Order Code IB94040
CRS Issue Brief for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
Peacekeeping: Issues of
U.S. Military Involvement
Updated August 6, 2003
Nina M. Serafino
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

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CONTENTS
SUMMARY
MOST RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS
Context for the Debate
The Definitional Problem
Current U.S. Military Participation in Peacekeeping
PDD 25 and Clinton Administration Policy
The Bush Administration Policy
Reductions in Bosnia and Kosovo
Issues Regarding Peacekeeping in Afghanistan
Issues Regarding Peacekeeping in Iraq
Other Issues of U.S. Military Involvement
Executive Consultation and Congressional Approval
FY2003 Legislative Restrictions on U.S. Miliary Participation in U.N. Peacekeeping
Operations
Administration Secures Guarantee Against ICC Prosecution
Funding Issues: Costs and Reimbursements
Costs
Transparency of Budgeting for Peacekeeping and Other Contingency Operations
Contingency Operation Funding for Iraq
Suitability and Desirability as a U.S. Military Mission
Decision to Close the U.S. Army Peacekeeping Institute Reversed
The Readiness Controversy and Related Concerns
Training Effects
Deployment Strains
Debate Over Force Size and Structure
Use of the Reserves in Peacekeeping

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Peacekeeping: Issues of U.S. Military Involvement
SUMMARY
For about a decade, Congress has
at the present time Congress is informed
expressed reservations about many complex
through regular monthly consultations be-
and intertwined peacekeeping issues. The
tween the armed services and foreign affairs
Bush Administration’s desire to reduce the
committees (usually at the staff level) and
commitment of U.S. troops to international
executive branch officers. Other important
peacekeeping parallels the major concerns of
concerns have been the high cost of and the
recent Congresses: that peacekeeping duties
appropriate method for funding DOD peace-
are detrimental to military “readiness,” i.e.,
keeping activities.
the ability of U.S. troops to defend the na-
tions. Critics, however, are concerned that
In the 107th Congress, two issues were
withdrawals of U.S. troops from peacekeeping
highly visible.
One was the military
commitments will undermine U.S. leadership.
“readiness” issue. Some policymakers have
worried that peacekeeping costs drain funds
Thousands of U.S. military personnel
that DOD uses to prepare its forces to defend
currently serve in or support peacekeeping
against a threat to U.S. vital interests, that
operations, performing tasks ranging from
peacekeeping deployments stress a force
providing humanitarian relief to monitoring
whose size is inadequate to handle such opera-
and enforcing cease-fires or other agreements
tions, and that deployed troops lose their
designed to separate parties in conflict. Of
facility for performing combat tasks. With the
these, 15 were serving
in five operations
entry into force in July 2002 of the Treaty on
under U.N. control (as of May 20, 2003).
the International Criminal Court, another
About 4,300 are serving full-time in the Bal-
concern was whether and how to protect U.S.
kans with some 1,800 of those in the NATO
servicemen against possible unwarranted
Stabilization Force (SFOR) in Bosnia and
prosecutions. To that end, Congress adopted
some 2,500 with the NATO Kosovo Force
the American Servicemen’s Protection Act as
(KFOR).
About 37,000 more serve in or
part of the FY2002 supplemental appropria-
support peacekeeping operations in South
tions act (P.L. 107-206).
Korea. These “peacekeeping” operations are
undertaken to promote, maintain, enforce, or
In the 108th Congress, with some
enhance the possibilities for peace, and can
policymakers and analysts arguing that the
sometimes be dangerous.
uncertainties of the post-September 11 world
demand a greater U.S. commitment to curbing
For Congress, two initial issues were (1)
ethnic instability, one issue Congress contin-
whether U.S. troops should be placed under
ues to face is what, if any, adjustments should
U.N. control and (2) when the President
be made in order for the U.S. military to
should consult with Congress and seek its ap-
perform peacekeeping missions — in Afghan-
proval to deploy U.S. troops on peacekeeping
istan, Iraq, or elsewhere — with less strain on
missions. As the number of troops under U.N.
the force, or whether the United States should
control declined steeply, the first concern
participate in such missions at all.
became less pressing. Regarding the second,

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MOST RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
As U.S. soldiers remain in Iraq to deal with continuing instability after President Bush
announced on May 1, 2003, the end of major combat operations, Congress debates the
appropriate U.S. military presence and role in post-combat Iraq, including the size, duration,
cost, and mission of the force. The latest hearings were held by the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee on July 23 and July 29, 2003.
BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS
Many questions have been raised in debate over U.S. involvement in international
peacekeeping.
These have ranged from the basic question of definition — what is
peacekeeping? — to the broad strategic question — how and when does it serve U.S.
interests? Some issues directly concern U.S. military involvement and are discussed here,
or in other CRS reports. Currently, Congressional attention focuses on three issues: (1) the
possible need for a long-term peacekeeping, or “stability” presence in Iraq and Afghanistan,
where the United States continues to be involved in low-intensity warfare; (2) the effect of
peacekeeping operations on the U.S. military’s warfighting capacity (“readiness”); and (3)
the suitability and desirability of deploying U.S. troops on peacekeeping missions. While
the costs of peacekeeping are not as salient an issue as they were several years ago, when the
United States participated in or provided substantial military assistance to several U.N.
peacekeeping operations, they are a continuing concern. (See CRS Issue Brief IB90103,
United Nations Peacekeeping: Issues for Congress, for information on the costs of U.N.
operations and its capability to handle them.)
