Order Code IB10012
CRS Issue Brief for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
Intelligence Issues for Congress
Updated October 6, 2003
Richard A. Best, Jr.
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

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CONTENTS
SUMMARY
MOST RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS
International Terrorism
CIA and the Israeli-Palestinian Situation
The Intelligence Community and Iraq
The Intelligence Community and Missile Defense
Kosovo/Operation Allied Force
Counterintelligence
Selected 107th Congress Legislation
LEGISLATION
FOR ADDITIONAL READING

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Intelligence Issues for Congress
SUMMARY
The U.S. Intelligence Community contin-
A specific concern for many in Con-
ues to adjust to the21st Century environment.
gress has been the Intelligence Community’s
Congressional and executive branch initiatives
assessment of the missile attack capabilities
have emphasized improved cooperation
of foreign countries, especially North Korea.
among the different agencies that comprise the
Some have believed that U.S. vulnerability to
Community by giving greater coordination
missile attack may arrive sooner than has
and managerial authority to the Director of
been estimated by intelligence agencies.
Central Intelligence (DCI).
In several regional crisis areas, the role
Priority continues to be placed on intelli-
of the U.S. Intelligence Community is espe-
gence support to military operations and on
cially important. Provisions for U.S. intelli-
involvement in efforts to combat transnational
gence to monitor security arrangements
threats, especially international terrorism.
between Israelis and Palestinians have been
Growing concerns about transnational threats
a factor in efforts to resolve Middle East
are leading to increasingly close cooperation
tensions. Intelligence efforts have also been
between intelligence and law enforcement
important in monitoring peace agreements in
agencies. This relationship is complicated,
Bosnia.
however, by differing roles and missions as
well as different statutory charters.
Cruise missile and bomb attacks on
Afghan targets in the campaign against the
The September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks,
Taliban, and on Serbian targets during the
for which no specific warning was provided,
Kosovo crisis have been heavily dependent
have led to increased emphasis on human
upon precise targeting data provided by
intelligence, statutory changes permitting
intelligence sensors. The mistaken attack on
closer cooperation between law enforcement
the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade in May
and intelligence agencies, and to consideration
1999 resulted from faulty information pro-
of organizational changes to the Intelligence
vided by the Intelligence Community.
Community.
Intelligence agencies supported military
Intelligence Community leadership and
operations in Iraq and contributed to the
congressional committees have expressed
highly effective use of precision guided
determination to enhance analytical capabili-
munitions. Some observers argue, however,
ties. A major concern is an imbalance be-
that intelligence on Iraqi weapons of mass
tween resources devoted to collection and
destruction was inadequate.
those allocated to analysis, with collected data
much exceeding analytical capabilities.
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

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MOST RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
Ongoing controversy surrounds intelligence on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction
(WMD). Pointing to a failure to locate Iraqi WMDs thus far, some critics charge that the
Intelligence Community greatly exaggerated sketchy intelligence on Iraqi WMD inventories.
Both House and Senate intelligence committees are investigating the Intelligence
Community’s role in collecting, analyzing, and disseminating information about Iraqi
weapons. On September 25, according to media reports, the Chairman and Ranking Member
of the House Intelligence Committee forwarded a letter to the Director of Central Intelligence
(DCI) criticizing “a weakness in intelligence collection,” arguing that “greater efforts should
have been made to acquire more and better sources of information — particularly well-
targeted, close-in HUMINT [human intelligence].”
On July 31, the Senate passed its version of the FY2004 Intelligence Authorization Act
(S. 1025). In a floor statement, Senator Roberts, Chairman of the Intelligence Committee,
acknowledged, “There is clearly not enough money in future years to fully fund the
intelligence programs in this year’s budget request.” On June 27, the House had approved
its version of the FY2004 Intelligence Authorization Act (H.R. 2417). Although total
amounts to be authorized are classified, the House version would authorize appropriations
at a level “just above the President’s request.” The accompanying report (H.Rept. 108-163)
expressed concern with the growing practice of funding intelligence activities through
supplemental appropriations measures
BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS
The end of the Cold War, now a decade past, continues to reverberate throughout the
United States Intelligence Community. Since the beginning of the first Bush Administration,
intelligence agencies have been reduced in size (reportedly by some 30%) and priorities
shifted away from the Soviet Union and its erstwhile allies. Yet the post-Cold War world
has its own complexities — political, economic, and technological — that continue to require
the attention of intelligence agencies. The attacks on the World Trade Center and the
Pentagon on September 11, 2001, dramatically demonstrated the changed nature of threats
facing the United States. The Intelligence Community is challenged by the variety of topics
on which information is needed, changing technologies that may limit success in acquiring
information, and, not least, by temporary and not-so-temporary needs for expertise in many
different foreign languages.
Changes in the nature of the world beyond U.S. borders, the focus of U.S. intelligence
agencies, have required a shift in the purposes and goals of the Intelligence Community.
Gone is the relentless focus on Soviet submarines, missile silos, and conventional military
capabilities; new threats include terrorism, transfers of weapons of mass destruction (WMD),
and political, ethnic, and social upheavals in a variety of regions. Gone also is the massive
military infrastructure of the Soviet Union that could be observed by overhead imagery
platforms. Intelligence agents must now be able to move beyond contacts with foreign
government officials and tap into political sects and terrorist cells often having no perceptible
infrastructure.
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As a result, some observers believe that intelligence agencies may be in for a period of
transition and adaptation exceeding the one that followed immediately upon the dissolution
of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact. In particular, it is argued that the three major
“INTs,” the major intelligence disciplines — signals intelligence (sigint), imagery
intelligence (imint), and human intelligence (humint) — will have to be fundamentally
reinvented and this process will have major technical and organizational ramifications.
There will have to evolve, it is further argued, a coherent community-wide managerial
structure that will respect the varied and changing needs of military and civilian intelligence
consumers while keeping costs within bounds and avoiding unnecessary duplication of effort.
Making some of these changes may not save money, and may even require budgetary growth.
However, according to this argument, a failure to confront changed realities may result in
substantial waste of the $27+ billion now invested in intelligence and intelligence-related
activities.
