Order Code RL32272
CRS Report for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
Bringing Peace to Chechnya?
Assessments and Implications
February 20, 2004
Jim Nichol
Analyst in Russian and Eurasian Affairs
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

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Bringing Peace to Chechnya?
Assessments and Implications
Summary
Russia’s then-Premier (and current President) Vladimir Putin ordered military,
police, and security forces to enter the breakaway Chechnya region in September
1999, and these forces occupied most of the region by early 2000. Putin’s rise to
power and continuing popularity have been tied at least partly to his perceived ability
to prosecute this conflict successfully. In the run-up to Russian legislative elections
in December 2003 and a presidential election scheduled for March 2004, Putin has
endeavored to demonstrate that peace has returned to the region.
Since Chechen terrorists held hundreds of Moscow theater-goers hostage in late
2002, the Putin administration has appeared unequivocally opposed to talks with the
rebels and more dedicated to establishing a pro-Moscow government in Chechnya.
This government will use its own forces to battle the remaining rebels, ostensibly
permitting the disengagement and withdrawal of some Russian troops from the
region. This “Chechenization” of the conflict, along with related pacification efforts,
constitute the main elements of the Russian government’s campaign to wind down
the fighting. Pacification efforts aim to gain the support or acquiescence of the
population to federal control and include rebuilding assistance and elections.
A consistent theme of U.S. and other international criticism of Russia is that
Russian troops use excessive and indiscriminate force to quell separatism in
Chechnya and committ serious human rights abuses. Several analysts have discerned
a decrease in Bush Administration criticism of Russian policy in Chechnya, perhaps
spurred to some degree by the Moscow theater hostage crisis and stepped-up terrorist
bombings throughout Russia in 2003-2004. U.S. concerns before the Iraq conflict
with gaining Russia’s support also may have contributed to the shifts. There
appeared to be fewer Administration suggestions to Russia that it should open peace
talks with former Chechnya leader Aslan Maskhadov, more tolerance for Russia’s
argument that it was battling terrorism in Chechnya, and some hope that elections
and rebuilding in Chechnya could contribute to a “political settlement.” But some
in the Administration also argue that Russia is showing declining interest in the
adoption of Western democratic and human rights “values,” and that such slippage
could ultimately harm bilateral relations.
Consolidated Appropriations for FY2004, including foreign operations (H.R.
2673; P.L.108-199) continues a provision first included in FY2001 appropriations
that cuts aid to Russia unless the President determines that Russia is not hampering
access to Chechnya by non-governmental organizations (NGOs). One issue for
Congress is whether to continue this ban. Conference managers for P.L.108-199
highlighted concerns about the harassment of U.S. citizens involved in aid programs
by Russia’s security services. Other issues raised by the conferees that may be
reflected in further legislative action include Russia’s reported coercion of displaced
Chechens. The conferees requested that the State Department press Russia to
terminate the forced return of displaced Chechens to Chechnya and to account for the
“gross human rights violations committed by Russian troops against Chechen
civilians.”

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Contents
Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Elections and Peace-Making . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
The Constitutional Referendum . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Chechnya’s Presidential Election . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Federal Elections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
The Federal Presidential Race . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Implications for Chechnya and Russia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Impact on Russian Elections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
International Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Chechnya’s Future . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Implications for U.S. Interests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

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Bringing Peace to Chechnya?
Assessments and Implications
Background
Russia’s then-Premier (and current President) Vladimir Putin ordered military,
police, and other security forces to enter the breakaway Chechnya region (with a
population variously estimated at less than one-half to one million) in September
1999, and these forces occupied most of the region by early 2000.1 The conflict has
ebbed and flowed since then. Chechen rebel forces –estimated by Russian officials
to number between 1,200 and 2,000 dedicated fighters – currently appear weakened
but still tenacious.2 In recent months, they increasingly have engaged in small-scale
attacks and bombings – including suicide bombings – against both Russian troops
and civilians in Chechnya and other parts of Russia.
Suicide bombings had been relatively rare occurrences in both Chechnya
conflicts but appeared to increase in 2002. The deadliest incidents were the hostage-
taking at a Moscow theater in October 2002 (although most of the 130 deaths of
hostages resulted from the rescue effort) and a suicide truck bombing in December
2002 that destroyed a government building in Chechnya and killed more than
seventy. Ten suicide bombings throughout Russia in 2003 – that resulted in over 200
casualties – seemed aimed in part to publicize the Chechnya conflict and to sway
voters in upcoming elections in Russia and Chechnya. In the run-up to the Russian
presidential election in March 2004, there have been several more suicide bombings,
including one in the Moscow subway on February 6 that resulted in about forty
casualties. Chechen rebel leader Shamil Basayev in late December 2003 reportedly
took responsibility for at least two of the suicide bombings.3
Since the Moscow theater siege, the Putin administration has appeared
unequivocally opposed to talks with the rebels and more dedicated to establishing a
pro-Moscow government in Chechnya. This government will use its own forces to
battle the remaining rebels, ostensibly permitting the disengagement and withdrawal
1The first Chechnya conflict occurred in 1994-1996. For background on the first and second
conflicts, see CRS Report RL30389, Renewed Chechnya Conflict, May 3, 2000; CRS Report
RL31620, Russia’s Chechnya Conflict: Developments in 2002-2003, April 16, 2003; and
CRS Issue Brief IB92109, Russia, updated regularly.
2Both sides agree that the rebels have been forced to break up into small units or cells and
to rely on unconventional warfare. Both sides deny that the number of rebel fighters has
decreased. ITAR-TASS, January 14, 2004; RIA-Novosti, January 21, 2004; Interfax,
January 17, 2004.
3Foreign Broadcast Information Service. Daily Report: Central Eurasia (hereafter, FBIS),
December 23, 2003, Doc. No. CEP-268.

