Order Code RL30395
CRS Report for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
Farm Labor Shortages and Immigration Policy
Updated February 9, 2004
Linda Levine
Specialist in Labor Economics
Domestic Social Policy Division
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress
Farm Labor Shortages and Immigration Policy
Summary
The connection between farm labor and immigration policies reemerged as an
issue in the Congress and was under discussion by the Bush and Fox Administrations
before the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. President Bush’s remarks in
December 2003 about a broad-based temporary foreign worker program have
reignited interest in the issue. Questions have again arisen about whether enough
workers are available domestically to meet the requirements of farmers and how, if
at all, the Congress should change immigration policy, which has long been linked
with the seasonal needs of crop growers for direct-hire and contract farmworkers.
Fifty-five percent of today’s hired farmworkers are not authorized to hold U.S.
jobs. For many years, farmers have expressed concern that if certain federal activities
prove effective, a considerable portion of the agricultural labor force and hence of
their livelihood could be lost. These federal actions include increased border
enforcement efforts, work eligibility verification pilot programs and audits of
employees’ work authorization documents to determine their authenticity.
Growers contend that the sizeable presence of unauthorized aliens implies a
shortage of legal farmworkers. Their advocates argue that farmers would rather not
employ unauthorized workers because doing so puts them at risk of incurring
penalties. Farmworker advocates in turn counter that crop growers prefer
unauthorized employees because they are in a weak bargaining position with regard
to wages and working conditions. If the supply of unauthorized workers were
curtailed, it is claimed, farmers could adjust to a smaller workforce by introducing
labor-efficient technologies and management practices, and by raising wages, which,
in turn, would entice more authorized persons to become farmworkers. Grower
advocates respond that further mechanization would be difficult for some crops and
that substantially higher wages would make the U.S. industry uncompetitive in the
world marketplace without expanding the legal farm labor force. These remain
untested arguments, as perishable crop growers have rarely, if ever, operated without
unauthorized aliens in their workforces.
At the present time, trends in the agricultural labor market generally do not
suggest the existence of a nationwide shortage of domestically available
farmworkers, in part because the government’s databases cover authorized and
unauthorized employment. (This finding does not preclude the possibility of spot
agricultural labor shortages, however.) Hired and contract farm employment has not
shown the same generally upward trend of total U.S. employment from 1990 through
2003. The length of time hired farmworkers are employed has changed little or
decreased over the years, depending on the measure examined. Their unemployment
rate has varied little and remains well above the overall average. Underemployment
among farmworkers also remains substantial. And, although two data series show
different levels and trends in the wages of field workers, they do concur that these
agricultural employees earn little more than 50 cents for every dollar paid to other
employees in the private sector.
This report will be updated as new data becomes available.
Contents
Farmworkers and Activities of SSA and DHS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
The Composition of the Seasonal Farm Labor Force . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
A Farm Labor Shortage? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Employment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Unemployment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Time Worked . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
The Seasonality of Demand: Hours Versus Employment . . . . . . . . . . 12
The Number of Days Worked . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Wages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
List of Tables
Table 1. Hired Farm Employment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Table 2. The Rate and Level of Unemployment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Table 3. Hired Farmworkers by Expected Days of Employment . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Table 4. Average Hourly Earnings of Field Workers and Other Workers
in the Private Sector . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Table 5. Average Hourly Earnings of Crop Workers and Other Workers
in the Private Sector . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Farm Labor Shortages
and Immigration Policy
Questions often have arisen over the years about (1) whether sufficient workers
are available domestically to meet the seasonal employment demand of perishable
crop producers in the U.S. agricultural industry1 and (2) how, if at all, the Congress
should change immigration policy with respect to farmworkers. Immigration policy
has long been intertwined with the labor needs of crop (e.g., fruit and vegetable)
growers, who rely more than most farmers on hand labor (e.g., for harvesting) and
consequently “are the largest users of hired and contract workers on a per-farm
basis.”2 Since World War I, the Congress has allowed the use of temporary foreign
workers to perform agricultural labor of a seasonal nature as a means of augmenting
the supply of domestic farmworkers.3 In addition, a sizeable fraction of immigrants
historically have found employment on the nation’s farms.4
The intersection between farm labor and immigration has again emerged as a
policy issue. The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 effectively quashed
discussions on this subject between the Bush and Fox Administrations that took place
shortly after President Bush came into office, but the proposal of a broad-based
temporary foreign worker program that President Bush sketched in December 2003
has revived interest in the labor-immigration nexus. (For a discussion of the bills that
have thus far been introduced in the 108th Congress and the President’s proposal see
CRS Report RL32044, Immigration: Policy Considerations Related to Guest Worker
Programs.)
This report first explains the connection made over the past several years
between farm labor and immigration policies. It next examines the composition of
the seasonal agricultural labor force and presents the arguments of grower and
farmworker advocates concerning its adequacy relative to employer demand. The
report closes with an analysis of the trends in employment, unemployment, time
worked and wages of authorized and unauthorized farmworkers to determine if they
1 In this report, the terms “agriculture” and “farming” will be used interchangeably as will
the terms “producer,” “grower,” and “farmer.”
2 Victor J. Oliveira, Anne B. W. Effland, Jack L. Runyan and Shannon Hamm, Hired Farm
Labor on Fruit, Vegetable, and Horticultural Specialty Farms, U.S. Department of
Agriculture, Economic Research Service, Agricultural Economic Report Number 676, Dec.
1993, p. 2. (Hereafter cited as, Oliveira, Effland, Runyan and Hamm, Hired Farm Labor
on Fruit, Vegetable, and Horticultural Specialty Farms.)