The events of September 11, 2001, persuaded many observers that there may a need for
a wide-ranging review of the organizational structure of the Intelligence Community.
Media reports in early November 2001 indicated that a review of the Intelligence Community
by an Administration panel, headed by former National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft,
would recommend transferring three major intelligence agencies to the direct control of the
DCI and the separation of the DCI from day-to-day management of the CIA. The conferees
on the FY2002 intelligence authorization bill indicated their conclusion that “today’s
intelligence structure is not suitable to address current and future challenges.” The two
intelligence committees at the conclusion of the Joint Inquiry into the 9/11 attacks
recommended the creation of Cabinet-level intelligence position without managerial
responsibilities for the CIA.
Sigint collection is the responsibility of the National Security Agency (NSA) at Fort
Meade, Maryland. Sigint operations are classified, but there is little doubt that the need for
intelligence on a growing variety of nations and groups that are increasingly using
sophisticated and rapidly changing encryption systems requires a far different sigint effort
than the one prevailing for several decades. In 1998 the House Intelligence Committee
concluded that “very large changes in the National Security Agency’s culture and method of
operations need to take place ....” Some observers believe that an inevitable restructuring of
NSA will be required at the cost of many billions. The Senate Intelligence Committee
acknowledged that “NSA’s core mission is an essential national capability, and must be
dramatically rejuvenated” but added that some new initiatives, already underway, will require
“a significant infusion of funds.” Observers credit the current Director of NSA, Lt. Gen.
Michael Hayden, with launching a long-overdue reorganization of the Agency, but adapting
it to changed technological and geopolitical conditions will remain a significant challenge.
Nevertheless, congressional intelligence committees remain concerned about managerial
effectiveness at NSA as well as disparities between the massive amounts of sigint collected
and the lesser quantities that are analyzed.
Several reports sponsored by the European Parliament have alleged that NSA operates
an international sigint collection effort, known as Echelon, that intercepts communications
worldwide in order to provide economic intelligence to U.S. corporations. On July 5, 2000,
the European Parliament voted to undertake a further investigation of Echelon; the resultant
draft report on Echelon was made public on May 18, 2001. Maintaining that NSA operates
in accordance with existing statutes and executive orders, senior U.S. officials have strongly
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disputed claims that intelligence agencies assist U.S. corporations competing with foreign
firms. They acknowledge, however, that intelligence agencies collect information regarding
the use of bribery and other illegal efforts by foreign firms in competition with U.S.
corporations. Indications of such foreign efforts are provided to the State and Commerce
Departments. (See CRS Report RS20444, Project Echelon: U.S. Electronic Surveillance
Efforts.)
A second major intelligence discipline, imagery or imint is also facing profound
changes. Imagery is collected in essentially three ways, satellites, manned aircraft, and
unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). (See CRS Report RL31369, Imagery Intelligence: Issues
for Congress.) The satellite program that covered Soviet Union and acquired highly accurate
intelligence concerning submarines, missiles, bombers and other military targets is perhaps
the greatest achievement of the U.S. Intelligence Community. The demise of the Soviet
Union and experience in the Persian Gulf War have indicated that there is likely to be a
greater number of collection targets than in the Cold War and that more maneuverable
satellites may be required. At the same time, the advent of high-quality commercial satellite
imagery has raised many questions about whether at least some coverage can be obtained less
expensively from the private sector. (See the discussion of India’s nuclear tests below.)
Concern has been widely expressed that imagery architecture is unbalanced, that acquiring
collection platforms has been emphasized at the expense of analytical and dissemination
efforts.
Imagery as a collection discipline has been affected by the establishment in 1996 of the
National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA) to manage imagery processing and
dissemination to national decision makers and combat commanders. NIMA is composed of
agencies and organizations with disparate backgrounds, including the Defense Mapping
Agency, which was never a member of the Intelligence Community. Inevitably, there have
been start-up problems, especially in terms of financial management.
Manned aircraft — the U-2 and other aircraft used by the services for tactical
intelligence collection — remain important sources of imagery. The SR-71, which flew at
very high altitudes, has been retired, and no replacement is apparently envisioned. The U-2s,
the earliest of which were procured in the 1950s, are being upgraded with new interception
capabilities and new navigational equipment, but some observers express concern that a
follow-on will not be available because of a questionable assumption that manned aircraft
can be completely replaced with unmanned aerial vehicles. Limited inventories of airborne
platforms that are in high demand have led some industry officials to suggest business-class
jets equipped with a number of sensors for use in military missions.
UAV procurement has been a continuing source of difficulties. Some UAVs were used
during the Vietnam War, the advantages of these pilotless craft have been more generally
appreciated in the last decade or so when they have been equipped with electro-optical
devices and real-time communications. Since the Persian Gulf War, they have been widely
recognized as relatively inexpensive sources of tactical imagery that do not place the lives
of U.S. personnel at risk; they have been widely used to monitor peacekeeping operations in
Bosnia. UAV procurement efforts, however, have been beset by problems. Several systems
have been canceled after millions of dollars were spent without producing operational
platforms. Despite having been of significant use in the Iraq campaign, the UAV effort has
been perceived by many in Congress as lacking in focus and unable to meet operational
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requirements. The Global Hawk UAV currently appears to be the most promising platform
for high-altitude, long-endurance unmanned surveillance and reconnaissance; see CRS
Report RL31872, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: Background and Issues for Congress, by
Elizabeth Bone and Christopher Bolkcom.
A long-standing criticism of the Intelligence Community’s imint effort has been an
imbalance between collection and analysis: that far more imagery is collected than can ever
be evaluated with large quantities remaining “on the cutting room floor.” Intelligence
budgets moreover reflect an emphasis on the procurement of collection systems with fewer
resources allocated to processing and analysis. Some also argue that priority is given to the
concerns of operational military forces rather than to matters of interest to senior political
leaders, e.g., it has been alleged that in 1995 imagery analysts were concentrating on Serb
air defenses to an extent that delayed finding evidence of mass grave sites of acute interest
to the State Department. The House intelligence committee has concluded that, “the
emphasis on collection at the expense of downstream activities [i.e., processing and analysis]
permeates the [Intelligence Community] at all levels and in most collection disciplines.”

