Order Code RL32270
CRS Report for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
Enforcing Immigration Law:
The Role of State and Local Law Enforcement
March 11, 2004
provided by:
MARCOS NEGRON & AKAIKE, LLP.
(English site) (Japanese site)
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Lisa M. Seghetti
Analyst in Social Legislation
Domestic Social Policy Division
Stephen R. Viña
Legislative Attorney
American Law Division
Karma Ester
Technical Information Specialist
Domestic Social Policy Division
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress
Enforcing Immigration Law:
The Role of State and Local Law Enforcement
Summary
Since the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, the enforcement of our nation’s
immigration laws has received a significant amount of attention. Some observers
contend that the federal government does not have adequate resources to enforce
immigration law and that state and local law enforcement entities should be utilized.
Several proposals introduced in the 108th Congress, such as the Clear Law
Enforcement for Criminal Alien Removal Act of 2003 (CLEAR Act; H.R. 2671) and
the Homeland Security Enhancement Act of 2003 (S. 1906) would enhance the role
of state and local officials in the enforcement of immigration law. This proposed
shift has prompted many to question what role state and local law enforcement
agencies should have in the enforcement of immigration law, if any.
Congress defined our nation’s immigration laws in the Immigration and
Nationality Act (INA) (8 U.S.C. §§1101 et seq.), which contains both criminal and
civil enforcement measures. Historically, the authority for state and local law
enforcement officials to enforce immigration law has been construed to be limited
to the criminal provisions of the INA; by contrast, the enforcement of the civil
provisions, which includes apprehension and removal of deportable aliens, has
strictly been viewed as a federal responsibility, with states playing an incidental
supporting role. The legislative proposals that have been introduced, however, would
appear to expand the role of state and local law enforcement agencies in the civil
enforcement aspects of the INA. This potential expansion has provoked a variety of
responses from lawmakers, scholars, interest groups, and law enforcement officials.
Congress, through various amendments to the INA, has gradually broadened the
authority for state and local law enforcement officials to enforce immigration law,
and some recent statutes have begun to carve out possible state roles in the
enforcement of civil matters. Indeed, states like Alabama and Florida have signed
agreements with the federal government to allow their respective state and local law
enforcement agencies to perform new, limited duties relating to immigration law
enforcement. Still, the enforcement of immigration by state and local officials has
sparked debate among many who question what the proper role of state and local law
enforcement officials should be in enforcing immigration law. For example, many
have expressed concern over proper training, finite resources at the local level,
possible civil rights violations, and the overall impact on communities. Some
localities, for example, even provide “sanctuary” for illegal aliens and will generally
promote policies that ensure such aliens will not be turned over to federal authorities.
This report examines some of the policy and legal issues that may accompany
the increasing role of state and local law officials in the enforcement of immigration
law. The discussion is limited to the role of state and local law enforcement in the
investigation, arrest, and detention of immigration law violators. This report will be
updated as warranted.
Contents
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Alien Criminal Apprehension Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Quick Response Teams . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Absconder Apprehension Initiative . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Current Practices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Authorities to Enforce Immigration Law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
State Involvement in the Enforcement of Immigration Law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Case Law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Express Authorization for State and Local Law Enforcement
Officers to Enforce Immigration Law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Current Efforts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Florida’s Memorandum of Understanding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Training . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Complaint Procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Program Evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Alabama’s Memorandum of Understanding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Background and Training . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Complaint Procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Commonalities in the MOUs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Legislation in the 108th Congress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Selected Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Sanctuary States and Cities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Access to Database . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
Civil Rights . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
Detention Space . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
Pro/Con Analysis of State and Local Law Enforcement
Officials Enforcing Immigration Law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
Impact on Communities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
Resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
National Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
Application of Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
Training . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
Selected Policy Options . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
Direct Access to Databases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
Funding for State Cooperation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
Criminalizing Civil Immigration Violations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
Enforcing Immigration Law: The Role of
State and Local Law Enforcement
Introduction
Since the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, the enforcement of our nation’s
immigration laws has received a significant amount of attention. Some observers
contend that the federal government has scarce resources to enforce immigration law
and that state and local law enforcement entities should be utilized. To this end,
several proposals introduced in the 108th Congress would enhance the role of state
and local law officials in the enforcement of immigration law. Still, many continue
to question what role state and local law enforcement agencies should have in light
of limited state and local resources and immigration expertise.
States and localities bear the primary responsibility for defining and prosecuting
crimes. But beyond enforcing the laws or ordinances of their state or locality, state
and local officials may also have the authority to enforce some federal laws,
especially criminal laws. Immigration law provides for both criminal punishments
(e.g., alien smuggling, which is prosecuted in the courts) and civil violations (e.g.,
lack of legal status, which may lead to removal through a separate administrative
system). The states and localities have traditionally only been permitted to directly
enforce the criminal provisions, whereas the enforcement of the civil provisions has
been viewed as a federal responsibility with states playing an incidental supporting
role.
The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) (8 U.S.C. §§1101 et seq.) currently
provides limited avenues for state enforcement of both its civil and criminal
provisions. The legislative proposals that have been introduced, however, would
appear to expand the role of state and local law enforcement agencies in the civil
regulatory aspects of immigration law (i.e., identifying and detaining deportable
aliens for purposes of removal). Adding the enforcement of civil immigration law
to the role of state and local law enforcement could, in essence, involve the agencies
in a seemingly unfamiliar mission. This potential expansion has prompted many to
examine the legal authority by which state and local law enforcement agencies may
enforce immigration law, particularly the civil enforcement measures.
This report examines the role of state and local law enforcement in enforcing
immigration law. The discussion is limited to the role of state and local law
enforcement in the investigation, arrest, and detention of all immigration violators.
The report does not discuss the prosecution, adjudication, or removal of aliens who
violate the law. The report opens with a brief discussion of the types of immigration
interior enforcement activities that the former Immigration and Naturalization
Service (INS) pursued and the current immigration activities that are now the focus
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of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). A discussion of the legal authority
that permits state and local law enforcement to enforce immigration law under certain
circumstances follows. Current administrative efforts to involve state and local law
enforcement in enforcing immigration law as well as selected issues are discussed.
The report concludes with a discussion of the pros and cons of such a policy and an
analysis of policy options for Congress.
Background
The enforcement of immigration laws in the interior of the United States has
been controversial. Traditionally, the debate posed concern over large numbers of
“lawbreakers” (i.e., illegal aliens) depressing wages against perceptions that foreign
labor benefits the economy and promotes relations with “source” countries.
Nonetheless, after the attacks of September 11, attention refocused on the adequacy
of interior immigration enforcement, especially the perceived lack of federal
resources. Prior to the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, the INS had fewer than
2,000 immigration agents to enforce immigration laws within the United States.
Although that number has not changed since the terrorist attacks, the merger of the
interior enforcement function of the former INS with the investigative arm of the
U.S. Customs Service (Customs) into the Bureau of Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (ICE), which is located in DHS, has doubled the number of interior
agents potentially available to enforce immigration laws.1
In spite of the increase in interior enforcement agents, many continue to believe
that the number is still insufficient. Moreover, although the consolidation increased
the number of interior enforcement agents, they now have multiple missions, which
include enforcing immigration law in the interior of the United States, stemming the
flow of illicit drugs, and deterring money laundering, among other things.
The enforcement of immigration law within the interior of the United States
includes investigating aliens who violate the INA and other related laws. Prior to
September 11, 2001, immigration interior enforcement focused on investigating: (1)
aliens committing crimes; (2) suspected fraudulent activities (i.e., possessing or
manufacturing fraudulent immigration documents); (3) suspected smuggling and
trafficking of aliens; and (4) suspected work site violations, frequently involving
aliens who work without legal permission and employers who knowingly hire illegal
aliens. Since the terrorist attacks, however, the majority of ICE’s resources have
been directed at stemming terrorist-related activities and activities that have a
national security interest.
Currently, there are express provisions in federal law that provide state and local
law enforcement the authority to assist federal officers with the enforcement of
immigration law under certain circumstances. Such authorities were enacted into law
in 1996 in §439 of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA; P.L.
104-132) and§133 and §372 of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
1 Michael Garcia, Director of the ICE, speech at the Heritage Foundation, July 23, 2003.
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Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA; P.L. 104-206).2 In addition to the provisions
enacted in AEDPA and IIRIRA, the DHS has several initiatives with state and local
law enforcement agencies to facilitate the investigation, arrest and apprehension of
foreign nationals who have violated the law, as discussed below.
Alien Criminal Apprehension Program
The Alien Criminal Apprehension Program (ACAP) was established in 1991 by
the former INS. Through ACAP, criminal aliens are identified by immigration
officials after they have been notified by state and local law enforcement officials.
Upon an encounter with an immigrant whose immigration status may be in question,
state and local law enforcement officials notify immigration officials, who determine
the immigrant’s status and, if applicable, take the immigrant into federal custody.
