Order Code RL31339
CRS Report for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
Iraq: U.S. Regime Change Efforts
and Post-War Governance
Updated August 18, 2003
Kenneth Katzman
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

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Iraq: U.S. Regime Change Efforts
and Post-War Governance
Summary
In his 2002 and 2003 State of the Union messages, President Bush characterized
Iraq as a grave potential threat to the United States because of its refusal to abandon
its weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs as required by U.N. Security
Council resolutions and the potential for it to transfer WMD to terrorist groups. In
September 2002, the President told the U.N. General Assembly that unless Iraq fully
disarmed in cooperation with United Nations weapons inspectors, the United States
would lead a coalition to achieve that disarmament militarily, making clear that this
would include the ouster of Iraq’s President Saddam Hussein’s regime. After a
November 2002 - March 2003 round of U.N. inspections in which Iraq’s cooperation
was mixed, on March 19, 2003, the United States launched “Operation Iraqi
Freedom,” to disarm Iraq and change its regime. The regime fell on April 9, 2003.
In the months prior to the war, the Administration stressed that regime change
through U.S.-led military action would yield benefits beyond disarmament and
reduction of support for terrorism; benefits such as liberation of the Iraqi people
from an oppressive regime and promotion of stability and democracy throughout the
Middle East. The goal of regime change in Iraq had been declared U.S. policy since
November 1998, and U.S. efforts to oust Saddam had been pursued, with varying
degrees of intensity, since the end of the Gulf war in 1991. These efforts primarily
involved U.S. financial backing for opposition groups inside and outside Iraq, several
of which are now contending for power in post-Saddam Iraq. Past efforts to change
the regime floundered because of limited U.S. commitment, disorganization of the
Iraqi opposition, and the efficiency and ruthlessness of Iraq’s several overlapping
intelligence and security forces. Previous U.S. Administrations ruled out major U.S.
military action to change Iraq’s regime, believing such action would be risky and not
necessarily justified by the level of Iraq’s lack of compliance on WMD disarmament.
The leadership and precise shape of the permanent government that will replace
Saddam Hussein’s Baath Party are yet to be determined. Some Administration
officials reportedly had hoped that major military and governmental defections from
the Hussein regime would serve as the core of a successor government. However,
no senior Hussein regime figures defected, and formerly exiled opposition groups
form the core of a U.S.-appointed 25-seat “governing council” that was unveiled on
July 13, 2003. It is hoped by the Administration that the formation of the council
will signal that Iraq is moving toward self rule and calm some of the resistance
against U.S. occupation forces in Iraq. Continuing resistance and the slow pace of
reconstruction have apparently prompted debate within the Administration over how
to enlist increased foreign participation in post-war peacekeeping and reconstruction.
This report will be updated as warranted by major developments.

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Contents
Past Attempts to Oust Saddam . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Emergence of An Anti-Saddam Coalition
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
The Iraqi National Congress/Ahmad Chalabi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Ahmad Chalabi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
The Kurds/KDP and PUK . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Ansar al-Islam/Al Qaeda . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Shiite Islamist Organizations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
SCIRI/Badr Corps . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Da’wa Party . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Sadr Movement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Ayatollah Sistani/Hawza al-Ilmiyah . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Islamic Amal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Schisms Among Anti-Saddam Groups . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
The Iraqi National Accord (INA) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Attempting to Rebound from 1996 Setbacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Iraq Liberation Act . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
The First ILA Designations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Monarchists/Sharif Ali . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Continued Doubts About the Capabilitiesof the Anti-Saddam Groups . . . 11
Bush Administration Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Pre-September 11 Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Post-September 11, 2001: Moving to Change the Regime . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Iraq and Al Qaeda . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
WMD Threat Perception . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Broadening the Internal Opposition to Saddam . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Second ILA Designations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Decision to Take Military Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Post-War Governance Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Establishing Iraqi Self-Rule . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
The Governing Council . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Post-War U.S. Operations and the Coalition Provisional
Authority (CPA) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
The Resistance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
The Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
Building Security Institutions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
Searching for Regime Violations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
Reviving the Oil Industry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
Continuation of the Oil-for-Food Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
International Role in Peacekeeping and Governance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
U.N. Role in Post-War Iraq . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
Fate of the Deposed Regime . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
Congressional Reactions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
Appendix. U.S. Assistance to the Opposition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33

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Iraq: U.S. Regime Change Efforts
and Post-War Governance
The United States has sought to change remove Iraq’s Saddam Hussein from
power since the 1991 Persian Gulf war, although achieving this goal was not declared
policy until 1998. In November 1998, amid a crisis with Iraq over U.N. weapons of
mass destruction (WMD) inspections, the Clinton Administration stated that the
United States would seek to go beyond containment to promoting a change of regime.
A regime change policy was endorsed by the Iraq Liberation Act (P.L. 105-338,
October 31, 1998). Bush Administration officials emphasized regime change as the
cornerstone of U.S. policy toward Iraq since shortly after the September 11, 2001,
attacks. Operation Iraqi Freedom was launched on March 19, 2003, and had
effectively removed Saddam Hussein from power by April 9, 2003.
Past Attempts to Oust Saddam
Prior to the launching on January 16, 1991 of Operation Desert Storm, an
operation that reversed Iraq’s August 1990 invasion of Kuwait, President George
H.W. Bush called on the Iraqi people to overthrow Saddam. Within days of the end
of the Gulf war (February 28, 1991), opposition Shiite Muslims in southern Iraq and
Kurdish factions in northern Iraq, emboldened by the regime’s defeat and the hope
of U.S. support, launched significant rebellions. The revolt in southern Iraq reached
the suburbs of Baghdad, but the well-trained and loyal Republican Guard forces had
survived the war largely intact, having been withdrawn from battle prior to the U.S.
ground offensive, and it defeated the Shiite rebels by mid-March 1991. Many Shiites
blamed the United States for not supporting their uprising and standing aside as the
regime retaliated against those who participated in the rebellion. Kurds, benefitting
from a U.S.-led “no fly zone” established in April 1991, drove Iraqi troops out of
much of northern Iraq and subsequently remained largely free of Baghdad’s rule.
According to press reports, about two months after the failure of the Shiite
uprising, President George H.W. Bush forwarded to Congress an intelligence finding
stating that the United States would undertake efforts to promote a military coup
against Saddam Hussein; a reported $15 million to $20 million was allocated for that
purpose. The Administration apparently believed — and this view apparently was
shared by many experts and U.S. officials — that a coup by elements within the
current regime could produce a favorable new government without fragmenting Iraq.
Many observers, however, including neighboring governments, feared that Shiite and
Kurdish groups, if they ousted Saddam, would divide Iraq into warring ethnic and
tribal groups, opening Iraq to influence from neighboring Iran, Turkey, and Syria.

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Emergence of An Anti-Saddam Coalition
Reports in July 1992 of a serious but unsuccessful coup attempt suggested that
the U.S. strategy might ultimately succeed. However, there was disappointment
within the George H.W. Bush Administration that the coup had failed and a decision
was made to shift the U.S. approach from promotion of a coup to supporting the
diverse opposition groups that had led the post-war rebellions. At the same time, the
Kurdish, Shiite, and other opposition elements were coalescing into a broad and
diverse movement that appeared to be gaining support internationally.
This
opposition coalition was seen as providing a vehicle for the United States to build a
viable overthrow strategy. Congress more than doubled the budget for covert
support to the opposition groups to about $40 million for FY1993.1
The Iraqi National Congress/Ahmad Chalabi
The growing opposition coalition took shape in an organization called the Iraqi
National Congress (INC). The INC was formally constituted when the two main
Kurdish militias, the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of
Kurdistan (PUK), participated in a June 1992 meeting in Vienna of dozens of
opposition groups. In October 1992, major Shiite Islamist groups came into the
coalition when the INC met in Kurdish-controlled northern Iraq.
The INC appeared viable because it brought under one banner varying Iraqi
ethnic groups and diverse political ideologies, including nationalists, ex-military
officers, and defectors from Iraq’s ruling Baath Party. The Kurds provided the INC
with a source of armed force and a presence on Iraqi territory. Its constituent groups
publicly united around a platform that appeared to match U.S. values and interests,
including human rights, democracy, pluralism, “federalism” (see below), the
preservation of Iraq’s territorial integrity, and compliance with U.N. Security Council
resolutions on Iraq.2
However, many observers doubted its commitment to
democracy, because most of its groups have an authoritarian internal structure, and
because of inherent tensions among its varied ethnic groups and ideologies. The
INC’s first Executive Committee consisted of KDP leader Masud Barzani, ex-Baath
Party and military official Hassan Naqib, and moderate Shiite cleric Mohammad
Bahr al-Ulum. (Barzani and Bahr al-Ulum are now on the 25-member post-war
Governing Council, inaugurated July 13, 2003, and both are part of its nine member
rotating presidency.)
Ahmad Chalabi. When the INC was formed, its Executive Committee
selected Ahmad Chalabi, who is about 58 years old, a secular Shiite Muslim from
a prominent banking family, to run the INC on a daily basis. Chalabi was educated
in the United States (M.I.T) as a mathematician. He fled Iraq to Jordan in 1958,
when the Hashemite monarchy was overthrown in a military coup. This coup
1 Sciolino, Elaine. “Greater U.S. Effort Backed To Oust Iraqi.” New York Times, June 2,
1992.
2 The Iraqi National Congress and the International Community. Document provided by
INC representatives, February 1993.

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CRS-3
occurred 10 years before the Baath Party took power in Iraq (July 1968). In 1978, he
founded the Petra Bank in Jordan but later ran afoul of Jordanian authorities on
charges of financial malfeasance (embezzlement) and he left Jordan, possibly with
some help from members of Jordan’s royal family, in 1989. In 1992, he was
convicted in absentia of embezzling $70 million from the bank and sentenced to 22
years in prison. The Jordanian government subsequently repaid depositors a total of
$400 million. Chalabi maintains that the Jordanian government was pressured by
Iraq to turn against him, and he asserts that he has since rebuilt ties to the Jordanian
government. In April 2003, senior Jordanian officials, including King Abdullah,
called Chalabi “divisive” and stopped just short of saying he would be unacceptable
to Jordan as leader of Iraq. Chalabi’s critics acknowledge that, despite allegations
about his methods, he has been single-minded in his determination to overthrow
Saddam Hussein, and he is said to be the favorite of those Administration officials,
particularly in the Department of Defense, that were the most supportive of changing
Iraq’s regime by force.
Since Chalabi returned to Iraq, there have been no large public demonstrations
supportive of him or the INC, indicating that he does not have a large following
inside Iraq. However, anecdotal press reporting suggest that he has attracted some
support from those Iraqis that most welcomed the U.S. military offensive against Iraq
and subsequent occupation. On April 6, Chalabi and about 700 INC fighters (“Free
Iraqi Forces”) were airlifted by the U.S. military from their base in the north to the
Nasiriya area, purportedly to help stabilize civil affairs in southern Iraq, later
deploying to Baghdad and other parts of Iraq. After establishing his headquarters in
Baghdad, Chalabi tried to build support by searching for fugitive members of the
former regime and arranging for U.S. military forces in Iraq to provide security or
other benefits to his potential supporters.
However, the Free Iraqi Forces
accompanying Chalabi were disbanded following the U.S. decision in mid-May 2003
to disarm independent militias.
Chalabi is part of a grouping of seven major party leaders that began meeting
shortly prior to the 2003 war. The seven-party leadership grouping was hoping to
become the core of a successor regime, and the seven parties are represented on the
Governing Council. Chalabi is a member of the Governing Council and one of the
nine that will rotate its presidency.
A prominent INC intellectual is Kanaan Makiya, who wrote a 1989 book,
Republic of Fear: The Politics of Modern Iraq, detailing alleged Iraqi regime human
rights abuses. Makiya supports a Western-style democracy for Iraq, including full
rights for women and Iraq’s minorities. A self-described atheist, he teaches Middle
Eastern politics at Brandeis University. In August 2003, Makiya was tapped by the
Governing Council to head a 25-person committee that will decide how to draft a
new constitution. Another INC activist, Mohammed al-Zubaidi, declared himself in
charge of Baghdad in mid-April, but U.S. officials did not recognize him as mayor
and detained him in April 2003.
The Kurds/KDP and PUK. The Kurds, among the most pro-U.S. of all the
groups in Iraq, do not have ambitions to play a major role in governing Arab Iraq, but
Iraq’s neighbors have always been fearful that the Kurds might still seek outright
independence. In committing to the concept of federalism, the INC platform

