

# CRS Report for Congress

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## **Bosnia and Kosovo: U.S. Military Operations**

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## Summary

With the on-going requirements of U.S. military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, the continuing peacekeeping deployments in the Balkans have come under congressional scrutiny to determine whether or not they could be safely reduced or terminated. This report examines the history and current status of U.S. military operations in the Balkans, and will be updated as events warrant.

In Paris on December 14, 1995, the presidents of Bosnia, Croatia, and Serbia signed the peace settlement negotiated in Dayton, OH (Dayton Accords). The United Nations Security Council's Resolution 1031 authorized the NATO-led implementation force (IFOR) for one year. On December 12, 1996, the Security Council authorized a follow-on force, dubbed the Stabilization Force (SFOR). This authorization has been renewed annually. In March 1998, the NATO allies agreed that SFOR will remain in Bosnia until significant progress has been made in the implementation of the Dayton Accords.

SFOR is now a force of about 12,000 troops. The U.S. contingent has been about 1,800. It will be reduced to 800 by summer 2004, and probably withdrawn by 2005 when the European Union is expected to take over peacekeeping duties from NATO. U.S. forces have suffered no fatal casualties from hostile action in Bosnia. SFOR continues the mission of monitoring and enforcing demilitarized zones and weapon cantonment. These efforts have been credited a success. NATO commanders have lent assistance to civilian authorities in their efforts to create a stable political environment (e.g., detaining war crimes suspects, and providing support for elections and limited assistance for refugees).

In Kosovo, with the failure of peace talks on March 24, 1999 NATO began *Operation Allied Force* airstrikes against targets in Serbia and Kosovo. In June Yugoslavia accepted a peace proposal and signed a military-technical agreement with NATO providing for the withdrawal of all Yugoslav forces from Kosovo and turning military control of the province over to NATO's peacekeeping forces (KFOR). U.N. Security Council Resolution 1244 endorsed the peace settlement and "an international security presence with substantial NATO participation." It is expected that NATO forces will remain in Kosovo until its political status is resolved.

KFOR totals about 20,000 troops in Kosovo, with the United States contributing about 2,100 troops. The U.S. has suffered no casualties from hostile action.

Congress has appropriated approximately \$23.5 billion for Bosnia and Kosovo operations from FY1992 through FY2004.

Congressional concerns have focused on the impact of Balkan operations on 1) military readiness and the ability to maintain military operations in Iraq, 2) whether there has been an equitable distribution of responsibilities among the NATO allies and 3) if the United States needs to participate in Balkan peacekeeping operations at all.

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# Bosnia and Kosovo: U.S. Military Operations

In the 1990's nationalist aspirations among the ethnic populations of Yugoslavia led to declarations of independence by Croatia, Slovenia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina. These were opposed by the Serbian-dominated Yugoslav central government in Belgrade, and by the Serb populations of these provinces. Though Slovenia maintained its independence without significant military confrontations, and Croatia successfully expelled Serb forces in a short military campaign, Bosnia was the site of several years of internecine warfare among Bosnian, Serb, and Croatian militias. Following the failure of United Nations peacekeeping forces to quiet the warring factions, the increasing instability led the United States and its NATO allies to intervene directly, resulting in the Dayton Peace Accords and their enforcement by NATO military forces in 1995.

In 1998, the Serbian province of Kosovo saw an independence movement arise among the ethnic Albanians who composed 80% of the province's population. Subsequent Serbian counter-insurgency operations against Kosovo's civilian population engendered wide-spread concern among NATO members, culminating in NATO's first offensive military operations. Almost two months of air strikes eventually brought the Serbian government to accept an end to its military presence in Kosovo and the introduction of NATO ground forces to enforce a peace settlement.

NATO deployments in both Bosnia and Kosovo have generally been heralded as successes. Active hostilities have been ended, some reductions of military equipment have been undertaken, and nationalist militias have been disbanded. The number of NATO troops deployed has been steadily reduced, and the international community has undertaken to establish the civil governmental institutions necessary for greater political stability in both regions.

## **U.S. and Allied Participation in Bosnia Peacekeeping (IFOR/SFOR)**

### **IFOR/SFOR Mission**

Before February 1993, the Clinton Administration steadfastly refused to contribute ground forces to UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in Bosnia. It then adopted a policy to provide troops to oversee implementation of an overall peace settlement. With the 1994 peace negotiations at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base in Dayton OH, Administration officials began to lay out their rationale and initial planning for U.S. participation in a NATO-led peace implementation force (IFOR) for Bosnia. Administration officials argued that U.S. participation with ground forces was necessary for two main reasons: 1) the Bosnian, Croatian, and Serb negotiators all made U.S. ground force participation a condition of their accepting

any peace settlement; and 2) U.S. participation was necessary for the United States to maintain a leadership position in NATO. President Clinton subsequently emphasized a moral responsibility to aid in ending the savagery of the Bosnian conflict.

