Order Code IB93108 CRS Issue Brief for Congress Received through the CRS Web Central Asia: Regional Developments and Implications for U.S. Interests Updated October 3, 2003 Jim Nichol Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress CONTENTS SUMMARY MOST RECENT DEVELOPMENTS BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS Historical Background Overview of U.S. Policy Concerns Post-9/11 and Afghanistan Support for Operation Iraqi Freedom Fostering Pro-Western Orientations Russia’s Role Obstacles to Peace and Independence Regional Tensions and Conflicts Democratization and Human Rights Democracy Pledges Security and Arms Control Weapons of Mass Destruction Trade and Investment Energy Resources Aid Overview LEGISLATION IB93108 10-03-03 Central Asia: Regional Developments and Implications for U.S. Interests SUMMARY After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the United States recognized the independence of all the former Central Asian republics and established diplomatic relations with each by mid-March 1992. The United States also supported their admission to the Organization on Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and other Western organizations, and elicited Turkish support in countering Iranian influence in the region. Congress was at the forefront in urging the formation of coherent U.S. policies for aiding these and other Eurasian states of the former Soviet Union, and approved the Freedom Support Act and other legislation for this purpose. Soon after the terrorist attacks on America on September 11, 2001, all the Central Asian states offered overflight and other support to coalition anti-terrorist efforts in Afghanistan. Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan have hosted coalition troops and provided access to airbases. After 9/11, the United States boosted its security assistance throughout the region for anti-terrorism, counter-narcotics, non-proliferation, border and customs, and defense cooperation programs, while also increasing aid for democratization and free market reforms. U.S. policy goals in Central Asia include fostering stability, democratization, free market economies, free trade and transport throughout the Eurasian corridor, denuclearization in the non-Russian states, and adherence to international human rights standards. An over-arching U.S. priority is to discourage attempts by extremist or terrorist regimes and groups to block or subvert progress toward these goals. Administration Congressional Research Service policy also aims to integrate these states into the international community so that they follow responsible security and other policies, and to discourage xenophobic and anti-Western orientations that threaten peace and stability. The Administration is concerned about human rights and civil liberties problems in all the states. The Administration’s policy goals in Central Asia reflect the differing characteristics of these states. U.S. interests in Kazakhstan include the security and elimination of Soviet-era nuclear and biological weapons materials and facilities. In Tajikistan, U.S. aid increasingly focuses on economic reconstruction. U.S. energy firms have invested in oil and natural gas development in Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. Some observers call for different emphases or levels of U.S. involvement in Central Asia. Some have called for strengthening conditions linking aid to progress in improving human rights or in making adequate progress in democratization and the creation of free markets. Some have disputed the importance of energy resources to U.S. national security. Others point to civil and ethnic tensions in the region as possibly endangering U.S. lives and investments. Heightened congressional interest in Central Asia was reflected in passage of “Silk Road” language in late 1999 (P.L.106-113) authorizing enhanced U.S. policy attention and aid to support conflict amelioration, humanitarian needs, economic development, transport (including energy pipelines) and communications, border controls, democracy, and the creation of civil societies in the South Caucasian and Central Asian states. ˜ The Library of Congress IB93108 10-03-03 MOST RECENT DEVELOPMENTS In September 2003, Turkmen President Saparamurad Niyazov launched new actions against those deemed actual or potential “traitors to the homeland.” On September 11, a local correspondent for Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty was forcibly detained by security officials and ordered to stop reporting. Russian media reported continued abuses against ethnic Russians in Turkmenistan who had declined recently to accept Turkmen citizenship. The U.S. Ambassador to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, Stephen Minikes, on September 25 raised concerns about the banishment of a relative of an exiled human rights activist and the continued detention of former foreign minister Batyr Berdiyev. On September 22, 2003, the Russian and Kyrgyz defense ministers signed a 15-year military basing accord for about 20 aircraft and 300-700 troops to be based at Kant, a few miles from the U.S.-led coalition’s Manas airbase. Tajik officials in charge of border troops in late September asserted that Tajik forces should guard the borders without assistance from Russian troops, arguing that cooperation had not worked and that “the borders should have one owner.” The Tajik deputy prime minister quickly overruled these officials, stating that Tajikistan wanted Russian border troops to stay. BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS Historical Background Central Asia consists of the former Central Asia: Basic Facts Soviet republics of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Area: 1.6 million sq. mi., larger than India; KazTajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan, akhstan: 1.1 m. sq. mi.; Kyrgyzstan: 77,000 sq. and borders Russia, China, the Middle East, mi.; Tajikistan: 55,800 sq. mi.; Turkmenistan: and South Asia. The major peoples of all but 190,000 sq. mi.; Uzbekistan: 174,500 sq. mi. Tajikistan speak Turkic languages (the Tajiks Population: 57.1 million (2002 est., Economist speak an Iranian language), and most are Intelligence Unit), somewhat less than France; Sunni Muslims (some Tajiks are Shiia Kazakhstan: 14.8 m.; Kyrgyzstan: 4.9 m.; TajMuslims). Most are closely related histori- ikistan: 6.4 m.; Turkmenistan: 5.4 m.; Uzbekically and culturally. By the late 19th century, stan: 25.6 m. Russian tsars had conquered the last Gross Domestic Product: $47.7 billion in 2001; independent khanates and nomadic lands of per capita GDP is about $948; poverty is ramCentral Asia. After the breakup of the tsarist pant. Kazakhstan: $24.8b.; Kyrgyzstan: $1.6b.; empire, Central Asia was at first included Tajikistan: $1.1b.; Turkmenistan: $12.3b.; Uzwithin Soviet Russia, but by 1936 five “union bekistan: $7.9 b. (EIU, current prices) republics” had been created. Soviet communist rule resulted in massive loss of life from collectivization and purges, though economic development took place. Upon the collapse of the Soviet Union in December 1991, the five republics gained worldwide diplomatic recognition. (For overviews, see CRS Report 97-1058, Kazakhstan; CRS Report 97-690, Kyrgyzstan; CRS Report 98-594, Tajikistan; CRS Report 97-1055, Turkmenistan; and CRS Report RS21238, Uzbekistan.) CRS-1 IB93108 10-03-03 Overview of U.S. Policy Concerns After the collapse of the Soviet Union at the end of 1991, the United States recognized the independence of all the former Central Asian republics. U.S. diplomatic relations were established with all five new states by