For several Congresses, two other important issues were: (1) when should the President
consult Congress and seek its approval to send U.S. troops on peacekeeping missions; and
(2) whether Congress should restrict the placement of U.S. troops under U.N. control. The
first issue is covered briefly below, and more completely in other CRS Reports. Regarding
the second, issues related to the International Criminal Court are discussed below in the
section on Legislative Restrictions on U.S. Military Participation in U.N. Peacekeeping
Operations, and issues related to command and control are covered by CRS Report RL31120,
Peacekeeping: Military Command and Control Issues.
The debate over peacekeeping has been complicated by the difficult context in which
the demand for U.S. troops and funds for such operations takes place. For the past decade,
this context has included, at home, the downsizing of U.S. forces, and the press of U.S.
domestic programs for funds spent on the military and on foreign aid, as well as the need for
funding other military programs. Internationally, complicating factors have included the
sometimes fractious relationship between the United States as a world leader and its allies,
and the nature of current ethnic and regional conflicts. During the past year, circumstances
in Iraq and Afghanistan have raised new conceptual issues and recast many practical issues
regarding the conduct of peacekeeping operations for U.S. policy.
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Context for the Debate
The Definitional Problem
“Peacekeeping” is a broad, generic, and often imprecise term to describe the many
activities that the United Nations and other international organizations undertake to promote,
maintain, enforce, or enhance the possibilities for peace. These activities range from
providing observers to monitor elections, recreating police or civil defense forces for the new
governments of those countries, organizing humanitarian relief efforts, and monitoring and
enforcing cease-fires and other arrangements designed to separate parties recently in conflict.
The use of the term “peacekeeping” gained currency in the late 1950s, when United
Nations peacekeeping efforts mostly fit a narrower definition: providing an “interpositional”
force to separate parties that had been in conflict and to supervise the keeping of a peace
accord they had signed. In 1992, the United Nations began to use a broader terminology to
describe the different types of peacekeeping activities. In particular, it created the term
“peace enforcement” to describe operations where peacekeepers are allowed to use force
because of a greater possibility of conflict or a threat to their safety. Subsequently, the
Administration and executive branch agencies substituted the term “peace operations” for
“peacekeeping.” (DOD categorizes peace operations among its “operations other than war”
[OOTW].) Congress has tended to use the term “peacekeeping,” as does this Issue Brief.
The definitional problem stems from a semantic dilemma: no single term currently in use
can accurately capture the broad and ambiguous nature of all these types of operations. Use
of any term with the word “peace” conveys the misleading impression that they are without
risk, when, in fact, “peace” operations can place soldiers in hostile situations resembling war.
Current U.S. Military Participation in Peacekeeping
Thousands of U.S. military personnel participate full-time in a variety of activities that
fall under the rubric of peacekeeping operations, most endorsed by the United Nations.
Unlike certain years in the 1990s, very few U.S. military personnel currently serve under
U.N. command. As of June 30, 2003, 15 U.S. military personnel were serving in five U.N.
peacekeeping or related operations. These operations are located in the Middle East (3 U.S.
military observers [or “milobs”] and one troop in two operations), Georgia (2 milobs),
Kosovo (2 milobs), and Ethiopia/Eritrea (7 milobs). Other U.S. forces are deployed in
unilateral U.S. operations and coalition operations, most undertaken with U.N. authority. As
of May 20, 2003 (which are the latest figures available to CRS), some 1,800 U.S. troops were
participating in the NATO Bosnia Stabilization Force (SFOR), and 2,500 in the NATO
Kosovo Force (KFOR). Others in Macedonia provide support to KFOR. (Numbers have
fluctuated by the hundreds with troop rotations.) Some 900 serve in the Sinai-based coalition
Multilateral Force (MFO), which has no U.N. affiliation.
The United States has other troops abroad in operations that are related to, but not
counted as, peacekeeping. Over 38,000 U.S. troops serve in South Korea under bilateral
U.S.-Republic of Korea agreements and U.N. authority. (Although technically
“peacekeeping,” this deployment has long been treated as a standard U.S. forward presence
mission.) No U.S. troops serve in the coalition peacekeeping operation in Afghanistan.
although U.S. troops are present there in other roles (see section on Afghanistan, below).
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Operations in Southwest Asia, undertaken to monitor and contain Iraq undertaken after the
Persian Gulf War in 1991 (i.e., Northern Watch, Southern Watch, and Desert Spring), were
terminated with the coalition occupation of Iraq.
PDD 25 and Clinton Administration Policy
On May 3, 1994, President Clinton signed a classified presidential decision directive
(PDD 25) that defined the scope and conditions of future U.S. participation in, and
contributions to, multilateral (mostly United Nations) peacekeeping efforts. (References in
this Issue Brief are to a 15-page unclassified summary, “The Clinton Administration’s Policy
on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations,” Department of State Publication 10161, May
1994.) This policy statement remains in effect for the Bush Administration unless revoked
or superseded by a subsequent directive.
