Order Code RS21148
Updated November 3, 2003
CRS Report for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
Military Space Programs: Issues Concerning
DOD’s SBIRS and STSS Programs
Marcia S. Smith
Specialist in Aerospace and Telecommunications Policy
Resources, Science, and Industry Division
Summary
The Department of Defense’s (DOD’s) programs to develop new satellites to alert
U.S. military commanders to foreign missile launches, and to support missile defense
objectives, are controversial because of cost growth and schedule slippage. SBIRS-
High, managed by the Air Force, would replace existing Defense Support Program
“early warning” satellites.
The Space Tracking and Surveillance System (STSS,
formerly SBIRS-Low), managed by the Missile Defense Agency, would perform
missile tracking and target discrimination for missile defense objectives. For FY2004,
DOD is requesting $617 million for SBIRS-High RDT&E, $95 million for SBIRS-High
procurement (of a backup control station), and $300 million for STSS RDT&E. The
House approved the requested funding in the FY2004 DOD authorization bill, while the
Senate cut STSS by $15.5 million (H.R. 1588/S. 1050).
In the FY2004 DOD
appropriations act (P.L. 108-87), SBIRS-High is fully funded, and STSS is cut by $15.5
million. This report will be updated.
Satellite Early Warning Systems
The United States began developing early warning satellite systems in the 1950s to
alert the National Command Authority to foreign missile launches. The current series is
called the Defense Support Program (DSP). The first DSP was launched in November
1970; 21 have been launched to date. Two more have been built and are awaiting launch;
each can operate for up to 10 years.1 Four satellites reportedly are needed for a full
operational capability; six satellites reportedly were operating as of January 2001.2
1 Space News (January 7, 2002, p. 14)
2 Space & Missile Defense Report, Jan. 18, 2001, p. 8. More recent data could not be obtained
in the open literature.
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

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DSP satellites (built by TRW Space and Electronics, which is now Northrop
Grumman Space Technology) use infrared sensors to detect the heat of fuel exhausts
associated with missile launches. Sensors on the satellites also can detect nuclear bursts
associated with the detonation of nuclear weapons. As recounted in a 2001 General
Accounting Office (GAO) report,3 DOD has wanted to build a replacement for DSP for
more than two decades. None of the proposed replacement programs—the Advanced
Warning System in the early 1980s, the Boost Surveillance and Tracking System in the
late 1980s, the Follow-On Early Warning System in the early 1990s, and the Alert, Locate
and Report Missiles System in the mid-1990s— reached fruition, according to GAO, “due
to immature technology, high cost, and affordability issues.” Instead, enhancements were
made to the DSP series. For example, DSP was designed to detect launches of strategic
long range missiles (such as Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles). However, the need to
detect short range tactical missiles, such as Scud, was highlighted during the 1990-1991
Persian Gulf War. In 1995, DOD added the ALERT (Attack and Launch Early Reporting
to Theater) system to DSP satellites to augment their theater missile warning capabilities.
DSP-type satellites are intrinsically part of any effort to develop a missile defense
system because they provide the first warning that a foreign missile has been launched
(during the missile’s “boost” phase), but DSP also serves other objectives. Since the
1980s, there has been interest in developing a system explicitly to support missile defense
—one that can track missiles as they progress along their flight path (the “mid-course”
phase), detect and track warheads once they are deployed from the missile, and cue
weapon systems to attack the missiles or warheads. A concept for a constellation of many
satellites in low Earth orbit, called Brilliant Eyes, was developed during the 1980s under
the auspices of the Strategic Defense Initiative Office (SDIO). Following a 1994 DOD
study on how best to meet the nation’s early warning needs, Brilliant Eyes was transferred
to the Air Force, which was given responsibility to build an integrated Space-Based
InfraRed System (SBIRS) with satellites in several orbits. Brilliant Eyes was renamed the
Space and Missile Tracking System and became the low Earth orbit component of SBIRS.
Later it was renamed SBIRS-Low. The system to replace DSP was named SBIRS-High,
consisting of satellites in geostationary orbit (GEO, where DSP satellites are placed) and
sensors on other DOD satellites in highly elliptical orbits (HEO).4 In 2001, SBIRS-Low
was shifted back to the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO), which was
SDIO’s successor and is now the Missile Defense Agency. That action was taken to stress
that SBIRS-Low’s main purpose is to support ballistic missile defense. The satellite
3 U.S. General Accounting Office. Defense Acquisitions: Space-Based Infrared System-low at
Risk of Missing Initial Deployment Date. GAO-01-6. Washington, U.S. GAO, Feb. 2001. For
more detail on the history of U.S. early warning satellite systems, see: Richelson, Jeffrey.