On December 14, 1995, the Presidents of Croatia, Bosnia, and Serbia signed a peace agreement in Paris. In brief, the military elements of the agreement, in addition to establishing IFOR and granting it full authority and freedom of movement to enforce the agreement, called for: 1) withdrawal of forces behind cease-fire lines within 30 days, with a demilitarized zone (DMZ) of four kilometers; 2) withdrawal of heavy weapons and personnel to barracks; 3) provision of information on personnel, weaponry, and landmines; 4) arms reduction negotiations under the auspices of the Organization for Cooperation and Security in Europe (OSCE). All these objectives have been completed.

To enforce the military provisions of the Dayton agreements, NATO sent the Intervention Force or (IFOR), which comprised approximately 54,000 ground troops in Bosnia proper. That force designation lasted until December 20, 1996, when it was changed to Stabilization Force (SFOR). This reflected the decision by NATO's members that the Bosnia deployment should not have a specified end-date, but rather that its duration would be tied to successful accomplishment of Dayton Peace Accord provisions. Though the SFOR operations have U.N. Security Council authorization, there is no "dual-key" command relationship with the United Nations.

SFOR's mission, as defined by NATO HQ, is "to provide a continued military presence in order to deter renewed hostilities, stabilize and consolidate the peace, and thus contribute to a secure environment and provide and maintain broad support for civil implementation plans." To accomplish this mission, NATO has identified key military and supporting tasks, as follows. Key military tasks are:

- Maintain a deterrent military presence.
- Prevent major hostilities or removal of weapons from cantonment.
- Operate the Joint Military Committees.
- Contribute to a secure environment for civil organizations to carry out their responsibilities.
- Ensure force protection and freedom of movement.
- Ensure compliance with the cease-fire and the demilitarized Zone of Separation.
- Monitor and enforce compliance with the military aspects of the Dayton Accords.
- Enforce the rules and procedures covering Bosnia-Herzegovina airspace.

Among key supporting tasks, to be undertaken within the capabilities and at the discretion of SFOR, are:

- Provide, on a case-by-case basis, support to the High Commissioner.
- Support the implementation of the arbitration decision concerning the contested Brcko Corridor. Support the conduct of elections and installation of elected officials.

- Support the return of displaced persons, but not forcibly return them or guard specific locations.
- Support the efforts of the International Criminal Tribunal, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, and the International Police Task Force.

Supporting tasks have become the primary focus for SFOR operations, given that the military provisions of the Dayton Accords continue to be observed. The International War Crimes Tribunal requested and received protection for its investigators and for suspected war crimes sites. SFOR also agreed to detain suspected war criminals, if encountered, but until late 1997 declined to participate in pursuit operations. This refusal to take more effective action to apprehend suspected war criminals led to continued criticism from the War Crimes Tribunal and human rights advocates. Those who favored greater action stressed the importance of supporting the International War Crimes Tribunal and the destabilizing influence of Karadzic and other Serb and Croat extremists. Since 1997, SFOR has played a more active role in detaining indicted suspects. Additional detentions and voluntary surrenders, perhaps encouraged by NATO's greater involvement, have resulted in over half of those indicted for war crimes currently being in custody. Former Bosnian Serb leaders Karadzic and Mladic, however, remain at large.

**Duration of NATO Bosnia Operations.** In late 1996, the lack of progress in civilian reconstruction and continued friction among the ethnic factions, including within the Muslim-Croat Federation, led to the widespread belief that some NATO military force would be required beyond IFOR's December 20, 1996 mandate. These concerns led NATO's political leaders to authorize the Stabilization Force (SFOR) in December, 1996, to last until June 1998. By the end of 1997, there was little optimism that Bosnia would have a viable national state or economy by that time.<sup>1</sup> Fragile government institutions and continued ethnic antagonisms lead most observers to believe that an international military force of substantial size will be necessary in Bosnia for perhaps years, if further internecine warfare is to be averted. Some, such as the former High Representative Carl Bildt, have suggested the permanent stationing of NATO troops in Bosnia because they believe the region's conflict to be the single greatest threat to contemporary European security, and hence should be a long-term NATO concern. While not accepting this position, in March 1998, NATO foreign ministers re-authorized SFOR, and tied the duration of its deployment to the achievement of specified benchmarks of success in implementing the Dayton Accords.

