Middle East Economic Digest, October 18, 2002.
CRS-4
Human Rights and Political Liberalization
The U.S. Department of State Country Report on Human Rights for 2002 states
that the government of Qatar “generally respected the human rights of its citizens;
however, its record was poor in some areas...”12 According to the report, the rights
of non-citizens are at times abused, particularly among domestic servants from the
Phillippines and South East Asia. As in other Gulf countries, expatriate laborers are
vulnerable to exploitation by employers who capitalize on their fear of deportation.
Citizenship is withheld from foreign workers, who outnumber native Qataris in the
labor force by an estimated ratio of more than 5 to 1.13 In response to Qatar’s
dependence on foreign labor, the government has embarked on a program of
“Qatarization,” which is designed to set aside higher-level government and energy
jobs for Qataris only.14 Although the government in 1995 lifted formal censorship of
the media, journalists tend to exercise a degree of self-censorship. Al-Jazeera devotes
less air time to coverage of Qatari affairs. Al-Jazeera, which does not generate
enough advertising revenue to be profitable, is partially dependent on the Qatari
government for its financing.15 Internet service is monitored for pornography and
other material considered
insulting to Islam. The
QATAR IN BRIEF
government maintains strict
limits on the freedom of
Area:
11,437 sq km
assembly and association.
(slightly smaller than
P o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s a n d
Connecticut)
demonstrations are not
Population (2002):
793,341
allowed in Qatar, and private
Literacy:
79.4%
professional and cultural
Religion:
95% Muslim
associations must register with
Ethnic Groups:
40% Arab, 18%
and are monitored by the state.
Pakistani, 18% Indian,
10% Iranian,
14% other
Since assuming power,
GDP (2002):
$28,000 per capita
Shaikh Hamad has embarked
Inflation (2001):
2.8%
upon a limited course of
Foreign Debt (2002):
$6 billion
political liberalization. In
Oil Reserves:
3.7 billion barrels
April 1998, he permitted about
Gas Reserves:
900 trillion cubic feet
3,700 business community
Armed Forces:
11,800 active
leaders to elect a Chamber of
personnel, 34 tanks, 18
Commerce, which selected 17
fighter aircraft
members from a slate of 41
candidates. In November
Source: The United States Central Intelligence Agency
World Factbook 2002.
1998, in a speech before the
12 Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, Department of State, “Country Report
on Human Rights Practices - 2002,” March 31, 2003.
13 The new Qatari constitution does not address the rights of foreign guest workers.
14 Ibid.
15 Meeting with Al-Jazeera producer, Mr. Khalid Al Mahmoud, January 11, 2003. Qatar
started Al-Jazeera with a $140 million grant. Advertising revenue only covers 35-40% of
Al-Jazeera’s operating expenses.
CRS-5
Advisory Council, Shaikh Hamad signaled his willingness to proceed with political
liberalization, declaring that “to meet the requirements of the future...it is necessary
to reinforce the role of constitutional institutions, activate meaningful, constructive
popular participation in the process of decision-making and supervise proper
execution of decisions.”16 In March 1999, the long-anticipated election for a Central
Municipal Council occurred. 248 candidates (including 6 women) competed for 29
seats, and all adult Qatari citizens, with the exception of members of the police and
armed forces, were allowed to vote and run for office. This was the first time a Gulf
country enfranchised all male and female citizens in a nation-wide election.17 In April
2003, elections for the Municipal Council resulted in the first electoral victory for a
Qatari female candidate, Sheikha Yousef Al-Jiffri, an appointed officer at the
Education Ministry who ran unopposed.18 Two other female candidates withdrew
from the election for unknown reasons. Although the council functions primarily in
an advisory role to the Ministry of Municipal and Agricultural Affairs, some
observers view it as a stepping-stone to wider political liberalization. On May 5,
2003, the Emir of Qatar appointed Sheikha bint Ahmed al-Mahmoud, daughter of the
Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, as Education Minister. This appointment
signified the first appointment ever of a female cabinet minister in any Persian Gulf
state.
