Order Code RS21592
Updated November 12, 2003
CRS Report for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
Iran’s Nuclear Program:
Recent Developments
Sharon Squassoni
Specialist in National Defense
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Summary
Revelations about Iran’s capability to produce enriched uranium — the fissile
material for a nuclear weapon — prompted a flurry of inspections, diplomatic missions
and rhetoric in mid-2003 regarding Iran’s compliance with the Nuclear Nonproliferation
Treaty (NPT). The International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) most recent findings
reportedly detail two enrichment programs (centrifuges and lasers) and the separation
of plutonium, another fissile material, in small quantities. Although the IAEA has stated
previously that Iran has not met all of its NPT obligations, it has not yet declared Iran
in violation of the NPT. On November 20-21, 2003, the IAEA Board of Governors will
meet to discuss Iran. Meanwhile, Iran agreed on November 10 to sign the Additional
Protocol, which contains provisions for enhanced inspections. This report, which will
be updated as needed, analyzes the significance of the IAEA’s findings for a possible
Iranian nuclear weapons program. See also CRS Report RL30551, Iran: Arms and
Weapons of Mass Destruction Suppliers.
Background
Iran has had a nuclear program for close to 50 years, beginning with a research
reactor purchased from the United States in 1959. The Shah’s plan to build 23 nuclear
power reactors by the 1990s may have been regarded as grandiose, but was not necessarily
viewed as a “back door” to a nuclear weapons program, possibly because Iran then did not
seek the technologies to enrich its own fuel or reprocess its own spent fuel.1 There were
a few suspicions of a nuclear weapons program, but these abated in the decade between
the Iranian 1979 revolution and the end of Iran-Iraq war, both of which brought a halt to
nuclear activities. Iran’s current plans — to construct nuclear power plants with a total
capacity of 6000MW within two decades — are still ambitious, and some question the
1 However, there have been reports that Iran’s AEOI sought laser enrichment technology in the
United States in the late 1970s, and that reprocessing-related experiments were conducted. In
addition, there were intelligence reports that the Shah had a secret group to work on nuclear
weapons. See Leonard S. Spector, Nuclear Ambitions (Colorado: Westview Press), 1990, p. 204.
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

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need for nuclear power in a state with considerable oil and gas reserves. Iran, however,
is using the same argument it used in the 1970s: that nuclear power is necessary in the
context of rising domestic energy consumption rates and a desire to preserve oil and gas
to generate foreign currency. Recently, however, Iran’s stated intention to explore fuel
cycle, safety, and waste management technology, which include sensitive fissile material
production capabilities, has elevated concern about possible nuclear weapons production.
In May 2003, the Iranian officials told other NPT Prepcom delegates that “we
consider the acquiring, development and use of nuclear weapons inhuman, immoral,
illegal and against our basic principles. They have no place in Iran’s defense doctrine.”2
Iranian officials call the speculations over the secrecy of Natanz and Arak “quite
unfounded and irrational;” that it is not obligated under its current safeguards agreement
to declare the heavy water production plant; and that it made no attempt to hide
construction (although it did argue similarly for the enrichment plant). On August 6,
President Khatami stated that Iran “cannot use such weapons based on our Islamic and
moral teachings,” but that Iran would not give up nuclear technology for power
generation.3
Longstanding U.S. concerns about Iran’s intentions to develop nuclear weapons have
escalated in the last two years. First, Iraq’s capabilities clearly have advanced.4 Much
concern in the last decade focused on what Iranians might learn through Russian help on
the Bushehr nuclear reactor project. Despite U.S. attempts to impose an international
embargo on nuclear cooperation with Iran since the 1980s, Iran appears to be on the
threshold of enriching uranium. The IAEA said in August that it detected particles of
highly enriched uranium in samples taken at Natanz, which may or may not indicate that
Iran has been able to enrich uranium. Iran has asserted that its nuclear program is strictly
peaceful, but few observers believe uranium enrichment necessary or economic for a
civilian nuclear fuel cycle like Iran’s.
The Bush administration’s emphasis on three “axis of evil” states — Iraq, Iran, and
North Korea — has also focused attention on Iran. Some observers have argued that the
WMD capabilities of Iran and North Korea were more worrisome than those of Iraq,
particularly in the nuclear area. Iran’s uranium centrifuge enrichment capability — a key
technology that is difficult to detect and quite efficient for producing highly enriched
uranium for simple gun-type assembly nuclear weapons — seems to be more advanced
than Iraq’s and, possibly, North Korea’s.5
2 Statement by H.E. Mr. G. Ali Khoshroo, Deputy Foreign Minister for Legal and International
Affairs, Second Session of the Prepcom for the 2005 NPT Review Conference, April 29, 2003.
3 “Iran Denies It’s Building Nuclear Bomb,” Associated Press, August 7, 2003.
4 Leonard S. Spector, “Iran’s Secret Quest for the Bomb.” YaleGlobal, May 16, 2003.
5 A November 2002 CIA white paper on North Korea’s enrichment capabilities said North Korea
had recently begun constructing a centrifuge facility and began seeking in 2001 large quantities
of centrifuge-related equipment. Iran, according to the IAEA’s report, is constructing a
commercial scale plant (built for 50,000 centrifuges) and has an operational pilot plant. See CRS
Report RL31900, Weapons of Mass Destruction: Trade Between North Korea and Pakistan.