Intelligence from human contacts — humint — is the oldest intelligence discipline and
the one that is most often written about in the media. (Humint collection is to be
distinguished from covert actions although they may on occasion involve the same agents;
see CRS Report 96-844, Covert Action: An Effective Instrument of U.S. Foreign Policy?)
The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), which is responsible for most humint collection, had
important successes during the Cold War; disaffected Soviets and others provided invaluable
help in providing information about weapons programs and political intentions that were not
obtainable from any other source. In large measure, targets of U.S. humint collection during
the Cold War were government officials and military leaders. Intelligence agency officials
working under cover as diplomats could approach such potential contacts at receptions or in
the context of routine embassy business. Today, however, the challenge is making contacts
with influential figures in heretofore obscure third world states, clandestine terrorist groups,
or narcotics traffickers who speak a variety of foreign languages. Humint regarding such
sources can be especially important as there may be little evidence of activities or intentions
that can be gathered from imagery and their communications may be carefully limited.
Contacts with such persons usually cannot be made in the course of embassy business
or in diplomatic receptions; in many cases contacts between a U.S. embassy and terrorist
figures or narcotics smugglers would be unacceptable to either side. Placing U.S.
intelligence officials in foreign countries under “non-official cover” in businesses or other
private capacities is possible, but it presents significant challenges to the agencies.
Administrative mechanisms are vastly more complicated; special arrangements have to be
made for pay, allowances, retirement, and healthcare. The responsibilities of operatives
under non-official cover to the parent intelligence agency have to be reconciled with those
to private employers and there is an unavoidable potential for many conflicts of interest or
even corruption. Any involvement with terrorist groups or smugglers has an inevitable
potential for major embarrassment to the U.S. government and, of course, physical danger
to those immediately involved.
Responding to allegations in the early-1990s that CIA agents may have been involved
too closely with narcotics smugglers and human rights violators in Central America, the then-
DCI, John Deutch, established guidelines in 1995 (which remain classified) to govern the
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recruitment of informants with unsavory backgrounds. Although CIA officials maintain that
no proposal for contacts with persons having potentially valuable information has been
disapproved, there is a widespread belief that the guidelines serve to encourage a “risk
averse” atmosphere at a time when information on terrorist plans, from whatever source, is
urgently sought. Section 903 of the USA Patriot Act (P.L. 107-56), enacted October 26,
2001, expressed the sense of Congress that intelligence officials “should be encouraged, and
should make every effort, to establish and maintain intelligence relationships with any
person, entity, or group” to acquire information on terrorist groups. The FY2002 Intelligence
Authorization Act (P.L. 107-108) directed the DCI to rescind and replace the guidelines and
July 2002 press reports indicated that they had been replaced.
Another problem is the availability of personnel trained in appropriate languages. Cold
War efforts required a supply of linguists in a relatively finite number of foreign languages,
but in recent years the Intelligence Community has needed experts in a wider range of more
obscure languages and dialects. Various approaches have been considered: use of civilian
contract personnel, military reservists with language qualifications, and substantial bonuses
for agency personnel who maintain their proficiency. The House Intelligence Committee has
called for consideration of the establishment of a new Intelligence Community language
training facility and for language proficiency requirements for intelligence analysts.
A fourth INT, measurement and signatures analysis — masint — has received greater
emphasis in recent years. A highly technical discipline, masint involves the application of
more complicated analytical refinements to information collected by sigint and imint sensors.
It also includes spectral imaging by which the identities and characteristics of objects can be
identified on the basis of their reflection and absorption of light. A key problem has been
retaining personnel with expertise in masint systems who are offered more remunerative
positions in private industry.
In the current geopolitical environment, another category of information, open source
information — osint (newspapers, periodicals, pamphlets, books, radio, television, and
Internet Web sites) — is increasingly important. Whereas the Soviet Union was a tightly
closed society with access difficult to come by, most (but not all) countries of interest today
are far more open in their media. A much greater proportion of information can thus be
obtained without the use of human agents or sophisticated collection platforms. At the same
time, requirements for translation, dissemination, and systematic analysis may even have
increased, given the multitude of different areas and the volume of materials. Most observers
believe that intelligence agencies should be more aggressive in using osint; some believe that
the availability of osint may even reduce the need for certain collection efforts. The
availability of osint also raises questions regarding the need for intelligence agencies to
undertake collection, analysis, and dissemination of information that could be directly
obtained by user agencies.
Whether the statutory authorities of the DCI are adequate is subject to debate; proposals
to transfer all intelligence agencies to the operational control of the DCI have not gained
pervasive support in either the executive or legislative branches. The budgetary authorities
of the DCI, enhanced in the Intelligence Authorization Act of FY1997 (P.L. 104-293), allow
him to prepare a consolidated national intelligence budget that in turn permits making
tradeoffs among different INTs and programs before budgets are submitted to Congress.
This authority, however, can realistically be exercised only with the cooperation of the
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Defense Department, given the location of intelligence agencies within DOD and the
enormous influence exercised by the Pentagon over intelligence spending. Although
extensive readjustments have been made by Congress, some argue that they could be more
efficiently undertaken within the executive branch.
The widespread use of computers and new communications systems means that
although there is a greater need for coordinating the INTs at the Washington level,
intelligence products are used at many different levels of government and that quite low-level
users can access information from Washington-area agencies. In addition, there has been
increased availability of tactical intelligence collectors — sigint systems, aircraft and UAVs
— that are operated by military commanders who are also the immediate recipients of the
information acquired. Some observers express concern about excessive emphasis on tactical
intelligence, arguing that national priorities may be downgraded. Others note, on the other
hand, that organizational structures, traditionally focused on providing information from each
“INT” to the Washington agency in charge of that “INT” (a practice known as “stove
piping”) do not adequately serve current needs of military commanders. Observers suggest
that there will be increasing needs to share national and tactical intelligence and for
organizational and individual flexibility.