mid-March 1992. Faced with calls in Congress and elsewhere that the Administration devise a policy on aiding the new Eurasian states, President George H.W. Bush sent the Freedom Support Act to Congress, which was amended and signed into law in October 1992 (P.L. 102-511). In 1999, Congressional concerns led to passage of the “Silk Road Strategy Act” authorizing language (contained in Consolidated Appropriations for FY2000; P.L. 106-113) calling for enhanced policy and aid to support conflict amelioration, humanitarian needs, economic development, transport and communications, border controls, democracy, and the creation of civil societies in the South Caucasus and Central Asia. There are various views among U.S. policymakers and others on the types and levels of U.S. involvement in the region. Some argue that Uzbekistan is the “linchpin” of the region (it borders all the other states, shaping the range and scope of regional cooperation) and should receive the most U.S. attention, while others argue that ties with “energy behemoth” Kazakhstan are more crucial to U.S. interests. In general, however, they support bolstering democratic and economic reforms and stability in the region. Such advocates of U.S. involvement argue that political instability and the growth of terrorist groups in Central Asia can produce spillover effects both in important nearby states, including U.S. allies and friends such as Turkey, and worldwide. They also argue that the United States has a major interest in preventing terrorist regimes or groups from illicitly acquiring nuclear weaponsrelated technology in the region. They maintain that U.S. interests do not perfectly coincide with those of its allies and friends, that Turkey and other actors possess limited aid resources, and that the United States is in the strongest position as the superpower to influence democratization and respect for human rights. They stress that U.S. leadership in world aid efforts to foster reform will help alleviate the social distress exploited by anti-Western Islamic extremist groups to gain new members. Although many U.S. policymakers acknowledge a role for a democratizing Russia in Central Asia, they stress that U.S. and other Western aid and investment strengthen the independence of the Central Asian states and forestall Russian attempts to re-subjugate the region. Some views of policymakers and academics who previously objected to a more forward U.S. policy toward Central Asia appeared less salient after 9/11, but aspects of these views could gain more credence once Afghanistan becomes more stable. These observers argued that the United States historically had few interests in this region and that developments there were largely marginal to U.S. interests. They discounted fears that anti-Western Islamic extremism would make enough headway to threaten secular regimes or otherwise harm U.S. interests. Other still topical arguments include whether the United States should continue to try to foster democratization among cultures some view as historically attuned to authoritarianism. Some observers urge reducing or cutting off most aid to repressive governments that widely violate human rights, arguing that such aid provides tacit support for these regimes, and might even unwittingly fuel the rise of Islamic fundamentalism as an alternative channel of dissent. These observers reject arguments that U.S. interests in antiterrorism, nonproliferation, regional cooperation, trade, and investment outweigh concerns over democratization and human rights. They warn that the populations of these states may come to view U.S. engagement as propping up authoritarian leaders. Some observers point CRS-2 IB93108 10-03-03 to civil problems in the region as another reason to eschew major U.S. involvement such as military access that might place more U.S. personnel and citizens in danger. Post-9/11 and Afghanistan. Since the terrorist attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001, the Administration has stated that U.S. policy toward Central Asia focuses on three inter-related activities: the promotion of security, domestic reforms, and energy development. The 9/11 attacks led the Administration to realize that “it was critical to the national interests of the United States that we greatly enhance our relations with the five Central Asian countries” to prevent them from becoming harbors for terrorism, according to Deputy Assistant Secretary of State B. Lynn Pascoe in testimony in June 2002. In a speech on April 10, 2003, Assistant Secretary of State Elizabeth Jones reiterated that the “United States is wholly committed to intensive engagement and dialogue” with Central Asia, a “pivotal region of the world,” and will assist the countries to “remain independent, and become democratic, stable, and prosperous partners of the United States.” After 9/11, all the Central Asian states soon offered overflight and other assistance to U.S.-led anti-terrorism efforts in Afghanistan. The states were predisposed to welcome such operations. Tajikistan and Uzbekistan had long supported the Afghan Northern Alliance’s combat against the Taliban, and these states, along with Kyrgyzstan, had suffered from incursions by Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU; see below) and other terrorists who were harbored by the Taliban. All the Central Asian states feared Afghanistan as a base for terrorism, crime, and drug trafficking (even Turkmenistan, which tried to reach some accommodation with the Taliban). On September 24, 2001, Turkmenistan’s President Saparamurad Niyazov gave his consent for ground transport and overflights to deliver humanitarian aid because “evil must be punished.” Kazakhstan’s President Nazarbayev also offered airfields, military bases, and airspace. The next day, Kyrgyz President Akayev indicated that he had received the backing of the other members of the Commonwealth of Independent States’ (CIS’s) Collective Security Treaty (CST; members include Russia, Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan) for U.S. use of Kyrgyz airspace. On September 24, 2001, Uzbek President Islam Karimov permitted U.S. use of Uzbek airspace for “humanitarian and security purposes” if Uzbekistan’s security was guaranteed. The United States and Kazakhstan signed a memorandum of understanding on July 10, 2002, permitting U.S. military aircraft to use Kazakhstan’s airport in Almaty for emergency military landings. The State Department’s Patterns of Global Terrorism 2002 report, released April 30, 2003, highlighted Kazakhstan’s, Kyrgyzstan’s, Tajikistan’s, and Uzbekistan’s continuing “strong” and “unprecedented” support for U.S. and international anti-terrorism efforts (see also below, Security). Support for Operation Iraqi Freedom. Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan have provided peacekeeping forces for Iraq. Uzbekistan was the only Central Asian state that joined the “coalition of the willing” in February-March 2003 that endorsed prospective U.S.-led coalition military operations in Iraq. Uzbek President Islam Karimov on March 6 stated that the Iraq operation was a continuation of “efforts to break the back of terrorism.” On May 8, his National Security Council endorsed sending medical and other humanitarian and rebuilding aid to Iraq. Among other Central Asian states, Kazakh Foreign Minister Kasymzhomart Tokayev on March 28 voiced general support for disarming Iraq. Reportedly responding to a U.S. appeal, Nazarbayev proposed and the legislature in late May approved sending 25 military personnel to Iraq. Kyrgyzstan’s Legislative Assembly (lower chamber) issued a statement on March 24 calling for the United States to cease “gross violations” of CRS-3 IB93108 10-03-03 international law by undertaking military action in Iraq. During Kyrgyz Foreign Minister Askar Aitmatov’s June 2003 U.S. visit, however, he told Vice President Cheney that Kyrgyzstan was ready to send peacekeepers to Iraq (and Afghanistan). Tajik President Emomaliy Rakhmanov reportedly on March 13 refused Russia’s request to denounce coalition actions in Iraq. Tajik political analyst Suhrob Sharipov in April argued that Tajikistan had taken a neutral stance toward U.S.