Order Code RL31741
CRS Report for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
Homeland Security: Protecting Airliners from
Terrorist Missiles
Updated November 3, 2003
Christopher Bolkcom
Specialist in National Defense
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Bartholomew Elias
Specialist in Aviation Safety, Security, and Technology
Resources, Science, and Industry Division
Andrew Feickert
Analyst in National Defense
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Congressional Research Service { The Library of Congress

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Homeland Security: Protecting Airliners
from Terrorist Missiles
Summary
Recent events have focused attention on the threat that terrorists with shoulder
fired surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) pose to commercial airliners. Most believe that
no single solution exists to effectively mitigate this threat. Instead, a menu of options
may be considered, including installing infrared (IR) countermeasures on aircraft;
modifying flight operations and air traffic control procedures; improving airport and
regional security; and strengthening missile non-proliferation efforts. Equipping
aircraft with missile countermeasure systems can protect the aircraft even when
operating in areas where ground-based security measures are unavailable or
infeasible to implement. However, this option has a relatively high cost, between $1
million and $3 million per aircraft, and the time needed for implementation does not
allow for immediate response to the existing terrorist threat. Procedural
improvements such as specific flight crew training, altering air traffic procedures to
minimize exposure to the threat, and improved security near airports may be less
costly than countermeasures and could more immediately help deter domestic
terrorist attacks. However, these techniques by themselves cannot completely
mitigate the risk of domestic attacks and would not protect U.S. airliners flying to
and from foreign airports. Legislation introduced in the 108th Congress (H.R. 580,
S. 311) calls for the installation of missile defense systems in all turbojet aircraft
used in scheduled air carrier service. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
appropriations for Fiscal Year 2004 (P.L. 108-90) designated $60 million dollars for
development and testing of a prototype missile countermeasure system for
commercial aircraft. DHS anticipates a two year program totaling about $100 million
to develop, test, and certify a suitable system.
This report will be updated as needed.

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Contents
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Types of Shoulder-Fired SAMS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Infrared (IR) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Command Line-of-Sight . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Laser Beam Riders . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Shoulder-Fired SAM Proliferation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Non-State Groups With Shoulder-Fired SAMs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Civilian Aviation Encounters with Shoulder-Fired Missiles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Options for Mitigating Missile Threats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
IR Countermeasures and Aircraft Improvements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Improved Pilot Training and Air Traffic Procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Improvements to Airport and Local Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Counterproliferation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Program Plan and Funding for Missile Countermeasure Development . . . . . . . . 16
Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
List of Figures
Figure 1. C-141B Starlifter Ejecting Flares on Takeoff . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
List of Tables
Table1. Non-State Groups with Shoulder-Fired SAMs:1996-2001 . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Table 2. Probable Large Civilian Turbojet Aircraft Encounters
with Shoulder-Fired Missiles (1978-Present) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

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Homeland Security: Protecting Airliners from
Terrorist Missiles
Introduction
Shoulder-fired surface-to-air missiles (SAMs), also known as MANPADs (man-
portable air defense systems), developed in the late 1950s to provide military ground
forces protection from enemy aircraft, are receiving a great deal of attention as
potential terrorist weapons. These missiles, affordable and widely available through
a variety of sources, have been used successfully over the past three decades both in
military conflicts1 as well as by terrorist organizations. The missiles are about 5 to
6 feet in length, weigh about 35 to 40 pounds, and, depending on the model, can be
purchased on the black market anywhere from a few hundred dollars for older models
to upwards of almost a quarter million dollars for newer, more capable models.
Seventeen countries, including the United States, produce man-portable air defense
systems.2 Shoulder-fired SAMs generally have a target detection range of about 6
miles and an engagement range of about 4 miles so aircraft flying at 20,000 feet (3.8
miles) or higher are relatively safe.3 Most experts consider aircraft departures and
landings as the times when it is most vulnerable to shoulder-fired SAM engagement.
There are a number of different types of shoulder-fired SAMs, primarily classified
by their seekers.4
Types of Shoulder-Fired SAMS
Infrared (IR)
Infrared shoulder-fired missiles are designed to home in on a heat source on an
aircraft, typically the engine exhaust plume, and detonate a warhead in or near the
1 Shoulder-fired SAMs have been used effectively in a variety of conflicts ranging from the
Arab-Israeli Wars, Vietnam, the Iran-Iraq War, to the Falklands Conflict, as well as conflicts
in Nicaragua, Yemen, Angola, and Uganda, the Chad-Libya Conflict, and the Balkans
Conflict in the 1990s. Some analysts claim that Afghan mujahedin downed 269 Soviet
aircraft using 340 shoulder-fired SAMs during the Soviet-Afghan War and that 12 of 29
Allied aircraft shot down during the 1991 Gulf War were downed by MANPADs.
2 Wade Bose, “Wassenaar Agreement Agrees on MANPADS Export Criteria”, Arms
Control Today, January/February 2001, p. 1.
3 Marvin B. Schaffer, “Concerns About Terrorists With Manportable SAMS”, RAND
Corporation Reports, October 1993, p. 4.
4 Seeker is a synonymous term for the missile’s guidance system which acquires the target
and guides the missile to its intended point of detonation.