Another issue is funding. Some alternatives to current platforms and procedures may
produce cost savings, but observers suspect that they may be outweighed by increases found
necessary in other areas. Satellites will remain high-cost programs, greater numbers of UAV
systems and human collectors will have to be supported and trained. Observers generally
expect that intelligence activities will probably continue to absorb some 10% of the defense
budget in any given year. It is uncertain whether such percentages will be adequate to
accommodate major changes in NSA’s operations, the acquisition of additional imagery
platforms, and a reorganized humint effort.
Although much of the restructuring that arguably is required could be accomplished by
executive branch initiative, Congress remains responsible for appropriations and for
oversight. In recent years Congress has emphasized the need for expanded humint
capabilities and has insisted upon a major role in the acquisition of new imagery collection
platforms. Other concerns and directives are undoubtedly expressed in the classified annexes
to intelligence authorization bills. Even if Congress and the leadership of the Intelligence
Community concur on the need for major changes in these and other areas, ensuring the
reorienting of long-established organizations is a difficult task.
Implementation of other changes enacted in 1996 remains an ongoing process. In May
1998, Joan Dempsey, a career intelligence official, was confirmed by the Senate to fill the
newly established position of Deputy DCI for Community Management. Two other positions,
designated as requiring Senate confirmation, have been filled without formal Senate action
as a result of an understanding reached between the Administration and the Senate
Intelligence Committee.
For budgetary purposes, intelligence spending is divided between the National Foreign
Intelligence Program (NFIP), which covers Washington-based agencies and Tactical
Intelligence and Related Activities (TIARA) (also known as intelligence-related activities),
which covers programs supporting the operating units of the armed services, and the Joint
Military Intelligence Program (JMIP), which covers programs, not-necessarily tactical, that
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are of primary concern to the Defense Department. Jurisdiction over these programs is
somewhat different in the House and the Senate, but in both chambers members of both
intelligence and armed services committees are involved in oversight efforts.
For a number of years some Members have sought to make public total amounts of
intelligence and intelligence-related spending; floor amendments for that purpose were
defeated in both chambers during the 105th Congress. In response, however, to a lawsuit
filed under the Freedom of Information Act, DCI Tenet stated on October 15, 1997 that the
aggregate amount appropriated for intelligence and intelligence-related activities for FY1997
was $26.6 billion. He added that the Administration would continue “to protect from
disclosure any and all subsidiary information concerning the intelligence budget.” In March
1998, DCI Tenet announced that the FY1998 figure was $26.7 billion. Figures for FY1999
and subsequent years have not been released and the executive branch has thus far prevailed
against legal efforts to force release of intelligence spending figures. On May 23, 2000, the
House voted 175-225 to defeat an amendment calling for annual release of an unclassified
statement on aggregate intelligence spending. Some have suggested that if intelligence
spending totals were made public it would no longer be necessary to “hide” intelligence
programs within the Defense Department budget; national programs at least could broken
out and consolidated under the DCI and the two intelligence committees. Others contend
that the current system ensures that national intelligence programs are closely related to
military operations and are considered in conjunction with defense programs.
A significant concern continues to be the need to provide intelligence support to
operating military forces. In 1997, the House intelligence committee noted that
“intelligence is now incorporated into the very fiber of tactical military operational activities,
whether forces are being utilized to conduct humanitarian missions or are engaged in
full-scale combat.” The Persian Gulf War demonstrated the importance of intelligence from
both tactical and national systems, including satellites that had been previously directed
almost entirely at Soviet facilities. There were, nonetheless, numerous technical difficulties,
especially in transmitting data in usable formats and in a timely manner. Many of these
issues have since been addressed with congressional support, but even in the Iraq war of
2003 significant technical and organizational challenges remained.
The House intelligence committee has given special attention to weaknesses in
analysis, expressing concern about “a largely inexperienced workforce; lack of language
skills and limited in-country familiarity ...; and a predominant focus on current intelligence
that is eroding the [Intelligence Community’s] ability to conduct comprehensive strategic
analysis.” The bureaucratic tendency to emphasize current intelligence over long-term
analysis has been noted for many years. It has been enhanced by the shift from enduring
targets such as the Soviet Union to the disparate and fluctuating concerns of the post-Cold
War period. The House committee advocates the establishment of core groups of analysts
to undertake research-oriented projects aimed at assessing strategic issues. It further
expressed support for a civilian intelligence reserve program that would utilize the expertise
of former intelligence officials as well as civilian experts and linguists. Provisions
authorizing competitive analysis of intelligence products having national importance and for
quadrennial intelligence reviews to complement the Quadrennial Defense Review were
included in the FY1999 Intelligence Authorization Act (P.L. 105-272).
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The Intelligence Community’s failure to provide advance notice of India’s nuclear
tests in May 1998 produced searching reviews of analytical efforts and capabilities both in
the executive branch and Congress. The initial review, undertaken by Admiral David
Jeremiah, former vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has not been made public, but
in a press conference Admiral Jeremiah described his conclusions. Although the Indian
government that took office in late March 1998 had indicated its intention to “exercise the
option to induct [sic] nuclear weapons,” most observers believed that India would conduct
a lengthy assessment prior to undertaking tests. Admiral Jeremiah concluded that “both the
intelligence and policy communities had an underlying mindset going into these tests that the
BJP [the party heading the new Indian government] would behave as we behave.” The
Indians also undertook various efforts to mask their intentions and to hide their test
preparations. The Intelligence Community provided more detailed information on the
follow-on Pakistani tests.
Admiral Jeremiah called for more rigor in analysts’ thinking and urged that outside
experts be brought into the analytical process. There is, he maintained, a need for “greater
collaboration and coordination of intelligence agencies and disciplines.” There is also, he
pointed out, an imbalance between the vast quantities of imagery collected and limits on
numbers of analysts. “In everyday language, that means there is an awful lot of stuff on the
cutting room floor at the end of the day that we have not seen.” In essence, Jeremiah
concluded that the DCI needs to ensure greater coordination among intelligence agencies in
regard both to collection and analysis. DCI Tenet accepted Jeremiah’s recommendations.
