Order Code IB93085
CRS Issue Brief for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
Jordan: U.S. Relations
and Bilateral Issues
Updated October 14, 2003
Alfred B. Prados
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

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CONTENTS
SUMMARY
MOST RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS
Jordanian Issues of U.S. Interest
Stability of the Regime and Succession
Experiments in Democratic Reform
Reaction to Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001
Murder of a U.S. Diplomat
Jordan’s Role in the Peace Negotiations
Peace Agreements and Normalization
Qualifying Industrial Zones
Opposition to Normalization
Further Arab-Israeli Negotiations
The West Bank and East Jerusalem
Hamas and Rejectionist Groups
Course of Jordanian-Iraqi Relations
Jordan and Operation Iraqi Freedom
Aftermath of the War
Embassy Bombing
Alternate Sources of Oil
Relations with Iran
U.S. Aid and Trade Issues
Aid and Funding Levels
Previous and Recent Aid
Wye River Funds
FY2002 Assistance
FY2003 Assistance
FY2004 Assistance
Free Trade Agreement
Debt Relief
Armed Forces Modernization
Military Equipment
Further Requests
Military Cooperation
Alternatives and Implications

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Jordan: U.S. Relations and Bilateral Issues
SUMMARY
The death of King Hussein on February
In each of the five fiscal years 1998
7, 1999, removed a strong U.S. ally and force
through 2002, Jordan received approximately
for stability; however, his son and successor,
$225 million in annual U.S. assistance. The
King Abdullah, has continued to follow the
Administration proposed doubling U.S. assis-
late King’s moderate and pro-western policies.
tance to Jordan in FY2003, in view of Jorda-
In recent years, Jordan has taken significant
nian support to the anti-terrorism campaign.
steps toward building democratic life, includ-
H.J.Res. 2, the Consolidated Appropriations
ing a return to limited parliamentary democ-
Resolution, 2003 (P.L. 108-7, February 20,
racy. Parliament has eased restrictions in laws
2003) contained $250 million for Jordan in
affecting the press, but some remain.
economic assistance.
It did not contain a
specific amount for Jordan in military assis-
Several issues in U.S.-Jordanian relations
tance, but noted that the $198 million con-
are likely to figure in decisions by Congress
tained in the Senate version of the FY2003
and the Administration on future aid to and
foreign operations bill (S. 2779) had already
cooperation with Jordan. These include the
been obligated by the Administration for
stability of the Jordanian regime, democratic
Jordan. Also, the Emergency Wartime Sup-
reform under way in Jordan, the role of Jordan
plemental Appropriations Act, 2003 (H.R.
in the Arab-Israeli peace process, Jordan’s
1559 / P.L. 108-11) provided $700 million in
concerns over the U.S.-led campaign against
additional economic and $406 million in
Iraq in 2003, and its relations with other
military assistance to Jordan in FY2003. The
regional states.
King Abdullah expressed
Administration requested $250 million in
Jordan’s “absolute condemnation” of the
economic and $206 million in military assis-
September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the
tance for Jordan in FY2004.
The Senate
U.S. and was the first Arab head of state to
version of the Foreign Operations Appropria-
visit President Bush after the attacks. Jordan
tions bill for FY2004 (S. 1426), as introduced
sent military medical and mine clearing units
on July 17, provides the requested aid levels
to Afghanistan in December 2001 to support
for Jordan; the House version (H.R. 2800),
the U.S.-led campaign against terrorism, and
passed on July 24, provides the requested
a field hospital to Iraq in April 2003 during
level of economic assistance and recommends
Operation Iraqi Freedom.
the requested level of military assistance in
report language (H.Rept. 108-222).
Economic and military aid levels are
important factors in the bilateral relationship.
Several alternative scenarios could de-
At the President’s request, Congress appropri-
velop in Jordan: a continuation of the current
ated a total of $401 million in three separate
course toward democracy under the present
appropriation bills, enacted between 1994 and
regime; a return to a more autocratic political
1996, to forgive Jordan’s $702.3 million debt
system; or fundamental changes in the charac-
to the United States. On October 24, 2000,
ter or configuration of the Jordanian state.
the two countries signed a free trade agree-
Steady democratic growth under the present
ment.
On September 28, 2001, President
regime would probably offer the best pros-
Bush signed a bill to implement the agreement
pects of supporting U.S. interests.
(H.R. 2603) as P.L. 107-43.
Congressional Research Service
˜ The Library of Congress

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MOST RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
On August 7, a car bomb exploded outside the Jordanian Embassy in Baghdad, killing
as many as 17 persons and wounding many more. Neither U.S. nor Jordanian officials have
identified the perpetrators; however, the chief U.S. administrator in Iraq, L. Paul Bremer,
speculated that various terrorist groups that have targeted U.S. military personnel might have
been involved, including remnants of the former Baathist regime or the paramilitary force
known as “Saddam’s Fedayeen.”
In an interview published on September 30, 2003, King Abdullah observed that
Jordanian expertise could assist in Iraqi reconstruction activities, noting that “[t]he Jordanian
private sector has had a long and productive relationship with Iraqi companies.” The King
also said Jordan will train approximately 30,000 Iraqi police and military personnel in a
series of 8-week courses to be conducted in Jordan but pointed out that he did not plan to
send Jordanian trainers to Iraq in view of the sensitivities involved.
BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS
Although the United States and Jordan have never been linked by a formal treaty, they
have cooperated on a number of regional and international issues over the years. The
country’s small size and lack of major economic resources have made it dependent on aid
from Western and friendly Arab sources. U.S. support, in particular, has helped Jordan deal
with serious vulnerabilities, both internal and external. Jordan’s geographic position,
wedged between Israel, Syria, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia, has made it vulnerable to the strategic
designs of its more powerful neighbors, but has also given Jordan an important role as a
buffer between these potential adversaries. In 1990, Jordan’s unwillingness to join the allied
coalition against Iraq disrupted its relations with the United States and the Persian Gulf
states; however, relations improved throughout the 1990s as Jordan played an increasing role
in the Arab-Israeli peace process and distanced itself from Iraq.
Jordanian Issues of U.S. Interest
Stability of the Regime and Succession
Jordan, created by colonial powers after World War I, initially consisted of desert or
semi-desert territory east of the Jordan River, inhabited largely by people of bedouin tribal
background. The establishment of the state of Israel brought large numbers of Palestinian
refugees to Jordan, which subsequently annexed a small Palestinian enclave west of the
Jordan River (the “West Bank” territory; see below). The original “East Bank” Jordanians,
through probably no longer a majority in Jordan, remain predominant in the country’s
political and military establishments and form the bedrock of support for the Jordanian
monarchy. Palestinians, who comprise an estimated 55% to 70% of the population, in many
cases tend to regard their stay in Jordan as temporary, and some are at most lukewarm in
their support for the Jordanian regime.