Quick Response Teams
Congress first authorized the former INS to establish Quick Response Teams
(QRTs) in the Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations
Act, FY1999 (P.L. 105-277). QRTs apprehend illegal aliens and deport them back
to their country by working directly with state and local law enforcement officers.
QRTs respond to requests from state and local law enforcement authorities who
believe they have an illegal immigrant in custody. QRTs are established in areas that
have experienced an increase in illegal immigration and are comprised of federal,
state and local law enforcement officials. The federal law enforcement officials on
a QRT usually include special agents, immigration officers and detention and
removal officers. As of September 30, 2002, there were 45 QRTs in 11 different
states. Congress appropriated funding for QRTs in FY1999 and FY2001.3
Absconder Apprehension Initiative
The Absconder Apprehension Initiative was initially created to clear up the
backlog of cases of aliens who had an unexecuted final order of removal.
Absconders are unauthorized or criminal aliens or nonimmigrants who violated
immigration law and have been ordered deported by an immigration court. Although
the identification and removal of criminal aliens had been a focus of the former INS,
the terrorist attacks brought renewed interest in their removal. In 2001, the former
INS Commissioner, James Ziglar, in cooperation with the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI), decided to list the names of absconders in the FBI’s National
Criminal Information Center (NCIC).4
2 See discussion under “State Involvement in the Enforcement of Immigration Law.”
3 For FY1999, Congress appropriated $21.8 million for INS to establish QRTs (see H.Rept.
105-825; P.L. 105-277). For FY2001, Congress appropriated $11 million for 23 additional
QRTs (see H.Rept. 106-1005; P.L. 106-553).
4 The names of aliens with final orders of deportation was included in the NCIC, which
includes both criminal aliens and aliens who violated civil immigration law.
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Current Practices
Although there is quite a bit of debate with respect to state and local law
enforcement officers’ authority to enforce immigration law (see discussion below),
as a matter of practice, it is permissible for state and local law enforcement officers
to inquire into the status of an immigrant during the course of their normal duties in
enforcing state and local law. This practice allows state and local law enforcement
officers to play an indirect role that is incidental to their general criminal enforcement
authority.
For example, when state or local officers question the immigration status of
someone they have detained for a state or local violation, they may contact an ICE
agent at the Law Enforcement Support Center (LESC).5 The federal agent may then
place a detainer on the suspect, requesting the state official to keep the suspect in
custody until a determination can be made as to the suspect’s immigration status.
However, the continued detention of such a suspect beyond the needs of local law
enforcement, and solely designed to aid in enforcement of federal immigration laws,
may be unlawful.6
Indirect state participation by means of immigration detainers is not without
controversy. Many have alleged such abuses as state detentions premised on
immigrant status alone and custodial arrests for traffic violations or similar offenses
as pretexts for verifying an individual’s status with immigration authorities. Past
allegations of abuse at times have led to states and localities entering into consent
decrees that strictly limit their role in the enforcement of immigration law. On the
other hand, some localities have been concerned that an active role in enforcing
immigration law may stretch resources and hinder community cooperation in curbing
criminal activity. (See discussion on Sanctuary States and Cities.)
Authorities to Enforce Immigration Law
The power to prescribe rules as to which aliens may enter the U.S. and which
aliens may be removed solely resides with the federal government,7 particularly with
the Congress. To implement its plenary power, Congress has enacted and amended
the INA — a comprehensive set of rules for legal immigration, naturalization,
deportation, and enforcement. Concomitant to its exclusive power to determine
which aliens may enter and which may stay, the federal government also has power
5 Under current practice in most jurisdictions, state and local law enforcement officials can
inquire into an alien’s immigration status if the alien is being questioned by an officer as a
result of a criminal investigation or other related matters (i.e., traffic violation). The LESC
is discussed in “Selected Issues,” under “Access to Database.”
6 6 Charles Gordon, Et. Al, Immigration Law and Procedure §72.02[2][b], at 72-27
(Matthew Bender & Co., Inc. 2000) (citing Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217 (1960);
United States v. Cruz, 559 F.2d 30 (5th Cir. 1977)).
7 U.S. Const., Art. I, §8, cl. 3, 4.
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to proscribe activities that subvert these rules (e.g., alien smuggling) and to set
criminal or civil penalties for those who undertake these activities.
In examining the INA, it is crucial to distinguish the civil from criminal
violations. For example, mere illegal presence in the U.S. is a civil, not criminal,
violation of the INA, and subsequent deportation and associated administrative
processes are civil proceedings.8 Criminal violations of the INA include, e.g., 8
U.S.C. §1324, which addresses the bringing in and harboring of certain
undocumented aliens; §1325(a), which addresses the illegal entry of aliens; and
§1326, which penalizes the reentry of aliens previously excluded or deported.9
Congress also has exclusive authority to prescribe procedures for determining
who may enter or stay and the right of aliens in these proceedings, subject to the
individual rights all aliens in the U.S. enjoy under the Constitution. However,
exclusive authority to prescribe the rules on immigration10 does not necessarily imply
exclusive authority to enforce those rules. While enforcement standards and
procedures may differ between the criminal and civil aspects of immigration law,
Congress may authorize the states to assist in enforcing both, and state officers may
exercise this authority to the degree permitted under federal and state law. There is
a notion, however — one being more frequently articulated by the federal courts and
the Executive branch — that states have “inherent” authority to enforce at least the
federal criminal law related to immigration. This inherent authority position is now
apparently beginning to be expressed with regard to the enforcement of the civil
aspects of immigration law as well. State enforcement, nonetheless, must always be
consistent with federal authority.
Even assuming states have some inherent authority to enforce immigration law,
federal law preempts inconsistent state law where concurrent jurisdiction exists.
Congress’ power to preempt state law arises from the Supremacy Clause of the
Constitution, which provides that “the Laws of the United States ... shall be the
supreme Law of the Land ... any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the
Contrary notwithstanding.”11 Congressional intent is paramount in preemption
analysis; accordingly, a court must determine whether Congress expressly or
implicitly intended to preempt state or local action.12 Generally, a court will
determine that Congress intended to preempt a state regulation or enforcement when
(1) Congress expresses preemptive intent in “explicit statutory language,” (2) when
8 8 U.S.C. §1229c(d). Other examples of civil violations include §1253(c) (penalties
relating to vessels and aircraft) and §1324d (penalties for failure to depart).
9 Other criminal provisions include §1253(a) disobeying a removal order, §1306 offenses
relating to registration of aliens, and §1324a(f) engaging in a pattern or practice of hiring
illegal aliens.
10 The federal authority to set rules on the entry of aliens and the conditions of their stay still
leaves limited room for state law aimed at the alien community. If a state regulation is
consistent with federal law and the equal protection requirements of the Fourteenth
Amendment, it may stand. See generally De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 355 (1976).
11 U.S. Const. Art. VI, cl.2.
12 See e.g., Gade v. National Solid Wastes Management Ass’n, 505 U.S. 88, 96 (1992).
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a state entity regulates “in a field that Congress intended the Federal Government to
occupy exclusively,” or (3) when a state entity’s activity “actually conflicts with
federal law.”13
State Involvement in the Enforcement of
Immigration Law
Setting the rules on the entry and removal of aliens is unquestionably an
exclusive federal power and some would argue that uniformity in enforcing those
rules is critical to the exercise of sovereign authority (i.e., it should not be enforced
by states).14 Accordingly, it has been suggested that state involvement in
immigration law should be strictly limited to express congressional indication for
such participation.15 On the other hand, Congress can not compel the states to
enforce federal immigration law and to do so in a particular way.16
From the states’ point of view, the federal government’s exclusive power over
immigration does not preempt every state activity affecting aliens.17 And it generally
has been assumed that state and local officers may enforce the criminal provisions
of the INA if state law permits them to do so but are precluded from directly
enforcing the INA’s civil provisions.18 This view may be changing, however.
State enforcement of the criminal provisions of the INA is seen as being
consistent with the state’s police power to make arrests for criminal acts and the
13 English v. General Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 78-79 (1990). Complete occupation of a field
can be inferred from a “scheme of federal regulation ... so pervasive as to make reasonable
the inference that Congress left no room for the States to supplement it,” or where an Act
of Congress “touches a field in which the federal interest is so dominant that the federal
system will be assumed to preclude enforcement of state laws on the same subject.” Id.
(quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)). Conflict preemption
occurs where it is “impossible for a private party to comply with both state and federal
requirements,” Id. (citing Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132,
142-43 (1963)), or where state law “stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and
execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.” Id. (quoting Hines v.
Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)).
14 Celica Renn, Selected Comment on 1986 Immigration Reform: State and Local
Enforcement of the Criminal Immigration Statutes and the Preemption Doctrine, 41 U.
Miami L. Rev. 999, 1023 (1987); see also Linda R. Yanez and Alfonso Soto, Local Police
Involvement in the Enforcement of Immigration Law, 1 Tex. Hisp. J.L. & Pol’y 9, 29 (1994).