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of some of the estimated 80-85,000 Russian troops from the region. This
“Chechenization” of the conflict, along with related pacification efforts, constitute
the main elements of the Russian government’s campaign to wind down the
Chechnya conflict. Pacification efforts aim to gain the support or acquiescence of the
population to federal control and include rebuilding assistance and elections.
The Putin government long claimed that the fight against terrorism in Chechnya
required the suspension of some civil rights. However, it claimed in 2002 that ebbing
fighting permitted the bolstering of civil rights and arranged a constitutional
referendum and a presidential election in the region in 2003. In keeping with this
new emphasis, in August 2003 the Russian government announced the transfer of
control over public safety in about two-thirds of Chechnya from military and security
agencies to the Interior (police) Ministry. Many human rights organizations
nonetheless have documented or alleged ongoing human rights abuses by Russian
and pro-Moscow Chechen forces, including artillery shellings, airstrikes, and sweeps
of villages by troops in search of hiding rebels. Such sweeps result in civilian
disappearances, summary killings, and hostage-taking for ransom. Although the
scale and number of such sweeps may have declined somewhat since 1999, as many
as 800-1,200 civilian abductions may have occurred in 2003, according to Russia’s
Memorial human rights organization (the pro-Moscow Chechen government cites
about 600 abductions). Chechen rebels also continue to commit abuses.4
The Putin government increasingly is pressing displaced Chechens outside the
region to return to Chechnya, arguing that civil order has been largely restored and
that rebuilding has commenced. Many have returned, but the U.N. High
Commissioner for Refugees has estimated that there still are over 100,000 displaced
Chechens outside the region (as well as over 190,000 within the region). About
10,000 still reside in tent cities in Chechnya’s neighboring Ingush region. During his
January 2004 visit to Chechnya, U.N. Undersecretary-General Jan Egeland raised
concerns about efforts to force the Chechens to return, such as by bulldozing camps
or turning off electricity, especially since he found that living conditions in Chechnya
were still harsh and unsafe.5
To encourage displaced Chechens to return to the region and to bolster popular
support, the Russian government has announced rebuilding assistance, including
compensation for the destruction of most housing during the conflict. Reconstruction
in Chechnya is lagging far behind schedule, however, because of a lack of
coordination between federal and regional governments and widespread corruption.6
Noting this slow progress, a U.N. appeal for aid for 2004 stated that the region’s
population still faced abductions, tortures, terrorist attacks, extrajudicial murders, and
4RFE/RL Newsline, January28, 2004; Interfax, January 4, 2004; FBIS, December 15, 2003,
Doc. No. CEP-134; Caucasus Times, November 24, 2003. Most sweeps and abductions
reportedly are still carried out by Russian troops. Targets allegedly have included Chechens
who earlier placed cases before the European Court for Human Rights. FBIS, May 30,
2003, Doc. No. CEP-236.
5Ruud Lubbers, talk at the American Enterprise Institute, Washington, D.C., December 10,
2003; Reuters, January 29, 2004.
6RFE/RL Newsline, November 6, 2003; RIA Novosti, February 10, 2004.

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rape. The appeal reported that most Chechens remained unemployed and in poverty,
many without homes or basic services such as healthcare, education, electricity,
water, and sewerage systems.7
Elections and Peace-Making
The scheduling of popular elections in Chechnya has been a primary component
of Russia’s effort to foster peace. The Russian government has hailed elections as
restoring civil order, affirming the region’s status as a constituent part of Russia,
establishing new pro-Moscow political institutions, and formally repudiating the
former Chechen government of President Aslan Maskhadov. The Russian
government hopes that the new political system will come to be viewed as legitimate
by the international community, and that Chechens will at least acquiesce to the new
system. The strategy has included holding a constitutional referendum, a presidential
election, a legislative election, federal elections, and local elections.
The Constitutional Referendum
The Russian government has portrayed the promulgation of a new Chechen
constitution and the holding of a referendum as marking the will of the people to re-
establish the rule of law. A pro-Moscow Chechen constitutional commission decided
on a final draft constitution in August 2002. Despite promises by Putin that a
constitutional referendum would by held in late 2002, pro-Moscow Chechen leader
Akhmad Kadyrov argued successfully that unrest in the region precluded a
referendum until March 26, 2003. Besides a question on approving the constitution,
voters were asked to approve draft laws on electing a president and a legislature.
Some Chechens protested against holding a referendum absent a peace settlement of
the conflict, but Kadyrov reportedly dismissed such protesters as enemies.8 Visiting
representatives from the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
(OSCE) and the Council of Europe in early March appeared to view the referendum
preparations with a few misgivings, including the absence of organized and open
opposition to the constitutional draft. They determined that the unstable and
inhospitable environment precluded deploying a full contingent of observers, but
recommended that a handful of observers be sent to assess the referendum.9
7U.N. Consolidated Appeal Process. Humanitarian Appeal 2004. Russian officials have
announced that the first electric generator in Chechnya will begin operation in March 2004.
ITAR-TASS, February 11, 2004.
8Chechnya Weekly, April 3, 2003.
9Joint Assessment Mission, Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, Office
for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, and the Council of Europe, Secretariat,
Preliminary Statement, March 3, 2003. Russia strongly objected to a recommendation by
the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) in January 2003 to postpone
the referendum because of the poor security situation, chaotic voter lists, and lack of critical
public discussion. PACE, Resolution 1315, January 29, 2003.

