Order Code RL32023
CRS Report for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
Homeland Security Advisory System:
Possible Issues for Congressional Oversight
August 6, 2003
Shawn Reese
Analyst in American National Government
Government and Finance Division
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

Homeland Security Advisory System:
Possible Issues for Congressional Oversight
Summary
The Homeland Security Advisory System (HSAS), established on Mar. 12,
2002, is a color coded terrorist threat warning system administered by the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS). The system, which federal departments
and agencies are required to implement and use, provides recommended protective
measures for federal departments and agencies to prevent, prepare for, mitigate
against, and respond to, terrorist attacks.
DHS disseminates HSAS terrorist threat warnings to federal departments, state
and local agencies, the public, and private sector entities. This dissemination of
warnings is conducted through multiple communication systems and public
announcements.
HSAS has five threat levels: low; guarded; elevated; high; or severe. From
March, 2002, to July, 2003, the HSAS threat level has been no lower than elevated,
and has been raised to high four times. The first time it was raised to high was on
September 10, 2002 due to the fear of terrorist attacks on the anniversary of the
terrorist attacks of Sept. 11, 2001, and the most recent time it was raised to high was
May 20, 2003 due to terrorist bombings in Saudi Arabia and Morocco.
While the need for terrorist threat warnings seems to be widely acknowledged,
there are numerous issues associated with HSAS and its effects on states, localities,
the public, and the private sector. These issues include the following:
! vagueness of warnings;
! lack of specific protective measures for state and local governments,
the public, and the private sector;
! dissemination of warnings to states, localities, the public, and the
private sector;
! coordination of HSAS with other federal warning systems; and,
! cost of threat level changes.
This report will be updated as congressional or executive actions warrant.

Contents
Threat Conditions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Vagueness of Warnings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Lack of Specific Protective Measures for State and
Local Governments, the Public, and the Private Sector . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Communication of Terrorist Threats to State and Local
Governments, the Public, and the Private Sector . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Coordination of HSAS with Other Warning Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Cost of Threat Level Changes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
List of Tables
Table 1. HSAS Threat Levels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
List of Figures
Figure 1. Homeland Security Threat Level Changes. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

Homeland Security Advisory System:
Possible Issues for Congressional Oversight
On March 12, 2002, Governor Tom Ridge—then Director of the White House
Office of Homeland Security (OHS), and now Secretary of the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS)—announced the establishment of the Homeland Security
Advisory System (HSAS). The HSAS is designed to measure and evaluate terrorist
threats and communicate these threats to federal, state, and local governments, the
public, and the private sector in a timely manner. Although HSAS is a nationwide
system, it can also be used at a smaller scale to warn of threats against a state, city,
critical infrastructure, or industry.1 Since inception to July 2003, the HSAS has been
raised from “Elevated” to “High” four times—see Figure 1 on page 15 of this report.
The HSAS was developed by OHS using information collected from state and
local first responders, business leaders, and the public. Following the March 12
announcement, the general public and the private sector were asked to provide
comments on the system, with a deadline for comments on April 26, 2002.2
Within DHS, the Undersecretary for Information Assurance and Infrastructure
Protection—as head of the Information Assurance and Infrastructure Protection
directorate (IAIP)—is responsible for administering the HSAS. Specifically, IAIP
is responsible for providing, in coordination with other agencies of the federal
government, specific warning information and advice about appropriate protective
measures and countermeasures to state and local government agencies and
authorities, the private sector, other entities, and the public.3
Threat Conditions
The advisory system is based on five threat levels: low, guarded, elevated, high,
and severe.
Each level, with its corresponding identification color, indicates
protective measures mandatory for federal departments and agencies.4
1 Office of the White House Press Secretary, “Remarks by Governor Ridge Announcing
Homeland Security Advisory System,” press release, (Washington: March 12, 2002).
Available at [http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/03/20020312-14.html],visited
March 15, 2003.
2 Ibid.
3 P.L. 107-296, Title II, subtitle A, sec. 201(d)(7).
4 U.S. President (Bush), “Homeland Security Advisory System,” Homeland Security
Presidential Directive 3, March 11, 2002. Available at:
[ http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/03/20020312-5.html], visited Jun. 3, 2003.