15 Renn, supra note 14, at 30.
16 See generally, Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 922 (1997); see, e.g., INA §287(g)(9)
(“Nothing in this subsection shall be construed to require an agreement under this subsection
in order for any State or political subdivision of a State to enter into an agreement with the
Attorney General (AG) under this subsection.”).
17 De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 355 (1976); Gonzalez v. City of Peoria, 722 F.2d 468,
474 (9th Cir. 1983).
18 See Gonzalez, 722 F.2d at 474 (9th Cir. 1983).
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expectation that states are expected to cooperate in the enforcement of federal
criminal laws.19 Civil immigration law enforcement, on the other hand, has generally
been viewed as strictly a federal responsibility: The civil provisions of the INA have
been assumed to constitute a pervasive and preemptive regulatory scheme — leaving
no room for a direct state or local role.20 The distinction between civil and criminal
violations in the INA has been seen to suggest a bifurcated role for states and
localities. For example, state and local law enforcement officers cannot arrest
someone solely for illegal presence for the purpose of deporting them because it is
a civil violation, but they can arrest someone for the criminal offense of entering the
country illegally.21
To the degree that it is not preempted, the authority of state and local law
enforcement officers to investigate and arrest for violations of federal law is
determined by reference to state law.22 This may be done through express
authorization in state law. However, this may not be necessary according to some
recent decisions from the Tenth Circuit that appear to suggest that state and local law
enforcement officers may possess “inherent authority” within their respective
jurisdictions to investigate and make arrests for criminal immigration matters (see
case law below).
Several Administrations have spoken on the scope of state and local
involvement. For example, a 1983 statement issued by the Reagan Justice
Department emphasized cooperation and joint federal/state law enforcement
operations but still made clear that only INS could make arrests for civil immigration
violations and that state and local cooperation consisted primarily of notifying INS
about, and detaining, suspected illegal aliens taken into police custody for state/local
violations.23 A 1978 press release during the Carter Administration was to somewhat
19 Yanez, supra note 14, at 28-29. Cf People v. Barajas, 81 Cal. App. 3d 999 (1978)
(concluding that “the supremacy clause is a two-edged sword, and in the absence of a
limitation, the states are bound by it to enforce violations of the federal immigration laws.”).
Id. at 1006.
20 Gonzalez, 722 F.2d at 474-75; see also Assistance by State and Local Police in
Apprehending Illegal Aliens, 1996 OLC Lexis 76, at 2 (Feb. 5, 1996); Jeff Lewis, et al.,
Authority of State and Local Officers to Arrest Aliens Suspected of Civil Infractions of
Federal Immigration Law, 7 Bender’s Immigration Bulletin No. 15, p. 944 (Aug. 1, 2002).
21 Illegal entry is a misdemeanor under INA §275. Because many encounters between local
police and undocumented aliens involve warrantless arrests, an officer’s authority to
apprehend a person in violation of §275 will necessarily depend on whether state arrest
statutes permit an arrest for a misdemeanor occurring outside the officer’s presence, since
the misdemeanor of illegal entry is apparently completed at the time of entry, and is not a
“continuing” offense that occurs in the presence of the officer. A continuing offense may
be found under INA §276, which applies to aliens previously deported who enter or are
found in the United States.
22 Vasquez-Alvarez, 176 F.3d at 1295; 84 Op. Atty. Gen. Cal. 189 (Nov. 16, 2001) 2001 Cal.
AG Lexis 46, at *15; 2000 Op. Atty Gen. N.Y. 1001 (Mar. 21, 2000) 2000 N.Y. AG Lexis
2, at *11-12.
23 Available at: Interpreter Releases, vol. 60, (Mar. 4, 1983), pp. 172-73 ,(quoting Feb. 10,
(continued...)
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similar effect, though it placed more emphasis on the exclusive federal role to
enforce civil immigration law and the special training required to do so.24 More
recently, a 1996 Department of Justice, Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) opinion
concluded that state and local police did possess the authority to arrest aliens for
criminal violations of the INA, but lacked recognized legal authority to enforce the
civil provisions of immigration law.25
A shift in policy towards increasing the role and authority of local law
enforcement officers in the field of immigration enforcement came following the
terrorist attacks in September 2001. In December 2001 the INS reportedly began
sending the names of thousands of noncitizens to the NCIC databases as part of the
Absconder Apprehension Initiative. At a 2002 press conference, Attorney General
Ashcroft confirmed the existence of a new Department of Justice, Office of Legal
Council opinion that, among other things, expressed the Department’s view that state
and local officials have “inherent authority” to enforce federal immigration law,
including the civil enforcement provisions. According to the Attorney General:
When federal, state and local law enforcement officers encounter an alien of
national security concern who has been listed on the NCIC for violating
immigration law, federal law permits them to arrest that person and transfer him
to the custody of the INS. The Justice Department’s Office of Legal Counsel has
concluded that this narrow, limited mission that we are asking state and local
police to undertake voluntarily — arresting aliens who have violated criminal
provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act or civil provisions that render
an alien deportable, and who are listed on the NCIC — is within the inherent
authority of states.26 (emphasis added)
The 2002 OLC opinion is unpublished and has not been made public despite several
FOIA requests.27 It should be recognized that although this legal opinion purportedly
23 (...continued)
1983, statement).
24 Available at: vol. 55 Interpreter Releases, (Aug. 9, 1978), p. 306 (quoting DOJ press
release).
25 Assistance by State and Local Police in Apprehending Illegal Aliens, 1996 OLC Lexis 76,
at 2 (Feb. 5, 1996) Here after cited as 1996 OLC Opinion.
26 Federal News Service, Press Conference With U.S. AG John Ashcroft and James Ziglar,
Commissioner, INS, Re: Tracking of Foreign Visitors, June 5, 2002. In June 2002, White
House Counsel, Alberto Gonzalez, acknowledged the “inherent authority” conclusion from
the 2002 OLC opinion in a letter to the Migration Policy Institute (which requested
information about the new policy) available at: Bender’s Immigration Bulletin, vol. 7 p.
965 Aug. 1, 2002.
27 A Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request for the underlying records supporting the
basis of Ashcroft’s statements has subsequently been denied by the DOJ and is now the
subject of federal litigation. See “Clear Law Enforcement for Criminal Alien Removal Act
of 2003” (CLEAR Act): Hearing on H.R. 2671 Before the Committee on the Judiciary,
Subcommittee on Immigration, Border Security, and Claims, 108th Cong. (Oct. 1, 2003)
(statement of Katherine Culliton, Legislative Staff Attorney, Mexican American Legal
Defense and Educational Fund) here after cited as, CLEAR Act Hearing, H.R. 2671 (Oct.
(continued...)
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describes a position in contrast to previous policy, it cannot compel state action nor
does it carry the same weight as an act of Congress. Generally, interpretations
contained in opinion letters are not controlling and should be followed only insofar
as they have the “power to persuade.”28
While certain provisions of the 2002 OLC opinion have been reported, several
key elements remain unknown, including: the rationale, the authorities, and the form
of the draft.”29 Building from what can be discerned, however, some posit that states
and localities, as sovereign entities, retain certain police powers under the
Constitution, and consequently, possess “inherent authority to enforce civil as well
as criminal violations of federal immigration law.”30 As such, it has been argued that
the ability of state police to make arrests for violations of federal law is not limited
to those instances in which they are exercising delegated federal power.31 Instead,
in the absence of an applicable federal statute, the law of the state where an arrest
takes place determines its validity.32
Case Law
The issue of whether state and local law enforcement agencies are precluded
from enforcing provisions of the INA was analyzed in the Ninth Circuit case of
Gonzalez v. City of Peoria.33 In Gonzalez, the Ninth Circuit examined the City of
Peoria’s policies that authorized local officers to arrest illegal immigrants for
violating the criminal entry provision of the INA (8 U.S.C. §1324).34 The arrestees
claimed that the INA represented a full federal occupation of the field, which would
in turn preempt state action. The court turned to the legislative history of §132435
27 (...continued)
1, 2003).
28 Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000).
29 Officers Need Backup, The Role of State and Local Police in Immigration Law
Enforcement at 6, Center for Immigration Studies, Backgrounder (Apr. 2003).
30 Id; see also CLEAR Act Hearing, H.R. 2671 (Oct. 1, 2003) (testimony of Kris W.
Kobach, Professor of Law, Univ. of Missouri-Kansas City).
31 CLEAR Act Hearing, H.R. 2671 (Oct. 1, 2003) (testimony of Kris W. Kobach, Professor
of Law, Univ. of Missouri-Kansas City).
32 Id. (citing United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581 (1948); Miller v. United States, 357 U.S.
301, 305 (1958)).
33 Gonzalez v. City of Peoria, 722 F.2d 468, 474 (9th Cir. 1983).
34 The plaintiffs alleged that the city police engaged in the practice of stopping and arresting
persons of Mexican descent without reasonable suspicion or probable cause and based only
on their race. Furthermore, they alleged that those persons stopped under this policy were
required to provide identification of legal presence in the U.S. and that anyone without
acceptable identification was detained at the jail for release to immigration authorities.