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Jordan in Brief
Population (July 2002):
5,307,470; growth rate: 2.89%
Area:
89,213 sq. km. (34,445 sq. mi., slightly smaller than Indiana)
Ethnic Groups:
Arabs 98%; Circassians 1%; Armenians 1%
Religion:
Sunni Muslim 92%; Christian 6%; small Muslim sects 2%
Literacy (1995):
87% (male 93%, female 79%)
GDP (2002):
$9.5 billion; real growth 3.5-4.0%
Inflation (2002):
1.8%
Unemployment (2002):
14.3% (official estimate); ca. 25% according to some unofficial estimates
Armed Forces (2002):
personnel 100,240; tanks 1,101; combat aircraft 101
Trade Balance (Dec. 2002): -$607.2 million
External Debt (2002):
$7.8 billion
Sources: U.S. Dept. of State; Central Bank of Jordan; other U.S. and Jordanian government departments; The Economist
Intelligence Unit (London)
Throughout his 46-year reign, the late King Hussein was the dominant figure in the
Jordanian political scene and enjoyed a high degree of legitimacy as head of a prestigious
dynasty, the loyalty of the armed forces, and widespread respect as a strong and energetic
leader with extensive experience in governing his country. On January 25, 1999, shortly
before his death from cancer on February 7, King Hussein replaced his brother Hassan with
his son Abdullah as Crown Prince and heir apparent. Upon succeeding to the throne on
February 7, 1999, King Abdullah appointed his younger half brother, Prince Hamzah, as the
new Crown Prince and heir apparent, in accordance with their late father’s wishes.
The King, known as Abdullah II, attended secondary school in the United States and has
studied at Oxford University and Georgetown University. He also attended British military
schools and served in the Jordanian Army starting in 1984, most recently as Commander of
the Special Operations Command before his elevation to the throne. King Abdullah’s wife,
Queen Rania, comes from a prominent Palestinian family, a fact that may garner additional
support from the large Palestinian community in Jordan.
As a military officer who
apparently did not expect to succeed to the throne, King Abdullah was not heavily involved
in politics, economics, or foreign affairs, but had many contacts with military counterparts
in Gulf states and other friendly countries, including the United States. Despite the gap left
by the death of King Hussein, most observers agree that King Abdullah has been successful
in consolidating his rule and has won respect for his hands-on style of governing. (For more
background information, see CRS Report 98-703, Jordan: Succession Issues, February 9,
1999.)
King Abdullah has been keenly interested in boosting Jordan’s economy, which has
been burdened by slow economic growth, declining per capita income, and high levels of
unemployment (see box). The government has recently instituted reform measures, including
reduced customs fees, laws protecting intellectual property, and removal of barriers to
foreign investment, and on April 11, 2000, Jordan became the 136th member of the World
Trade Organization (WTO).
On April 15, 2002, Jordan’s Foreign Minister said the
government would impose “minimal” price increases on such staples as bread, barley, bran,
fodder, and diesel, fuel oil, and kerosene in an effort to qualify for an International Monetary
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Fund (IMF) program designed to reduce Jordan’s chronic budget deficits. A 2% general
sales tax was imposed on 87 items, mainly food products, on June 1, thus completing IMF-
directed reforms aimed at increasing domestic revenue. After sluggish economic growth in
much of the 1990s, Jordan’s Gross National Product (GDP) grew 3.9% in 2000 and 4.6% in
2001, dropping to an estimated 3.8% in 2002 and forecast to drop further to 2.6% in 2003,
due in part to the effect of the Iraq war of 2003 on tourism and other sectors of the economy.
Experiments in Democratic Reform
Jordan is a constitutional monarchy with a bicameral legislature composed of an elected
110-member lower house and a 55-member appointed upper house. Starting in 1989, the late
King Hussein supported a return to limited parliamentary democracy while periodically
moving to curtail dissent when it threatened economic reforms or normalization of relations
with Israel. Jordan held relatively free elections to the lower house of Parliament in 1989
and 1993. In both elections the fundamentalist Islamic Action Front (IAF), which opposed
the government on various issues, emerged as the largest single party, but the King was able
to muster majorities for his domestic and foreign policies. Elections held in November 1997,
however, were boycotted by the IAF and eight smaller nationalist parties, who complained
that recent government decrees had stifled dissent and marginalized the role of Parliament.
King Abdullah has taken further measures to open the political system within certain
limits. Despite their boycott of the 1997 parliamentary elections, members of the IAF
decided to participate in municipal elections held in July 1999 to choose 2,530 councillors
for 304 municipalities. Although pro-government candidates won a majority of the seats, the
IAF registered gains, particularly in several larger cities including the capital city of Amman.
In mid-1999, the government proposed amendments to an unpopular press law that had
banned 14 topics including criticism of the royal family or coverage of the armed forces. On
September 6, 1999, Parliament went further and deleted the entire Article 37, which
contained the restrictions. Journalists, however, can still be punished for various violations
under other provisions of the penal code. Moreover on October 9, 2001, with Parliament in
recess, the government promulgated an amendment to the press law stipulating closure of
publications that carry “false or libelous information that can undermine national unity or the
country’s reputation.” It also bans articles that incite crimes, strikes, or threats to public
order.
This amendment, however, was repealed on April 21, 2003 (The Economist
Intelligence Unit, Country Report, Jordan, June 2003, pp. 19-20.)
On June 16, 2001, King Abdullah dissolved Parliament and approved a new electoral
law on July 23. The new law lowered the voting age from 19 to 18, expanded membership
in the lower house of Parliament from 80 to 104 (subsequently increased to 110), and created
new safeguards against ballot fraud. The law retained a voting system that favors tribal East
Bank constituencies over the largely Palestinian populated cities. Elections, postponed
because of regional tensions, were held on June 17, 2003, and gave 62 seats — more than
half the 110 seats in the lower house — to conservative, independent, and tribal allies of
King Abdullah. However, the fundamentalist Islamic Action Front (IAF), which had
boycotted the 1997 parliamentary elections, won 22% of the vote, thereby gaining 18 seats
in the lower house, plus six IAF sympathizers. Six seats in the 110-member lower house
were reserved for women, one of whom is a member of the IAF. The IAF also participated
in municipal elections for the capital city of Amman, held on July 26-27, 2003, but boycotted
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elections in other municipalities in protest against what IAF spokesmen described as
undemocratic procedures governing the municipal elections.