Under PDD 25 guidelines, a primary consideration for U.S. support of multilateral
peacekeeping operations was to be whether “there is a threat to or breach of international
peace and security.” Basic considerations for political and financial support were whether
U.N. or other peacekeeping operations advanced U.S. interests and whether other countries
would commit adequate resources. In deciding whether to send U.S. troops, other factors to
consider were: whether the U.S. presence is essential to an operation’s success, the risks to
U.S. troops are acceptable, resources are available, and domestic and congressional support
“exists or can be marshaled.” Where U.S. troops might encounter combat, other factors
included whether there are: “a determination to commit sufficient forces to achieve clearly
defined objectives;” “a plan to achieve those objectives decisively;” and “a commitment to
reassess and adjust” as necessary the size, composition, and use of forces.
The Bush Administration Policy
During his presidential campaign, President Bush expressed a dislike for open-ended
“nation-building” missions involving U.S. ground forces. (For a discussion of candidate and
president Bush’s statements on peacekeeping, see CRS Report RL31109, NATO: Issues for
Congress, by Paul E. Gallis.) During the first 16 months of his Administration, Bush sought
and achieved a reduction of over 50% of U.S. forces in the Balkans, and thus far has resisted
calls to provide troops for peacekeeping in Afghanistan. (U.S. troops remain there in a
combat role, however, to hunt down Al Qaeda operatives.) Secretary of Defense Donald
Rumsfeld has also argued for a reduction of the MFO in the Sinai (which has not occurred).
To fill the gap left by U.S. forces, the Bush Administration has tended to encourage other
nations to take the lead role in international peacekeeping efforts. Critics, however, have
argued against such reductions, and the withdrawal of U.S. troops from a peacekeeping role,
on the grounds that such actions undermine U.S. leadership and expose post-conflict areas
to a resurgence of violence and continued instability. Countering the Administration’s
contention that peacekeeping tasks have overburdened U.S. forces, critics state that
relatively few U.S. troops are involved in peacekeeping operations compared to the large
forward presence of the U.S. elsewhere, including some 37,000 troops in Korea (technically
involved in peacekeeping) and some 40,000 in Japan.
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In the wake of the coalition invasion of Iraq, the debate over the appropriate role for the
United States in peacekeeping or “stability” operations (the term currently used by the
military for peacekeeping and related operations) has again moved to the forefront. Critics
of the Bush Administration have charged that its disdain for peacekeeping has led to errors
of judgment concerning the number and type of forces necessary in the current environment
in Iraq, putting the United States and its allies at risk of “losing the peace” there.
Reductions in Bosnia and Kosovo. Bush Administration actions in the Balkans
have been consistent with President-elect Bush’s remarks in early 2001 that he was “in
consultation with our allies” concerning his desire to reduce the U.S. peacekeeping presence
in the Balkans. Denying that he intended to precipitously withdraw U.S. troops, the
President-elect nonetheless stated that “we’d like for them [the allies] to be the
peacekeepers....And it’s going to take a while.” (New York Times, January 14, 2001) After
that, the de facto Bush Administration policy was to quietly seek to minimize forces in the
two NATO Balkans peacekeeping operations through negotiations with U.S. allies, following
established NATO procedures. The U.S. presence in Bosnia has dropped steadily during the
Bush Administration from some 4,200 participating in the NATO Bosnia Stabilization Force
(SFOR) at the beginning of 2001 to about 1,800 as of mid-May 2003. Similarly, the U.S.
presence in Kosovo has dropped from some 5,600 involved in the NATO Kosovo Force
(KFOR) to about 2,500 for the same time period. In both cases, there has been an overall
reduction of forces serving in the NATO peacekeeping missions. (For more on Bush
Administration statements and policy regarding U.S. troops in Bosnia, see CRS Report
RL30906, Bosnia-Hercegovina and U.S. Policy. For U.S. military commitments abroad, see
[http://web1.whs.osd.mil/mmid/military/miltop.htm].)
Issues Regarding Peacekeeping in Afghanistan. The United States has some
10,000 soldiers deployed in Afghanistan in continuing combat (hunting Al Qaeda) and
training roles as of late June 2003, according to DOD.
For some time, the Bush
Administration maintained that no U.S. troops would participate in peacekeeping operations
in the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). With about 4,600 troops contributed
by 29 countries as of mid-2003, ISAF patrols Kabul and its immediate surrounding areas
under a United Nations Chapter VII authorization. (ISAF is not, however, a U.N.-
commanded or U.N.-funded operation. It was initially commanded by the United Kingdom
from its inception in January 2002 until June 2002, then by Turkey, and as of February 2003
by Germany and the Netherlands. ) U.S. troops provide some assistance to the ISAF, i.e.,
logistical, intelligence, and quick reaction force support, but they do not engage in
peacekeeping. They do, however, provide training and assistance for the formation of an
Afghani national military, an activity which some analysts label “nation-building” and which
is expected to continue through at least June 2004.