-led coalition actions in Iraq because Tajikistan had benefitted from U.S. aid to rebuild the country and from the improved security climate following U.S.-led actions against terrorism in Afghanistan. Fostering Pro-Western Orientations The United States has encouraged the Central Asian states to become responsible members of the international community, and supported their admission to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), NATO bodies, and other Western organizations. The United States has supported these integrative goals through bilateral aid and through coordination with other aid donors, including regional powers such as Turkey. These and other means are used to discourage radical regimes, groups, and Islamic fundamentalists — who use repression or violence to oppose democratization — from attempts to gain influence. All the Central Asian leaders publicly embrace Islam, but display hostility toward Islamic fundamentalism. At the same time, they have established some trade and aid ties with Iran. While they have had greater success in attracting development aid from the West than from the East, some observers argue that, in the long run, their foreign policies will probably not be anti-Western, but may more closely reflect the concerns of other moderate Islamic states. (See also CRS Report RL30294, Central Asia’s Security.) Russia’s Role. The long-term impact of the events of 9/11 on the Central Asian states may depend upon the duration and scope of U.S. and coalition presence in the region, Russia’s countervailing polices, and the fate of Afghanistan. Prior to 9/11, Putin had tried to strengthen Russia’s interests in the region while opposing the growth of U.S. and other influence. On the other hand, while calling Central Asia an important or even “vital” interest of the United States, U.S. Administrations had generally deferred to Russia on regional security issues and had refused major U.S. military assistance to the states to combat terrorism. Russia’s reasons for permitting the increased U.S. and coalition presence after 9/11 included its interests in boosting some economic and other ties to the West and its hope of regaining influence in a post-Taliban Afghanistan. Russia cooperated with Central Asia in supporting U.S. and coalition efforts, including by quickly sending military equipment and advisors to assist the Northern Alliance in attacks on the Taliban. In accord with long-standing U.S. policy, the Bush Administration generally views a democratizing Russia as able to play a traditional stabilizing role in Central Asia, though emphasizes that Russia should not seek to dominate the region or exclude Western and other involvement. While some observers continue to warn that Russia seeks to reabsorb Central Asia into a new empire, others discount Russia’s capabilities, if not intentions, because of what they view as Russia’s own internal economic, ethnic, and military problems. Virtually all U.S. analysts agree, however, that Russia’s actions should be monitored to ensure that they do not infringe on the independence of the Central Asian states. CRS-4 IB93108 10-03-03 Russian officials have emphasized interests in strategic security and economic ties with Central Asia, and concerns over the treatment of ethnic Russians. Strategic concerns have focused on drug trafficking and regional conflict, and the region’s role as a buffer to Islamic extremism. By the late 1990s, Russia’s economic decline and demands by Central Asia caused it to reduce its security presence, a trend that President Putin appears to be reversing. About 12,000 Russian Border Troops (mostly ethnic Tajiks under Russian command) still defend “CIS borders” in Tajikistan, but were largely phased out in Kyrgyzstan in 1999. Russia justified a 1999 military basing protocol with Tajikistan – for about 8,000 Russian troops of the 201st motorized rifle division – by citing the Islamic extremist threat to the CIS. In late 1999, the last Russian military advisors left Turkmenistan. In 1999, Uzbekistan withdrew from the CST, citing its ineffectiveness and obtrusiveness. In an apparent shift toward a more activist Russian role in Central Asia, in January 2000, then-Acting President Putin approved a “national security concept” that termed foreign efforts to “weaken” Russia’s “position” in Central Asia a security threat. In April 2000, Russia called for the members of the CST to approve the creation of rapid reaction forces, including in Central Asia, to combat terrorism emanating from Afghanistan, and hinted that such a force might launch pre-emptive strikes on Afghan terrorist bases. These hints elicited U.S. calls for Russia to exercise restraint and consult the UN, and elicited Taliban warnings of reprisals against Central Asian states if they permitted Russia to use their bases for strikes. Marking mutual concern, Presidents Clinton and Putin agreed at their June 2000 summit to set up a working group to examine Afghan-related terrorism, and the group held two meetings prior to 9/11. A May 2001 CST summit approved the creation of a Central Asian rapid-reaction force composed of Russian and Kazakh, Kyrgyz, and Tajik battalions. This initiative seemed in part aimed to protect Russian regional influence in the face of nascent U.S. and NATO anti-terrorism moves in the region against Afghanistan. CIS members in 2001 also approved setting up a regional Anti-Terrorist Center (composed of intelligence agencies) in Kyrgyzstan. Soon after 9/11, Russia demonstrably reversed its policy of drawing down its military presence in Central Asia by increasing its troop presence in Tajikistan. In June 2002, it also signed accords with Kyrgyzstan extending leases on military facilities, opening shuttered Kyrgyz defense industries, and training Kyrgyz troops. Most significantly, Kyrgyzstan also agreed that its Kant airfield outside its capital of Bishkek could be used as a base for the Central Asian rapid reaction force. In signing the accords, Russian Defense Minister Sergey Ivanov declared that they showed Russia’s cooperation with the United States and China in combating terrorism, were necessary for Russia to monitor the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and reaffirmed Russia’s presence in the region. A basing accord for Kant was signed by the Russian and Kyrgyz defense ministers in September 2003, with Putin stressing that it “enshrines our military presence in Kyrgyzstan.” Uzbekistan’s President Karimov also seemed to be re-evaluating his sometimes cool relations with Russia when on August 6, 2003, he flattered a visiting Putin by stating that “we are convinced ... that Russia is rising again and regaining its leading positions that rightfully belong to it.” Economically, Russia seeks to counter Western business interests and gain substantial influence over oil and gas resources in the region through participation in joint ventures and by insisting that pipeline routes transit Russian territory. At the same time, Russia has avoided large economic subsidies to the region. Russia’s views regarding a Western role in energy development in the Caspian remain complex. Particularly after the signing of the CRS-5 IB93108 10-03-03 Statement on Energy Cooperation at the May 2002 U.S.