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CRS-4
assured the Kurds substantial autonomy within a post-Saddam Iraq. Turkey, which
has a sizable Kurdish population in the areas bordering northern Iraq, particularly
fears that independence for Iraq’s Kurds would likely touch off an effort to unify into
a broader “Kurdistan.” Iraq’s Kurds have been fighting intermittently for autonomy
since their region was incorporated into the newly formed Iraqi state after World War
I. (Iraq became an independent Kingdom in 1932, although it remained under British
influence until the 1958 fall of the British-installed monarchy.) In 1961, the KDP,
then led by founder Mullah Mustafa Barzani, current KDP leader Masud Barzani’s
father, began an insurgency that has continued until today, although interrupted by
periods of autonomy negotiations with Baghdad. Masud Barzani’s brother, Idris,
commanded Kurdish forces against Iraq during the Iran-Iraq war but was killed in
that war. The PUK, headed by Jalal Talabani, split off from the KDP in 1965; the
PUK’s members are generally more well-educated, urbane, and left-leaning than
those of the KDP. Together, the PUK and KDP have about 40,000-60,000 fighters,
some of which are trained in conventional military tactics. Both Barzani and
Talabani were part of the seven-party grouping that has now been incorporated into
the Governing Council, and both are part of the Council’s rotating presidency.
Ansar al-Islam/Al Qaeda. In the mid-1990s, the two main Kurdish parties
enjoyed good relations with a small Kurdish Islamic faction, the Islamic Movement
of Iraqi Kurdistan (IMIK), which is headed by Shaykh Ali Abd-al Aziz. Based in
Halabja, Iraq, the IMIK publicized the effects of Baghdad’s March 1988 chemical
attack on that city, and it allied with the PUK in 1998.
A radical faction of the IMIK split off in 1998, calling itself the Jund al-Islam
(Army of Islam). It later changed its name to Ansar al-Islam (Partisans of Islam).
This faction, led by Mullah Krekar (who was detained in Europe in August 2002 and
now lives in Norway), reportedly associated itself with Al Qaeda and hosted in its
northern Iraq enclave Al Qaeda fighters who had fled the U.S.-led war in
Afghanistan. Mullah Krekar reportedly studied under Shaykh Abdullah al-Azzam,
an Islamic theologian of Palestinian origin who was the spiritual mentor of Osama
bin Laden. Prior to Operation Iraqi Freedom, during which its base was captured,
about 600 fighters in the Ansar al-Islam enclave, located near the town of Khurmal.3
Ansar fighters clashed with the PUK around Halabja in December 2002, and Ansar
gunmen were allegedly responsible for an assassination attempt against PUK prime
minister Barham Salih in April 2002.
The leader of the Arab contingent within Ansar al-Islam is said by U.S. officials
to be Abu Musab Zarqawi, an Arab of Jordanian origin who reputedly fought in
Afghanistan. Zarqawi has been linked to Al Qaeda plots in Jordan during the
December 1999 millennium celebration, the assassination in Jordan of U.S. diplomat
Lawrence Foley (2002), and to reported attempts in 2002 to spread the biological
agent ricin in London and possibly other places in Europe. In a presentation to the
U.N. Security Council on February 5, 2003, Secretary of State Powell tied Zarqawi
and Ansar to Saddam Hussein’s regime, which might have viewed Ansar al-Islam as
a means of pressuring Baghdad’s Kurdish opponents. Although Zarqawi reportedly
3 Chivers, C.J. Repulsing Attack By Islamic Militants, “Iraqi Kurds Tell of Atrocities.”
New York Times, December 6, 2002.

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CRS-5
received medical treatment in Baghdad in May 2002 after fleeing Afghanistan, many
experts believed Baghdad-Ansar links were tenuous or even non-existent; Baghdad
did not control northern Iraq even before Operation Iraqi Freedom.4 Zarqawi’s
current whereabouts are unknown, although some unconfirmed press reports indicate
he might have fled to Iran after the fall of the Ansar camp to U.S.-led forces. Some
press accounts in July 2003 say Iran might have him in custody. U.S. officials said
in August that some Ansar fighters might have remained in or re-entered Iraq and are
participating in the resistance to the U.S. occupation.
Shiite Islamist Organizations
Some outside experts have had concerns about the potential strength and
ideological orientation of Iraq’s Shiite Islamic fundamentalist groups in post-
Saddam Iraq. The United States sought to work with some Shiite Islamist opposition
factions during the 1990s but had few if any contacts with others. Shiite Islamist
factions hold at least five seats on the Governing Council unveiled July 13, 2003.
SCIRI/Badr Corps. The most well known among these is called the Supreme
Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), which was a member of the INC
in the early and mid-1990s but progressively distanced itself from the INC banner.
SCIRI was set up in 1982 to increase Iranian control over Shiite opposition groups
in Iraq and the Persian Gulf states. SCIRI’s leader, Ayatollah Muhammad Baqr al-
Hakim, was the late Ayatollah Khomeini’s choice to head an Islamic Republic of
Iraq, a vision that, if realized, might conflict with U.S. plans to forge a democratic
Iraq. Baqr Al Hakim and his family fled Iraq to Iran in 1980, during a major
crackdown on Shiite activist groups by Saddam Hussein. Saddam feared that Iraqi
Shiite Islamists, inspired and emboldened by the Islamic revolution in Iran in 1979,
posed a major threat to his regime. Prior to the formation of SCIRI, Hakim and his
family were leaders of the Da’wa (Islamic Call) Party (see below). Mohammed Baqr
is the son of the late Ayatollah Muhsin Al Hakim, who was a prominent Shiite leader
in southern Iraq and an associate of Ayatollah Khomeini when Khomeini was in exile
in southern Iraq during 1964-1978. He returned to Iraq on May 10, welcomed by
crowds in Basra and Najaf, where he is now based.
In addition to its agents and activists in the Shiite areas of Iraq, SCIRI has about
10,000-15,000 fighters/activists organized into a “Badr Corps” (named after a major
battle in early Islam) that, during the 1980s and 1990s, conducted forays from Iran
into southern Iraq to attack Baath Party officials there. The Badr Corps is headed by
Mohammed Baqr’s younger brother, Abd al-Aziz al-Hakim, who returned to Iraq on
April 20, 2003, to pave the way for Mohammed Baqr’s return. (Another Hakim
brother, Mahdi, was killed in Sudan in May 1990, allegedly by agents of Iraq’s
security services.) Iran’s Revolutionary Guard, which is politically aligned with
Iran’s hard line civilian officials, has been the key patron of the Badr Corps,
providing it with weapons, funds, and other assistance. The Badr Corps fought
alongside the Guard against Iraqi forces during the Iran-Iraq war. However, many
Iraqi Shiites view SCIRI as an Iranian creation and SCIRI/Badr Corps operations in
4 “U.S. Uncertain About Northern Iraq Group’s Link to Al Qaida.” Dow Jones Newswire,
March 18, 2002.

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CRS-6
southern Iraq prior to Operation Iraqi Freedom did not spark broad popular unrest
against the Iraqi regime. Some Badr fighters deployed inside northern Iraq on the eve
of Operation Iraqi Freedom, and the rest have since entered Iraq.
A variety of press reports say that individual militias now providing security in
many towns in southern Iraq are linked to the Badr Corps. One such militia is
derived from the fighters who challenged Saddam Hussein’s forces in the marsh
areas of southern Iraq, around the town of Amara, north of Basra. It goes by the
name Hizbollah (Party of God)-Amara, and it is headed by marsh guerrilla leader
Abdul Karim Muhammadawi, nicknamed “Prince of the Marshes” who was named
to the Governing Council. He is widely perceived as an ally of SCIRI.
Until August 2002 when Abd al-Aziz al-Hakim joined other opposition figures
for meetings in Washington, D.C., SCIRI had publicly refused to work openly with
the United States or accept U.S. assistance, although it was part of the INC and did
have contacts with the United States prior to the 2003 war effort. Since the fall of the
regime on April 9, SCIRI leaders have criticized what they called an illegitimate U.S.
occupation of Iraq and have called for the rapid establishment of an Iraqi self-rule
authority, while at the same time publicly opposing the use of violence against the
occupation. Even though Mohammed Baqr Al Hakim says he is for a democracy and
would not seek to establish an Iranian-style Islamic republic, U.S. officials are said
to be mistrustful of SCIRI and have been seeking to disarm its fighters. Suggesting
that SCIRI sees its interests in a degree of cooperation with the occupation, Abd al-
Aziz al Hakim did meet with other opposition leaders in late April 2003 at a post-war
governance planning session sponsored by U.S. officials. He later helped constitute
the seven-party core of the Governing Council, and Abd al-Aziz is part of the nine-
person rotating Council presidency. Unlike some other Shiite Islamist groups, SCIRI
has had good working relations with some Sunni oppositionists and the Kurds.
SCIRI might get additional support from the family of the late Ayatollah
Khomeini. In July 2003, Khomeini’s grandson, Hassan Khomeini, who is about 45,
relocated from Qom, Iran to Najaf. Hassan Khomeini is believed to be an opponent
of the more militant Shiite clerics such as Moqtada Al Sadr (see below), who is also
considered a rival of SCIRI.
Da’wa Party. The Da’wa Party, perhaps Iraq’s oldest Shiite Islamist grouping,
continues to exist as a separate group, but many Da’wa activists appear to be at least
loosely allied with SCIRI. The party was founded in 1957 by a revered Iraqi Shiite
cleric, Ayatollah Mohammed Baqr Al Sadr, a like-minded associate of Ayatollah
Khomeini. Baqr Al Sadr was hung by the Iraqi regime in 1980 for the Da’wa’s
alleged responsibility in fomenting Shiite anti-regime unrest following Iran’s 1979
Islamic revolution. That unrest included an attempted assassination of senior Iraqi
leader Tariq Aziz. Da’wa was part of the seven-party council grouping that is now
been incorporated into the Governing Council. Da’wa’s spokesman, Ibrahim Jafari,
and its leader in Basra, Abdal Zahra Othman, are on the Governing Council, as is a
former Da’wa activist turned human rights activist, Muwaffaq Al-Ruba’i. Jafari is
one of the nine members of the Council that is rotating the presidency, and Jafari is
the first to take that post.

