Order Code RL32157
CRS Report for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
Mutual Fund Reform Bills:
A Side-by-Side Comparison
Updated December 9, 2003
Mark Jickling
Specialist in Public Finance
Government and Finance Division
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

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Mutual Fund Reform Bills:
A Side-by-Side Comparison
Summary
The current mutual fund scandal began in September 2003, when New York
Attorney General Eliot Spitzer brought charges against a few mutual funds, brokers,
and hedge funds. Since then, the New York investigation has widened, and the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has intensified its scrutiny of mutual
funds. A number of illegal or unethical practices are under investigation: the
common theme is that fund managers and insiders have permitted favored customers,
including hedge funds, to engage in highly profitable short-term trading strategies
that reduce the investment returns of millions of long-term investors. The number of
firms and individuals charged to date is fairly small, but growing. The SEC has
reported (in testimony before the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee on
November 3, 2003) that preliminary investigations indicate that trading practices that
appear to be abusive (but not in all cases illegal) are widespread in the industry.
The congressional response to the mutual fund investigations has included
several hearings and bills. Legislative proposals include H.R. 2420 (Representative
Baker), which passed the House on November 19, 2003; S. 1822 (Senator Akaka),
introduced November 5, 2003; S. 1958 (Senators Kerry and Kennedy), introduced
November 25, 2003; and S. 1971 (Senators Dodd and Corzine), also introduced on
November 25, 2003.
All four bills would require mutual funds to provide more information to
investors about the fees they charge and about the funds’ financial relationships with
stockbrokers and investment advisers. The bills would also require that funds’
governing boards contain majorities of independent directors with no financial or
family ties to fund management. S. 1958 would create a new mutual fund regulator
to carry out registration, inspections, and disciplinary proceedings, and to make rules
promoting mutual fund ethics and independence.
This report compares the provisions of these legislative proposals. It will be
updated as the bills are amended, or as new bills are introduced.

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Contents
Table 1. Side-by-Side Comparison of Mutual Fund Reform
Legislation in the 108th Congress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
New Regulatory Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Disclosure of Mutual Fund Fees and Costs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Soft Dollar, Revenue Sharing, and Directed Brokerage
Arrangements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Mutual Fund Governance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Restrictions on Late Trading, Market Timing, and Other
Forms of Trading . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Other Provisions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Studies and Reports Called For . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

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Mutual Fund Reform Bills:
A Side-by-Side Comparison
The mutual fund scandal began in September 2003, when New York Attorney
General Eliot Spitzer brought civil and criminal charges against a few mutual funds,
brokers, and hedge funds. Since then, the New York investigation has widened, and
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has intensified its scrutiny of mutual
funds. Several illegal or unethical practices are under investigation: the common
theme is that fund managers and insiders have permitted favored customers,
including hedge funds, to engage in highly profitable short-term trading strategies
that reduce the investment returns of millions of long-term investors. The number of
firms and individuals charged to date is fairly small, but growing. The SEC reported
(in testimony before the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee on November 3,
2003) that preliminary investigations indicate that trading practices that appear to be
abusive (but not in all cases illegal) are fairly widespread in the industry.
Congressional response to the mutual fund investigations has taken the forms
of hearings and proposed legislation. On November 19, 2003, the House passed a
mutual fund reform bill, H.R. 2420, by a vote of 418-2. In the Senate, three bills
have been introduced – S. 1822, S. 1958, and S. 1971 – but none has yet seen
committee action.
All the bills would require mutual funds to make more extensive disclosure of
the fees and charges that investors pay. Financial relationships among mutual funds,
brokers, and investment advisers would also have to be disclosed. Under three of the
bills, brokers selling mutual funds would have to disclose how their compensation
was structured, including any incentives for selling particular funds.
The proposals would all require mutual funds’ boards of directors to contain
majorities of independent directors – those not affiliated with the funds or its
advisers. The bills also include various provisions to enhance the oversight role of
the board, in matters such as auditing, nomination of directors, and supervision of
ethical and legal compliance.
S.1958 would establish an independent regulator for mutual funds, to operate
under the oversight of the SEC.
Finally, the proposals call for a number of reports or studies on subjects
including the creation of an independent regulator for mutual funds, the SEC’s
enforcement record, “soft dollar” arrangements (financial links among brokers,
advisers, and funds), transaction costs, arbitration in mutual fund disputes, fund
advertising, and the financial literacy of mutual fund investors.