Reaction to Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001
King Abdullah was the first Arab head of state to visit President Bush after the
September 11, 2001, attacks, and at a joint press conference on September 28, he reiterated
Jordan’s “full, unequivocal support” for the United States. Since then, Jordan has taken
several steps to support the U.S. campaign against terrorism. In December 2001, Jordan sent
approximately 200 military medical personnel to Afghanistan to set up a 50-bed field
hospital in the northern city of Mazar-i-Sharif. According to a U.S. Defense Department fact
sheet, as of June 6, 2002, the hospital had seen 68,811 patients, almost all of them civilian,
and performed 798 surgeries. A Jordanian Army mine-clearing unit, also deployed to
Afghanistan during December, helped clear 70,000 square meters of territory including a key
air base of anti-tank and anti-personnel mines. Also, the Defense Department fact sheet
noted that Jordan has provided basing and overflight permission for U.S. and coalition forces
taking part in operations in Afghanistan.
Over a year before the September attacks, in April 2000, Jordan had charged 28 persons
(13 in absentia) allegedly linked to the exiled Saudi extremist Osama bin Laden with
involvement in a plot to carry out terrorist acts in Jordan. Six of these were sentenced to
death by a military court on September 18, 2000; 16 received varying prison terms (including
two life terms); and six were acquitted. In later developments, Jordan reportedly thwarted
at least two attacks planned by agents linked to bin Laden in 2001. (Time, November 18,
2001). Subsequently, Jordan reportedly arrested 11 suspected terrorists who were allegedly
planning attacks on the U.S. and Israeli embassies in Jordan, along with other Israeli targets
on the West Bank (Christian Science Monitor, June 3, 2002). The detainees are said to have
ties to Osama bin Laden’s Al Qaeda organization.
In November 2002, Jordanian police and military units moved to suppress rioting in the
south-central town of Maan following government attempts to arrest a militant Islamic
preacher who had earlier staged a rally in support of Osama bin Laden. Government sources
attributed the unrest in Maan to drugs and smuggling, but some other observers attributed
it to perceived neglect by the government of poor economic conditions in the Maan area,
notably high unemployment.
Murder of a U.S. Diplomat. On October 28, 2002, Lawrence Foley, a U.S. diplomat
assigned to the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) program in Jordan, was
shot and killed by an unknown assailant as Foley was leaving for work, marking the first
lethal attack on a U.S. official in Jordan in more than 30 years. On December 14, the
Jordanian Minister of Information announced that two persons who had been apprehended
by Jordanian authorities as suspects in the Foley case had confessed to membership in Al
Qaeda. According to Jordanian authorities, the two had received instructions from an Al
Qaeda official outside Jordan to target foreign diplomats and Jordanian security services
personnel. According to subsequent press reports on May 12, 2003, a Jordanian military
prosecutor charged 11 men with “plotting to carry out terrorist activities leading to the death
of an individual” [presumably referring to Mr. Foley]. The charge did not specifically
mention Al Qaeda. Five of the accused pleaded innocent in court proceedings on July 8,
2003; the other six are being tried in absentia. A subsequent news wire reported that a
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Jordanian military court convened on September 29, 2003, to try 13 suspected terrorists
(including three in absentia) on charges of conspiring to attack the U.S. embassy and four
Jordanian military bases where they believed U.S. troops were stationed.
Jordan’s Role in the Peace Negotiations
Peace Agreements and Normalization. Jordan and Israel signed a peace treaty
on October 26, 1994. Subsequently, the two countries exchanged ambassadors; Israel
returned approximately 131 square miles of territory near the Rift Valley to Jordan; the
Jordanian Parliament repealed laws banning contacts with Israel; and the two countries
signed a number of bilateral agreements between 1994 and 1996 to normalize economic and
cultural links. Water sharing, a recurring problem, was partially resolved in May 1997 when
the two countries reached an interim arrangement under which Israel began pumping 72,000
cubic meters of water from Lake Tiberias (the Sea of Galilee) to Jordan per day (equivalent
to 26.3 million cubic meters per year — a little over half the target amount envisioned in an
annex to the peace treaty).
Qualifying Industrial Zones. An important vehicle for commercial cooperation has
been the establishment of “Qualifying Industrial Zones” (QIZs), under which goods produced
with specified levels of Jordanian and Israeli input can enter the United States duty free,
under the provisions of P.L. 104-234. This act amended previous legislation so as to grant
the President authority to extend the U.S.-Israel free trade area to cover products from QIZs
between Israel and Jordan or between Israel and Egypt. Since 1998, the U.S. Trade
Representative has designated thirteen industrial parks in Jordan as QIZs, of which three are
publicly operated and ten are privately owned. Seven of these QIZs are active; three are not
yet active; and two are in the process of becoming active, according to a fact sheet provided
by the Jordanian Embassy in Washington on August 21, 2003. A joint Israeli-Jordanian
committee including an observer from the United States approves products produced in the
QIZs and certifies their eligibility for duty free entry into the United States.
Opposition to Normalization. King Abdullah’s efforts to normalize relations with
Israel have faced significant resistance within Jordan, particularly among Islamic
fundamentalist groups, parts of the Palestinian community, and influential trade and
professional organizations representing some 80,000-100,000 engineers, doctors, lawyers,
journalists, and writers. Among many mainstream Jordanians, there is some disappointment
that peace with Israel has not brought more tangible economic benefits to them so far.
Opponents of normalization have repeatedly called on Jordanians to boycott contacts with
Israel, and activists among them have compiled two “black lists” of Jordanian individuals
and companies that deal with Israel. In January 2001, Prime Minister Ali Abu Raghab
warned that such lists harm Jordan’s investor-friendly image. Police subsequently arrested
seven union leaders on charges of belonging to an illegal organization (apparently, a 24-
member umbrella committee which had been in the forefront of the black list campaign). A
Jordanian appellate court ruled on November 28, 2002, that there is no legal foundation for
the creation of anti-normalization committees by trade unions.
Further Arab-Israeli Negotiations. Jordan, like Egypt, has resisted pressures from
some Arab states to sever relations with Israel since the outbreak of Israeli-Palestinian
clashes in September 2000, but the Jordanian government has deferred sending a new
ambassador to Israel, because of what Jordan regards as an excessive Israeli response to the
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Palestinian uprising. On May 24, 2001, Jordan’s official news agency announced that King
Abdullah and visiting Palestinian leader Yasir Arafat supported the recommendations of a
fact-finding team led by former U.S. Senator George Mitchell aimed at halting Israeli-
Palestinian strife. At an Arab summit conference on March 27-28, 2002, Jordan backed a
peace initiative by Crown Prince Abdullah of Saudi Arabia calling, among other things, for
Israeli withdrawal from territories occupied since 1967, a “just solution to the Palestinian
refugees,” and establishment of normal relations between Arab states and Israel. According
to the press, the Jordanian Prime Minister told attendees at the conference that this initiative
“constitutes a corner-stone of a comprehensive peace in the region.”