3 U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Temporary Worker Programs:
Background and Issues, committee print, 96th Cong., 2nd sess. (Washington: GPO, 1980).
4 Philip L. Martin, “Good Intentions Gone Awry: IRCA and U.S. Agriculture,” Annals of
the American Academy of Political and Social Science, July 1994.
CRS-2
are consistent with the existence of a nationwide shortage of domestically available
farmworkers.
Farmworkers and
Activities of SSA and DHS
During the second half of the 1990s, attention began to focus on the growing
share of the domestic supply of farmworkers that is composed of aliens who are not
authorized to work in the United States. The U.S. Department of Labor (DOL)
estimated that foreign-born persons in the country illegally accounted for 37% of the
domestic crop workforce in FY1994-1995. Shortly thereafter (FY1997-1998),
unauthorized aliens’ share of the estimated 1.8 million workers employed on crop
farms reached 52%.5 And, by FY1999-2000, their proportion had increased to 55%.6
Although a number of studies found that no nationwide shortage of domestic
farm labor existed in the past decade,7 a case has been made that the considerable
presence of unauthorized aliens in the seasonal agricultural labor force implies a lack
of legal farmworkers relative to employer demand. Arguably, the purported
imbalance between authorized-to-work farm labor and employer demand would
become more apparent were the supply of unauthorized aliens curtailed sufficiently
— a fear that has plagued growers for some time.
Crop producers and their advocates have testified at congressional hearings over
the last several years that they believe the latest risk of losing much of their labor
force comes from certain activities of the Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration
Services and the Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement within the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Social Security Administration
5 According to U.S. Department of Labor Report to Congress: The Agricultural Labor
Market — Status and Recommendations, the 1.8 million figure was developed by dividing
the hourly earnings of field and livestock workers into farm labor expenditures to estimate
the number of work hours on crop and livestock farms. As it was calculated that 72% of the
hours were being worked on crop farms, the percentage was then applied to the Commission
on Agricultural Workers’ estimate for 1992 of 2.5 million persons employed for wages on
U.S. farms to yield a current estimate of the hired crop workforce. The Commission had
developed its earlier farm employment figure from a variety of data sources because there
is no actual head count of farmworkers. For other current estimates of hired farm and crop
workers see Table 1.
6 Based upon public access data from the DOL’s National Agricultural Worker Survey
(NAWS).
7 Commission on Agricultural Workers, Report of the Commission on Agricultural Workers,
(Washington: GPO, Nov. 1992). (Hereafter cited as Commission on Agricultural Workers,
Report of the Commission on Agricultural Workers.). U.S. General Accounting Office, H-
2A Agricultural Guestworker Program: Changes Could Improve Services to Employers and
Better Protect Workers, GAO/HEHES-98-20, Dec. 1997. (Hereafter cited as GAO, H-2A
Agricultural Guestworker Program). DOL, A Profile of U.S. Farmworkers: Demographics,
Household Composition, Income and Use of Services, Research Report No. 6, Apr. 1997.
(Hereafter cited as DOL, A Profile of U.S. Farmworkers.). And, annual calculations in the
early 1990s by the U.S. Departments of Labor and Agriculture.
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(SSA). Growers have asserted that these activities have disrupted their workforces
by increasing employee turnover and therefore, decreasing the stability of their labor
supply. The perception that government actions might negatively impact the
agricultural workforce — allegedly to the extent that crops would not be harvested,
farmers would go bankrupt or produce costs to U.S. consumers would rise — has
prompted a legislative response in the past.
The SSA and DHS activities are briefly described below:
(1) The SSA sends employers “educational correspondence” that includes a
sample of mismatches between the names/social security numbers (SSNs) that appear
on the W-2 forms employers must submit to the agency annually and those in the
SSA’s database. The purpose of the “no-match letter” is to make wage reports more
accurate so that the agency can properly credit earnings to employees’ records for
future benefit payments. As part of this effort, the SSA has encouraged employers
not to wait until the annual submission of W-2 forms and instead, to use its
Enumeration Verification Service (EVS) to match the names/social security numbers
of employees with those in the agency’s database.8
Growers have told the SSA that their concern with using the EVS is that when
they discuss any discrepancies with employees, the employees do not return to work.
The National Council of Agricultural Employers has testified about the large and
growing numbers of employers receiving no-match letters.9 The American Farm
Bureau Federation has said that growers are apprehensive about being liable for
penalties (commonly referred to as employer sanctions) due to “constructive
knowledge” of illegal workers on their payrolls if they do not act on the SSA letters.10
The agency’s correspondence clearly states, however, that there are many reasons
why discrepancies can occur and that the letter, by itself, should not form the basis
for taking any adverse actions against employees.11
SSA has responded to the growers’ concerns in a variety of ways over the past
few years. The agency has, for example, translated into Spanish portions of the letter
so that if growers show it to farmworkers they can see they have nothing to fear from
it. In addition, based upon a change in selection criteria that went into effect January
2003, SSA has stopped sending no-match letters to virtually all employers. Letters
now are received by thousands rather than millions of employers.
8 Conversations with SSA staff.
9 Testimony of James S. Holt on behalf of the National Council of Agricultural Employers
before the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Immigration, May 4, 2000.
10 Testimony of Josh Wunsch on behalf of the American Farm Bureau Federation before the
Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Immigration, May 4, 2000; and Alexander T. Aleinikoff,
“The Green Card Solution,” The American Prospect, Dec. 1999. Note: In addition to
potential fines under immigration law, the Internal Revenue Service may charge employers
or employees $50 for providing incorrect information on W-2 forms.
11 The SSA provides the following examples in its letters of why mismatches might occur:
errors in spelling the employees’ names or in listing their SSNs, not reporting name changes,
and names or SSNs that are incomplete.