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CRS-2
Table 1. Side-by-Side Comparison of Mutual Fund Reform Legislation in the 108th Congress
Provision
H.R. 2420
S. 1822
S. 1958
S. 1971
Short Title
Mutual Funds Integrity
Mutual Fund Transparency
Mutual Fund Investor
Mutual Fund Investor
and Fee Transparency Act
Act of 2003
Protection Act of 2003
Confidence Restoration
of 2003
Act of 2003
New Regulatory Structure.
New mutual fund
No provision.
SEC shall study and report
Establishes a Mutual Fund
GAO is directed to study
regulator
to Congress on the creation
Oversight Board to
the feasibility and benefits
of an entity with inspection
register mutual funds and
(if any) to shareholders of
and enforcement authority
establish ethical, quality
establishing a Mutual Fund
over mutual fund boards of
control, internal auditing,
Oversight Board with
directors, funded by
independence, and other
inspection, examination,
assessments on mutual
standards. The Board will
and enforcement authority
funds, and appointed by the
conduct inspections and
over mutual fund boards of
SEC. (Sec. 3(e))
investigations of mutual
directors. (Sec. 401)
funds, and may impose a
range of sanctions,
including civil fines. The
Board will have five
members, appointed by
the SEC to five year
terms. The SEC will have
oversight authority,
including the right of prior
approval (or modification)
of all the Board’s rules.
The Board’s budget (to be
subject to SEC approval)
will be funded by an
annual assessment upon
registered mutual funds.

(Title II)

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CRS-3
Provision
H.R. 2420
S. 1822
S. 1958
S. 1971
Disclosure of Mutual Fund Fees and Costs.
Improved
Directs the SEC to require
Brokers selling mutual
Directs the SEC to revise
Directs SEC to require
disclosure of
periodic disclosure of:
funds would be required to
its regulations to require
disclosure of:
mutual fund fees
(1) the estimated amount,
disclose to their customers
disclosure of:
(1) the actual dollar
and costs
in dollars per $1000
the amount of
(1) the estimated dollar
amount borne by each
invested, of operating
compensation to be
amount of the fund’s
shareholder of the fund’s
expenses borne by
received by the broker.
operating expenses borne
expenses;
shareholders; (2) how the
Such disclosure must be
by each shareholder (and
(2) the structure and total
fund pays investment
made before the sale is
the amount per $1000
amount of compensation
advisers, and those
final. (Sec. 2(a))
invested);
paid to investment
advisers’ investments in
(2) how the fund pays
advisers, and advisers’
the fund; (3) the rate at
Funds would be required to
investment advisers, and
investments in the fund;
which the fund turns over
include the cost of
those advisers’ holdings
(3) the dollar amounts of
its portfolio; (4) how the
brokerage commissions in
in the fund;
all payments made by the
fund pays commissions to
any disclosure of fees and
(3) the rate at which the
fund, set out so as to permit
brokers who provide
expenses that may be
fund turns over its
comparison among funds;
investment advice or
payable by shareholders.
portfolio;
(4) how the fund pays
research or who facilitate
(Sec. 2(b))
(4) commission payments
commissions to brokers
the sale of the fund’s
to brokers who provide
who provide investment
shares; (5) payments to
SEC shall by rule require
investment advice or
advice or research or who
any other person who
funds to disclose how they
research or who facilitate
facilitate the sale of the
facilitates the sale of the
compensate portfolio
the sale of the fund’s
fund’s shares;
fund’s shares; and (6)
managers, and the
shares;
(5) payments to any other
information on discounts
ownership of fund shares
(5) payments to any other
person who facilitates the
in front-end fees for
by such investment
persons who facilitate the
sale of the fund’s shares;
which investors may be
advisers and their
sale of the fund’s shares;
and
eligible, including the
employees. (Sec. 4)
and (6) information on
(6) information on
minimum required
discounts in front-end fees
discounts in front-end
purchase amounts
for which investors may
fees for which investors
(breakpoints).
be eligible, including the
may be eligible,
(Sec. 101)
minimum required
including the minimum
purchase amounts
(“breakpoints”).
required purchase
amounts (breakpoints).
(Sec. 101)
(Sec. 101)