Some observers and Arab commentators have questioned the timing of Qatar’s
reforms, calling them symbolic and primarily geared toward satisfying U.S. policy
goals of promoting democracy in the region. In response to this criticism, one Qatari
politician wrote that “the truth is that this constitution is not a reaction to these
events, and as a Qatari politician, I can assert that the democratic trend and the desire
to establish a state of institutions and rule of law represents a deep conviction that the
Prince of Qatar beholds ... even before he became a Prince.”19
Foreign Policy
Qatar is a member of the United Nations, the Arab League, the Organization of
Islamic Conference, and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), the latter a sub-
regional organization consisting of six states (Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar,
the United Arab Emirates, and Oman) bordering the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of
Oman. It is also a member of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
(OPEC).
16 “Qatar Plans to Set up First Parliament,” Reuters, November 16, 1998.
17 All 6 female candidates were defeated in the elections.
18 “Qatar Elects First Woman to Council Doha,” Gulf News, April 8, 2003.
19 “The Constitution’s Referendum: Proof of the Democratic Experience in Qatar,” Dar Al-
Hayat, April 22, 2003.
CRS-6
Gulf States
Qatar’s relations with its neighbors have fluctuated over the last decade.
Territorial disputes have marred Qatar’s relations with Bahrain. In the past, both
Qatar and Bahrain have claimed the nearby Hawar island chain, along with the
abandoned town of Zubarah on Qatar’s northern border. On March 16, 2001, after
seven years of deliberations, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) found that Qatar
has sovereignty over Zubarah, and that Bahrain has sovereignty over the Hawar
islands.20 Since the resolution of the dispute, Qatar and Bahrain have discussed a plan
to construct a 28-mile causeway, aptly named the “Friendship Bridge,”which would
connect the two kingdoms.
Relations between the new Emir of Qatar and Saudi rulers were strained in the
first few years of his rule. Some Qatari officials accused Saudi Arabia of plotting to
restore the former ruler of Qatar in 1996. Since then, Al-Jazeera’s treatment of Saudi
Arabia in its programming has been the largest point of contention between the two
regimes. In protest, Saudi Arabia withdrew its ambassador from Doha in September
2002 in response to an Al-Jazeera program that criticized the kingdom’s founder,
King Abdul Aziz al-Saud. The following month, Kuwait closed Al-Jazeera’s local
office in response to an allegedly insulting report on a member of the Kuwait royal
family.
Iraq
A combination of factors — strains with Saudi Arabia and Bahrain and
aspirations to a more influential role in regional affairs — has contributed to Qatar’s
increasingly independent foreign policy since 1992. Although it was an active
member of the allied coalition formed during the 1990-1991 Gulf crisis and has been
a participant in post-war security arrangements, Qatar adopted a conciliatory stance
toward both Iraq and Iran before the other members of the GCC did. Qatar restored
diplomatic ties with Saddam Hussein’s regime shortly after the 1991 Gulf war,
hosted visits by the Iraqi Foreign Minister, and called for relaxing economic
sanctions against Iraq.
Nevertheless, Qatar played an important logistics role in Operation Iraqi
Freedom, providing headquarters for the U.S. Central Command and pre-positioning
facilities for U.S. tanks and armored personnel carriers. At the same time, the Al-
Jazeera news network, which is privately owned but partially financed and based out
of Qatar, was criticized by some U.S. officials for being sensationalistic and slanted
in its coverage of the U.S. military operation. Qatar will most likely continue to serve
as an important base of operations for U.S. forces in post-war Iraq, particularly after
the transfer of the U.S. Combat Air Operations Center from Saudi Arabia to Qatar.
On May 8, 2003, President Bush hosted the Emir of Qatar at the White House,
thanking him for his steadfast support during Operation Iraqi Freedom and
highlighting his role as a reformer.
20 “The Islands Dispute - Resolved,” The Middle East Economic Digest, September 28,
2001.
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Arab-Israeli Issues
Although Qatar and Israel do not have formal diplomatic ties, Qatar has been
in the forefront of Arab-Israeli talks on expanding economic ties during periods of
progress in the peace process. Qatar’s position regarding the Arab boycott of Israel
is governed by the September 1994 decision by the GCC to terminate enforcement
of the indirect boycotts, while maintaining, at least in theory, the primary boycott.