-Russia summit, it appeared that Russia would support or accept a Western role in the Caspian region, including construction of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) oil pipeline. In April 2003, Leonard Coburn of the U.S. Energy Department testified to Congress that “the Russians have basically said as long as the economics are there, they have no objection to [the BTC pipeline].” However, Russian energy firms (including Lukoil and the state-owned Transneft) have failed to participate in building or to commit to supplying the BTC pipeline, and some Russian officials have continued to argue that the pipeline is un-necessary and un-economical, and that a proposed undersea link to Kazakhstan is environmentally hazardous. The safety of Russians in Central Asia is a populist concern in Russia, but has in practice mainly served as a political stalking horse for those in Russia advocating the “reintegration” of former “Russian lands.” Ethnic Russians residing in Central Asia have had rising concerns about employment, language, and other policies or practices they deem discriminatory and many have emigrated, contributing to their decline from 20 million in 1989 to 6.6 million in 2001. They now constitute 12% of the population of Central Asia, according to the CIS Statistics Agency. Remaining Russians tend to be elderly or low-skilled. In Kazakhstan, ethnic Kazakhs have again become the majority. Putin was criticized by many in Russia in mid-2003 for his alleged acquiescence to Niyazov’s demand in April 2003 that about 95,000 Russians with dual citizenship residing in Turkmenistan renounce one or the other citizenship. Obstacles to Peace and Independence Regional Tensions and Conflicts. The legacies of co-mingled ethnic groups, convoluted borders, and vague national identities pose challenges to stability in all the Central Asian states. With the Soviet collapse, most in Central Asia support national identities, but also are emphasizing identifications with clan, family, region, and Islam. Most analysts conclude that in the foreseeable future, the term Central Asia will denote a geographic area more than a region of shared identities and aspirations, although it can be argued that the land-locked, poverty-stricken, and non-populous region will need to embrace economic integration in order to develop. Central Asia’s borders, described as among the world’s most convoluted, fail to accurately reflect ethnic distributions and are hard to police, hence contributing to potential instability. Ethnic Uzbeks make up sizeable minorities in the other Central Asian countries and Afghanistan. In Tajikistan, they make up almost a quarter of the population. More ethnic Turkmen reside in Iran and Afghanistan — over three million — than in Turkmenistan. Sizeable numbers of ethnic Tajiks reside in Uzbekistan, and seven million in Afghanistan. Many Kyrgyz and Tajiks live in China’s Xinjiang province. The fertile Ferghana Valley was divided by Stalin among Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan, leaving large numbers of people outside their “national” borders. Criss-crossing mountains thwart Tajikistan’s territorial integrity by limiting regional intercourse. Regional cooperation remains stymied by tensions among the states, and extra-regional cooperative efforts such as the CST Organization (a military secretariat set up in April 2003), NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PFP), and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) have varied in their effectiveness. In 1996, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan, CRS-6 IB93108 10-03-03 signed the “Shanghai treaty” with China pledging the sanctity and substantial demilitarization of mutual borders, and in 1997 they signed a follow-on treaty demilitarizing the 4,300 mile former Soviet-Chinese border. China has used the treaty to pressure the Central Asian states to deter their ethnic Uighur minorities from supporting separatism in China’s Xinjiang province, and to get them to extradite Uighurs fleeing China. In 2001, Uzbekistan joined the group, re-named the SCO. The SCO played no real role in U.S.-led coalition actions in Afghanistan in the winter of 2001-2002. Some of the reasons for forming the SCO — to counter terrorism and limit U.S. presence — appeared undercut when the United States moved militarily into the region after 9/11. Nonetheless, Russia and China reaffirmed these objectives during recent SCO summits. Karimov, who had previously criticized the SCO as ineffective, reversed course in August 2003 and insisted that Uzbekistan host the SCO center. In explaining this shift, Karimov stressed Uzbekistan’s desire for closer ties with Russia, since Russia was playing a larger regional security role. The Bombings in Tashkent, Uzbekistan. The February 16, 1999, explosions in Tashkent demonstrated that the government was vulnerable to terrorism. By various reports the explosions killed 16-28 and wounded 100-351. The aftermath involved wide-scale arrests of political dissidents and others deemed by some observers as unlikely conspirators. Karimov in April accused Mohammad Solikh (former Uzbek presidential candidate and head of the banned Erk Party) of masterminding the plot, along with Tohir Yuldashev (former leader of the banned Uzbek Adolat social movement) and the Taliban. The first trial of 22 suspects in June resulted in six receiving death sentences. The suspects were described in court proceedings as Islamic terrorists who received training in Afghanistan, Tajikistan, Pakistan, and Russia , and were led by Solikh, Yuldashev, and Jama Namanganiy (the latter two were leaders of the IMU). In late 2000, the Uzbek Supreme Court handed down death sentences in absentia for Yuldashev and Namanganiy, and 15.5 years in prison for Solikh. Solikh denies that he is a member of the IMU and both Solikh and Yuldashev deny involvement in the bombings, although Yuldashev has warned that more bombings might occur if Karimov does not step down. In September 2000, the State Department designated the IMU as a Foreign Terrorist Organization, stating that the IMU, aided by Afghanistan’s Taliban and by Osama bin Laden, resorts to terrorism, actively threatens U.S. interests, and attacks American citizens. The “main goal of the IMU is to topple the current government in Uzbekistan,” the State Department warned, linking the IMU to bombings and attacks on Uzbekistan in 1999-2000. According to Patterns of Global Terrorism 2002, IMU forces assisting the Taliban and alQaeda against coalition actions in Afghanistan suffered major losses, and Namanganiy was probably killed, but the IMU remains a regional threat. Some officials in Central Asia claimed in August 2003 that the IMU and other terrorist groups appeared to be recovering somewhat from their losses. The Incursions into Kyrgyzstan. Several hundred Islamic extremists and others first invaded Kyrgyzstan in July-August 1999. Namanganiy headed the largest guerrilla group. They seized hostages and several villages, allegedly seeking to create an Islamic state in south Kyrgyzstan as a springboard for a jihad in Uzbekistan. With Uzbek and Kazakh air and other support, Kyrgyz forces finally forced the guerrillas out in October 1999. According to some observers, the incursion indicated both links among terrorism in Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Russia (Chechnya), and elsewhere and the weakness of Kyrgyzstan’s security forces. Dozens of IMU and other insurgents again invaded Kyrgyzstan CRS-7 