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CRS-7
The Kuwaiti branch of the Da’wa Party allegedly was responsible for a May
1985 attempted assassination of the Amir of Kuwait and the December 1983 attacks
on the U.S. and French embassies in Kuwait. The Hizballah organization in Lebanon
was founded by Lebanese clerics loyal to Ayatollah Baqr Al Sadr and the late
Ayatollah Khomeini, and there continue to be linkages between Hizballah and the
Da’wa Party. The Hizballah activists who held U.S. hostages in that country during
the 1980s often linked release of the Americans to the release of 17 Da’wa Party
prisoners held by Kuwait for those offenses. Some Iraqi Da’wa members look to
Lebanon’s senior Shiite cleric Mohammed Hossein Fadlallah, who was a student and
protege of Ayatollah Mohammed Baqr Al Sadr, for spiritual guidance.
Sadr Movement. Members of the clan of the late Ayatollah Mohammed Baqr
Al Sadr have become highly active in post-Saddam Iraq. The Sadr clan, based in Iraq
during Saddam Hussein’s rule, was repressed and not politically active during that
time. The United States had no contact with this grouping prior to the 2003 war and
did not attempt to enlist it in any overthrow efforts during 1991-2002. Although the
Al Sadr clan has been closely identified with the Da’wa Party, it appears that
members of the clan and their followers currently are operating in post-war Iraq as
grouping separate from the Da’wa. Another revered member of the clan, Mohammed
Sadiq Al Sadr, and two of his sons, were killed by Saddam’s security forces in 1999.
A surviving son, Moqtada Al Sadr, who is about 27 years old, has attempted to rally
his followers to attain a prominent role in post-Saddam Shiite politics. He and his
clan apparently have a large following in the poorer Shiite neighborhoods of
Baghdad, which, after the fall of the regime on April 9, renamed their district “Sadr
City,” from the former name of “Saddam City.” However, Moqtada is viewed by
Iran and many Iraqi Shiites as a young radical who lacks religious and political
weight. To compensate for his lack of religious credentials, he has sought spiritual
authority for his actions from exiled Iraqi senior cleric, Ayatollah Kazem Haeri, who
is living in Qom, Iran. An alternate interpretation by some experts is that Haeri is
acting at the direction of Iran’s leadership to keep Moqtada Sadr under a measure of
control. Moqtada’s
reputation may have been tarnished in early April when
Moqtada al Sadr reportedly killed Abd al-Majid Khoi, the son of the late Grand
Ayatollah Abdol Qasem Musavi-Khoi, shortly after his return to Najaf from exile in
London. Abd al-Majid Khoi headed the Khoi Foundation, based in London, and he
returned to Iraq after U.S.-led forces took Najaf. Grand Ayatollah Khoi differed with
the political doctrines of Ayatollah Khomeini of Iran.
The Sadr grouping has not been included in the Governing Council. Moqtada
has used his Friday prayer sermons in Najaf and other forums to denounce the
Council as a puppet of the U.S. occupation. In July 2003, Moqtada and his aides
began recruiting for an Islamic army, for now unarmed, that Sadr says must
challenge the U.S. occupation with force. He is also openly calling for a cleric-led
Islamic state similar to that of Iran. In August 2003, Shiites in Basra and in Baghdad
rioted against British and U.S. occupation forces over fuel shortages and perceived
slights, and there was speculation that Moqtada was helping fuel the riots.
Ayatollah Sistani/Hawza al-Ilmiyah. The revered Grand Ayatollah Ali al-
Sistani, based in Najaf, was repressed during Saddam’s rule and is emerging as a
major potential force in post-war Iraq. The United States had no contact with Sistani
when Saddam was in power. He is the most senior of the four Shiite clerics that lead

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CRS-8
the Najaf- based “Hawza al-Ilmiya,” a major grouping of seminaries and Shiite
clerics. The Hawza, which is well funded through donations, is becoming an
important source of political authority in the Shiite regions of Iraq, hiring Iraqis to
perform functions performed by the former regime and issuing directives, often
obeyed, for some Iraqi civil servants to return to work. Sistani himself, now free of
a long house arrest at the hands of Baghdad, has a large following of former students
throughout the Shiite portions of Iraq. Sistani and the Hawza are generally allied
with SCIRI in the intra-Shiite power struggle, seeking to contain Moqtada Al Sadr,
who Sistani and SCIRI both view as radical and impulsive. Sistani, who is of Iranian
ethnicity, is considered to be in the tradition of Ayatollah Khoi in opposing a direct
role for clerics in governmental affairs, and Sistani and the Hawza have spoken
against a direct role for the clerics in governing post-war Iraq. However, in early July
2003, Sistani began to take a more active role in Iraq’s post-war decision-making by
issuing a statement that only elected Iraqis — not a U.S.-appointed governing council
— should draft a constitution.
Islamic Amal. SCIRI has been allied with another Shiite Islamist organization
called the Islamic Amal (Action) Organization. In the early 1980s, Islamic Amal was
under the SCIRI umbrella but later broke with it. It is headed by Mohammed Taqi
Modarassi, who returned to Iraq from exile in Iran in April 2003, after Saddam
Hussein’s regime fell. Islamic Amal, which has a following among Shiite Islamists
mainly in Karbala, conducted attacks against Saddam Hussein’s regime in the 1980s.
However, it does not appear to have a following nearly as large as SCIRI or the other
Shiite Islamist groups. Modarassi’s brother, Abd al-Hadi, headed the Islamic Front
for the Liberation of Bahrain, which tried to stir up Shiite unrest against the Bahrain
regime in the 1980s and 1990s (see below). Since returning to Iraq in April 2003,
Mohammad Taqi has argued against violent opposition to the U.S. occupation, saying
that such a challenge would plunge Iraq into civil warfare.
Schisms Among Anti-Saddam Groups
The differences among the various anti-Saddam organizations led to the near
collapse of the U.S. regime change effort the mid-1990s. In May 1994, the KDP and
the PUK began clashing with each other over territory, customs revenues levied at
border with Turkey, and control over the Kurdish enclave’s government based in
Irbil. The PUK lined up support from Iran while the KDP sought and received
countervailing backing from its erstwhile nemesis, the Baghdad government. The
infighting contributed to the defeat of an INC offensive against Iraqi troops in March
1995; the KDP pulled out of the offensive at the last minute. Although it was
repelled, the offensive did initially overrun some of the less well-trained and poorly
motivated Iraqi units facing the Kurds. Some INC leaders point to the battle as an
indication that the INC could have succeeded militarily, without direct U.S. military
help, had it been given additional resources and training in the 1990s.
The Iraqi National Accord (INA). The infighting in the opposition in the
mid-1990s caused the United States to briefly
revisit the “coup strategy” by

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CRS-9
renewing ties to a non-INC group, Iraq National Accord (INA).5 The INA, originally
founded in 1990 with Saudi support, consists of military and security defectors who
were perceived as having ties to disgruntled officials currently serving within their
former organizations. It is headed by Dr. Iyad Alawi, former president of the Iraqi
Student Union in Europe and a physician by training. He is a secular Shiite Muslim,
but most of the members of the INA are Sunni Muslims. The INA’s prospects
appeared to brighten in August 1995 when Saddam’s son-in-law Hussein Kamil al-
Majid — architect of Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction programs — defected to
Jordan, suggesting that Saddam’s grip on the military and security services was
weakening. Jordan’s King Hussein agreed to allow the INA to operate from there.
The INA was ultimately penetrated by Iraq’s intelligence services and, in June 1996,
Baghdad dealt it a serious setback by arresting or executing over 100 INA
sympathizers in the military.
Iraq’s counteroffensive against the opposition was expanded two months after
the arrests of the INA sympathizers. In late August 1996, the KDP asked Baghdad
to provide armed support for its capture of Irbil from the rival PUK. Iraq took
advantage of the request to strike against the INC base in Salahuddin, a city in
northern Iraq, as well as against remaining INA operatives throughout northern Iraq.
In the course of its incursion in the north, Iraq reportedly executed two hundred
oppositionists and arrested as many as 2,000 others. The United States evacuated
from northern Iraq and eventually resettled in the United States 650 oppositionists,
mostly from the INC.
Prior to Operation Iraqi Freedom, Alawi claimed that the INA continued to
operate throughout Iraq, and it apparently had rebuilt itself to some extent since the
June 1996 arrests. However, it does not appear to have a large following in Iraq.
Although it has was cooperating with the INC at the start of the U.S.-led 2003 war,
there is a history of friction between the two groups; the INA reportedly bombed an
INC facility in northern Iraq in October 1995. Alawi was part of the seven-party
grouping that became the core of the Governing Council, and Alawi has been named
a member of that Council and one of its nine-member rotating presidency.
Attempting to Rebound from 1996 Setbacks
For the two years following the anti-Saddam opposition groups’ 1996 setbacks,
the Clinton Administration had little contact with these groups. In those two years,
the INC, INA, and other opposition groups attempted to rebuild their organizations
and their ties to each other, although with mixed success. On February 26, 1998,
then Secretary of State Madeleine Albright testified to a Senate Appropriations
subcommittee that it would be “wrong to create false or unsustainable expectations”
about what U.S. support for the opposition could accomplish.
Iraq’s obstructions of U.N. weapons of mass destruction (WMD) inspections
during 1997-1998 led to growing congressional calls for overthrowing Saddam
Hussein. A formal congressional push for a regime change policy began with an
5 An account of this shift in U.S. strategy is essayed in Hoagland, Jim. “How CIA’s Secret
War On Saddam Collapsed.” Washington Post, June 26, 1997.

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CRS-10
FY1998 supplemental appropriation (P.L. 105-174, signed May 1, 1998) that, among
other provisions, earmarked $5 million in Economic Support Funds (ESF) for the
opposition and $5 million for a Radio Free Iraq, under the direction of Radio Free
Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL). The radio service began broadcasting in October
1998, from Prague. Of the ESF, $3 million was devoted to an overt program to
coordinate and promote cohesion among the various opposition factions, and to
highlighting Iraqi violations of U.N. resolutions. The remaining $2 million was used
to translate and publicize documented evidence of alleged Iraqi war crimes; the
documents were retrieved from the Kurdish north, placed on 176 CD-ROM diskettes,
and translated and analyzed by experts under contract to the U.S. government. In
subsequent years, Congress has appropriated funding for the Iraqi opposition and for
war crimes issues, as shown in the appendix. Some of the war crimes funding has
gone to the opposition-led INDICT (International Campaign to Indict Iraqi War
Criminals) organization for publicizing Iraqi war crimes issues.
Iraq Liberation Act
A clear indication of congressional support for a more active U.S. overthrow
effort was encapsulated in another bill introduced in 1998: the Iraq Liberation Act
(ILA, H.R. 4655, P.L. 105-338, signed into law October 31, 1998). The ILA gave the
President authority to provide up to $97 million in defense articles (and authorized
$2 million in broadcasting funds) to opposition organizations to be designated by the
Administration. (An FY2003 supplemental appropriation, P.L. 108-11, added $86.5
million to the allowed draw-down ceiling to enable additional funds to flow to groups
helping the United States in Operation Iraqi Freedom. The supplemental brought the
total authorized under the Act to $183 million.) The Act’s passage was widely
interpreted as an expression of congressional support for the concept of promoting
an insurgency by using U.S. air-power to expand opposition-controlled territory.
This idea was advocated by Chalabi and some U.S. experts, such as General Wayne
Downing, who subsequently became a National Security Council official on counter-
terrorism in the first two years of the George W. Bush Administration. President
Clinton signed the legislation despite reported widespread doubts within the Clinton
Administration about the chances of success in promoting an opposition insurgency.
The Iraq Liberation Act made the previously unstated policy of promoting
regime change in Iraq official, declared policy. A provision of the ILA states that it
should be the policy of the United States to “support efforts” to remove the regime
headed by Saddam Hussein. In mid-November 1998, President Clinton publicly
articulated that regime change was a component of U.S. policy toward Iraq.
The signing of the ILA and the declaration of the overthrow policy came at the
height of the one-year series of crises over U.N. weapons inspections in Iraq, in
which inspections were repeatedly halted and restarted after mediation by the United
Nations, Russia, and others.
On December 15, 1998, U.N. inspectors were
withdrawn for the final time, and a three-day U.S. and British bombing campaign
against suspected Iraqi WMD facilities followed (Operation Desert Fox, December
16-19, 1998). (For information on these crises, see CRS Issue Brief IB92117, Iraq:
Weapons Programs, U.N. Requirements, and U.S. Policy.)