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CRS-4
Provision
H.R. 2420
S. 1822
S. 1958
S. 1971
Mandatory
SEC shall require that
No provision.
Fee disclosure must be
No provision.
inclusions in fee
quarterly statements
included in each statement
disclosures
disclose that investors
of account, and fee
have been charged fees,
information must be
and where additional
displayed in close
information on fees may
proximity to the value of
be found.
the investor’s shares.
(Sec. 101)
(Sec 101)
Disclosure of fees
SEC shall by rule require
Brokers selling mutual
No provision.
Brokers would be required
and compensation
disclosure by brokers of
funds would be required to
to disclose in writing to
in mutual fund
the amount and source of
disclose to their customers
their customers the amount
sales
sales fees and charges,
the amount of
and nature of compensation
incentives, commissions,
compensation to be
they receive for selling
any other expenses
received by the broker.
mutual funds, and any
incurred in the sale of
(Sec. 2(a))
conflicts of interest that
mutual funds or municipal
arise from such
securities, as well as
compensation.
related conflicts of
(Sec. 104)
interest between the
broker and the customer.
(Sec. 110)
Reduction of
SEC shall consider ways
No provision.
SEC shall consider ways
No provision.
disclosure burden
of reducing costs
of reducing costs
on small funds
associated with disclosure
associated with disclosure
to small funds, consistent
to small funds, consistent
with public interest.
with public interest.
(Sec. 101)
(Sec. 101)
Definition of no-
SEC directed to make
No provision.
No provision.
SEC directed to make rules
load fund
rules defining “no-load”
defining “no-load” mutual
mutual funds and
funds and requiring
requiring disclosure to
disclosure to prevent
prevent investors from
investors from being
being misled by the use of
misled by the use of such
such terminology.
terminology.
(Sec. 106)
(Sec. 103)

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CRS-5
Provision
H.R. 2420
S. 1822
S. 1958
S. 1971
Soft Dollar, Revenue Sharing, and Directed Brokerage Arrangements.
Disclosure of soft
Investment advisers to
Soft dollar payments would
Certain soft dollar
Investment advisers to
dollar, revenue
mutual funds must report
be included in the
payments would be
registered mutual funds
sharing, and
annually to the fund’s
aggregate brokerage
included in the aggregate
would be required to report
directed brokerage
board on (1) payments
commission disclosure
operating expenses
annually to the fund’s
arrangements
made to promote sale of
required by Sec. 2(b).
disclosures mandated by
board regarding all
the fund’s shares
Sec. 101.
payments received and
(“revenue sharing”), (2)
services provided
services or payments to
(including research). A
the fund by a broker in
summary of these reports
exchange for brokerage
would be included in the
business (“directed
fund’s annual report to
brokerage”), and (3)
shareholders.
research services obtained
(Sec. 102)
by the adviser from a
broker in exchange for
securities transactions
(“soft dollar
arrangements”). A
summary of this annual
report must be included in
the annual report to
shareholders. (Sec. 102)
Fiduciary duty of
Directors shall have a
No provision.
SEC shall issue
No provision.
mutual fund
fiduciary duty to review
regulations establishing a
directors regarding
such arrangements to
fiduciary duty for
soft dollar, revenue
ensure that they comply
directors to demonstrate
sharing, and
with law and regulation
that all management,
directed brokerage
and are in the best
marketing, and investment
arrangements
interests of fund
advisory fees paid by the
shareholders.
fund are reasonable and in
(Sec. 102)
the best interests of fund
shareholders.
(Sec. 101(g))

