Order Code RS21695
December 22, 2003
CRS Report for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
The Islamic Traditions of
Wahhabism and Salafiyya
Febe Armanios
Analyst in Middle East Religions and Cultures
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Summary
The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and subsequent investigations of these
attacks have called attention to Islamic puritanical movements known as Wahhabism
and Salafiyya. The Al Qaeda terrorist organization and its leader Osama bin Laden have
advocated a message of violence that some suggest is an extremist interpretation of this
line of puritanical Islam. There are those who blame these extremists for corrupting the
Islamic religion in general and Wahhabism in particular. Others have accused Saudi
Arabia, the center of Wahhabism, of having disseminated a religion that promotes hatred
and violence, targeting the United States and its allies. Saudi officials strenuously deny
these allegations. This report provides a background on Wahhabi Islam and its
association to militant fundamentalist groups; it will also summarize recent charges
against Wahhabism and responses. It will be updated periodically. Related CRS
products include CRS Issue Brief IB93113, CRS Report RS21432, CRS Report
RS21529, CRS Report RS21654, and CRS Report RL31718.
Background on Wahhabism
Definitions. “Wahhabism” is a term with varied connotations, but it generally
refers to a movement that seeks to purify the Islamic religion1 of any innovations or
practices that deviate from the seventh-century teachings of the Prophet Muhammad and
his companions. In the West, the term has been used mostly to denote the form of Islam
practiced in Saudi Arabia and which has spread recently to various parts of the world. In
most Muslim nations, however, believers who adhere to this creed prefer to call
themselves “Unitarians” (muwahiddun) or “Salafiyyun” (sing. Salafi, noun Salafiyya).
The latter term derives from the word salaf meaning to “follow” or “precede,” a reference
to the followers and companions of the Prophet. In general, Muslims view the Western
usage of the term “Wahhabism” as carrying negative and derogatory connotations. While
this paper explains differences in these terms, it will refer to Wahhabism in association
with Saudi Arabia and to Salafiyya as a more general puritanical Islamic movement.
1 For more on the Islamic religion, see CRS Report RS21432, Islam: A Primer, by Clyde Mark.
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

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History of Wahhabism. In Islam, there are four schools of legal theory, and
Wahhabism is considered to be an offshoot of the most conservative of these schools, the
Hanbali school of law that developed in the ninth century. Wahhabism is a puritanical
form of Sunni Islam,2 and it is the doctrine practiced in Saudi Arabia and in Qatar,
although it is much less rigidly enforced in the latter. The word “Wahhabi” is derived
from the name of a Muslim scholar, Muhammad bin Abd al-Wahhab (1703-1791). This
scholar had been frustrated by the moral decline of his society and came to denounce
many popular beliefs and practices as idolatrous. Ultimately, he encouraged a “return”
to the pure and orthodox practice of the “fundamentals” of Islam, as embodied in the
Quran and in the life of the Prophet Muhammad. In the eighteenth century, Muhammad
bin Saud, founder of the modern-day Saudi dynasty, partnered with Abd al-Wahhab to
begin the process of unifying disparate tribes in the Arabian Peninsula. Since the
foundation of modern Saudi Arabia in 1932, there has been a close relationship between
the Saudi ruling family and the Wahhabi religious establishment.3
Wahhabism in Saudi Arabia Today. With the establishment of the Kingdom
of Saudi Arabia, Wahhabism gained new ground as it expanded beyond a theological
doctrine and was used as the official basis for determining laws and conduct in Saudi
society. In day-to-day life, this has translated into practices such as the segregation of the
sexes, the absolute prohibition of the sale and consumption of alcohol, a ban on women
driving, and numerous other social restrictions. This Islamic interpretation also has
shaped the Saudi educational structure and in general Saudi schoolbooks denounce any
teachings that do not conform to Wahhabist beliefs.4 The puritanical and iconoclastic
philosophies reflected in this sect historically have resulted in conflict with other Muslim
groups. Wahhabism is against most popular religious practices such as saint veneration,
the celebration of the Prophet’s birthday, and practices associated with the mystical
teachings of Sufism. Moreover, according to the State Department’s 2002 International
Religious Freedom Report on Saudi Arabia,5 “members of the Shi‘a [Muslim] minority
are the subjects of officially sanctioned political and economic discrimination.”
Wahhabism also has been accused of promoting intolerance of Christianity and Judaism.6
2 Sunni Muslims believe that the political leadership of the Muslim community should come from
the most qualified individuals and not necessarily through lineage from the Prophet Muhammad,
which is what Shiite Muslims believe.