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(2) The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996
(IIRIRA, P.L. 104-288) provided for increased border enforcement efforts and for
employment verification pilot programs.12 Employer participation in these programs,
which was set to last no more than 4 years, has been voluntary and the programs have
involved a limited number of areas. Organizations of growers nonetheless testified
that inclusion of the pilot programs in P.L. 104-288 merely delayed the creation of
a mandatory nationwide verification system.13 And indeed, in the Basic Pilot
Program Extension and Expansion Act of 2003 (P.L. 108-156), Congress extended
the program for 5 years through 2008 and expanded it to include all states, but
employer participation in the program remains optional.
Currently, employers fulfill the legal requirement to not knowingly hire illegal
workers by viewing documents that show the new-hire’s identity and eligibility to
work in the United States, and by completing an I-9 (employment eligibility
verification) form. Under the Basic Pilot Program, employers can access the
Customs and Immigration Services’ system to validate a newly hired citizen’s or non-
citizen’s eligibility to work. If employers receive a final nonconfirmation of
employment eligibility, they must either fire the new-hire or be subject to financial
penalties. The U.S. General Accounting Office reported in 1997 that neither the pilot
programs nor the agency’s border enforcement initiative were likely to have an
immediate, significant effect on the supply to growers of fraudulently documented
farmworkers.14
(3) The Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (another former part
of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, INS) reportedly increased its audits
of I-9 forms even before September 11, 2001, but the incidence was and remains
relatively low according to the agency. In the audits, the bureau checks the
authenticity of employees’ work authorization documents against government
records. At the audits’ completion, employers are given a list of employees whose
documents were deemed to be invalid. According to a representative of the growers,
“Frequently, INS audits of agricultural employers reveal that 60 to 70 percent of
seasonal agricultural workers have provided fraudulent documents. The employer
is then required to dismiss each employee on the list who cannot provide a valid
employment authorization document, something few workers can do.”15 This
12 Work eligibility verification demonstrations in addition to the IIRIRA pilots are
authorized under Section 274A(d)(4) of the Immigration and Nationality Act and
Presidential Executive Order 12781 of Nov. 20, 1991. For more information see: Miksch,
Karen I. INS Pilot Programs for Employment Eligibility Confirmation. Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace, International Migration Policy Program, November
1998.
13 Testimony of Bob L. Vice on behalf of the National Council of Agricultural Employers
and the American Farm Bureau Federation before the House Judiciary Subcommittee on
Immigration and Claims, Sept. 24, 1997.
14 GAO, H-2A Agricultural Guestworker Program.
15 Testimony of James S. Holt on behalf of the National Council of Agricultural Employers
before the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Immigration, May 12, 1999.
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estimate of hired farmworkers who have secured their jobs through presentation of
fraudulent documents is at the high end of figures reported elsewhere, however.16
While a grower representative recently testified that “agriculture has historically
not been a major target” of immigration enforcement activities, he pointed to some
experiences involving Vermont dairy farmers and Georgia onion growers in the last
few years. The increased attention that has been paid to homeland security since
September 11, 2001 and the better integration of agencies within DHS has led the
American Farm Bureau Federation to speculate that more raids could be
forthcoming.17 Stuart Anderson of the National Foundation for American Policy
testified, however, that DHS “does not have the resources to enforce those
[immigration] laws in a manner that would stop employers from using illegal
workers.”18
The Composition of the Seasonal Farm Labor Force
Immigration legislation sometimes has been crafted to take into account the
purported labor requirements of U.S. crop growers. In 1986, for example, Congress
passed the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA, P.L. 99-603) to curb the
presence of unauthorized aliens in the United States by imposing sanctions on
employers who knowingly hire individuals who lack permission to work in the
country. In addition to a general legalization program, P.L. 99-603 included two
industry-specific legalization programs — the Special Agricultural Worker (SAW)
program and the Replenishment Agricultural Worker (RAW) program19 — that were
intended to compensate for the Act’s expected impact on the farm labor supply and
encourage the development of a legal crop workforce. These provisions of the Act
have not operated in the offsetting manner that was intended, however, as substantial
numbers of unauthorized aliens have continued to join legal farmworkers in
performing seasonal agricultural services (SAS).20
16 Perhaps one-fourth to three-fourths of the hired farm labor force may have relied on
fraudulent documents to gain employment. U.S. Department of Agriculture, “Status Report:
Hired Farm Labor in U.S. Agriculture,” Agricultural Outlook, Oct. 1998.
17 Testimony of Larry Wooten on behalf of the American Farm Bureau Federation before
the House Committee on Agriculture, Jan. 28, 2004.
18 Fawn H. Johnson, “Immigration: Goodlatte Calls for Prevailing Wage in H-2A Program,
Condemns Amnesty,” Daily Labor Report, Jan. 29, 2004, p. A-3.
19 The INS approved over 1 million of the applications that individuals filed under the SAW
program to become legal permanent residents. Anticipating that SAWs would leave farming
because IRCA did not require them to remain in order to adjust their status, P.L. 99-603
included the RAW program as a back-up measure to ensure growers of an adequate labor
supply. The RAW program was never used because the annual calculations of farm labor
supply and demand that were made by the U.S. Departments of Labor and Agriculture
during the FY1990-1993 period found no national shortages of farmworkers.
20 Seasonal agricultural services (SAS) were defined broadly in IRCA as field work related
to planting, cultivating, growing and harvesting of fruits and vegetables of every kind and
(continued...)
