Order Code RL32022
CRS Report for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
Air Cargo Security
Updated September 11, 2003
Bartholomew Elias
Specialist in Aviation Security, Safety, and Technology
Resources, Science, and Industry Division
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

Air Cargo Security
Summary
The air cargo system is a complex, multi-faceted network that handles a vast
amount of freight, packages, and mail carried aboard passenger and all-cargo aircraft.
The air cargo system is vulnerable to several security threats including: potential
plots to place explosives aboard aircraft; illegal shipments of hazardous materials;
criminal activities such as smuggling and theft; and potential hijackings and sabotage
by persons with access to aircraft. While it is generally agreed that full screening of
all cargo placed on aircraft is not currently feasible, several procedural and
technology initiatives have been proposed to enhance air cargo security and deter
terrorist and criminal threats. Procedural initiatives include proposals to: expand the
“known shipper” program; increase cargo inspections; increase physical security of
air cargo facilities; increase oversight of air cargo operations; provide security
training for cargo workers; and tighten controls over access to aircraft during cargo
operations. Technology being considered to improve air cargo security includes:
tamper-resistant and tamper-evident packaging and containers; explosive detection
systems and other cargo screening technologies; blast-resistant cargo containers; and
biometric systems for worker identification and access control.
The Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA, P.L. 107-71) contains
general provisions for cargo screening, inspection, and security measures. Cargo
carried in passenger airplanes must be screened or its security otherwise ensured. In
practice, the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has relied heavily on
“known shipper” programs to prevent shipments of cargo from unknown sources on
passenger aircraft. ATSA also mandated that a security plan for all-cargo operations
was to be put in place as soon as possible, but aviation security initiatives to date
have primarily focused on enhancing the security of passenger operations.
In the 108th Congress, several legislative proposals to address concerns over air
cargo security are under consideration. The Air Cargo Security Act (S. 165) was
passed by the Senate on May 8, 2003, and similar legislation (H.R. 1103) has been
introduced in the House. Other legislation (H.R. 2455, H.Amdt. 183 to H.R. 2555
) would require the screening of all cargo placed on passenger aircraft. Proposals to
expand the current program for arming pilots, to include all-cargo pilots in addition
to pilots of passenger airliners, are also under consideration (see S. 516, H.R. 765,
H.R. 1049, S. 165).
This report will be updated as needed.

Contents
Overview of the Air Cargo System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Air Cargo Security Risks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Explosives and Incendiary Devices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Hazardous Materials . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Cargo Crime . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Aircraft Hijacking and Sabotage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Cargo Screening and Inspection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
“Known Shipper” Programs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Cargo Inspection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
U.S. Mail Carried on Aircraft . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Physical Security of Air Cargo Facilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Inspection and Oversight of Air Cargo Facilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Cargo Security Training . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Increased Control over Access to Aircraft . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Arming All-Cargo Pilots . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Technology For Air Cargo Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Tamper-Evident and Tamper-Resistant Seals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Cargo Screening Technology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Hardened Cargo Containers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Biometric Screening Technology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Funding for Air Cargo Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
Potential Congressional Approaches . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
List of Figures
Figure 1: Air Cargo Volume . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Figure 2: Distribution of Air Cargo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
List of Tables
Table 1. Proposed FY2004 Appropriations for Air Cargo Security . . . . . . . . . . 23
Table 2. Potential Benefits and Possible Risks of Various Congressional Approaches
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24

Air Cargo Security
Overview of the Air Cargo System
The air cargo system is a complex, multi-faceted network responsible for
moving a vast amount of freight, express packages, and mail carried aboard
passenger and all-cargo aircraft. The air cargo system consists of a large, complex
distribution network linking manufacturers and shippers to freight forwarders to
airport sorting and cargo handling facilities where shipments are loaded and unloaded
from aircraft. Business and consumer demand for fast, efficient shipment of goods
has fueled the rapid growth of the air cargo industry over the past 25 years. In fiscal
year 2001, about 13.9 billion revenue ton miles1 (RTMs) of cargo2 were shipped by
air within the United States, and another 14.5 billion RTMs of cargo were shipped
by air on international flights to and from the United States. The volume of air cargo
operations in fiscal years 1995, 2001, and the estimated volume for 2002 are shown
in Figure 1.
It is estimated that air cargo shipments will increase by 49%
domestically, and by 86% internationally over the next ten years.3 In 1999, air cargo
comprised about 0.4% of all freight movement in the United States.4 While this
percentage may seem small, it is much greater than the 0.07% percent of freight that
traveled by air in 1965, indicating that not only is the volume of air cargo increasing
significantly, but so is the percent of total freight movements that travel by air. Also,
cargo shipments by air comprise a significant percent of the total value of cargo
shipments. In fact, in 2000, air cargo accounted for 29.7% of international trade by
value, surpassed only by maritime shipping which accounted for 37% of the
import/export value of cargo.5 While the current downturn in the aviation industry
may slow the pace of the expected growth in air cargo, the existing size and
complexity of the air cargo system already poses a significant challenge for aviation
security.
Given the sheer volume of cargo that must be expediently processed and loaded
on aircraft, experts generally agree that full screening of all air cargo, as is now
required of checked passenger baggage, is simply not feasible with available
1 A revenue ton mile is equivalent to one ton of cargo being transported one mile.
2 Cargo, as defined by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), includes freight, express
packages, and mail.
3 Federal Aviation Administration. FAA Aerospace Forecasts Fiscal Years 2003-2014.
4 Bureau of Transportation Statistics. National Transportation Statistics 2002. Washington,
D.C.: U.S. Department of Transportation (BTS02-08).
5 Bureau of Transportation Statistics. Pocket Guide to Transportation. Washington, DC:
U.S. Department of Transportation (BTS03-01).





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































CRS-2
screening technologies and procedures.6 In fact, it has been reported that TSA
computer models estimated that if full physical screening is implemented, only 4%
of the daily volume of freight at airports could be processed due to the time that
would be required to breakdown shipments, inspect them, and reassemble them for
transport.7
Currently, less than 5% of cargo placed on passenger airplanes is
screened8.
TSA staff have recently made recommendations to increase these
inspections to 5%, acquire at least 200 additional explosive trace detectors
systemwide to support this effort, and conduct focused audits at freight forwarder and
air cargo operations facilities.9
Figure 1: Air Cargo Volume
10000
8000
s
M
T
6000
R
4000
Million
2000
0
1995
2001
2002
Year
Domestic: All-Cargo
Domestic: Passenger
International: All-Cargo
International: Passenger
Source: Federal Aviation Administration. FAA Aerospace Forecasts Fiscal Years
2003-2014
.
6 See Statement of Admiral James M. Loy Under Secretary of Transportation for Security
Before the Subcommittee on Aviation Committee on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation U.S. Senate, February 5, 2003.
7 Greg Schneider. “Terror Risk Cited for Cargo Carried on Passenger Jets; 2 Reports List
Security Gaps.” The Washington Post, June 10, 2002.
8 Denise Marois. “IPA Lobbies Congress for Tougher Cargo Security.” Aviation Daily,
January 6, 2003.
9 Greg Schneider. Ibid.



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































CRS-3
While the current focus is primarily on cargo carried aboard passenger aircraft,
air cargo security is also a challenge for all-cargo operators. The largest all-cargo
operators in the United States include FedEx, UPS, Airborne Express, and DHL
Airways. Figure 2 shows the distribution of air cargo operations among passenger
and all-cargo aircraft. International operations make up about half of the total
system-wide air cargo operations in the United States. While about 30% by weight
of domestic air cargo travels aboard passenger aircraft within the United States,
almost 49% by weight of international cargo to and from the United States is carried
aboard passenger aircraft. The percentage of air cargo carried on passenger aircraft
has dropped somewhat since September 11, 2001, with an estimated 26% by weight
of domestic air cargo and 46% by weight of international air cargo carried on
passenger aircraft in 2002. This reduction in the distribution of air cargo to passenger
flights is primarily attributable to a post-September 11th restriction on mail parcels
weighing more than 16 ounces, and a prohibition against carrying cargo from
unknown shippers aboard passenger aircraft. A reduction in passenger flights to
certain locations over the past two years has also contributed to an increased reliance
on all-cargo aircraft for cargo shipments.
Figure 2: Distribution of Air Cargo
International
Domestic
All-Ca
(
rgo 24.36%)
(34.73%)All-Cargo
Passeng (
er25.72%)
(15.19%) Passenger
Source: Federal Aviation Administration. FAA Aerospace Forecasts Fiscal Years
2003-2014
.
A variety of air cargo security measures have been put in place or are under
consideration. The purpose of these security measures is to mitigate the risks
associated with: placing cargo on passenger and all-cargo aircraft; and the high level
of access to aircraft during cargo operations. This paper will examine the key
security risks associated with air cargo operations and options for mitigating these
risks.