Qatar has hosted meetings of multilateral Arab-Israeli working groups and then
Israeli Prime Minister Shimon Peres visited in April 1996. In addition, Qatar agreed
to the establishment of an Israeli trade mission in Doha, Qatar’s capital city, although
relations cooled after the peace process slowed down in 1996. Since the beginning
of the second Palestinian uprising in 2000, Qatar has claimed to have shut down the
office; however, according to Qatari officials, it continued to operate at a very low
level.21 Prior to the start of Operation Iraqi Freedom, the Israeli Foreign Ministry
closed the trade mission in Doha and evacuated three Israeli envoys and their
families. Israel promised to reopen the office after the war.22 Despite pressure from
some other Arab states, Qatar hosted the fourth annual Middle East/North Africa
Economic Conference (MENA) in November 1997. This was a gathering that
brought together some Arab and Israeli business and political leaders to discuss
regional economic cooperation.
In May 2003, Qatari and Israeli Foreign Ministers met in Paris to discuss ways
of reviving the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. The meeting took place only a week
after the Emir’s visit to Washington DC, prompting speculation that President Bush
encouraged Qatari officials to take a more active role in the peace process. Shaikh
Hamad has acknowledged that Qatar is keen to play a role in encouraging
negotiations between Israelis and Palestinians, but that it is too early to open full
diplomatic ties with Israel.
February 2004 Assassination in Doha
According to press accounts, on February 13, 2004, a Chechen guerrilla leader
named Zelimkhan Yandarbiyev was allegedly assassinated in a car bombing outside
a mosque in Doha.23 In the past, the Russian government had accused Yandarbiyev
of funding Chechen terrorist activity. Qatari authorities reportedly arrested two
Russians who may have been involved in the car bombing and have filed criminal
charges against them. Russian and Qatari officials have been conducting negotiations
over the release of the two Russian detainees.
21 Meeting with the Qatari Minister of State, Ahmed Abdullah al-Mehmood, January 12,
2003.
22 “Israel Shuts Qatar Mission, To Reduce Staff in Egypt, Jordan, Muaritiania,” Yedi’ot
Aharanot, March 3, 2003, translated by the Foreign Broadcasting Information Service
(FBIS), Document ID: GMP20030311000208.
23 “In Qatar, Standing Up to Putin, Washington Post, March 16, 2004.
CRS-8
Defense and Regional Security
With its small territory and narrow population base, Qatar relies to a large
degree on external cooperation and support for its security. Qatar, like other Gulf
states, contributes military units to a small GCC rapid deployment force of 5,000 -
10,000 known as Peninsula Shield. With a personnel strength of 11,800, Qatar’s
armed forces are the second smallest in the Middle East. (Bahrain, with an estimated
11,000-member force, has the smallest) France has provided approximately 80% of
Qatar’s arms inventory. Since the 1991 Gulf war, Qatar has pursued a limited
program of force modernization. To date, however, it has not been a purchaser of
U.S. weapons.
U.S.-Qatari Relations
A U.S. embassy was established in Doha in 1973, but U.S. relations with Qatar
did not blossom until the 1991 Gulf war. During the fighting in January 1991, Qatari
armored forces helped coalition troops repel an Iraqi attack on the Saudi Arabian
town of Kafji. The United States promptly recognized the assumption of power by
Shaikh Hamad in June 1995. Analysts regard Qatar’s exchanges with Israel, though
limited, as broadly in accord with U.S. efforts to foster an expanding dialogue
between Israel and Arab states.
Trade between the United States and Qatar has increased since the 1990-1991
Gulf war. U.S. exports to Qatar amounted to $320 million in 2001, consisting mainly
of machinery and transport equipment. U.S. imports from Qatar, mainly textiles and
fertilizers, totaled $501 million in 2001.24 Although the bulk of Qatar’s trade
continues to be with a few European countries and Japan, several U.S. firms,
including ExxonMobil, Occidental, and Pennzoil are active in the development of
Qatar’s oil and gas resources. Despite the presence of U.S. firms in the Qatari
hydrocarbon industry, the U.S. imports virtually no oil from Qatar. In June 2002,
Qatar’s Minister of Energy, Abdallah bin Hamad Attiyah, held talks with U.S.
Secretary of Energy Spencer Abraham over possible cooperation in the gas sector.
Bilateral defense and security cooperation have expanded since the Gulf war.