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On the basis of case studies that it sponsored, the Commission on Agricultural
Workers concluded in its 1992 report that individuals legalized under the SAW
program (i.e., SAWs) and other farmworkers planned to remain in the agricultural
labor force “indefinitely, or for as long as they are physically able.”21 According to
the DOL’s National Agricultural Workers Survey, two-thirds of SAWs stated that
they intended to engage in field work until the end of their working lives.22
For many SAWs, the end of their worklives — at least their worklives in
farming — may now be near at hand. The diminished physical ability generally
associated with aging in combination with the taxing nature of crop tasks could well
be prompting greater numbers of SAWs to leave the fields. Relatively few
farmworkers are involved in crop production beyond the age of 44 and even fewer
beyond the age of 54 (15% and 5%, respectively, in FY1999-2000).23 The
Commission on Agricultural Workers noted that the typical SAW in 1990 was a 30-
year-old male who “is likely to remain in farm work well into the 21st century.”24 He
is now closer to the age of diminished participation in SAS labor: in FY1999-2000,
the average age of SAWs was 40, older than U.S.-born farmworkers (33) and
unauthorized farmworkers (27).25 Thus, the 1986 legalization program has become
less useful to fulfilling the labor requirements of crop producers.
A combination of factors (e.g., aging and the availability of nonfarm jobs) likely
has contributed to the decrease in SAWs’ share of agricultural employment.26 The
fraction of IRCA-legalized farmworkers fell from 33% in FY1989 to 15% in
FY1999-2000.27 Possibly the leading factor, however, is the substantial increase in
20 (...continued)
other perishable commodities. The terms “SAS,” “seasonal farm work,” “field work” and
“crop work” are used interchangeably in this report.
21 Commission on Agricultural Workers, Report of the Commission on Agricultural
Workers, p. 75.
22 DOL, U.S. Farmworkers in the Post-IRCA Period, Research Report No. 4, Mar. 1993.
(Hereafter cited as DOL, U.S. Farmworkers in the Post-IRCA Period.)
23 Based upon public access data from NAWS.
24 Commission on Agricultural Workers, Report of the Commission on Agricultural
Workers, p. 80.
25 Based upon public access data from NAWS.
26 Alternatively, there are a number of reasons why SAWs would remain in farm
employment (e.g., limited English-language fluency and little formal education). In light
of these competing factors, the Commission on Agricultural Workers concluded that it
would be difficult to estimate the attrition rate of SAWs from the fields. The existence of
fraud in the SAW program further complicates such a calculation because the stock of
SAWs who genuinely were farmworkers is unknown: when Congress was debating
immigration proposals in the mid-1980s, the U.S. Department of Agriculture estimated that
there were 300,000-500,000 unauthorized farmworkers, but more than twice the upper-end
estimate were legalized under the SAW program; this large discrepancy, as well as
additional research, led to the widely held conclusion that fraud was extensive.
27 Department of Labor, Findings from the National Agricultural Workers Survey: 1997-
(continued...)
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the presence of illegal aliens.28 In the first half of the 1990s, unauthorized workers
rose from 7% to 37% of the SAS labor force.29 Their share climbed to 52% by
FY1997-1998, and then rose further to 55% by FY1999-2000.30 Moreover, the
number of SAS workdays performed by unauthorized aliens increased dramatically
from 57 in FY1989 to 147 some 10 years later.31 In addition, of the many foreign-
born newcomers to the sector in FY1999-2000, 99% were employed without
authorization.32
Unauthorized aliens, arguably, have been displacing legal workers from jobs in
the agricultural industry. Farmworker advocates assert that crop producers prefer
unauthorized employees because they have less bargaining power with regard to
wages and working conditions than other employees. Growers counter that they
would rather not employ unauthorized workers because doing so puts them at risk of
incurring penalties. They argue that the considerable presence of unauthorized aliens
in the U.S. farm labor force implies a shortage of legal workers.
Farmworker groups and some policy analysts contend that even if the previously
described DHS and SSA activities were to deprive farmers of many of their
unauthorized workers, the industry could adjust to a smaller supply of legal workers
by (1) introducing labor-efficient technologies and management practices, and (2)
raising wages which, in turn, would entice more authorized workers into the farm
labor force. Grower advocates respond that further mechanization would be difficult
to develop for many crops and that, even at higher wages, not many U.S. workers
27 (...continued)
1998, Research Report No. 8, Mar. 2000. (Hereafter cited as DOL, Findings from the
National Agricultural Workers Survey: 1997-1998.); and public access data from NAWS.
Note: In addition to the more than 1 million workers legalized through the SAW program,
about 7% (119,000) of the 1.7 million aliens granted legal permanent resident status under
IRCA’s general amnesty program were employed in agriculture when they filed their
applications. Oliveira, Effland, Runyan and Hamm, Hired Farm Labor in Fruit, Vegetable,
and Horticultural Specialty Farms.
28 The Commission on Agricultural Workers determined that the design of the SAW
program was, at least in part, responsible for the increase in unauthorized immigration
because if dependents of SAWs did not similarly have their status adjusted, they might have
illegally entered the United States to join family members. In addition, the network or
kinship recruitment process for SAS work continued to flourish and to facilitate not only job
placement, but also migration by assisting in border-crossing and in acquiring fraudulent
work authorization documents. These findings led the Commission to conclude that “the
concept of a worker-specific and industry-specific legalization program was fundamentally
flawed. It invited fraud, posed difficult definitional problems regarding who should or
should not be eligible, and ignored the longstanding priority of U.S. immigration policy
favoring the unification of families.” Commission on Agricultural Workers, Report of the
Commission on Agricultural Workers, p. 67.
29 DOL, A Profile of U.S. Farmworkers.
30 DOL, Findings from the National Agricultural Workers Survey: 1997-1998 and public
access data from NAWS.