In late summer 2002, as terrorist threats against the new Afghan government increased
and many policymakers argued for expansion, the Bush Administration indicated that it had
reconsidered its earlier objection to expanding ISAF. Proponents of an expanded force and
of U.S. military participation in Afghanistan peacekeeping argued that a larger force that
would operate throughout the country was necessary to control a dangerous and deteriorating
security situation in the countryside as warlords compete for power, and to prevent that
situation from impeding the consolidation of a central government and the delivery of
humanitarian aid. The United States must commit its own forces to peacekeeping, some also
argued, in order to provide the necessary leadership to accomplish such a mission. In early
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September, 2002, Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz reportedly endorsed an
expansion of ISAF and the use of its peacekeepers to patrol beyond Kabul, calling on other
nations to provide the necessary leadership and resources. Another Administration official,
however, ruled out contributing U.S. forces to expand the force. (See: U.S. Seeks to Broaden
Peacekeeping. Washington Post, September 6, 2002.)
In early June 2003, NATO announced that it will take the leading role in Afghanistan
by assuming “the strategic coordination, command and control of ISAF” as of August 2003.
In a statement at the end of the June 3-4 Madrid ministerial summit, NATO announced that
the operation will continue to operate under the U.N. mandate. “NATO’s enhanced role will
strengthen ISAF’s effectiveness and sustainability, and, together with the Provincial
Reconstruction Teams being deployed by several Allies and Partners, reinforce the
international community’s commitment to building a peaceful and democratic Afghanistan,”
according to the final communique. There was no indication, however, as to whether an
expansion of the force is contemplated, or whether there will be changes in arrangements
under which the contributing countries provide peacekeeping troops.
William Durch of the Stimson Center, a Washington-based private think tank, has
outlined a rationale and proposals for an expanded peacekeeping force that would operate
throughout Afghanistan.. See Security and Peace Support in Afghanistan: Analysis and
Short-to-Medium-Term Options, [http://www.stimson.org/fopo/pubs.cfm?ID=58], revised
July 8, 2002; and Durch’s op-ed, “A Realistic Plan to Save Afghanistan,” The Washington
Post, July 30, 2002.
After a preliminary survey of 16 20th century U.S. military operations, the U.S. Army
Center of Military History estimated that some 300,000 troops would be needed for a
peacekeeping force in Afghanistan if the peacekeepers were to carry out the full range of
tasks of an occupation force throughout the country. These tasks would include providing
emergency humanitarian relief, rebuilding Afghanistan, and administering it on an interim
basis.
The survey was presented in a July 2002 briefing to the Army’s director of
transformation. (“Study: New Demands Could Tax Military.” The Washington Post,
September 23, 2002.)
Issues Regarding Peacekeeping in Iraq. Nearly four months after the fall of
Baghdad on April 9, 2003, the Administration has yet to offer a definitive assessment of the
number of troops needed in post-war Iraq, the length of their stay, and the costs of their
deployment. In statements before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (SFRC) on
February 11, 2003, Administration officials cited five goals for a U.S. military occupation
of Iraq. Of these, the first was to demonstrate to Iraqis that the United States “aspires to
liberate them, not occupy or control their economic resources;” another was to “begin the
process of economic and political reconstruction.” The last three involved security: (1) to
eliminate the weapons of mass destruction; (2) destroy Iraq’s terrorist infrastructure; and
(3) to safeguard territorial integrity (which may include securing oilfields). Administration
officials outlined a plan for administering the Iraqi government (which subsequently has been
subject to change), but provided virtually no information on plans for how U.S., and perhaps
other forces, would provide security.
In the face of what many analysts perceive as a continuing climate of general
lawlessness and insecurity, critics argue that the United States should deploy a greater
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number of troops, particularly military police, to provide greater stability. (According to
several news reports, some 150,000 U.S. troops are deployed in Iraq as of mid-summer
2003.) Looking to the future, many also argue that an extensive force will be needed for
several years to perform a wide spectrum of tasks, from “peace enforcement” duties such as
providing basic security as Iraqi police and military forces are reconstructed, through the
reestablishment of a judiciary and a prison system, and through reconstructing basic
infrastructure such as water supplies, communications networks, and sanitation services.
The United States may well have to take on much more of the responsibility itself than
earlier anticipated, as efforts to transform and expand the warfighting coalition into a sizable
force to take on peacekeeping tasks reportedly have not resulted in firm commitments to
contribute a great number of troops. The Bush Administration has sought troop contributions
from other countries, but thus far major contributors to other peacekeeping operations, such
as Germany, and many other nations will not deploy without a new U.N. Security Council
mandate endorsing such a force. A Washington Post article of June 27, 2003, reports that
some 9,200 troops from about 14 and possibly more nations will deploy under Polish
leadership on September 1, 2003, after training, but some critics argue that this number is but
a fraction of that needed. (Other reports indicate that as many as 29 or 30 nations have
pledged troops for peacekeeping or related activities in Iraq.) The United States reportedly
has agreed to bear the deployment costs of at least some Polish and Ukrainian troops, while
NATO has agreed to provide Poland with support to head up the peacekeeping contingent
in one of the three peacekeeping sectors. The United States and Great Britain are each
responsible for operations in one of the other sectors.) The Bush Administration reportedly
would like NATO to take on a further responsibilities in Iraq.