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The First ILA Designations. Further steps to promote regime change
followed Operation Desert Fox.
In January 1999, a career diplomat, Frank
Ricciardone, was named as a State Department’s “Coordinator for the Transition in
Iraq” — the chief liaison with the opposition.
On February 5, 1999, after
consultations with Congress, the President issued a determination (P.D. 99-13) that
the following organizations would be eligible to receive U.S. military assistance
under the Iraq Liberation Act: the INC; the INA; SCIRI; the KDP; the PUK; the
Islamic Movement of Iraqi Kurdistan (IMIK); and the Movement for Constitutional
Monarchy (MCM). Because of its possible role in contributing to the formation of
Ansar al-Islam, the IMIK did not receive U.S. support after 2001, although it was not
formally taken off the ILA eligibility list.
Monarchists/Sharif Ali. The MCM, which was an original designee of
eligibility to receive assistance under the ILA, is led by Sharif Ali bin al-Hussein, a
relative of the Hashemite monarchs (he is a cousin of King Faysal II, the last Iraqi
monarch) that ruled Iraq from the end of World War I until 1958. Sharif Ali, who is
about 47 and was a banker in London, claims to be the leading heir to the former
Hashemite monarchy, although there are other claimants, mostly based in Jordan.
The MCM was considered a small movement that could not contribute much to the
pre-war overthrow effort, although it was part of the INC and the United States had
contacts with it. In the post-war period, Sharif Ali returned to Iraq on June 10, 2003,
to a small but apparently enthusiastic welcome. He did not participate in the seven-
party grouping that negotiated with the U.S.-led occupation authority on the
formation of the Governing Council, and neither Sharif Ali nor any of his followers
was appointed to the Governing Council.
In May 1999, in concert with an INC visit to Washington, the Clinton
Administration announced it would draw down $5 million worth of training and
“non-lethal” defense equipment under the ILA. During 1999 - 2000, about 150
opposition members underwent civil administration training at Hurlburt air base in
Florida, including attending Defense Department-run courses providing civil affairs
training,
including
instruction
in
field
medicine,
logistics,
computers,
communications, broadcasting, power generation, and war crimes issues. However,
the Clinton Administration asserted that the opposition was not sufficiently organized
to merit U.S. provision of lethal military equipment or combat training. This
restriction reflected divisions within and outside the Clinton Administration over the
effectiveness and viability of the opposition, and over the potential for the United
States to become militarily embroiled in civil conflict in Iraq. The trainees during
1999-2000 are not believed to have been brought into the Operation Iraqi Freedom
effort against the regime, or into the Free Iraqi Forces that deployed to Iraq toward
the end of the active combat phase of the war.
Continued Doubts About the Capabilities
of the Anti-Saddam Groups
During 1999-2000, U.S. efforts to rebuild and fund the opposition did not end
the debate within the Clinton Administration over the regime change component of
Iraq policy. In hearings and statements, several Members of both parties expressed
disappointment with the Clinton Administration’s
decision not
to give the

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CRS-12
opposition lethal military aid or combat training. Many took those decisions as an
indication that the Clinton Administration was skeptical about the opposition’s
capabilities. The Clinton Administration maintained that the Iraqi opposition would
not succeed unless backed by direct U.S. military involvement, and that direct U.S.
military action was risky and not justified by the degree of threat posed by Iraq.
Critics of the Clinton Administration policy on Iraq maintained that the potential
threat from Saddam Hussein’s regime was sufficiently grave that direct U.S. military
action should be taken. Others suggested the Clinton Administration should focus
instead on rebuilding containment of Iraq by threatening force if Iraq refused to
permit re-entry into Iraq of the U.N. weapons inspectors that left Iraq in December
1998.
As a reflection of continued congressional support for the overthrow effort, a
provision of the FY2001 foreign aid appropriation (H.R. 4811, P.L. 106-429, signed
November 6, 2000) earmarked $25 million in ESF for “programs benefitting the
Iraqi people,” of which at least $12 million was for the INC to distribute
humanitarian aid inside Iraq; $6 million was for INC broadcasting; and $2 million
was for war crimes issues. According to the appropriation, the remaining $5 million
could be used to provide additional ESF to the seven groups then eligible to receive
assistance under the ILA.
Taking note of congressional sentiment for INC
distribution of aid inside Iraq, on September 29, 2000, the Clinton Administration
reached agreement with the INC to provide the organization with $4 million in
FY1999 ESF (one half the total earmark available) to develop an aid distribution plan
and to gather information in Iraq on Iraqi war crimes. However, three days before
it left office, the Clinton Administration issued a required report to Congress that
noted that any INC effort to distribute aid in areas of Iraq under Baghdad’s control
would be fraught with security risks to the INC, to Iraqi recipients of such aid, and
to any relief distributors with which the INC contracts.6
Bush Administration Policy
Bush Administration policy toward Iraq changed after the September 11, 2001
terrorist attacks, even though no significant evidence linking Iraq to those attacks
came to light. The shift toward a more assertive policy first became clear in
President Bush’s State of the Union message on January 29, 2002, when he
characterized Iraq as part of an “axis of evil,” along with Iran and North Korea.
Pre-September 11 Policy
Throughout most of its first year, the Bush Administration continued the basic
elements of Clinton Administration policy on Iraq. With no immediate consensus
within the new Administration on how forcefully to proceed with an overthrow
strategy, Secretary of State Powell focused on strengthening containment of Iraq,
which the Bush Administration said had eroded substantially in the year prior to its
taking office. Secretary Powell visited the Middle East in February 2001 to enlist
6 U.S. Department of State. Washington File. “Clinton Sends Report on Iraq to Congress.”
January 17, 2001.

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CRS-13
regional support for a so-called “smart sanctions” plan: a modification of the U.N.
sanctions regime to ensure that no weapons-related technology reached Iraq. His
plan offered to alter the U.N.-sponsored “oil-for-food” program by relaxing U.N.
restrictions on exports to Iraq of civilian equipment and needed non-military
technology.7
The Administration believed that the proposal, by easing the suffering of the
Iraqi people, would cause Iraq’s neighbors and other countries to cease unilateral
violations of the sanctions regime. Powell, who had openly expressed skepticism
about the opposition’s prospects, barely raised the regime change issue during his trip
or in his March 7, 2001, testimony before the House International Relations
Committee, at which he was questioned about Iraq.8
After about a year of
negotiations among the Security Council permanent members, the major feature of
the smart sanctions plan — new procedures that virtually eliminate U.N. review of
civilian exports to Iraq — was adopted on May 14, 2002 (U.N. Security Council
Resolution 1409).
Even though several senior officials had been strong advocates of a regime
change policy, many of the questions about the wisdom and difficulty of that strategy
that had faced previous administrations were debated early in the Bush
Administration.9 Aside from restating the U.S. policy of regime change, the Bush
Administration did little to promote that outcome throughout most of its first year.
During his confirmation hearings as Deputy Secretary of Defense, a leading advocate
of overthrowing Iraq’s regime, Paul Wolfowitz, said that he did not yet see a
“plausible plan” for changing the regime.
Like its predecessor, the Bush
Administration initially declined to provide the opposition with lethal aid, combat
training, or a commitment of direct U.S. military help. It eliminated the separate
State Department position of “Coordinator for the Transition in Iraq,” further casting
doubt on its enthusiasm for the overthrow strategy. On February 2, 2001, the Bush
Administration confirmed that, shortly after President Bush took office, the Treasury
Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) granted the INC a license to
proceed with information gathering inside Iraq only, and not actual distribution of
humanitarian aid inside Iraq. This decision by the Administration amounted to a
withholding of U.S. backing for the INC plan to rebuild its presence inside Iraq.
Many in Congress, on the other hand, continued to support the INC as the
primary vehicle for achieving regime change. Partly in deference to congressional
sentiment, the Bush Administration continued to expand its ties to the INC despite
doubts about its capabilities. In August 2001, the INC began satellite television
broadcasts into Iraq, from London, called Liberty TV. The station was funded by the
7 For more information on this program, see CRS Report RL30472, Iraq: Oil For Food
Program.
8 Perlez, Jane. “Powell Goes on the Road and Scores Some Points.” New York Times,
March 2, 2001.
9 One account of Bush Administration internal debates on the strategy is found in, Hersh,
Seymour. “The Debate Within.” The New Yorker, March 11, 2002.

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CRS-14
ESF aid appropriated by Congress, with start-up costs of $1 million and an estimated
additional $2.7 million per year in operating costs.10
Post-September 11, 2001: Moving to Change the Regime
Bush Administration policy toward Iraq became notably more assertive after the
September 11, 2001 attacks, stressing regime change far more than containment.
Almost immediately after the U.S.-led war on the Taliban and Al Qaeda in
Afghanistan began in early October 2001, speculation began building that the
Administration might try to change Iraq’s regime through direct use of military force
as part of a “phase two” of the war on terrorism. Some U.S. officials reportedly
believed that the United States needed to respond to the September 11 attacks by
ending any or all regimes that support terrorist groups, including Iraq. As noted
above, in his January 29, 2002 State of the Union message, President Bush named
Iraq as part of an “axis of evil,” along with North Korea and Iran. Vice President
Cheney visited the Middle East in March 2002 reportedly to consult regional
countries about the possibility of confronting Iraq militarily, although the countries
visited reportedly urged greater U.S. attention to the Arab-Israeli dispute and opposed
confrontation with Iraq.
The two primary themes in the Bush Administration’s public case for
confronting Iraq were (1) its purported refusal to end its WMD programs, and (2) its
ties to terrorist groups, to which Iraq might transfer WMD for the purpose of
conducting a catastrophic attack on the United States. The Administration added that
regime change would have the further benefit of liberating the Iraqi people and
promoting stability in the Middle East, possibly facilitating a resolution to the Arab-
Israeli dispute.
Iraq and Al Qaeda. Although they did not assert that Saddam Hussein’s
regime had a direct connection to the September 11 attacks or the subsequent anthrax
mailings, senior U.S. officials said in the runup to the war that there was evidence
of Iraqi linkages to Al Qaeda. Secretary of State Powell, as noted above, cited
intelligence information that Ansar al-Islam and its enclave leader Abu Musab al-
Zarqawi had links to Saddam Hussein’s regime.11 (See section above on Ansar al-
Islam for more information on that organization and its reputed links to Saddam
Hussein’s regime.) Other senior officials cited intelligence information that Iraq
provided advice and training to Al Qaeda in the manufacture and use of chemical
weapons, although Administration information appears to date to the early 1990s
when Iraq, largely isolated after the first Gulf war, was politically close to Sudan. Al
Qaeda founder Osama Bin Laden was based in Sudan during that time (1991-1996).
The Bush Administration did not extensively cite reports that Czech intelligence
believed that Iraqi intelligence had met with lead September 11 hijacker Mohammad
Atta in Prague in spring 2001, suggesting official skepticism of those reports. Some
outside commentators believed that those reports indicated a direct Iraqi connection
to the September 11 attacks.
10 Sipress, Alan. “U.S. Funds Satellite TV to Iraq.” Washington Post, August 16, 2001.
11 Goldberg, Jeffrey. “The Great Terror.” The New Yorker, March 25, 2002.