CRS-2
Table 1. HSAS Threat Levels
Risk of
Threat
Terrorist
Protective Measures
Level
Attack
GREEN
Low
- Refine preplanned protective measures
Low
- Ensure personnel trained on HSAS and preplanned
protective measures
- Institutionalize a process for assuring all facilities are
assessed for vulnerabilities and measures are taken to
mitigate these vulnerabilities
BLUE
General
- Check emergency response communications
Guarded
- Review and update emergency response procedures
- Provide information to public that would strengthen its
ability to react to an attack
YELLOW
Significant
- Increase surveillance of critical locations
Elevated
- Coordinate emergency plans with other federal, state, and
local facilities
- Assess the threat and refine protective measures as
necessary
- Implement emergency response plans
ORANGE
High
- Coordinate security efforts with federal, state, and local
High
law enforcement agencies
- Take additional protective measures at public events,
changing venues, or consider cancelling if necessary
- Prepare to execute contingency operations
- Restrict facility access to essential personnel
RED
Severe
- Increase or redirect personnel to address critical
Severe
emergency needs
- Assign emergency response personnel and mobilize
specially trained teams
- Monitor, and redirect transportation systems
- Close public and government facilities
Source: U.S. President (Bush), “Homeland Security Advisory System,” Homeland Security Presidential Directive
3, March 11, 2002. Available at [http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/03/2002312-5.html], visited
Jun. 3, 2002.
DHS receives threat information from the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the
Central Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, the Drug Enforcement
Agency, the Department of Defense (DOD), and other agencies. DHS uses this
information to determine what terrorist threat level to set.5
5 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Threats & Protection: Synthesizing and
Disseminating Information,” [http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/theme_home6.jsp], visited Jun.
3, 2003.

CRS-3
Assigning a threat condition involves a variety of considerations, among which
are the following:
! To what degree is the threat information credible?
! To what degree is the threat information corroborated?
! To what degree is the threat specific and imminent?
! How grave are the potential consequences of the threat?6
The DHS Secretary decides to raise or lower the threat level in consultation with
the Homeland Security Council.7 When the decision to change the threat level is
made, DHS sends an electronic notification to state homeland security centers, and
federal,
state
and
local
agencies
via
the
National
Law
Enforcement
Telecommunications System (NLETS).8 If circumstances and time permit, however,
the DHS Secretary or his representative makes an advance conference call to alert
Governors, state homeland security advisors, and mayors of selected cities that the
terrorism threat level has been changed and that electronic notification is about to be
sent.
Homeland Security Council Membership
Secretary of Homeland Security
Secretary of the Treasury
Secretary of Defense
Attorney General
Secretary of Health and Human Services
Secretary of Transportation
Director of Office Management and Budget
Director of Central Intelligence
Director of Federal Bureau of Investigation
Director of Federal Emergency Management Agency
Chief of Staff to the President
Chief of Staff to the Vice President
Source: Executive Office of the President, “Fact Sheet: Homeland
Security Council,” press release, Oct. 29, 2001.
Following the first conference call and electronic notification via NLETS, DHS
makes a second conference call to as many state and local law enforcement
associations as can be reached. Following the second conference call, DHS initiates
6 U.S. President (Bush), “Homeland Security Advisory System,” Homeland Security
Presidential Directive 3, March 11, 2002.
Available at [http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/03/20020312-5.html], visited
June 3, 2003.
7 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Threats & Protection: Advisory System,”
http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/display?theme=29, visited May 12, 2003.
8 U.S. Congress, Senate Governmental Affairs Committee, State and Local Homeland
Security Challenges,
unprinted hearing of 108th Cong., 1st sess., May 1, 2003.