In the months before U.S. military action commenced, several organizations have
published reports outlining plans for a post-war Iraq, which, among other things, discuss
appropriate tasks for U.S. military forces. (Such plans have been put forth by the Center for
International and Strategic Studies, the Council of Foreign Relations, the Heritage
Foundation, and the U.S. Army Strategic Studies Institute.) The U.S. Army Center of
Military History survey, mentioned above, estimated the number of troops needed to
constitute a post-Saddam Hussein occupation force at 100,000, although officers at the
Center pointed out that this was a preliminary estimate. (For further information on
suggested plans, see CRS Report RL31871, Post-War Iraq: Potential Issues Raised by
Previous Occupation and Peacekeeping Experiences. For information on current U.S.
military operations in Iraq, see CRS Report RL31701, Iraq: U.S. Military Operations.)
Other Issues of U.S. Military Involvement
Executive Consultation and Congressional Approval
A primary concern of Congress is that it be consulted about the commitment of U.S.
forces in peacekeeping operations; many Members also want Congress’ approval sought if
and when U.S. forces are to be placed at risk. Debate over the type of consultation and
approval that the executive branch must seek is a continuation of the ongoing dispute
regarding powers under the Constitution to deploy U.S. troops abroad into hostilities. The
War Powers Resolution (P.L. 93-148), a 1973 legislative attempt to clarify that dispute,
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requires the President to consult with and report to Congress any introduction of U.S. forces
into hostilities or imminent hostilities. The War Powers Resolution also requires that troops
usually be withdrawn after 60 days if Congress does not approve a continued stay. It does
not provide a mechanism for Congress to disapprove the initial deployment of troops.
Congress’ primary power to exercise control over peacekeeping deployments and
expenditures is the power of the purse, but many consider this insufficient. Not all Members
wish to change this situation, preferring not to take a position on uses of force abroad.
The first session of the 104th Congress rejected attempts to repeal the War Powers Act
and substitute another mechanism. Subsequent Congresses have debated placing conditions
on peacekeeping deployments.
Most such efforts have been defeated.
The Bush
Administration continues the practice, adopted during the Clinton years, of informing
Congress of ongoing and planned operations through monthly meetings with staff of the
armed services and foreign affairs committees.
FY2003 Legislative Restrictions on U.S. Miliary Participation in U.N.
Peacekeeping Operations
The treaty creating the International Criminal Court, which has the power to prosecute
alleged war criminals, entered into force July 1, 2002. This court’s creation prompted U.S.
policymakers to debate the necessity of protecting U.S. citizens from prosecution by the
court, and, if so, how. One concern has been the possible risk that U.S. soldiers serving in
international peacekeeping operations would be accused of and prosecuted for war crimes.
Although the treaty creating the court was signed by a U.S. official on behalf of former
President Clinton, President Clinton said that he would not forward it to the Senate for
ratification, and recommended that his successor also not forward it, until specific U.S.
concerns were met. In early May 2002, the Bush Administration renounced its support for
the court. (For more information on the issues involved in the establishment and operation
of the ICC, see, among others, CRS Report RL31495, U.S. Policy Regarding the
International Criminal Court, and CRS Report RL31437, International Criminal Court:
Overview and Selected Legal Issues.)
Congress adopted a provision regarding the ICC in the FY2002 Emergency
Supplemental Appropriations Act (H.R. 4775); the conference report (H.Rept. 107-593) was
passed by the House on July 23 and the Senate on July 24, 2002. As signed into law (P.L.
107-206, August 2, 2002), the “American Servicemembers’ Protection Act” provisions in
the FY2002 supplemental (H.R. 4775) require the President to take precautions that protect
U.S. service members from ICC actions. Under this law, U.S. military forces may not
participate in a U.N. peace operation after the date that the Rome Statute enters into effect
unless the President has certified that they “are able to participate...without risk of criminal
prosecution or other assertion of jurisdiction by the International Criminal Court,” or that
U.S. national interests justify such participation. One of three conditions must exist for the
President to certify the absence of such risk: either (1) the U.N. Security Council has
provided an exemption from such prosecution or assertion of jurisdiction, or (2) each country
in which the operation is conducted is not a party to the ICC and has not invoked its
jurisdiction, or (3) each country has agreed to refrain from proceeding against members of
the U.S. armed forces.
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The law also requires the President to ensure that each resolution of the Security
Council authorizing any Chapter VI or Chapter VII U.N. peace operation would permanently
exempt, “at a minimum, members of the Armed Forces of the United States participating in
such operation from criminal prosecution or other assertion of jurisdiction by the
International Criminal Court for actions undertaken by such personnel in connection with the
operation.” It provides the President waiver authority for successive periods of one year if
he reports to Congress that the ICC is a party to a binding agreement not to exercise
jurisdiction over covered U.S. and allied persons, and related assurances.