3 The Wahhabism practiced in Saudi Arabia today is a combination of the teachings of its founder
Abd al-Wahhab and other religious and cultural traditions. Eleanor Abdella Doumato, “Manning
the Barricades: Islam according to Saudi Arabia’s School Texts,” The Middle East Journal 57,
iss. 2(2003):230-248.
4 Michaela Prokop, “Saudi Arabia: The Politics of Education,” International Affairs 79, no. 1
(London, 2003):77-89.
5 Department of State, “Saudi Arabia: International Religious Freedom Report 2003,”
[http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2003/24461.htm] indicates that approximately two million
Shi‘ites are citizens of Saudi Arabia.
6 The United States Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF) “Report on Saudi
Arabia” (May 2003) cites that anti-Semitic and anti-Western sentiment “remains prevalent in the
(continued...)

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Political and Religious Factors
What Is Salafiyya? As noted above, among adherents in general, preference is
given to the term “Salafiyya” over “Wahhabism.” These terms have distinct historical
roots, but they have been used interchangeably in recent years. Wahhabism is considered
by some as the Saudi form of Salafiyya. Modern Salafi beliefs have their roots in a
reform-oriented movement from the early twentieth century, which progressively grew
more conservative. In line with puritanical Islamic teachings, Salafis believe that the
ultimate religious authority is located directly in the Quran and in the Prophet’s practices,
and not in commentaries which interpret these sources.7 Salafis also maintain that they
are “the only [Muslim] group that will be saved on Judgment Day.”8 The Salafiyya is not
a unified movement and there exists no single Salafi “sect.” However, the Salafi
interpretation appeals to a large number of Muslims worldwide — in Africa, Asia, North
America, and throughout the Middle East.
The Use of Violence. The use of violent jihad9 is not inherently associated with
puritanical Islamic beliefs. Among certain puritanical Muslims — be they self-ascribed
Salafis or Wahhabis — advocacy of jihad is a relatively recent phenomenon and is a
highly disputed matter within these groups. Some scholars date the ascendancy of
militancy among Salafis to the 1980s war of resistance against the Soviet occupation of
Afghanistan. The war against the Soviets gained wide support throughout the Muslim
world and mobilized numerous volunteer fighters. Radical beliefs spread rapidly through
select groups of mosques and madrasas (Islamic religious schools),10 located on the
Afghanistan-Pakistan border, which were funded primarily by Saudi Arabia and at times
by the United States and Europe. Following the war and the rise of the puritanically-
oriented Taliban, Jihadist Salafis denounced leaders of countries such as Saudi Arabia and
Egypt as “apostates” and as vehicles for facilitating Western imperialism. Jihadist Salafi
groups such as Al Qaeda now advocate the overthrow of the Saudi government and other
regimes and the establishment of states that would sustain the puritanical Islamic doctrine
enforced under a strict application of shari‘a or Islamic law.
Osama bin Laden and the Al Qaeda Terrorist Network. The Al Qaeda
terrorist organization arose in the early 1990s, directly out of the radical Salafi Jihadist
tradition. As analysts have noted, the ideology of Al Qaeda’s leader, Osama bin Laden,
6 (...continued)
[Saudi] government-controlled media.”
7 Ahmad Dallal, “Appropriating the Past: Twentieth-Century Reconstruction of Pre-Modern
Islamic Thought,” Islamic Law and Society 7, no. 1(Leiden, 2000): 347.
8 Quintan Wiktorowicz, “The New Global Threat: Transnational Salafis and Jihad,” Middle East
Policy
8, no. 4(2001): 20.
9 Jihad literally means “striving” or “struggle.” It has also been used to refer to a “holy war,”
although this term does not appear in the Quran. A “greater jihad” implies the spiritual struggle
that each Muslim must wage within himself or herself in order to become a better individual. The
“lesser jihad” is the one in which a Muslim spreads his/her faith through persuasion and social
justice, but it has also been commonly used to refer to war against an aggressor.
10 See Islamic Religious Schools, or Madrasas: Background, CRS Report RS21654, by Febe
Armanios.