CRS-4
Air Cargo Security Risks
Potential risks associated with air cargo security include: introduction of
explosive and incendiary devices in cargo placed aboard aircraft; shipment of
undeclared or undetected hazardous materials aboard aircraft; cargo crime including
theft and smuggling; and aircraft hijackings and sabotage by individuals with access
to aircraft.
Explosives and Incendiary Devices. Undetected explosive or incendiary
devices placed in air cargo are potential threats to aircraft. Experts have warned that
air cargo may be a potential target for terrorists because screening and inspection of
air cargo is currently not as extensive as required screening of passengers and
checked baggage. Cargo carried aboard passenger aircraft may be at particular risk
since passenger aircraft are generally regarded as highly attractive targets to terrorists
and have been attacked in the past. It has been reported that TSA considers the
likelihood of a terrorist bombing of a passenger airplane to be between 35% and 65%
based on year-old intelligence reports, and TSA believes that cargo is either likely to
become, or already is, the primary aviation target for terrorists in the short term.10
However, other terrorism experts regard placing explosives in air cargo as less
appealing to terrorists because typically a specific flight cannot be targeted without
the assistance of an individual with access to aircraft. Furthermore, experts generally
believe that all-cargo aircraft are less appealing targets to terrorists because an attack
against an all-cargo aircraft is not likely to generate the degree of public and media
attention that a bombing of a commercial passenger aircraft would have.
The December 22, 2001 attempted shoe bombing aboard a American Airlines
Boeing 767 on a trans-Atlantic Paris to Miami flight has heightened concerns over
possible terrorist bombings of U.S. aircraft in the wake of the terrorist attacks of
September 11, 2001. Historically, bombings of U.S. airliners have been rare and
have mostly involved bombs placed in either the aircraft passenger cabin or in
checked passenger baggage. The most catastrophic bombing of a U.S. airliner was
the December 21, 1988 crash of Pan Am flight 103, a Boeing 747, over Lockerbie,
Scotland that was attributed to an explosive device placed in a baggage container in
the airplane’s forward hold.11 Investigation of the deadliest bombing of a passenger
aircraft, the June 23, 1985 downing of Air India flight 182 off the coast of Ireland,
similarly revealed evidence of a explosive device that was most likely introduced in
checked baggage and placed in the aircraft’s forward cargo hold.12 The most notable
event involving detonation of an explosive device transported as cargo aboard an
airliner in the United States was the Nov. 15, 1979 explosion aboard an American
Airlines Boeing 727 that made a successful emergency landing at Dulles Airport
following the incident. Investigation revealed that the device was contained in a
10 Greg Schneider. Ibid.
11 United Kingdom Air Accidents Investigation Branch. Report on the accident to Boeing
747-121, N739PA at Lockerbie, Dumfriesshire, Scotland on 21 December 1988
(Aircraft
Accident Report No 2/90 (EW/C1094)), July 1990.
12 Canadian Aviation Bureau Safety Board. Aviation Occurrence, Air India Boeing
747-237B VT-EFO, Cork, Ireland 110 Miles West, 23 June1985.

CRS-5
parcel shipped by U.S. mail that the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) linked to
convicted “Unabomber”, Theodore Kaczynski.13
While using cargo as a means to place explosive or incendiary devices aboard
aircraft has historically been rare, heightened screening of passengers, baggage, and
aircraft may make cargo a more attractive means for terrorists to place these devices
aboard aircraft in the future. However, as previously noted, some terrorism experts
believe that placing explosives or incendiary devices in cargo may be less appealing
because it would be difficult to target specific flights without the cooperation of
individuals with access to aircraft such as cargo workers. Thus, increased efforts to
perform background checks of workers with access to aircraft and increased physical
security around air cargo operations may further mitigate the threat of explosives and
incendiary devices. Additionally, the use of hardened cargo containers capable of
withstanding internal bomb blasts are being evaluated and may also provide a means
of mitigating the risks of explosives and incendiary devices.
Hazardous Materials.14 Despite increased Federal Aviation Administration
(FAA) oversight and enforcement efforts, undeclared and undetected shipments of
hazardous materials continues to pose a significant safety problem for air carriers.
Most explosives and gases are prohibited aboard aircraft, however many properly
handled hazardous materials are permitted aboard passenger and all-cargo aircraft
within specified quantity limitations .15
Risks are introduced when hazardous materials are not declared leading to the
potential transport of prohibited materials by air or improper handling of hazardous
goods during loading and while in transit. The dangers of undetected and improperly
handled hazardous materials in air cargo shipments were highlighted by the May 11,
1996 crash of a ValuJet DC-9 in the Florida Everglades.
The National
Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) determined that improperly carried oxygen
generators ignited an intense fire in one of the airplane’s cargo holds leading to the
crash and issued several safety recommendations for improving the handling and
tracking of hazardous materials to prevent improper carriage aboard passenger
aircraft.16
While safety concerns regarding hazardous cargo shipments aboard passenger
aircraft are of particular concern, preventing unauthorized shipments of hazardous
13 Affidavit of Assistant Special Agent in Charge, Terry D. Turchie, Before the U.S. District
Court, District of Montana, April 3, 1996.
14 Hazardous materials or dangerous goods include: explosives; gases; flammable liquids
and solids; oxidizers and organic peroxides; toxic materials and infectious substances;
radioactive materials; corrosive materials; and other miscellaneous dangerous goods (e.g.
asbestos).
15
U.S. General Accounting Office.
Aviation Safety: Undeclared Air Shipments of
Dangerous Goods and DOT’s Enforcement Approach. (GAO-03-22, January 2003).
16 National Transportation Safety Board. Aircraft Accident Report: In-Flight Fire and
Impact with Terrain, ValuJet Airlines, Flight 592,DC-9-32, N904VJ, Everglades, Near
Miami, Florida, May 11, 1996
(AAR-97/06).

CRS-6
materials is a challenge for all-cargo aircraft operators as well. About 75 percent of
hazardous materials shipped by aircraft are carried aboard all-cargo aircraft, while the
remaining 25 percent is shipped on passenger aircraft.17 Enhanced air cargo security
measures may also improve air cargo safety by increasing the detection of undeclared
hazardous materials.
Cargo Crime. Cargo crimes include theft of goods transported as cargo, and
shipment and smuggling of contraband, counterfeit, and pirated goods through the
cargo distribution network. It is estimated that direct losses due to cargo theft across
all transportation modes total between $10 and 25 billion annually in the United
States.18 The large range in this estimate reflects the fact that cargo theft is not a
specific crime category and therefore reliable statistics on cargo theft are unavailable.
Furthermore, many experts believe a large percentage of cargo theft is unreported.
The large estimated level of cargo theft and other cargo crimes is indicative of
potential weaknesses in cargo security including air cargo security.
Specific
weaknesses in air cargo security have been highlighted in several high profile
investigations of cargo theft. Major cargo and baggage theft rings have been
uncovered at JFK International Airport in New York, Logan International Airport in
Boston, and at Miami International Airport.19 In addition to theft, smuggling is a
problem for air cargo security. Smuggling of contraband, counterfeit, and pirated
goods undermines legal markets and reduces government tax and tariff revenues.
Smuggling operations are often linked to organized crime, and may provide support
for terrorist activities.20 A large portion of cargo crime is either committed by or with
the assistance of cargo workers. Therefore, increased security measures such as
conducting more stringent or more frequent background checks of cargo workers and
enhancing physical security of cargo operations areas are likely to reduce cargo
crimes and improve the capability to detect criminal activity in air cargo operations.
A review of transportation security needs for combating cargo crime identified six
key issues regarding cargo security:
! A lack of effective cargo theft reporting systems;
! Weaknesses in current transportation crime laws and prosecution;
! A lack of understanding regarding the nature of cargo crime by
governments and industry;
! Inadequate support for cargo theft task forces;
17 General Accounting Office. Aviation Safety: Undeclared Air Shipments of Dangerous
Goods and DOT’s Enforcement Approach.
GAO-03-22, January 2003.
18 U. S. General Accounting Office. Aviation Security: Vulnerabilities and Potential
Improvements for the Air Cargo System.
GAO-03-334, December, 2002. FIA International
Research, Ltd. Contraband, Organized Crime and the Threat to the Transportation and
Supply Chain Function
. September 2001.
19 U. S. General Accounting Office. Ibid; Department of Transportation, Office of the
Inspector General. Press Release: Six MIA Airport Employees Indicted for Stealing from
Checked Passenger Bags
. December 11, 2002.
20 FIA International Research, Ltd. Op cit.