NATO leaders hope that tying withdrawal to demonstrable political and administrative progress will encourage more widespread cooperation in implementing the Accords. Those who endorse an extended SFOR believe that a return to ethnic warfare in Bosnia holds greater dangers for U.S. security interests than the prospect of continued U.S. deployments in the region. They also point out that Bosnia is the type of mission for which NATO is supposedly shaping its forces

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<sup>1</sup> *Bosnia Peace Operations: Progress Toward Achieving the Dayton Agreement's Goals*, GAO/NSAID-97-132, May 1997, and its update, GAO/T-NSIAD-97-216, July 17, 1997.

after the collapse of the Warsaw Pact, and the inability or unwillingness to bring a lasting peace to Bosnia would bring NATO's credibility into question.

Some of those opposing extended operations in Bosnia question whether the Dayton Accords are, in fact, a workable basis for Bosnia's future, and suggest they are rather a settlement internationally imposed with inadequate indigenous support. There has been a concern in Congress about the United States being drawn into a military commitment without a foreseeable end. Reflecting this, the FY1999 DOD Authorization Act (P.L. 105-261) contained several "sense of the Congress" provisions, and established extensive reporting requirements for both the President and the Secretary of Defense regarding Bosnia operations. Among these provisions are:

- 1) U.S. ground forces should not remain in Bosnia indefinitely, and that the President should work with SFOR nations to allow the U.S. to withdraw its ground forces; 2) a NATO-led force, without U.S. ground troops, might be suitable for continued operations, and the United States might supply intelligence and logistical support, and a "ready reserve force in the region".
- Semiannual presidential reports providing: 1) the expected duration of deployment; 2) the percentage of Dayton Accord "benchmarks" achieved and the time for completion of those remaining; 3) the status of the paramilitary police force; 4) a detailed discussion of the specific missions undertaken by U.S. forces, including cost estimates and an assessment of the risks involved; 5) a joint assessment by the Secretaries of Defense and State of the planning for European assumption of SFOR operations.

**Costs.** Each nation contributing to IFOR/SFOR bears the cost of its own deployment and operations. Prior to IFOR/SFOR, DOD carried out air support and maritime intercept operations in conjunction with U.N. peace-keeping efforts and the U.N. arms embargo. FY1996 saw the introduction of U.S. ground forces into Bosnia, and the consequent increase in incremental costs reflected in Table 1. The term "incremental costs" refers to those costs over and above those of normal day-to-day DOD peacetime operations.

These costs have been covered through a combination of DOD annual budget appropriations, supplemental appropriations, transfers between budget accounts, and re-programmings within DOD Operations & Maintenance and Military Personnel accounts. To remain within the limits of the balanced budget agreement, the supplemental appropriations have been sometimes offset by reductions in other elements of the DOD budget. The Administration requested that the FY1998/FY1999 funding for Bosnia be "emergency" appropriations, which under the balanced budget agreement raised the cap on both defense spending and total discretionary spending. The Administration justified this on the grounds that Bosnia costs were not included in the calculations for the balanced budget agreement. For the previous three years, however, Congress had directed that the costs of military operations in Bosnia be provided within the annual caps for defense spending. Departing from this position, the FY1999 DOD Authorization Act granted the emergency appropriations status. It

capped spending of FY1999 funds for Bosnia operations at \$1,858,600,000, thus prohibiting DOD from exceeding Administration-projected expenditures without congressional action. The FY1999 Omnibus Appropriations Act (P.L. 105-277) provided the Administration's full supplemental request for Bosnia operations as an emergency appropriation. Funding for Bosnia for FY2000 and FY2001 was provided through normal appropriations to the Overseas Contingency Operations Fund, as indicated in Table 1.

Beginning with the FY2002 budget, both the Bosnia and Kosovo operations are no longer funded through the Overseas Contingency Fund, but rather through the individual service budgets.

**Table 1. DOD Incremental Cost of Bosnia Operations,  
FY1992-2002**  
(in \$ millions)

	SFOR/IFOR	Other Bosnia-Related Operations*	Total
FY1992	—	5.8	5.8
FY1993	—	138.8	138.8
FY1994	—	292.0	292.0
FY1995	—	347.4	347.4
FY1996	2,231.7	288.3	2,520.0
FY1997	2,087.5	195.0	2,282.5
FY1998	1,792.8	169.9	1,962.7
FY1999	1,382.5	155.4	1,537.9
FY2000	1,381.7	101.2	1,482.9
FY2001	1,400.0	N/A	1,400.0
FY2002	932.9	N/A	932.9
FY2003	930.7	N/A	930.7
FY2004	913.0	N/A	913.0
<b>Total</b>	<b>13,052.8</b>	<b>1,694.3</b>	<b>15,373.6</b>

**Source:** Department of Defense

\* Other Bosnia-related Operations include: *Able Sentry* (Macedonia preventative deployment), *Deny Flight/Decisive Edge/Deliberate Forge* (air support), *Sharp Guard* (maritime intercept), and *Provide Promise* (humanitarian relief).