IB93108 10-03-03 and Uzbekistan in August 2000. Uzbekistan provided air and other support, but Kyrgyz forces were largely responsible for defeating the insurgents by late October 2000, reporting the loss of 30 Kyrgyz troops. According to the State Department, the IMU did not invade the region in the summer before September 11, 2001, in part because bin Laden had secured its aid for a Taliban offensive against the Afghan Northern Alliance. Civil War in Tajikistan. Tajikistan was among the Central Asian republics least prepared and inclined toward independence when the Soviet Union broke up. In September 1992, a loose coalition of nationalist, Islamic, and democratic parties and groups tried to take over. Kulyabi and Khojenti regional elites, assisted by Uzbekistan and Russia, launched a successful counteroffensive that by the end of 1992 had resulted in 20,000-40,000 casualties and up to 800,000 refugees or displaced persons, about 80,000 of whom fled to Afghanistan. In 1993, the CIS authorized “peacekeeping” in Tajikistan, consisting of Russian and token Kazakh, Kyrgyz, and Uzbek troops. After the two sides agreed to a cease-fire, the U.N. Security Council established a small U.N. Mission of Observers in Tajikistan (UNMOT) in December 1994. In June 1997, Tajik President Emomali Rakhmanov and rebel leader Seyed Abdullo Nuri signed a comprehensive peace agreement. Benchmarks of the peace process were largely met, and UNMOT pulled out in May 2000, replaced by a small U.N. aid contingent, but Russian troops have remained. Tajikistan’s future remains clouded by regional, ethnic, and religious tensions, and its poverty rate is among the highest in the world. Recent moves by Rakhmanov to marginalize the political opposition and constrain freedom of religion threaten Tajikistan’s fragile peace. State Department officials served as observers of the peace talks and pledged to help Tajikistan rebuild after the peace settlement, indications of U.S. efforts to ease ethnic and civil tensions in the Eurasian states. The United States has been the major humanitarian donor to alleviate the effects of the Tajik civil war. The United States supported the presence of U.N. observers in Tajikistan, and urged Russian-CIS “peacekeepers” to cooperate fully with U.N. observers. U.S. programs in Tajikistan were complicated by the U.S. closure of its embassy in Dushanbe in 1998, and relocation of personnel to Kazakhstan, because of inadequate security. Since 2000, some diplomatic personnel have traveled back and forth to Dushanbe. A site has been leased where a secure chancery is being built. Democratization and Human Rights A major goal of U.S. policy in Central Asia has been to foster the long-term development of democratic institutions and policies upholding human rights. U.S. democratization support has been provided for political parties, voter education and electoral laws, legal and constitutional reform, media, structuring the division and balance of governmental powers, and parliamentary and educational exchanges. At the same time, the United States has worked with the ex-Communist Party officials who have led in the five states (even in Tajikistan, the current president was once a low-level party official) since before independence, recognizing that they may continue to hold power for some time. Possible scenarios of political development in Central Asia include continued rule in most of the states by former Soviet elites, gradual transitions to more nationalistic elites who are at least somewhat democratic and Western-oriented, or large-scale and perhaps violent transitions to Islamic fundamentalist or xenophobic rule. All the Central Asian leaders have CRS-8 IB93108 10-03-03 given assurances to the United States that they support democratization, but have continued to rule largely as they did during the communist period, with minimal adaptations. They have remained in power by orchestrating extensions of their terms and by eliminating possible contenders. Only one regional leader – Kyrgyzstan’s President Akayev – has stated that he will step down when his term expires in 2005. Belying appearances of political stability in the states, alleged coup attempts have occurred in Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, and leaders in Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Kyrgyzstan face rising popular protests. Democracy Pledges. During Nazarbayev’s 1994 U.S. visit, he and then-President Clinton signed a Charter on Democratic Partnership recognizing Kazakhstan’s commitments to the rule of law, respect for human rights, and economic reform. During his December 2001 visit, Nazarbayev repeated these pledges in a joint statement with President Bush. In March 2002, Uzbek Foreign Minister Abdulaziz Komilov and Secretary Powell signed a Strategic Partnership Declaration pledging Uzbekistan to “intensify the democratic transformation” and improve freedom of the press. During previous visits in 1997 and 1999 to Washington, D.C., Tajikistan’s President Rakhmanov was not received at the presidential level as a protest against failures in democratization. However, during his December 2002 visit he met with President Bush and other top officials, with the Administration highlighting Tajikistan’s recent “significant progress” in democratization, and Rakhmanov pledging to “expand fundamental freedoms and human rights.” Despite such pledges, none of the states have made much progress in democratization and human rights, according to the State Department’s Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2002. Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan are generally viewed as the most repressive, while Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan permit some limited free expression and other rights. Tajikistan experienced many conflict-related human rights abuses during its civil war, but there have been a few human rights improvements since then. Non-favored faiths, missionaries, and pious Muslims face religious rights abuses in all the states. Unfair elections and unseemly extensions of presidential terms increase political alienation and violence aimed against the regimes. In its June 2003 Trafficking in Persons Report, the State Department categorized Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan as having serious problems with human trafficking for labor or prostitution. If the states did not make serious efforts to reduce such trafficking by October 2003, they could be subject to U.S. aid sanctions. The White House reported to Congress on September 10, 2003, that both Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan were taking significant steps to address the concerns of the June report. The U.N. Rapporteur on Torture in March 2003 completed a draft report on his late 2002 visit to Uzbekistan that concluded that police and prison officials systematically employed torture and other coercive means to obtain confessions and as punishment. The Uzbek government denied that human rights problems in the prisons were systematic, while admitting that some instances of abuse occurred but were being fully addressed. In a speech on April 10, 2003, Assistant Secretary of State Elizabeth Jones reported that the Administration’s “persistent and consistent diplomatic engagement” with Uzbekistan had resulted in “real achievements” in improving human rights conditions in Uzbekistan. Several high-profile arrests and beatings of reporters, political opponents, and human rights advocates in Uzbekistan in recent months, however, have raised new concerns. In Turkmenistan, an alleged November 2002 failed coup resulted in dozens of arrests and trials, the