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The Central Electoral Commission (CEC) reported a very high 89.5% turnout
among 569,000 eligible voters and that 96% approved the new constitution. The
voting rolls reportedly included about 23,000-30,000 Russian troops who were
considered “permanently based” in Chechnya. Also, the authorities deemed that up
to 17,000 Chechens displaced in Ingushetia were eligible to vote. The OSCE
observers described voting irregularities in the polling places they visited, and some
journalists reported few observable voters and many voting irregularities. There were
allegations that displaced and resident Chechens were threatened with food aid
cutoffs or other sanctions if they did not vote. In some districts, the vote counts
reportedly were higher than the number of registered voters.10 Despite these
problems, the OSCE voiced hope that the vote might lead to political talks and the
end of human rights abuses. President Putin hailed the win as removing the last
serious threat to Russia’s territorial integrity. Putin’s presidential spokesman
dismissed criticism of the referendum by some representatives of the Parliamentary
Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE), asserting that they were needlessly
badgering Russia.11
Before the referendum, the Venice Commission of the Council of Europe and
others had raised concerns about the secretive constitutional drafting process and
unsuccessfully had urged rewriting some sections they viewed as problematic. As
approved, the Chechen Constitution appears to spell out fewer powers than those
provided in other regional constitutions. The constitution does not provide the region
with a special status in the Russian Federation, totally repudiating its uncertain
autonomy in 1996-1999. Russian language is designated the exclusive language of
official discourse. The Constitution prohibits advocacy of separatism and establishes
strong federal control over the region, specifying the primacy of federal law, ensured
in part by the center’s appointment and direct control over the regional Prosecutor.
The federal government can remove the regional president and the federal legislature
can dissolve the regional legislature. The Constitution creates a presidential system
of administration in the region, with the president able to appoint many officials with
no advice or consent by the regional legislature and to issue decrees with the force
of law.12
Chechnya’s Presidential Election
Soon after the constitutional referendum, Putin decreed that a popular election
of Chechnya’s executive head would take place on October 5, 2003. This election
would replace a system put in place in June 2000 whereby Putin directly appointed
a head of administration. Many Russian officials publicized this race as
demonstrating that local civil order was being restored. Prospective candidates were
10FBIS, March 11, 2003, Doc. No. CEP-345; Chechnya Weekly, March 27, 2003; Chicago
Tribune, March 25, 2003.
11Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, Office for Democratic Institutions
and Human Rights, Press Release, March 28, 2003; Interfax, April 9, 2003; FBIS, October
6, 2003, Doc. No. CEP-117.
12European Commission for Democracy Through Law (Venice Commission). Opinion on
the Draft Constitution of the Chechen Republic Adopted by the Venice Commission at its
54th Plenary Meeting (Venice, 14-15 March 2003), Opinion no. 231/2003.

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required either to gather signatures from 2% of the electorate or to pay a $160,000
deposit. Eleven candidates were registered for the ballot, but three of the major
opponents to Kadyrov – State Duma deputy Aslambek Aslakhanov and businessmen
Malik Saydullayev and Khusein Dzhabrailov – dropped out before the election under
circumstances deemed questionable, according to some observers. All three of them
had been running ahead of Kadyrov, according to several polls. Dzhabrailov, deputy
manager of Moscow’s Rossiya Hotel, suddenly withdrew from the campaign on
September 2 without giving a reason, although Russian media widely reported that
he had received threats from top Putin administration officials. Both Aslakhanov and
Saydullayev dropped out of the race on September 11, 2003. Aslakhanov accepted
an appointment as Putin’s advisor for the Caucasus and justified the move by
strongly implying that he had expected to be disqualified as a candidate anyway
through legerdemain by pro-Kadyrov officials in Chechnya. Saydullayev reported
that he had received similar inducements from the government but had refused to
drop out. Although the CEC chief on August 27 had praised Saydullayev for having
few unverifiable signatures (only 2.5%) on his lists after a “thorough” examination,
on September 11 the Chechen Supreme Court suddenly determined that over 40% of
the signatures were invalid and disqualified him from running.
Just before political campaigning was to begin in early September 2003,
Kadyrov’s security forces seized control of Chechnya’s television and radio stations
and newspapers. These media highlighted Kadyrov’s activities and gave scant
coverage to other candidates, and Kadyrov was virtually the only candidate shown
on posters and billboards. On election day, journalists and observers from Agence
France Presse and the Moscow Helsinki Commission reported a low turnout at
several polling places they visited in the region, perhaps partly because many
Chechens feared venturing out because of rebel threats of violence. Nonetheless,
electoral officials reported that 88% of 562,000 registered voters turned out, of which
81% voted for Kadyrov. Kadyrov allegedly had electoral support throughout
Chechnya, including in all mountainous conflict areas. He also presumably enjoyed
automatic support from the 23,000-30,000 permanently deployed Russian troops in
the region. Reportedly, Chechens being detained at Russian prison camps also
voted.13
The OSCE and the Council of Europe decided that because of security concerns
they would not send observers to monitor the election. Afterward, then-chairman of
the OSCE Jaap de Hoop Scheffer suggested that media manipulation and a lack of
viable opposition candidates had rendered the race non-pluralistic. However, other
observers from the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) and the Arab
League did monitor the election and declared it unobjectionable, after which they
were praised by Putin.
The COE and Russia reached agreement in December 2003 for the COE to
monitor a prospective Chechen legislative election. Kadyrov in mid-January 2004
13AFP, October 5,2003. Interfax, October 7, 2003. Analyst Alexey Malashenko argues that
the majority of the population of Chechnya tends toward conformism and were hesitant to
increase tensions with Moscow by voting against its preferred candidate. Carnegie Moscow
Center, Briefing Papers, September-October 2003.