CRS-7
! A need to improve local law enforcement expertise on cargo theft;
and
! The need for more effective cargo security technology including:
cargo tracking systems, tamper-evident and tamper-resistant seals,
high-speed screening devices, and integration of security technology
into supply chain management systems.21
Addressing these issues specific to cargo crime may also affect overall cargo security
serve to deter terrorist threats to cargo shipments. While these recommendations are
directed toward cargo crime issues in all modes of transportation, they could be
particularly applicable to air cargo security where other security concerns such as
explosive and incendiary device detection, hazardous materials detection, and
deterring hijackings and sabotage may also be addressed through the implementation
of tighter controls to deter cargo crime.
Aircraft Hijacking and Sabotage. Individuals with access to aircraft may
pose a risk of potential hijackings and aircraft sabotage. Instances of hijackings by
individuals with access to aircraft have been extremely rare, but include
two
examples of particularly violent incidents by disgruntled individuals who had access
to aircraft that facilitated their plots. A particularly dramatic hijacking attempt by an
individual with access to aircraft and cargo operations facilities occurred on April 7,
1994.22 An off-duty Federal Express flight engineer attempted to hijack a FedEx DC-
10 aircraft and crash it into the company’s Memphis, Tennessee headquarters. The
hijacker boarded the airplane in Memphis under the guise of seeking free
transportation to San Jose, California. His only luggage was a guitar case that
concealed hammers, mallets, a knife, and a spear gun. At the time there was no
requirement or company procedure to screen or inspect personnel with access to
cargo aircraft or their baggage. The flight crew thwarted the hijacker’s attempt to
take over the airplane by force and made a successful emergency landing in Memphis
despite serious injuries to all three flight crew members.
Individuals have also used their access to aircraft credentials to bypass existing
security measures. For example, on December 7, 1987, a PSA regional jet crashed
near San Luis Obispo, California killing all 43 people on board.23 Investigation
revealed that a disgruntled former USAir employee, recently fired for alleged theft,
used his employee identification, which had not been returned, to bypass airport
security with a loaded handgun. At altitude, he shot his former supervisor who was
a passenger on the airplane. He then entered the flight deck, shot the two pilots, and
then shot himself after putting the airplane into a crash dive. At the time, federal
regulations permitted airline employees to bypass airport security checkpoints.
21 Ed Badolato. “Cargo Security: High-Tech Protection, High-Tech Threats. TR News, 211,
November-December 2000, pp. 14-17.
22 Dave Hirschman. Hijacked: The True Story of the Heroes of Flight 705. (New York:
William Morrow & Co, 1997).
23
National Transportation Safety Board.
Accident Brief, NTSB Identification:
DCA88MA008. Available at www.ntsb.gov

CRS-8
Since these incidents, airport and air cargo security regulations have been
tightened to establish better controls over aircraft access including background
checks and physical screening of individuals with access to aircraft. However,
without full screening of air cargo and airport personnel, the potential still exists for
persons with access to aircraft to pass weapons inside the secured areas of airports.
Heightened security measures on passenger aircraft since September 11, 2001
could make all-cargo aircraft more attractive to terrorists seeking to hijack large
airplanes. Currently, federal air marshals are not deployed on all-cargo aircraft, cargo
airplanes are not required to have hardened cockpit doors, and pilots of all-cargo
aircraft may not participate in the Federal Flight Deck Officer program, that permits
deputized pilots of passenger airplanes to carry firearms to protect the flight deck (see
CRS Report RL31674).
Legislation introduced in the 108th Congress seeks to allow pilots of all-cargo
aircraft to participate in the Federal Flight Deck Officer program (S. 165, H.R. 765;
H.R. 1049; S. 51624). Sabotage by individuals with access to aircraft is also a
potential risk, although generally not considered a significant threat because of the
high level of knowledge regarding aircraft systems needed to sabotage flight critical
systems, the levels of redundancy of flight critical systems on modern transport
category airplanes25, and the existing capabilities to detect sabotage attempts through
aircraft systems checks and pre-flight inspections.
Cargo Screening and Inspection
Screening and inspection of air cargo may be an effective means for detecting
explosives, incendiary devices, and hazardous materials in air cargo. The Aviation
and Transportation Security Act (ATSA, P.L. 107-71) requires the screening of all
property, including mail and cargo, carried aboard passenger aircraft in the United
States. In implementing the security procedures for cargo carried aboard passenger
airplanes, TSA has relied extensively on “known shipper” programs to prevent the
shipment of cargo from unknown sources aboard passenger aircraft. ATSA also
specifies that, as soon as practicable, a system must be implemented to screen,
inspect, or otherwise ensure the security of all cargo transported in all-cargo aircraft
using methods such as those outlined in this report.
However, the General
Accounting Office (GAO) recently reported that the TSA lacks specific long-term
goals and performance targets for cargo security.26
24 Unless otherwise noted, all bill numbers cited in this report are from the 108th Congress.
25 Transport category airplanes include all jet-powered airplanes with 10 or more passenger
seats or weighing more than 12,500 pounds maximum takeoff weight (MTOW), and all
propeller-driven airplanes with 19 or more seats or weighing more than 19,000 pounds
MTOW.
26 United States General Accounting Office. Post-September 11th Initiatives and Long-Term
Challenges.

Statement of Gerald L. Dillingham, Testimony Before the National
Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, April 1, 2003 (GAO-03-616T).

CRS-9
Current aviation security regulations require that each passenger aircraft
operator and indirect air carrier27 develop a security program for acceptance and
screening of cargo to prevent or deter the carriage of unauthorized explosives or
incendiaries. However, the volume of air cargo handled and the distributed nature
of the air cargo system presents significant challenges for screening and inspecting
air cargo. Presently, in the United States, about 50 air carriers transport air cargo on
passenger aircraft handling cargo from nearly 2 million shippers per day.28 About
80% of these shippers use freight forwarders who operate about 10,000 facilities
across the country.29 Since experts generally believe that 100% screening of all air
cargo is not a practical solution with currently available technology, security
programs have relied on pre-screening of cargo to identify shipments for physical
screening and inspection. The principal means for pre-screening or profiling cargo
has been though use of “known shipper” programs.
“Known Shipper” Programs. Known shipper programs were created to
establish procedures for differentiating trusted shippers known to a freight forwarder
or air carrier through prior business dealings, from unknown shippers who have
conducted limited or no prior business with a freight forwarder or air carrier. Using
this system, packages from unknown shippers can then be identified for additional
screening and inspection. Currently, shipments from unknown sources are prohibited
from passenger aircraft. Additionally, air carriers and freight forwarders must refuse
to transport any cargo from shippers, including known shippers, that refuse to give
consent for searching and inspecting the cargo. ATSA provides for use of known
shipper programs as an alternate means for ensuring the security of cargo carried
aboard passenger aircraft in lieu of screening of property by federal government
employees prior to aircraft boarding.
The development of known shipper programs was prompted by industry experts
and Congress in the mid-1990s who recognized that increased controls over air cargo
shipments were needed to better ensure air cargo safety and security. Key concerns
included the need for increased compliance with guidelines for the shipment of
hazardous materials and the need to deter terrorists from using cargo as a means to
place explosives or incendiary devices on aircraft.
In addition, congressional
hearings on the 1996 Valujet accident concluded that air cargo safety could only be
achieved through a comprehensive inspection program encompassing all components
of the air cargo network.30
In December 1996, the FAA’s Aviation Security Advisory Committee (ASAC)
Security Baseline Working Group issued a series of recommendations that formed
the basis for FAA’s effort to strengthen aviation security in response to this need.
27 An indirect air carrier refers to an entity, such as a freight forwarder, that engages
indirectly in the air transportation of property on passenger aircraft (See Title 49 Code of
Federal Regulations, Chapter XII, Part 1544).
28 See Senate Report 108-38.
29 United States General Accounting Office. Aviation Security.
30
Department Of Transportation, Office of the Inspector General. Aviation Security:
Federal Aviation Administration (Report No. AV-1998-134, May 27, 1998).