35 8 U.S.C. §1324 states:
No officer or person shall have authority to make any arrest for a violation of any
(continued...)
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and determined that when Congress specifically removed language limiting the
enforcement of §1324 to federal officers and inserted specific language authorizing
local enforcement, that “it implicitly made the local enforcement authority as to all
three criminal statutes (i.e., §§1324, 1325, 1326) identical.”36 Accordingly, the Ninth
Circuit declared that local police officers may, subject to state law, constitutionally
stop or detain individuals when there is reasonable suspicion or, in the case of arrests,
probable cause that such persons have violated, or are violating, the criminal
provisions of the INA.37
With regards to preemption, the Gonzalez court determined that the criminal
immigration provisions were “few in number,” “relatively simple in their terms,”
constituted a “narrow and distinct element” of the INA, and did not require a
“complex administrative structure” consistent with exclusive federal control.38 The
court, therefore, concluded that the criminal provisions did not support the inference
that the federal government occupied the field of criminal immigration enforcement.
With respect to civil immigration enforcement, Gonzalez has been construed to
support the argument that states do not possess the authority, “inherent” or otherwise,
(unless specifically granted by Congress) to enforce the civil enforcement measures
of the INA.39 In conducting a preemption analysis for certain criminal provisions of
the INA, the Ninth Circuit in Gonzalez made a distinction between the civil and
criminal provisions of the INA, and assumed that the former constituted a pervasive
and preemptive regulatory scheme, whereas the latter did not. The court stated:
We assume that the civil provisions of the Act regulating authorized entry, length
of stay, residence status, and deportation, constitute such a pervasive regulatory
scheme, as would be consistent with the exclusive federal power over
immigration. However, this case [Gonzalez] does not concern that broad scheme,
but only a narrow and distinct element of it — the regulation of criminal
immigration activity by aliens.40
Accordingly, the court concluded that the authority of state officials to enforce
the provisions of the INA “is limited to criminal provisions.”41 The preemption
analysis in Gonzalez has been criticized by some for parsing the INA when statutory
construction and preemption principles generally require consideration of the whole
35 (...continued)
provision of this section except officers and employees of the Service designated
by the Attorney General, either individually or as a member of a class, and all
other officers whose duty it is to enforce criminal laws. (italics added)
36 See Gonzalez, 722 F.2d at 475 (citing H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 1505, 82nd Cong., 2d Sess,
reprinted in 1952 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1358, 1360-61).
37 Gonzalez, 722 F.2d at 475.
38 Id. at 474-75.
39 See e.g., 1996 OLC Opinion; 84 Op. Atty. Gen. Cal. 189 (Nov. 16, 2001) 2001 Cal. AG
Lexis 46; 2000 Op. Atty Gen. N.Y. 1001 (Mar. 21, 2000) 2000 N.Y. AG Lexis 2.
40 Gonzalez, 722 F.2d at 474-75.
41 Id. at 476.
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statutory scheme in evaluating a specific provision.42 While Gonzalez appears to
stand for the proposition that states do not possess the authority to enforce civil
immigration laws, it has been argued that the preemption analysis in Gonzalez was
based merely on an assumption and was outside the holding of the case, and thus
does not constitute binding precedent.43 Whether this conclusion is completely
accurate has yet to be tested in the courts in a definitive manner, although some
decisions from the Tenth Circuit regarding criminal investigations may be seen by
some as strengthening the role of state and local law enforcement agencies in
immigration enforcement.
In the Tenth Circuit case of United States v. Salinas-Calderon,44 a state trooper
pulled over the defendant for driving erratically but soon found six individuals in the
back of the defendant’s truck. Because the defendant, who was eventually charged
with the crime of illegally transporting aliens did not speak English, the state trooper
questioned the passenger (the defendant’s wife) and learned that the driver and the
other six individuals were in the country illegally. From this line of questioning, the
court determined that the trooper had probable cause to detain and arrest all the
individuals.
In addition to the probable cause conclusion, the Tenth Circuit determined that
a “state trooper has general investigatory authority to inquire into possible
immigration violations.”45 It has been argued that since there was no reason to
believe that the alien passengers had committed any criminal violations (i.e, they
were only in the country illegally — a civil violation), the court’s statement appears
to apply fully to civil as well as criminal violations.46 The Salinas-Calderon court,
however, did not differentiate between civil and criminal INA violations nor did it
address the charges or judicial proceedings for the six alien individuals found in the
back of the truck. Instead, the focus of the Salinas-Calderon decision was on the
probable cause and potential suppression of the statements made by the six alien
passengers.
In United States v. Vasquez-Alvarez, an Oklahoma police officer arrested a
Hispanic male suspected of drug dealing because he was an “illegal alien.”47 A
specific provision in the INA (8 U.S.C. §1252c) authorizes state officers to pick up
and hold for deportation a previously deported alien who had been convicted of a
crime in the U.S. and reentered illegally. Section 1225c requires state officers to
obtain confirmation from the INS before making such an arrest. At the time of the
arrest in Vasquez-Alvarez, however, the state officer did not have actual knowledge
42 Yanez, supra note 14, at 28-29.
43 CLEAR Act Hearing, H.R. 2671 (Oct. 1, 2003) (testimony of Kris W. Kobach, Professor
of Law, Univ. of Missouri-Kansas City).
44 United States v. Salinas-Calderon, 728 F.2d. 1298 (10th Cir. 1984).
45 Salinas-Calderon, 728 F.2d. at 1302 n.3.
46 See CLEAR Act Hearing, H.R. 2671 (Oct. 1, 2003) (testimony of Kris W. Kobach,
Professor of Law, Univ. of Missouri-Kansas City).
47 United States v. Vasquez-Alvarez, 176 F.3d 1294 (10th Cir. 1999).
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of the defendant’s immigration status or past criminal behavior; it was only later
discovered that the alien had a history of prior criminal convictions and deportations.
The defendant argued that the state police could only arrest him in accordance
with the restrictions detailed in 8 U.S.C. §1252c and since his arrest did not meet the
requirements of that provision, it was unauthorized. The Tenth Circuit, however,
ultimately concluded that §1252c “does not limit or displace the preexisting general
authority of state or local police officers to investigate and make arrests for violations
of federal law, including immigration law. Instead, §1252c merely creates an
additional vehicle for the enforcement of federal immigration law.”48
The court also recognized that it had previously determined in Salinas-Calderon
that state law enforcement officers have the general authority to investigate and make
arrests for violations of federal immigration laws.49 The court concluded that the
“legislative history (of §1252c) does not contain the slightest indication that Congress
intended to displace any preexisting enforcement power already in the hands of state
and local officers.”50 While Vasquez-Alvarez may be interpreted to suggest that state
and local police officers do in fact possess the “inherent authority” to enforce all
aspects of immigration law, it should be noted that the case arose in the context of
a criminal investigation and was premised on Oklahoma law, which allows local law
enforcement officials to make arrests for violations of federal law, including
immigration laws.51
Expanding on Vasquez-Alvarez, the Tenth Circuit, in United States v. Santana-
Garcia,52 again addressed the role of local law enforcement in immigration. In
Santana-Garcia, a Utah police officer stopped a vehicle for a traffic violation. The
driver of the car did not speak English and did not possess a driver’s license. The
passenger of the car spoke limited English and explained that they were traveling
from Mexico to Colorado, which prompted the officer to ask if they were “legal.”
The passenger and the driver appeared to understand the question and answered “no.”
From these facts, the court held that the officer had probable cause to arrest both
defendants for suspected violation of federal immigration law.
In recognizing that state and local police officers had “implicit authority” within
their respective jurisdictions to investigate and make arrests for violations of
immigration law, the court seemingly dismissed the suggestion that state law must
explicitly grant local authorities the power to arrest for a federal immigration law
violation.53 To come to this conclusion, the court relied upon a number of inferences
48 Id. at 1295.
49 Id. at 1296 (citing Salinas-Calderon, 728 F.2d at 1301-02 & n.3 (10th Cir. 1984)).
50 Id. at 1299.
51 Id. at 1297 (citing 11 Okla. Op. Att’y Gen. 345 (1979), 1979 WL 37653).
52 United States v. Santana-Garcia, 264 F.3d 1188 (10th Cir. 2001).
53 Id. at 1194. The court, nonetheless, cited Utah’s peace officer statute (Utah Code Ann.
§77-7-2) which empowers Utah state troopers to make warrantless arrests for “any public
(continued...)
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from earlier decisions that recognized the “implicit authority” or “general
investigatory authority” of state officers to inquire into possible immigration
violations.54 The court also seemed to rely upon a broad understanding of a Utah
state law that empowers officers to make warrantless arrests for any public offense
committed in the officers presence to include violations of federal law.55
While the defendants in Santana-Garcia were apparently in violation of a civil
provision of the INA (i.e., illegal presence), the Santana-Garcia court made no
distinction between the civil and criminal violations of the INA, and the authorities
the court cited generally involved arrests for criminal matters. Moreover, it remains
unclear how the court, pursuant to its broad understanding of the Utah state law it
relied upon, would have ruled absent the initial reason for the stop — the traffic
violation. Accordingly, it can be argued that this case still seems to leave unresolved
the extent to which state and local police officers may enforce the civil provisions of
the INA as such.