31 DOL, Farmworkers in the Post-IRCA Period and public access data from NAWS.
32 Based upon public access data from NAWS.
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would want to perform physically demanding, seasonal farm labor under variable
climactic conditions. Moreover, employer representatives and some policy analysts
maintain that growers cannot raise wages substantially without making the U.S.
industry uncompetitive in world markets which, in turn, would reduce farm
employment. In response, farmworker supporters note that wages are a small part of
the price consumers pay for fresh fruits and vegetables and accordingly, higher wages
would result in only a slight rise in retail prices. These remain untested arguments
as perishable crop growers have rarely, if ever, had to operate without unauthorized
aliens in their workforces.
A Farm Labor Shortage?
At the present time, trends in the farm labor market generally do not suggest the
existence of a nationwide shortage of domestically available farmworkers, in part
because the government’s statistical series cover authorized and unauthorized
workers. This overall finding does not preclude the possibility of farm labor
shortages in certain areas of the country at various times of the year (i.e., spot labor
shortages).
Caution should be exercised when reviewing the statistics on farmworkers’
employment, unemployment, time worked and wages that follow. The surveys from
which the data are derived cover somewhat different groups within the farm labor
force (e.g., all hired farmworkers as opposed to those engaged only in crop
production or workers employed directly by growers as opposed to those supplied to
growers by farm labor contractors), and they have different sample sizes. A
household survey such as the Current Population Survey (CPS) could well understate
the presence of farmworkers because they are more likely to live in less traditional
quarters (e.g., labor camps) and of unauthorized workers generally because they may
be reluctant to respond to government enumerators. And, some of the surveys have
individuals as respondents (e.g., the CPS and DOL’s National Agricultural Workers
Survey) while others have employers as respondents (e.g., the U.S. Department of
Agriculture’s National Agricultural Statistics Service Farm Labor Survey). Surveys
that query employers are more likely to pickup unauthorized employment than are
surveys that query individuals.
Employment
The demand for and supply of labor typically cannot be measured directly.
Instead, proxies are used such as the trend in employment. Decreases in an
occupation’s employment or small gains compared to those recorded for other
occupations might signal that labor demand is not approaching a supply constraint.
As shown in Table 1, the employment of hired workers engaged in crop or
livestock production (including contract workers) has fluctuated erratically over time
(columns 3 and 7). However, the trend overall has been downward. The
employment pattern among crop workers hired directly by growers (i.e., excluding
those supplied by farm labor contractors and crew leaders) has regularly risen and
then fallen back, but to a higher level through 2000 (column 4). This ratcheting
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upward of employment produced a 12% gain over the 1990-2000 period. In contrast,
other wage and salary workers have experienced steady and robust job growth over
almost the entire period: from 1990 to 2000, wage and salary employment in
nonfarm industries advanced by 14%. These divergent employment patterns suggest
that hired farmworkers did not share equally in the nation’s longest (1992-2000)
economic expansion and appears to be inconsistent with the presence of a nationwide
farm labor shortage.
In recent years, the labor market has been slow to rebound from the latest
recession. Although nonfarm wage and salary employment showed signs of revival
in 2003, the same may not be said for hired farmworkers (columns 2 and 7 of Table
1).
Table 1. Hired Farm Employment
(numbers in thousands)
Total
Economic Research
National Agricultural Statistics
nonfarm
Service (ERS) b
Service (NASS) c
wage &
Year
salary
Hired
Hired
Hired
Agricultur-
employ-
farm
crop
farm
al service
Total
ment a
workers d
workers e
workers f
workers g
1990
115,570
886
419
892
250
1,142
1991
114,449
884
449
910
259
1,169
1992
115,245
848
409
866
252
1,118
1993
117,144
803
436
857
256
1,113
1994
110,517
793
411
840
250
1,090
1995
112,448
849
433
869
251
1,120
1996
114,171
906
451
832
236
1,068
1997
116,983
889
432
876
240
1,116
1998
119,019
875
458
880
246
1,126
1999
121,323
840
440
929
233
1,162
2000
125,114
878
468
890
243
1,133
2001
125,407
745
392
881
244
1,125
2002
125,156
793
370
886
225
1,111
2003
126,015
n.a.
n.a.
836
236
1,072
Source: Created by the U.S. Congressional Research Service (CRS) from sources cited below.
Note: n.a. = not available
CRS-10
a. Data are from the monthly CPS, a survey of households, as reported by the DOL’s Bureau of Labor
Statistics (BLS) for individuals age 16 or older. Because the CPS was substantially revised, data
from 1994 forward are not strictly comparable with data from earlier years.
b. Data are from the monthly CPS as reported by the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s ERS for
individuals age 15 or older.
c. Data are from the Farm Labor Survey, a quarterly survey of farm operators, as reported by the U.S.
Department of Agriculture’s NASS. The statistics reflect individuals on employers’ payrolls
during the survey week in January, April, July, and October. Data for Alaska are not included.
1990-1994 annual averages for all hired farmworkers and all annual averages for agricultural
service workers were calculated by CRS.
d. In the CPS, an individual’s occupation is based on the activity in which he spent the most hours
during the survey week. Hired farmworkers are those whose primary job is farmwork and for
which they receive wages, as opposed to unpaid family workers or self-employed farmers.