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Third, the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCR) has been quite active in
exposing nuclear facilities in Iran.6 The NCR, which has been on the State Department’s
list of foreign terrorist organizations since 1997, held three press conferences in the last
year to reveal alleged covert nuclear weapons-related sites. On August 14, 2002, the NCR
described the nuclear sites at Natanz and Arak, which were shown in satellite photographs
later that year. On May 27, 2003, the NCR revealed information about sites thought to
be used for laser enrichment of uranium: the Lashkar-Abad site near Hashtgerd and a site
near Ramandeh village. On July 8, 2003, the NCR revealed two more sites, including the
Kolahdouz Complex (related to centrifuge enrichment) and Ardekan Nuclear Fuel Site.
The NCR and other exiled groups have a mixed record of providing accurate
information, but their revelations have given the International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA) leverage to investigate claims.7 Following the August 2002 NCR press
conference, Iran’s Vice President Reza Aghazadeh informed the IAEA about its nuclear
fuel cycle activities; according to the IAEA, Director General ElBaradei asked Aghazadeh
to confirm media reports of the facilities at Natanz and Arak at the September General
Conference.8
What Inspections Revealed
The IAEA conducted additional inspections beginning in spring of 2003 and reported
its findings at the June and September 2003 Board of Governors meetings.9 In June, it
identified three major concerns for implementing nuclear safeguards: Iran’s failure to
report uranium imported from China in 1991; questions about the centrifuge enrichment
program; and questions about the heavy water program. By September, further details
emerged. Environmental sampling revealed particles of highly enriched uranium at
several sites, and Iran’s centrifuges appear to be based on a European design.
Information provided by Iranian officials clarified some details and obscured others.
The use of undeclared uranium may have allowed Iran to experiment with processes
that could have relevance for a nuclear weapons program. Had such processes been under
safeguards, they would have been closely scrutinized. Inspections revealed that Iran
imported, but did not declare, 1800 kilograms of natural uranium in different forms:
uranium hexafluoride (UF6), which is used in centrifuge enrichment; uranium tetra
fluoride (UF4); and uranium oxide (U02). Iran converted the UF4 into uranium metal and
used the UO2 in various processing experiments, including isotope production and
purification and conversion processes. Some of these processes are also used in
6 The NCR, according to its web site, was established in 1981 and is based in Paris. It has been
described as the political arm or umbrella for other Iranian resistance groups, including the
People’s Mujahedin of Iran and the Muhahedin-e Khalq organization (MEK or MKO).
7 In February 1992, the People’s Mujahedin of Iran revealed two “secret Iranian” nuclear sites
— Darkhouin and Gurgan — which had been sites for terminated French and Russian power
reactor projects. See Mark Hibbs, “IAEA Explores Iran’s Intentions, Minus Evidence of
Weapons Drive,” Nucleonics Week, February 13, 1992.
8 “Iran’s Nuclear Policy,” H.E. Mr. Reza Aghazadeh, May 6, 2003.
9 “Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran, Report by
the Director General, GOV/2003/40,” June 6, 2003 (released June 19, 2003).