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Recommendations issued by the working group regarding air cargo security included:
tightening the definition of a “known shipper”; using profiles to review the shipments
of known shippers and apply additional security measures; and exploring
technologies to develop a profile to be applied to cargo shipments. The White House
Commission on Aviation Safety and Security, formed after the 1996 crash of TWA
Flight 800 and commonly referred to as the Gore Commission, urged the adoption
of the recommendations made by the FAA’s Baseline Working Group regarding the
profiling of “known” and “unknown”shippers.31 As part of FAA’s efforts in air cargo
safety and security, a “known shipper” program was subsequently established,
outlining procedures for freight forwarders and air carriers to review the security
practices of known frequent customers and establish a cargo security plan for
handling cargo from known and unknown shippers. With the passage of ATSA,
oversight of cargo security measures was transferred from the FAA to the TSA. The
TSA has continued to rely on known shipper programs as a principle means for pre-
screening air cargo.
A review of aviation security after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks by
the Department of Transportation (DOT) Office of the Inspector General, drew
attention to the vulnerabilities of air cargo and questioned the overall effectiveness
of the known shipper program.32 In Congressional testimony following the terrorist
attacks of September 11, 2001, DOT Inspector General, Kenneth Mead, referenced
a 1998 report by the DOT Office of the Inspector General documenting a high rate
of non-compliance with hazardous materials regulations and cargo security
requirements across the air cargo industry and a lack of industry oversight to ensure
that security procedures were carried out by cargo workers.33 In 1998, The DOT
Inspector General noted that FAA was making progress toward improving the
policies, procedures, and controls over air cargo safety and security.34 However,
Mead testified that a follow-up audit revealed continued weaknesses in FAA’s policy
for allowing cargo on passenger aircraft.
Several loopholes have been noted,
including the relative ease of obtaining known shipper status, and the relative ease
with which someone could pose as a known shipper by falsifying or counterfeiting
shipping documents used to identify the source as a known shipper.35
Two main issues regarding the current implementation of known shipper
programs are the adequacy of procedures for auditing and monitoring known shippers
and the current lack of a consolidated database of known shippers. Critics of existing
31 White House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security. Final Report to President
Clinton.
Vice President Al Gore, Chairman. February 12, 1997. Washington, DC: The
White House.
32 Ken Leiser. “Gaps in air cargo security may offer terrorism openings”. AEROTECH News
and Review
, June 21, 2002, p. B2.
33 Statement of The Honorable Kenneth M. Mead, Inspector General U.S. Department of
Transportation. “Action Needed to Improve Aviation Security.” Before the Committee on
Governmental Affairs and the Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management,
Restructuring and the District of Columbia, United States Senate, September 25, 2001.
34 Department Of Transportation, Office of the Inspector General. Ibid.
35 Greg Schneider. Op cit.

CRS-11
known shipper programs argue that currently very little investigation of known
shippers is required to demonstrate that these shippers are trustworthy and have
adequate security measures in place to ensure the integrity of their shipments.36
Freight forwarders and air carriers have also questioned why extensive background
checks and established relations with a particular customer are required to establish
that the customer is a known shipper when that customer is already considered a
known shipper to another air carrier or freight forwarder. Therefore, the air cargo
industry has called for a standardized, centralized database of known shippers. Both
S. 165 and H.R. 1103 contain provisions for the development of a industry-wide pilot
program database of known shippers and use of the results of this pilot program for
improving the overall known shipper program. The House Homeland Security
appropriations bill (H.R. 2555, H. Rept. 108-169) identifies $20 million for
developing an air cargo security program that would include a risk-weighted freight
screening system utilizing an automated known shipper verification system, while the
Senate Committee on Appropriations recommends $30 million in FY2004 for the air
cargo pilot program (see S. Rept. 108-86). The Congressional Budget Office (CBO)
estimates that it would cost about $10 million per year to maintain an industry-wide
database of known shippers.37
Cargo Inspection. Another issue for air cargo security is the adequacy of
cargo inspection procedures and oversight of cargo inspections at air carrier and
freight forwarder facilities. ATSA established requirements for screening and
inspection of all individuals, goods, property, vehicles, and other equipment entering
a secured area of a passenger airport that assures the same level of protection as
passenger and baggage screening.
ATSA did not establish specific requirements for the screening of air cargo.
With regard to air cargo, current regulations specify that aircraft operators must use
the procedures, facilities, and equipment described in their security program to
prevent or deter the carriage of unauthorized explosives or incendiaries in cargo
onboard a passenger aircraft and inspect cargo shipments for such devices before it
is loaded onto passenger aircraft. Additionally, aircraft operators must establish
controls over cargo shipments, in accordance with their security program, that
prevent the carriage of unauthorized explosive or incendiary devices aboard
passenger aircraft and access by unauthorized individuals. Aircraft operators must
refuse to transport any cargo presented by a shipper that refuses to consent to a search
and inspection of their shipment.38 With regard to all-cargo aircraft, ATSA mandates
that a system to screen, inspect, or otherwise ensure the security of all-cargo aircraft
is to be established as soon as practicable, but sets no specific deadlines or time
frame for compliance.
A significant challenge regarding cargo inspection is the feasibility of
implementing inspection procedures that offer adequate assurances for security
36 Ken Leiser, Op cit.
37 See Senate Report 108-38. Air Cargo Security Improvement Act: Report of the Committee
on Commerce, Science, and Transportation on S. 165.
United States Senate, April 11, 2003.
38 See Title 49, Code of Federal Regulations, Chapter XII, Part 1544.205

CRS-12
without unduly affecting cargo shipment schedules and processes. In 1997, the Gore
Commission recommended that unaccompanied express packages shipped on
commercial passenger aircraft should be subject to examination by explosives
detection systems.39 However, most experts agree that current technology does not
offer a readily available, affordable solution for scanning cargo containers or cargo
unit loading devices (ULDs) in an expeditious manner that would not unduly affect
the schedule of air cargo operations.
Also, scanning or inspecting individual
packages is considered infeasible by many experts due to the volume of cargo
handled and the schedule demands of the air cargo business. Therefore, most experts
agree that the most practical solution, using available technology, is the application
of physical screening and inspections on selected shipments and the use of cargo
profiling procedures such as known shipper programs to identify shipments that may
require additional screening and inspection.
Since the ability to screen and inspect cargo is limited by available technology,
flight schedules, and cargo processing demands, alternative measures for screening
and inspection at cargo handling facilities have been suggested. In particular, the
Gore Commission recommended a significant expansion of the use of bomb-sniffing
dogs. Recently, TSA head, Admiral James Loy, also indicated that increased use of
canine teams may be an effective means for increasing inspections of cargo and
mail.40 Canine teams may offer a viable alternative means for screening air cargo at
a relatively low cost.
U.S. Mail Carried on Aircraft. The transport of U.S. mail aboard aircraft
introduces additional security challenges to prevent illegal hazardous material
shipments and the introduction of explosive and incendiary devices. Inspecting first
class, priority, and express mail prior to shipment by air is difficult because the Postal
Service regards these items as private materials protected by the Fourth Amendment
against search.41 The Postal Service has implemented a screening process to prevent
unauthorized shipments of hazardous substances that relies on customer screening
by postal clerks who are trained to question individuals shipping packages weighing
more than one pound by air. Items weighing less than one pound, on the other hand,
are not subject to any inquiry and can be deposited in mailboxes thereby precluding
any inquiry of the sender. However, only a small percentage of this mail is shipped
by air. About 5 to 7.5 percent of all domestic mail shipments, regardless of weight,
are transported by either passenger or all-cargo aircraft. Federal Express is the largest
carrier of U.S. mail and its all-cargo operations account for about half of the total
volume of U.S. mail shipments by air.42
In 1997, the Gore Commission recommended that the Postal Service obtain
authorization from customers shipping mail weighing more than one pound allowing
39 White House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security. Op cit.
40 See Statement of Admiral James M. Loy, Op cit.
41 U.S. General Accounting Office. Aviation Security.
42 “Northwest to drop U.S. mail; Canceled domestic routes to cost 250 ground jobs”. Detroit
Free Press,
September 5, 2003.