CRS-4
a secure call using the Business Roundtable’s Critical Emergency Operations
Communications Link (CEO COM LINK) to notify chief executive officers of the
nation’s top businesses and industries.9
They are asked to dial into a secure
conference call, and after each CEO goes through a multi-step authentication process
to ensure security, DHS or other federal officials brief them on developments and
threats.10
Following the conference call via CEO COM LINK, DHS makes a public
announcement through a press conference.
Finally, critical infrastructure
associations and other business groups are notified.11
Issues
Since the creation of the HSAS, a number of issues has arisen, among which
are: the vagueness of warnings disseminated by the system; the system’s lack of
protective measures recommended for state and local governments and the public;
the perceived inadequacy of disseminating threats to state and local governments, the
public, and the private sector; and how best to coordinate HSAS with other existing
warning issues. These issues and pertinent oversight options available to Congress
are discussed below.
Vagueness of Warnings
The HSAS threat level has been raised four times from “Yellow” to
“Orange”since its activation on March 12, 2002. With each change, the Attorney
General or DHS Secretary cited intelligence information but offered no specifics. No
federal facilities, regions, states, localities, or private sector entities were identified
as being at special risk. Moreover, DHS has never explained the sources and quality
of intelligence upon which the threat levels were based.12
Analysis and Options. Some observers have asserted that when federal
government officials announce a new warning about terrorist attacks, the threats are
9 CEO COM LINK is a secure telecommunications network that is activated during national
crises and threats. Due to the sensitive nature of CEO COM LINK, a list of businesses and
industries that participate in the system is not publicly available.
10
Business
Roundtable,
“Questions
and
Answers
on
CEO
COM
LINK,”
[http://www.brtable.org/document.cfm/760], visited May 12, 2003.
11 U.S. Congress, Senate Governmental Affairs Committee, State and Local Homeland
Security Challenges
, May 1, 2003.
12 Eunice Moscoso, “Government Hikes Terror Alert Status to ‘High’,” Cox News Service,
Sept. 10, 2002, sec. Washington, General News. “Threats and Responses,” The New York
Times,
Sept. 11, 2002, p. A12. U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Office of Press
Secretary, “Statement by Homeland Security Secretary Tom Ridge on Raising Threat
L e v e l , ”
p r e s s
r e l e a s e ,
M a y
2 0 ,
2 0 0 3 ,
a v a i l a b l e
a t :
[http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/display?content=741], visited Jun. 4, 2003. Allyson Price,
U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Congressional Liaison, telephone conversation with
author, Jun. 20, 2003.

CRS-5
too vague.13 The vagueness that characterized the four increases in the threat
condition in the past two years has raised concerns that the public may begin to
question the authenticity of the HSAS threat level. Secretary Ridge told reporters on
June 6, 2003, that DHS is worried about the credibility of the system. He said that
the system needs to be further refined.14
Questions about the credibility of the threat, say other observers, might cause
the public to wonder how to act or whether to take any special action at all. Some
observers maintain that, without specific terrorist threat information, there is no basis
for formulating a clear, easily understood public announcement of what appropriate
protective measures to take.15 Others assert that the continued lack of specific
information arguably can lead to complacency.16
DHS officials cite the lack of specificity in intelligence as the reason for a lack
of detailed information when the threat level is changed. Secretary Ridge has been
quoted saying that the intelligence gathered so far has been generic; but he
maintained that DHS, and the federal intelligence community that provides
information about terrorist threats, will improve. 17
Option 1: Status quo. Congress may view the evolution of the process, and
decisions relating to it are best left to the Department. The lack of specificity may
be due to the need to protect intelligence sources or a desire by DHS to issue
warnings when threat information is generic, but nonetheless credible. Maintaining
the status quo places the burden of responding to complaints about the vagueness of
HSAS warnings and the critiques of DHS’s perceived inability to give adequate
terrorist attack warnings on the Department.
Option 2: Provide general warnings. Due to the reported misunderstanding
of HSAS threat levels, and the system’s lack of recommended protective measures
for state and local agencies, the public, and private sector entities, Congress could
consider directing DHS to issue general warnings concerning the threat of terrorist
attacks without using the HSAS to notify state and local governments, the public, and
the private sector. General warnings via public statements, in coordination with
HSAS warnings to the federal government, would ensure that notices of terrorist
threats are issued to state and local governments, the public, and the private sector.
This approach would address the concerns of some who have asserted that the HSAS
causes misunderstanding at the state and local level, but it would not address the
13 Dan Barry, and Al Baker, “Security Tighter in New York After Vague Terrorist Threat,”
[http://www.nytimes.com/2002], visited May 22, 2002. Philip Shenon, “Suicide Attacks
Certain in U.S., Mueller Warns,” [http://www.nytimes.com/2002], visited May 21, 2002.
14 John Mintz, “Ridge Seeking Fewer Changes in Terror Alerts,” The Washington Post, June
6, 2003, sec. p. A11.
15 Ross Kerber, “The Pallette of Warning Terror-Alert System Called Inadequate,” The
Boston Globe,
May 31, 2003, sec. Business, p. C1.
16 David A. Fahrenthold, “This Time, Orange Alert Seems Less So,” The Washington Post,
May 22, 2003, p. B2.
17 Ibid.