The aforementioned cases ultimately arose in the context of enforcing criminal
matters or violations of state law. This would seem to weaken the argument for an
independent role in enforcing civil immigration matters. Nonetheless, as the cases
from the Tenth Circuit illustrate, there appears to be a general movement towards
expanding the role of state and local law enforcement officers in the field of
immigration law, including some aspects of civil immigration enforcement.
Express Authorization for State and Local Law Enforcement
Officers to Enforce Immigration Law
Clearly preemption does not bar state and local immigration enforcement where
Congress has evidenced intent to authorize such enforcement.56 In exercising its
power to regulate immigration, Congress is free to delegate to the states, among other
things, the activities of arresting, holding, and transporting aliens. Indeed, Congress
already has created avenues for the participation of state and local officers in the
enforcement of the federal immigration laws.
53 (...continued)
offense.” The court also found Defendant’s acknowledgment in Vasquez-Alvarez that
Oklahoma law specifically authorized local law enforcement officials to make arrests for
violations of federal law unnecessary to that decision. Id. at 1194 n.7.
54 Citing Salinas-Calderon, 728 F.2d 1298 (10th Cir. 1984); United States v. Janik, 723 F.2d
537, 548 (7th Cir. 1983); United States v. Bowdach, 561 F.2d 1160, 1167 (5th Cir. 1977).
55 Santana-Garcia, 264 F.3d at 1194 n.8 (citing UTAH CODE ANN. §77-7-2).
56 Conversely, state action may be preempted where Congress explicitly manifests its intent
in law. Such an intent is evidenced in INA §274A(h)(2) (8 U.S.C. §1324A(h)(2)), which
explicitly prohibits states from imposing civil or criminal sanctions upon those who employ,
recruit, or refer unauthorized aliens. Other provisions that expressly consider the role of
states are INA §287(d) (state and local police are requested to report to INS arrests related
to controlled substances when the suspect is believed to be unlawfully in the country) and
INA §288 (instructing INS to rely on state and local police for the enforcement of local laws
within immigrant stations).
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8 U.S.C. §1357(g). One of the broadest grants of authority for state and local
immigration enforcement activity stems from §133 of the Illegal Immigration Reform
and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, which amended INA §287 (8 U.S.C.
§1357(g)). This provision authorizes the AG to:
enter into a written agreement with a State, or any political subdivision of a
State, pursuant to which an officer or employee of the State or subdivision, who
is determined by the Attorney General to be qualified to perform a function of
an immigration officer in relation to the investigation, apprehension, or detention
of aliens in the United States (including the transportation of such aliens across
State lines to detention centers), may carry out such function at the expense of
the State or political subdivision and to the extent consistent with State and local
law.
Section 1357(g) allows for significant flexibility. It permits state and local
entities to tailor an agreement with the AG to meet local needs, contemplates the
authorization of multiple officers, and does not require the designated officers to stop
performing their local duties.57 In performing a function under §1357(g), the written
agreement must articulate the specific powers and duties that may be, or are required
to be, performed by the state officer, the duration of the authority, and the position
of the agent of the AG who is required to supervise and direct the individual.58
8 U.S.C. §1357(g)(2) requires that state officers “have knowledge of and adhere
to” federal law governing immigration officers in addition to requiring adequate
training regarding the enforcement of immigration laws. Section 1357(g)(3)
mandates that the AG direct and supervise state officers who are performing
immigration functions pursuant to §1357(g). Under §1357(g)(6), the AG, in carrying
out §1357(g), can not accept a service if the service will displace any federal
employee. Officers designated by the AG are not federal employees except for
certain tort claims and compensation matters, but they do enjoy federal immunity.59
Section 1357(g)(9) establishes that a state is not required to enter into an agreement
with the AG under §1357(g); furthermore, under §1357(g)(10) no agreement is
required for a state officer to communicate with the AG regarding the immigration
status of any individual or to cooperate with the AG in the identification,
apprehension, detention, or removal of aliens unlawfully present in the U.S.
8 U.S.C. §1103(a)(8). Section 372 of IIRIRA amended INA §103(a) to allow
the AG to call upon state and local police in an immigration emergency (8 U.S.C.
§1103(a)). 8 U.S.C. §1103(a)(8) provides:
In the event that the Attorney General determines that an actual or imminent
mass influx of aliens arriving off the coast of the United States or near a land
border presents urgent circumstances requiring an immediate Federal response,
the Attorney General may authorize any State or local law enforcement officer,
57 Jay T. Jorgensen, Comment, The Practical Power of State and Local Governments to
Enforce Federal Immigration Laws, 1997 B.Y.U. L. REV. 899, 925 (1997).
58 INA §287(g)(5).
59 INA §287(g)(7)(8).
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with the consent of the head of the department, agency or establishment under
whose jurisdiction the individual is serving, to perform or exercise any of the
power, privileges or duties conferred or imposed by the Act or regulations issued
thereunder upon officers or employees of the service.
Thus, under 8 U.S.C. §1103(a)(8), state and local officers may exercise the civil or
criminal arrest powers of federal immigration officers (1) when expressly authorized
by the AG; (2) when given consent by the head of the state or local law enforcement
agency; and (3) upon the AG’s determination of an emergency due to a mass influx
of aliens. Any authority given by the AG to state law enforcement officers under this
provision can only be exercised during the emergency situation.
On July 24, 2002, the DOJ issued a final rule that implemented §1103(a)(8) and
described the cooperative process by which state or local governments could agree
to place authorized state and local law enforcement officers under the direction of the
INS in exercising federal immigration enforcement authority.60 In February of 2003,
the DOJ found it necessary to amend the previous regulations, however, because it
determined that the AG did not have the flexibility to address unanticipated situations
that might occur during a mass influx of aliens. The new rules also allow the AG to
abbreviate or waive the otherwise normally required training requirements when such
an action is necessary to protect public safety, public health, or national security.61
8 U.S.C. §1252c. Section 1252c originated in the House of Representatives
as a floor amendment to the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996
(AEDPA §439).62 Section 1252c authorizes the arrest of aliens by state and local
officers who have presumably violated §276 of the INA (Reentry of Removed Alien).
Section 1252c(a) states in part:
[T]o the extent permitted by relevant State and local law, State and local
law enforcement officials are authorized to arrest and detain an individual
who —
(1) is an alien illegally present in the United States; and
(2) has previously been convicted of a felony in the United States and
deported or left the United States after such conviction, but only after the
State or local law enforcement officials obtain appropriate confirmation
from the Immigration and Naturalization Service of the status of such
individual and only for such period of time as may be required for the
Service to take the individual into Federal custody for purposes of
deporting or removing the alien from the United States.
The purpose of §1252c was to overcome a perceived federal limitation on the
ability of state and local officers to arrest an alien known by them to be dangerous
60 Codified at 28 C.F.R. §65.84; see also 67 Fed. Reg. 48354.
61 Abbreviation or Waiver of Training for State or Local Law Enforcement Officers
Authorized To Enforce Immigration Law During a Mass Influx of Aliens, 68 Fed. Reg.
8820-8822 (Feb. 26, 2003) (codified at 28 C.F.R. §65.84(a)(4)).
62 P.L. 104-132, §439. See 142 Cong. Rec. 4619 (Rep. Doolittle offering amend. no. 7 to
H.R. 2703).
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because of past crimes committed in their jurisdiction.63 The court in United States
v. Vasquez-Alvarez, however, found that neither the defendant, the government, or
the court could identify any pre-§1252c limitations on the powers of state and local
officers to enforce federal law.64 Section 1252c(b) also mandates cooperation
between the AG and the states to assure that information in the control of the AG,
including information in the NCIC, that would assist state and local law enforcement
officials in carrying out the duties of §1252c is made available to the states.
Current Efforts
As mentioned above, IIRIRA amended the INA by authorizing the AG to enter
into written agreements with states or political subdivisions of a state so that
qualified officers could perform specified immigration-related duties. This authority
was given new urgency following the terrorist attacks in September 2001. In 2002,
the AG proposed an initiative to enter into such agreements in an effort to carry out
the country’s anti-terrorism mission. Under the agreement, state and local law
enforcement officers could be deputized to assist the federal government with
enforcing certain aspects of immigration law.65 To date, Florida and Alabama have
entered into such an agreement.66
Florida’s Memorandum of Understanding
Background. In September 2002, the state of Florida Department of Law
Enforcement (FDLE) and DOJ entered into a one-year memorandum of
understanding (MOU).67 The MOU is design as a pilot program that authorizes 35
state and local law enforcement officers to work on Florida’s Regional Domestic
Security Task Forces (RDSTF). The task forces perform immigration enforcement
functions that pertain to domestic security and counter-terrorism needs of the nation
and the state of Florida.