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announced that the election would take place in October or November 2004, pending
the construction of legislative buildings. The 122 deputies will be elected for four
years and the legislature will consist of two chambers, the Council of the Republic
and the National Assembly.
Federal Elections
Marking Chechnya’s full participation as a subject of the Russian Federation in
the elections to the State Duma (the lower legislative chamber of the Federal
Assembly), polling purportedly took place throughout the region on December 7,
2003. The head of Russia's Central Electoral Commission later reported, however,
that the vote count in Chechnya had exceeded the number of registered voters by
about 11%, but attributed the discrepancy to returnees who were added to the
electoral rolls when they turned up to vote.14 Perhaps marking contempt for the
Duma as a symbol of Russian power, suicide bombers allegedly targeted the building
in early December 2003, but the bombs went off prematurely just short of the
legislative building.
Both of Chechnya’s seats in the Russian Federation Council (the upper
legislative chamber, where members are selected by the regional governments)
became vacant in late 2003. One seat became vacant when Zavgayev won election
to the State Duma. On January 5, 2004, Kadyrov appointed Umar Dzhabrailov – a
wealthy Chechen who ran against Putin in 1999 – to fill this seat (in 1996, the State
Department had revoked Dzhabrailov's visa for entry into the United States in
connection with the unsolved Moscow murder of U.S. investor Paul Tatum).
According to some speculation, Dzhabrailov’s appointment may have been a partial
reward for the sudden withdrawal of his brother, Khusein, from the presidential
election in Chechnya.15 Chechnya’s other seat in the upper chamber became vacant
when Kadyrov removed Adnan Muzykayev and appointed Musa Umarov, another
wealthy Chechen who had withdrawn as a candidate for the State Duma election.16
The Federal Presidential Race. In the face of Putin’s strong candidacy,
many democratic, communist, and other parties and groups are calling for a boycott
of the election to register displeasure with the Russian government, since the
electoral law requires a turnout of over 50% for the election to be valid. In January
2004, a Chechen web site called for Chechens also to boycott the race as a symbol
14Russian Commentator Ilya Ferapontov termed the vote disparity a sign of “massive
falsification of the election results.” Polit.ru, December 27, 2003, as reported in Chechnya
Weekly, January 7, 2004; the Caucasus Times on December 12, 2003, alleged that local
electoral officials had been directed well before the race to ensure that Zavgayev won the
constituency contest and that United Russia win the party list vote. FBIS, December 12,
2003, Doc. No. CEP- 61.
15Chechnya Weekly, January 7, 2004; Maria Tsvetkova, Gazeta.ru, January 5, 2004; FBIS,
January 9, 2004, Doc. No. CEP- 65.
16Analyst Lawrence Uzzell points out that according to federal law, Umarov was supposed
to be chosen by the regional legislature, in Chechnya’s case its interim State Council.
Chechnya Weekly, January 14, 2004.

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CRS-7
of protest against the Chechnya War.17 While the Russian government made claims
during the 2000 presidential race that some areas of Chechnya were peaceful enough
for polling to take place, during this election cycle it claims that peace and
“normalization” are region-wide.18
Implications for Chechnya and Russia
The Russian and pro-Moscow Chechen governments have hailed elections in
Chechnya as marking an emergent peace and rule of law in the republic. Some
independent Russian media, however, were highly critical and pointed to the rise in
suicide bombings and other violence as proof that questionable elections exacerbate
tensions and cannot precede or substitute for a peace settlement.19 Such voting raises
questions about its representativeness or inclusiveness and hence its legitimacy, since
some portion of the rebel population could not or would not participate, they argue.
Reflecting this view, one Russian publication ruefully noted that “life in Chechnya
did not improve ... it was not safer, and therefore the threat to Russia did not
decrease.”20
Impact on Russian Elections. By hailing elections in Chechnya, Putin
planned to minimize the conflict as an issue in the December 2003 Russian
legislative elections and his own March 2004 presidential race. Whereas he
presented himself during his first presidential election in 2000 as dedicated to a
military solution to Chechen separatism, he is presenting himself in his current re-
election campaign as a peacemaker.21
In the run-up to Russia’s State Duma elections in December 2003, the
authorities asserted that peace and “normality” had come to Chechnya, but several
major terrorist bombings in Moscow and elsewhere outside of Chechnya belied these
claims. However, these bombings may have had consequences unintended by the
bombers, since voters heavily supported parties that backed existing government
policy on Chechnya, and may have rendered a negotiated peace settlement less likely,
according to some observers.22 Vladimir Zhirinovskiy, who advocated that the
families of Chechen bombers be imprisoned and that their villages be annihilated,
17 Kavkaz-Tsentr News Agency, January 19, 2004, as reported in FBIS, January 20, 2004,
Doc. No. CEP-279.
18Russia: Normal Voting Not Possible in Chechnya, RFE/RL Feature Article, March 23,
2000.
19Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation,
Baltimore, Johns Hopkins, 1996, pp. 366-400.
20FBIS, December 15, 2003, Doc. No. CEP-134.
21Carnegie Moscow Center. Alexey Malashenko, Briefing Papers, September-October
2003.
22Basayev stated that his mujahidin were carrying out attacks in Moscow and elsewhere
outside of Chechnya because Russia had “created an information blockade” around
Chechnya to hush up the conflict, and that his mujahidin “will give the citizens of Russia
the opportunity to savor the delights of this war.” FBIS, January 12, 2004, Doc. No. CEP-
333.