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is intended to polarize the Islamic world into two clearly delineated factions: between the
umma (Islamic community) and those regimes which are closely allied with the United
States and the West.11 Recent attacks inside Saudi Arabia, in particular, have aimed to
undermine the Saudi ruling family, to expose its “misguided” or insufficient dedication
to Wahhabism, and to jeopardize its protectorship of Mecca and Medina, Islam’s holiest
cities. Since the 1990s, Al Qaeda has called for a war against the United States, alleging
that “U.S. crimes against Islam” were part of a “Zionist-Crusader” plot intended to
annihilate Muslims.12 Al Qaeda has preached that while Islam may prohibit the killing
of civilians, the Quran justifies “reciprocal attacks” against an enemy that, Al Qaeda
claims, has purposely attacked Muslim civilians, particularly in the context of the
Palestinian struggle.13 Many Islamic scholars, including some Wahhabi leaders, have
condemned the September 11 attacks against civilians as having no roots in the Islamic
religion and view bin Laden as a hijacker and a usurper of their religion.14 Bush
Administration officials have echoed this sentiment, noting that the United States has “an
interest in the voices of the moderates, the people who do not want their religion stolen
away from them by extremists like Osama bin Laden.”15
Although the majority of Salafi adherents do not advocate the violence enshrined in
bin Laden’s message, this ideology has attracted a number of followers throughout the
Muslim world. Analysts note that some receptive groups are drawn to the anti-Western
message preached by bin Laden and his organization, despite the fact that these groups
may hold different religious beliefs. Some experts caution against “homogenizing” these
groups and organizations into a monolithic entity. One warns that the neglect of these
groups’ historical roots and the consolidation of “varying motivations, ideologies and
objectives of regional terrorist groups”16 undermines the overall understanding of
terrorism, particularly in regions such as Southeast Asia and North Africa.
“Reformist” Salafi Trends. It is worth noting that there are Salafis and
Wahhabis who believe that violence should be a last resort and, if used, should be the
final stage in a long process of personal transformation, purification, and self-discipline
in which each Muslim should engage and which ultimately will lead to the establishment
of a pure Islamic state. These “reformists” oppose violence on the basis of the Prophet
Muhammad’s own practices; however, their rejection of violence is not absolute and is
debated in the face of defending perceived threats against the Islamic religion.
11 Michael Scott Doran, “Somebody Else’s Civil War,” Foreign Affairs (Jan./Feb. 2002): 23.
12 John Kaltner and Quintan Wiktorowicz, “Killing in the Name of Islam: Al Qaeda’s
Justification for September 11,” Middle East Policy 10, no. 2(2003): 85.
13 Ibid., pp. 86-87.
14 Nora Boustany, “Bin Laden Now a Target in Arab Media; Criticism Emerges as Scholars
Emphasize Distance from ‘Distortion of Religion,’” The Washington Post, Nov. 23, 2001. See
also Tamara Albertini, “The Seductiveness of Certainty: The Destruction of Islam’s Intellectual
Legacy by the Fundamentalists,” Philosophy East and West 53, no. 4(2003): 456.
15 “Defense Undersecretary Feith Holds News Briefing,” the Heritage Foundation, Nov. 24, 2003.
16 Carlyle A. Thayer, “No, Al Qaeda Isn’t Everywhere,” Far Eastern Economic Review, Aug. 21,
2003.

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Recent Allegations against Wahhabism and Responses
There have been two major allegations against Wahhabism and against the Saudi
Arabian government, which is viewed as its principal proponent:
“Wahhabism Spreads Terrorism”? It is widely acknowledged that the Saudi
government, as well as wealthy Saudi individuals, have supported the spread of the
Wahhabist form of Islam in several Muslim countries and in the West. Some have argued
that this proselyting has promoted terrorism and has spawned Islamic militancy
throughout the world.17 Saudi funding of mosques, madrasas, and charities, some of
which have been linked to terrorist groups such as Al Qaeda, has raised concern that
Wahhabi Islam has been used by militants who tailor this ideology to suit their political
goals and who rely on Saudi donations to support their aspirations. One argument
maintains that spreading Wahhabism was used to placate the most radical and
conservative religious groups which threatened the Saudi ruling family.18 Others maintain
that Islam, like other religions, “possesses holy texts that can be invoked to support [peace
or violence], depending on the circumstances.”19
“Wahhabism Spreads Intolerance”? Some reports suggest that teachings
within Saudi domestic schools may foster intolerance of other religions and cultures. A
2002 study by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) indicates that
“some Saudi textbooks taught Islamic tolerance while others viciously condemned Jews
and Christians...[and] use rhetoric that was little more than hate literature.”20 There are
those who have also argued that the global spread of Wahhabist teachings threatens the
existence of more moderate Islamic beliefs and practices in other parts of the world.21
Saudi Arabia’s Response to these Allegations. The Saudi government has
strenuously denied the above allegations. With regard to charges of terrorism, senior
Saudi government and religious officials have issued statements insisting there is no
association between the Islamic religion and terrorism.22 In response to allegations of
teaching intolerance, the Saudi government has embarked in recent months on a campaign
of educational reforms, although the outcome of these reforms remains to be seen. Many
17 In the controversial work of journalist Stephen Schwartz, The Two Faces of Islam (New York:
Doubleday, 2002), the author writes that “Wahhabism exalts and promotes death in every element
of its existence: the suicide of its adherents, mass murder as a weapon against civilization, and
above all the suffocation of the mercy embodied in Islam,” p. 180.