CRS-6
issue raised by those who say DHS does not give enough specificity in its terrorist
attack warnings.
Option 3: Increase specificity of warnings. Were Congress to decide that
the terrorist warnings issued by DHS are too vague and cause complacency in state
and local agencies, the public, and the private sector, it might instruct DHS to use the
HSAS to provide specific warnings to targeted federal facilities, regions, states,
localities, and private sector industries to the extent that is possible. DHS has said
that its goal is to have the capability to issue high alerts to designated cities,
geographical regions, industry, or critical infrastructure.18 This approach arguably
would address the concerns about the perceived vagueness of HSAS warnings.
Lack of Specific Protective Measures for State and Local
Governments, the Public, and the Private Sector

The HSAS provides a set of protective measures for each threat condition, but
these protective measures are identified only for federal agencies. DHS does not
recommend protective measures for states, localities, the public, or the private sector.
Analysis and Options. HSAS silence with regard to protective measures for
the public, the private sector, and state and local governments has drawn the attention
of some interested observers.
Early on, William B. Berger, President of the
International Association of Chiefs of Police, testified before the Senate
Governmental Affairs Committee that the lack of defined response protocols for state
and local governments was an area of concern among local law enforcement
agencies.19
Citing what some contend is a lack of DHS guidance on protective measures,
non-federal entities are beginning to fill the perceived void. For example, the
American Red Cross recommends protective measures for individuals, families,
neighborhoods, schools and businesses at each of the HSAS threat levels.20 Further,
the State of Maryland has adopted the American Red Cross protective measures.21
18 Ibid.
19 U.S. Congress, Senate Governmental Affairs Committee, Communities and Homeland
Security,
unprinted hearing of the 107th Cong., 2nd sess., Dec. 11, 2001.
20 American Red Cross, “American Red Cross Homeland Security Advisory System
Recommendations for Individuals, Families, Neighborhoods, Schools, and Businesses,”
[http://www.redcross.org/services/disaster/beprepared/hsas.html], visited June 3, 2003.
21 Maryland Emergency Management Agency, “Overview of the Maryland Threat Alert
System and Guidance for Citizens, Schools, and Businesses,”
[http://www.memo.domestic-preparedness.net/documents/mtas_public.pdf], visited June 10,
2003.

CRS-7
Without federal guidance, some cities have adopted the following types of
protective measures when the HSAS threat condition is raised to “Orange”:
! Surveillance cameras are activated.
! Law enforcement officers are not granted time off.
! Port security patrols are increased.
! Law enforcement officers are required to carry biological/chemical
protective masks.
! First responders are placed on alert.
! Mass transit authorities broadcast warnings and instructions.
! Mass transit law enforcement officers increase patrols.
! Law enforcement agencies make security checks in sensitive areas,
such as bridges, shopping centers, religious establishments, and
courthouses.22
Option 1: Status quo. The HSAS was designed for federal government use
and Congress may deem the system adequate for the federal government. This
approach can encourage states and localities to conduct threat and vulnerability
assessments that would then assist in the development of specific protective measures
geared to each state and locality’s homeland security needs. On the other hand, this
approach might cause confusion among states and localities in their attempts to
prepare for terrorist attacks without federal guidance on protective measures from the
federal government.
Option 2: Federal guidelines for state and local protective measures. If
Congress decided that there were a need for more guidance for states, localities, the
public, and the private sector, it could either encourage DHS to establish HSAS
protective measure guidance for states, localities, the public, and the private sector,
or it could enact legislation mandating these activities. These protective measures
could match the federal government preparedness and response activities identified
in the HSAS. This approach could provide federal government guidance on how to
be prepared for, and mitigate against a terrorist attack. A list of general protective
measures for states, localities, the public, and the private sector may not, however,
be as effective as state and locally devised protective measures.
22 David A. Fahrenthold, “This Time Orange Alert Seems Less So,” The Washington Post,
May 22, 2003, p. B2-3.