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received more votes for his party than previously. The newly created pro-Putin
Motherland-Patriotic Union (MPU) siphoned votes away from the Communist Party,
with MPU co-head Dmitriy Rogozin accusing the Communist Party of supporting
Chechen terrorism since it advocated peace talks.23
While the Chechnya conflict appeared to play a peripheral role in the State
Duma races, it appears somewhat more salient to the Russian presidential election
campaign. Although Putin entered the presidential race with very high standing in
public opinion polls and faced only minor opposing candidates, he stressed his
pacification and Chechenization efforts to show that the conflict he helped launch in
1999 was essentially won. He announced the pull-out of a token number of Russian
troops from Chechnya and pledged to eliminate human rights abuses against Chechen
civilians. Although the almost-daily deaths of Russian troops in Chechnya as well
as suicide bombings in Moscow and elsewhere belied Putin’s claims, they seemed
nevertheless to galvanize popular support for him.24 Some of the minor candidates
running against Putin attempted to use the Chechnya conflict as a campaign issue.
Irina Khakamada blamed the government for the deaths of civilian hostages during
the Moscow theater siege. Candidate Ivan Rybkin blamed Putin for the renewed
conflict in Chechnya and advocated peace talks.
Some observers have argued that Russia’s actions in Chechnya have had
negative repercussions on its democratization. They point out that central and local
governments throughout Russia have come routinely to commit civil rights abuses
against ethnic Chechens and similar “swarthy” ethnic groups because of fears that
they are separatists or terrorists. Also, Russian police who commit abuses in
Chechnya allegedly have continued such abuses – even against non-Chechens – when
rotated back to their home districts. Military units allegedly have been emboldened
by freedom of action in Chechnya, weakening civilian control over the military.
Zbigniew Brzezinski has argued that the conflict is “helping to reverse”
democratization in Russia as it strengthens the power of the security apparatus.25
International Response. During 2003-2004, the international community
variously assessed Russia’s peace-making efforts in Chechnya, with European bodies
appearing recently to become more critical. Having earlier called for Russia to
cancel the constitutional referendum, PACE in April 2003 approved a resolution
23One Russian commentator argued that since Putin’s interior (police) minister was the head
of the Putin-endorsed United Russia Party, the police had to downplay the threat of
Chechen terrorism, since such threats belied the success of Russia’s peace-making in
Chechnya. FBIS, December 15, 2003, Doc. No. CEP-134; RFE/RL Newsline, November
21, 2003.
24FBIS, February 9, 2004, Doc. No. CEP-148.
25Zbigniew Brzezinski and Fred Hiatt, presentations at the American Enterprise Institute,
December 10, 2003. Putin has justified beefing up security forces throughout Russia by
asserting that they protect the country from foreign Islamic terrorists who aim to dismember
it. Interfax, December 18, 2003; ITAR-TASS, December 25, 2003. Rogozin and other
officials have gone farther, depicting the conflict in Chechnya as an attempt by foreign
“organizations” to destroy Russia. RFE/RL Newsline, November 21, 2003; ITAR-TASS,
December 17, 2003.