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CRS-6
Provision
H.R. 2420
S. 1822
S. 1958
S. 1971
Record keeping
SEC shall by rule require
No provision.
No provision.
No provision.
requirements
that all such arrangements
regarding soft
involving research service
dollar, revenue
be documented by written
sharing, and
contracts that describe the
directed brokerage
nature and value of
arrangements
services provided.
(Sec. 102)
Mutual Fund Governance.
Independent
At least 2/3 of a mutual
At least 75% of a mutual
At least 75% of a mutual
At least 75% of a mutual
directors
fund’s directors must be
fund’s directors must be
fund’s directors must be
fund’s directors must be
independent (versus 40%
independent.
independent. The
independent. The
under current law).
chairman of the board
chairman of the board must
(Sec. 103(a))
Interested persons who
must be independent.
be independent.
serve as board members or
(Sec. 101(e))
(Sec. 201)
chairmen must be approved
by shareholder vote at least
every five years.
(Sec. 3(a))
Prohibition on
No provision.
No action taken by the
No provision.
No provision.
actions requiring
board may require the vote
the vote of non-
of a non-independent
independent
director.
directors
(Sec. 3(b))
Nomination of
No provision.
A committee made up
No provision.
A committee made up
directors
entirely of independent
entirely of independent
directors shall select
directors shall select
persons to be nominated to
persons to be nominated to
the board and adopt
the board and adopt
qualification standards for
qualification standards for
directors.
directors.
(Sec. 3)
(Sec. 201)

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CRS-7
Provision
H.R. 2420
S. 1822
S. 1958
S. 1971
Definition of
A member of a class of
Includes any person with a
A member of a class of
Includes any person with a
“interested person”
persons whom the SEC by
material business or family
persons whom the SEC by
material business or family
(i.e., not
rule deems to be unlikely
relationship with, or who
rule deems to be unlikely
relationship with, or who
independent)
to exercise an appropriate
was employed by a fund’s
to exercise an appropriate
was employed by a fund’s
degree of independence
investment adviser,
degree of independence
investment adviser,
because of a business,
underwriter, or who served
because of a business,
underwriter, or who served
professional, or family
as an officer or director of
professional, or family
as an officer or director of
relationship with fund
a “significant service
relationship with fund
a “significant service
management or
provider” (to be defined by
management or
provider” (to be defined by
investment advisers.
the SEC) within the last 10
investment advisers.
the SEC) within the last 10
(Sec. 103(b))
years. (If one was merely
(Sec. 101(f))
years. (If one was merely
employed by the
employed by the
significant service
significant service
provider, the term of
provider, the term of
restriction is five years.)
restriction is five years.)
(Sec. 3)
(Sec. 201)
Audit committee
A mutual fund’s board
No provision.
No provision.
Audit committees would
composition and
shall include an audit
consist entirely of
responsibilities
committee, made up
independent directors, and
entirely of independent
would be responsible for
directors, which shall be
hiring, compensating, and
responsible for selection,
overseeing outside
compensation, and
auditors. The audit
oversight of the fund’s
committee will also
independent auditor, and
establish procedures for
for procedures for
receiving and encouraging
monitoring complaints
complaints about auditing
from investors and fund
and accounting matters.
employees regarding
(Sec. 202)
questionable accounting
and auditing practices.
(Sec. 104)
Financial expert
No provision.
No provision.
No provision.
Each mutual fund board
shall include a financial
expert, to be defined by the
SEC. (Sec. 201)

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CRS-8
Provision
H.R. 2420
S. 1822
S. 1958
S. 1971
Exemption from
SEC may exempt mutual
No provision.
No provision.
No provision.
in-person meeting
fund directors from the
requirements
requirement that they be
physically present to cast
a vote, if their presence is
impractical, and if this
exemption is consistent
with the public interest.
(Sec. 108)
Notice of
If an SEC inspection
No provision.
No provision.
Significant deficiencies in
regulatory
discovers deficiencies in a
a fund or its advisers and
deficiencies
fund’s operations, fund
underwriters found by SEC
management must inform
inspectors must be
the board of directors.
disclosed to the fund’s
(Sec. 107)
board. The 10 most
common deficiencies in
mutual funds would be
made public annually by
the SEC.
(Sec. 203)
Insider transactions
Short-term transactions in
No provision.
No provision.
Share purchases by senior
in fund shares
fund shares by insiders,
executive officers of
advisers, or underwriters
mutual funds must be
prohibited. (Sec. 203)
disclosed and shares must
be held at least six months.
(Sec. 307)