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Some outside observers expressed skepticism about Iraq-Al Qaeda connections
because of the ideological differences between Saddam Hussein’s secular regime and
Al Qaeda’s Islamist character. Others noted that bin Laden sought to raise an Islamic
army to fight Saddam’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990, arguing against the need for U.S.
troops, and that he was more an enemy of Saddam Hussein than an ally. Those
differences were evident in a February 12, 2003, bin Laden statement referring to
Saddam Hussein’s regime as socialist and infidel, although the statement exhorted
Iraq to resist impending U.S. military action. In the Administration view, the two
shared similar anti-U.S. goals, which outweighed ideological differences and
propelled them into tactical or strategic cooperation.
WMD Threat Perception. In arguing for military action, U.S. officials
maintained that Iraq’s purported commitment to developing WMD — coupled with
its support for terrorist groups to which Iraq might transfer WMD — constituted an
unacceptable potential threat to the United States and that major U.S. military action
was justified if Iraq refused to disarm voluntarily. U.S. officials said the September
11, 2001 attacks demonstrated that the United States could not wait for threats to
gather before acting, but must instead act preemptively or preventively. Senior U.S.
officials asserted a WMD threat as follows:
! Iraq had worked to rebuild its WMD programs in the nearly 4 years
since U.N. weapons inspectors left Iraq and had failed to comply
with 17 U.N. resolutions, including Resolution 1441 (November 8,
2002), calling for its complete elimination of all WMD programs.
However, statements by U.N. weapons inspectors after inspections
resumed November 27, 2002 indicated they believed Iraq did not
have an active nuclear weapons program, and that inspections on
other weapons categories were making progress.
! Iraq used chemical weapons against its own people (the Kurds) and
against Iraq’s neighbors (Iran), implying that Iraq would not
necessarily be deterred from using WMD against the United States
or its allies. Others noted that Iraq did not use such weapons against
adversaries, such as the United States, that have the capability of
destroying Iraq’s government in retaliation. Under the U.S. threat of
massive retaliation, Iraq did not use WMD against U.S. troops in the
1991 Gulf war. On the other hand, Iraq defied U.S. warnings of
retaliation and did burn Kuwait’s oil fields in that war.
! Iraq could transfer its WMD to terrorists such as Al Qaeda who
could use these weapons to cause hundreds of thousands of deaths
in the United States or elsewhere.
Critics of this view cited
presentations by CIA Director Tenet to Congress in October 2002,
portions of which were released publicly, stating the CIA view that
Iraq was likely to transfer WMD to terrorists if the United States
were to attack Iraq. At that point, according to that argument,
Saddam Hussein would be left with little incentive not to cooperate
with terrorist groups capable of striking at U.S. interests. No WMD
was used against Iraq during Operation Iraqi Freedom, and little
evidence of actual WMD have thus far been found, although the

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CRS-16
Administration asserts that WMD programs, and perhaps actual
weapons themselves, will eventually be found in Iraq.
Broadening the Internal Opposition to Saddam
As it began in mid-2002 to prepare for possible military action against Iraq, the
Bush Administration tried to broaden the Iraqi opposition and build up its
capabilities. On June 16, 2002, the Washington Post reported that, in early 2002,
President Bush authorized stepped up covert activities by the CIA and special
operations forces to destabilize Saddam Hussein. In early August 2002, the State and
Defense Departments jointly invited six major opposition groups — the INC, the
INA, the KDP, the PUK, SCIRI, and the MCM — to Washington for meetings with
senior officials, including a video link to Vice President Cheney. The meetings were
held to show unity within the opposition and among different agencies of the U.S.
government, which reportedly tended to favor different opposition groups.
In conjunction with the stepped up engagement with the opposition, on August
15, 2002, the State Department agreed to provide $8 million in ESF to the Iraqi
National Congress (INC), funds that had been held up due to differences between the
State Department and the INC over what activities would be funded. The $8 million
was to be used to fund the INC, during May 2002 to December 2002, to run its
offices in Washington, London, Tehran, Damascus, Prague, and Cairo, and to operate
its Al Mutamar newspaper and Liberty TV. The Defense Department agreed to fund
the information gathering portion of the INC’s activities; the State Department had
refused to fund those activities, which are conducted inside Iraq, because of strains
between the INC and other opposition groups and questions about INC use of U.S.
funds.
In addition, the Administration expanded its ties to Shiite Islamist groups and
to groups composed of ex-military and security officers, as well as to some ethnic-
based groups. The groups and individuals with which the Bush Administration had
increasing contact during this period include the following:
! Iraqi National Movement. It formed in 2001 as an offshoot of the
INC. Its leaders include ex-senior military officer Hassan al-Naqib
(who was part of an early leadership body of the INC); and Hatim
Mukhlis, who claimed support of some in Saddam’s Tikriti clan.
! Iraqi National Front.
Another grouping of ex-military officers,
founded in March 2000 by Tawfiq al-Yasseri. Yasseri, a Shiite
Muslim ex-military officer, headed Iraq’s military academy and
participated in the post-1991 Gulf war anti-Saddam uprisings.
! Iraqi Free Officers and Civilians Movement. Established in 1996 by
ex-military officer Najib al-Salh, this group was close to the INC.
Salhi, who defected in 1995, served in the Republican Guard.
! Higher Council for National Salvation. Based in Denmark, it was
established in August 2002, headed by Wafiq al-Samarra’i, a
former head of Iraqi military intelligence. Ex-chief of staff of Iraq’s

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military (1980-1991) Nizar al-Khazraji, who was based in Denmark
since fleeing Iraq in 1996, may also be a member. Khazraji was
placed under travel restrictions by Danish officials in late November
2002 after saying he wanted to leave Denmark.
He is under
investigation there for alleged involvement in Iraq’s use of chemical
weapons against the Kurds in 1988. Danish authorities said on
March 17, 2003 that Khazraji had unexpectedly left his home
there,12 although his current whereabouts are unknown.
! Iraqi Turkmen Front. A small, ethnic Turkomen-based grouping,
generally considered aligned with Turkish policy on Iraq.
Turkomens number about 350,000 and live mainly in northern Iraq.
! The Islamic Accord of Iraq. Based in Damascus, this is another
Shiite Islamic Party, but it is considered substantially less pro-
Iranian than SCIRI or the Da’wa Party. It is headed by Jamil Wakil,
a follower of Ayatollah Shirazi, an Iranian cleric who was the
spiritual leader of a group called the Islamic Front for the Liberation
of Bahrain (IFLB, see above under Islamic Amal).
The IFLB
allegedly attempted to overthrow Bahrain’s regime in the early
1980s.
! The Assyrian Democratic Movement, an ethnic-based movement
headed by Secretary-General Yonadam Yousif Kanna.
Iraq’s
Assyrian community is based primarily in northern Iraq. There is a
strong diaspora presence in the United States as well. After building
ties to this group over the past year, the Bush Administration
formally began incorporating the Assyrian Democratic Movement
into its meetings with the Iraqi opposition in September 2002.
(Kanna is on the Governing Council.)
Second ILA Designations. The Bush Administration applauded efforts
during 2001 and 2002 by the ex-military led groups to coordinate with each other
and with the INC and other groups. One such meeting, in July 2002 in London and
jointly run with the INC, attracted over 70 ex-military officers. However, since the
regime vacated Baghdad on April 9, 2003, virtually none of the ex-military led
groups listed above has openly sought a major role in post-Saddam Iraq.
As a decision whether to launch military action approached, President Bush
issued a determination (December 9, 2002) to draw down the remaining $92 million
in defense articles and services authorized under the Iraq Liberation Act for the INA,
the INC, the KDP, the PUK, SCIRI, and the MCM “and to such other Iraqi
opposition groups designated by me under the Act before or after this determination.”
That same day, the Bush Administration made six of the ex-military led factions
discussed above (except the Higher Council for National Salvation) eligible to
receive draw downs under the ILA. The announcement appeared to be part of
reported plan to train about 5,000 oppositionists in tasks that could assist U.S. forces,
12 ‘Missing’ Iraqi General Now in Kuwait: Paper. Agence France Press, April 7, 2003.

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CRS-18
possibly including combat units.13 An initial group of 3,000 was selected, but only
about 70 oppositionists completed training at an air base (Taszar) in Hungary,
according to press reports.14
These oppositionists served with U.S. forces in
Operation Iraqi Freedom as translators and mediators between U.S. forces and local
leaders, and most did not stay in Iraq, according to observers.
As the prospects for military action against Iraq grew, the opposition began
planning its role in the war and the post-war period. During December 14-17, 2002,
with U.S. officials attending, major Iraqi opposition groups held a conference in
London. In advance of the meeting, the Bush Administration appointed NSC official
Zalmay Khalilzad to be a liaison to the Iraqi opposition. The conference was
organized by the same six groups whose leaders visited Washington in August 2002,
but included other groups as well, and they discussed whether the opposition should
declare a provisional government. The Administration opposed that step on the
grounds that doing so was premature and would give the impression that outside
powers were determining Iraq’s political structure.
The meeting ended with agreement to form a 65-member follow-up committee,
which some criticized as weighted heavily toward Shiite Islamist groups such as
SCIRI. The opposition met again during February 24-27, 2003, in northern Iraq.
Against the urging of U.S. representatives at the meeting, the opposition agreed to
form a six man committee that would prepare for a transition regime, although it
stopped short of declaring a provisional government. The six-person committee
included PUK leader Jalal Talabani, KDP leader Masud Barzani, SCIRI leader
Mohammed Baqr Al Hakim, Chalabi, INA leader Iyad Alawi, and a former Iraqi
foreign minister Adnan Pachachi. (All six groups of these personalities, or their
designated representatives, are on Governing Council.)
Decision to Take Military Action. As inspectors worked in Iraq under the
new mandates provided in Resolution 1441, the Administration demanded complete
disarmament and full cooperation by Iraq if that country wanted to avert military
action. In a probable effort to garner international support for any U.S.-led war effort
against Iraq, the Administration had downplayed the goal of regime change in
President Bush’s September 12, 2002, speech before the United Nations General
Assembly, stressing instead the need to enforce U.N. resolutions that required Iraqi
disarmament. However, the Administration resumed stressing the regime change
goal after February 2003 as diplomacy at the United Nations ran its course.
The possibility of war became clearer following the mid-March 2003
breakdown of U.N. diplomacy over whether the U.N. Security Council should
authorize war against Iraq for failing to comply with Resolution 1441.
The
diplomatic breakdown followed several briefings for the U.N. Security Council by
the director of the U.N. inspection body UNMOVIC (U.N. Monitoring, Verification,
and Inspection Commission) Hans Blix and the director of the International Atomic
13
Deyoung, Karen, and Daniel Williams.
“Training of Iraqi Exiles Authorized.”
Washington Post, October 19, 2002.
14 Williams, Daniel. “U.S. Army to Train 1,000 Iraqi Exiles.” Washington Post, December
18, 2002.

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CRS-19
Energy Agency (IAEA), Mohammad al-Baradei, most recently on March 7, 2003.
The briefings were generally critical of Iraq for failing to pro-actively cooperate to
clear up outstanding questions about Iraq’s WMD program, but the latter two
briefings (February 24 and March 7) noted progress in clearing up outstanding WMD
questions. The Blix/Baradei briefings said Iraq had not accounted for its past WMD,
but the two did not state that they were certain that Iraq had retained WMD, or that
they had uncovered any banned WMD. Iraq declared short range ballistic missiles
that were determined by Blix to be of prohibited ranges, and Blix ordered Iraq to
destroy them. Iraq began the destruction prior to the launching of the U.S.-led war.
(For more detail on the final round of inspections and evidence of WMD programs
found in the post-war period, see CRS Issue Brief IB92117: Iraq: Weapons
Programs, U.N. Requirements, and U.S. Policy.)
Security Council opponents of war, including France, Russia, China, and
Germany, said the briefings indicated that Iraq could be disarmed peacefully and that
inspections should be given more time. They noted that Iraq was well contained by
sanctions and the U.S./British enforced no-fly zones. Those who agreed with this
view maintained that, as long as Iraq allowed access to U.N. weapons inspections
under Resolution 1441, Iraq could not pose an immediate threat to U.S. national
security. The inspectors reported few, if any, Iraqi obstructions in about 700
inspections of about 400 different sites, as of mid-March 2003. Others experts
believed that, even if Iraq were to acquire major new WMD capabilities, Iraq could
have been deterred by U.S. overall strategic superiority, presumably including the
U.S. nuclear arsenal.
The United States, Britain, Spain, and Bulgaria disagreed, maintaining that Iraq
had not fundamentally decided to disarm, and was attempting to preserve WMD
capabilities. The Administration asserted on March 17, 2003, that diplomatic options
to disarm Iraq peacefully had failed and turned its full attention to military action.
That evening, President Bush gave Saddam Hussein and his sons, Uday and Qusay,
an ultimatum to leave Iraq within 48 hours to avoid war.
They refused the
ultimatum, and Operation Iraqi Freedom was launched on March 19, 2003.
In the war, Iraq’s conventional military forces were overwhelmed by U.S. and
British forces in Operation Iraqi Freedom, although the Iraqi military, at times, put
up stiff resistance using unconventional tactics. No major Iraqi military commanders
or Baathist political figures came forward to try to establish a post-Saddam
government, but senior regime leaders fled Baghdad, and the whereabouts of some
of the top leadership, including Saddam Hussein, are unknown. The outcome of a
post-war debate on the results of the war might depend on such factors as the pace
of reconstruction; the degree of resistance to the U.S.-led occupation; the amount
of WMD ultimately found, if any; and whether a new government is stable and
democratic.