Under Florida’s MOU, selected officers are authorized to enforce immigration
laws and policies upon successful completion of mandatory training provided by
63 Vasquez-Alvarez, 176 F.3d at 1299.
64 Vasquez-Alvarez, 176 F.3d at 1299, n.4.
65 U.S. Department of Justice, Attorney General Prepared Remarks on the National Security
Entry-Exit Registration System, June 6, 2002.
66 Local law enforcement was used to enforce immigration law prior to the 2002 DOJ
initiative. In 1997, the then-INS and the police department in Chandler, Arizona conducted
a joint operation wherein individuals in the community who were suspected of being
illegally present in the United States were investigated. The city was sued due to allegations
of profiling and settled the law suit with members in the community who were involved in
the operation.
67 The MOU was renewed on Nov. 26, 2003.
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DHS instructors.68 Officers assigned to the RDSTF are nominated by the co-directors
of each RDSTF and are presented to the FDLE for consideration. Each nominee has
to be a U.S. citizen, have been a sworn officer for a minimum of three years, and
have, at minimum, an Associate Degree. Candidates also must be able to qualify for
federal security clearances. Once selected, each candidate’s employer has to indicate
that it will allow the officer to work a significant portion of his work responsibilities
within the RDSTF for a minimum of one year.
Training. Training for the officers is provided by ICE at a mutually designated
site in Florida. The program uses ICE curriculum and competency testing, which
includes information on the following: (1) the scope of the officer’s authority; (2)
cross-cultural issues; (3) the proper use of force; (4) civil rights law; and (5) liability
issues. Officers also receive specific training on their obligations under federal law
and the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations on making proper notification
upon the arrest of foreign nationals.69 All training materials are provided by DHS,
while the employing agency is responsible for the salaries and benefits of the officers
in training. The FDLE covers the costs of housing and meals during training.
Upon successful completion of the training, DHS provides a signed document
setting forth the officer’s authorization to perform specified immigration enforcement
functions for an initial period of one year. The officer’s performance is evaluated by
the District Director and the FDLE commissioner on a quarterly basis to assure
compliance with the MOU requirements. Authorization of the officer’s powers could
be revoked at any time by DHS, FDLE or the employing agency.
Immigration-related activities performed by the officers are supervised by DHS.
Participating officers cannot perform any immigration officer functions except when
fulfilling their assigned RDSTF duties and under the direct supervision of a DHS
officer. The DHS officer coordinates the involvement of the officers in DHS-related
operations in consultation with the RDSTF supervisor to assure appropriate
utilization of personnel. Under the MOU, officers cannot be utilized in routine DHS
operations unless it relates to the RDSTF’s domestic security and counter-terrorism
functions. All arrest made under this authority must be reported to ICE within 24
hours.
Complaint Procedures. Florida’s MOU requires complaint procedures to
be disseminated throughout the state in English and any other appropriate languages.
Under the MOU, complaints can be accepted from any source and submitted to
federal or state authorities. All complaints received by the federal government,
FDLE or the officer’s employing agency have to be reported to ICE’s Office of
Internal Audit. Under the MOU, complaints reported directly to ICE must be shared
68 Under the MOU, law enforcement officers have the following authorities: (1) interrogate
an alien in order to determine if there is probable cause for an immigration arrest; (2) arrest
an alien without warrant for civil and criminal immigration violations; (3) complete required
arrest reports and forms; (4) prepare affidavits and take sworn statements; (5) transport
aliens; (6) assist in pre-trial and post-arrest case processing of aliens taken into custody by
the ICE; (7) detain arrested aliens in ICE approved detention facilities.
69 Available at [http://www.un.org/law/ilc/texts/consul.htm].
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with FDLE, at which time both agencies would determine the appropriate jurisdiction
for the complaint to be resolved. Under the MOU, complainants must receive
notification of the receipt of the complaint, and officers involved could be removed
from participation in activities covered under the MOU pending resolution of the
complaint.
Program Evaluation. Under the MOU, the Secretary of DHS and the
commissioner of FDLE are require to establish a steering committee to periodically
review and assess the effectiveness of the operations conducted by the task forces.
The reviews are intended to assure that the efforts remain focused on the
investigation of domestic security and counter-terrorism related matters. According
to the MOU, within nine months of certification an evaluation of the program should
be conducted by DHS with cooperation from other involved entities.70
Alabama’s Memorandum of Understanding
Background and Training. On September 10, 2003, the state of Alabama
and DHS entered into an MOU that is similar to Florida’s MOU. Officers are
nominated by the Director of the state’s Department of Public Safety (DPS) and
forwarded to ICE. As with Florida’s MOU, all nominees must be U.S. citizens, have
at least three years of experience as a sworn law enforcement officer, and be able to
qualify for federal security clearances. Unlike Florida’s MOU, however, there is no
minimal education requirement. Training is provided by ICE, and the curriculum is
the same as provided in Florida’s MOU. DPS is responsible for all expenses incurred
during training and updated training will be provided to the officers at the end of their
initial year of appointment.71
Immigration enforcement activities of the officers will be supervised and
directed by ICE special agents, who are located in Huntsville, Birmingham and
Montgomery, Alabama. Such activities can only be performed under direct
supervision of ICE special agents. Arrests made under the authority must be reported
to ICE within 24 hours, and will be reviewed by the ICE special agent on an ongoing
basis to ensure compliance with immigration laws and procedures.
Complaint Procedures. Complaint procedures under the MOU are the same
as those described in the Florida MOU. Community and media relations in both
MOUs are stressed. DHS will engage in community outreach with any organization
or individuals expressing interest in the MOUs. All information released to the
media will be coordinated between DHS and state law enforcement entities.
70 The evaluation should include statistical evaluation, reports, records, officer evaluation,
case reviews, complaint records, site visits, media coverage and community interaction.
71 On Oct. 3, 2003, 21 Alabama state troopers completed training under the MOU.
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Commonalities in the MOUs
In Florida and Alabama’s MOUs, officers are treated as federal employees for
the purpose of the Federal Tort Claims Act72 and worker’s compensation claims
when performing duties authorized under the MOUs. They also have the same
immunities and defenses of ICE officers from personal liability from tort suits.73
Under Alabama’s MOU, however, officers named as defendants in litigation arising
from activities carried out under the MOU may request representation by the DOJ.
The MOUs of both states stipulate that any party can terminate the MOU at
anytime. While Florida’s MOU expired on September 1, 2003, it was renewed in
November 2003. During the MOU renewal process, designated members of the
FDLE task forces were not authorized to enforce any authority given to them under
the prior MOU. Alabama’s MOU has no termination date.
Legislation in the 108th Congress74
On November 20, 2003 Senators Session and Miller introduced the Homeland
Security Enhancement Act of 2003 (S. 1906). On July 9, 2003 Representative
Charlie Norwood introduced the Clear Law Enforcement for Criminal Alien
Removal Act of 2003 (CLEAR; H.R. 2671). Among other things, the bills would:
! reaffirm the existing general authority of state and local law
enforcement to investigate, apprehend, and detain aliens in the U.S.
(including the transportation of such aliens across state lines to
detention centers), in the enforcement of immigration law (H.R.
2671 would also reaffirm state and local law enforcement’s
authority to remove aliens in the U.S. in the enforcement of
immigration law);
! prohibit State Criminal Alien Assistance (SCAAP) funding to states
and localities for the cost of incarcerating undocumented criminal
aliens if they fail to enact a law that would authorize state and local
law enforcement officers to enforce federal immigration law;
! amend the INA to make it a criminal penalty for aliens in violation
of the act and subject their assets to forfeiture; increase criminal and
civil penalties for illegal aliens or aliens who are in violation of
immigration laws; increase the civil penalties for aliens who fail to
depart the country; and subject their assets to forfeiture, under
certain circumstances;
! require states and localities to have a policy that provides DOJ and
DHS with identifying information on aliens in violation of
immigration laws;
72 28 U.S.C. §§2671-2680.
73 5 U.S.C. §§8101 et seq.
74 Legislation discussed in this part is limited to provisions that pertain to state and local law
enforcement’s role in enforcing immigration law.
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! amend the INA by permitting the Secretary of DHS or the AG to
enter into contracts with states that would provide states or localities
compensation for incarcerating illegal aliens; and requiring the
Secretary of DHS or the AG to take custody of illegal aliens.
! require the AG or the Secretary of DHS to establish a training
manual for state and local law enforcement personnel with respect
to enforcing immigration law; also require DHS (both bills) or DOJ
(H.R. 2671) to make the training available to state and local law
enforcement officers through as many means as possible (S. 1906
would permit DHS to charge a fee for the training and would limit
the training to no longer than 14 days or no more than 80 hours);
! require immunity for federal, state and local law enforcement
officers with respect to personal liability that may arise as a result of
the officer enforcing immigration law so long as the officer was “...
acting within the scope of his or his official duties; and
! require immunity for federal, state or local law enforcement agencies
with respect to claims of money damages that may arise as a result
of an officer from the agency enforcing immigration law, “except to
the extent a law enforcement officer ... committed a violation of
federal, state, or local criminal law in the course of enforcing such
immigration law.