Hired farmworkers include individuals engaged in planting, cultivating, and harvesting crops
or tending livestock whom growers employ directly or through agricultural service providers
(e.g., farm labor contractors and crew leaders), as well as farm managers, supervisors of
farmworkers, and nursery and other workers.
e. The ERS disaggregates hired farmworkers by the kind of establishment employing them (i.e.,
establishments primarily engaged in crop production, livestock production or other). As “other”
includes agricultural service providers, the figures for crop workers are limited to farmworkers
whom growers employ directly.
f. The NASS counts as hired farmworkers only those persons paid directly by farmers. Hired
farmworkers include field workers (i.e., those who plant, cultivate and harvest crops), livestock
workers (i.e., those who tend livestock, milk cows or care for poultry) and supervisory workers
(e.g., managers or range foremen) as well as other workers on farmers’ payrolls (e.g.,
bookkeepers, secretaries or pilots).
g. Includes contract, custom or other workers supplied to farmers but paid by agricultural service
firms (e.g., farm labor contractors or crew leaders).
Farm employment is subject to considerable seasonal variation during the course
of a year. Typically, demand for hired farm labor peaks in July when many crops are
ready to be harvested. The July employment data from the NASS Farm Labor
Survey, like the annualized data from the same survey shown in Table 1, was very
unstable between 1990 and 2003.33
Unemployment
Employment data paint an incomplete picture of the state of the labor market.
At the same time that employment in a given occupation is decreasing or increasing
relatively slowly, unemployment in the occupation might be falling. Employers
would then be faced with a shrinking supply of untapped labor from which to draw.
A falling unemployment rate or level would offer some basis for this possibility.
As shown in Table 2, the unemployment rate of hired farmworkers engaged in
crop or livestock production (including contract labor) is quite high. Even the
economic boom that characterized most of the 1990s did not reduce the group’s
unemployment rate below double-digit levels (ranging between almost 11% and
13%), or about twice the average unemployment rate in the nation at a minimum.
33 According to the Farm Labor Survey, hired farmworker and agricultural services
employment was as follows in July of each year: 1990 — 1,462,000; 1991 — 1,486,000;
1992 — 1,417,000; 1993 — 1,420,000; 1994 — 1,381,000; 1995 — 1,414,000; 1996 —
1,346,000; 1997 — 1,409,000; 1998 — 1,450,000; 1999 — 1,474,000; 2000 — 1,374,000;
2001 — 1,374,000; 2002 — 1,262,000; and 2003 — 1,072,000.
CRS-11
Discouragement over their employment prospects in agriculture or better
opportunities elsewhere may have prompted some unemployed farmworkers to leave
the sector as evidenced by their reduced number after 1998 (see column 4).
Other observers have examined the unemployment rates in counties that are
heavily dependent on the crop farming industry. The GAO, for example, found that
many of these agricultural areas chronically experienced double-digit unemployment
rates that were well above those reported for much of the rest of the United States.
Even when looking at monthly unemployment rates for these areas in order to take
into account the seasonality of farm work, the agency found that the agricultural
counties exhibited comparatively high rates of joblessness.34 These kind of findings
imply a surplus rather than a shortage of farmworkers.35
Another perspective on the availability of untapped farm labor comes from the
DOL’s National Agricultural Worker Survey (NAWS).36 During FY1999-2000, the
typical crop worker spent 56% of the year performing farm jobs. The remainder of
the year, these farmworkers either were engaged in nonfarm work (6% of the year)
or not working (13%) while in the United States, or they were out of the country
(21%).37 This pattern also suggests an excess supply of labor, assuming that the
workers wanted more farm employment. Grower advocates contend that the pattern
is a manifestation of working in a seasonal industry. But, during the peak month in
1997, only a small majority of farmworkers (58%) held farm jobs.38
34 GAO, H-2A Agricultural Guestworker Program.
35 See also testimony of Cecilia Munoz, on behalf of the National Council of La Raza before
the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Immigration, May 12, 1999.
36 See “Note” in Table 5 for information about the survey.
37 Based upon public access data from NAWS.
38 DOL, Findings from the National Agricultural Workers Survey: 1997-1998.
CRS-12
Table 2. The Rate and Level of Unemployment
Unemployment rate
Number of unemployed
Year
hired farmworkers (in
All occupations
Hired farmworkers
thousands)
1994
6.1
12.1
109
1995
5.6
12.5
121
1996
5.4
11.5
118
1997
4.9
10.6
106
1998
4.5
11.8
117
1999
4.2
10.6
100
2000
4.0
10.6
104
2001
4.7
12.1
103
2002
5.8
11.4
102
2003
6.0
n.a.
n.a.
Source: CPS data tabulated by the BLS (column 2) and the ERS (columns 3 and 4).
Note: In the CPS, an individual’s occupation is based on the activity in which they spent the most
hours during the survey week. The ERS defines hired farmworkers as individuals age 15 or older
whose primary job is farmwork and for which they receive wages. Hired farmworkers include
individuals engaged in crop or livestock production whom growers employ directly or through
agricultural service providers (e.g., farm labor contractors), as well as farm managers, supervisors of
farmworkers, and nursery and other workers.
n.a.=not available
Time Worked
Another indicator of supply-demand conditions is the amount of time worked
(e.g., hours or days). If employers are faced with a labor shortage, they might be
expected to increase the amount of time worked by their employees.
The Seasonality of Demand: Hours Versus Employment. Recent data
reveal no discernible year-to-year variation in the average number of weekly hours
that hired farmworkers are employed in crop or livestock production. According to
the NASS Farm Labor Survey (FLS), the average workweek of hired farmworkers
has ranged narrowly around 40.0 hours since the mid-1990s. Thus, neither the trend
in employment nor in work hours imply the existence of a farm labor shortage.
There also is not much variability in demand over the course of a year based on
hours worked. In 2003, for example, the average week of hired farmworkers was
37.7 hours in mid-January, 40.1 hours in mid-April, 39.8 hours in mid-July and 40.2
hours in mid-October.
CRS-13
The instability of the demand for farm labor within a year (i.e., seasonality) is
reflected in employment levels more than in work hours per week. The FLS data
show that in 2003, for example, farmers had 729,000 workers on their payrolls in
mid-January; 781,000 in mid-April; 943,000 in mid-July; and 891,000 in mid-
October.