first of which resulted in the quick conviction in late December of former CRS-9 IB93108 10-03-03 Turkmen foreign minister Boris Shikhmuradov and two other opposition leaders (tried in absentia) for organizing the coup attempt. The U.S. State Department strongly protested violations of legal due process and “credible reports” of forced confessions. The United States supported the passage of a resolution by the U.N. Human Rights Commission in April 2003 that strongly condemned political repression and other human rights abuses in Turkmenistan (see also CRS Report RS21384, Turkmenistan’s Attempted Coup). In Congress, conferees on H.R. 4775 (H.Rept.107-593; an emergency supplemental for FY2002; P.L. 107-206) called for added Foreign Military Financing (FMF) aid to Uzbekistan to be conditioned on a report by the Secretary of State that it is making progress in meeting its human rights commitments under the “Strategic Partnership” agreement. Omnibus Appropriations for FY2003 (P.L. 108-7; signed into law on February 20, 2003) goes further, forbidding FREEDOM Support Act assistance to the government of Uzbekistan unless the Secretary of State determines and reports that Uzbekistan is making substantial progress in meeting its commitments to democratize and respect human rights. P.L. 108-7 also forbids assistance to the government of Kazakhstan unless the Secretary of State determines and reports that Kazakhstan has significantly improved its human rights record during the preceding six-month period. Unlike the case with Uzbekistan, the legislation permits the Secretary to waive this requirement on national security grounds. The Secretary has reported that both states are making such progress, eliciting some criticism of these findings from Congress. These conditions have been retained in Foreign Operations Appropriations for FY2004 (S. 1426). Other current legislation includes S.J.Res. 3, which calls on the President to condition U.S. political, economic and military relations with the regional governments on their respect for human rights and democracy. A similar bill, H.Con.Res. 32, has been introduced in the House, and provisions from both resolutions have been incorporated into the Foreign Relations Authorization Act of 2003 (H.R. 1950; see below, Legislation). Security and Arms Control The U.S.-led coalition’s overthrow of the Taliban and routing of al-Qaeda and IMU terrorists in Afghanistan (termed Operation Enduring Freedom or OEF) greatly increased the security of Central Asia. The development of U.S. security ties with Central Asia pre-9/11 facilitated the cooperation of the states in OEF. Reportedly, such pre-9/11 ties included Uzbek permission for U.S. clandestine efforts against al-Qaeda in Afghanistan. According to Assistant Secretary of Defense Crouch in testimony in June 2002, “our military relationships with each [Central Asian] nation have matured on a scale not imaginable prior to September 11th.” Kyrgyzstan, he relates, is a “critical regional partner” in OEF, providing basing for combat and combat support units at Manas Airport (at the U.S.-designated Ganci airbase) for U.S., Italian, and South Korean forces. Uzbekistan provides a base for U.S. operations at Karshi-Khanabad and a base for German units at Termez, and a land corridor to Afghanistan for humanitarian aid via the Friendship Bridge at Termez. Kazakhstan has provided overflight rights and expedited rail transhipment of supplies. Turkmenistan has permitted blanket overflight and refueling privileges for humanitarian flights. Tajikistan has permitted use of its international airport in Dushanbe for refueling. While the Administration has rejected the idea of permanent military bases in these states, Crouch stated that “for the foreseeable future, U.S. defense and security cooperation in Central Asia must continue to support actions to deter or defeat terrorist threats” and to build effective armed forces under civilian control. In July 2003, Kyrgyz security officials pointed to the impermanence of U.S. CRS-10 IB93108 10-03-03 coalition basing and its focus on Afghanistan as justifying Kyrgyzstan’s agreement to host 300-500 Russian troops at the Kant airbase, who would focus on combating regional terrorism. (See also CRS Report RL30294, Central Asia’s Security.) Among significant U.S.-regional security accords, on March 12, 2002, a U.S.Uzbekistan Declaration on the Strategic Partnership was signed that includes a nonspecific security guarantee. The United States affirms that “it would regard with grave concern any external threat” to Uzbekistan’s security and would consult with Uzbekistan “on an urgent basis” regarding a response. The two states pledge to intensify military cooperation, including “re-equipping the Armed Forces” of Uzbekistan. Similarly, visiting Kyrgyz President Askar Akayev and President Bush issued a joint statement on September 23, 2002, pledging to deepen the strategic partnership, including cooperation in counter-terrorism. A small but increasing amount of U.S. security assistance was provided to the region pre-9/11, and much more after 9/11. All the states receive FMF and International Military Education and Training (IMET) assistance, and are eligible to receive Excess Defense Articles (EDA) on a grant basis. Increasing support is also provided to enhance border security to combat trafficking in drugs, humans, and weapons of mass destruction. In 2003, the Drug Enforcement Administration will set up its first counter-narcotics unit in the region in Uzbekistan. U.S. Central Command in 1999 became responsible for U.S. military engagement activities, planning, and operations in Central Asia. It states that its peacetime strategy aims to foster “apolitical, professional militaries capable of responding to regional peacekeeping and humanitarian needs” in the region. USCENTCOM Commanders visited the region regularly, setting the stage for more extensive military ties post-9/11. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld also visited the region in December 2001 and April-May 2002. Efforts to foster military cooperation were furthered when all the Central Asian states except Tajikistan joined NATO’s PFP by mid-1994. Tajikistan decided to join PFP before 9/11, and signed accords on admission in February 2002. Central Asian officers and troops have participated in PFP (or “PFP-style”) exercises in the United States since 1995, and U.S. troops have participated in exercises in Central Asia since 1997. In April 2003, participants and observers from over nineteen NATO and PFP countries (including all Central Asian states but Turkmenistan) took part in “Ferghana 2003” emergency rescue exercises in Uzbekistan. In July 2003, U.S. and British forces participated in PFP “Steppe Eagle 2003” anti-terrorism exercises in Kazakhstan. (Indicating its east-west balancing act, Kazakhstan simultaneously hosted SCO “Cooperation 2003” exercises.) Weapons of Mass Destruction. Major U.S. security interests have included elimination of nuclear weapons remaining in Kazakhstan after the breakup of the Soviet Union and other efforts to control nuclear proliferation in Central Asia. The United States has tendered aid aimed at bolstering their export and physical controls over nuclear technology and materials, including because of concerns that Iran is targeting these countries. In December 2002, Harlan Strauss, the head of Counterproliferation Programs at the U.S. Defense Department, reported that U.S. aid had assisted Central Asian states during 2002 in halting the smuggling of radioactive materials out of the region that could have been used in so-called “dirty bombs” (radioactive materials