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CRS-2
heat source to disable the aircraft. These missiles use passive guidance, meaning that
they do not emit signals to detect a heat source, which makes them difficult to detect
by targeted aircraft employing countermeasure systems. The first missiles deployed
in the 1960s were IR missiles. First generation shoulder-fired SAMs such as the U.S.
Redeye, early versions of the Soviet SA-7, and the Chinese HN-5 are considered
“tail chase weapons” as their seekers can only acquire and engage a high performance
aircraft after it has passed the missile’s firing position. In this flight profile, the
aircraft’s engines are fully exposed to the missile’s seeker and provide a sufficient
thermal signature for engagement. First generation IR missiles are also highly
susceptible to interfering thermal signatures from background sources, including the
sun, which many experts feel makes them somewhat unreliable.
Second generation IR missiles such as early versions of the U.S. Stinger, the
Soviet SA-14, and the Chinese FN-6 use improved coolants to cool the seeker head
which enables the seeker to filter out most interfering background IR sources as well
as permitting head-on and side engagement profiles. These missiles also employ
technologies to counter decoy flares that might be deployed by targeted aircraft and
also have backup target detection modes such as the ultra violet (UV) mode found
on the Stinger missile.5
Third generation IR shoulder-fired SAMs such as the French Mistral, the
Russian SA-18, and the U.S. Stinger B use single or multiple detectors to produce
a quasi-image of the target and also have the ability to recognize and reject flares
dispensed from aircraft - a common countermeasure used to decoy IR missiles.6
Fourth generation missiles such as the U.S. Stinger Block 2, and missiles believed
to be under development in Russia, Japan, France, and Israel could incorporate focal
plane array guidance systems and other advanced sensor systems which will permit
engagement at greater ranges.7
Command Line-of-Sight
Command line-of- sight (CLOS) missiles do not home in on a particular aspect
(heat source or radio or radar transmissions) of the targeted aircraft. Instead, the
missile operator or gunner visually acquires the target using a magnified optical sight
and then uses radio controls to “fly” the missile into the aircraft. One of the benefits
of such a missile is that it is not as susceptible to standard aircraft mounted
countermeasure systems which are designed primarily to defeat IR missiles. The
major drawback of CLOS missiles is that they require highly trained and skilled
operators. Numerous reports from the Soviet-Afghan War in the 1980s cite Afghan
mujahedin as being disappointed with the British-supplied Blowpipe CLOS missile
because it was too difficult to learn to use and highly inaccurate, particularly when
5 Schaffer, p. 2.
6 Ibid., p. 3.
7 “Raytheon Electronic Systems FIM-92 Stinger Low-Altitude Surface-to-Air Missile
System Family” Jane’s Defence, October 13, 2000, p. 3.

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CRS-3
employed against fast moving jet aircraft.8 Given these considerations, many experts
believe that CLOS missiles are not as ideally suited for terrorist use as are IR
missiles, which sometimes are referred to as “fire and forget” missiles.
Later versions of CLOS missiles, such as the British Javelin, use a solid state
television camera in lieu of the optical tracker to make the gunner’s task easier, and
the Javelin’s manufacturer, Thales Air Defence Ltd., claims that their missile is
virtually impervious to countermeasures.9 Even more advanced CLOS versions, such
as the British Starburst, uses a laser data link in lieu of earlier radio guidance links
to fly the missile to the target.
Laser Beam Riders
Laser beam riding shoulder-fired SAMs use lasers to guide the missiles to the
target. The missile literally flies along the laser beam and strikes the aircraft where
the missile operator or gunner aims the laser. These beam riding missiles are
resistant to current countermeasure systems on military and civilian aircraft. Missiles
such as Sweden’s RBS-70 and Britain’s Starstreak, can engage aircraft from all
angles and only require the operator to continuously track the target using a joystick
to keep the laser aim point on the target. Because there are no data links from the
ground to the missile, the missile can not be effectively jammed after it is launched.
Future beam riding SAMs may require the operator to designate the target only once
and not manually keep a continuous laser aimpoint on the aircraft. Even though
beam riders require relatively extensive training and skill to operate, many experts
consider these missiles particularly menacing in the hands of terrorists due to the
missiles’ resistance to most conventional countermeasures in use today.
Shoulder-Fired SAM Proliferation
Unclassified estimates of the worldwide shoulder-fired SAMs inventory are
widely varied. Published estimates on the number of missiles presently being held
in international military arsenals range from 350,00010 to 500,00011 but disparities
among nations in accountability, inventory control, and reporting procedures could
make these figures inaccurate. Legal transfer of shoulder-fired SAMs is not governed
by an international treaty. The Wassenaar Arrangement12 is the only international
8 Timothy Gusinov, “Portable Weapons May Become the Next Weapon of Choice for
Terrorists”, The Washington Diplomat, January 2003, p. 2.
9 “Land-Based Air Defence 2003-2004”, Jane’s, 2003, p. 37.
10 “Mombasa Attack Highlights Increasing MANPADs Threat”, Jane’s Intelligence Review,
February 2003, p. 28.
11 The 500,000 figure is found in multiple sources including Gusinov, p. 2 and Thomas
Withington’s “Terrorism: Stung by Stingers”, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, May-June
2003, p. 1.
12 The Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use
(continued...)

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CRS-4
agreement that addresses shoulder-fired missiles sales and provisions governing these
sales were not adopted by its 33 members until December 2000. Recent actions by
the Administration may, however, renew emphasis on nonproliferation. According
to press reports and a White House Fact Sheet13 President Bush obtained
commitments from 21 Asian and Pacific Rim members of the Asia Pacific Economic
Group (APEC) to “adopt strict domestic export controls on MANPADs; secure
stockpiles; regulate MANPADs production, transfer, and brokering; ban transfers to
non-state end users; and exchange information in support of these efforts.” APEC
leaders meeting in Bangkok also agreed to strengthen their national controls on
MANPADs and review progress at next year’s APEC meeting in Chile.14 While it is
not clear if the Administration intends to pursue similar commitments in other
regions or with other countries in the future, some analysts believe that such efforts
could possibly serve as the starting point for a comprehensive MANPADs
nonproliferation agreement.
Tracking proliferation to non-state actors is considered even more difficult by
many analysts. There are a variety of means that terrorist organizations use to obtain
missiles, including: theft, black market, international organized crime, arms dealers,
and transfers from states willing to supply missiles to terrorists. Often times, the only
verification that a non-state actor has a shoulder-fired SAM is when a launcher or
fragments from an expended missile are recovered after an attack.15 As in the case
of military arsenals, estimates of shoulder-fired SAMs in terrorist hands vary
considerably. Estimates range from 5,00016 to 150,00017 of various missile types, but
most experts agree that the vast majority of them are IR guided and are likely SA-7
derivatives, versions of which are reportedly possessed by at least 56 countries.18
Some examples attest to the large numbers of these missiles in circulation. As
of December 2002, coalition forces in Afghanistan had captured 5,592 shoulder- fired
SAMs from the Taliban and Al Qaeda.19 Some of these included U.S. Stinger and
British Blowpipe missiles believed to have been left over from the Afghan-Soviet
12 (...continued)
Technologies was established in 1995 to promote greater transparency and responsibility
with regard to transfers of armaments and sensitive dual-use goods and technologies. For
detailed information see [http://www.wassenaar.org].
13 “New APEC Initiatives on Counterterrorism” Fact Sheet from the Office of the Press
Secretary, the White House, Bangkok, Thailand, October 21, 2003; Philip Shenon,”U.S.
Reaches Deal to Limit Transfers of Portable Missiles”, New York Times, October 21, 2003;
Joseph Curl, “Asian Nations Agree to Aid Effort to Battle Terrorism”, Washington Times,
October 22, 2003.
14 “New APEC Initiatives on Counterterrorism”.
15 Thomas B. Hunter, “The Proliferation of MANPADS”, Jane’s, November 28, 2002, p. 1.
16 Soyoung Ho, “Plane Threat” The Washington Monthly”, April 2003, p. 2.
17 “Mombasa Attack Highlights Increasing MANPADs Threat”, p. 28.
18 Ho, p. 2.
19 “SAMs-The New Air Security Threat”, The Travel Insider, December 12, 2002, p. 6.