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warning that the international community might create a war crimes tribunal if Russia
did not remedy human rights abuses in Chechnya. However, PACE has not followed
up on this warning. The European Parliament in July 2003 appeared less dismissive
of the referendum, but echoed PACE in criticizing the non-inclusiveness of the vote,
condemning Russian “war crimes” in Chechnya, and urging Russia soon to agree to
peace talks under international auspices.
Disagreements within the EU regarding Chechnya policy were highlighted
during Putin’s visit to Italy in early November 2003. Premier and EU president
Silvio Berlusconi suggested that Western media had exaggerated Russia’s human
rights abuses in Chechnya, prompting the European Commission on November 7,
2003, to announce that Berlusconi's remarks did not represent its official position.
Even before Berlusconi’s comments, the European Parliament’s Committee on
Foreign Affairs had undertaken an assessment of EU-Russia ties. Its report in
January 2004 stated that the EU should place more emphasis on Russia’s human
rights abuses in Chechnya and issues such as Chechnya’s “illusory” presidential
election.26
Faced with Russia’s refusal to extend an expiring 2000 agreement for the
cooperation of COE human rights advisors with Putin’s Special Representative for
human rights in Chechnya, the two sides in December 2003 agreed to some future ad
hoc COE programs in Chechnya, such as technical assistance for holding elections.
These programs were to be coordinated with the special representative. Seeming to
place the agreement in limbo, however, Russia abolished this post in late January
2004 and stated that the duly elected Kadyrov would guarantee human rights.
Following COE criticism, Russia demurred that a new representative would be
appointed.
Outside these European institutions, the U.N. Human Rights Commission in
mid-April 2003 failed to pass a resolution that accused Russia of grave human rights
violations in Chechnya.27 Russia’s actions in Chechnya also appeared to receive
legitimacy in the Muslim world when Saudi Arabia shifted its critical stance toward
Russia’s policy in Chechnya in January 2004 by hosting Kadyrov on a state visit as
a bonafide regional leader. According to Kadyrov, the Saudis agreed to further crack
down on financiers of the Chechen rebels and offered increased humanitarian and
rebuilding aid to the region.
26Council of Europe. PACE. The Human Rights Situation in the Chechnya Republic, Res.
No. 1323, April 2, 2003; Chechnya Weekly, April 10, 2003. In July 2003, the COE’s
Committee for the Prevention of Torture issued a statement that Russia was not complying
with the European Convention on Torture, and warned Russia that it should not abandon
civilized values. See also EU. European Parliament. Resolution on Chechnya,
P5_TA(2003)0335, July 3, 2003; and Report with a Proposal for a European Parliament
Recommendation to the Council on EU-Russia Relations, A5-0053/2004, February 2, 2004.
The European Commission endorsed the Report on February 9 as a basis for EU-Russia
discussions.
27United Nations. Economic and Social Council. Commission on Human Rights. Situation
of Human Rights in the Republic of Chechnya of the Russian Federation, E/CN.4/2003/L.13,
April 9, 2003. The United States did not help sponsor the resolution but voted for it.

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International observers and some Russians and Chechens who reject current
Russian government policy have made various proposals for peace negotiations.28
In February 2004, nearly 150 European Parliament deputies endorsed a peace
proposal first submitted to the body by Chechen “foreign minister” Ilyas Akhmadov
in April 2003 that calls for deploying U.N. peacekeepers, withdrawing Russian
troops, and disarming rebels. In mid-December 2003, Chechens who had been
elected to the regional legislature before the 1999 Russian incursion met with
Kadyrov and urged political talks to end the conflict. Reportedly, Kadyrov rejected
holding such talks, and in turn urged the legislators to convince rebels to surrender.
Chechen factionalism is widely expected to make it difficult to arrange peace
talks (Russia insists they would be impossible to arrange). Besides including pro-
Moscow Chechens, many advocates of talks urge Maskhadov’s inclusion as a
moderate separatist. Most observers exclude Islamic extremists such as Basayev,
because of their terrorist acts, although some argue that all parties to the conflict
should be invited to take part in talks. Both Maskhadov and Basayev demand full
independence for Chechnya, but with varying emphasis on whether it should be an
Islamic state. 29
Chechnya’s Future. Alternative futures facing Chechnya include not only
Russia’s hope to wind down the conflict but also the possibilities of continued low-
level fighting or greatly escalating violence.
The Russian government argues that its pacification and Chechenization efforts,
along with attrition of the rebel forces, will result in a largely peaceful and secure
Chechnya. The success or failure of these efforts is highly dependent on the
character of the Kadyrov government. They could backfire, since Kadyrov appears
to view the presidential election as providing a wide mandate to rule and to seek a
high degree of autonomy for the region, some observers warn.30 Even if his election
initially was viewed as illegitimate by many or most Chechens, Kadyrov might even
come to be supported by many rebels if he seeks maximal regional autonomy, in this
view.31
28Analyst John Dunlop argues that barring talks with moderate rebels, Russia’s objective is
“the enemy's unconditional surrender. In a guerrilla war, such a stance is clearly unrealistic.”
Talk at the American Enterprise Institute, December 10. 2003.
29Basayev has criticized the Akhmadov peace plan’s concept of “conditional independence”
for Chechnya under a U.N. provisional administration. FBIS, January 5, 2004, Doc. No.
CEP-67; January 12, 2004, Doc. No. CEP-333; February 2, 2004, Doc. No. CEP-124;
Chechen Times, January 1, 2004.
30Among some of his demands for greater autonomy, Kadyrov has requested that his Interior
Ministry have “operational control” over all Russian troops in Chechnya. He also has
proposed opening Chechen missions abroad and controlling regional oil resources, since the
new Chechen constitution “states that rivers, forests, and oil are the property of [Chechens],
and we will do everything to ensure that this is the case.” FBIS, December 25, 2003, Doc.
No. CEP-81; January 13, 2004, Doc. No. CEP-74; January 20, 2004, Doc. No. CEP-147.
31According to one poll, most Chechens think that the region should be part of Russia,
although given maximal autonomy. Carnegie Endowment, Policy Brief No. 28, November
(continued...)