CRS-8
Communication of Terrorist Threats to State and Local
Governments, the Public, and the Private Sector

DHS uses a variety of communications systems to provide terrorist threat
warnings to states, localities, the public, and the private sector. These systems
include, for an example, conference calls, public announcements, CEO COM LINK,
and NLETS, but DHS has no single communication system it uses to issue HSAS
terrorist warnings.
Analysis and Options. On April 30, 2003, Jeffery Horvath, chief of the
Dover, Delaware police department told the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee
that his department has never received any official notification of a change of HSAS
threat condition and has relied on the news media for this information. Michael J.
Chitwood, chief of the Portland, Maine police department reiterated this point, and
specifically identified the Cable News Network (CNN) as the news medium through
which he receives notifications of changes in the HSAS threat level. He added that
he received official notification from state authorities eight hours later. Fire chief
Edward P. Plaugher of Arlington County, Virginia, also identified CNN as the
primary source for notification of changes in the HSAS threat level.23
When testifying before the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee, DHS
Secretary Ridge said that the process for notifying state, and local agencies and
authorities of a change in the HSAS threat condition needs improvement.24
The public is alerted to a change in HSAS threat condition through the news
media, following a public announcement from DHS or media leak of the information.
There is no Emergency Alert System (EAS) type communication activated to alert
the public to a change in threat condition, so the public is not informed of the change
until they monitor a public news source.25
Private sector alerts are through CEO COM LINK and conference calls. DHS
uses CEO COM LINK to notify private sector entities that participate in the system,
and then makes calls to other critical infrastructure and business associations. This
arguably results in a de facto prioritization of alerted private sector entities, which
could result in a targeted private sector entity being attacked without a timely and
effective alert.
Option 1: Status quo. Congress may decide to allow DHS to deal with issues
relating to HSAS advisories at this stage of HSAS development. This approach
would encourage the continued utilization of the DHS terrorist threat communication
23 U.S. Congress, Senate Governmental Affairs Committee, Homeland Security and First
Responders,
108th Cong., 1st sess., April 30, 2003.
24 U.S. Congress, Senate Governmental Affairs Committee, State and Local Homeland
Security Challenges,
May 1, 2003.
25
For information on the EAS see CRS Long Report RS21440, “Emergency
Communications: The Emergency Alert System and All-Hazard Warnings,” by Linda K.
Moore, May 15, 2003.

CRS-9
systems. Since the HSAS is designed for federal government use, there may be no
need for DHS to establish any other communication systems that disseminate
changes in the HSAS terrorist threat levels. This would, however, not address the
issues some have raised about the dissemination of HSAS advisories. Some would
argue that before DHS establishes a specific system that communicates a change in
HSAS terrorist threat levels, DHS needs to establish protective measures for states,
localities, the public, and the private sector. This argument is based on the belief that
there is little value in knowing of a change in the HSAS terrorist threat level in the
absence of recommended protective measures.
Option 2: Revise the HSAS notification process.
Congress could
encourage, or enact legislation instructing, DHS to revise the HSAS notification
process to ensure that state and local law enforcement, and emergency management
agencies are informed of changes of the terrorist threat level in a more effective and
timely manner. This approach could address the problem of states and localities
receiving the notification via the news media without first receiving official
notification from DHS. This approach, however, would not address the issue of the
public, and private sectors receiving timely notification of changes in the HSAS
threat level.
Coordination of HSAS with Other Warning Systems
HSAS is not the only federal warning system: eight separate systems exist to
provide timely notification about imminent and potentially catastrophic threats to
health and safety.26 The types of hazards covered by these systems include severe
weather,27 contamination from chemical and biological weapon stockpiles scheduled
for destruction,28 terrorist attacks,29 and any other emergency or hazard the President
decides is significant enough to warrant public notification.30
Analysis and Options. Some argue for the consolidation of the existing
warning systems into one “all-hazard” system. The Partnership for Public Warning
is one organization advocating this type of consolidation.31 Other organizations, such
as the Federal Communications Commission’s (FCC) Media Security and Reliability
Council (MSRC) have recommended that the Emergency Alert System (EAS) should
26 For a summary of these warning systems see CRS Report RS21377, Federal Emergency
Warning Systems: An Overview
, by Shawn Reese.
27 Advanced Weather Information Processing System (AWIPS), Emergency Managers
Weather
Information
Network
(EMWIN),
National
Oceanic
and
Atmospheric
Administration (NOAA) Weather Radio (NWR), and NOAA Weather Wire Service
(NWWS)
28 Federal Emergency Managers Information System (FEMIS)
29 Homeland Security Advisory System (HSAS)
30 Emergency Alert System (EAS), and National Warning System (NAWAS)
31 [http://www.partnershipforpublicwarning.org], visited June 10, 2003.