**IFOR/SFOR Force Components.** DOD has scheduled the major unit rotations for SFOR through May 2005, should the deployment last that long. Six of the eight 6-month long rotations will be commanded by National Guard Divisions,



and all will include National Guard and/or Army Reserve units. The parent units involved are:

- 10/03-04/04 – 34<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division (Minnesota NG)
- 04/04-10/04 – 38<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division (Indiana NG)
- 10/04-04/05 – 42<sup>nd</sup> Infantry Division (New York NG)

The current U.S. SFOR contingent in Bosnia is about 1,800. U.S. forces are headquartered in the Tuzla area in eastern Bosnia. British forces are headquartered in central Bosnia at Gornii Vakuf, and French forces in Mostar. Other national contingents are subordinated to these three major commands, all of which serve under a NATO commander, who is based in Sarajevo. The full Stabilization Force numbers about 12,000 troops.

The troop requirements for Iraq military operations have intensified pressure to speed the withdrawal of U.S. troops, and encourage the European NATO allies to assume full responsibility for Bosnia operations, with the U.S. supplying intelligence, logistical, and other support — but no ground troops. The NATO allies have responded that by pointing out that non-U.S. forces currently comprise almost 80% of SFOR. They further emphasize that continued U.S. presence in the Balkans is fundamental to the continuance of the operations. The Bush Administration has indicated that, although there will be no unilateral U.S. withdrawal from the Balkans, consultations regarding continued U.S. participation will be on-going with the NATO allies. Discussions among NATO defense ministers in February have indicated that the number of SFOR troops will be reduced by about one-third during 2004, and that it is now expected that the European Union (EU) will assume responsibility for Bosnian peacekeeping operations in 2005. The EU contingent will comprise both military and police personnel, and is likely to be somewhat smaller than SFOR.

## **U.S. and Allied Peacekeeping in Kosovo**

### **Background**

Once an autonomous province of the former Yugoslavia, Kosovo has a 90% ethnic Albanian population. It nevertheless holds an emotional place in Serbian nationalist tradition. As part of his nationalist program, Yugoslav President Milosevic revoked Kosovo's autonomous status, putting it under control of the Serbian-dominated Belgrade government. An armed ethnic Albanian resistance movement developed, led by the so-called Kosovo Liberation Army. The Belgrade government responded in early 1998 with counter-insurgency operations, with Yugoslav military ground units and aircraft destroying villages, and executing civilians suspected of supporting the insurgents.

In 1998, NATO political leaders turned their attention to the Kosovo region because of the flow of refugees into Western Europe and Albania (itself destabilized by regional uprisings in 1997), and concerns about the conflict spilling over into the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM). FYROM, an independent

nation bordering Kosovo to the southeast, also has a large Albanian population alienated from its central government.

In May 1998, the North Atlantic Council, NATO's governing body, directed accelerated assessment of "a full range of options with the mission of halting or disrupting a systematic campaign of violent repression in Kosovo." Options considered included; 1) preventative deployments in Albania and FYROM to stabilize the borders; 2) declaration of no-fly/no tank zones in Kosovo and enforcement of them with NATO air forces; 3) direct military intervention either through airstrikes or ground troops deployments; and 4) peacekeeping deployments in the event of a political resolution.

On September 24, 1998, NATO defense ministers authorized an "activation warning" for limited air strikes and a phased air campaign in Kosovo. On October 12, NATO defense ministers authorized an "activation order," placing the necessary forces under the NATO command. The following day, it was announced that U.S. envoy Richard Holbrooke had negotiated an agreement with Serbian leader Milosevic that postponed the threat of airstrikes if the Serbian government 1) would reduce its troops and security forces in Kosovo to "pre-crisis" levels; 2) permit unarmed NATO reconnaissance flights over Kosovo; 3) accede to an international force of 2,000 unarmed civilian monitors to oversee the ceasefire; and 4) begin meaningful negotiations towards Kosovar autonomy.