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CRS-5
War. Shoulder-fired missiles continue to be seized routinely during coalition raids,
suggesting that Taliban and Al Qaeda forces operating in and around Afghanistan
still have access to an undetermined number of these systems. In Iraq, recent press
reports indicate that 4,000 to 5,000 shoulder-fired SAMs may be available to Iraqi
insurgent forces20 who are credited with 19 shoulder-fired SAM attacks against
planes in and around Baghdad International Airport since May 2003.21 Africa, the
region where most terrorist attacks with these missiles have occurred, reportedly also
has a large quantity of shoulder-fired SAMs left over from Cold War sponsorships
and the numerous civil wars of that era.22
Non-State Groups With Shoulder-Fired SAMs
Unclassified estimates suggest that between 25 and 30 non-state groups possess
shoulder-fired SAMs. Table 1 depicts non-state groups believed to possess shoulder-
fired SAMs through the 1996-2001 time period. Additional groups may have
obtained missiles since 2001 but details at the unclassified level are not known.
Actual or estimated quantities of these weapons attributed to non-state groups at the
unclassified level are also unknown.
Table1. Non-State Groups with Shoulder-Fired SAMs:
1996-200123
Group
Location
Missile Type
Armed Islamic Group (GIA)
Algeria
Stinger (c)
Chechen rebels
Checnya, Russia
SA-7 (c), Stinger (c), Blowpipe (r)
Democratic Republic of the
Democratic Republic of
SA-16 (r)
Congo (DRC) rebel forces
the Congo
Harkat ul-Ansar (HUA)
Kashmir
SA-7 (c)
Hizbullah
Lebanon
SA-7 (c),QW-1 (r), Stinger (r)
Hizbul Mujahideen (HM)
Kashmir
Stinger (r)
Hutu militiamen
Rwanda
Unspecified type (r)
Jamaat e Islami
Afghanistan
SA-7 (c), SA-14 (c)
Jumbish-i-Milli
Afghanistan
SA-7 (c)
Khmer Rouge
Thailand/Cambodia
Unspecified type (r)
20 “Shoulder-Fired Missiles Not too Hard to Find”, Associated Press, August 17, 2003.
21 “Coalition Says Hundreds of Surface-to-Air Missiles in Iraq” Agence France Presse,
October 9, 2003.
22 “Shoulder-Fired Missiles Not too Hard to Find”.
23 This table is taken from p. 43 of “The Proliferation of MANPADS”, by Thomas B.
Hunter Jane’s, November 28, 2002.

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CRS-6
Group
Location
Missile Type
Kosovo Liberation Army
Kosovo
SA-7 (r)
(KLA)
Kurdistan Workers Party
Turkey
SA-7 (c), Stinger (c)
(PKK)
Liberation Tigers of Tamil
Sri Lanka
SA-7 (r), SA-14 (r), Stinger (c),
Eeelam
HN-5 (c)
Oromo Liberation Front
Ethiopia
Unspecified type (r)
(OLF)
Palestinian Authority (PA)
Palestinian autonomous
SA-7 (r), Stinger (r)
areas and Lebanon
Popular Front for the
Palestinian autonomous
Unspecified type (r)
Liberation of Palestine-
areas and Lebanon
General Command (PFLP-
GC)
Provisional Irish Republican
Northern Ireland
SA-7 (c)
Army (PIRA)
Revolutionary Armed Forces
Colombia
SA-7 (r), SA-4 (r), SA-16 (r),
of Colombia (FARC)
Redeye (r), Stinger (r)
Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF)
Rwanda
SA-7 (r), SA-16 (r)
Somali National Alliance
Somalia
Unspecified types (r)
(SNA)
Al Qaeda/Taliban
Afghanistan
SA-series (c), Stinger (c),
Blowpipe (c)
National Liberation Army
Colombia
Stinger (r), Unspecified types (r)
(ELN)
National Liberation Army
Macedonia
SA-18 (c)
(UCK)
National Union for the Total
Angola
SA-7 (c), SA-14 (r), SA-16 (r),
Independence of Angola
Stinger (c)
(UNITA)
United State Wa Army
Myanmar
SA-7 (c), HN-5N (c)
United Somali Congress -
Somalia
Unspecified types (r)
Somali Salvation Alliance
(USC-SSA)
Note: (c) is possession confirmed through intelligence sources or actual events; (r) is reported but not
confirmed.