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CRS-9
Provision
H.R. 2420
S. 1822
S. 1958
S. 1971
Certification of
Independent directors
No provision.
No provision.
Board chairman would be
financial
shall certify in disclosure
required to certify the
statements
documents that
accuracy of disclosure
procedures are in place to
documents, and that
oversee the setting of net
procedures were in place to
asset values, the flow of
oversee the setting of net
funds in and out of the
asset values, the flow of
mutual fund, the provision
funds in and out of the
of discounts to eligible
mutual fund, the provision
investors, that different
of discounts to eligible
classes of mutual fund
investors, that different
shares are appropriate for
classes of mutual fund
investors, disclosure of
shares are appropriate for
the fund’s portfolio,
investors, disclosure of the
compensation of portfolio
fund’s portfolio,
managers, and the fund’s
compensation of portfolio
code of ethics and
managers, and that the fund
antifraud policies.
has established and
enforces a code of ethics.
(Sec. 201)
(Sec. 204)
Ethics compliance
Requires funds and
No provision.
Directs the SEC to require
Requires funds and
investment advisers to
funds to appoint a
investment advisers to
adopt a code of ethics and
compliance officer, who
adopt a code of ethics and
policies and procedures to
will report only to
policies and procedures to
prevent violations of law
independent directors.
prevent violations of law
and SEC regulations, to
(Sec. 101(j))
and SEC regulations, to
review those policies
review those policies
annually, and to appoint a
annually, and to appoint a
compliance officer.
compliance officer, who
Independent directors
would certify that
shall certify that such
appropriate internal
procedures and policies
controls existed..
are in force.
(Sec. 301)
(Sec. 201)

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CRS-10
Provision
H.R. 2420
S. 1822
S. 1958
S. 1971
Restrictions on Late Trading, Market Timing, and Other Forms of Trading.
Late trading rules
SEC directed to write
No provision.
Amends the Investment
SEC directed to write
rules to prevent after-
Company Act to
rules to prevent and
hours trading.
prohibit late trading.
detect after-hours
(Sec. 205)
(Sec. 101(a))
trading. (Sec. 306)
Increased
No provision.
No provision.
Increases civil and
No provision.
penalties
criminal penalties.
(Sec. 101)
Market timing
Short-term transactions
No provision.
Requires disclosure of
Short-term transactions
rules
in fund shares by
market timing policies
in fund shares by
affiliated persons (fund
and steps taken to
affiliated persons (fund
managers, directors,
prevent abuse of such
managers, directors,
advisers, or
policies. (Sec. 101(d))
advisers, or underwriters)
underwriters) are
are prohibited.
prohibited.
Prohibits short-term
transactions in fund
Directs the SEC to
SEC directed to make
shares by interested
require funds that do not
rules permitting funds to
persons (fund managers,
allow market timing
charge redemption fees
directors, advisers, or
trading to charge a
in excess of 2% to
underwriters).
redemption fee for short-
prevent short-term
(Sec. 101(i))
term trades.
trading that the SEC
(Sec. 303)
deems unfair to fund
shareholders.
(Sec. 203)

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CRS-11
Provision
H.R. 2420
S. 1822
S. 1958
S. 1971
Elimination of
SEC directed to make
No provision.
No provision.
SEC directed to make rules
stale prices
rules governing the use of
governing the use of fair
fair value pricing to set
value pricing to set net
net asset values when
asset values when market
market quotations are
quotations are unavailable
unavailable or out of date.
or out of date. Funds and

advisers would be required
(Sec. 204)
to adopt formal policies
regarding price-setting
procedures and certify that
they were being adhered to.
(Sec. 304)
Suspension of
Mutual funds may not
No provision.
No provision.
No provision.
redemptions
suspend investors’ right of
redemption unless the
primary stock market is
closed or other emergency
exists. SEC is directed to
make rules specifying the
conditions under which
trading may be restricted.

(Sec. 105)
Other Provisions.
Disclosure of
Codifies SEC rules that
No provision.
No provision.
No provision.
proxy votes
require funds to disclose
how they voted in proxy
contests of companies
whose shares they hold.