Administration Secures Guarantee Against ICC Prosecution. The Bush
Administration’s attempts to secure a U.N. Security Council guarantee against any
investigation or prosecution of U.S. citizens involved in peacekeeping by the International
Criminal Court embroiled it in a dispute with the United States’ closest allies, including
Great Britain, and ended in a compromise in mid-July 2002. The European Union nations,
Mexico, and Canada resisted providing exceptions for U.S. peacekeepers. On July 12, 2002,
after the United States withheld its approval for the extension of U.N. peacekeeping missions
in Bosnia and Croatia, the Security Council adopted the compromise, Security Council
Resolution 1422 (2002). That resolution requests that the ICC “not commence or proceed
with investigation or prosecution” of any case against “current or former officials or
personnel from a contributing State not a Party to the Rome Statute [i.e., the treaty which
creates the ICC] over acts or omissions relating to a United Nations Established or authorized
operation.” It also stated the Security Council’s intention to renew this request annually. The
compromise reportedly was based on Article 16 of the ICC treaty, which provides that “no
investigation or prosecution may be commenced or proceeded with” for one year if the
Security Council should so request under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter. On June 12,
2003, the Security Council extended the request for another year, through July 1, 2004.
(S.C.Res. 1487 (2003)). The vote was 12-0; France, Germany, and Syria abstained.
Funding Issues: Costs and Reimbursements
Costs. Until the 1990s, DOD did not keep a central accounting of figures on
peacekeeping because these “incremental” costs (i.e., the amount spent on peacekeeping
over that which would have been normally spent on regular salaries, and on routine training,
equipment repairs and replacements) were minimal. But, as U.S. spending on U.S. and U.N.
peacekeeping activities soared in the early to mid-1990s, Congress became increasingly
concerned about the costs of those operations.
Because the “incremental” costs of
peacekeeping and other military contingency operations generally have been funded through
supplemental appropriations, for many years DOD had to postpone and cancel training and
maintenance and to rescind funds from weapons modernizations and other accounts.
Supplemental appropriations designated as “emergency” funding do not disrupt DOD
activities and plans, but they can be controversial as they can raise overall spending above
the budget caps set by Congress. During the second session of the 104th Congress, Members
sought to resolve the problem by budgeting annual funding for ongoing missions in a DOD
“Overseas Contingency Operations Transfer Fund,” (OCOTF).
This mechanism was
included in legislation of the 105th and 106th Congresses, but the President still sought
supplemental funding for Bosnia, and then Kosovo, in subsequent years.
The costs of such operation became much less controversial in the 107th Congress as the
Bush Administration sought reductions in Balkans peacekeeping, and the operations in
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Southwest Asia became more accepted as ongoing operations. This led to a change in the
budgeting mechanisms for such operations, as discussed in the section on transparency,
below. (For more information on the concept of incremental costs, and on attempts to create
more efficient methods of funding contingency operations see CRS Report 98-823, Military
Contingency Funding for Bosnia, Southwest Asia, and Other Operations: Questions and
Answers. Incremental costs in constant FY2002 dollars though FY2000 are available in CRS
Report RS21013, Costs of Major U.S. Wars and Recent U.S. Overseas Military Operations.)
Transparency of Budgeting for Peacekeeping and Other Contingency
Operations. As a result of decisions by the Bush Administration and the Congress
concerning the FY2002 budget, as of that fiscal year the costs of the Balkans and Southwest
Asia contingency operations were budgeted within the services’ accounts as ongoing
peacetime operations. (Korea had long been budgeted this way.) A July 2001 GAO defense
budget report (GAO-01-829) warned that such a budgeting practice could have both positive
and negative effects: while this funding method “could provide an incentive to better control
costs,” it could also mean that Congress will no longer be able to track the expenditure of
those funds and know of their possible diversion to other uses. The GAO suggested that
Congress could require (1) written notification if funds intended for SWA were obligated for
other purposes and (2) that DOD continue to report monthly on the costs of SWA operations.
In keeping with the provisions of 2001 which mandated that Balkans and SWA operations
be considered ongoing, not contingency, operations, the FY2003 and FY2004 budget
requests did not
break out information on these costs, although budget justification
documents, made available at a later date, did so. The OCOTF request for FY2003, which
did not include these operations, was $50 million. The conference version of the FY2003
DOD appropriations bill (H.R. 5010, P.L. 107-248, signed into law October 23, 2002)
contained $5 million in new FY2003 budget authority for the OCOTF. The FY2004 budget
documents show that an additional $32 million in funds appropriated prior to FY2003 as
available for obligation in FY2003.
The FY2004 Administration budget request for the OCOTF was $50 million. Given
that no current operations are funded through the OCOTF, the Senate and House FY2004
defense authorization bills (S. 1050 and H.R. 1588) would eliminate proposed OCOTF
funding completely, the Senate FY2004 defense appropriations bill (S. 1382) would cut it
to $10 million, and the House version of that bill (H.R. 2658) would cut it to $5 million. The
Administration request also proposed deleting the provision requiring a breakdown of
OCOTF spending, but appropriators in both chambers retained the provision. Senate
appropriators noted (S.Rept. 108-87, from the Committee on Appropriations to accompany
S. 1382) that the U.S. Special Operations Command “bears a substantial portion of the
unanticipated costs of unforeseen contingency operations,” according to DOD budget
justification provisions, but opined that given significant increases requested for USSOCM,
the funding it provided would be adequate to cover unexpected needs.