CRS-10
be established and implemented uniformly in all parts of the United States.32 This
enhanced EAS would be fed information from systems such as the HSAS.
Consolidation and coordination of these warning systems would present
challenges to administering an “all-hazard” warning system. Some of the challenges
include the
administration of the warning system, interoperability of existing
warning systems, and the involvement of industry.
Congress has directed the President to insure that all appropriate federal
agencies are prepared to issue warnings of potential disasters to state and local
officials, and that federal agencies provide technical assistance to state and local
governments to insure that timely and effective disaster warnings are provided. The
President is authorized to utilize or make available to federal, state, and local
agencies the facilities of the civil defense communications system, or any other
federal communications system, for the purpose of providing warnings to
governmental authorities and the civilian population in areas endangered by
disasters.33 Federal agencies that currently administer warning systems include
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, Federal Communications
Commission, Federal Emergency Management Agency, and Department of Defense.
DHS is also responsible for coordinating and distributing warnings to the public.34
Existing warning systems are not interoperable. Some of the reasons that
warning systems are not interoperable is that the present systems have
! separate transmitting and receiving equipment;35
! separate standard message protocols;
! separate procedures for how warnings are input into dissemination
systems; and
! separate training, exercising, and testing of the system.36
Since this technology is primarily researched, developed, and operated by
private industry, the federal government could establish a relationship with the
corporate suppliers of these technologies, a relationship to encourage development
32 Molly M. Peterson, “Experts Call For Uniformity in Anti-Terrorism Alert,” National
Journal’s Technology Daily,
May 28, 2003.
33 42 U.S.C. 5132.
34 P.L. 107-296, sec. 102, (c), (3).
35 This transmitting and receiving equipment include satellite antenna receivers, NOAA
Weather Radio, AM and FM radio, television, 1610mHz radio receiver, dedicated computer
networks, and dedicated telephone networks.
36 National Science and Technology Council, Committee on Environment and Natural
Resources, Effective Disaster Warnings, (Washington: November 2000), pp. 19-20.
[http://www.nnic.noaa.gov/CENR/NDIS_rev_Oct27.pdf], visited Dec. 23, 2002.

CRS-11
and effectively consolidate or provide the means to make the current warning systems
interoperable.
Consolidating and coordinating federal warning systems, however, may cause
a loss of concentration on the systems’ traditional hazards. Mature warning systems
have established alerting protocols and routines that, if consolidated, could become
to broad, which may result in less effective warnings.
Option 1: Status quo. Without congressional intervention, federal agencies
responsible for issuing warnings will likely continue to narrowly focus on traditional
hazards. This approach allows mature warning systems to continue communicating
alerts and protective measures to an identified audience. Also, this approach would
not incur an increased need for federal funding that would be required to update, test,
and ensure compatibility of the systems. On the other hand, this approach would not
address issues such as overlap of hazards (terrorist threat warnings of HSAS, and any
presidential declared emergency warning issued by EAS), and the potential need to
reach a wide audience through the use of multiple warning systems.
Option 2: Coordination and update of warning systems. If Congress
decided to address the issue of coordinating warning systems, it could require all
federal agencies with hazard warning responsibilities, to establish, and develop a
means for coordinating and updating existing warning systems. This approach could
allow any warning of man-made or natural hazards to be issued on the full range of
federal warning systems. This could ensure that a larger number of the state and
local governments, the public, and private sector entities would receive the specific
warning in an effective and timely manner. It would require a communication
protocol to be developed that allowed one federal warning system to “talk” to a
different system.
Updating of warning systems would not only include the ability of one system
to “talk” to another, but could also include the ability of such systems as EAS to be
transmitted on off-the-shelf telecommunication devices such as cellular phones.
Given the widespread use of wireless communications, some observers have argued
for warnings to be issued on wireless devices.37 In the 108th Congress, S. 564
proposes such an approach that would facilitate the deployment of wireless networks
in order to extend the range and reach of EAS. It would also ensure emergency
personnel priority access to communications facilities in times of emergency.38
Option 3: Consolidation of warning systems. If Congress decided that there
needs to be an all-hazard warning system, it could enact legislation requiring the
federal agencies that have warning responsibilities to develop and implement such
a system to warn states, localities, the public, and the private sector. This approach
could ensure that any warning of a hazard—man-made or natural—would be
disseminated to as many entities as necessary in a timely and effective manner. In
the 108th Congress, two bills, S. 118, and H.R. 2537, propose such an approach to all-
hazard warnings. The bills propose the establishment of a single all-hazard warning
37 See footnote 33 on the Partnership for Public Warning.
38 S. 564, sec. 2, (108th Cong.)