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CRS-7
Civilian Aviation Encounters with Shoulder-Fired
Missiles
The most widely reported statistics on civilian aircraft experience with shoulder-
fired missiles indicate that, over the past 25 years, 35 aircraft have come under attack
from these weapons. Of those 35, 24 were shot down resulting in more than 500
deaths.24 While these statistics have been frequently cited, at least one report has
suggested that these figures may significantly overstate the actual numbers of
civilian-use aircraft that have been attacked by shoulder-fired missiles.25 That report
instead concluded that only about a dozen civil-registered airplanes have been shot
down during this time period and further notes that some of these aircraft were
operating as military transports when they were shot down. On the contrary,
available statistics may underestimate the total number of civilian encounters with
shoulder-fired missiles. It is possible that some aircraft shootings may have been
attributed to other causes for various reasons and are not included in these statistics.
Also, it is possible that some failed attempts to shoot down civilian airliners have
either gone undetected or unreported.
For many incidents considered to be a shoulder-fired missile attack against a
civilian aircraft, there is scant information to make a conclusive determination if that
was, in fact, the case. In some instances, while it is widely recognized that the
incident was a shooting, there is no conclusive determination regarding the weapon
used. For example, in some instances of aircraft shootings there are discrepancies
among accounts of the event, with some reporting that the aircraft was brought down
by a shoulder-fired missile while others claim that anti-aircraft artillery was used.
Also, in many instances there are questions as to whether the flight operation was
strictly for a civilian use or may have been for military or dual use (civilian/military)
purposes. Therefore, there is no universal agreement as to which incidents should
be included in the tally of civilian aviation encounters with shoulder-fired missiles.
Based on our review of available reports and databases on the subject, the
statistic of 24 catastrophic losses out of 35 aircraft appears to be a reasonable
estimate, but not a definitive count, of the total worldwide civil aviation shootings
with shoulder-fired missiles or similar weapons. However, since most of these
incidents took place in conflict zones, they are not typically considered to be
politically motivated because the targeted aircraft may have been perceived as being
used for military purposes.26 While these historical examples do not provide any
particular insight into the political motivation behind shootings of inflight aircraft,
they do provide some indication of the possible outcomes of such an attack. Based
on the commonly cited statistic of 24 aircraft destroyed out of 35 attacks over the past
24 Phillip O’Connor, “Planes are easy targets for portable missiles.” Saint Louis Post-
Dispatch, June 1, 2003, p. A1.; Association of Old Crows, “AOC Position Statement:
‘Missile Defense Systems for the American Commercial Airline Fleet’, Revised August 15,
2003. Alexandria, VA: Author [http://www.crows.org/advocacyManpads.htm]
25 Bill Sweetman, “The enemy down below.” Air Transport World, September 2003, 34-36.
26 See Federal Aviation Administration. Criminal Acts Against Civil Aviation (1996-2000
Editions).

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CRS-8
25 years, the odds of surviving an attack are not particularly encouraging. Using
these numbers, the odds of surviving an attack may be estimated to be only about
30%. However, it is important to note that these incidents include a wide variety of
aircraft types including small piston-engine propeller airplanes, turboprop airplanes,
helicopters, and business jets, as well as large jet airliners. Since the current
legislative proposals and administration efforts to date have been aimed at addressing
ways to protect large commercial jet airliners from shoulder-fired missiles, it is useful
to examine past incidents involving these types of aircraft in order to gain further
insight regarding the threat.
CRS reviewed various sources and found only 5 incidents where large turbojet
airliners were believed to have been attacked by shoulder-fired missiles. These
incidents are listed in Table 2.27 Of these 5 encounters, there was a wide range of
outcomes. Only 2 of the 5 shootings resulted in catastrophic losses of the airplanes
— killing all on board. In two other incidents, the airplanes received significant
damage — but no one was killed. In the most recent incident, the aircraft was fired
upon but not hit.
Table 2. Probable Large Civilian Turbojet Aircraft Encounters
with Shoulder-Fired Missiles (1978-Present)
Date
Location
Aircraft
Operator
Outcome
8-Nov-
Angola
Boeing
Angolan
Catastrophic:130 fatalities
1983
737
Airlines
of 130 people on board
(TAAG)
9-Feb-
Angola
Boeing
Angolan
Hull Loss: aircraft overran
1984
737
Airlines
runway on landing after
(TAAG)
being struck by a missile at
8,000 ft during climbout.
No fatalities with 130 on
board.
21-Sep-
Afghanistan
DC-10
Ariana
Substantial Damage:
1984
Afghan
Aircraft was damaged by
Airlines
the missile, including
damage to two hydraulic
systems, but landed
without further damage.
No fatalities.
27 Sources: Marvin Schaffer, Op. cit.; http://aviation-safety.net/database/index.html (Visited
on 9/30/2003); [http://www.airdisaster.com/cgi_bin/database.cgi (Visited on 9/30/2003);
[http://www.b737.org.uk/accident_report.htm] (Visited on 9/30/2003); Thomas B. Hunter.
“The proliferation of MANPADS.” Jane’s Intelligence Review, November 28, 2002.;
Federal Aviation Administration. Criminal Acts Against Civil Aviation (1996-2000
E d i t i o n s ) ; T h e R A N D - M I P T T e r r o r i s m I n c i d e n t D a t a b a s e
(http://www.rand.org/psj/rand-mipt.html, visited October 8, 2003].