Contingency Operation Funding for Iraq. The appropriate method for requesting
and budgeting funding for operations in Iraq is currently under debate. As noted above,
peacekeeping and other contingency operations have been funded in several ways. Although
contingency operations have often been funded through supplemental appropriations, the
OCOTF was developed in the mid-1990s to enable DOD to handle unexpected contingency
operations or ongoing operations that were not entirely predictable without dipping into
training and maintenance funds if supplemental appropriations were delayed or if expenses
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occurred in the fourth quarter of the fiscal year, as happened in the early 1990s. In the cases
of Korea, many years ago, and recently Bosnia, Southwest Asia, and Kosovo, when expenses
became predictable they were budgeted as ongoing missions in the services accounts.
In their actions on defense funding for FY2004, four committees have opined on the
appropriate funding method for future incremental costs in Iraq. The Senate Appropriations
Committee advises that “requirements for substantial contingency funding should be
addressed in a request for supplemental appropriations or through reprogramming
procedures.” (S.Rept. 108-87) The House Appropriations Committee, noting that additional
personnel related costs are being incurred as a result, in part, of the mobilization of guard and
reserve forces for the contingency operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, encouraged DOD to
submit a supplemental appropriations request or reprogramming action to address military
personnel shortfalls. (H.Rept. 108-187) The House Armed Services Committee stated that
it expected that “unforeseen costs [for contingency operations] will be requested in either the
annual omnibus reprogramming request or supplemental requests in fiscal year 2004.”
(H.Rept. 108-106, part 1) Its Senate counterpart noted that DOD had stated its intention to
fund operations in Iraq through supplemental appropriations. (S.Rept. 108-46)
Suitability and Desirability as a U.S. Military Mission
Some analysts question whether military forces in general and U.S. military forces in
particular are, by character, doctrine, and training, suited to carry out peacekeeping
operations. One reason given is that military forces cultivate the instincts and skills to be
fighters, while the instincts and skills needed for peacekeeping are those inculcated by law
enforcement training. (In some peacekeeping operations, however, the military’s training to
work in highly-disciplined units and employ higher levels of force are seen as necessary.)
Another reason is that peacekeeping requires a different approach than combat operations.
Many senior U.S. military planners hold that successful military action requires
“overwhelming” force. U.S. troops are taught to apply “decisive” force to defeat an enemy.
Most peacekeeping tasks, however, require restraint, not an “overwhelming” use of force.
As the military has gained more experience with peacekeeping missions and analyzed
their requirements, and as some officers and analysts have begun to look more favorably on
peacekeeping as a mission, many assert that to be a good peacekeeper, one must first be a
good soldier. (“Peacekeeping is not a job for soldiers, but only soldiers can do it,” states the
Army field manual outlining doctrine on Peace Operations, FM 100-23, in a quote attributed
to former U.N. Secretary General Dag Hammarskjold.) In part this argument is based on the
growing recognition that troops in peacekeeping operations need military and combat skills
to respond to unanticipated risks, in part it is based on the judgment that part of the task of
a peacekeeping operation is to provide a deterrent to the use of force and that the most
credible deterrent is a soldier well-trained for combat.
U.S. military participation in
peacekeeping has become regarded more favorably by some military officers who argue that
although combat skills deteriorate (“degrade”) during peace operations, many other skills
necessary for military operations are enhanced. (See section on Training Effects, below.)
Questions also arise as to whether peacekeeping is a desirable mission for U.S. forces.
On the one hand, some point out that as representatives of the sole world “superpower,” U.S.
troops are particularly vulnerable to attempts to sabotage peacekeeping operations by those
who want to convince potential followers of their power by successfully engaging U.S.
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forces. On the other, analysts note that other countries are often reluctant to commit forces
if the United States does not, and that U.S. participation in peacekeeping is an important part
of “shaping” the world environment to decrease the possibilities of future conflict and war.
In recent years, the military services made several changes to adjust for peacekeeping
missions.
In particular, the U.S. military has been increasing special training for
peacekeeping functions. Most of the training is for units who are deployed, or expect to be
deployed, for peace operations: the Army norm is that units should receive four to six weeks
of special training. The unified commands have developed exercise programs involving staff
planning, command and control, simulated deployments, and training with non-governmental
organizations and foreign militaries. Units that are drawn upon for peacekeeping operations
have also incorporated training for peace operations in their normal training routines.
Some analysts argue that U.S. combat forces should not be used for peacekeeping.
Instead, they suggest two options: establish a separate peacekeeping force, distinct from the
current military service branches, or create special units dedicated solely to peacekeeping
within the current services. (In PDD 25, the Administration stated that it did not support the
concept of a standing U.N. army, nor would it earmark military units for participation in
U.N. peacekeeping operations.) The military has resisted the concept of dedicated units for
many years, but those who view the United States as inexorably committed for several more
years to peacekeeping in the Balkans and Iraq, and eventually to similar activities in
Afghanistan, have revived the idea.