18 Dave Montgomery, “Radical Re-Education,” The Fort-Worth Star-Telegram, Dec. 3, 2003.
19 Peter David, “In the Name of Islam,” The Economist, Sept. 13, 2003.
20 “Saudi Arabia: Opposition, Islamic Extremism, and Terrorism,” Report by the Center for
Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Nov. 27, 2002, p. 18.
21 The U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom has proposed that Congress support
a study by the General Accounting Office (GAO) that would examine the “Saudi exportation of
intolerance” to foreign countries and the United States. Hearing, “Is Saudi Arabia A Strategic
Threat: The Global Propagation of Intolerance,” Nov. 18, 2003.
22 “Saudi Arabia’s Highest Religious Authority Warns Against the Dangers of Extremism,” Press
release, Aug. 21, 2003, Saudi Arabia Embassy website:
[http://saudiembassy.net/ReportLink/Report_Extremism_Oct03.pdf].

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Saudi leaders have asserted publicly that their religion is one of “peace and tolerance”23
and have denied allegations that their government exports religious or cultural intolerance.
A recent Saudi Embassy press release notes that “We do not fund the so-called radical
madrassas that people accuse us of funding, because that goes against our policy.”24
Current U.S. Policy and Legislation
In light of allegations against Wahhabism, some critics have called for a reevaluation
of the relationship between the United States and Saudi Arabia,25 although others maintain
that U.S. economic and security interests require continued and close ties with the Saudis.
In November 2003, Secretary of State Colin Powell noted that the Bush Administration
has “encouraged our Saudi friends to do more with respect to terrorist activity, at least
within the Kingdom, and they are.”26 President Bush has made a number of statements
that praise the Islamic religion as a whole and denounce those groups that have “hijacked
a great religion.”27
Wahhabism has been a focus of congressional hearings, which have examined the
relationship between this religious belief and terrorist financing, as well as its alleged ties
to the spread of intolerance. In November 2003, the “Saudi Arabia Accountability Act
of 2003” was introduced as S. 1888 and H.R. 3643. The bill lists charges against Saudi
Arabia and states that “many Saudi-funded religious institutions and the literature they
distribute teach a message of hate and intolerance that provides an ideological basis for
anti-Western terrorism.” Among other provisions, it calls for the end of Saudi government
funding to all institutions that incite or encourage global terrorism. H.R. 3137, introduced
in September 2003, lists several specific charges against Saudi Arabia and calls the
country “the center of Wahabbism, the ultra-purist, jihadist form of Islam followed by
members of Al Qaeda.” The bill calls for a ban of direct aid to Saudi Arabia along with
five other countries. Saudi Arabia receives $25,000 in annual U.S. aid under the
International Military Education and Training (IMET) program. H.Con.Res. 244
concludes that “the Government of Saudi Arabia forcefully limits the public practice or
expression of religion to the Wahhabi interpretation of Islam” and calls upon the Saudi
government to safeguard the freedom of non-Muslims and of non-Wahhabi Muslims.
These bills have been referred to committees of jurisdiction.
23 “Saudi King and Crown Prince Address Muslims,” Press release, Feb. 13, 2003, ibid.
24 “Statement by Adel al-Jubeir, Foreign Affairs Advisor to the Crown Prince,” Press release,
Nov. 14, 2003, Saudi Arabia Embassy website:
[http://www.saudiembassy.net/press_release/releases/03-PR-1114-terrorism.htm].
25 David Van Biema, “Wahhabism: Toxic Faith?” Time, Sept. 15, 2003; David E. Kaplan, et al.,
“The Saudi Connection,” U.S. News and World Report, Dec. 15, 2003.
26 “Interview by Abdul Rahman Al-Rashed of Asharq Al-Awsat,” Nov. 5, 2003, U.S. Department
of State website: [http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2003/26028.htm].
27 “Remarks by President George W. Bush on U.S. Humanitarian Aid to Afghanistan,” Oct. 11,
2002, White House website: [http://www.whitehouse.gov/infocus/ramadan/islam.html].