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CRS-20
Post-War Governance Issues
Since Saddam Hussein’s regime vacated Baghdad on April 9, 2003, there has
been increasing debate about governing post-war Iraq. The same U.S. concerns about
fragmentation of and instability in Iraq that existed in prior years are present in the
current debate over how to establish a post-war regime. Although some Iraqi
civilians have welcomed U.S. and British troops in areas captured, many Iraqis now
want U.S. and British forces to leave Iraq, and the top U.S. military commander in
the Persian Gulf theater, General John Abizaid, says that U.S. forces now face a
“classic guerrilla war.” Other experts fear that a post-war Iraq will inevitably fall
under the control of pro-Iranian Shiite Islamist forces who are asserting growing
control over areas inhabited by Iraq’s Shiites. Shiites constitute about 60% of Iraq’s
population but have been under-represented in every Iraqi government since modern
Iraq’s formation in 1920. (For information on U.S. and international funding for
humanitarian assistance and reconstruction, see CRS Report RL31833, Iraq: Recent
Developments in Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance.)
Establishing Iraqi Self-Rule
The Administration says that U.S. forces will stay in Iraq until there is a stable,
democratic successor regime that is at peace with its neighbors. However, there has
been some debate between U.S. authorities and key anti-Saddam groups over how
to move Iraq to self-government. Senior U.S. officials, including deputy Defense
Secretary Paul Wolfowitz, had said in early April 2003 that they hoped to have a
successor regime in place within six months of the fall of the regime. However, in
mid-May 2003, U.S. officials, apparently fearing that existing major groups could not
form a stable regime, or that Shiite Islamists would dominate a successor authority,
backed away from any deadlines for establishing an Iraqi self-rule authority.
Shortly after the war, the United States began a process of establishing a
successor regime. The Administration organized an April 15 meeting, in Nasiriyah,
of about 100 Iraqis of varying ideologies, present by U.S. invitation. Many of the
attendees were representatives of Iraqi tribal groupings that had not been politically
active before.
However, SCIRI, along with several Shiite clerics that have
appropriated authority throughout much of southern Iraq since the fall of the regime,
boycotted the meeting and called for an Islamic state and the withdrawal of U.S.
forces. Another meeting of about 250 delegates was held in Baghdad on April 26,
ending in agreement to hold a broader meeting, within a month, to name an interim
Iraqi administration.
In parallel with the April 26 meeting, the five most prominent exiled opposition
groups met, with U.S. envoys present: SCIRI, the INC, the INA, the PUK, and the
KDP. On May 9, 2003, the five agreed to expand their grouping to seven, adding to
their ranks the little known Nasir al-Chadirchy, head of a party called the National
Democratic Party of Iraq, as well as the Shiite Islamist Da’wa Party. The “seven-
party grouping” strongly criticized the U.S. decision in mid-May 2003 to delay the
formation of an Iraqi self-rule authority indefinitely and to instead form an advisory
body of 25 to 30 Iraqis. The seven-party grouping subsequently began meeting with
U.S. occupation authorities to try to reverse that decision.

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CRS-21
With U.S. casualties in Iraq mounting and a growing sense of resentment among
the Iraqi population, the U.S.-led occupation authority (Coalition Provisional
Authority, CPA) incorporated the views of the seven-party grouping.
U.S.
administrator for Iraq Paul Bremer (see below) said on June 23, 2003, that the
planned 25- to 30-member body would have “real authority” from its first days. He
said it would nominate ministry heads, recommend policies, and convene a
“constitutional conference” to draft a new constitution.15
The Governing Council. On July 13, 2003, a Governing Council was
unveiled to the Iraqi public, appointed by the U.S.-led Coalition Provisional
Authority (CPA) but reflecting the influence of the seven-party grouping, as well as
prominent Iraqis who were never in exile and were not affiliated with the exiled
opposition. The Council has 25 members, of which 3 are women and 13 are Shiite
Muslims.
Of the 13 Shiite Muslims on the Council, one seat is held by SCIRI directly
(Abd al-Aziz Al Hakim, younger brother of Mohammad Baqr), one is held by a
guerrilla affiliated with SCIRI (Abdul Karim al-Muahmmadawi), two are Da’wa
Party (Ibrahim al-Jafari and Abdul Zahra Othman) leaders, and considered allies of
SCIRI, and one is a former Da’wa activist (Muwaffaq al-Ruba’i). Also on the
Council is a moderate Shiite cleric, Mohammad Bahr al-Ulum, considered pro-U.S.
and not affiliated with SCIRI or the Da’wa. He headed the Ahl al-Bayt charity center
in London since the 1980s. The remaining Shiite Muslims, such as Chalabi and Iyad
al-Alawi, are mostly considered secular. Appointed to the Council was one Sunni
Muslim Islamist, Muhsin Abdul Hamid, who heads the Iraqi Islamic Party, but he
does not have a clear affiliation or relationship with the Shiite Islamists on the
Council.
The Council includes five Kurds, including the two main Kurdish leaders Jalal
Talabani and Masud Barzani. The Kurds are generally considered pro-U.S. and
might be expected to vote the way the U.S.-led coalition wants.
Although not a cohesive bloc, the Council includes exiles and non-exiles who
generally want a liberal democracy and would be considered pro-U.S.
Most
prominent among them is Chalabi, but this grouping includes National Democratic
Party leader Nasir al-Chadirchy and former foreign minister Adnan Pachachi, both
of whom are Sunni Muslims, as well as former foreign ministry official Akila al-
Hashimi, a Shiite woman. Others most likely to affiliate with this bloc include
Sunni businessman Samir Shakir al-Sumaidy; Sunni civil engineer Ghazi al-Yawar,
who is president of Saudi-based Hicap Technology; the Shiite coordinator for the
Human Rights Association of Babel, Ahmad al-Barak; and the two other women
Council members — Songul Chapouk, a member of the Turkomen minority, who
heads the Iraqi Women’s Association, and Raja al-Khuza’i, a Shiite who heads the
maternity hospital in Diwaniyah.
15 Transcript: Bremer Reviews Progress, Plans for Iraq Reconstruction. Washington File,
June 23, 2003.

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CRS-22
A member of the Assyrian Christian community is on the Council. Yonadam
Kanna, the secretary-general of the Democratic Assyrian Movement, is on the body.
It is not known what other members of the Council, if any, he might be aligned with,
although it is reasonable to believe that he might have an affinity for fellow residents
of northern Iraq, the Kurds. Also unclear is whether or not Hamid al-Musa, the
Shiite head of the Iraqi Communist Party, is allied with anyone else on the Council.
In late July 2003, the Council decided that nine Council members will rotate as
chairpersons, each for one month. Ibrahim al-Jafari of the Da’wa Party is the first
chairman. The other eight who will rotate that post are Chalabi, Alawi of the INA,
Hakim of SCIRI, Pachachi, Barzani of the KDP, Talabani of the PUK, Bahr al-Ulum,
and Abdul Hamid, the Sunni Islamist figure.
Among its first actions, the Council has authorized the establishment of an Iraqi
war crimes tribunal for Saddam and associates accused of major human rights abuses.
It also has empowered a three member delegation to seek formal U.N. recognition.
The grouping, Chalabi, Pachachi, and Akila Hashimi, traveled to the United Nations
in July 2003 and received a supportive statement from Secretary General Kofi
Annan. No decision on seating the Governing Council at the United Nations was
announced.
The Governing Council is working on a new constitution. On July 17, 2003,
CPA head Bremer said that a constitution could conceivably be drafted in time to
have national elections by summer of 2004. He has linked the potential length of the
U.S. occupation to the completion of successful national elections and the restoration
of security in Iraq. As noted above, in early August 2003, the Governing Council
tapped INC activist Kanaan Makiya to head a 25-person committee that will
determine the process for drafting the constitution.
As part of the planning process that took place before the war, the U.S. State
Department supported a group of Iraqi exiles to address issues that would confront
a successor government.16 However, the State Department working group (the
“Future of Iraq Project”) does not appear to have significant influence on any post-
war regime decision-making in Iraq. Some experts believe the Defense Department
was promoting a competing or separate group of exiles.17 The State Department
project, which cost $5 million, consisted of working groups that discussed (1)
transitional justice; (2) public finance; (3) public and media outreach; (4) democratic
principles; (5) water, agriculture, and the environment; (6) health and human
services; (7) economy and infrastructure; (8) education; (9) refugees, internally-
displaced persons, and migration policy; (10) foreign and national security policy;
(11) defense institutions and policy; (12) free media; (13) civil society capacity-
building; (14) anti-corruption measures; and (15) oil and energy.
16
“State Department Hosts Working Group Meeting for Future of Iraq Project,”
Washington File, December 11, 2002.
17 Fineman, Mark, Robin Wright, and Doyle McManus. Preparing for War, Stumbling to
Peace. Los Angeles Times, July 18, 2003.

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CRS-23
Post-War U.S. Operations and the Coalition Provisional
Authority (CPA)
Experts note that projections about U.S. operations in post-war Iraq, including
the duration of the U.S. military occupation and the numbers of occupation troops,
are largely dependent on the amount of continuing Iraqi resistance, the number of
U.S. casualties taken, and the rate at which such U.S. objectives as the establishment
of a stable and democratic successor regime are accomplished. At present, about
160,000 U.S. and British troops remain in Iraq, according to a June 2003 report to
Congress mandated by P.L. 108-11. Of those, about 148,000 are U.S. personnel and
11,000 are British. There are another approximately 10,000 foreign forces, deploying
in accordance with international commitments to post-war peacekeeping (see below).
Earlier press reports said the Administration wanted to draw the U.S. force level
down to about 35,000 by the end of 2003, but continued unrest and insecurity in Iraq
appears to have made that goal untenable, and some U.S. commanders do not rule out
an increase in U.S. force levels if necessary.
The Resistance. There are indications that resistance to the U.S. governance
of Iraq is growing, judging by the frequency of attacks on U.S. forces over the past
few weeks and the type and geographical distribution of attacks. U.S. military
operations are focused on hunting down guerrilla resistance leaders and their
suspected Baathist financiers, as well as finding former leader Saddam Hussein. The
new Centcom commander John Abizaid said on July 17, 2003, that the United States
faces a “classic guerrilla war” led by “mid-level Baath Party activists organized
regionally.” Such attacks have killed 60 U.S. military personnel since President Bush
declared an end to “major combat operations” in Iraq on May 1, 2003.
The Bush Administration says resistance comes not only from remnants of the
Baath Party but also from Arab volunteers, possibly linked to or supportive of Al
Qaeda, who have come to Iraq from other countries to fight the U.S. occupation.
Attacks have been more frequent in the Sunni areas of central Iraq, where support for
Saddam Hussein’s regime was traditionally stronger than elsewhere, but there have
been at least two fatal attacks on British and Danish forces in August 2003 in the
Shiite areas in and around Basra. Some elements of the resistance appear to want to
restore the old regime, while others appear to be motivated by opposition to foreign
rule or the goal of forming an Islamic state. Other resistance fighters appear to be
motivated by the difficulty the U.S. and British authorities have had in restoring
civilian services. U.S. military officials put the resistance numbers at about 5,000,
although they do not explain precisely how they arrive at that figure. In June 2003,
some opponents of the occupation began identifying themselves as distinct groups,
scribbling graffiti warnings and faxing statements to the Arab satellite television
network Al Jazeera, UAE-based Al Arabiya TV, and other outlets. They are using
such names as:
! Al Awda (the Return);
! the Snakes;
! the Movement of the Victorious Sect;
! Iraq’s Revolutionaries - Al Anbar’s Armed Brigades;
! The Popular Resistance for the Liberation of Iraq;