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According to some observers, the Putin administration is divided on how far to
accommodate Kadyrov’s jockeying for greater self-rule and autonomy. Some
observers suggest that the apparent strengthening of Russian nationalism as a result
of the State Duma election and the strengthening of the security apparatus within the
Putin administration may make the government less supportive of Kadyrov and the
Chechenization process. A Russian government after Putin’s re-election in March
2004 could do a volte face and re-impose a greater degree of direct rule and exclude
ethnic Chechens from political and economic control over their region. Reflecting
this more nationalist viewpoint, some Russians argue that Chechnya’s oil and other
resources should serve as reparations to Russia for the economic costs of the
conflict.32
Analyst Rajan Menon and some others argue that low-level conflict may well
continue indefinitely, contributing to a downward spiral of “further barbarization of
the Russian military, the erosion of Russian democracy, and a Chechnya that breeds
... radicalism and terrorism.”33 These analysts point to evidence that major human
rights abuses including kidnapings and killings continue despite the supposed
establishment of the rule of law in the region. Pointing to such abuses as fueling the
determination of some Chechens to continue to fight, Akhmadov stated in January
2004 that “nothing can persuade us that Russia is able to guarantee [our] legitimate
rights and freedoms.”34
Some observers warn that the Chechnya conflict appears to be intensifying
again, including not only clashes between Russian forces and Chechen rebels, but
also intra-Chechen clan conflict and vendettas that Moscow seems to be overlooking
as part of its Chechenization effort. According to the London-based International
Institute for Strategic Studies, deaths suffered by Russian forces during the period
from August 2002 to August 2003 were higher (up to 1,200) than at any period since
1999. The Kadyrov government also has asserted that rebel (“terrorist”) attacks were
greater in 2003 (543) than in 2002 (351).35
Some observers have warned that Islam is becoming a motivating factor in what
formerly was mainly a secular struggle for Chechen independence. Some even
caution that Islamic fundamentalism also is increasing among the wider Chechen
31(...continued)
2003.
32Interfax, January 12, 2004; The NIS Observed, January 2004; Dunlop, American Enterprise
Institute, December 10, 2003.
33Rajan Menon, presentation at the American Enterprise Institute, December 10, 2003.
34Chechen Times, January 1, 2004. One poll in late 2003 seemingly indicated that Chechens
continue armed resistance toward Russia and become suicide bombers mainly to revenge
past abuses, rather than for independence. Carnegie Endowment, Policy Brief No. 28,
November 2003; AP, December 2, 2003.
35 (Mil Balance 2003-2004); Chechnya Weekly, January 14, 2004.

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society. These trends could make it increasingly difficult for Russia to engage in
future peace talks that consider less than full independence.36
Implications for U.S. Interests
A consistent theme of U.S. and other international criticism of Russia has been
that Russian troops are using excessive and indiscriminate force in quelling
separatism in Chechnya and otherwise are committing serious human rights abuses.
As stated by U.S. Ambassador to Russia Alexander Vershbow in January 2004,
Russia’s operations in Chechnya “lead ... to needless suffering of the civilian
population ... they are not holding enough of their own troops accountable when they
commit excesses.”37
On other issues, several analysts have discerned shifts in Administration policy
in recent months, perhaps spurred to some degree by the Moscow theater siege in late
2002 and stepped-up terrorist bombings throughout Russia in 2003. U.S. concerns
before the Iraq conflict with gaining Russia’s support and concerns afterward with
terrorist bombings against coalition forces also may have contributed to the shifts.
There appeared to be fewer Administration suggestions to Russia that it should open
peace talks with Maskhadov, more tolerance for Russia’s argument that it was
battling terrorism in Chechnya, and some hope that elections and rebuilding efforts
in Chechnya could contribute to a “political settlement.”38
The Administration’s view that elections could contribute to a political
settlement was highlighted by the U.S. Mission to the OSCE on March 27, 2003.
The U.S. emissary stressed that problematic voting could harm the legitimacy of
Russia’s peace process, which the United States hoped could create “institutions of
self-government acceptable to the people of Chechnya.”39 In the case of the regional
presidential race, President Bush reportedly urged Putin at a September 2003 U.S.-
Russia summit to ensure a free and fair election.40 After the race, however, State
Department spokesman Richard Boucher on October 6 criticized the elimination of
viable challengers to Kadyrov and constraints on the media and concluded that
“given these problems, it's unclear whether the election will have sufficient
credibility and legitimacy [among Chechens] to advance the settlement process.” He
also called on the “people of Chechnya on both sides ... to work with the Russians
36Chechnya Weekly, January 14, 2004; FBIS, January 20, 2004, Doc. No. CEP-147; AP,
February 10, 2004.
37Alexander Vershbow, Russia After the December Elections and U.S.-Russian Relations,
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, January 8, 2004.
38Voice of America News, October 7, 2003; The State Department. Amb. Southwick
Explanation of Vote at U.N. Commission on Human Rights, April 16, 2003.
39U.S. Mission to the OSCE. Statement to the OSCE Permanent Council, March 27, 2003.
40State Department. Daily Press Briefing, October 6, 2003. At the summit press conference,
however, President Bush emphasized that “terrorists must be opposed wherever they spread
chaos and destruction, including Chechnya.” White House. Office of the Press Secretary,
September 27, 2003.