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plutonium reprocessing (e.g., dissolution in nitric acid and separation in a pulse column).
Prior to the September IAEA Board meeting, Iran admitted it had conducted “bench
scale” uranium conversion experiments a decade ago, which should have been declared
under its safeguards agreement. Iran suggested that its “uranium metal experiments could
be considered as a process to gain know-how in nuclear material production,” in light of
Iran’s decision to pursue a heavy-water-moderated reactor that would not use uranium
metal as fuel.10 Uranium metal plates can be used to produce medical radioisotopes, but
it is not clear whether Iran pursued this.
Reports that the containers of UF6 were lighter than declared raised the question of
whether some UF6 was used to perform tests of the centrifuge equipment. Iranian
officials initially countered that their program began in 1985 but experienced so many
difficulties that they did not conduct experiments with inert or process gas. Evidence of
highly enriched uranium from environmental sampling at the Natanz pilot plant later in
the summer also contributed to speculation about enrichment, since few believed Iran
would have produced centrifuges and constructed facilities without tests.11 The presence
of highly enriched uranium on the centrifuges installed for single machine tests was,
according to Iranian officials, contamination from imported centrifuge components. In
fact, the IAEA’s report for the November Board meeting, according to one source, reveals
that Iran acknowledged enriching uranium at the Kalaye electric plant, although only to
low levels of enrichment.12 More importantly, the latest IAEA report apparently also
reveals that Iran also successfully used laser enrichment techniques to enrich uranium.
The two enrichment plants detected by satellite imagery have drawn the most
attention.13 The pilot fuel enrichment plant began to operate in June (although not all
centrifuges have been installed), despite requests by the IAEA to delay operations, and
the commercial-scale plant is still under construction. The pilot facility eventually will
have about 1000 centrifuges installed. The commercial-scale plant is planned to have
50,000 centrifuges but is not scheduled to introduce nuclear material in the near future.
These plants are built partly underground, raising concerns about the transparency of
Iran’s program.
The heavy water program also has raised questions about Iran’s intentions.
Reportedly, Iran first told the IAEA that it planned to produce heavy water for export, but
then told the Agency in May that the heavy water would be used as a coolant and
moderator for a planned research reactor for research and development, radioisotope
production, and training. Subsequently, Iran’s design information for the facility omitted
necessary hot cell equipment for producing radioisotopes. The Agency has asked Iran to
clarify this issue, given reports of efforts by Iran to import hot cell equipment.
10 See IAEA Director General’s Report, Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the
Islamic Republic of Iran, Report by the Director General, GOV/2003/63. p. 5.
11 IAEA experts have suggested that the centrifuges at Natanz were an early European design and
that their sophistication likely indicated process testing with UF6. See Implementation of the NPT
Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran, GOV/2003/63, August 26, 2003, p. 6.
12 “Iran Had Secret Nuclear Program, U.N. Agency Says,” Washington Post, November 11, 2003.
13 See website, [http://www.isis-online.org] for satellite photos of the enrichment plant.