CRS-13
examination by explosive detection systems, and if necessary, seek appropriate
legislation to accomplish this.43
Since September 11, 2001, postal shipments
weighing more than one pound have been limited to all-cargo aircraft. Passenger air
carriers have been pushing to have these restrictions lifted because of a significant
loss of revenue from U.S. mail shipments. Items weighing less than one pound
shipped by U.S. mail are not subject to this restriction from carriage aboard passenger
airliners.
Assuring the safety and security of U.S. mail transported by aircraft, and
preventing the introduction of explosives or incendiaries in mail shipped by aircraft
while maintaining privacy rights of postal patrons remains an important issue in the
debate over air cargo security. The Aviation Industry Stabilization Act of 2003 (H.R.
1366) contains a provision directing the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
to take such actions that may be necessary to improve the screening of U.S. mail so
it can be carried aboard passenger airliners and would also require the TSA to report
to Congress on its ongoing pilot program to determine whether canine teams can be
used to screen mail before being placed aboard passenger-carrying aircraft.
Following the events of September 11, 2001 and the Postal Service anthrax incidents,
the Technology Subcommittee of the President’s Commission on the United States
Postal Service recommended that the Postal Service, in coordination with the
Department of Homeland Security, should explore technologies and procedures for
utilizing unique sender identification on all mail.44 Such procedures may provide a
means of pre-screening all mail shipped by air, including packages weighing less than
one pound.
Physical Security of Air Cargo Facilities
Air cargo facilities present unique challenges for physical security. The large
physical size of these facilities and relatively continuous high-volume cargo
operations introduce numerous individuals, vehicles, and shipments into secured
access areas around aircraft. Key issues regarding physical security of these air cargo
facilities include the adequacy of :
! Inspections and oversight of air cargo facilities to ensure compliance
with aviation security regulations and procedures established in the
approved security programs of air carriers and freight forwarders;
! Training for air cargo personnel with regard to security procedures
and guidelines; and
! Access control requirements for personnel with access to air cargo
facilities and aircraft.
Inspection and Oversight of Air Cargo Facilities. Current regulations
specify that all air carriers and freight forwarders must allow the TSA to conduct
43 White House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security. Op cit.
44 President’s Commission on the United States Postal Service. Final Recommendations of
the Technology Challenges and Opportunities Subcommittee.
Washington, DC: United
States Department of the Treasury [http://www.ustreas.gov/offices/domestic-finance/usps/]

CRS-14
inspections and to review and copy records in order to determine compliance with
applicable laws and regulations pertaining to aviation security. Legislation currently
under consideration (S. 165, H.R. 1103, and H.R. 2455) would require TSA to
develop a system for inspecting air cargo shipping facilities on a regular basis and
would give TSA the authority to hire more inspectors to conduct these inspections.
Presently, TSA has reportedly offered a short-term plan to increase its scrutiny
of lax freight forwarders and cargo operations facilities by conducting high-profile
“blitz” audits.45 However, the ability to increase oversight of air cargo facilities will
be highly dependent on the availability of resources and funding. The effectiveness
of this oversight will also likely be highly dependent on the adequacy of available
tools and procedures to track needed corrective actions and ensure compliance among
air carriers and freight forwarders.
Cargo Security Training. Currently, air cargo handlers are not required to
receive any specific or formal training on security procedures or identification of
suspicious activities. However, air cargo handlers may be considered the front line
in protecting against security threats by adhering to procedures that would mitigate
physical security breaches at cargo operations facilities, and by increasing their
awareness of suspicious activities and knowing the proper procedures for reporting
their observations. Security training for cargo workers may focus on security
procedures for ensuring cargo integrity, protecting facilities, reporting suspicious
activities, and so on. Several legislative proposals under consideration (S. 165, H.R.
1103, and H.R. 2455) would establish a training program for cargo handlers to ensure
that the cargo is properly handled and safe-guarded from security breaches.
Increased Control over Access to Aircraft. Under ATSA, TSA was
directed to work with airport operators to strengthen access control points in secured
areas and was authorized to use biometric screening procedures to positively identify
individuals with access to secure airport areas. ATSA contains provisions for TSA
oversight of secured-area access control to assess and enforce compliance with access
control requirements. These requirements include screening and inspection of
individuals, goods, property, vehicles and other equipment seeking to access secure
airport areas. Background checks for individuals having access to passenger aircraft
are required and vendors with direct access to airfields where passenger operations
take place are required to have a TSA-approved security program in place. Presently,
background checks and displayed identification serve as the principal means for
screening airport workers including cargo handlers.
There has been growing concern over the adequacy of these procedures for
screening and monitoring airport workers. One particular concern is the integrity of
airport worker credentials and the potential that unauthorized individuals could gain
access to secure areas of the airport using stolen or fraudulent identification. TSA
currently has ongoing contracts to conduct field tests of various technologies for
transportation worker identification, including biometric markers, in an effort to
develop a common and universally recognized Transportation Workers Identification
Credential (TWIC).
45 Greg Schneider. Op cit.

CRS-15
Another concern has been raised over the use of identification checks in lieu of
physical screening of airport workers, including cargo handlers. Rep. Peter DeFazio
recently expressed concern over this practice noting that workers who bypass
physical screening could potentially carry threat objects into secured areas of the
airport or on board aircraft.46 Congress may consider whether existing security
procedures regarding airport worker access to secured airport areas meets the intent
of ATSA with regard to providing at least the same level of protection of secured
airport areas and passenger aircraft as screening passengers and their baggage.
In addition to ongoing concerns over access controls around passenger aircraft,
access control and monitoring of workers at all-cargo facilities remains a significant
challenge. While all-cargo operators have various security measures in place to
control access to their facilities and monitor operations areas, there is no existing
regulatory framework regarding the security of all-cargo operations. Proposed
legislation (S. 165; H.R. 1103) seeks to require all-cargo operators to develop and
carry out TSA-approved security plans detailing the physical security measures for
air cargo operations areas, cargo placed aboard all-cargo aircraft, and background
checks and screening of individuals having access to their aircraft on the ground or
in flight.
Arming All-Cargo Pilots. Proponents for arming all-cargo pilots are urging
Congress to allow all-cargo pilots to join the ranks of passenger airline pilots who
can volunteer for selection and training in the Federal Flight Deck Officers (FFDO)
program. This program, recently established by the Homeland Security Act of 2002
(P.L. 107-296), currently trains and deputizes qualified passenger pilots to carry
firearms and use deadly force to protect the flight deck against terrorist attacks (see
CRS Report RL31674). Proponents for including all-cargo pilots in the program
point out that all-cargo aircraft lack hardened cockpit doors, federal air marshals, and
passengers that may assist in thwarting a hijacking attempt.47 They also point out that
physical security and access control to cargo operations areas and all-cargo aircraft
is lax compared to the tight screening of passengers and baggage since September 11,
2001, and the current lack of screening of individuals and property at these sites
could offer the opportunity for terrorists plotting to hijack an aircraft to board an all-
cargo aircraft as stowaways and seize the cockpit in flight. All-cargo aircraft include
more than 1,000 transport category jet airplanes, of which about half are wide-body
jets similar to those used in the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks.48
Proponents for arming all-cargo pilots contend that doing so would mitigate the
risk of a hijacking aboard all-cargo aircraft and is needed expediently given the
limited measures currently in place to mitigate this risk. Cargo airlines, on the other
hand, have opposed allowing their pilots to join the FFDO program. Air carriers in
46 National Public Radio. “Some Members of Congress Raising Concerns about Potential
Lapses at Airports”, Morning Edition, May 22, 2003.
47 See Statement of Captain Duane Woerth, President, Air Line Pilots Association,
International.
The Status of the Federal Flight Deck Officer Program.
Before the
Subcommittee on Aviation, Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, U.S. House of
Representatives. Washington, DC: May 8, 2003.
48 Federal Aviation Administration. FAA Aerospace Forecast Fiscal Years 2003 - 2014.