Appreciating that no system can prevent any future intelligence surprise or “failure,” many
observers believe that inadequate coordination may have contributed significantly to the
inability to monitor Indian nuclear efforts more closely. (See CRS Report 98-672, U.S.
Intelligence and India’s Nuclear Tests: Lessons Learned, by Richard A. Best, Jr.)
Further concerns about the quality of intelligence analysis resulted from the North
Korean launch of a three-stage Taepo Dong 1 missile on August 31, 1998. The
Intelligence Community had long anticipated a two-stage Taepo Dong missile launch, but
its capability to be used as a space launch vehicle with potential for striking some U.S.
territory was unexpected.
Congress remains concerned with the potential for abuses by intelligence agency
personnel and has addressed the question of whistleblower protection for officials working
in intelligence agencies who may not be covered by other whistleblower legislation. The
FY1999 Intelligence Authorization Act established procedures by which an intelligence
agency official (or contractor) who seeks to provide information to Congress with respect to
an urgent concern would first report such concern to the inspector general of his or her
agency. The IG in turn would forward the information to the agency head within 14 days.
The agency head would then forward it to the congressional intelligence committees within
7 days. If the IG does not transmit the information (or does so inaccurately) the complainant
could forward it to the intelligence committees directly if the agency head is notified. The
conference report noted that “an intelligence committee Member or staff employee receiving
such complaints or information must abide by the rules of the intelligence committees.”
Congress also remains concerned about intelligence support provided to the
government’s counter-narcotics effort. The Explanatory Statement accompanying the
FY1998 intelligence authorization conference report expressed concern about funding the
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National Drug Intelligence Center (NDIC) through the National Foreign Intelligence
Program inasmuch as NDIC functions within the Department of Justice. Nonetheless, NDIC
funding has continued to be incorporated in defense authorization and appropriation acts.
FY2003 intelligence authorization legislation provides NDIC with $34.1 million.
In February 2000, the Clinton Administration announced the establishment of an
interagency Counter Drug Intelligence Coordinating Group composed of representatives
of major federal law enforcement and intelligence agencies. The Group’s responsibility will
be to ensure coordination in the narcotics intelligence efforts of federal departments and
agencies. An interagency staff, the Counterdrug Intelligence Executive Secretariat, with
some 30 personnel has been created to support the Group and roles and missions have been
assigned to the four major national narcotics intelligence centers: the DCI’s Crime and
Narcotics Center (CNC), the National Drug Intelligence Center (NDIC), the El Paso
Intelligence Center (EPIC), and the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCen).
Although most observers acknowledge the need for close coordination among
intelligence and law enforcement agencies in regard to narcotics intelligence, some questions
exist about the implications of the creation of this interagency structure for the DCI’s
statutory responsibilities for the national intelligence effort. Questions also remain
concerning policy guidelines and procedures for the use of intelligence information for law
enforcement purposes. Concern has also been expressed about the role of U.S. intelligence
agencies in support of counter-narcotics efforts in South America, with some observers
expressing concern about the value of the contribution and others noting the danger of
involving the U.S. in local insurrections fueled by drug money. Others have pointed to the
dangers involved in U.S. intelligence officials or contractors providing intelligence to foreign
countries who use this data to attack suspicious civilian aircraft.
For some years concerns have been expressed about issues of secrecy and
classification. Some argue that classification and declassification authorities and procedures
should be more closely based in statutory law. Others believe that far too much government
information is classified and withheld from the public, especially given the end of the Cold
War. A Commission on Protecting and Reducing Government Secrecy, chaired by Senator
Moynihan, recommended in 1997 a series of measures to establish the basic principles of
security classification and declassification. These measures were incorporated in legislation
introduced in the 105th Congress (H.R. 1546/S. 712), but the bills did not receive floor
consideration in either chamber. Similar legislation (S. 22) was introduced in the 106th
Congress and eventually incorporated into the Intelligence Authorization Act for FY2001
(P.L. 106-567). (For additional background, see CRS Report 98-298, Managing Secrecy:
Security Classification Reform — the Government Secrecy Act Proposal, by Harold C.
Relyea.)
Other provisions of the FY2001 intelligence authorization bill would have established
criminal penalties for the unauthorized disclosure of properly classified information.
Previous legislation established penalties only for disclosure of specific types of classified
material, e.g. codes and cryptographic devices and information related to nuclear programs.
Proponents of the provision maintained that recent leaks of highly sensitive intelligence
information have not only risked the loss of valuable collection capabilities but also
jeopardized important security interests. Critics argued that the provisions in H.R. 4392 were
overly broad and would preclude the type of leaks that in the past have ultimately benefitted
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the public. The bill was vetoed by President Clinton on November 4, 2000, and another
version (H.R. 5630) with the unauthorized disclosure provisions deleted was enacted on
December 27, 2000, as P.L. 106-567.
Consideration was given to including similar provisions in FY2002 legislation, but
Attorney General Ashcroft requested that the Administration be given time for a thorough
interagency study of the need for legislation to provide additional protections against
unauthorized disclosures of classified information. Accordingly, FY2002 intelligence
authorization legislation provided that such a review be conducted by the executive branch
and a reported submitted to Congress by May 1, 2002. The Bush Administration ultimately
concluded that further legislation is unnecessary.
International Terrorism. Terrorism has emerged as a top intelligence priority
especially since September 2001. Major increases in personnel and funding have been
directed towards international terrorism. The ongoing Joint Inquiry by the two intelligence
committees and other investigations may lead to significant changes in the organization of
the Intelligence Community. There has also been greater emphasis on the role of humint in
counterterrorism. See CRS Report RL31292, Intelligence to Counter Terrorism: Issues for
Congress.
Since such terrorist threats are often dealt with in law enforcement channels, greater
cooperation between intelligence and law enforcement agencies has been encouraged in
recent years. This cooperation has raised a number of difficult issues: potential duplication
of effort, the use of information obtained by intelligence agencies in court trials, the danger
that the methods of covert intelligence collectors might be used routinely in law enforcement
cases, and the undermining of legitimate foreign policy and defense initiatives. (For
additional background, see CRS Report RL30252, Intelligence and Law Enforcement:
Countering Transnational Threats to the U.S.)