Since the resumption of violence between Palestinians and Israelis in September 2000,
Jordan has pushed the United States to take a more active role in the peace process. In a
press release by the Jordanian Embassy in Washington, Jordan welcomed President Bush’s
speech of June 24, 2002, outlining a forthcoming plan, or “Road Map,” to help jumpstart the
peace process. The Road Map, released by the so-called Quartet (the United States, the
European Union, Russia, and the United Nations) on April 30, 2003, includes a role for
Jordan as part of an oversight board to assist in Palestinian-Israeli security cooperation and
reconstruction activities on the West Bank and Gaza. On June 4, 2003, Jordan hosted a
summit conference attended by President Bush, Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, and
Prime Minister Mahmoud Abbas on June 4, 2003 at the Jordanian Red Sea port city of
Aqaba, where attendees discussed further steps to implement the Road Map.
In his
welcoming remarks, King Abdullah stated that “we reaffirm today our strong position against
violence in any form and from whatever source.” In an interview on September 30, the King
said the death of the Road Map would be disastrous; he urged Israel to support the new
Palestinian Prime Minister appointee Ahmad Quray and called on Palestinians to end
violence against Israelis.
The West Bank and East Jerusalem. The Jordanian-Israeli peace treaty does not
address the status of the West Bank territory, which was annexed by Jordan in 1950 but
occupied by Israel in 1967, nor does it address the status of East Jerusalem (except as noted
below); both issues are subjects of Israeli-Palestinian rather than Israeli-Jordanian
negotiations. Although King Hussein decided in August 1988 “to disengage our legal and
administrative relations with the West Bank,” Jordan remains involved in Palestinian issues
for several reasons: Jordan’s large Palestinian population, its continuing involvement in
supporting some West Bank institutions, the preference on the part of some Israeli leaders
for a Jordanian role in a future Palestinian settlement, and Jordan’s continued role in
protecting and maintaining the Islamic holy places in East Jerusalem. Also, the Jordanian
government provides humanitarian, educational, and social services to Palestinian refugees
residing in refugee camps in Jordan, estimated by a Jordanian official at $400 million in
2001.
Palestinian leaders have taken exception to Article 9 of the 1994 Israeli-Jordanian
treaty, which states that Israel “respects the historical role of the Hashemite Kingdom [of
Jordan] in the mosques of Jerusalem” and “will give high priority to the Jordanian historic
role in these shrines.” Palestinian leader Arafat has asserted that “sovereignty over Jerusalem
and supervision of Jerusalem is for Palestinians.” In a speech to a Washington, DC audience
on May 13, 2002, King Abdullah said that under a peace deal that he envisions, “[t]he
Jerusalem question would be answered, by providing for a shared city open to all faiths.”
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Hamas and Rejectionist Groups. According to the U.S. State Department’s most
recent annual report on patterns of global terrorism (April 2003), the Jordanian government
has remained vigilant in opposing terrorism. On August 30, 1999, Jordanian security forces
closed offices used by the fundamentalist Palestinian organization Hamas, which the late
King Hussein had tolerated to some degree, on the grounds that the offices were registered
as businesses but were conducting illegal political activity. In November 1999, authorities
announced that the Hamas offices would be closed permanently. On October 9, 2001, after
the terrorist attacks on the United States, the Jordanian government issued an amendment to
terrorism laws banning any banking operations “linked to terrorism activities”, along with
banning border infiltration and attacks on industry, shipping, telecommunications, and
computer systems. On April 24, 2002, news articles reported that Jordan had arrested five
members of an illegal Islamic fundamentalist organization known as Tahrir (Liberation),
which has demanded that Jordan send troops to support Palestinians in the West Bank.
Course of Jordanian-Iraqi Relations
Jordan’s earlier ties with Iraq during the 1990-1991 Iraq-Kuwait crisis, a major irritant
in U.S.-Jordanian relations, cooled considerably after the early 1990s. Jordan subsequently
tightened enforcement of U.N. economic sanctions against Iraq, allowed an Iraqi opposition
group to establish an office in Jordan, increased its military cooperation with the United
States (see below), and repeatedly criticized Saddam Hussein’s policies, including Iraq’s
failure to observe the terms of U.N. Security Council resolutions. At the same time,
Jordanian officials frequently voiced opposition to any use of force against Iraq and
suggested that lifting sanctions could alleviate suffering by the Iraqi people.
Prior to Operation Iraqi Freedom, Jordan continued to import oil from Iraq at discounted
prices, pointing out to the U.N. Sanctions Committee that it has had no other source of
affordable oil since the cessation of Saudi oil shipments in 1990. Sources quote somewhat
varying figures, ranging from 70,000 to 80,000 barrels per day (bpd) of crude oil and
additional amounts of oil products (fuel oil, gas oil, lubrication oil), with maximum estimates
of 96,000 bpd of crude oil and oil products combined. Actual payments were reportedly
made in commodities rather than cash, through shipments of humanitarian goods from
Jordan to Iraq, in accordance with annual trade accords signed between the two countries.
Under the trade accord for 2002, for example, Jordan was to export an estimated $260
million worth of commodities to Iraq.1 A news wire report of August 30, 2002, provided
higher figures, indicating that Jordan was receiving an oil grant of $300 million and another
$350 million worth of oil in barter arrangements. According to preliminary Jordanian
government figures covering the first 11 months of 2002, Iraq and the United States ranked
first and second, respectively, among Jordan’s leading trading partners.
Since 1991, annual U.S. foreign assistance appropriations acts have contained
restrictions on U.S. assistance to any country not in compliance with U.N. Security Council
sanctions against Iraq. According to the State Department, the U.N. Sanctions Committee
has “taken note of” Jordan’s imports of Iraqi oil and its lack of economically viable
alternatives. The U.S. Administration issued annual waivers of the above restrictions on U.S.
assistance to Jordan on grounds of national interest but continued to encourage Jordan to
1 “Iraq Renews Annual Oil Deal with Jordan,” Reuters News Wire, December 23, 2001.
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seek alternative energy sources. (See below.) With the collapse of the Saddam Hussein
regime, this issue is largely overtaken by events.