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CRS-24
! the Salafist Jihad Group (Salafi is a Sunni extremist Islamic
movement): and
! Armed Islamic Movement for Al Qaeda - Falluja Branch. Actual
linkages to Al Qaeda, if any, are not known.
! Jaysh (Army) of Mohammad
! Black Banners Group
! Nasirite Organization
As noted above, some Shiite factions are becoming more active against the
occupation. The Sadr faction has reportedly instigated riots and demonstrations that
took place against U.S. and British forces in Baghdad and Basra. One report says
that Sunni Islamists, led by Shaykh Ahmad Qubaysi, who returned in April 2003
from exile in the UAE, is assisting the Sadr faction.18 This represents the possible
emergence of a Sunni-Shiite Islamist anti-occupation coalition.
The continuing resistance has complicated the U.S. mission. In addition to
targeting U.S. forces, resistance fighters have assassinated
Iraqis who are
cooperating with the United States. In August 2003, in a possible evolution of its
tactics, resistance fighters stepped up their attacks on Iraqi oil export pipelines and
water and other infrastructure facilities. In addition, U.S. officials say that the
continued resistance has raised the costs of the ongoing U.S. operations in Iraq; the
United States is spending about $3.9 billion per month for military operations there,
about double what was anticipated for the occupation period. On the other hand, the
Administration maintains that reconstruction is proceeding apace and has logged a
number of major accomplishments, as discussed in a White House fact sheet.
(“White House Notes Successful Results of Iraq Liberation.” August 8, 2003. At
[http://www.usinfo.state.gov/xarchives].)
The Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA). The Bush Administration
initially tasked Lt. Gen. Jay Garner (ret.) to direct civilian reconstruction, working
through a staff of U.S. diplomats and other U.S. government personnel who are
serving as advisers and administrators in Iraq’s various ministries. He headed the
Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA), within the
Department of Defense, created by a January 20, 2003 executive order. After
spending the combat phase of the war in neighboring Kuwait, Garner and some of his
staff of about 200 deployed to Baghdad on April 21, 2003, to begin work.
Press reports said that senior U.S. officials were dissatisfied with the slow pace
of reconstruction under Garner, and on May 6, 2003, the Administration appointed
former ambassador L. Paul Bremer to lead the overall reconstruction effort, with a
focus on political reconstruction. He arrived on May 12 to head the Coalition
Provisional Authority (CPA), which subsumed ORHA. The appointment represented
an apparent adjustment from the original structure of the U.S. reconstruction effort,
although the Administration stated that it was always envisioned that a civilian
would eventually take over the U.S. effort and denied it was an indication of high-
level dissatisfaction with the effort. U.S. officials now refer to the CPA as an
18 Shadid, Anthony. Iraqi Clerics Unite in Rare Alliance. Washington Post, August 17,
2003.

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CRS-25
occupying authority legitimized by U.N. Security Council Resolution 1483 of May
22, 2003. Among other provisions, the resolution lifted U.N. sanctions on Iraq.
Building Security Institutions. While attempting to restore security to Iraq,
the CPA is beginning to build new Iraqi institutions that can eventually take over the
security function from the United States. The United States is planning to train a
40,000 person Iraqi army, about 10% the size of the pre-war Iraqi force. About
12,000 are expected to be in the force by mid-2004. Former Defense Department
official Walter Slocombe is in charge of forming the new Iraqi army. The CPA is
also trying to turn basic policing functions over to Iraqis. Overall, about 32,000 Iraqi
policemen have returned to their jobs, about half the total goal. The CPA official
responsible for the new police force, former New York City police commissioner
Bernard Kerik, says it will take about 18 months (end of 2004) to reach the goal of
65,000 policemen nationwide.19 The CPA is also recruiting a 7,000 man, all- Iraqi
civil defense force to guard installations such as oil pumping stations, electricity
substations, and like facilities.
Searching for Regime Violations. Organs of the CPA and the U.S.
government are attempting to uncover abuses and violations of the regime of Saddam
Hussein, including evidence of WMD. A 1,500 person “Iraq Survey Group,” headed
by a U.S. military commander (Maj. Gen. Keith Dayton) but composed of many
civilian technical experts, including former U.N. weapons inspector David Kay, is
attempting to uncover alleged WMD. The Survey Group is also searching for mass
graves of victims of the former regime. Kay and Dayton briefed Members of
Congress on July 30, 2003, saying they were making substantial progress in
uncovering the fate of suspected WMD programs. Thus far, the Survey Group has
found at least 60 mass graves, some with hundreds of corpses. Most appear to
contain bodies of Kurdish and Shiite opponents of the former regime, but some
contain some of the bodies of about 600 Kuwaitis missing from the first Gulf war.
(WMD issues and the fate of the missing Kuwaitis are discussed in CRS Issue Brief
IB92117.)
Reviving the Oil Industry.20 As the driver of Iraq’s economy, the rebuilding
of the oil industry is receiving substantial U.S. attention. Ambassador Bremer said
in a press interview on July 31, 2003, that it could take $50 - $100 billion to
reconstruct Iraq, and a $1.6 billion plan to rehabilitate Iraq’s oil industry was agreed
in late July. It has been widely assumed that Iraq’s vast oil reserves, believed second
only to those of Saudi Arabia, would be used to fund much of the costs of
reconstruction. Presidential spokesman Ari Fleischer said on February 18, 2003,
referring to Iraq’s oil reserves, that Iraq has “a variety of means ... to shoulder much
of the burden for [its] own reconstruction.” Many observers had been concerned that
an Iraqi regime on the verge of defeat could destroy its own oil fields, but coalition
forces quickly secured Iraq’s southern oil fields after combat began. Only about 9
19 Schmitt, Eric. Wolfowitz on Visit to Iraq to Assess Rebuilding Effort. New York Times,
July 18, 2003.
20 For information on the prospects for Iraq’s post-war economy, see CRS Report RL31944.
Iraq’s Economy: Past, Present, Future.

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CRS-26
oil wells were set on fire, of a total of over 500 oil fields in that region, and all were
put out quickly. The northern oil fields in Kirkuk and Mosul were not set afire.
In early May 2003, the U.S.-led coalition set up an advisory board, headed by
former Shell executive Phillip Carroll, to oversee the rebuilding of Iraq’s oil sector.
An Iraqi oil industry professional, Thamer Ghadhban, was named to serve as head
of the interim management team that will run Iraq’s oil ministry and report to the
advisory board. The first exports began in late June 2003, and Ghadhban said that
Iraq would be up to about 1 million barrels per day of exports by mid-July. In late
July, Iraq contracted to sell oil, about 750,000 barrels per day, slightly below the
target rate. Its pre-war export rate was about 2.2 million barrels per day, a level that
U.S. officials and Iraqi oil appointees had hoped to reach by late 2003. However,
sabotage by the resistance has reduced Iraq’s oil exports to about 600,000 barrels per
day as of August 18, 2003, significantly below the 1 million barrel per day target
figure, a development that could jeopardize existing budgetary projections. The
CPA-produced budget for Iraq, which is based on the targeted levels of oil exports,
assumes that oil revenues will yield about $3.6 billion through the end of 2003, and
provide about half of the approximately $6.6 billion budget for Iraq for the period.
The deficit is to be covered from funds in the Development Fund for Iraq, set up by
the post-war Resolution 1483 (see below).
A related issue is long-term development of Iraq’s oil industry and which
foreign energy firms, if any, might receive preference for contracts to explore Iraq’s
vast reserves. Russia, China, and others are said to fear that the United States will
seek to develop Iraq’s oil industry with minimal participation of firms from other
countries.
Continuation of the Oil-for-Food Program. About 60% of Iraqis have
been receiving all their foodstuffs from the U.N.-supervised Oil-for-Food Program.
The program, which is an exception to the comprehensive U.N. embargo on Iraq put
in place after the 1991 Persian Gulf war, began operations in December 1996. It was
suspended just before hostilities began, when U.N. staff in Iraq that run the various
aspects of the program departed Iraq. As of the start of the war, about $9 billion
worth of humanitarian goods were in the process of being delivered or in production.
(See CRS Report RL30472, Iraq: Oil-for-Food Program, Sanctions, and Illicit
Trade.)
On March 28, 2003, the U.N. Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution
1472 that restarted the program’s operations and empowered the United Nations, for
a 45-day period (until May 12), to take direct control of all aspects of the program.
Under the new resolution, the United Nations is setting priorities for and directing the
delivery of already contracted supplies. The enhanced U.N. authority was extended
on April 25, 2003, to last at least until the six-month phase of the program expired
on June 3, 2003.
On April 17, 2003, the Administration called for a lifting of U.N. sanctions
against Iraq, signaling that the Administration wanted to focus on restoring normal
international commerce with Iraq rather than extending the oil-for-food program.
Resolution 1483 lifted sanctions and provided for the phasing out of the oil for food
program within six months after adoption of that resolution on May 22. The

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CRS-27
resolution also provided for the United Nations to transfer to the new Development
Fund for Iraq $1 billion in funds held by the oil-for-food program escrow fund. That
Development Fund contained about $7 billion in June 2003, consisting of captured
Iraqi assets, Iraqi assets abroad, the monies transferred from the oil-for-food account,
and U.S. funds available for reconstruction. (For more information, see CRS Report
RL30472, Iraq: Oil-for-Food Program, International Sanctions, and Illicit Trade.)
International Role in Peacekeeping and Governance
The relatively slow pace of establishing Iraqi security institutions, coupled with
ongoing security difficulties and continued U.S. casualties, has led to calls from
Members of Congress and others for the Administration to expand its efforts to
enlist other countries to help with the stabilization of Iraq. Negotiations with other
countries is proceeding for a multinational peacekeeping force in Iraq that would
presumably spread some of the peace-keeping and stabilization burden now borne
mostly by U.S. forces. According to the Administration, more than 30 countries are
discussing offers of forces for a multilateral stabilization force, and the countries
listed below have begun implementing pledges of troops and or police or support
personnel. The commitments of several nations, including Germany, France, India,
and Turkey appear to be contingent on whether the U.N. Security Council authorizes
such a force, and several nations appear to require U.S. or other funding in order to
participate. Secretary of State Powell said on July 16, 2003, that the United States
is discussing with other countries the possibility of seeking formal U.N. backing for
a multilateral peacekeeping force.
The United Kingdom and Poland have offered to lead multinational divisions
in that mission in southern Iraq and central Iraq, respectively. The United States and
Poland reached agreement in late July 2003 for the United States to fund the
deployment of the Polish force, support valued at about $250 million. The UK-led
force is to number about 14,000, of which all but 2,000 are British forces. The
Polish-led force is to number about 9,200, of which 2,300 will be Polish. The
pledged forces listed below have begun deploying to Iraq as of early August 2003,
and there are now about 21,000 non-U.S. troops on the ground (including 11,000
British), as of August 18, 2003. Confirmed pledges include those in Table 1.