On June 23, 1992, the United States and Qatar concluded a Defense Cooperation
Agreement that provided for U.S. access to Qatari bases, pre-positioning of United
States materiel, and combined military exercises.25 Qatar built Al-Udeid airbase in
1996 at a cost of more than $1 billion. The U.S. government also has invested
considerable amounts to upgrade the base in order to handle U.S. aircraft, equipment,
and personnel. This investment was rapidly expanded following the terrorist attacks
24 United States International Trade Commission, “U.S. Trade Balance by Partner Country
2001,” online at [http://dataweb.usitc.gov/SCRIPTS/cy_m3_run.asp].
25 Library of Congress, Federal Research Division (Helen Chapin Metz, ed.) Persian Gulf
States: Country Studies, Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1994, p. 194. In
December 2002, the United States and Qatar signed an agreement to upgrade Qatari military
facilities and expand U.S. access to them.
CRS-9
of September 11, 2001. As part of Operation Enduring Freedom, the U.S. Air Force
has conducted approximately 14-16 supply flights per day to Afghanistan out of Al-
Udeid.
The airbase houses between 5,000-6,500 U.S. troops and civilian contractors.
The United States has constructed a 76,000 square foot hangar at Al-Udeid airbase,
which can hold a maximum of 40 aircraft. Al-Udeid can accommodate a total of
10,000 troops and 140 aircraft. The base is home to the 379th Air Expeditionary
Wing, which includes 17 KC -135 Stratotankers and KC 10-A Extenders for in-flight
refueling of attack aircraft and fuel shipments to Afghanistan, which is 2.5 hours
away.26 Most importantly, Al-Udeid now features the region’s main combat air-
operations center, which had originally been built as a backup to U.S. operations in
Saudi Arabia.
Qatar also has allowed the United States to construct the As-Sayliyah Army
base, the largest pre-positioning facility of U.S. equipment in the world. The climate-
controlled warehouses at As-Sayliyah held hundreds of M1 tanks and Bradley
fighting vehicles prior to the recent Iraq war.27 As-Sayliyah also features a new
command center for CENTCOM personnel. Currently, there are approximately 3400
troops and civilian contractors at As-Sayliyah. After the base received warnings of
a potential threat in 2000, U.S. personnel were confined to the base for 45 days.
War on Terrorism
In addition to increased military cooperation, Qatar has assisted the United
States in the war on terrorism. Qatar has passed a money laundering law, which
closed all bank accounts for foreign charities. Also, Qatar National Bank has
provided its entire staff with a four-day course on fighting money laundering and
terrorist financing.
According to several counterterrorism experts who formerly worked for the U.S.
government, Qatar’s current Interior Minister and royal family member, Shaikh
Abdullah bin Khalid Al-Thani briefly harbored Al Qaeda terrorists in 1996, including
the suspected mastermind of the September 11th hijacking plot, Khalid Shaikh
Mohammed.28 The Emir of Qatar appointed Shaikh Abdullah bin Khalid Al-Thani
to the post of Interior Minster during an expansion of the cabinet in January 2001. It
is unclear what types of discussions the United States has conducted with the
government of Qatar regarding the allegations against Qatar’s Interior Minister.
26 Meeting at Al-Udeid Air Base, January 13, 2003.
27 Meeting at As-Sayliyah Army Base, January 13, 2003.
28 “Qatar’s Security Chief Suspected of Having Ties to Al Qaeda,” Los Angeles Times,
March 28, 2003.
CRS-10
Chiefs of State and Cabinet Members of Qatar
Emir
Hamad bin Khalifa Al-Thani
Heir Apparent
Tamim bin Hamad bin Khalifa Al-Thani29
Prime Minister
Abdallah bin Khalifa Al-Thani
Deputy Prime Minister
Muhammad bin Khalifa Al-Thani
Foreign Minister
Hamad bin Jassem bin Jabr Al-Thani
Energy Minister
Abdallah bin Hamad Al-Attiyah
Finance Minister
Youssef Hussein Al-Kamal
Ambassador to the United States
Badr Umar Al-Dafa
29 In August 2003, the Emir named his fourth son as heir apparent, replacing his third oldest
son, Jassem bin Hamad Al-Thani, who reportedly was either dissatisfied with his lack of
responsibilities, or did not have an interest in continuing to serve as crown prince. The Emir
has two other sons, one of whom is a businessman and the other is involved in Islamic
charities.
CRS-11
Figure 2. Country Map of Qatar
Source: Shaded Relief Country Map of Qatar, Central Intelligence Agency, 1995.