(Sec. 109)

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CRS-12
Provision
H.R. 2420
S. 1822
S. 1958
S. 1971
Hedge funds
Prohibits persons from
No provision.
No provision.
Prohibits persons from
serving as advisers or
serving as advisers or
managers of both mutual
managers of both mutual
funds and hedge funds.
funds and hedge funds.
(Sec. 202)
(Sec. 302)
Arbitration of
SEC directed to study
No provision
Directs the SEC to adopt
SEC directed to study
investor disputes
trends in mutual fund
rules giving complainants
trends in mutual fund
arbitration claims, and the
in mutual fund disputes
arbitration claims, and the
reasons for the increase in
the right to have their
reasons for the increase (if
such claims since 1995.
complaints heard in an
any) in such claims since
(Sec. 112)
independent arbitration
1995. (Sec. 406)
forum. (Sec. 209)
Whistleblowers
A mutual fund’s audit
No provision.
No provision.
Requires funds to establish
committee shall be
policies and procedures to
responsible for monitoring
protect whistleblowers
complaints from fund
from retaliation.
employees and others
(Sec. 301)
regarding questionable
accounting and auditing
practices. (Sec. 104)
Studies and Reports Called For.
Soft dollar
SEC directed to study soft
No provision.
SEC to issue a concept
SEC directed to study soft
arrangements and
dollar arrangements
release and report to
dollar arrangements –
transaction costs
involving fund investment
Congress on portfolio
trends, amounts, benefits
advisers – trends,
transaction costs,
and costs to investors,
amounts, benefits and
including commission,
possible conflicts of
costs to investors, possible
spread, opportunity, and
interest, and transparency.
conflicts of interest, and
market impact costs.
(Sec. 404)
transparency – and to
(Sec. 101(h))
make legislative
recommendations.
(Sec. 111)

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CRS-13
Provision
H.R. 2420
S. 1822
S. 1958
S. 1971
Arbitration claims
SEC directed to study
No provision.
No provision.
SEC directed to study
trends in mutual fund
trends in mutual fund
arbitration claims, and the
arbitration claims, and the
reasons for the increase in
reasons for the increase (if
such claims since 1995.
any) in such claims since
(Sec. 112)
1995. (Sec. 406)
Adequacy of
SEC to report to Congress
No provision.
No provision.
GAO directed to study the
remedial actions
on market timing and late
coordination of the
trading, including (1)
enforcement activities of
economic harm to long-
the SEC and the states.
term shareholders, (2) the
(Sec. 402)
SEC’s findings regarding
such trading practices, (3)
SEC to study the allocation
when and how the SEC
and adequacy of its
discovered that such
regulatory and enforcement
trading was harming
resources devoted to
shareholders, (4) steps
mutual funds. (Sec. 403)
taken by the SEC to
protect long-term
SEC to report on economic
shareholders, and (5)
harm caused by late trading
additional legislation or
and market timing and the
regulation needed to
SEC’s actions since
protect shareholders.
becoming aware of those
(Sec. 206)
practices. (Sec. 405)
Creation of a
No provision.
SEC shall study and report
No provision. (Section
GAO to study the
Mutual Fund
to Congress on the creation
101 establishes such a
feasibility and benefits (if
Oversight Board
of an entity with inspection
board.)
any) to shareholders of
and enforcement authority
establishing a Mutual Fund
over mutual fund boards of
Oversight Board with
directors, funded by
inspection, examination,
assessments on mutual
and enforcement authority
funds, and appointed by the
over mutual fund boards of
SEC.
directors. (Sec. 401)
(Sec. 3(e))

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CRS-14
Provision
H.R. 2420
S. 1822
S. 1958
S. 1971
Financial literacy
No provision.
SEC shall study and report
No provision.
SEC to study the existing
to Congress on the existing
level of financial literacy
level of financial literacy
among mutual fund
among mutual fund
investors, the information
investors, what information
most needed by investors,
they most need, the
methods to increase
transparency of fee
transparency, and existing
disclosure, and efforts and
and improved methods of
strategies to educate
educating investors.
investors. (Sec. 5)
(Sec. 501)
Mutual fund
No provision.
The GAO shall study and
No provision.
No provision.
advertising
report to Congress on the
impact and regulation of
mutual fund advertising,
current sales practices in
the industry, and consider
recommendations to
improve investor
protection.
(Sec. 6)

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