The Number of Days Worked. Another measure of time worked available
from the FLS is “expected days of employment” (i.e., farm operators are asked the
number of days they intend to utilize their hired farmworkers over the course of a
year). As shown in Table 3, they anticipated a low of 593,000 farmworkers on their
payrolls for at least 150 days in 1996 and a high of 679,000 (un)authorized workers
in 2002. Typically, “year-round” workers accounted for more than 70% of hired
farmworkers since the mid-1990s.39
NAWS data show that the number of days crop workers actually were employed
on farms has diminished over time. In the early 1990s, the typical foreign-born crop
worker was employed in farming for 196 days; over the mid-1990s the number of
farm workdays fell first to 186 and then to 174; and by FY1999-2000, foreign-born
crop workers averaged 161 days of employment in farming.40 Thus, the trend in days
worked — in addition to the previously discussed trends in employment and in hours
worked — appear to suggest that a nationwide farm labor shortage is not at hand.
39 These figures potentially are relevant to the one bill thus far introduced in the 108th
Congress that would link eligibility for legalization to time spent in farm work. H.R.
3142/S. 1645 would require unauthorized workers who want to apply for legal temporary
residence to prove that they had performed at least 100 days or 575 hours of farm work,
whichever is less, during any 12 consecutive months of the 18-month period ending on Aug.
31, 2003. To adjust status to legal permanent residence, these individuals would have to
have been employed on farms for at least 360 days or 2,060 hours during the 6-year period
from September 2003 through August 2009. Most of the continued employment in
agriculture is front-loaded (i.e., 240 days or 1,380 hours, whichever is less, during the 3-year
period from September 2003 through August 2006).
While some might wish to use the above-described data to roughly estimate the number
of unauthorized farmworkers who would be eligible to adjust status, they describe the
expectations of farmers and they do not distinguish between legal and illegal workers. In
addition, the data could produce an underestimate because they omit the more than 200,000
contract workers on the payrolls of agricultural service providers. Alternatively, the data
could produce an overestimate because they include employees not normally thought of as
farmworkers (e.g., bookkeepers, secretaries or pilots).
40 Calculated from data reported in DOL, Findings from the National Agricultural Workers
Survey: 1997-1998 and public access data from NAWS. Note: The dwindling number of
farm workdays over time suggests that unauthorized crop workers could find it difficult to
meet the farm employment requirement to apply for temporary resident status and then for
adjustment to permanent resident status in H.R. 1645/S. 1645.
CRS-14
Table 3. Hired Farmworkers by Expected Days of Employment
(numbers in thousands)
150 Days or more of expected employment
149 Days or less
Year
of expected
Number of hired
Percent of all hired
employment
workers
farmworkers
1994
597
71
243
1995
598
69
271
1996
593
71
239
1997
629
72
247
1998
639
73
241
1999
666
72
263
2000
640
72
251
2001
658
75
224
2002
679
77
207
2003
635
76
201
Source: Annual averages calculated by CRS from quarterly releases of the Farm Labor Survey.
Note: The NASS Farm Labor Survey counts as hired farmworkers only those persons paid directly
by farmers (i.e., contract, custom or other workers paid directly by agricultural service providers are
excluded). Hired farmworkers include field workers (i.e., those who plant, cultivate and harvest
crops), livestock workers (i.e., those who tend livestock, milk cows or care for poultry) and
supervisory workers (e.g., crew leaders or range foremen) as well as other workers on farmers’
payrolls (e.g., bookkeepers, secretaries or pilots).
Wages
Economic theory suggests that if the demand for labor is nearing or has
outstripped the supply of labor, firms will in the short-run bid up wages to compete
for workers. As a result, earnings in the short-supply field would be expected to
increase more rapidly than earnings across all industries or occupations. The ratio
of, in this instance, farm to nonfarm wages also would be expected to rise if the
former’s labor supply were especially constrained.
The average hourly earnings of field workers (excluding contract workers) rose
to a greater extent than those of other employees in the private sector between 1990
and 2003, at 58.9% and 50.9%, respectively. (See Table 4) Nonetheless, field
workers’ pay hardly increased compared to other workers’ pay: at $8.31 per hour in
2003, field workers still earn little more than 50 cents for every dollar earned by other
private sector workers.
CRS-15
Table 4. Average Hourly Earnings of Field Workers and Other
Workers in the Private Sector
(in nominal dollars)
Average hourly wages
Ratio of hourly
Average hourly
of production or
field worker
Year
wages of field
nonsupervisory
wages to private
workers
workers in the private
nonfarm worker
nonfarm sector
wages
1990
$5.23
$10.19
0.51
1991
5.49
10.50
0.52
1992
5.69
10.76
0.53
1993
5.90
11.03
0.53
1994
6.02
11.32
0.53
1995
6.13
11.64
0.53
1996
6.34
12.03
0.53
1997
6.66
12.49
0.53
1998
6.97
13.00
0.54
1999
7.19
13.47
0.53
2000
7.50
14.00
0.54
2001
7.78
14.53
0.54
2002
8.12
14.95
0.54
2003
8.31
15.38p
0.54
1990-2003
58.9%
50.9%
—
change
Source: Created by CRS from FLS (column 2) and BLS (column 3) employer survey data.
Note: Field workers are a subset of hired farmworkers who engage in planting, tending and harvesting
crops. The data relate to all field workers regardless of method of payment (i.e., those paid an hourly
rate, by the piece or a combination of the two). Contract, custom or other workers paid directly by
agricultural service providers are excluded.