America’s Space Sentinels. Lawrence, Kansas, University Press of Kansas, 1999.
4 Geostationary orbit (GEO) exists 35,800 kilometers above the equator. A satellite in GEO
maintains a fixed position relative to a point on Earth. Three or four properly spaced GEO
satellites can view the entire globe, except for the polar regions. HEO orbits can provide
coverage of the polar regions. A classic HEO orbit (called a Molniya orbit after the Soviet
communications satellite system that first utilized it), has an apogee (the highest point of the
orbit) of approximately 40,000 kilometers, and a perigee (the lowest point) of about 5,000
kilometers, giving the orbit an elliptical shape. With an inclination of about 63 degrees (the angle
at which it intersects the equator), such an orbit allows a satellite to linger or “dwell” over the
northern hemisphere for several hours per orbit, viewing parts of the globe not observable from
GEO. DOD reportedly uses this type of orbit for classified satellites.

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program has since been renamed again, and is now the Space Tracking and Surveillance
System (STSS).
SBIRS-High
Purpose, Design, and Cost Estimate. SBIRS-High is intended to perform four
missions: missile warning, missile defense, technical intelligence, and battlespace
characterization (observing and reporting on military activities on a battlefield). It will
consist of four operational GEO satellites (plus a ground spare), sensors on two classified
DOD satellites in HEO, a ground-based Mission Control Station (MCS), and ground-
based relay stations. MCS achieved initial operational capability in January 2002 using
the existing DSP satellites.
Aviation Week & Space Technology (November 18, 1996, p. 23) described the
expected technical capabilities of SBIRS-High. Reportedly it will have both high speed
scanning sensors and staring sensors. After the scanning sensor detects a launch, it will
cue the staring sensor to observe the event and provide more detailed data.
DSP
satellites, by contrast, reportedly have only scanning sensors. DSP takes 40-50 seconds
to detect a missile launch and determine its course, while SBIRS-High is being designed
to make those determinations and relay warnings to ground forces in 10-20 seconds.
A Lockheed Martin-Northrop Grumman team won a $2.16 billion contract to build
SBIRS-High in 1996. DOD increased the Lockheed Martin contract by $2.15 billion in
September 2002, bringing its value to $4.18 billion, which does not include the cost of
three of the five GEO satellites. In the FY2004 budget request, the total SBIRS-High
cost for engineering and manufacturing development (EMD) is shown as $6.3 billion, a
9% increase over DOD’s prior estimate (in the FY2003 budget documentation) of $5.8
billion. That figure does not include certain other costs that reportedly bring total
projected program costs to $8-8.5 billion.5
Issues.
The SBIRS-High program has become controversial because of cost
growth and schedule slippage caused by technical challenges that have been encountered
in developing the sensors and satellites.
In the FY2002 DOD appropriations act,
Congress denied all procurement funding ($94 million had been requested) because it felt
more research and development (R&D) was required. It added $40 million to the $395
million requested for R&D. The House Appropriations Committee’s report on the
FY2002 DOD appropriations act (H.Rept. 107-298, p. 140) cited findings by GAO that
the program was facing serious hardware and software design problems including sensor
jitter, inadequate infrared sensitivity, and stray sunlight. (The GAO report is classified).
Space News reported on January 7, 2002 (p. 14) that the program’s cost estimate had
grown from $1.9 billion to $4.5 billion, and the first launch slipped from 2002 to 2006.
Space News attributed the cost increase to technical problems, including software
development; faulty cost estimates; budget erosion; and schedule slippage.
In December 2001, SBIRS-High breached the “Nunn-McCurdy” 25% cost growth
limit, which requires recertification of the program by the Undersecretary of Defense for
Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (USD/ATL) that the program meets certain
5 Delayed SBIRS-High Payload to be Delivered in May. Aerospace Daily, April 8, 2003, p. 3.

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criteria to continue. Then-USD/ATL Pete Aldridge issued the recertification on May 2,
2002, and the Air Force restructured the program. Space News reported on February 17,
2003 (page 8) that the first SBIRS-High sensor, intended to be launched on one of the
HEO satellites, had encountered technical difficulties and its delivery was delayed. DOD
decided to pay for the first two GEO satellites (scheduled for launch in FY2006 and
FY2007) using research, development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E) funds. The
remaining three will be bought with procurement funds, and there will be a 2-year gap
between the first two and the last three. Some question whether that decision could
increase total program costs because the contractor will have to rebuild its team for the
later satellites. DOD argues that the 2-year break will provide time to learn from the
earlier satellites and make improvements.