Concern that information from both law enforcement and intelligence agencies may not
be reaching those responsible for dealing with international terrorist threats has grown since
the incidents of September 11, 2001. Much information about Osama bin Laden and the Al
Qaeda network was accumulated for trials of individuals connected with the 1993 World
Trade Center attack and an aborted January 2000 attack on the Los Angeles airport. Critics
charge that much of this information was not made available to intelligence agencies, and
some of that which was available may not have been thoroughly exploited. Further, some
argue that information available to intelligence agencies was not shared with the law
enforcement agencies that could have apprehended (because of immigration violations) some
of those involved in the September 11 attacks. The USA Patriot Act (P.L. 107-56) was
designed to facilitate the greater sharing of information available to law enforcement
agencies (including grand jury testimony) with the Intelligence Community in accordance
with guidelines to be established by the executive branch. The Justice Department
announced the completion of the guidelines on September 23, 2002.
The new Department of Homeland Security (DHS) includes an Information Analysis
and Infrastructure Protection division that will be responsible for analyzing information
provided by intelligence and law enforcement agencies. The new Department will not itself
engage in collecting intelligence but will receive analyses and, to some as yet unknown
extent, unanalyzed information from other intelligence and law enforcement agencies. On
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the basis of its threat analysis, the Homeland Security Department would effect or
recommend necessary measures to protect the U.S. public and infrastructures. In January
2003, the Administration announced plans to create a Terrorist Threat Integration Center
(TTIC) under the DCI. TTIC commenced operations on May 1, 2003 and performs a number
of analytical functions earlier assigned to DHS; its reports and analyses are made available
to DHS. (See CRS Report RS21283, Homeland Security: Intelligence Support.)
CIA and the Israeli-Palestinian Situation. The accord between Palestinian and
Israeli leaders (the “Wye River Memorandum”) signed in Washington on October 23, 1998,
provided for a Trilateral Security Committee of high-ranking Israeli, Palestinian, and U.S.
officials to oversee the implementation of the agreement and coordinate efforts to combat
terror and terrorist organizations. Media accounts at the time indicated that, as a result of
ongoing efforts by CIA officials to assist in the establishment of security arrangements, both
the Israeli and Palestine leadership supported a more formal role for the Agency.
The accord assumed that CIA officials would continue liaison efforts, which were
ongoing for several years, to improve communications between the two sides on security
matters and to enhance the professionalism of Palestinian security forces. According to DCI
Tenet, however, CIA officials were not to interpose themselves between the two sides,
conduct interrogations, or assume a direct role on the ground. Some observers expressed
concern that CIA officials might become responsible for making judgments as to whether
“violations” had occurred, a responsibility that, holders of this view maintain, should be
reserved to policymakers. With the deterioration of Israeli-Palestinian relations in the spring
of 2001, the CIA role was reduced. DCI Tenet visited the region, but CIA-sponsored
meetings between Israeli and Palestinian security officials were unproductive.
Media reports indicate that subsequent Bush Administration efforts to promote its
Roadmap to peace between Israel and the Palestinians may include a role for the CIA in
training Palestinian security officials. Although some argue that a CIA advisory role could
be accepted by both sides, others believe that further involvement could complicate the
CIA’s primary responsibilities of gathering intelligence for U.S. policymakers and entangle
it in complex peacekeeping efforts.
In the final stages of negotiations of the Wye Accord, Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu
pressed President Clinton to pardon Jonathan Pollard, a former Navy Intelligence analyst,
who was convicted of spying on behalf of Israel in 1986. Subsequent Israeli leaders have also
pressed Pollard’s case. Media reports indicate that many Intelligence Community officials,
including DCI Tenet, strongly oppose any presidential pardon and opposition has been
expressed by Members of both intelligence committees. (See CRS Report RS20001,
Jonathan Pollard: Background and Considerations for Presidential Clemency.)
The Intelligence Community and Iraq. The Baath regime in Iraq presented major
challenges to intelligence agencies. U.S. intelligence agencies supported the efforts of U.N.
inspectors charged with determining Iraqi compliance with U.N. resolutions requiring Iraq
to end any programs for the acquisition or deployment of weapons of mass destruction, but
such efforts were resisted by the Iraqi government. The Iraq Liberation Act of 1998 led to
funding for covert assistance to opposition elements in legislation, but intelligence agency
officials were skeptical of providing aid to the groups working against Saddam Hussein.
(See CRS Report RL31339, Iraq: U.S. Efforts to Change the Regime, by Kenneth Katzman;
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also, CRS Issue Brief IB92117, Iraq: Weapons Threat, Compliance, Sanctions, and U.S.
Policy, by Kenneth Katzman.)
The attack on the Iraqi regime launched in March 2003 by the United States, the United
Kingdom, and other countries was based on extensive intelligence preparation. Intelligence
sources also provided specific locating information that led to attacks on two structures in
which Saddam Hussein was believed to be present. Intelligence supported the extensive use
of precision-guided munitions that targeted key Iraqi military and command facilities but
limited civilian casualties.
Since the end of hostilities, questions have been raised about the extent and accuracy
of U.S. intelligence reports concerning Iraqi weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The
inability thus far to locate anticipated stocks of chemical and biological weapons has led
some observers to argue that prewar intelligence estimates were inaccurate and unreliable.
Others point out that the Intelligence Community’s October 2002 report, Iraq’s Weapons of
Mass Destruction Programs, carefully noted Iraq’s previous use of WMD, its ongoing WMD
programs, and its unwillingness to document the destruction of WMD stocks in accordance
with U.N. resolutions. Few observers contest these factors, but intelligence judgments
regarding the existence of specific inventories of WMD products — and the interpretation
and use of these judgements by policymakers — are under dispute. Both House and Senate
intelligence committees are reviewing intelligence assessments prior to the beginning of
hostilities. According to media reports, the Chairman and Ranking Member of the House
Intelligence Committee forwarded a letter on September 25 strongly criticizing the collection
effort that had been directed against Iraq. According to a published version of the letter, the
authors stated: “At this point, several months into our review, we believe there were
significant deficiencies with respect to the IC’s [Intelligence Community’s] intelligence
collection activities concerning Iraq’s WMD programs and ties to al-Qa’ida prior to the
commencement of hostilities there.” An October 1 response from DCI Tenet published in
the media took strong issue with the committee’s letter, recalling a comprehensive
Intelligence Community’s assessment in 1998 of “Iraq collection challenges” that resulted
in collection gains but noting that “the Committee has never sought to understand the results
of these collection initiatives....”