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CRS-9
Date
Location
Aircraft
Operator
Outcome
10-Oct-
Democratic
Boeing
Congo
Catastrophic: 41 fatalities
1998
Republic of
727
Airlines
of 41 people on board.
Congo
19-Nov-
Kenya
Boeing
Arkia Israeli
Miss: Two SA-7’s were
2002
767
Airlines
fired at the aircraft during
climbout, but missed. No
fatalities.
In the first instance, the official findings by Angolan authorities attributed the
November 8, 1983, crash of a TAAG Angolan Airlines Boeing 737 to a technical
problem with the airplane, but UNITA rebels in the area claimed to have shot down
the aircraft with a surface to air missile.28 All 130 people on board were killed
making this the deadliest single incident involving a probable shoulder-fired missile
attack against a civilian aircraft.
In the February 9, 1984 attack of a TAAG Angolan Airlines Boeing 737, the
airplane was struck at an altitude of 8,000 feet during climbout. The crew reportedly
attempted an emergency landing at Huambo, Angola, but were unable to extend the
flaps because of damage to the airplane’s hydraulic systems. Consequently, the crew
was unable to slow the airplane sufficiently before landing and overran the runway
by almost 600 feet. The airplane was totaled but no one was killed.29
In the September 21, 1984 incident, an Ariana Afghan Airlines DC-10 was
struck causing damage to two of the airplane’s 3 hydraulic systems. While some
sources30 defined this incident as a shoulder-fired missile attack, another account
indicated that the DC-10 was hit by “explosive bullets.”31
The most recent catastrophic loss of an aircraft from a surface to air missile was
the October 10, 1998 downing of a Congo Airlines Boeing 727 near Kindu,
Democratic Republic of Congo. The aircraft was reportedly shot down by a missile,
possibly an SA-7, that struck one of the airplane’s engines. Tutsi rebels admitted to
the shooting, claiming that they believed the airplane to be carrying military supplies.
The ensuing crash killed all 40 persons on board.32
The most recent attempted shooting of a jet airliner was the November 19, 2002
incident involving an Israeli-registered Boeing 767 aircraft operated by Arkia Israeli
Airlines. Two SA-7 missiles were fired at the airplane on departure from Mombasa,
Kenya but missed. While the threat of shoulder-fired missiles has long been
recognized by aviation security experts, this incident has focused the attention of
28 [http://aviation-safety.net/database/1983/831108-0.htm] (Visited 10/9/2003).
29 [http://www.b737.org.uk/accident_reports.htm] (Visited 9/30/2003);
30 See Schaffer, Op. cit.; Sweetman, Op. cit.
31 [http://aviation-safety.net/database/1984/840921-0.htm] (Visited 10/9/2003).
32 Federal Aviation Administration. Criminal Acts Against Civil Aviation (1998 Edition).

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CRS-10
many in Congress and the Bush Administration on this threat and options to mitigate
it. Unlike the prior attacks on jet airliners that occurred in war torn areas, the
Mombasa attack was clearly a politically motivated attack, believed to have been
carried out by terrorists with links to Al Qaeda.33 That fact, coupled with already
heightened concerns over aviation security in the aftermath of the September 11,
2001 terrorist attacks, has made the shoulder-fired missile threat a key issue for
homeland security.
The Bush Administration has formed a task force to assess the vulnerability of
U.S. airports to SAMs. Many in Congress are concerned about the threat shoulder-
fired SAMs could pose to airliners. Specific concerns include protecting civilians and
mitigating the potential financial burden for an already besieged industry. Legislation
is being proposed, as are hearings on the subject.34 On February 5, 2003
Representative Steve Israel and Senator Barbara Boxer introduced legislation (H.R.
580, S. 311) directing the Secretary of Transportation to issue regulations requiring
airliners to be equipped with missile defense systems.
Options for Mitigating Missile Threats
Most observers believe that no single solution exists to effectively mitigate the
SAM threat to airliners. Instead, a menu of options may be considered, including
improvements or modifications to commercial aircraft, changes to pilot training and
air traffic control procedures, and improvements to airport and local security.
IR Countermeasures and Aircraft Improvements
Military aircraft employ a variety of countermeasures to mitigate the threat
posed by SAMs. With few exceptions, commercial airlines today do not employ these
protective systems.35 Historical arguments against fielding countermeasures on
airliners include their acquisition cost, cost and difficulty of integrating them into the
aircraft, life cycle costs, environmental constraints on their use, and the fear that they
may promote perceptions that flying is not safe. Estimates of the cost of acquiring
and installing IR countermeasures on commercial aircraft range between $1 million
and $3 million per aircraft.36 According to FAA forecasts, there will be about 5,575
passenger jet aircraft in service in 2004, including 3,455 large narrowbody airplanes,
638 large widebodies, and 1,482 regional jets. Additionally, there are expected to be
33 Sweetman, Op. cit..
34 Marc Selinger. “Lawmakers push anti-missile systems for commercial aircraft.”
Aerospace Daily. January 21, 2003. and Walt Op. cit.
35 It has been reported that the Israeli airline El Al has deployed or is in the process of
equipping some or all of its 34 aircraft with missile countermeasure systems.
36 David Learmount. “Can Countermeasures Work?” Flight International. December 10,
2002. Robert Wall & David A. Fulghum. “Israel to Protect Airliners; U.S. on the Fence.”
Aviation Week & Space Technology. December 9, 2002. p.26.

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1,082 all-cargo jets deployed in air carrier operations in 2004.37 Estimates on
equipping the air carrier jet fleet with IR countermeasures vary because of
assumptions regarding the type of system, whether they would be installed directly
into the aircraft or attached via a pod, and the overall number to be procured. Some
IR countermeasures could increase the airline’s operating costs by increasing the
aircraft’s weight and drag and thus the amount of fuel consumed. Another issue for
installing IR countermeasures on passenger jets is the logistics of equipping the fleet
and the potential indirect costs associated with taking airplanes out of service to
accomplish these installations.
For decades, military aircraft have ejected inexpensive flares to foil IR-guided
SAMs. When a white-hot flare passes through an IR-guided SAM’s field of view, its
intense IR energy can confuse the missile and cause it to lose its lock on the targeted
aircraft. Although effective against older shoulder-fired SAMs, flares often cannot
fool newer models, which use more sophisticated sensors. Also, most flares pose a
fire hazard to combustibles on the ground, and may be too risky for urban areas. DoD
has recently developed new flares and similar decoys that may be more effective
against modern IR-guided missiles, and pose less of a fire hazard.
Figure 1. C-141B Starlifter Ejecting Flares on
Takeoff
Military aircraft also a use variety of transmitters — known as IR
countermeasures, or IRCMs to create fields of IR energy designed to confuse
shoulder-fired SAMs. Unlike flares, IRCMs do not pose a fire hazard to combustibles
on the ground. Like flares, however, they are only effective against older IR-guided
missiles. Recent advances in lasers have led to the development and employment of
directed IRCMs (DIRCMs), that focus their IR energy directly on the incoming SAM.
DIRCMs are able to generate more jamming power than IRCMs, and may offer the
most effective defense against modern shoulder-fired SAMs. DIRCM weight, size,
cost, and reliability, however, may not yet make them attractive for commercial
airlines.
37 Federal Aviation Administration. FAA Aerospace Forecasts Fiscal Years 2003-2014.
Available at: [http://api.hq.faa.gov/clientfiles/CONTENT.htm]