Jordan and Operation Iraqi Freedom. As U.S.-Iraqi tensions mounted in mid-
2002, Jordan tried to balance its close U.S. ties with its reluctance on political and economic
grounds to support a military campaign against Iraq. Palestinians, who form a majority of
Jordan’s population, and other Jordanians with tribal ties to Iraq largely opposed military
action against Iraq; moreover, Jordanian officials reportedly estimated that a war with Iraq
would create an additional burden of $1 billion on Jordan’s economy. During the months that
preceded the U.S.-led military campaign against Iraq (Operation Iraqi Freedom), Jordanian
officials maintained publicly that Jordan would not become a “launching pad” for military
action against Iraq2 and that there were no U.S. troops in Jordan. On February 24, 2003,
however, Jordanian Prime Minister Ali Abu Raghab and U.S. defense officials
acknowledged that several hundred U.S. troops were in Jordan to operate newly delivered
Patriot anti-missile systems and coordinate search and rescue operations. (“U.S. Troops
Deployed in Jordan,” Boston Globe, February 25, 2003.) A Washington Post article of April
1, 2003, two weeks after the military campaign began, estimated that 3,000 U.S. troops were
in Jordan.
After the war began, Jordanian authorities reportedly prevented two Iraqi terrorist plots
targeting Americans in the country. On March 23, 2003, the Jordanian government expelled
five Iraqi diplomats believed to be involved in the terrorist plots. Jordan also took several
steps to meet the humanitarian needs of the Iraqi people during the war. A 55-bed field
hospital dispatched by the Jordanian Armed Forces to Iraq in late April had treated 5,500
patients, mostly Iraqis, by May 1 (the date President Bush announced the end of major
combat operations) and continued to provide services in Iraq after the war. The Jordanian
port of Aqaba also served as a transit point for shipments of wheat and flour to Iraq.
Aftermath of the War. Jordan has not taken a firm position on the 25-member Iraqi
Governing Council (reduced to 24 by the death of one of its members), which was appointed
by the U.S.-led coalition on July 13 to serve as an interim government for Iraq. Jordanian
leaders have welcomed the Council but said it would be premature to recognize it formally
yet. On July 15, Jordanian Foreign Minister Muasher called the establishment of the Iraqi
Governing Council “a positive step,” while expressing hopes that it would lead to a
government elected by the Iraqi people. Foreign Minister Muasher supported the admission
of an Iraqi Governing Council representative at a meeting of the Arab League in Cairo on
September 9; however, after the meeting, he cautioned that “[r]ecognition of the Governing
Council has not taken place ... all that has happened is the acceptance of representation of
Iraq in the League.”3 Jordanian leaders have strongly criticized one member of the Iraqi
2 In an interview with Reuters on March 6, 2003, Jordanian Foreign Minister Marwan Muasher said
“[w]e’ve made it clear Jordan is not going to participate in a war and will not be a launching pad for
war against Iraq.” In an interview with the official Jordan News Agency published on April 3, King
Abdullah stated that “[w]e are not part of this war.”
3 “Iraq Council moves towards international acceptance,” Reuters News Wire, September 9, 2003.
Jordanian leaders object to one member of the Governing Council, former Iraqi exile leader Ahmad
Chalabi, who was convicted in absentia by a Jordanian military court in 1992 of embezzling $70
(continued...)
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Governing Council, Ahmad Chalabi, who was convicted in absentia in 1992 by a Jordanian
military court of embezzling $70 million in the late 1980s. Chalabi, a leading figure in the
Iraqi exile community before the collapse of the Saddam Hussein regime, says that he was
framed by the former Iraqi President and Chalabi’s daughter listed rebuttals to charges
against Chalabi in a letter to the Wall Street Journal on August 7, 2003.
Jordanians have indicated willingness to play some role in the reconstruction of Iraq.
A Jordanian news article reported that Jordanian and Iraqi businessmen agreed on June 9 to
set up a joint business council that, among other things, will seek to launch joint ventures
between the two countries (Jordan Times, August 10 and 12, 2003). In an interview
published on September 30, 2003, King Abdullah observed that Jordanian expertise could
assist in Iraqi reconstruction activities, noting that “[t]he Jordanian private sector has had a
long and productive relationship with Iraqi companies.” The King also said Jordan will train
approximately 30,000 Iraqi police and military personnel in a series of 8-week courses to be
conducted in Jordan, pointing out that he did not plan to send Jordanian trainers to Iraq in
view of the sensitivities involved.
Embassy Bombing. On August 7, a car bomb exploded outside the Jordanian
Embassy in Baghdad, killing as many as 17 persons and wounding many more. Neither U.S.
nor Jordanian officials have identified the perpetrators; however, the chief U.S. administrator
in Iraq, L. Paul Bremer, speculated that various terrorist groups that have targeted U.S.
military personnel might have been involved, including remnants of the former Baathist
regime or the paramilitary force known as “Saddam’s Fedayeen.” Bremer also said U.S.
officials are tracking an Islamist group known as Ansar al-Islam, formerly based in Iraq’s
northern Kurdish areas with alleged ties to Al Qaeda, in the aftermath of the Jordanian
embassy bombing. According to news reports, U.S. special forces and pro-Western Kurdish
militia expelled Ansar al-Islam in April, but the organization may have regrouped in
Baghdad during the summer. (“Bremer says no conclusion on Iraq embassy bombers,”
Reuters, August 9, 2003). Shortly after the explosion, young Iraqi men stormed the embassy
gate, vandalized pictures of the late King Hussein and King Abdullah, and shouted anti-
Jordanian slogans. (“At Least 7 Die in Car Bombing at Jordan’s Embassy in Baghdad,” New
York Times, August 7, 2003.) Later on, following the bombing of the U.N. Headquarters in
Baghdad on August 19, an estimated 65 injured U.N. staff personnel were evacuated to
Amman, Jordan, and treated at Jordanian medical facilities.
Alternate Sources of Oil. According to news reports on March 6, 2003, an
unidentified Arab official said Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates had
agreed to provide Jordan with a total of 120,000 barrels of oil per day to replace shipments
of Iraqi oil. A subsequent news report in April indicated that Saudi Arabia and Kuwait had
agreed to provide Jordan with 50,000 and 25,000 barrels of oil per day, respectively. On
April 13, Jordanian Energy Minister Muhammad Batayneh announced that a Saudi tanker
delivered a shipment of 100,000 tons of crude oil to Jordan. Sources did not indicate if these
shipments are being provided at market prices, which would be significantly more costly than
the discounted prices previously offered by Iraq.
3 (...continued)
million in the late 1980s while residing in Jordan. Chalabi maintains he was framed by agents of
former Iraqi President Saddam Hussein.
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Relations with Iran. Jordan has had generally poor relations with Iran since the
establishment of the Islamic Republic in 1979, due in part to Jordanian allegations that Iran
was promoting Islamic opposition in Jordan. There have been recent indications of a
warming trend between the two countries, however, at least on the commercial level. During
a landmark visit by King Abdullah to Iran on September 3 — the first by a Jordanian ruler
in over 20 years — the two sides discussed bilateral trade and security. Also, according to
the Iranian news agency, the leaders “welcomed the establishment of the Iraqi Governing
Council, and described it as a step towards handing over the power to the Iraqi people.”