CRS-16
general have been hesitant about the programs because of liability concerns even
though specific liability protections were extended to the airlines and pilot
participants when the FFDO program was established under the Homeland Security
Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-296). Legislation introduced in both the House (H.R. 765;
H.R. 1049) and the Senate (S. 165; S. 516) would expand the FFDO program to
include all-cargo pilots, as does the FAA reauthorization bill that was reported out
of conference (H.R. 2115; H.Rept. 108-240).
Technology For Air Cargo Security
Various technologies are under consideration for enhancing the security of air
cargo operations.49 Tamper-evident and tamper resistant packaging and container
seals may offer a relatively low cost means of protecting cargo integrity during
shipping and handling. Cargo screening technology using x-rays, chemical trace
detection systems, or possibly neutron beams or other techniques may offer means
to screen cargo prior to placement aboard aircraft. Additionally, canine teams may
be used to augment cargo screening technology or to screen cargo independently.
Hardened cargo container technology may be used to mitigate the threat of in-flight
explosions or incendiary fires aboard aircraft. Finally, biometric technologies are
being evaluated and may be useful in authenticating cargo worker identification and
improving access control to aircraft and cargo operations areas.
Tamper-Evident and Tamper-Resistant Seals. Various technologies
exist for sealing cargo shipments and cargo containers to prevent tampering.
Relatively low cost solutions such as tamper-evident tapes that provide visual
indications of tampering are readily available and could easily be implemented during
packaging. Such technology could be used in combination with “known shipper”
protocols to insure that known shippers provide sufficient security in their packaging
facilities and deter tampering during shipping and handling. Tamper-evident tape
can identify cargo during inspections processes for further screening and inspection
to safeguard against the introduction of explosives and incendiary devices. Tamper-
evident tape may also be an effective tool to deter cargo crime, including cargo theft
and the introduction of contraband, counterfeit, and pirated goods during shipment.
At cargo handling facilities, tamper evident seals and locks can be utilized on cargo
containers to prevent theft and the introduction of contraband or threat objects into
air cargo shipments. Electronic seals may serve as an additional deterrent to terrorist
and criminal activity by providing more immediate detection of tampering.
Electronic seals have alarms, some triggered by fiber optic cable loops, that activate
a transmitted signal when tampered with.50 Electronic seals cost about $2,500 per
unit, but are reusable. However, the utility of electronic seals in air cargo operations
has been questioned by some experts because currently available electronic seals
have a limited transmission range which may make detecting and identifying seals
49 Technologies for enhancing the security of passenger flight operations are detailed in CRS
Report RL31151, Aviation Security Technologies and Procedures: Screening Passengers
and Baggage
by Daniel Morgan.
50 “Electronic cargo security seals” Frontline Solutions, 3(6), 42 (June, 2002).

CRS-17
that have been tampered with difficult. In addition, there is some concern that they
may interfere with aircraft electronic systems.51
Cargo Screening Technology. Various technologies are available for
detecting explosives, incendiary devices, and the presence of various chemical and
biological agents and nuclear weapons in cargo.
Key technologies under
consideration for screening air cargo for threat objects include x-ray screening, x-ray
based explosive detection systems, chemical trace detection systems, and
technologies based on neutron beams. In addition to these technological approaches,
several experts and TSA officials have been advocating and pursuing an increased
use of canine teams for screening cargo and mail. The main drawback to any of these
screening techniques is that the screening process takes time and may significantly
impact cargo delivery schedules. While the various technologies differ in their
capabilities and performance, in general, more detailed screening analyses require
more time and could affect cargo throughput. Another concern regarding these
technologies is the cost associated with acquisition, operation, and maintenance of
screening systems.
X-Ray Screening. The most common systems currently available for large-
scale screening of cargo shipments utilize x-ray technology. These systems rely on
well understood transmission and backscatter x-ray techniques to probe cargo
containers. Many of these systems utilize low-dose x-ray sources that emit narrow
x-ray beams thus virtually eliminating the need for shielding. These devices are
compact and light weight, thus allowing them to be mounted on moving platforms
that can scan over containers.52 X-ray devices are becoming more common at major
ports of entry, border crossings, and airports overseas as post-September 11th security
concerns are spurring increased development and deployment of these devices. The
systems are being utilized to screen for drugs and other contraband as well as
explosives in cargo shipments.
One of the most significant operational challenges in using x-ray screening
devices is the performance of the human operator. A variety of human factors
considerations contribute to the operator’s ability to detect threat objects when
viewing x-ray images. These include: the monotony of the task, fatigue, time
pressure, the adequacy of training, and working conditions. These human factors are
important to consider in fielding x-ray screening systems to ensure high detection
rates of threat objects while minimizing false alarm rates that would unnecessarily
slow the cargo inspection and handling process. Technologies such as threat image
projection (TIP), that superimpose stored images of threat objects on x-ray scans can
help keep operators alert and may be effective tools for training and performance
monitoring. Additional technologies, such as computer algorithms for highlighting
potential threat objects, may also be considered to aid human observers.
Explosive Detection Systems. Currently, explosive detection systems
(EDS) are being used extensively in the aviation security environment, particularly
51 U.S. General Accounting Office. Aviation Security.
52 David S. De Moulpied & David Waters. “Cargo Screening Techniques Become More
Widely Accepted.” Port Technology International, 10, 127-129.

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in response to the mandate in ATSA requiring screening of all checked passenger
baggage by EDS. These systems use x-ray computed tomography (CT) to scan
objects, and computational algorithms that assess the probability of threat object
detection based on object density characteristics. Certified EDS systems must meet
acceptable detection and false alarm rates for bulk explosives detection. While most
specific performance criteria of certified EDS systems are classified, EDS systems
used for passenger checked baggage must meet or exceed a throughput rate of 450
bags per hour.
In 1997, the Gore Commission specifically recommended that unaccompanied
express packages carried on passenger aircraft should be subject to EDS
examination,53 however to date this recommendation has not been acted upon by
regulatory agencies and has not been proposed in legislation. Undoubtedly, the TSA
has gained considerable experience with the large scale deployment and use of EDS
equipment to meet the mandate for full explosives detection screening of checked
passenger bags. Many of the lessons learned by TSA from this experience will be
useful for assessing the technical and operational challenges of applying large-scale
EDS screening initiatives for air cargo operations. Efforts are also underway at TSA
to improve the performance of EDS equipment and reduce its cost. However, air
cargo operations are likely to present some of their own unique challenges for
implementing large scale EDS screening of freight, express packages, and mail.
Some of the potential operational challenges associated with effectively fielding EDS
equipment for screening air cargo include:
! The limited size of objects that can be placed in EDS machines
which would require objects to be screened before being placed in
containers or on pallets;
! The distributed nature of the air cargo system often involves loading
containers at remote sites, and EDS screening at these remote sites
may leave the system vulnerable to possible introduction of
explosives or incendiary devices at points along the supply chain
beyond the screening site;
! Reported high false alarm rates of current generation EDS systems
may lead to high levels of secondary screening and detailed
inspections that could impact the ability to meet the schedule
demands of cargo operations; and
! The processing rate of current generation EDS equipment may
require the purchase of large numbers of EDS machines, thus
increasing program costs, to minimize the impact on cargo
operations scheduling and meet desired security program goals (e.g.,
reaching a desired percentage of cargo that is screened by EDS).
Chemical Trace Detection Systems. Chemical trace detection systems,
referred to commonly as explosive trace detection (ETD) devices are being widely
used as secondary screening tools for passenger carry-on and checked baggage.
Items identified for closer scrutiny by initial screening methods or selected at random
may undergo further examination using these systems. These systems use a variety
53 White House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security. Op cit.