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Military aircraft use flares and IRCMs preemptively: in anticipation of a SAM
launch, a pilot can eject numerous flares, or turn on the IRCM to foil a potential
threat. However, environmental considerations may make the use of flares difficult
for commercial airlines. DIRCM’s can’t be used preemptively. They must be aware
that a missile has been launched, and use missile approach and warning systems
(MAWS) for that function.38 Because IR-guided SAMs are difficult to detect,
MAWS performance is a key factor in the overall effectiveness of the aircraft’s
protection system. DoD is also developing paint that is designed to reduce an
aircraft’s IR reflectivity and visual profile. IR camouflage paint would not reduce an
engine’s heat signature, but it might make it more difficult for terrorists to visually
see the aircraft, and thus could avert a SAM launch. The Navy is studying IR
camouflage paint on the V-22 Osprey.39 The cost and maintainability of this paint
is still being studied, but the paint might actually be lighter than conventional aircraft
paint. Today, IR paint appears to offer few complications for airline application
compared to other potential countermeasures.
In addition to equipping airliners with missile countermeasures, strengthening
the airframe to better withstand missile strikes has been suggested. To date, the
FAA’s Commercial Aircraft Hardening Program has primarily focused on studying
how hardened aircraft can better withstand internal bomb blasts.40 The survivability
of passenger jets following missile strikes is largely unknown. It is expected that
developing hardened aircraft structures will be a challenging problem given that IR
guidance systems seek hot engine exhaust and will likely detonate at or near an
aircraft engine. Since most jet airliners have wing-mounted engines, hardening of
surrounding aircraft structure will likely be infeasible, particularly with regard to
modifying existing aircraft. However, some aircraft survivability experts believe that
isolating critical systems, like redundant hydraulic lines and flight control linkages,
and improving fire suppression and containment capabilities could prevent
catastrophic failures cascading from the initial missile strike.41 While such options
can be integrated into new aircraft type designs, they are unlikely to have any near
term impact on reducing the threat since retrofitting existing air carrier jets with
damage tolerant structures and systems is likely to either be technically infeasible or
not economically practical. Moreover, aircraft hardening options will likely require
extensive research and testing before their feasibility and effectiveness can be
adequately assessed. Initial indications suggest that aircraft hardening and structural
redesign, if feasible, will likely be very costly and could take many years to
implement.
38 MAWS are also employed on aircraft that use flares and IRCMs.
39 Stephen Trimble. “Glitches Pose Little Threat to V-22 Flight Trial Results, Navy Says.”
Aerospace Daily. January 29, 2003.
40 Howard J. Fleisher. “Commercial Aircraft Vulnerability Assessment and Threat
Mitigation Techniques.” Aircraft Survivability, Fall 2002, 24-25. Available at:
[http://www.bahdayton.com/surviac/asnews.htm]
41 Bill Sweetman, Op. cit.

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Improved Pilot Training and Air Traffic Procedures
Airline pilots already receive substantial simulator training on handling loss of
power to one engine during critical phases of flight such as takeoffs and landings.
This training should already prepare flight crews to handle a loss of engine power
resulting from a missile strike. Therefore, additional training for handling missile
attacks may be of limited benefit. On the other hand, specific simulator exercises
using missile attack scenarios may be beneficial by preparing pilots to fly and land
a damaged aircraft. Modern airliners are built with redundancy in avionics and flight
control systems, and consequently, a missile strike that does not cause a catastrophic
structural failure would likely be survivable if the flight crew is properly trained to
handle such a scenario.
Another potential mitigation technique is training flight crews in evasive
maneuvers if fired upon by a shoulder-fired SAM. However, this approach would
not likely be effective and presents significant risks. Without a missile detection and
warning system, it is unlikely that a flight crew would have any indication of a
missile launch. Also, large transport category airplanes are generally not
maneuverable enough to evade a shoulder-fired SAM. There is also concern that
defensive maneuvering of large transport category airplanes could result in a loss of
control or structural failure.42 Consequently, most observers concur that evasive
maneuvering is not a viable option for mitigating the risk of missile attacks.
However, properly trained crews may be able to use other special procedures to evade
missile attacks. Examples of procedures that may be considered to reduce the
airplane’s heat signature and vulnerability to missile strikes include: minimizing the
use of auxiliary power units and other heat sources when operationally feasible;
minimizing engine power settings; and, if a missile launch is detected, reducing
engine power settings to minimum levels required to sustain flight at a safe altitude.
The effectiveness and safety risks associated with techniques such as these will need
to be carefully assessed before procedural measures are implemented.
Another mitigation technique may be to alter air traffic procedures to minimize
the amount of time airliners are vulnerable to missile launches and make flight
patterns less predictable. Current arrival procedures rely on gradual descents along
well defined and publicly known approach courses that place airplanes within range
of shoulder-fired SAMs as far away as 50 miles from the airport.43 Similarly,
departing aircraft with heavy fuel loads operating at high engine power, often along
predefined departure routes, may be particularly vulnerable and can be targeted up
to 30 miles away from the airport before they climb above the effective range of
shoulder-fired SAMs.44
42 See Dave Carbaugh, John Cashman, Mike Carriker, Doug Forsythe, Tom Melody, Larry
Rockliff, & William Wainwright, “Aerodynamic Principles of Large-Airplane Upsets.”
FAST Special: Airbus Technical Digest, June 1998. Available at
[http://www.airbus.com/customer/fastspecial.asp] (Also published in Boeing Aero No. 3).
43 Marvin B. Shaffer. Op. cit..
44 Robert Wall & David A. Fulghum. Op. cit..