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From June to November
In June, the IAEA Board of Governors called upon Iran to 1) rectify all safeguards
problems identified in the report and resolve open questions; 2) not introduce nuclear
material into the Natanz enrichment plant; and 3) sign the Additional Protocol without
any conditions.14 Iran provided some information and began discussions on the
Additional Protocol, but began operating the pilot centrifuge enrichment plant in June
with process gas (UF6).
The IAEA Board of Governors adopted a resolution on September 12, 2003 calling
on Iran, among other things, to suspend all further uranium enrichment and reprocessing
activities and setting an October 31 deadline for Iran’s compliance. The IAEA requested
that Iran provide details about its contaminated centrifuge equipment, including the origin
and date of receipt of the equipment, and where it has been used or stored in Iran, as well
as further information about its uranium conversion experiments.15
With the October 31 deadline looming, Iran invited the foreign ministers of Britain,
France, and Germany to visit Tehran. On October 21, 2003, Iran issued a statement
declaring the following: that Iran has agreed to sign the IAEA Additional Protocol and
decided to suspend all uranium enrichment and “processing activities” and that nuclear
weapons have “no place in Iran’s defense doctrine.” The ministers agreed that once
international concerns are fully resolved, that Iran “could expect easier access to modern
technology and supplies in a range of areas.”16 There has been some controversy over
Iran’s commitment to suspend enrichment; although some have seen this as a cessation
of enrichment, subsequent statements have made clear that it is a voluntary and, perhaps,
temporary suspension.17
According to the IAEA, Iran provided what it called a complete and accurate
declaration of its past nuclear activities.18 Media reports have suggested, however, that
information on centrifuge procurement has been lacking. In particular, the Iranian
representative to the IAEA reportedly said the records did not contain information on the
origin of components for centrifuges, which could be a critical piece of information if Iran
seeks to demonstrate that highly enriched uranium found in its facilities was the result of
foreign contamination.19 However, this omission may pale in comparison to the
revelations that Iran has produced “small amounts of low-enriched uranium, using both
14 See [http://www.iaea.org/worldatom/Press/P_release/2003/med-advise_072.shtml] for text.
The protocol, which was developed in response to the failure to detect Iraq’s nuclear weapons
program in 1991, and is designed to strengthen the IAEA’s ability to detect undeclared nuclear
activities, will be a key step towards greater transparency.
15 Dr. Mohammed ElBaradei, Statement to Board of Governors, September 8, 2003 at
[http://www.iaea.org/worldatom/Press/Statements/2003/ebsp2003n019.shtml#Anchor-Iran]
16 “Statement by the Iranian Government and visiting EU Foreign Ministers,” Reuters, October
21, 2003.
17 “Iran: Khatami Reaffirms Right To Peaceful Nuclear Technology,” BBC, November 3, 2003.
18 [http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/MediaAdvisory/Iran/ma_iran_3110.html]
19 “Iran Discloses Nuclear Activities,” Los Angeles Times, October 24, 2003.

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centrifuge and laser enrichment processes...and a small amount of plutonium.”20 DG
ElBaradei has not reported Iran as violating its safeguards agreement, which requires the
Board to inform the UN Security Council and General Assembly. The June report stated
that “Iran failed to meet its obligations under its Safeguards Agreement with respect to
reporting of nuclear material, the subsequent processing and use of that material and the
declaration of facilities where the material was stored and processed.” The United States
stated in September 2003 that “the facts already established would fully justify an
immediate finding of noncompliance by Iran with its safeguards obligations.”21 It
remains to be seen whether the latest revelations will trigger a chain of events leading to
UN Security Council resolutions.
Significance for a Nuclear Weapons Program

Nuclear safeguards are fundamentally accounting procedures to ensure that material
is not diverted to weapons uses. Therefore, failures to report material can be significant,
but some failures are more significant than others. Iran has stated that “The failures...are
minor, and are only on the order of the gram or milligram.”22 A discrepancy in accounting
for large quantities of weapons-grade plutonium or highly enriched uranium would
certainly be more significant for a nuclear weapons program than a discrepancy for
smaller quantities or for other materials like natural uranium. However, some argue that
a pattern of deception is significant. In part, a principle underlying strengthened
safeguards is the evolution from a strict accounting approach (seeing the “trees”) to
evaluating the program in its entirety (seeing the “forest”). The latest IAEA report seems
to indicate that Iran has pursued two different methods for uranium enrichment and that
it sought experience in reprocessing plutonium. Although Iran is years away from
producing quantities of fissile material (highly enriched uranium or plutonium) that it
could use in nuclear weapons, the steady accrual over time of expertise in weapons-
relevant areas is viewed with concern by many. In the run-up to a Board decision on
whether or not Iran has violated its safeguards agreement, a key factor may be whether
Board members feel that the enhanced inspections under the Additional Protocol will be
enough to keep any potential nuclear weapons ambitions by Iran in check.
20 “Iran Had Secret Nuclear Program, U.N. Agency Says,” Washington Post, November 11, 2003.
21 Statement of Ambassador Kenneth Brill at September 2003 IAEA Board of Governors
Meeting.
22 “After Report, Iran Acknowledges ‘Minor’ Breach of Nuclear Pact,” Washington Post,
November 12, 2003.

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