CRS-19
of technical principles to analyze the chemical composition of sample residue wiped
from suspect articles. These systems compare the chemical composition of such a
sample to the signature of known explosive materials and signal an alarm to the
operator if the probability of a match exceeds a specified threshold.
The use of chemical trace detection systems is now common practice in the
screening of checked and carry-on bags. It has been reported that TSA is considering
expanding the use of chemical trace detection systems for screening cargo carried
aboard passenger aircraft.54 However, screening procedures using these systems is
very labor intensive and time consuming. Like the manner in which this technology
is used to perform secondary screening of checked and carry on bags, chemical trace
detection may be employed in air cargo operations to perform detailed screening of
suspicious packages identified through known shipper databases, or can be used for
detailed secondary screening in conjunction with primary screening performed by x-
ray and EDS systems similar to procedures currently in use for checked baggage
screening. Random screening of cargo using chemical trace detection systems as a
primary screening method is unlikely to be effective given the very low percentage
of cargo that could be screened using this technique without significantly impacting
cargo operations schedules.
Neutron Beam Technologies. Another potential class of technologies for
screening air cargo is based on neutron beams. These systems use a pulsed neutron
generator to probe an object, initiating several low energy nuclear reactions with the
chemical elements comprising the object. Detectors can then measure the nuclear
signature of the transmitted neutrons and/or the gamma-rays emitted from the
reactions. Since neutrons and gamma-rays have the ability to penetrate through
various materials to large depths in a non-intrusive manner, neutron technologies
may have advantages for cargo screening, and some of these technologies are
currently being operationally evaluated for used in contraband and explosives
detection.55
However, the GAO noted that currently available neutron-based
technologies cost about $10 million per machine and require about one hour per
container for screening thus making this option very expensive and time
consuming.56
In addition to the cost and time factors associated with neutron beam
technologies, the National Research Council (NRC) has raised considerable doubts
about performance capabilities for screening the full spectrum of cargo containers or
pallets for explosives.57 The NRC also expressed potential safety concerns over the
use of radiation-producing particle accelerators, and expressed concerns over the
54 Greg Schneider. Op cit.
55 G. Vourvopoulos & P. C. Womble. “Pulsed Fast/Thermal Neutron Analysis: A Technique
for Explosives Detection.” TALANTA (54), pp. 459-468, 2001.
56 U.S. General Accounting Office. Aviation Security.
57 National Research Council. The Practicality of Pulsed Fast Neutron Transmission
Spectroscopy for Aviation Security.
NMAB-482-6. Washington, DC: National Academy
Press, 1999.

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practicality of using this technology in the aviation environment because of the size
and weight of the equipment.
In 1999, the NRC advised the FAA against further funding for research,
development, and deployment of a neutron-based explosive detection system known
as pulsed fast/thermal neutron spectroscopy (PFTNS) for primary screening of
carry-on baggage, checked baggage, or cargo citing low current explosive threat
levels and inadequate performance. In 2002, the NRC concluded that another
neutron-based technique, pulsed fast neutron analysis (PFNA), is not ready for airport
deployment or testing. However, the NRC conceded that PFNA has greater potential
for screening containerized cargo that any other technology currently under
consideration.58
Because the perceived threat of explosives has increased since September 11,
2001, neutron-based detection technology continues to be mentioned as a possible
means for screening air cargo. However, wide-scale deployment of this technology
for air cargo security in the near term seems unlikely.
Hardened Cargo Containers. In addition to cargo screening technology,
hardened cargo container technology is being considered as a means to mitigate the
threat of an explosion or fire caused by a bomb or incendiary device that makes its
way onto an aircraft undetected.
Ongoing research efforts are examining the
feasability and effectiveness of equipping the passenger air carrier fleet with
blast-resistant cargo containers. Following the December 21, 1988 bombing of Pan
Am flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland, the British Air Accident Investigation
Branch recommended that regulatory authorities and airplane manufacturers study
methods to mitigate the effects of in-flight explosions.59 The FAA has had a active
research program in blast resistant containers for more than 10 years examining the
airworthiness, ground handling, and blast resistance of hardened containers. These
containers, or hardened unit-loading devices (HULDs), are seen as a potential means
for mitigating the threat of explosives placed aboard passenger aircraft in either
checked baggage or cargo. These containers must withhold a explosive blast of a
specified magnitude without any rupturing or fragment penetration of the container
wall or the aircraft structure, and must contain and “self-extinguish” any post-blast
fire in order to meet the FAA-established test criteria.60
However, the increased weight of these containers would have significant
operational impacts on airlines by increasing fuel costs and decreasing payload
capacity for carrying revenue passengers and cargo. Challenges associated with
deploying hardened cargo containers include:
! Increased weight affecting aircraft range and payload capacity;
58 National Research Council. Assessment of the Practicality of Pulsed Fast Neutron
Analysis for Aviation Security.
Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 2002.
59 United Kingdom Air Accidents Investigation Branch. Op cit.
60 National Research Council. Assessment of Technologies Deployed to Improve Aviation
Security: First Report
. Publication NMAB-482-5. Washington, DC: National Academy
Press, 1999.

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! Increased procurement cost for hardened containers;
! Potentially higher maintenance costs for hardened container
materials;
! Potential reduction in cargo volume (in addition to reduced payload
weight) due to thicker container walls; and
! Possible design specifications, such as door hinging and positioning,
that are not compatible with current airline baggage and cargo
loading procedures and operations facilities.61
The National Research Council (NRC) estimated that the per unit cost for acquiring
hardened cargo containers would be $10,000, and recommended that the FAA
continue efforts to operationally test HULDs and establish more rigorous protocol for
certifying HULDs, but should not deploy them unless deemed to be a necessary
security measure based on the assessments of cost, operational, and deployment
studies by FAA and other stakeholders.
The NRC panel also recommended further economic assessment of their
proposed deployment plan for fielding one HULD per wide-body aircraft, which they
anticipated would require an industry-wide procurement cost of $125 million, and an
annual industry-wide economic impact of $11 million in increased fuel burn and
reduced payload revenue.62
The NRC panel also noted that research and
development on the use of HULDs on narrow-body aircraft was lagging far behind
the work done on wide-body aircraft, and recommended an increased emphasis on
research in this area to assess the operational effectiveness of HULDs in narrow-body
aircraft before any further recommendations could be made.
S. 165 contains a provision that would direct the TSA and the FAA to submit
a joint report to Congress evaluating the use of blast-resistant cargo container
technology. While neither H.R. 1103 nor H.R. 2455 contain such a provision, a
similar provision is offered in the Aviation Security Technical Corrections and
Improvements Act of 2003 (H.R. 2144).
Biometric Screening Technology. Provisions of ATSA give the TSA
authority to use biometric technology to verify the identity of employees entering the
secured areas of airports and directed the TSA to review the effectiveness of
biometrics systems currently used by airports such as San Francisco International
Airport. Additionally, the Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-
295) requires the issuance of biometric transportation security cards for identity
authentication of individuals with background checks for entry to any secured area
of a vessel or facility. The TSA’s approach to meet these various mandates is
through the establishment of a universal Transportation Worker Identification
Credential (TWIC) to be used across all transportation modes for any personnel
requiring unescorted access to secure areas of the national transportation system.63
61 National Research Council. Ibid.
62 National Research Council. Ibid.
63
Transportation Security Administration.
Credentialing: TSA TWIC Program.
(continued...)