mixed with conventional explosives). After the Soviet breakup, Kazakhstan was on paper a major nuclear weapons power (in reality Russia controlled these weapons). Though some in Kazakhstan urged “retaining” the CRS-11 IB93108 10-03-03 weapons, it pledged to become a non-nuclear weapons state. All bombers and their air-launched cruise missiles were removed by late February 1994. On April 21, 1995, the last of about 1,040 nuclear warheads had been removed from SS-18 missiles and transferred to Russia, and Kazakhstan announced that it was nuclear weapons-free. The SS-18s were eliminated by late 1994 and most silos were blown up in 1995-1996. In December 1993, the United States and Kazakhstan signed a CTR umbrella agreement for the “safe and secure” dismantling of 104 SS-18s, the destruction of their silos, and related purposes. In June 2002, the United States and Kazakhstan signed an extension accord to destroy six remaining silos at the Leninsk testing ground in the Kyzyl-Orda region. Besides the Kazakh nuclear weapons, there are active research reactors, uranium mines, and milling facilities in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan that pose proliferation concerns. Kazakhstan is reported to possess one-fourth of the world’s uranium reserves, and Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan are among the world’s top producers of low enriched uranium. Kazakhstan had a fast breeder reactor at Aktau, the world’s only nuclear desalinization facility. Shut down in April 1999, it has nearly 300 metric tons of enriched uranium and plutonium spent fuel in storage pools. Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan report that their mining and milling activities have resulted in massive and hazardous waste dumps. In 1997 and 1999, U.S.-Kazakh accords were signed on safeguarding and mothballing the Aktau reactor and eventually removing its weapons-grade plutonium. Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan hosted major chemical and biological warfare (CBW) facilities during the Soviet era. CTR and Energy Department funds are being used to eliminate infrastructure at a former biological weapons production facility in Stepnogorsk, Kazakhstan, and for retraining scientists. At the U.S.-Uzbek Joint Commission meeting in May 1999, the two sides signed a CTR agreement on securing, dismantling, and decontaminating the Soviet-era Nukus chemical research facility. Other aid will help keep Uzbek weapons scientists employed in peaceful research. U.S. aid has been used to eliminate active anthrax spores and other hazards at a Soviet-era CBW testing site on an island in the Aral Sea belonging to Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. (See also CRS Report RL31539, Nuclear Smuggling and International Terrorism.) Trade and Investment The Administration and others stress that U.S. support for free market reforms directly serves U.S. national interests by opening new markets for U.S. goods and services, and sources of energy and minerals. U.S. private investment committed to Central Asia has greatly exceeded that provided to Russia or most other Eurasian states except Azerbaijan, although the region is relatively isolated and the states lag behind Russia in accommodating commercial ties. However, corruption is stifling the emergence of the rule of law, as exemplified by allegations that both Nazarbayev and Niyazov siphoned energy revenues into bank accounts they controlled. Currency convertibility problems in Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan stymie investment, business growth, and trade. U.S. trade agreements have been signed and entered into force with all the Central Asian states. Permanent normal trade relations with Kyrgyzstan were established by law in June 2000, so that “Jackson-Vanik” trade provisions no longer apply that call for presidential reports and waivers concerning freedom of emigration. On August 8, 2003, President Bush CRS-12 IB93108 10-03-03 reported to Congress that Turkmenistan was no longer in full compliance with “JacksonVanik” provisions. Of concern were Turkmenistan’s recent imposition of exit visas and selective use of emigration regulations. However, the President exercised his waiver authority under the Act after receiving assurances from Turkmenistan that it would move to restore freedom of emigration (see also “Most-Favored-Nation Treatment,” in the CRS Trade Briefing Book). The Export-Import Bank (Eximbank) has obligated funds for short-term insurance, loans, or guarantees for export sales of industrial and agricultural equipment and bulk agricultural commodities to all the states except Tajikistan. The Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) has signed agreements with all the Central Asian states on insuring U.S. private investments overseas, and has obligated funds for financing or insurance in all the states except Tajikistan. The Central Asian American Enterprise Fund, authorized by Congress to lend up to $150 million, was bedeviled by convertibility problems and major defaults on its joint venture loans and has halted operations. All the states of the region possess large-scale resources that could yield export earnings, but major investments are needed to revamp, develop, or market the resources in most cases. The Kazakh and Turkmen economies are dependent on energy exports but need added foreign investment for production and transport. Uzbekistan’s cotton and gold production rank among the highest in the world and much is exported. It also has moderate energy reserves. Kyrgyzstan owns major gold mines and strategic mineral reserves, is a major wool producer, and could benefit from tourism. Tajikistan has one of the world’s largest aluminum processing plants and is a major cotton grower. Energy Resources. U.S. policy goals regarding energy resources in the Central Asian and South Caucasian states have included supporting their sovereignty and ties to the West, supporting U.S. private investment, promoting Western energy security through diversified suppliers, assisting ally Turkey, and opposing the building of pipelines that transit “energy competitor” Iran or otherwise give it undue influence over the region. Security for Caspian region pipelines and energy resources also has been a recent interest. President Bush’s May 2001 National Energy Policy report suggests that greater oil production in the Caspian region could not only benefit regional economies, but also help mitigate possible world supply disruptions. It recommends U.S. support for building oil and gas pipelines from Baku, Azerbaijan, through Tbilisi, Georgia, to Turkey, coaxing Kazakhstan to use the oil pipeline, and otherwise encouraging the regional states to provide a stable and inviting business climate for energy development. It avers that the building of the pipelines will help diversify energy supplies, including for Georgia and Turkey. According to the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), the Caspian region is emerging as a significant source of oil and gas for world markets. Oil resources, DOE reports, are comparable to those of the North Sea, and Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Kazakhstan rank among the top countries in terms of proven and probable gas reserves. DOE reports estimates of 10-17.6 billion barrels of proven oil reserves and 53-83 trillion cubic feet of natural gas in Kazakhstan, and 98-155 trillion cubic feet of proven gas reserves in Turkmenistan. Kazakhstan’s Tengiz oil field began to be exploited by Chevron-Texaco and Kazakhstan during 1993 in a consortium called TengizChevoil (U.S. Exxon-Mobil, ARCO, and Russia’s LUKoil later