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Military aircraft often use spiral descents from altitude above the airfield when
operating in hostile areas. Using spiral descents may be an option for mitigating the
threat of terrorist SAM attacks to airliners approaching domestic airports. Doing so
can limit approach and descent patterns to a smaller perimeter around the airfield
where security patrols can more effectively deter terrorist attacks. While spiral
approaches may be implemented on a limited basis, wide scale use of spiral patterns
would likely require extensive restructuring of airspace and air traffic procedures.
This technique may present safety concerns by greatly increasing air traffic controller
workload and requiring pilots to make potentially difficult turning maneuvers at low
altitude. The use of spiral patterns could also reduce passenger comfort and
confidence in flight safety. Also, this technique would not mitigate the risk to
departing aircraft, which are generally considered to be the most vulnerable to missile
attacks.
Another technique used by military aircraft, particularly fighter jets, to reduce
vulnerability on departure is to make steep, rapid climbouts above the effective range
of surface to air missiles over a short distance. Like spiral descents, such a technique
has limited application for civilian jet airliners. A typical climb gradient for these
aircraft is between 400 and 500 feet per mile, which means that they remain in range
of shoulder-fired missiles for about 40 to 50 miles after departure. Even if the
airplane were to double its climb rate, which would probably be close to the
maximum practically achievable climb rate for most jet airliners, the distance
traveled before safely climbing above the range of shoulder-fired missiles would still
be 20 miles or more. Climbing out at such a steep rate would also pose a risk to the
aircraft since it may not provide an adequate margin of safety if an engine were to fail
during climbout. Also, steep climb angles are likely to be perceived as objectionable
by passengers.
Another option that may be considered is to vary approach and departure
patterns. Regularly varying approach and departure patterns, in non-predicable ways,
may make it more difficult for terrorists to set up a shoulder-fired SAM under a
known flight corridor; and, may increase the probability that they will be detected,
while trying to locate a usable launch site, by ground surveillance, local law
enforcement, or civilians reporting suspicious activities. One challenge to
implementing this technique is that aviation radio frequencies are not protected, and
terrorists might gather intelligence regarding changing flight patterns. Also, flight
tracking data are available in near real time from Internet sources and may be
exploited by terrorists to gain information about aircraft position. Nonetheless, this
approach could be a deterrent by making overflights of particular locations less
predictable. Limitations to this approach include disruption of normal air traffic flow
which may result in delays, increased air traffic controller workload, and possible
interference with noise mitigation procedures. Varying air traffic patterns may be a
viable mitigation technique, particularly at airports with low to moderate traffic and
for approach and departure patterns that overfly sparsely populated areas. Also,
maximizing the use of over water approach and departure procedures, when

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available, coupled with measures to limit or restrict access to and increase patrols of
waters under these flight paths has also been suggested as a mitigation alternative.45
Other suggested changes to air traffic procedures include the increased use of
nighttime flights and minimal use of aircraft lighting. However, this approach is
likely to be opposed by the airlines and passengers since there is little demand for
night flights in many domestic markets. Furthermore, minimizing the use of aircraft
lighting raises safety concerns for aircraft collision avoidance. While the airspace
system includes good radar coverage in the vicinity of airports and airliners are
required to have collision avoidance systems, the last line of protection against midair
collisions is the flight crew’s ability to see and avoid other aircraft. Therefore,
increased use of night flights and minimizing aircraft lighting is not thought to be a
particularly viable mitigation option.
Improvements to Airport and Local Security
One of the most expedient measures that can be taken to mitigate the risk from
shoulder-fired SAMs to airliners is to heighten security, surveillance, and patrols in
the vicinity of airports served by air carriers. The difficulty with implementing these
security measures is that the approach and departure corridors where aircraft operate
within range of shoulder-fired SAMS extend for several miles beyond airport
perimeters. Therefore, while heightening security in the immediate vicinity of an
airport may reduce the threat from shoulder-fired SAMs, these measures cannot
effectively mitigate the threat during the entire portion of flight while airliners are
vulnerable to attack. Nonetheless, using threat and vulnerability assessments, airport
and airspace managers can work with security forces to determine those locations
beyond the airport perimeter that have high threat potential and where aircraft are
most vulnerable to attack. Using this information, security can concentrate patrols
and surveillance in these high risk areas. Airport security managers will likely need
to work closely with local law enforcement to coordinate efforts for patrolling these
high risk areas. Public education and neighborhood watch programs in high risk
areas may also be effective means to mitigate the threat. Aerial patrols using sensor
technology, such as Forward Looking Infrared (FLIR), may also be an effective tool
for detecting terrorists lurking underneath flight paths. However, use of aerial patrols
may significantly impact normal flight schedules and operations, particularly at the
nation’s larger airports.
In addition to increased security, some have suggested using ground based
countermeasures in high risk locations. Randomly dispensing flares in the vicinity
of airports has been suggested, noting that the Israeli airline El Al occasionally used
this technique during periods of heightened tension in the 1980s. However, ground-
based flares pose a risk of fires on the ground and therefore would not be suitable at
many airports in the United States, particularly those surrounded by populated or
wooded areas. Furthermore, dispensing flares may be annoying to some and may
also diminish public confidence in the safety and security of air travel. Ground based
interceptors are another option that has been suggested. These interceptors could be
vehicle-mounted SAMs like the Marine Corps “HUMRAAM” system, or even
45 Marvin B. Schaffer. Op. cit..