CRS-12
system that would ensure that states, localities, the public, and the private sector
would be alerted to specific risks from man-made, and natural hazards.39 This
approach, however, would arguably require federal funding and effort to research,
test, develop, and implement an all-hazard warning system.
Cost of Threat Level Changes
An increase in the HSAS threat level imposes both direct and indirect costs on
federal, state, and local governments, the private sector, and the public. These costs
include the increased security measures undertaken by states and localities, loss to
tourism, and the indirect cost on the economy during a period of heightened threat
level. Currently, the only cost to states and localities that DHS offers funding for is
certain overtime pay due to an increase in the HSAS threat level. In the ODP Critical
Infrastructure Protection grant program, state and local first responder agencies may
apply and receive funding that assists in paying overtime costs. Also, ODP High
Urban Threat Area grant program allows the use of funds to assist in overtime costs.
Analysis and Options. Local governments incur direct costs when they put
in place additional security measures to deal with a higher threat condition.40 An
example of this is the cost of random car searches at Atlanta’s Hartsfield airport,
which reportedly requires $180,000 a month for labor and signage. This cost is borne
by Atlanta’s police department and airport administration.41 Because of the budget
crisis that many states are experiencing, additional homeland security costs during
heightened threat periods are seen as an additional fiscal burden. The costs associated
with threat level changes have prompted many state and local officials to complain
to DHS.42 The United States Conference of Mayors released a 145-city survey that
reported that during periods of heightened alert homeland security cost increased to
additional $70 million a week.43
This increase in homeland security costs during heightened threat periods also
has localities arguing for direct funding from the federal government. FEMA’s
Assistance to Firefighters program and ODP’s High Urban Threat Area and Critical
Infrastructure Protection grant programs are the only assistance that provide 100%
of the funding to localities.
ODP’s High Urban Threat Area and Critical
39 S. 118, sec. 3, (108th Cong.), H.R.2537, sec. 3, (108th Cong.)
40 John Mintz, “U.S. Lowers Level of Terror Alert from Orange to Yellow; Intelligence
Suggests Less Risk of Attack,” The Washington Post, June 1, 2003, p. A4.
41 Eunice Moscoso, “U.S. Lowers Alert to Yellow But Urges Caution,” The Atlanta Journal-
Constitution,
April 17, 2003, p. A3.
42 John Mintz, and Susan Schmidt, “Government Raises Terror Alert Level to Orange;
Officials Say Intelligence Suggests Al Qaeda Attacks,” The Washington Post, May 21, 2003,
sec. p. A1.
43 Andy Soloman, The United States Conference of Mayors, “War, Threat Alert Increase
City Security Costs by $70 Million per Week Nationwide,” press release, March, 27, 2003.
Available at:
[http://www.usmayors.org/uscm/news/press_releases/documents/surveyrelease_032703.pdf], visited
Aug. 4, 2003.