Meaningful negotiations never took place, owing to recalcitrance on both sides, and sporadic violence continued, with increasing reports of Serbian executions of Albanian civilians. NATO allies were concerned over the escalating violence and its possible spread to other areas of the Balkans. On January 30, 1999, the NATO allies authorized Secretary-General Solana to order airstrikes anywhere in Yugoslavia, if the warring Serb and Albanian factions had not reached a peace settlement by February 20. The "Contact Group," an informal forum of representatives from the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany, France, Italy, and Russia dealing with Balkan crises, devised a framework for a peace settlement. They did not wish to encourage continued fighting for Kosovar independence, but rather sought a settlement that would restore Kosovo's autonomy within Yugoslavia. However, the Serb government did not agree to the framework, the so-called Rambouillet Agreement, and the talks adjourned.

## **NATO Offensive Military Operations**

During March 1999, Yugoslav Army and paramilitary Ministry of Interior troops moved out of garrison in Kosovo in violation of the October agreement, and about 20,000 additional Serb troops massed at the northern Kosovo border. With violence against ethnic Albanian civilians escalating, on March 24, NATO began airstrikes against targets in Serbia and Kosovo. These airstrikes were the first military offensive action undertaken by NATO without specific U.N. endorsement. U.N. Security Council approval was not sought because both Russia and China, each with veto power on the Council, opposed the use of force to resolve the Kosovo crisis. The September 23, 1998 U.N. Security Council resolution, which called for the immediate withdrawal of Serbian security forces from Kosovo, did, however,

reference the U.N. Charter's Article VII, which permits military force to maintain international security.

NATO defined five conditions for ending its air campaign:

- Cessation of Serb operations against the Albanians in Kosovo;
- Withdrawal of Serb forces from Kosovo;
- Acceptance of Kosovar democratic self-government;
- Acceptance of a NATO-led peacekeeping force; and
- Return of Kosovar refugees.

On May 6, 1999, at the G-8 economic summit, another set of principles for a peace settlement were agreed upon by the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Japan, Canada, Italy, and Russia. These G-8 principles were:

- Immediate end to the violence.
- Withdrawal of all Yugoslav military and other security forces.
- Deployment of UN- endorsed international civil and security presences.
- Interim international administration with U.N. Security Council approval.
- Return of all refugees, and access for aid organizations.
- Substantial self-government for Kosovo.
- Economic development of the region.

On June 4, 1999, the Yugoslav government accepted the provisions of the G-8 peace plan, and on June 9 NATO and Yugoslav military officials signed a Military-Technical Agreement (MTA) which provided for the phased withdrawal of all Yugoslav forces from Kosovo by June 20, 1999, and detailed the authority of the KFOR commander to enforce the peace agreement with all means necessary. On June 10, 1999, the United Nations Security Council passed a resolution (No. 2580), endorsing the peace-keeping mission under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter.

**The Air Campaign (Operation *Allied Force*).** On March 24, 1999, NATO began air operations, code-named *Operation Allied Force*, against targets primarily in Serbia and Kosovo. DOD defined the mission as attacking the Yugoslav military infrastructure with the objective of deterring future attacks on Albanian Kosovars and degrading the ability of Yugoslav forces to carry out these operations. Target selection focused on airfields, air defense and communication centers, military barracks, and some equipment production facilities. Attacks then extended to logistical support facilities and lines of resupply, Yugoslav ground forces in Kosovo, and the national electrical and television systems. In total, NATO aircraft flew over 35,000 sorties (1 aircraft flight), about one-third of which were strike sorties, launching about 23,000 munitions.

NATO HQ acknowledged that the air campaign did not impede the Serb operations to drive the Albanian population from Kosovo. The inability to stop Serb operations brought strong criticism of the decision to launch the air campaign while completely ruling out any use of ground forces. Aside from official NATO and Administration spokesmen, few, if any, observers believed that air power alone could

achieve the desired objectives. Press reports indicated that NATO political leaders were cautioned of an air campaign's potential shortfalls, but believed that their domestic public opinion would not support a ground invasion of Kosovo. It was then perceived as a choice between "do nothing" or proceed with air strikes. Some also suggested that in the wake of the 1991 Persian Gulf War, some advocates have overemphasized the capabilities of air power, encouraging the belief that ground forces are no longer as crucial to achieving military objectives.

There was also criticism that "command by committee" hampered NATO military leaders' ability to wage an effective, rapidly responsive campaign. Target lists, weapons used, and forces deployed were all subject to prior approval by all NATO governments. This slowed decision-making, constrained operations, and sometimes emphasized political over military considerations. However, NATO officials maintain that SACEUR received all resources requested, and emphasized that this consensual process was critical to ensuring the cohesion of the alliance. A more fundamental criticism is that the air campaign's actual objective from the start was political, not military — i.e., to bring President Milosevic back to the bargaining table. This, in turn, contributed to a constrained, incremental approach to targeting.