NAWS data reveal a different trend in wages, which cannot be explained by the
different periods covered in Table 4 and Table 5. The survey also produces lower
wage estimates than those from the FLS. These disparities likely are related to
differences between the two surveys. Although the populations covered by the
NAWS and the FLS are similar, the NAWS’ wage figures include contract labor
while those from the FLS do not. As workers supplied to growers by farm labor
contractors generally are paid less than direct-hires, this difference could have
contributed to the lower hourly earnings of the NAWS. In addition, the NAWS
questions workers; the FLS, employers. Figures supplied by employers usually are
thought to be more accurate than those recalled by workers. And, while both surveys
are designed to reflect seasonal variations during the course of a year, they do not
cover identical reference periods.
CRS-16
Between 1990 and 2000, the average hourly earnings of crop workers rose to a
lesser extent based on the NAWS (28.7%) than on the FLS (43.4%). Crop workers’
wages, as shown in Table 5, rose to a lesser extent in the 1990-2000 period than
those of other workers in the private sector (28.7% and 37.4%, respectively) — just
the opposite of the relationship between the FLS and BLS data (43.4% and 37.4%,
respectively). As a result of the relatively lower wage estimates and the relatively
slow wage growth derived from the NAWS, the typical crop worker was estimated
to have dropped below 50 cents for every dollar paid to other private sector workers
since the late 1990s.
Table 5. Average Hourly Earnings of Crop Workers and
Other Workers in the Private Sector
(in nominal dollars)
Average hourly wages
Ratio of hourly
Average hourly
of production or
crop worker
Year
wages of crop
nonsupervisory
wages to private
workers
workers in the private
nonfarm worker
nonfarm sector
wages
1990
$5.23
$10.19
0.51
1991
5.57
10.50
0.53
1992
5.33
10.76
0.50
1993
5.46
11.03
0.50
1994
5.54
11.32
0.50
1995
5.71
11.64
0.49
1996
5.67
12.03
0.47
1997
5.89
12.49
0.47
1998
6.18
13.00
0.48
1999a
6.47
13.47
0.48
2000a
6.73
14.00
0.48
1990-2000
28.7%
37.4%
—
change
Source: Created by CRS from NAWS worker (column 2) and BLS employer survey data (column
3).
Note: Crop workers include field packers, supervisors and other field workers who engage in such
activities as planting, tending and harvesting crops. Initially, the survey included only field workers
on perishable crop farms to comply with IRCA: NAWS was developed to enable the DOL to calculate
changes in the supply of SAS labor, which was then used in the shortage calculation conducted by the
U.S. Departments of Labor and Agriculture for triggering the RAW program. In the mid-1990s, the
survey was expanded to include field workers in non-perishable crops (e.g., silage or other crops
intended solely for animal fodder). The data relate to the farm earnings of field workers age 14 or
older, regardless of method of payment (i.e., those paid an hourly rate, by the piece or a combination
of the two). The sample includes direct-hires and contract labor. The survey is conducted at different
times over the course of a year to capture seasonal variations.
a. Only fiscal year data for 1999 and 2000 are available from the NAWS public access data shown
in column 2. All other data in the table are on a calendar year basis.
CRS-17
Conclusion
In summary, indicators of supply-demand conditions generally are inconsistent
with the existence of a nationwide shortage of domestically available farmworkers
in part because the measures include both authorized and unauthorized employment.
This finding does not preclude the possibility of farmworker shortages in certain
parts of the country at various times during the year. The analysis does not address
the adequacy of authorized workers in the seasonal farm labor supply relative to
grower demand.
Whether there would be an adequate supply of authorized U.S. farmworkers if
new technologies were developed or different labor-management practices were
implemented continues to be an unanswered question. Whether more U.S. workers
would be willing to become farmworkers if wages were raised and whether the size
of the increase would make the industry uncompetitive in the world marketplace also
remain open issues. These matters remain unresolved because perishable crop
growers have rarely, if ever, had to operate without unauthorized aliens being present
in the domestic farm workforce.41
41 In the conference report for the Labor Department’s FY2000 appropriation (H.Rept. 106-
479), the Congress charged the DOL with reporting on ways to promote a legal domestic
workforce in the agricultural sector and on options for such things as improving farmworker
compensation, developing a more stable farm workforce, and enhancing farmworkers’ living
conditions. The report (U.S. Department of Labor Report to Congress: The Agricultural
Labor Market — Status and Recommendations), issued in December 2000, recommends that
the federal minimum wage be raised, agency funding for labor law enforcement increased,
congressional appropriations for AgWork (i.e., an internet-based, on-line job matching
system specifically for agricultural employees and employers) continued, growers’ greater
use of automated employee verification systems encouraged, H-2A program streamlining
further pursued while maintaining protections for U.S. and foreign farmworkers and
discussions held with countries from which farmworkers come to “explore ways in which
their legal rights can be better protected.” The Department concluded that IRCA’s farm
legalization program failed to turn an unauthorized into an authorized workforce. It asserted
that congressional proposals to ease growers’ access to temporary farmworkers outside the
existing H-2A program “would not create a legal domestic agricultural workforce” and
instead “would lower wages and working and living conditions in agricultural jobs resulting
in fewer domestic workers continuing employment in agriculture and perpetuating the
industry’s dependence on a foreign labor force.” The DOL pointed out that another
approach to creating an authorized supply of crop workers has never been tried —
increasing wages and improving working conditions “by normalizing legal protections for
farm workers and increasing mechanization,” which has the potential to attract more U.S.
workers to agriculture and raise the productivity of a possibly smaller farm labor force. In
recognition that there might be short-run increases in farm labor costs were its
recommendations implemented, the Department urged the Congress to consider ways to
temporarily assist crop growers.