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Infrastructure Protection grant programs, however, first pass through the state, which
causes some localities to complain about a delay in receiving funding.
Authorized program expenditures are another point of contention that states and
localities have with homeland security funding and costs. All homeland security
grant programs list authorized equipment and activities that grant allocations can be
used to fund. States and localities may argue that these authorized expenditures do
not address their specific homeland security needs.
These direct homeland security costs occur not only at the state and local level:
when the threat level changes, federal departments and agencies have to adopt
prescribed protective measures outlined in the different threat condition levels of the
HSAS.
An indirect cost of a heightened threat level is the negative effect on tourism in
cities perceived as potential targets of terrorism . It has been observed that increased
threat levels and the need for heightened security have hurt the tourism industry of
such metropolitan areas as Washington, DC, New York, and Chicago. Washington’s
Mayor Anthony Williams urged residents to be alert for suspicious activities. He also
wanted the city to remain friendly, open, and safe to minimize the affects of the
terrorist threat level on tourism.44 D.C. Delegate Eleanor Holmes Norton agreed with
the need to keep Washington open to tourism. She said that the city’s tourism
industry had been hurt by changes in threat condition, and that she feared some
officials would overreact and shut down public buildings.45 An example of the
impact on tourism is the decision by some schools to cancel trips to Washington
because of the threat of terrorist attack.46
Some municipal officials have had to make a costly decision between homeland
security and tourism. Philadelphia’s mayor, John F. Street, for instance, chose not
to close down a street around Independence Hall after he received a call from DHS
Secretary Ridge, who advised its closing. Mayor Street cited traffic and tourism
concerns as the reason he chose not to respond to the recommendation.47 Another
indirect cost may be how a change in the HSAS threat condition affects the stock
markets.48
44 Spencer S. Hsu, “Tightening the Security Net,” The Washington Post, March 19, 2003,
p. A1.
45 Vaishli Honawar, “Tours of Capitol Get Go-Ahead to Resume,” The Washington Times,
April 24, 2003, p. B1.
46 “New Hampshire News Notes,” The Union Leader,(Manchester, New Hampshire) March
21, 2003, p. B2.
47 Alex Fryer, “Feds Guide, Can’t Enforce Tight Security at Local Level,” Seattle Times,
May 24, 2003, sec. Domestic News.
48 Steve Gelsi, “Dow Hits New 2003 High as Stocks Rally,” CBS Market Watch, May 30,
2003, sec. Market Snapshot.
“Stock Market Ticker,” Comtex News Network,
[http://www.briefing.com], May 30, 2003. Eric Kirzner, “War Footing Keeps Markets In
Retreat,” National Post’s Financial Post & FP Investing, March 3, 2003, p. FP 7.

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Option 1: Status quo. Congress may decide that the ODP grant programs
adequately meet the needs of states and localities’ homeland security costs due to a
heightened HSAS threat. It may be an appropriate approach for ensuring the splitting
of homeland security costs among the several tiers of government. This policy
approach would not however, address such issues as the needs of some state and
local first responder agencies, of hiring additional personnel, the loss of revenue
generated by tourism due to an increased terrorist threat level, or the cost the
economy incurs when the terrorist threat level is raised.
Option 2: Funding through established ODP grant programs. Should
Congress decide that more funding needs to be provided to cover costs incurred by
states and localities due to an increased terrorist threat level, it could consider
establishing grant programs that specifically fund such terrorist prevention,
preparedness, and mitigation activities as overtime pay for first responders and the
purchase of equipment and personnel for the protection of critical infrastructure. In
the 108th Congress, S. 1245 proposes such an approach by recommending that ODP
State Homeland Security Grant program provide up to 5% of appropriated funds for
covering the expense of first responder overtime. It also proposes the grant funds be
allowed to purchase first responder equipment. 49
Option 3: Funding specifically for heightened threat levels. Should
Congress decide to provide funding for costs incurred during heightened threat level
periods, it could appropriate funds, in addition to ODP homeland security grant
programs, specifically to states, localities, and private sector entities to compensate
for costs associated with a change in the HSAS threat level. In the 108th Congress,
S. 728 proposes such an approach by compensating state and local law enforcement
for costs associated with airport security.50
49 S.1245, sec. 4, (108th Cong.)
50 S. 728, sec. 4, (108th Cong.)