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CRS-16
directed energy weapons like the Army’s tactical high-energy laser (THEL). Cost,
reliability, probability of intercept, and potential side-effects and unintended
consequences would have to be weighed when considering these options. Older
“lamp-based” IR countermeasures might also offer some missile jamming capability,
by generating wide, if relatively weak, fields of IR energy near airports. Again,
potential side-effects and unintended consequences would have to be assessed.
Another way to mitigate the threat of shoulder-fired SAMs is through
intelligence and law enforcement efforts to prevent terrorists from acquiring these
weapons, particularly terrorists operating inside the United States. Congress may
consider ways to improve current missile non-proliferation efforts, and may also wish
to debate ways to better share intelligence information with airport security managers
so that appropriate security measures can be implemented to respond to specific
threat information.
Counterproliferation
There are a number of both formal and informal counterproliferation actions that
could be undertaken. Informally, U.S. and coalition forces routinely seize and destroy
caches of shoulder-fired SAMs during combat operations in Afghanistan and Iraq,
thereby reducing the number of these systems available for terrorist use. Formally,
the U.S. is offering $500 for each shoulder-fired SAM turned over to authorities in
both Iraq and Afghanistan.46 According to one press report, 317 shoulder-fired
missiles had been turned over to U.S. military authorities in Iraq since May 1, with
the U.S. paying out over $100,000 in rewards for the missiles.47 Other formal options
could include infiltrating black market, organized crime or terrorist groups, and
seizing or destroying these missiles or setting up “sting” operations to arrest arms
brokers and seize their missiles.
Program Plan and Funding for Missile
Countermeasure Development
Language in the conference report accompanying the Emergency Wartime
Supplemental Appropriations Act of 2003 (P. L. 108-11; H. Rept. 108-76) directed
the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Under Secretary for Science and
Technology to prepare a program plan for developing an anti-missile device for
commercial aircraft. DHS submitted the requisite plan to Congress on May 22,
2003.48 The plan specifies a two year time frame for development, design, testing,
and evaluation of an anti-missile device on a single aircraft type. The plan
anticipates that a parallel FAA certification effort will coincide with this system
development and demonstration leading to an FAA-certified system that can be
46 “Rewards Offered for Missile Launcher”, USA Today, August 1, 2003, p. 6.
47 Raymond Bonner, “The Struggle for Iraq: Missing Weapons; U.S. Can’t Locate Missiles
Once Held in Arsenal of Iraq”, New York Times, October 8, 2003.
48 U.S. Department of Homeland Security. Program Plan for the Development of an
Antimissile Device for Commercial Aircraft. Washington, DC: Author.

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operationally deployed on commercial aircraft at the end of the two year project or
soon thereafter.
The program plan submitted by DHS estimated that the costs to carry out this
project would consist of $2 million in FY 2003 for administrative costs, $60 million
in FY 2004 for system development and initial testing, and an unspecified amount,
not to exceed $60 million, in FY 2005 to complete development and demonstration
of the system and obtain FAA certification. The Department of Homeland Security
Appropriations Act for 2004 (P.L. 108-90, H. Rept. 108-280) fully funded the
requested $60 million in FY 2004 for this effort.
In anticipation of this funding, the DHS established a Counter-MANPADs
Special Program Office (SPO) and published a pre-solicitation notice for prospective
vendors on September 15, 2003.49 DHS envisions the program to consist of two
phases. Phase I will consist of an intensive six-month effort to assess proposed
solutions based on threat mitigation capabilities, system costs, airframe and avionics
integration, and FAA certification issues. Phase II will consist of an 18-month
prototype development based on existing technology that will be demonstrated and
evaluated. DHS indicates that they will be evaluating DIRCM and other existing
technologies in this effort and point out that this program is not intended to develop
new technologies, but to apply existing technologies from the military environment
to the commercial airline environment. DHS indicates that there is a potential for
multiple contract awards with the aggregate total of all Phase I and Phase II awards
estimated to be about $100 million.
Conclusion
No single solution can immediately and completely mitigate the shoulder-fired
SAM threat. As Congress considers possible legislative and oversight approaches,
it is likely that it may consider implementing various combinations of available
mitigation alternatives in whole or in part. In addition, Congress may consider
phasing in mitigation options to best respond to available threat assessments or other
criteria. For example, if threat assessments indicate that large widebody airplanes are
most at risk, Congress may consider whether initially equipping these airplanes
would more effectively deter the threat of missile attacks. Congress may also
consider whether it would be more effective to initially equip aircraft used on
overseas flights, particularly those operating in countries or regions where the risk
of missile attacks is greatest. Congress may also debate whether equipping only a
portion of the air carrier fleet would be a sufficient deterrent, whether all-cargo jets
should be equipped, whether passenger carrying regional jets should be equipped, or
whether equipping the entire air carrier fleet is needed to adequately mitigate the
threat.
49 Department of Homeland Security. Counter-MANPADS Demonstration and
Development. Solicitation Number HSSCST-04-R-AR001-2. Available at FedBizOpps:
Federal Business Opportunities
http://www2.eps.gov/spg/DHS-DR/OCPO/DHS%2DOCPO/postdate_1.html]; last visited
on 10/9/2003).

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Equipping aircraft with missile countermeasure systems has advantages.
Countermeasures are fixed to the aircraft, require little or no flight crew intervention,
and can protect the aircraft even when operating in areas where ground-based security
measures are unavailable or infeasible to implement. Down sides include a high
cost, and potentially undermining passenger confidence in the safety and security of
air travel. Also, because implementation will take time, countermeasures cannot
immediately mitigate today’s terrorist threat. Procedural improvements such as flight
crew training, changes to air traffic management, and improved security near airports
may be less costly than countermeasures and could more immediately help deter
domestic terrorist attacks. However, these techniques by themselves cannot
completely mitigate the risk of domestic attacks and would not protect U.S. airliners
flying to and from foreign airports.
Congress and the Administration have initiated preliminary actions intended to
provide a degree of protection to commercial airliners. Legislation introduced in the
108th Congress (H.R. 580, S. 311) calls for the installation of missile defense
systems in all turbojet aircraft used in scheduled air carrier service. The Department
of Homeland Security (DHS) appropriations for 2004 (P.L. 108-90) designated $60
million for development and testing of a prototype missile countermeasure system
for commercial aircraft. DHS anticipates a two year program totaling about $100
million to develop, test, and certify a suitable system. These actions may constitute
a starting point for the consideration of additional protective measures designed to
address all aspects of the shoulder-fired SAM threat.

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