After the air operation, U.S. Secretary of Defense Cohen, NATO's Supreme Allied Commander, Europe Gen. Wesley Clark, and the Chairman of NATO's Military Committee Gen. Klaus Naumann all recommended that NATO's decision-making processes for conducting a military campaign be examined and, in some way, streamlined. None, however, offered specific suggestions, noting that any changes made would have to gain and sustain acceptance by all NATO members. NATO's current structure and procedures were created to deal with homeland defense against invasion. Out-of-area operations like *Allied Force* present different political constraints and military requirements. Some have suggested greater delegation of authority to NATO's Supreme Allied Commander, Europe once the alliance has made the decision to carry out a military operation. However, within an alliance of democracies which maintains full consensus as a fundamental principle, this approach has not achieved acceptance. In addressing this issue, Gen. Clark emphasized that, structural reforms aside, "there has to be a strong political consensus founded on a common perception of military doctrine to overcome the obstacles we hit in the air campaign".<sup>2</sup> In responding to the critics of the air campaign, Gen. Naumann has noted that NATO planned for a limited operation from the outset, and made this fact public, while President Milosevic "planned for a war." Naumann also observed that NATO threatened military action, without having a consensus on how it would be carried out, thereby precluding its military commanders' use of "overwhelming force from the beginning."<sup>3</sup>

In the wake of the Yugoslav acceptance of NATO peace conditions, supporters of reliance upon NATO airpower believe they have been vindicated in their approach. They emphasize that NATO sustained no combat fatalities in the course of the 78-day campaign, and that the complete withdrawal of Yugoslav forces from Kosovo was achieved. The air campaign's critics, however, point to the fact that it did

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<sup>2</sup> Testimony before the Senate Armed Service Committee, July 20, 1999.

<sup>3</sup> "Naumann on Kosovo", *Defense News*, July 20, 1999. P. 1

not prevent the temporary expulsion of almost the entire Albanian population of Kosovo.

The Department of Defense Joint Staff provided the following statistical summary of the 78-day air campaign:

Total sorties: 37,200

- U.S.: 23,208 (62%)
- Allies: 13,992 (38%)

Strike sorties: 9,500

- U.S.: 5,035 (53%)
- Allies: 4,465 (47%)

Intelligence/reconnaissance sorties: 1,200

- U.S.: 948 (79%)
- Allies: 252 (21%)

Support sorties: 26,500

- U.S.: 17,225 (65%)
- Allies: 9,275 (35%)

On October 14, 2000, Secretary Cohen and Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman General Shelton provided the Senate Armed Services Committee with DOD's initial "lessons learned" observations.<sup>4</sup> Among the issues addressed, were the following:

- Parallel U.S. and NATO command and control structures complicated operational planning and maintenance of unity of command. Disparities between U.S. capabilities and those of allies, including precision strike, mobility, and command, control, and communications capabilities impeded U.S. ability to operate at optimal effectiveness with NATO allies.
- DOD needs to develop options for earlier and more efficient use of its reserve forces.
- DOD systems for planning and executing transportation of its forces were strained by the rapidly evolving requirements.
- The heavy commitment of NATO's air defense suppression forces indicates the need to find innovative and affordable ways to exploit our technological skills in electronic combat.
- Success using the latest generation of air-delivered munitions systems in Kosovo validates plans to increase inventories.
- Task Force Hawk (U.S. ground troops in Albania) pointed out the need to regularly experiment with the independent use of key elements of all of our forces without their usual supporting elements.
- Improved unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) mission planning, improved processes for interaction between UAV operators and

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<sup>4</sup> Department of Defense, *Report to Congress: Kosovo/Operation Allied Force After-Action Report*, January 31, 2000.

manned aircraft, frequent and realistic training opportunities, and equipment upgrades for individual UAVs all would benefit force effectiveness.

- Humanitarian operations highlighted the importance of such resources as linguists and civil affairs personnel, engineering assets capable of emergency repair of roads and bridges in very austere environments, detailed maps, and prepositioned stocks.

It is unclear to what extent NATO members have undertaken to address these concerns. For the U.S. part, some of these issues have again been highlighted by military operations in Iraq, e.g., transportation of forces and equipment, improved UAV capabilities, and the importance of humanitarian/civil operations capabilities.

### **Ground Force Operations — KFOR (*Operation Joint Guardian*).**

Because air operations did not stop Serb operations against Kosovar Albanians, public discussion of NATO ground force intervention was widespread. U.S. and NATO spokesmen continued to maintain there was no intention to introduce ground troops without “a permissive environment.” In the latter weeks of the air campaign, the British government began to push for ground intervention, but was unable to win the support of other alliance members. Though President Clinton and others publically made the point that no option was permanently “off the table”. and NATO HQ re-examined the military requirements for an invasion of Kosovo and even Serbia, at no time did there appear alliance-wide support of offensive ground operations. Indeed, several member governments, particularly Greece, Italy, and Germany were publicly adamant in their opposition.