The Intelligence Community and Missile Defense. A key Cold War-era
intelligence mission that endures in the post-Cold War era is collection targeted at foreign
missile capabilities, especially those capable of delivering WMD. As noted above, the
unanticipated North Korean testing of the Taepo Dong 1 missile raised questions about
intelligence collection capabilities. In addition, the July 1998 report of the Commission to
Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States (known as the Rumsfeld
Commission) concluded: “A new strategic environment now gives emerging ballistic missile
powers the capacity, through a combination of domestic development and foreign assistance,
to acquire the means to strike the U.S. within about five years of a decision to acquire such
a capability (10 years in the case of Iraq). During several of those years, the U.S. might not
be aware that such a decision had been made. Available alternative means of delivery can
shorten the warning time of deployment nearly to zero.” Although more pessimistic than
much-criticized Intelligence Community estimates, this assessment underscored the vital
importance of intelligence efforts in this area, especially given its key role in the debate over
missile defense systems.
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Kosovo/Operation Allied Force. The highly successful air strikes against Serbian
military targets, the centerpiece of Operation Allied Force, taxed U.S. intelligence
capabilities. Intelligence enabled NATO to use precision munitions to destroy Serbian
targets with no NATO combat casualties and with relatively limited losses of civilian lives.
Nonetheless, some observers suggest that difficulties in relaying targeting data, the need for
communications “work arounds,” and escalating requirements for additional aircraft reflected
a serious failure in the years after the Persian Gulf War to address increased requirements for
imagery collection platforms for use in conjunction with precision guided munitions.
In addition to uncertainties about the future government satellite programs, critics note
that DOD has been unable to acquire significant numbers of unmanned aerial vehicles
(UAVs) as a result of the managerial problems that have long been subjects of congressional
censure. Further, they cite the absence of plans for follow-ons to U-2 aircraft, first developed
in the Eisenhower Administration, as well as a limited inventory of JSTARS aircraft with
ground-radar capabilities. UAV procurement remains a high priority despite losses of several
platforms in Afghan operations.
According to official accounts, the mistaken attack on the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade
on May 7, 1999, resulted from the use of outdated maps and databases. The Yugoslav
Federal Directorate of Supply and Procurement, a military supply facility, was the intended
target, but it was confused with a nearby and similarly-sized building that was actually
China’s embassy. Although embassies were on “no-strike” lists for Operation Allied Force,
along with hospitals, churches, and mosques, U.S. databases did not reflect the location of
the current Chinese Embassy in Belgrade. Secretary of Defense William Cohen subsequently
announced several steps to prevent future targeting errors; the State Department will be
responsible for reporting to the Intelligence Community whenever embassies move or new
embassies are built, new procedures for developing target information, including procedures
for updating maps will be established, and the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) and the
National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA) will establish new rapid response
procedures for updating critical databases for no-strike targets.
The 9/11 Investigation. In the aftermath of September 11, 2001, there was extensive
public discussion of whether the attacks on the Pentagon and World Trade Center
represented an “intelligence failure.” The House, in passing its version of the FY2002
intelligence bill (H.R. 2883), endorsed the establishment of a commission of individuals with
experience in intelligence and national security to report on the national security readiness
of the United States with respect to the events of September 11. The Senate version of
intelligence authorization legislation (S. 1448) did not contain a similar provision, and the
House provision was deleted by the conference committee. Provisions for establishing an
independent commission on the 2001 terrorist attacks were included in the FY2003
Intelligence Authorization Act (P.L. 107-306). Former New Jersey Governor Thomas H.
Kean has been named to serve as chairman with former Representative Lee H. Hamilton
serving as vice chairman. A final report is to be prepared by mid-2004.
On February 14, 2002, a joint investigation of the September 11 attacks by the House
and Senate intelligence committees was announced. Britt Snider, the first staff director of
the joint inquiry, resigned on April 25, 2002; his successor is Eleanor Hill, a former Inspector
General of the Defense Department. On July 17, 2002, the House Intelligence Committee
Subcommittee on Terrorism and Homeland Security released an unclassified summary of its
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investigation of ways to improve counterterrorism and homeland security capabilities. The
findings were discussed further in a September 5, 2002 hearing before the House Armed
Services Committee, Special Oversight Panel on Terrorism.
Public hearings by the Joint Inquiry began on September 18 with testimony from
representatives of families of those who died in the attacks. Eleanor Hill, the Inquiry Staff
Director also summarized the Inquiry’s findings thus far: “ ... the Intelligence Community
did have general indications of a possible terrorist attack against the United States or U.S.
interests overseas in the spring and summer of 2001 and promulgated strategic warnings.
However, it does not appear to date that the Intelligence Community had information prior
to September 11 that identified precisely where, when and how the attacks were to be carried
out.” Former policymakers and senior CIA and FBI officials also testified. (See CRS
Report RL31650, The Intelligence Community and 9/11: Congressional Hearings and the
Status of the Investigation.)
The two intelligence committees published the findings and conclusions of the Joint
Inquiry on December 11, 2002. The committees found that the Intelligence Community had
received beginning in 1998 and continuing into the summer of 2001 “a modest, but relatively
steady, stream of intelligence reporting that indicated the possibility of terrorist attacks
within the United States.” Further findings dealt with specific terrorists about whom some
information had come to the attention of U.S. officials prior to September 11 and with
reports about possible employment of civilian airliners to crash into major buildings. The
Inquiry also made systemic findings highlighting the Intelligence Community’s lack of
preparedness to deal with the challenges of global terrorism, inefficiencies in budgetary
planning, the lack of adequate numbers of linguists, a lack of human sources, and an
unwillingness to share information among agencies.