A May 2003 report of the Defense Science Board and Air Force Scientific Advisory
Board [http://www.acq.osd.mil/dsb/space.pdf] on acquisition of national security space
programs sharply criticized early program management of SBIRS-High, and took a
cautious attitude concerning whether the restructured program would succeed. An
October 2003 GAO report (GAO-04-48) concluded the program remains at “substantial
risk of cost and schedule increases” despite the restructuring.
FY2004 Request and Congressional Action. The FY2004 request was $617
million for RDT&E, and $95 million for procurement of a backup mission control station.
Congress approved full funding in the FY2004 DOD appropriations actl (P.L. 108-87).
In the FY2004 DOD authorization bill (H.R. 1588/S. 1050), the House added $15 million
for RDT&E, while the Senate approved full funding. The report from the Senate Armed
Services Committee (S.Rept. 108-46) called the 2-year gap in acquiring the satellites
“unwise” (page 244).
Space Tracking and Surveillance System (formerly SBIRS-Low)
Purpose, Design, and Cost Estimates. The Space Tracking and Surveillance
System (STSS, previously named SBIRS-Low) is designed specifically to support missile
defense. Management of the program was transferred from the Air Force back to the
Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO, the successor to SDIO—see earlier
discussion of Brilliant Eyes), to emphasize that missile defense is its primary objective.
BMDO is now the Missile Defense Agency (MDA). For more on missile defense, see
CRS Report RL31111, Missile Defense: The Current Debate.
The missile defense system is envisioned as a “layered” defense that can attack
missiles or warheads in three different phases of flight: boost (launch), mid-course
(enroute to a target, when warheads are deployed from the missile), and terminal (after
reentry). The goal of an operational STSS is to track missiles through all three phases;
discriminate between warheads and decoys; transmit data to other systems that will be
used to cue radars and provide intercept handovers; and provide data for intercept hit/kill
assessments. Tracking missiles during the mid-course phase is more difficult than during
boost, because the missile is no longer firing its engines and hence does not have a strong
infrared (heat) signature, making it necessary to track a cold object against the cold
background of space. Similarly, tracking warheads after they have been deployed, and
discriminating between warheads and decoys, is a technically challenging task.

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Cost estimates are problematic because there is no final system architecture and the
schedule is in flux. In its February 2001 report, GAO reported that DOD had estimated
the life-cycle cost for STSS (then SBIRS-Low) through FY2022 at $11.8 billion. The
House Appropriations Committee reported in late 2001 (H.Rept. 107-298, p. 250) that the
program’s life cycle cost had grown from $10 billion to over $23 billion. In January
2002, the Congressional Budget Office estimated the cost through 2015 at $14-17 billion.
Two industry teams were chosen in 1999 for program definition and risk reduction
(PDRR), one led by Spectrum Astro and Northrop Grumman, and the other led by TRW
and Raytheon.
DOD was expected to select one of the teams for the next phase
(Engineering and Manufacturing Development) in mid-2002 and the satellites were to
have been launched between 2006 and 2010.6
In the April 2002 restructuring (see
below), DOD decided to merge the teams. Northrop Grumman Space Technology
(formerly TRW Space & Electronics) is the prime contractor, and Spectrum Astro a major
subcontractor, for building the satellites. Competition between Raytheon and Northrop
Grumman to build the sensors was to continue, but a May 2003 GAO report (see below)
reports that MDA now plans to fund tentatively the design, but not the production, of a
competitive sensor.
Issues. This program has gone through several name changes, making it difficult
to track. Congress began expressing concern about it as early as 1996, when it was
known as the Space and Missile Tracking System, particularly in terms of program
management.7 Indications of technical and funding problems emerged in 1999 when
DOD cancelled contracts with TRW and Boeing to build and launch three prototype
demonstration satellites because of significant cost growth.8 In the early 2000s, when its
name was SBIRS-Low, questions began to arise as to whether it was truly vital to a
missile defense system. Views on the need for this type of capability vary. Some assert
that missile defense cannot be achieved without such a system, while others argue that
there are alternatives, such as ground-based radars.