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The proposed TWIC Program is currently under evaluation at two regional pilot sites:
the Philadelphia/Delaware River and Los Angeles/Long Beach ports. Available
biometric technologies such as fingerprint, retinal scan, and facial pattern recognition
are being evaluated in the current operational evaluation phase of the TWIC program.
It is likely that system-wide deployment of a common transportation worker
credentialing system will evolve from this program and could be applied to improve
access control to air cargo operations areas and cargo handling facilities.
Funding for Air Cargo Security
The cost of air cargo security options are significant to both the Federal
government and the air cargo industry. Furthermore, the indirect costs of air cargo
security on air cargo operations may pose significant long-term challenges. On the
other hand, the potential costs of a terrorist attack, both in terms of the loss of life and
property and the long term economic impacts may also be significant but are difficult
to predict and quantify.
Not surprisingly then, air cargo security has been a central issue in the current
debate over Homeland Security appropriations.
Most notably, an amendment
contained in the House-passed version of the Department of Homeland Security
Appropriations for 2004 (H.R. 2555) would prohibit funding of any aviation cargo
security plan that permits the transport of unscreened or uninspected cargo aboard
passenger airplanes. This proposal may enhance the security of passenger flights by
subjecting air cargo to the same standards as passenger checked and carry-on
baggage, but has been criticized by the aviation industry who voiced concerns over
their ability to meet any mandate requiring the full screening and inspection of all
cargo carried aboard passenger aircraft. The measure otherwise proposes to fund air
cargo security operations and research and development programs for air cargo
security technology at modest levels in comparison to the costs of screening
passengers and their carry-on and checked baggage. For fiscal year 2004, the House
approved $50 million in spending and the Senate approved $60 million in spending
for air cargo security operations and research (see Table 1).
In FY 2003, the TSA received $20 million for cargo screening improvements,
and the budget request for FY 2004 would keep funding for cargo security operations
at that level. The modest increase in funding levels for air cargo security proposed
by Congress appear to be in line with the objectives of much of the legislation
currently under consideration that seeks to expand the known shipper program and
increase oversight of security at air cargo operations and freight forwarder facilities.
However, the budget for air cargo security operations may be significantly stressed
if additional requirements beyond the current practice of using the known shipper
program to clear most of the freight that travels by passenger airplane are enacted.
63 (...continued)
[http://www.tsa.gov]

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Table 1. Proposed FY2004 Appropriations for
Air Cargo Security
($ Million)
House
Senate
Air Cargo
H.R. 2555
H.R. 2555 (as
Security -
Budget Request
H. Rept. 108-169
amended)
S. Rept. 108-86
Operations:
20
20
30
Research and
Development:
10
30
30
TOTAL:
30
50
60
To address these funding concerns, H.R. 2455 proposes to establish a fee
schedule for shippers to cover costs associated with screening cargo transported in
passenger aircraft that is similar to the security service fee imposed on passengers.
Imposing a fee on air cargo shipments for security could provide offsetting
collections for security costs. Regardless of how such a fee is collected, either direct
fees to air carriers or freight forwarders, or direct fees applied to each shipment, the
costs will ultimately be borne by shippers, and ultimately the customers of their
products. The overall impact of fees on air cargo is dependent on the relative cost of
the fee. Since air cargo shipments tend to consist of relatively high value goods, it
is likely that the relative cost of a security fee in relation to the value of the shipment
will be low which would minimize the economic impact of imposing such a fee.
However, if fees applied to air cargo carried on passenger aircraft are higher than fees
for transporting that same cargo on all-cargo aircraft, a significant impact on
passenger air carrier revenues from cargo may result. Equity in fee collections will
likely be an important consideration in assessing if and how air cargo security fees
should be collected.
Potential Congressional Approaches
Under ATSA a mandate for screening or otherwise ensuring the security of all
cargo placed on passenger aircraft already exists. ATSA also mandated that a system
to screen, inspect, or otherwise insure the security of cargo carried aboard all-cargo
is put in place as soon as possible. The law gives the TSA broad authority to carry
out these requirements. Therefore, many of the proposed cargo security initiatives
could be accomplished under existing law. Consequently, Congress may simply
allow the administration to conduct air cargo security programs and provide oversight
to insure that the intent of ATSA with regard to air cargo security is met through
these initiatives. Presently, TSA’s strategy for meeting the intent of ATSA is through
the use of “known shipper” programs and targeted screening of a small percentage
of cargo based on known shipper pre-screening. TSA has requested a budget of $20

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million in FY2004 to carry out these functions.
While ATSA gives the
administration flexibility in meeting the mandate to screen and inspect air cargo, it
is likely that TSA will continue to rely heavily on “known shipper” programs for air
cargo security for two key reasons.
First, many of the proposed options for
increasing air cargo security, such as full cargo screening, are costly. Second, the
potential impacts on the air cargo industry are not fully understood but could be
significant. Therefore, any significant changes in air cargo security practices will
likely be dependent on Congressional action.
A variety of options for implementing air cargo security exist. Some possible
approaches and the potential benefits and risks associated with implementing these
approaches are provided in Table 2. In general, for any of the listed approaches, there
is a tradeoff between program costs and potential impacts on the air cargo industry
on the one hand and the level of security that can be achieved by implementing the
option on the other hand. Currently, there are two main positions or views on air
cargo security. One position argues that full screening of air cargo and extensive
security measures would be too costly and too disruptive to the air cargo industry to
successfully implement. The alternative position argues that full screening and
enhanced security measures are needed to adequately mitigate the risks associated
with air cargo to the maximum extent possible and maintain public confidence in air
travel.
Table 2. Potential Benefits and Possible Risks of Various
Congressional Approaches
Option
Potential Benefits
Possible Risks
Allow TSA to
• Relatively low cost
• Over-reliance on known
carry out existing
• Provides administration
shipper programs
air cargo program
flexibility to meet changing
• Limited screening of cargo
with continued
threat levels with a
may not adequately mitigate
Congressional
relatively small budget
the risk of explosives
oversight
• Limited funds to initiate
targeted security in response
to threats
Expand the
• Relatively low cost
• Provides limited security
known shipper
• Consistent with
that could be circumvented
program and TSA
administration approach
oversight of
existing air cargo
security practices
Increase funding
• Could deter a variety of
• May be difficult and costly
and grants for
risks to cargo including
to provide increased
physical security
cargo crime, hijacking, and
physical security
of air cargo
sabotage
• May not mitigate the risk
facilities
of explosives introduced in
pre-packaged cargo

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Option
Potential Benefits
Possible Risks
Mandate the use
• Could deter terrorists from
• Low cost solutions may be
of tamper
attempting to place
circumvented relatively
resistant and
explosives in air cargo
easily
tamper evident
• Could mitigate cargo
• More sophisticated
packaging and
crime such as theft and
solutions, such as fiber
containers
contraband
optic loops, may be
relatively costly
Mandate physical
• Ensure that workers with
• Relatively high cost
screening of all
access to aircraft meet the
• Would require additional
persons with
same level of security as
screeners and screening
access to air
passengers
stations at air cargo
cargo facilities
• Mitigate risk of weapons
facilities
and aircraft
and explosives introduced
by cargo workers
Mandate
• Deter terrorists from
• Without full screening,
increased
attempting to place
explosives may not be
screening and
explosives in air cargo
detected
inspection of air
• May impact air cargo
cargo shipments
operations and schedules
Mandate full
• Ensure that cargo placed
• High cost
screening of air
on passenger aircraft meets
• May significantly impact
cargo on
the same level of security as
air cargo schedules
passenger flights
passengers and their
• May significantly impact
property
air carrier revenues from air
cargo if shipments are
diverted to all-cargo flights
in response to requirement
Increase funding
• May lead to new
• No foreseeable near term
for air cargo
technologies and procedures
solutions to address current
security research
for improving air cargo
security risks
and development
security.
• Currently funded
programs such as neutron
beam technologies and
hardened cargo containers
have operational limitations