With the Yugoslav acceptance of the peace plan devised by the G-8, the focus turned to *Operation Joint Guardian*, the peace-keeping mission to be undertaken by KFOR. To facilitate this operation, NATO obtained the Yugoslav acceptance of a Military-Technical Agreement (MTA) prepared by NATO on June 9, 1999. The United Nations Security Council passed a resolution (S/RES/1244) endorsing the peace plan and an “international security presence” in Kosovo for its enforcement.

KFOR did not begin deploying into Kosovo until June 12, 1999, reportedly waiting to synchronize its deployment with the withdrawal of Serb forces in order to avoid co-mingling forces. This delay, however, allowed time for a 200-strong contingent of Russian troops to leave their SFOR station in Bosnia and occupy the airport in Pristina, Kosovo’s capital. Reportedly planned by the Russian General Staff, and endorsed by president Yeltsin, to ensure Russia a high-profile role in KFOR. This action occasioned high-level U.S.-Russian negotiations. An agreement reached on June 18, 1999 provided for shared control of Pristina airport operations, with Russian participation in airport ground operations and air operations under KFOR control and deployment of Russian troops in the U.S., German, and French sectors. These troops were under a unified KFOR command, with a Russian general officer at KFOR HQ. Once initial tensions dissipated, KFOR commanders praised the Russian troops for their professionalism and cooperation. Russia ended its participation in KFOR operations in 2003, owing to domestic financial constraints.

The KFOR Military Technical Agreement with the Belgrade government affirms the terms of the peace plan, and provides specific details of its implementation. Some of the main provisions are:

- KFOR will deploy and operate without hindrance.
- KFOR has the authority to take all necessary action to establish and maintain a secure environment, and to carry out its mission, the KFOR commander has the right to compel the removal or relocation of forces and weapons, and to order the cessation of any activities that pose a potential threat to KFOR, its mission, or a third party. Failure to comply will result in military action, including the use of necessary force.
- KFOR has the right to monitor and inspect all facilities or activities that may have a police or military capability, or are deemed otherwise relevant to compliance. The KFOR commander is the “final authority” for the interpretation of the MTA.
- Air and Ground Safety Zones will extend 25 and 5 kilometers respectively beyond the borders of Kosovo, and no Yugoslav forces, aside from local police, may enter these zones without KFOR permission. All Yugoslav military, paramilitary, and police forces will conduct a phased withdrawal from Kosovo, to be completed by June 20, 1999.
- Yugoslav forces will mark and remove all mines, booby traps, and obstacles as they withdraw. A subsequent, separate agreement will address the return of “agreed Yugoslav and Serb personnel.”

On June 20 1999, NATO announced an agreement with the Kosovo Liberation Army for its phased disbanding. The presence of armed KLA guerillas has given KFOR some concerns, and KFOR has disarmed KLA groups that could have presented a threat to security. In the demilitarization agreement, the KLA agreed to:

- Renounce the use of force and comply with KFOR and U.N. Interim Civil Administration directives. Refrain from hostile or provocative acts, including reprisals or detentions.
- Acknowledge KFOR’s use of necessary force to ensure compliance.
- Not carry weapons in specified areas.

In an attempt to involve former KLA personnel in positive activities, NATO and U.N. officials agreed to the creation of the Kosovo Corps. NATO and the U.N. intend the 3,000-strong organization to be a uniformed civilian force to deal with emergency situations such as forest fires, search and rescue, and reconstruction. Some KLA leaders see the Kosovo Corps as the nucleus of a future Kosovo army, a view rejected by NATO and U.N. officials.

**U.S. and Allied Force Contributions.** Of the almost 22,000 troops stationed with KFOR, the United States is providing about 2,100 or 11%. D O D scheduled the major unit rotations for KFOR through May 2005, should the deployment last that long. The parent units involved are: 1<sup>st</sup> Cavalry Division (11/03-05/04); 3<sup>rd</sup> Infantry Division (05/04-11/04), and 101<sup>st</sup> Airborne (11/04-05/05). With

the bulk of these units' personnel involved in rotations for Iraq, however, DOD has not indicated how this might effect deployments to Kosovo.

**Costs of Operation Allied Force/Joint Guardian.** Within NATO, each nation participating in *Operation Allied Force* assumed the cost of its own operations. NATO does not provide estimates of the overall cost of the operation or of the cost of each member's contributions.<sup>5</sup> (Individual nations also assume the full cost of the deployments in support of on-going KFOR operations.