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Table 1. Multinational Division Force Pledges
Azerbaijan
150
Bulgaria
500
Czech Republic
400
Denmark
380
Dominican Republic
300
El Salvador
300
Estonia
55
Georgia
100
Honduras
300
Hungary
300
Italy
3,000 (mostly military police)
Japan
1,000 (logistics and combat support)
Latvia
150
Lithuania
85
Macedonia
28
Mongolia
200
Netherlands
1,100
Nicaragua
300
Norway
150
Philippines
500
Poland
2,300
Portugal
120
Romania
150
Slovakia
85
South Korea
700 (mostly medical)
Spain
1,300
Ukraine
1650
Total Non-U.S./U.K
16,600

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The United States has had some discussions with NATO on whether the
organization would take on Iraq as a fifth peacekeeping mission. However, on July
17, NATO secretary general George Robertson said the body had no plans for a
greater role beyond providing logistical help to the Polish-led force in Iraq. On July
10, 2003, the Senate adopted an amendment, by a vote of 97-0, to a State Department
authorization bill (S. 925) calling on the Administration to formally ask NATO to
lead a peacekeeping force for Iraq. A related bill (H.R. 2112) was introduced in the
House on May 15, 2003.
Other countries have also agreed to provide funding for reconstruction.
According to the June 30, 2003, report to Congress by the Administration, the
following countries have made financial pledges for Iraq reconstruction: United
Kingdom ($177.1 million); Japan ($101.8 million); Australia ($60.5 million); UAE
($47.6 million); Canada ($41.2 million); Saudi Arabia ($36.6 million); Spain ($32.2
million); Kuwait ($27.5 million); the European Commission ($26.3 million); and
Italy ($22.4 million).
U.N. Role in Post-War Iraq. Just after the fall of Saddam Hussein’s regime,
the United States and its European allies and other countries reached a measure of
agreement on a U.N. role in post-war Iraq. Resolution 1483, which was adopted
unanimously, provided for a U.N. special representative to coordinate the activities
of U.N. personnel in Iraq and to help establish a successor government. The
Secretary General subsequently (May 27, 2003) appointed Brazilian diplomat Sergio
Vieira de Mello for that post. The resolution also gave the United Nations a
monitoring role over the Development Fund for Iraq, a fund that will handle Iraq’s
oil revenues until there is a successor government. The resolution did not authorize
a return to Iraq of U.N. weapons inspectors, although the resolution provides for
deliberations on that issue. Some International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors
returned to Iraq in June 2003 on a limited nuclear mission in Baghdad. As noted
above, some countries are conditioning any contribution of peacekeeping troops to
Iraq on a formal U.N. authorization, a step the Administration now appears to be
weighing. On the other hand, the Washington Post reported on August 2, 2003, that
the Administration did not want to agree to a U.N. resolution that dilutes its
prerogatives in Iraq, particularly its authority in determining a new political structure.
The World Bank, which visited Iraq in late July 2003, said it would resume lending
to Iraq after it conducts national elections.
On August 14, 2003, the U.N. Security Council adopted a compromise
resolution. The Resolution, 1500, welcomed, but did not “endorse,” the formation
of the Governing Council, an apparent nod to U.S. requests. The resolution also
enhanced U.N. authority in Iraq somewhat by establishing a “U.N. Assistance
Mission for Iraq,” which is headed in Iraq by de Mello. The resolution did not
formally authorize an international peacekeeping force for Iraq (Resolution 1483
already “calls on” governments to contribute forces for stabilization) and did not
measurably dilute U.S. authority over post-war governance in Iraq. The resolution
did not appear to meet the requirements of France and others for them to donate
peacekeeping forces.

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CRS-30
Fate of the Deposed Regime
An issue related to regime change but somewhat separate is whether Saddam
Hussein and his associates should be prosecuted for war crimes and crimes against
humanity, if and when they are caught. The Administration said in early April 2003
that Saddam and his inner circle should be tried by Iraqis if they are captured,
although others might be tried by a U.S.-led process for any crimes committed in the
course of the 2003 war. In the year prior to the war, the Administration was
gathering data for a potential trial of Saddam and 12 of his associates. Those it had
sought for trial include Saddam; his two sons Uday and Qusay (killed after discovery
by and a firefight with U.S. forces in Mosul on July 22, 2003); Ali Hassan al-Majid,
for alleged use of chemicals against the Kurds (he was reported by British officers
to have died in an early April air strike on his home in Basra, although that is now in
question); Muhammad Hamza al-Zubaydi (surrendered in mid-April 2003); Taha
Yasin Ramadan; first Vice President and number three in the regime; Izzat Ibrahim,
Vice Chairman of the Revolutionary Command Council and formally number two
in the regime; Barzan al-Tikriti, Saddam’s half brother (captured in mid-April 2003);
Watban al-Tikriti (captured in April 2003) and Sabawi al-Tikriti, both other half
brothers of Saddam and former leaders of regime intelligence bureaus; Tariq Aziz,
deputy Prime Minister and foremost regime spokesman (surrendered in May 2003);
and Aziz Salih Noman, governor of Kuwait during Iraq’s occupation of that country
(apprehended in May 2003).
Others not on the list of twelve, but part of a list of 55 former regime officials
sought by the United States for questioning and possible arrest, have been captured
or surrendered. As of mid-July 2003, according to Coalition Provisional Authority
officials, more than half of the Iraqis on the list of 55 are now in custody or are
confirmed killed. Among the others apprehended are Amir al-Saadi, chief science
adviser to Saddam; Jamal Mustafa al-Tikriti, a son-in-law of Saddam; Vice President
Taha Muhi ad-Din Ma’ruf; and suspected WMD manager Hoda Mahdi Salih al-
Ammash.
The war crimes issue has been addressed by previous U.S. administrations and
the international community. U.N. Security Council Resolution 674 (October 29,
1990) calls on all states or organizations to provide information on Iraq’s war-related
atrocities to the United Nations. The Foreign Relations Authorization Act for
FY1992 (P.L. 102-138, October 28, 1991, Section 301) stated the sense of Congress
that the President should propose to the U.N. Security Council a war crimes tribunal
for Saddam Hussein. Similar legislation was later passed, including H.Con.Res. 137
(passed the House November 13, 1997); S.Con.Res. 78 (passed the Senate March
13, 1998); and a provision of the Iraq Liberation Act (P.L. 105-338, signed October
31, 1998).
A U.S. Army report on possible war crimes was released on March 19, 1993,
after Clinton took office.
Since April 1997, the United States has supported
INDICT, a private organization that publicizes alleged Iraqi war crimes and seeks the
arrest of the 12 alleged Iraqi war criminals mentioned above. In August 2000, the
Clinton Administration’s Ambassador-At-Large for War Crimes, David Scheffer,
said that the United States wanted to see an Iraq war crimes tribunal established,
focusing on “nine major criminal episodes.” These included the use of chemical

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CRS-31
weapons against Kurdish civilians at Halabja (March 16, 1988, killing 5,000 Kurds)
and the forced relocation of Kurds in the “Anfal” campaign (February 1988, in which
an estimated 50,000 to 182,000 Kurds died); the use of chemical weapons against
Iran; post-war crimes against humanity (the Kurds and the Marsh Arabs); war crimes
against Kuwait (including oil field fires) and coalition forces; and other allegations.
In FY2001 and again in FY2002, the State Department contributed $4 million to a
U.N. “Iraq War Crimes Commission,” to be spent if a U.N. tribunal for Iraq war
crimes is formed.
Congressional Reactions
Congress, like the Administration, had divergent views on the mechanisms for
promoting regime change, although there was widespread agreement in Congress that
regime change was desirable and an appropriate U.S. policy. There was substantial
disagreement over whether a major military offensive was the most desirable option
for achieving that objective. On December 20, 2001, the House passed H.J.Res. 75,
by a vote of 392-12, calling Iraq’s refusal to readmit U.N. weapons inspectors a
“mounting threat” to the United States. The resolution did not call for new U.S. steps
to overthrow Saddam Hussein but a few Members called for the overthrow of
Saddam Hussein in their floor statements in support of the resolution.
In early 2002, prior to the intensified speculation about possible war with Iraq,
some Members expressed support for increased aid to the opposition. In a joint
appearance with Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Joseph Biden on
Cable News Network on February 17, 2002, House International Relations
Committee Chairman Henry Hyde said that “...supporting the underground, the
opposition, the internal opposition, is to me the procedure of choice. That is an
option that is being worked on. All of these options are under consideration.” In
early December 2001, a bipartisan group of nine Members — Senators John
McCain, Jesse Helms, Richard Shelby, Sam Brownback, Joseph Lieberman, and
Trent Lott and Representatives Henry Hyde, Benjamin Gilman, and Harold Ford Jr.
— wrote to President Bush to urge that U.S. assistance be provided to the INC for
operations inside Iraq itself. According to the letter,
Despite the express wishes of the Congress, the INC has been denied U.S.
assistance for any operations inside any part of Iraq, including liberated Kurdish
areas. Instead, successive Administrations have funded conferences, offices and
other intellectual exercises that have done little more than expose the INC to
accusations of being “limousine insurgents” and “armchair guerrillas.”
As discussion of potential military action
increased in the fall of 2002,
Members debated the costs and risks of an all-out U.S. effort to achieve that result.
Congress adopted H.J.Res. 114, authorizing the President to use military force
against Iraq if he determines that doing so is in the national interest and will enforce
U.N. Security Council resolutions on Iraq. The measure passed the House on
October 11, 2002 by a vote of 296-133, and the Senate the following day by a vote
of 77-23. The legislation was signed into law on October 16, 2002 (P.L. 107-243).
The 108th Congress was sworn in on January 7, 2003. Prior to the war, it held
several hearings on the progress of post-war reconstruction. During the war and in

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its aftermath, several Members applauded the performance of the U.S. military and
the overthrow of the regime.
Some Members, however, have criticized the
Administration for inadequate planning for the post-war period in light of major
looting and disorder in Iraq’s cities after the fall of the regime. Criticism of post-war
planning has escalated as attacks on U.S. occupation forces have mounted, although
the Administration and others say U.S. casualties are relatively light and that the
resistance is not jeopardizing overall U.S. objectives for Iraq. Several Committees
are conducting inquiries into why substantial amounts of WMD have not been found
in Iraq to date. Some Members of both parties have also expressed concern about the
costs of the U.S. occupation, and several Members have called on the Administration
to take greater steps to persuade other countries to share the burden of peacekeeping
in and reconstruction of Iraq.

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CRS-33
Appendix. U.S. Assistance to the Opposition
Appropriated Economic Support Funds (E.S.F.)
to the Opposition
(Figures in millions of dollars)
Unspecified
War
INC
Broadcasting
Opposition
Total
Crimes
Activities
FY 1998
2.0
5.0
3.0
10.0
(P.L. 105-174)
(RFE/RL)
FY 1999
3.0
3.0
2.0
8.0
(P.L. 105-277)
FY 2000
2.0
8.0
10.0
(P.L. 106-113)
FY 2001
12.0
2.0
6.0
5.0
25.0
(P.L. 106-429)
(aid
(INC radio)
distribution
inside Iraq)
FY 2002
25.0
25.0
(P.L. 107-115)
Total,
15.0
9.0
11.0
43.0
78.0
FY1998-FY2002
FY2003
3.1
6.9
10.0
(no earmark)
(announced
(remaining
April 2003)
to be
allocated)
FY2004
0
0
(request)
Notes: The figures above do not include defense articles and services provided under the Iraq
Liberation Act. During FY1999-FY2000, approximately $5 million worth of services, out of the $97
million authorized by the Act, was obligated to the opposition, and $1 million of that has been spent,
as of late December 2002. The figures provided above also do not include any covert aid provided,
the amounts of which are not known from open sources. In addition, during each of FY2001 and
FY2002, the Administration has donated $4 million to a “U.N. War Crimes Commission” fund, to be
used if a war crimes tribunal is formed. Those funds were drawn from U.S. contributions to U.N.
programs.

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