! S. 1906 would require the names of aliens to be listed in the FBI’s
NCIC if they (1) have a final order of deportation; (2) have signed
a voluntary departure agreement; or (3) have overstayed their visas.
H.R. 2671 would require the names of all aliens who violate
immigration laws to be listed in NCIC.
! S. 1906 would require DHS to take possession of illegal aliens
within 48 hours after the state or local law enforcement agency has
completed its charging process or within 48 hours after the illegal
alien has been apprehended if no charges are filed. H.R. 2671 would
require the AG or the Secretary of DHS to establish a mechanism to
collect illegal aliens from state and local law enforcement
authorities;
! S. 1906 would require DHS to reimburse state and local law
enforcement agencies for the cost incurred to incarcerate and
transport illegal aliens in their custody, and authorize $500 million
for the detention and transportation of illegal aliens to federal
custody. H.R. 2671 would require the AG to make grants to state
and local law enforcement agencies with respect to detaining and
processing illegal aliens in custody for immigration law violations,
and authorize $1 billion in funding, annually, for the grants;
! H.R. 2671 would permit states and localities to file a claim against
the federal government if they are adversely affected by the federal
government’s requirement to cooperate with the state or locality to
enforce immigration law. S. 1906 does not have a similar provision.
S. 1906 was referred to the Senate Judiciary Committee on November 20, 2003
and no further action has been taken, however, it is possible that further action will
be taken on the bill. H.R. 2671 was referred to the House Subcommittee on
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Immigration, Border Security and Claims on September 4, 2003 and a hearing was
held on October 1, 2003.
Selected Issues
In addition to the legal complexities that may arise with respect to utilizing state
and local law enforcement to enforce immigration law, several additional issues have
been noted.
Sanctuary States and Cities
Current day “sanctuary cities” or “non-cooperation policies” have their roots in
the 1980s religious sanctuary movement by American churches. These churches
provided sanctuary to thousands of unauthorized Central American migrants fleeing
civil war in their homelands. Most cities that are considered sanctuary cities have
adopted a “don’t ask-don’t tell” policy where they don’t require their employees,
including law enforcement officers, to report to federal officials aliens who may be
illegally present in the country.
Localities, and in some cases individual police departments, in such areas that
are considered “sanctuary cities,” have utilized various mechanisms to ensure that
unauthorized aliens who may be present in their jurisdiction illegally are not turned
in to federal authorities.75 Some municipalities address the issue through resolutions,
executive orders or city ordinances, while many police departments address the issues
through special orders, departmental policy and general orders. To date, there are
two statewide policies regarding providing sanctuary for unauthorized aliens. In May
2003, Alaska’s state legislature passed a joint resolution prohibiting state agencies
from using resources or institutions for the purpose of enforcing federal immigration
laws.76 In 1987, Oregon passed a law that prohibits state and local law enforcement
agencies from using agency moneys, equipment or personnel for the purpose of
detecting or apprehending foreign citizens based on violation of federal immigration
law.77 Oregon law, however, does permit their law enforcement officers to exchange
information with federal authorities to verify the immigration status of an individual
arrested for criminal offenses.
According to proponents, the movement to provide coverage for unauthorized
aliens stems from the belief that the enforcement of immigration law is the
75 Cities and counties currently that have sanctuary policies are; Anchorage, AK, Fairbanks,
AK, Chandler, AZ, Fresno, CA., Los Angeles, CA., San Diego, CA., San Francisco, CA.,
Sonoma County, Ca., Evanston, IL., Cicero, IL., Cambridge, MA., Orleans, MA., Portland,
ME., Baltimore, MD., Takoma Park, MD., Ann Arbor, MI., Detroit, MI., Minneapolis, MN.,
Durham, NC., Albuquerque, NM., Aztec, NM., Rio Arriba, County, NM., Sante Fe, NM.,
New York, NY., Ashland, Or., Gaston, Or., Marion County, OR., Austin, TX., Houston,
TX., Katy, TX., Seattle, WA., and Madison, WI. .
76 H.R. J. RES. 22, 23rd Leg., 1st sess., (Ak. 2003).
77 OR. REV. STAT. §181.850.
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responsibility of federal authorities, and that state resources should not be used for
this purpose. Some view these policies to be at odds with §642 of IIRIRA, which
permits the sharing of information between agencies and requires state and local
agencies to share information with INS and prohibits such information from being
restricted. They argue that requiring the reporting of unauthorized aliens to federal
authorities infringes on states’ tenth amendment right to sovereignty.
Access to Database
Under current practice, state and local law enforcement officials do not have
direct access to information on the immigration status of an alien. In the course of
their duties, if state and local law enforcement officials encounter an alien whose
immigration status is in question, they can contact the LESC in Burlington,
Vermont.78 Immigration officials at the LESC query a database that contains
information on an alien’s immigration status. If the alien is unauthorized to be
present in the country and the state or local law enforcement official has decided that
the alien will be released from their jurisdiction, immigration officials are notified
to come and pick up the alien.79
In addition to the LESC, state and local law enforcement officials can access the
NCIC for those aliens who are listed as absconders.80 Aliens listed on the absconder
list can be detained by state and local law enforcement officials because they are in
violation of the federal criminal code. It has been reported, however, that the FBI has
a backlog with respect to entering the names of over 350,000 absconders in the
database.81
State and local law enforcement officials, however, have reported a variety of
problems with accessing LESC and soliciting the help of federal immigration
officials once it has been determined that an alien is unauthorized to be present in the
country.82 According to some state and local law enforcement officials, it can take
78 LESC was established in 1994 and is administered by ICE. It operates 24 hours a day,
seven days a week. LESC gathers information from eight databases and several law
enforcement databases, including the NCIC. In July 2003, LESC processed 48,007
inquiries.
79 Section 642(c) of IIRIRA required the former INS to respond to inquiries from local law
enforcement agencies that sought to ascertain the immigration status of an individual within
the jurisdiction of the agency for any purpose authorized under law.
80 Absconders are unauthorized or criminal aliens or nonimmigrants who violated
immigration law and have been ordered deported by an immigration court.
81 Testimony of INS Commissioner James Zigler, in U.S. Congress, House Appropriations
Committee, Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, State and the Judiciary, Hearing on the
President’s FY2003 Budget Request, Mar. 7, 2002.
82 In some cases, local law enforcement may pick up an alien for questioning and determine
that the alien could be released under normal circumstances, but because the alien has an
illegal status, the officer should turn the alien over to federal authorities.
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several hours to get the results of a single query.83 DHS, however, has reported that,
on average, an immigrant status query takes 15 minutes.84 State and local law
enforcement officials have also reported that federal authorities rarely cooperate once
they have been contacted by a state or local law enforcement entity.85 Whatever the
facts may be, there is a perception on the part of state and local law enforcement
personnel that cooperation could be improved.
Civil Rights
One of the overriding concerns with state and local police involvement in the
enforcement of immigration law is the potential for civil rights violations. A person
is afforded certain civil rights under the Fifth Amendment, which guarantees that “no
person shall ... be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without the due process of law
...,” and the Fourteenth Amendment, which prohibits a state from denying to “any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” It should also be
noted that courts have reviewed alleged police misconduct under the Fourth
Amendment’s prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures.
Congress has also statutorily prohibited certain discriminatory actions and has
made available various remedies to victims of such discrimination. For example,
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits “discrimination under federally
assisted programs on the grounds of race,” which can include federal and state law
enforcement entities. 42 U.S.C. §1983, enacted as part of the Civil Rights Act of
1871, provides a monetary damages remedy for harm caused by deprivation of
federal constitutional rights by state or local governmental officials. The Violent
Crime and Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 included a provision, 42
U.S.C. §14141, which authorizes the DOJ (but not private victims) to bring civil
actions for equitable and declaratory relief against any police agency engaged in
unconstitutional “patterns or practices.”
Because unauthorized aliens are likely to be members of minority groups,
complications may arise in enforcing immigration law due to the difficulty in
identifying illegal aliens while at the same time avoiding the appearance of
discrimination based on ethnicity or alienage. Thus, a high risk for civil rights
violations may occur if state and local police do not obtain the requisite knowledge,
training, and experience in dealing with the enforcement of immigration laws.
Moreover, suspects of immigration violations may become victims of “racial
profiling” — the practice of targeting individuals for police or security detention
based on their race or ethnicity in the belief that certain minority groups are more
83 U.S. Congress, House Subcommittee on Immigration, Border Security, and Claims, H.R.
2671, The Clear Law Enforcement for Criminal Alien Removal Act, 108th Cong., 1st sess.,
Oct. 1, 2003.
84 Congressional Research Service interview with an ICE congressional liaison and official
in Dec. 2003.