U.S. Aid and Trade Issues
Aid and Funding Levels
Previous and Recent Aid. The United States has provided economic and military
aid, respectively to Jordan since 1951 and 1957. Total U.S. aid to Jordan through 2003
amounted to approximately $7 billion, including $4 billion in economic aid and $3 billion
in military aid. Levels of aid have fluctuated, increasing in response to threats faced by
Jordan and decreasing during periods of political differences or worldwide curbs on aid
funding. The United States has markedly increased its aid to Jordan since the mid-1990s to
help Jordan strengthen its economy, maintain domestic stability, and pursue normalization
with Israel. Between FY1998 and FY2002, annual U.S. economic and military aid levels to
Jordan were approximately $150 million and $75 million, respectively. Further increases in
U.S. aid to Jordan began in FY2003, in view of Jordan’s support for the post-9/11 campaign
against terrorism. More detailed discussion follows. Table 2 shows U.S. levels of U.S.
assistance to Jordan since 1990.
Wye River Funds. In addition to annual aid funds, at the request of the Clinton
Administration, Jordan received $300 million as part of a special package to support the Wye
River agreement, a U.S.-sponsored Israeli-Palestinian agreement that the late King Hussein
had helped negotiate in 1998. Of the $300 million in Wye River funds provided to Jordan,
$100 million ($50 million in ESF and $50 million in FMF) were included in a supplementary
appropriations bill for FY1999 (P.L. 106-31, May 21, 1999). The remaining $200 million
($50 million in ESF and $150 million in FMF) were included in H.R. 3422, the Foreign
Operations Appropriations bill for FY2000, which was passed by reference in the
Consolidated Appropriations Act for FY2000 (P.L. 106-113, November 29, 1999). (See
Table 2.)
FY2002 Assistance. The Bush Administration requested $150 million in ESF and
$75 million in FMF, as well as $1.8 million in IMET for Jordan in FY2002. The House
version of the Foreign Operations Appropriations bill for FY2002, H.R. 2506, did not
contain specific allocations for Jordan; however, in report language (H.Rept. 107-142, July
17, 2001) the House Appropriations Committee expressed “its continued strong support for
Jordan’s constructive and critical role in the region” and recommended the same levels of
ESF and FMF contained in the President’s budget request. The House passed H.R. 2506 on
July 24, 2001, by 381 to 46 (Roll no. 266). The Senate version, passed on October 24, 2001,
by 96 to 2 (Record Vote No. 312), did contain the amounts requested by the President for
Jordan. The conference report (H.Rept. 107-345, December 19, 2001) included the amounts
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contained in the Senate version ($150 million in ESF and $75 million in FMF). The House
agreed to the conference report by 357-66 (Roll no. 505) on December 19 and the Senate
agreed to the report by unanimous consent on December 20. President Bush signed the bill
as P.L. 107-115 on January 10, 2002.
As part of its campaign against terrorism in the aftermath of the September 11 attacks,
the Bush Administration requested supplemental funding in FY2002 for a number of
countries that are playing a role in supporting the U.S. effort. Under supplemental funds
requested by the Administration, Jordan received an additional $125 million in U.S.
assistance, consisting of $100 million in budget support and $25 million to finance
equipment for border security and special operations forces. Respective versions of a
supplemental bill (H.R. 4775) passed by the House on May 24 and the Senate on June 7 did
not specifically earmark these funds for Jordan, nor did the conference report (H.Rept. 107-
593). The President signed H.R. 4775 as P.L. 107-206 on August 2, 2002. According to the
Jordanian press, the last installment of the $100 million in FY2002 supplemental budgetary
support was released to Jordan on November 7, 2002.
FY2003 Assistance. The Bush Administration sought to double U.S. aid to Jordan
in FY2003, in view of Jordanian support to the campaign against terrorism.
The
Administration’s budget request contained a total of $448 million for Jordan in FY2003,
including $250 million in economic assistance and $198 million in military assistance. A
spokesman for the Office of Management and Budget was quoted as saying the increased aid
would be used to improve border controls and interdiction of illegal weapons flow, to
support financial training, trade, and investment, and to strengthen educational opportunities.
These amounts were contained in S. 2779, the Foreign Operations Appropriations bill for
FY2003, reported by the Senate Appropriations Committee on July 24, 2002 (S.Rept. 107-
219). In the report, the Committee noted “with appreciation Jordan’s constructive role in the
peace process and efforts to implement economic reforms.” A bill reported by the House
Appropriations Committee on September 19, 2002, H.R. 5410, did not contain specific
amounts; however, in report language (H.Rept. 107-663), the Committee recommended the
same levels of aid as those contained in the President’s budget request. The Committee also
“expressed its continued strong support for and appreciation of Jordan’s constructive and
critical role in the region.” The 107th Congress adjourned without floor action on either bill.
On February 12, 2003, both houses agreed to the conference report on a new bill, H.J.Res.
2, the Consolidated Appropriations Resolution, 2003, which President Bush signed as P.L.
108-7 on February 20. The conference report (H.Rept. 108-10) contained $250 million in
ESF for Jordan in FY2003. The conference report did not contain a specific earmark in FMF
for Jordan in FY2003 but noted that the $198 million contained in the Senate version of the
bill had already been obligated by the Administration for Jordan.
On March 25, 2003, the President sent Congress a request for supplemental funding
including, among other things, $700 million in economic aid and $406 million in military
assistance for Jordan to help offset the effects of the war with Iraq on Jordan’s economy and
bolster its security. Versions of the Emergency Wartime Supplemental Appropriations Act,
2003, H.R. 1559) passed by the House on April 3 and Senate on April 7, respectively,
contained the requested amounts for Jordan, as did the conference report (H.Rept. 108-76),
which was passed by voice vote in the House and unanimous consent in the Senate on April
12, 2003. In addition, Section 1310 of the bill provided that up to $1,400 million may be
transferred under the heading Iraqi Freedom Fund to Pakistan, Jordan, and other key
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cooperating states to reimburse them for certain logistical expenses and military support.
The bill was signed into law (P.L. 108-11) on April 16.
FY2004 Assistance. In its budget request for FY2004, the Administration requested
$250 million in ESF and $206 million in FMF for Jordan. These amounts are included in
S. 1426, the Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriation
Bill, 2004, which was reported by the Senate Appropriations Committee on July 17, 2003
(S.Rept. 108-106). The House version, H.R. 2800, reported by the House Appropriations
Committee on July 21, 2003 (H.Rept. 108-222) and passed on July 24 by 370-50 (Roll no.