joined). The non-Kazakh partners balked in late 2002 at a Kazakh demand for higher taxes, but the dispute seemed resolved in early 2003. In July 2002, another consortium led by Italy’s Agip oil firm reported that Kazakhstan’s Kashagan offshore Caspian oil field had between 7-9 billion barrels of oil in proven reserves and up to 38 billion CRS-13 IB93108 10-03-03 barrels in probable reserves, comparable to those of Tengiz. Kazakhstan’s oil exports are over 630,000 barrels per day (bpd), compared to 3 million bpd for Russia. (See also CRS Report RS21190, Caspian Oil and Gas: Production and Prospects.) The Central Asian states have been pressured by Russia to yield portions of their energy wealth to Russia, in part because Russia controls most existing pipelines to export markets. In a strategy similar to one it has used in other CIS and in Eastern Europe, Russia heavily restricted Kazakhstan’s Tengiz oil exports to Europe until the consortium admitted LUKoil in 1996 and until Gazprom was admitted to another consortium. Also, Russian shareholders have a controlling interest, 44 percent, in the Caspian pipeline consortium (CPC), which completed construction in 2001 on a 930-mile oil pipeline from Kazakhstan to Russia’s Black Sea port of Novorossiysk — the region’s first new large-capacity pipeline — that initially carries 560,000 bpd, and eventually may carry 1.3 million bpd. President Bush hailed the opening of the pipeline as an example of U.S., Russian, and Kazakh economic cooperation and as “advanc[ing] my Administration’s National Energy Policy by developing a network of multiple Caspian pipelines ... [that] help diversify U.S. energy supply and enhance our energy security.” However, the Administration still has advocated building pipelines that break Russia’s near-monopoly of existing routes, as evidenced by an Energy Cooperation Statement issued at the May 2002 U.S.-Russia Summit that included Russia’s acceptance of the building of the BTC pipeline. In the late 1980s, Turkmenistan was the world’s fourth largest natural gas producer. It is now largely dependent on Russian export routes. It tried unsuccessfully for several years to diversify its export routes and to get higher prices from Russia’s natural gas firm Gazprom (and its subsidiary Itera). In December 1997, Turkmenistan opened the first pipeline from Central Asia to the outside world beyond Russia, a 125-mile pipeline linkage to Iran’s pipeline system. Plans for substantial shipments to Iran were unrealized, however. Turkmenistan also has not been able to convince investors to help it build a gas pipeline through still-unstable Afghanistan. Appearing resigned to getting less than the world market price, Niyazov signed a 25-year accord with Putin in April 2003 on supplying Russia up to 80 million cubic meters of gas per year, tying up the bulk of Turkmenistan’s planned gas exports. Under the deal, Gazprom will pay far less than world market price for the gas, permitting it to export more of its own gas to Europe at world market prices. Aid Overview The Bush Administration provided added security and other assistance to the Central Asian states in FY2002 in response to the events of September 11, 2001. Some observers characterized this assistance as a U.S. quid pro quo for the use of military facilities and an incentive for continued cooperation. The Administration has argued that the safer environment in the Central Asian states fostered by security assistance and the U.S. military presence should permit greater democratization, respect for human rights, and economic liberalization in the region, and the development of Caspian energy resources. For much of the 1990s and until 9/11, the United States provided much more aid each year to Russia, Ukraine, Armenia, and Georgia than to any Central Asian state (most such aid was funded from the FREEDOM Support Act account in Foreign Operations Appropriations, but some derived from other program and agency budgets). Cumulative CRS-14 IB93108 10-03-03 foreign aid budgeted to Central Asia for FY1992 through FY2002 amounted to $2.76 billion, about 13% of the amount budgeted to all the Eurasian states, reflecting the lesser priority given to these states prior to 9/11. Budgeted spending for FY2002 for Central Asia, during OEF, was greatly boosted in absolute amounts and as a percent of total aid to Eurasia. Aid amounts for FY2003 and proposed for FY2004 appear less in absolute amounts than in FY2002, but aid to Central Asia planned for FY2004 may loom larger as a percent (31%) of the total FREEDOM Support Act and other Function 150 aid to Eurasia (see Table 1). Besides bilateral and regional aid, the United States contributes to international financial institutions and nongovernmental organizations that aid Central Asia. Policy issues regarding U.S. aid include whether the states are properly using it (is the aid subject to corruption or is the aid conditioned on reforms), what it should be used for, and who should receive it. (For details, see CRS Issue Brief IB95077, The Former Soviet Union and U.S. Foreign Assistance.) LEGISLATION H.R. 1719 (Weldon) Nuclear Security Initiative Act of 2003. Sec.107, the Silk Road Initiative, calls for Energy Department aid to retrain and employ scientists in Central Asia and the South Caucasus formerly involved in research and development of weapons of mass destruction. Introduced April 10, 2003; referred to the International Relations Committee. H.R. 1950 (Hyde) Millennium Challenge Account, Peace Corps Expansion, and Foreign Relations Authorization Act of 2003. Introduced May 5, 2003; reported by the Committees on International Relations, Armed Services, Energy and Commerce, and Judiciary (H.Rept.108105, Parts 1-4). Passed House on July 16, 2003; placed on the Legislative Calendar in the Senate on July 17, 2003. Sense of the Congress that the President should condition U.S. political, economic and military relations with Central Asian governments on their respect for human rights and democracy. H.R. 2800 (Kolbe) Making Appropriations for Foreign Operations for FY2004. Introduced July 21, 2003; referred to Committee on Appropriations. Reported July 21 (H.Rept. 108-222). Approved July 24, 2003; placed on calendar in Senate. Provides $576 million for the Independent States of the Former Soviet Union. S. 1426 (McConnell) Making Appropriations for Foreign Operations for FY2004. Introduced July 17, 2003; referred to Committee on Appropriations. Ordered to be reported as an original measure July 17 (S.Rept. 108-106). Provides $596 million for the Independent States of the Former Soviet Union. Sec. 674 repeats FY2003 democratization and human rights conditions on assistance to Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. CRS-15 IB93108 10-03-03 Table 1. U.S. Foreign Assistance to Central Asia (in millions of dollars) Central Asian Country Cumulative Funds Budgeted FY1992FY2002* Kazakhstan 885.95 74.87 89.34 51.183 41.53 Kyrgyzstan 635.03 41.46 95.66 45.378 50.27 Tajikistan 489.96 56.48 141.29 29.007 46.8 218.2 12.57 18.06 10.561 11.15 530.59 57.22 239.78 80.68 57.46 2,759.73** 242.6 584.13 216.809 207.21 13% 21% 25% 21.4% 31% Turkmenistan Uzbekistan Total Percent FY2001 Budgeted* FY2002 Budgeted* FY2003 Est.*** FY2004 Request*** Source: State Department, Office of the Coordinator for U.S. Assistance to Europe and Eurasia. *FREEDOM Support Act and Agency funds. **In addition, $22.61 million in region-wide funds were budgeted FY1992-FY2002. ***FREEDOM Support Act and other Function 150 funds, not including Defense or Energy Department funds; the FY2004 request excludes funding for exchanges. Map: Central Asia’s New States CRS-16