Separately, the two intelligence committees submitted recommendations for
strengthening intelligence capabilities. Most significantly, they urged the creation of a
Cabinet-level position of Director of National Intelligence (DNI) separate from the position
of director of the CIA. The DNI would have greater budgetary and managerial authority over
intelligence agencies in the Defense Department than currently possessed by the DCI. The
committees also expressed great concern with the reorientation of the FBI to counterterrorism
and suggested consideration of the creation of a new domestic surveillance agency similar
to Britain’s MI5. Senator Shelby, the vice chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee
in the 107th Congress, submitted extensive additional views detailing his concerns with the
functioning of intelligence agencies as currently organized.
Counterintelligence. Allegations that U.S. classified information regarding missile
warhead design may have been provided to Chinese officials by a scientist at the Los Alamos
National Laboratory (part of the Energy Department) led to charges of lax security especially
in regard to visits by foreign nationals. An Intelligence Community damage assessment,
released in April 1999, concluded that China obtained by espionage classified U.S. nuclear
weapons information that “probably accelerated” its program to develop future nuclear
weapons. According to the assessment, China obtained at least basic design information on
several modern U.S. nuclear reentry vehicles, including the Trident II (W88). A report of
the Select Committee on U.S. National Security and Military/Commercial Concerns with the
People’s Republic of China concluded that U.S. information accelerated Chinese nuclear
weapon modernization and “helped the PRC in its efforts to fabricate and successfully test
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its next generation of nuclear weapons designs. These warheads give the PRC small, modern
thermonuclear warheads roughly equivalent to current U.S. warhead yields.”
(For additional details, see CRS Report RL30143, China: Suspected Acquisition of U.S.
Nuclear Weapon Data, by Shirley A. Kan and CRS Report RL30220, China’s Technology
Acquisitions: Cox Committee’s Report — Findings, Issues and Recommendations. For more
recent developments, see CRS Report RL30569, Department of Energy: Status of Legislated
Security and Counterintelligence Measures, by Jonathan Medalia.)
Reflecting concern about shortcomings in the investigation of potential espionage
against Energy Department laboratories, amendments to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Act (FISA) were included in the Senate version of the FY2001 Intelligence Authorization
bill (H.R. 4392) to establish specific provisions for the review by the Attorney General of
requests for surveillance and searches under FISA. The legislation would also encourage
closer cooperation between the FBI and national security agencies. Title VI of the resulting
Intelligence Authorization Act for FY2001 (P.L. 106-567) included provisions designed to
enhance the FBI’s capabilities to undertake counterintelligence investigations and authorized
$7 million in additional funding for FY2001. Additional amendments to FISA, designed to
clear up ambiguity about which individuals can be considered terrorists, are included in S.
113 that was passed by the Senate on May 9, 2003. (See CRS Report RS21472, Proposed
Change to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) under S. 113, by Jennifer Elsea.)
Selected 107th Congress Legislation
P.L. 107-108, H.R. 2883. Intelligence Authorization Act for FY2002. Introduced
September 13, 2001; referred to Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence; reported,
September 26, 2001; passed House (amended), October 5, 2001. Passed Senate (amended)
November 8, 2001. Conference report (H.Rept. 107-328) passed House on December 12;
passed Senate on December 13. Signed into law December 28, 2001.
P.L. 107-306, H.R. 4628. Intelligence Authorization Act for FY2003. Introduced May
1, 2002; referred to House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. Reported July 18.
Passed House (amended) July 25. Passed Senate (amended) September 25, 2002.
Conference report (H.Rept. 107-789) agreed to by House and Senate, November 27, 2002.
Signed into law November 27, 2002.
LEGISLATION
H.R. 2417 (Goss)
Intelligence Authorization Act for FY2004. Introduced June 11, 2003; referred to the
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence; reported June 18, 2003. Passed House,
amended, June 27, 2003.
S. 113 (Kyl)
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act Amendment. Introduced January 9, 2003. Passed
Senate, amended, May 8, 2003.
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S. 1025 (Roberts)
Intelligence Authorization Act for FY2004. Introduced May 8, 2003 from Select
Committee on Intelligence with report; referred to Committee on Armed Services; reported
by Armed Services Committee, June 26, 2003. Passed Senate, amended, July 31, 2003 (text
substituted for H.R. 2417).
FOR ADDITIONAL READING
U.S. Commission on the Role and Capabilities of the United States Intelligence Community,
Preparing for the 21st Century: An Appraisal of U.S. Intelligence, March 1, 1996.
U.S. Congress. House of Representatives. Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence.
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003. July 18, 2002. 107th Congress, 2d
session (H.Rept. 107-592).
——Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003. November 14, 2002. 107th
Congress, 2d session (H.Rept. 107-789).
—— Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004. June 18, 2003. 108th Congress,
1st session (H.Rept. 108-163).
——IC21: Intelligence Community in the 21st Century. Staff Study. April 9, 1996. 104th
Congress.
——Subcommittee on Terrorism and Homeland Security. Counterterrorism Intelligence
Capabilities and Performance Prior to 9-11. July 2002.
U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Armed Services. Intelligence Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2004. June 26, 2003. 108th Congress, 1st session. (S.Rept. 108-80).
U.S. Congress. Select Committee on Intelligence. To Authorize Appropriations for Fiscal
Year 2003 for Intelligence and Intelligence-Related Activities of the United States
Government, the Community Management Account, and the Central Intelligence
Agency Retirement and Disability System. May 13, 2002. 107th Congress, 2d session.
(S.Rept. 107-149).
—— Authorizing Appropriations for Fiscal Year 2004 for Intelligence and Intelligence-
Related Activities of the United States Government, the Community Management
Account, and the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System. May
8, 2003. 108th Congress, 1st session. (S.Rept. 108-44).
U.S. Department of Justice, Commission for Review of FBI Security Programs, A Review
of FBI Security Programs, March 2002.
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