85 Reportedly, this is more of a problem in rural areas where the closest immigration official
may be in another state. U.S. Congress, House Subcommittee on Immigration, Border
Security, and Claims, H.R. 2671, The Clear Law Enforcement for Criminal Alien Removal
Act.
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likely to engage in unlawful behavior or be present in the U.S. illegally. The
prevalence of alleged civil rights violations and racial profiling among federal, state,
and local law enforcement agencies has already received a significant amount of
attention from the public and the courts.86
Detention Space
The former INS has long lacked sufficient beds to house immigration violators.
As a result of the lack of bed space, many aliens continue to be released from
detention. Some contend that a possible unintended consequence of permitting state
and local law enforcement entities to enforce immigration law would lead to more
aliens being detained. These critics point to the fact that there are over 350,000
aliens with final orders of deportation present in the United States; and, according to
the 2000 U.S. Census, there are approximately 8 million undocumented aliens
present. By increasing the number of law enforcement officers to enforce
immigration law, they argue, inevitably more undocumented aliens would be
detained. States and local jurisdictions already face some of the same challenges the
federal government has been experiencing with respect to the lack of facilities to
house criminals and immigrant violators. Moreover, some argue that state and local
law enforcement agencies may bear the cost of detaining unauthorized aliens.87
Pro/Con Analysis of State and Local Law
Enforcement Officials Enforcing Immigration Law
Determining what the proper role of state and local law enforcement officials
is in enforcing immigration law is not without controversy. Lawmakers, scholars,
observers and law enforcement officials have all expressed their opposition or
support for increasing the role of state and local law enforcement with respect to
enforcing immigration law. Following is a discussion of a few of the issues.
Impact on Communities
Opponents argue that utilizing state and local law enforcement to enforce
immigration law would undermine the relationship between local law enforcement
agencies and the communities they serve. For example, potential witnesses and
victims of crime may be reluctant to come forward to report crimes in fear of actions
that might be taken against them by immigration officials. They assert that the trust
between immigrants and local authorities is tenuous in many jurisdictions and that
such a policy could exacerbate the negative relationship.
86 See Department of Homeland Security Transition: Bureau of Immigration and Customs
Enforcement: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Immigration, Border Security, and
Claims of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. 66-69 (2003) (statement of the
Mexican American Legal Defense and Education Fund) (citing various examples of racial
profiling among federal and state officers).
87 For additional information on aliens in detention, see CRS Report RL31606, Detention
of Noncitizens in the United States, by Alison Siskin and Margaret Mikyung Lee.
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Proponents contend that state and local law enforcement officers would best be
able to enforce such laws simply because they know their communities. They argue
that state and local law enforcement officers already have the power to enforce
criminal immigration violations and have not seen a reluctance on the part of the
communities they serve to cooperate.
Resources
Opponents argue that state and local law enforcement resources should not be
used to fund a federal responsibility. They contend that such action could result in
the reduction of local law enforcement resources available for other purposes and
constitute a cost shift onto state and local law enforcement agencies. According to
some, local jurisdictions are already witnessing a depletion of traditional funding to
fight crime. Moreover, they contend, many jurisdictions have not received funding
for their first responders programs. These critics also contend that there could be a
de-emphasis on certain types of criminal investigations in an effort to focus on
enforcing immigration law, which would divert law enforcement authorities’ from
their primary duties.
Proponents in favor of utilizing state and local law enforcement to enforce
immigration law argue that such assistance would help the federal government to
enforce the immigration law deeper into the interior of the United States. Moreover,
they contend that local law enforcement agencies would bring additional resources
to assist the federal government with enforcing immigration law. Finally, they argue
that the current atmosphere of terrorist threat adds impetus to any efforts that might
reduce this threat.
National Security
Opponents argue that such a policy would undermine public safety and could
force many undocumented aliens to go underground, thus making it more difficult
to solicit their cooperation in terrorist-related and criminal investigations.
Proponents assert that permitting state and local law enforcement to enforce
immigration law would make it easier to arrest potential terrorists and criminals who
are illegally present in the country, thus providing an elevated level of security for the
nation. They argue that these individuals could provide important tips in an
investigation.
Application of Policy
Under current law, the AG could enter into separate agreements with states and
localities. Opponents contend that separate agreements could lead to inconsistent
application of immigration law across jurisdictions and possible legal claims of
disparate treatment. Moreover, they contend that different applications could lead
to allegations of racial profiling and discrimination.
Proponents argue that jurisdictions have different needs and that separate
agreements that are designed to meet the need of each jurisdiction are critical. They
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contend that as long as the jurisdiction is abiding by the conditions set forth in its
MOU with the federal government, then the propensity for abuse or misapplication
is mitigated.
Training
Since federal immigration law is a complex body of law, it requires extensive
training and expertise to adequately enforce. Some argue that there are a variety of
documents that allow someone to be legally present in the United States and state and
local law enforcement officials do not have the necessary training on how to
differentiate between those documents. Additionally, opponents maintain that the
use of fraudulent documents is a growing problem and immigration authorities must
be familiar with the various techniques that are used to misrepresent a document.
Proponents argue that the current training that is outlined in policy is sufficient
to adequately train state and local law enforcement officials to properly enforce
immigration law. They contend that state and local law enforcement entities, as in
the case of Alabama’s MOU, can supplement the required training as they see fit.88
Selected Policy Options
As Congress debates the use of state and local law enforcement officers to
enforce immigration law, it may want to consider several policy options, which may
represent a choice among the options listed below or a combination. Congress may
also choose to take no action, which could leave it to the courts to define these
boundaries.
Direct Access to Databases
Under current practice, state and local law enforcement officials have indirect
access to the immigration status of aliens through LESC and direct access to
absconders through the FBI’s NCIC, (see discussion in “Legislation in the 108th
Congress”). Some law enforcement officials argue that direct access to databases
that contain information on the immigrant’s status would assist them in carrying out
their responsibilities more efficiently and effectively. Opponents, on the other hand,
argue that providing state and local law enforcement officials with direct access to
an alien’s personal information could lead to abuse of such information by the law
enforcement official. Some raise questions about the quality of the various databases
and the potential for false positives, which could lead to the incarceration of innocent
people. While there are critics on both sides of the issue, there may be a consensus
that state and local law enforcement officials need access to certain information on
aliens with whom they come into contact.
88 According to a 2002 rule, the AG could waive the required training for state or local law
enforcement officers who may deputized to enforce immigration law.
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According to some, other issues arise when addressing state and local law
enforcement’s access to immigration databases: (1) how much access should be
granted to state and local law enforcement officials; (2) who should have access to
the databases; (3) what level of background clearance would be sufficient for the
officers accessing the database; (4) what type of privacy protection should be given
for individuals whose personal information is being accessed; and (5) how can the
quality of the databases be improved to avoid potential problems such as “false
positives” and individuals with similar names, which could potentially clog up the
system.
Funding for State Cooperation
Congress could appropriate additional funding to state and local law
enforcement agencies for their cooperation with enforcing immigration law. A
common argument made by local law enforcement officials against enforcing
immigration law is the lack of resources.89 Many states are facing budget crises and
police departments have seen decreases in federal funding for some law enforcement
programs. Moreover, there have been complaints from some jurisdictions that they
are not receiving first responder funding.
State Criminal Alien Assistance Program (SCAAP). In addition to
some reduction in traditional funding for law enforcement-related purposes, states
and localities have also seen a reduction in federal reimbursement for the SCAAP.
SCAAP provides payment assistance to states and localities for the costs incurred for
incarcerating undocumented aliens being held as a result of state or local charges.90
SCAAP funding decreased from $564 million in FY2002 to $250 million in FY2003.
SCAAP funding for FY2004 increased to $300 million.
Criminalizing Civil Immigration Violations
At the center of the current debate to permit state and local law enforcement to
enforce immigration law is whether state and local law enforcement has the inherent
authority to enforce civil immigration violations, such as a nonimmigrant who
overstays his visa. While this issue still appears somewhat unclear from a legal
perspective (see earlier discussion in “Authorities to Enforce Immigration Law” and
“State Involvement in the Enforcement of Immigration Law”), by criminalizing all
civil immigration violations, state and local law enforcement agencies could
seemingly arrest and detain all immigration violators.
While some view this option as closing the existing loophole, others express
concern that state and local law enforcement officials are not adequately trained to
ascertain the difference between a bonafide asylum seeker and an individual who
may be fraudulently trying to circumvent the system. Others express concern that the
89 Local law enforcement officials have also made other arguments against enforcing
immigration law as discussed in “Pro/Con Analysis of State and Local Law Enforcement
Officials Enforcing Immigration Law.”
90 Section 241 of the INA created SCAAP.
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pool of violators is great (8 million undocumented aliens)91 and the immigration
system is already overburdened. Observers question that if civil immigration
violations were to become criminal would it be retroactive, and if so to what date;
and would it preempt aliens who have civil immigration violations from adjusting
their status?
91 The 2000 Census Bureau estimated that there are approximately 8 million undocumented
aliens in the United States.