In April 1999, the Clinton Administration submitted a \$6.05 billion emergency supplemental appropriation request to cover military operations in Kosovo and continuing air operations in Southwest Asia during FY1999. On May 18, 1999, the House approved a House-Senate conference agreement on H.R. 1141, providing \$14.9 billion in FY1999 supplemental appropriations. On May 20 1999, the Senate concurred and it was signed into law (P.L. 106-31) on May 21. Of this, only \$10.8 billion was actually defense-related, and included funds for items other than Kosovo operations such as a military pay raise, military construction, training, and equipment/munitions procurement. The Administration's funding request assumed offensive military operations against Yugoslavia through September 1999. With the campaign ending in June, DOD calculated its actual FY1999 incremental costs to be \$3.0 billion, and the remainder of the appropriated supplemental were re-programmed.

The Administration's FY2000 budget request contained no funds for combat or peacekeeping operations in Kosovo. The House Armed Services Committee expressed its concern that under or unbudgeted contingency operations have diverted funds from "quality of life, readiness, and modernization" programs. Seeing no funds budgeted for Kosovo operations in FY2000, and seeking to ensure that incremental Kosovo-related costs would be dealt with only through specific budgeted accounts or supplemental appropriations, the Committee inserted a provision in DOD's authorizing legislation (H.R. 1401) prohibiting the use of any funds authorized by the legislation for military operations in Yugoslavia. On June 9, during consideration on the House floor, Representative Skelton introduced an amendment removing this provision. Upon receiving written notice from President Clinton stating that if military readiness were to be harmed by on-going operational requirements, he would submit a FY2000 budget amendment request, the House agreed (270-155) to remove the funding prohibition. A \$2 billion supplemental appropriation for Kosovo was subsequently included in the FY2001 Military Construction Act (P.L. 106-246). From FY2002-FY2004, Congress has appropriated approximately \$2.8 billion for Kosovo operations.

Beginning with the FY2002 budget, both the Bosnia and Kosovo operations are no longer funded through the Overseas Contingency Fund, but rather through the individual service budgets. Consequently, published DOD budget documents do not provide a separate accounting for these operations.

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<sup>5</sup> For individual national cost estimates for Kosovo operations, see CRS Report RL30398, *NATO Burdensharing and Kosovo: a Preliminary Report.*)



## Considerations for Congress

At the outset of military operations in both Bosnia and Kosovo, congressional reaction was mixed. In both cases, resolutions in favor and in opposition to participation passed either the House or Senate; but no legislation authorizing or prohibiting U.S. participation passed both chambers. Appropriations for these military operations were never denied, though extensive reporting requirements often conditioned the funding.<sup>6</sup>

If current intentions are carried out, NATO forces – including U.S. troops – will be completely withdrawn from Bosnia by the end of 2004 and replaced by a European Union force of both police and military personnel. With that withdrawal, a close monitoring of the EU's mission performance and Bosnia's political stability would appear to be the primary remaining concerns.

While NATO troops may withdraw from Bosnia, there appears to be no time line for a withdrawal from Kosovo. A continued NATO military presence in Kosovo will probably remain until the province's political future is determined, and perhaps for a period thereafter. Whether the NATO contingent need continue to include U.S. troops is, however, open to question. The possibility remains that the European Union could eventually assume peace-keeping responsibilities in Kosovo also; however, that is unlikely to occur until its performance in Bosnia is evaluated.

## Recent Legislation

### **P.L. 108-384**

To authorize appropriations for FY2004 for military activities of the Department of Defense, and for military construction, to prescribe military personnel strengths for fiscal year 2004, and for other purposes. Signed into law November 24, 2003.

### **P.L. 108-87**

Making appropriations for the Department of Defense for the fiscal year 2004, and for other purposes. Signed into law September 30, 2003.

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<sup>6</sup> For a detailed discussion of the legislative activity related to military operations in the Balkans, see CRS Report RL31185, *The War Powers Resolution: After Twenty-Eight Years*.

## **Additional Reading**

### **CRS Reports**

CRS Report RL31053, *Kosovo and U.S. Policy*.

CRS Report RL30906, *Bosnia-Herzegovina and U.S. Policy*.

CRS Issue Brief IB94040, *Peacekeeping and Related Stability Operations: Issues of U.S. Military Involvement*.

### **World Wide Web Sites**

BosniaLink (DOD) — [<http://www.dtic.mil/bosnia/>]

KFOR Headquarters — [<http://www.nato.int/kfor/welcome.html>]

NATO Headquarters — [<http://www.nato.int/kosovo/press.htm>]

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