429), contains the requested level of ESF, and it recommends the requested level of FMF in
report language.
Free Trade Agreement
On October 24, 2000, President Clinton and King Abdullah witnessed the signing of a
U.S.-Jordanian Free Trade Agreement, which will eliminate duties and commercial barriers
to bilateral trade in goods and services originating in the two countries. Earlier, in a report
released on September 26, the U.S. International Trade Commission concluded that a U.S.-
Jordan Free Trade Agreement would have no measurable impact on total U.S. imports or
exports, U.S. production, or U.S. employment. Under the agreement, the two countries
agreed to enforce existing laws concerning worker rights and environmental protection. On
January 6, 2001, then President Clinton transmitted to the 107th Congress a proposal to
implement the Free Trade Agreement. On July 23, U.S. Trade Representative Zoellick and
Jordanian Ambassador Marwan Muashir exchanged letters pledging that the two sides would
“make every effort” to resolve disputes without recourse to sanctions and other formal
procedures. These letters were designed to allay concerns on the part of some Republican
Members over the possible use of sanctions to enforce labor and environmental provisions
of the treaty.
Meanwhile, similar bills were introduced in both houses of Congress to implement the
U.S.-Jordanian FTA: S. 643 (Baucus, introduced on March 28, 2001), H.R. 1484 (Levin,
introduced on April 4, 2001), and H.R. 2603 (Thomas, introduced on July 24, 2001). On
July 26, the Senate Finance Committee and the House Ways and Means Committee approved
S. 643 and H.R. 2603, respectively, by voice votes. On July 31, the House passed H.R. 2603
by voice vote, and the Senate passed the bill by voice vote on September 24. President Bush
signed the bill as P.L. 107-43 on September 28, during King Abdullah’s visit to Washington.
For additional information, see CRS Report RL30652, U.S.-Jordan Free Trade Agreement.
Debt Relief
In 1994, in recognition of Jordan’s support for Middle East peacemaking, President
Clinton asked Congress to pass the necessary legislation to forgive Jordan’s $702.3 million
debt to the United States (approximately 10% of Jordan’s worldwide debt). Congress
appropriated a total of $401 million in subsidies, which under pertinent budgetary procedures
were sufficient to forgive the entire $702.3 million owed to the United States at the time.
The $401 million in subsidies were contained in three appropriations bills beginning in 1994,
as shown in Table 1 below. Not covered under the previous debt forgiveness package are
certain loan guarantees, concessional credits (consisting of food aid), and non-concessional
credits (mainly U.S. Defense Department loans) estimated respectively at $223.8 million,
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$84.1 million, and $171.1 million as of the end of 2001. (The Consolidated Appropriations
Resolution, 2003, P.L. 108-7, makes $15 million available from FY2002 supplemental funds
to restructure certain loans and guarantees for Jordan.) In seeking U.S. debt forgiveness,
Jordanian officials hoped to obtain a three-fold benefit: to foster popular support for peace
with Israel by creating a climate favorable for foreign investment with accompanying
economic benefits; to demonstrate the credibility of U.S. commitments to domestic and
regional opponents of the peace process; and to encourage Jordan’s other international
creditors to follow suit in providing debt relief.
Though willing to ease payment terms, Jordan’s creditors (other than the United States)
have been largely unwilling to forgive debts, and Jordan’s total indebtedness rose slightly
from 2002 ($7.55 billion) to mid-2003 ($7.62 billion). Among major creditors, Jordan owes
$1.67 billion to Japan, $1.09 billion to the World Bank, and $1.86 billion to three major
European countries: Germany, France, and Britain. Jordan did succeed in easing repayment
pressures by rescheduling $400 million of its debt to Paris Club creditors in 1997 and another
$800 million in 1999; and on April 4, 2000, Jordan signed a $123 million aid agreement with
the European Union, of which about two thirds was to be used to alleviate poverty in
Jordan’s burgeoning cities and shanty towns. A subsequent Paris Club agreement in July
2002 rescheduled $1.2 billion out of $3.8 billion owed by Jordan to the 11 members of the
Paris Club, thereby relieving Jordan of an annual $250 million in debt-servicing payments
to international creditors until 2007.
Table 1. U.S. Debt Forgiveness for Jordan
($ in millions)
Fiscal Year
Amount of
Approximate
Act
Funds
Subsidy
Amount Forgiven
P.L. 103-306
1994
99
220
P.L. 104-19
1995
275
419
P.L. 104-208
1997-1998
27*
63
*Subsidy split as follows: $15 million in FY1997 funds, $12 million in FY1998 funds.
Armed Forces Modernization
Military Equipment. The United States is helping Jordan modernize its armed forces,
which have been the traditional mainstay of the regime. The Jordanian military forces,
though well trained and disciplined, are outnumbered and outgunned by each of Jordan’s
neighboring forces.
In 1996, under Section 572, P.L. 104-107 (the FY1996 Foreign
Operations Appropriations Act), Congress approved a drawdown of $100 million, mainly in
ground force equipment from U.S. stocks (including 50 M60A3 tanks), to enhance Jordan’s
ability to maintain border security and implement terms of the peace treaty with Israel. Most
of this equipment was delivered in December 1996. In addition, during 1996, the United
States agreed to lease 16 refurbished F-16 fighter aircraft to Jordan at a cost of approximately
$220 million (most of which represents the cost of upgrading the aircraft), with title passing
to Jordan after five years. Deliveries of the aircraft were completed in early 1998. The
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aircraft transfer was funded through a combination of foreign military financing (FMF)
allocations to Jordan over a four-year period ($150 million), plus $70 million in additional
FMF funds contained in the FY1996 omnibus continuing appropriations bill (P.L. 104-134).
(CRS Report 96-309, Jordan: U.S. Military Assistance and Cooperation. Out of print, but
available upon request from author, Alfred Prados, at 7-5050.)
Further Requests. Jordanian Armed Forces leaders are hoping ultimately continue
modernizing their tank fleet and to obtain three or four more squadrons of F-16 fighters (70-
80 planes), enabling them to replace older model French Mirage F-1 and U.S. F-5 fighters.
Under a March 1999 agreement, Jordan received 288 Challenger-1 tanks from Britain. It was
announced on October 24, 2002, that Britain has offered Jordan an additional 100
Challenger-1 tanks. In April 2002, the U.S. Defense Department said it was proposing to sell
a $22 million long-range radar system (AN/FPS-117) to Jordan to provide it with an
enhanced early warning capability. With regard to the three Patriot anti-missile batteries
delivered to Jordan by the United States in early 2003, Jordan’s Prime Minister stated on
February 25 that Jordan requested these weapons from the United States after Russia was
unable to deliver S-300 surface-to-air missiles originally requested by Jordan. According to
press accounts (Jane’s Defence Weekly, September 24, 2003), Jordan is seeking upgrade kits
for F-16 fighters and is interested in buying UH-60L Black Hawk utility helicopters.