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to resolve this conflict peacefully.”41 Putin downplayed this criticism by stressing
“understanding ... from the President of the United States,” regarding Russia’s
efforts to combat “Islamic radicalism” in Chechnya, and that “it serves U.S. interests
to shore up” such efforts.42 Secretary Powell reiterated during his January 2004
Moscow visit that the United States was “not satisfied with” the presidential
election.”43
This U.S. disappointment with elections in Chechnya contributed to a rising
concern in the Administration that Russia was showing a lessening interest in the
adoption of Western democratic and human rights “values,” and that such slippage
could ultimately harm bilateral relations.44 While Secretary Powell during his
Moscow visit in January 2004 highlighted this rising U.S. “strategic concern,” he
nonetheless reiterated that the conflict was “an internal matter for [Russia] to deal
with,” and that U.S. concern would not jeopardize friendship and cooperation with
Russia on higher priority strategic issues such as anti-terrorism and combating
weapons of mass destruction. Other observers such as Zbigniew Brzezinski have
decried such a prioritization on the grounds that it results in U.S. government
“indifference” to the plight of the Chechens.45
The United States has urged dialogue between Russia and mainline Chechen
groups, while acknowledging the difficulty in distinguishing terrorists from
separatists. The U.S. government and the U.N. Security Council have labeled some
Chechen factions and individuals as terrorists. While there also appears to be ample
evidence of foreign Islamic fundamentalist support for some Chechen rebel groups,46
the questions of support by al Qaeda and recent rebel support for terrorist actions
outside Russia remain controversial. Analyst Brian Williams argues that there is no
evidence of Chechen rebel involvement in Afghanistan or other ties with al Qaeda.47
Other analysts argue that there are some al Qaeda members in Chechnya and other
links, but discount the significance of the links to the current Chechnya conflict or
to the suicide bombings in Russia.48
41State Department. Daily Press Briefing, October 6, 2003.
42New York Times, October 6, 2003.
43U.S. Department of State. Secretary Colin L. Powell. Opening Remarks at the Civil Society
Event, Moscow, January 27, 2004.
44Alexander Vershbow; U.S.-Russian Relations after the Duma Election, Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace, January 8, 2004.
45State Department. Secretary Colin L. Powell. Interview with Vladimir Varfalomeyev at
Ekho Moskvy Radio. January 27, 2004; Voice of America. Editorial, February 3, 2004;
Zbigniew Brzezinski, presentation at the American Enterprise Institute, December 10, 2003.
46U.S. Department of State. Patterns of Global Terrorism 2002, April 2003, pp. 31-34; U.N.
Security Council. The New Consolidated List of Individuals and Entities Belonging to or
Associated with the Taliban and Al-Qaida Organisation as Established and Maintained by
the 1267 Committee, January 26, 2004; Washington Post, February 15, 2004.
47Chechnya Weekly, October 2, 2003; FBIS, January 8, 2004, Doc. No. CEP-13.
48Time, May 26, 2003; Christian Science Monitor, July 8, 2003. For evidence of al Qaeda
(continued...)

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Congress consistently has criticized Russia’s human rights abuses in Chechnya
since the conflict resumed in 1999 and has called for various sanctions. Even after
9/11 – when the Administration’s focus was on forging an international anti-terrorist
coalition that included Russia – Congress retained a provision first included in
FY2001 appropriations that cut aid to Russia unless the President determined that
non-governmental organizations (NGOs) were given access to Chechnya.
Consolidated Appropriations for FY2004, including foreign operations (H.R. 2673;
P.L.108-199) continues this provision. The President has made determinations
consistently reprogramming Russian aid on this and other scores.
Issues for Congress include weighing the benefits of Russian support for U.S.-
backed anti-terrorism efforts against continuing a ban on some aid to Russia. While
Kadyrov recently has invited NGOs and international aid agencies to set up offices
in Chechnya, many of the groups remain troubled by ongoing violence, and are
suspicious that Russian forces may be among those targeting aid workers. U.N.
Undersecretary General for Humanitarian Affairs Jan Egeland in February 2004
stressed such concerns about a Dutch aid worker who had been kidnaped in 2002
while being accompanied by Russian security agents. Russia also continues to
severely restrict the movement of aid workers within Chechnya. The U.N., EU, and
others prefer to have aid offices outside of Chechnya, and have pressed Russia to
facilitate freer access by these offices to Chechnya.49 Conference Managers for
P.L.108-199 likewise highlighted concerns about the harassment of U.S. citizens
involved in aid programs by Russia’s security services.
Other issues raised by the Conferees on P.L.108-199 may be reflected in further
legislative action. These include Russia’s reported coercion against displaced
Chechens to get them to return to Chechnya. The Conferees called for added aid for
these displaced Chechens, and requested that the State Department press Russia
immediately to terminate such forced returns. Resurrecting some legislative
language from earlier years, they also called on the State Department to press Russia
to account for the “gross human rights violations committed by Russian troops
against Chechen civilians.” More generally, they raised concerns about backsliding
in democratization in Russia and called for a large portion of U.S. aid to Russia to
be dedicated to democracy and rule of law programs.
48(...continued)
links just across Chechnya’s borders, see CRS Report RS21319, Georgia’s Pankisi Gorge.
49The Guardian (London), February 11, 2004, p. 16; Europe Information Service, February
14, 2004.

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