To some extent, the answer may depend on the nature of the threat the missile
defense system is expected to defeat (e.g., number of incoming warheads, or
sophistication of countermeasures). Radars have been used for early warning of missile
launches for decades, and already are envisioned as part of the missile defense system. To
provide effective coverage, the radars must be based not only in the United States, but in
other countries—radars in England and Greenland are part of the early warning system
on which the United States relies today. The question is whether ground- based radars
can substitute for a space-based system, especially now that the United States is no longer
bound by numerical and geographic limitations imposed on radars that are part of an anti-
ballistic missile (ABM) system by the 1972 ABM treaty. Ground-based radars may be
less costly to build and maintain than a multi-satellite constellation, but the need to locate
them in other countries could be a disadvantage if the countries with suitable geographic
6 The first launch was scheduled for 2006, but Congress directed DOD to accelerate the schedule
to 2002. The Defense Science Board concluded that 2002 was technically feasible, but 2004
would represent a more efficient approach. (Aerospace Daily, Oct. 3, 1996, p. 18; Space News,
Sept. 16-22, 1996, p. 10.) The date then slipped back to 2006 primarily due to funding issues.
7 Authorizers Blast DOD for SMTS Management. Aerospace Daily, Aug. 8, 1996, p. 207.
8 Ferster, Warren. SBIRS Demonstration Projects Terminated. Space News, Feb. 15, 1999, p. 1.

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locations were to decline to accommodate them. Without an extensive network, there also
might be gaps in coverage such that missiles could not be tracked throughout their flights.
Thus, trade-offs must be made between the cost and availability of space-based versus
ground-based systems, and the capabilities each offers. Sea-based radars may be another
alternative. In its November 19, 2001, report on the FY2002 DOD appropriations bill
(H.R. 3338, H.Rept. 107-298, p. 250), the House Appropriations Committee cited an
internal DOD study that indicated ground-based radars are a viable, lower cost, and lower
risk, alternative. In the FY2004 budget request, DOD requested $101 million under the
sensor line item to study radars further.
Technical challenges have continued. In its February 2001 report (cited earlier),
GAO raised a number of questions about whether the program (then SBIRS-Low) could
meet its technical milestones. For example, it found that five of six critical satellite
technologies were too immature to ensure they would be ready when needed. The House
Appropriations Committee, in its November 2001 report (cited above), expressed concern
too, including that the program’s life cycle cost that had grown from $10 billion to over
$23 billion. Consequently, the committee zeroed funding ($385 million was requested)
and instead created a Satellite Sensor Technology program ($250 million) and a Ground
Sensor Technology program ($75 million) as a possible alternative. Conferees approved
the $250 million for Satellite Sensor Technology, but allowed the Secretary of Defense
to choose to spend it either on SBIRS-Low or new technology. (It was spent on SBIRS-
Low.) The ground sensor technology program was not approved in conference.
A restructuring plan was submitted to Congress on April 15, 2002. Previously, a
system consisting of 20-30 satellites was envisioned, with the first launch in 2006. The
restructuring plan called for completing two “legacy” demonstration satellites that had
been partially built as part of the 1999 plan, and launching them in 2006 and 2007. New
technologies would be introduced in future satellites, and two new demonstration
satellites would be launched beginning in 2010. In August 2002, DOD awarded Northrop
Grumman Space Technologies (formerly TRW) an $869 million contract to complete the
two legacy satellites, develop a ground system, and conduct preliminary engineering
analysis of the new demonstration satellites, with options for building eight operational
satellites. The program’s name was changed to Space Tracking and Surveillance System
(STSS). In May 2003, GAO reviewed (GAO-03-597) changes made to the restructuring
plan by MDA in late 2002 because MDA decided to reduce STSS funding. Under this
plan, both legacy demonstration satellites will be launched in 2007. Work on one (rather
than two) new demonstration satellite will begin in 2003, with launch delayed from 2010
to 2011. GAO criticized MDA’s decisions because it asserts that MDA does not
understand the status of the legacy hardware and therefore the schedule risks associated
with the 2007 launch date. It also criticized the decision to delay development and launch
of new demonstrators because, GAO says, MDA already knows that it wants to pursue
different designs and different technologies than in the legacy satellites. Further, GAO
reports that MDA decided to forego production of sensors from a competing contractors,
thereby losing the potential benefits of competition.
FY2004 Request and Congressional Action.
The FY2004 request for
STSS was $300 million for RDT&E. Congress cut STSS by $15.5 million in the FY2004
DOD appropriations act (P.L. 108-87). In the FY2004 DOD authorization bill (H.R.
1588/S. 1050), the Senate cut STSS by $15.5 million, while the House approved the
requested amount.

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