Military Cooperation. A U.S.-Jordanian Joint Military Commission has functioned
since 1974. Combined training exercises by U.S. and Jordanian military units continue to
take place in Jordan, at least on an annual basis and sometimes more often. These have
included fairly large scale training activities involving special forces, air defense,
communications, fighter aircraft, and other military units, together with an annual month-
long exercise with U.S. Navy and Marine units called “Infinite Moonlight.” In early 2002,
at U.S. request, Jordan reportedly began a training program to help Yemeni forces in
countering terrorism. Subsequently, after Operation Iraqi Freedom, an article carried in the
June 2, 2003, issue of Defense News reported that the United States has asked Jordan to help
train the nucleus of a new Iraqi Army.
Under the provisions of Section 517 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 as amended,
President Clinton designated Jordan as a major non-NATO ally of the United States,
effective on November 13, 1996. According to a State Department spokesman, this status
“makes Jordan eligible for priority consideration for transfer of excess defense articles, the
use of already appropriated military assistance funds for procurement through commercial
leases, the stockpiling of U.S. military material, and the purchase of depleted uranium
munitions.”
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Alternatives and Implications
In the aftermath of the peace treaty with Israel and the Gulf wars of 1991 and 2003,
several alternative scenarios could develop in Jordan.
The first would be continued
movement toward democracy under the present regime. There is much evidence that the late
King favored this course, and some speculate that his U.S. and British trained successor will
do likewise. The political experience since the parliamentary elections of 1989 and 1993 was
generally positive, although the 1997 elections were marred by a boycott by much of the
opposition; the 2003 elections get mixed reviews. During his reign, King Hussein succeeded
in opening the political system to a wide spectrum of Jordanian opinion while restraining
extreme steps by the religious right or the nationalist left. Externally, Jordan has survived
major diplomatic isolation and economic loss brought on by the Gulf crisis, and conditions
have improved on both fronts.
The process of normalizing relations with Israel and
fluctuating relations with Iraq will continue to confront the King with sensitive decisions, in
seeking to accommodate opposition groups within the Jordanian political system.
Under a second scenario, Jordan might return to a more restrictive political system. In
addition to his commitment to fostering democracy, the late King was long dedicated to
preserving the basic integrity and institutional character of the state that his grandfather built.
On at least two occasions — when threatened by a radical nationalist coup d’etat in 1957 and
by a potential takeover of the country by armed Palestinian guerrillas in 1970 — the late
King, backed by the armed forces, moved decisively to reestablish order at the expense of
democratic experiments previously under way. It is arguable that the country’s institutions
today are stronger, more durable, and more able to absorb political pressures than they were
in 1957 or 1970 and that the current situation is far less threatening. On the other hand, the
combination of domestic economic hardships, an uncertain peace process opposed by many
Jordanians, and a strong and aggressive Islamist movement could create new challenges that
the new King might feel compelled to preempt through returning to a more autocratic system
of government.
A third scenario would involve a fundamental change in the character of the Jordanian
state. This could come about in a number of ways: emergence of a strongly Islamist
government that would exclude other groups from participation in national political life; a
close alliance with a neighboring patron (such as Syria) that would exert control over
Jordanian policies; disappearance of the monarchy; or replacement of the present Jordanian
state with a Palestinian entity. These developments, though not likely in the short term,
could become more plausible if the country’s governmental, economic, and military
institutions should suffer serious erosion. Radical changes in the character or configuration
of Jordan would be of concern to U.S. policy makers. Almost any successor to the Jordanian
state as it is now constituted would present the United States and its allies with a less stable
and more threatening regional environment.
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Table 2. Annual U.S. Aid to Jordan Since the Gulf Crisis
($ in millions)
Economic Assistance
Military Assistance
Fiscal
Year (FY)
EconSpt
Food
Devel
PeaceCp
FMF*
IMET**
Totals
1991
35.0a
0
0
0
20.0a
1.3
56.30
1992
30.0b
20.0
0
0
20.0b
.6
70.60
1993c
5.0
30.0
0
0
9.0
.5
44.50
1994d
9.0
15.0
4.0
0
9.0
.8
37.80
1995
7.2
15.0
6.7
0
7.3
1.0
37.20
1996
7.2
21.0
7.9
0
200.0e
1.2
237.30
1997f
112.2
2.6
4.5
1.1
30.0
1.7
152.10
1998f
150.0
0
0
1.2
75.0g
1.6
227.80
1999
150.0
0
0
1.4
70.0g
1.6
223.00
1999 (Wye)
50.0
0
0
0
50.0
0
100.00
2000
150.0
0
0
1.7
75.0
1.6
228.30
2000 (Wye)
50.0
0
0
0
150.0
0
200.00h
2001
150.0
0
0
1.7
75.0
1.7
228.40
2002
150.0
0
0
1.6
75.0
2.0
228.60
2002 (Suppl.)
100.0
0
0
0
25.0
0
125.00
2003
250.0
0
0
1.0
198.0
2.4
451.40
2003 (Suppl.)
700.0
0
0
0
406.0
0
1,106.00
2004i
250.0
0
0
2,3
206.0
2.9
461.20
Note: These figures do not include debt relief subsidy appropriations listed in Table 1 or small amounts for de-mining
assistance. Nor do they include supplemental funding requested by the Clinton Administration in FY2001 (never acted
upon by Congress).
*Foreign Military Financing
**International Military Education and Training Program
***To be determined
a. Suspended in April 1991 under P.L. 102-27; released in early 1993.
b. Released in late July 1993.
c. Restrictions on FY1993 funds waived by Presidential Determination (PD) 93-39, Sept. 17, 1993.
d. FY1994 funds released by PD 94-11, Jan. 13, 1994, waiving restrictions under P.L. 103-87.
e. Three components: $30 million (Administration’s original request); $70 million in additional FMF under FY1996
appropriation (P.L. 104-134) to cover balance of F-16 aircraft package; and $100 million in special drawdown
authority (P.L. 104-107).
f. These figures include $100 million in economic assistance under the President’s Middle East Peace and Stability Fund
($100 million in FY1997, $116 million in FY1998).
g. For each of these two years, FMF figure includes $25 million in drawdown authority.
h. Some of these funds to be obligated in later years (FY2001or FY2002).
i. Administration’s request for FY2004.
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