Decision to Close the U.S. Army Peacekeeping Institute Reversed
For those who favor the concept of U.S. military involvement in peacekeeping, or who
simply view it as a necessary albeit secondary role of the services, the Army’s decision to
close the U.S. Army Peacekeeping Institute (PKI) as of the end of September 2003 was one
sign of a continuing resistance by many army leaders and the Office of the Secretary of
Defense. The reversal of that decision in July 2003 was thus viewed as an indication that
peacekeeping is likely to be a continuing military mission, despite such resistance.
Founded in 1993 and placed under the Center for Strategic Studies at the U.S. Army
War College at Carlisle Barracks, PA, the institute was assigned several important tasks. To
many analysts, the Institute’s most important responsibility was the charge to assist with the
development of army doctrine (i.e., the standardization of Army practices) on peacekeeping
at the strategic (i.e., the leadership and planning) level. It was specifically charged with
providing support to the Army’s senior leadership, the Army War College, and the
commanders of the military’s combat commands in the development of peace operations
concepts and doctrine. PKI has also provided pre-and post-peacekeeping deployment
training and assistance to military officers, and served as a liaison between the military and
civilian groups working in peacekeeping, such as humanitarian non-governmental
organizations and diplomats. PKI was also charged with studying and disseminating
information on the strategic and operational implications of peace operations, and, in doing
so, PKI has worked with the United Nations, U.S. government interagency groups, inter-
service groups, and foreign militaries.
The Army, which plays the largest role in
peacekeeping operations, is the only one of the four services to have established a special
organization to study them.
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PKI’s supporters stated that its closure would have removed an important source of
information for top Army leadership on strategic “lessons learned,” as well as an institution
exclusively devoted to the development of peacekeeping concepts and doctrine for the army,
capable of conveying “lessons learned” to those deploying to such operations. Between
1997-2002, PKI educated and trained leaders for 29 battalions preparing to deploy to peace
operations, and deployed individuals to U.N. peacekeeping missions in Bosnia, Haiti, and
East Timor for about three months each, as well as sending two members to Rwanda for two
months as part of the U.S. peacekeeping contingent. It conducted after-action reviews of
peace operations in Bosnia, Haiti, Hurricane Mitch, and Kosovo, focusing on the strategic
and operational lessons. As of 2002, PKI was headed by an Army colonel, who had a staff
of nine and a budget of slightly under $200,000, excluding salaries.
The Readiness Controversy and Related Concerns
“Readiness” issues have been a driving force in congressional debate over the extent to
which the U.S. military should engage in peacekeeping. Readiness is a subjective and
ambiguous concept referring to the degree to which the armed forces are “prepared” — i.e.,
currently in training and well-equipped — to defend the nation. As the U.S. military has
been increasingly called upon to perform peacekeeping and other non-combat missions —
at the same time as it has downsized significantly — Members have questioned whether U.S.
military forces can perform their “core” war-fighting mission to protect U.S. vital interests
if they engage extensively in other activities. Readiness, as related to peacekeeping, depends
on several factors: the size of the force, the numbers of troops devoted to specific tasks (force
structure), the size, length, and frequency of deployments (operational tempo), and
opportunities for training in combat skills during a peace operation.
There is some difference of opinion concerning the importance of the readiness issue.
Peacekeeping (and all other operations other than war) is directly related to the readiness
problem, if one is looking strictly at the results of the readiness ratings that are calculated
periodically. That is because all the standards — all the factors and tests — that are used to
measure “readiness” only measure the military’s combat preparedness, that is, its ability to
fight and win wars. These standards measure the availability of a unit’s personnel, the state
of a unit’s equipment, and the performance of a unit’s members on tests of their wartime
skills. When the military deploys large numbers of personnel to peacekeeping operations,
scores on these measures can decline, and they have declined in some cases.
This happens for several reasons. For one, people are transferred from units that are not
deployed to peace operations to take part in peacekeeping. Second, funds for training and
equipment have been diverted in the past to fund peacekeeping operations. Third, military
personnel cannot continue to practice all their combat skills when participating in peace
operations; and fourth, the U.S. military has been deployed for peacekeeping operations at
the same time that the size of the force, particularly the army, has been reduced substantially.
Whether a potential or actual “degradation” of readiness ratings is important depends
on one’s perspective on the utility of readiness measures. The standard of readiness ratings
rests on the concept that the U.S. military must be prepared to fight two nearly simultaneous
major regional conflicts (MRCs). Those who believe that in holding the military to that
standard when there are many other necessary military missions see the measures as flawed.
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They argue that peacekeeping is a significant mission and therefore readiness standards
should also measure, or otherwise account for, performance of peacekeeping tasks.
If one looks at the larger “readiness” problem, that is the perception that U.S. military
personnel are in general overworked and underpaid, that military equipment is in poor shape,
that there are rampant shortages of spare parts, and that the military forces cannot recruit and
retain needed personnel, the relationship of peacekeeping to readiness is less pronounced,
according to some analysts. They argue that peacekeeping is responsible to some extent for
this larger readiness problem, but there are many other contributing factors. The strong
economy is frequently cited as impairing the military’s ability to recruit and retain personnel.
Equipment is deteriorating and spare parts are increasingly in demand not only because of
peacekeeping deployments, but also in many cases because the equipment was old. The area
in which peacekeeping most affects readiness is the stress that frequent deployments have
placed on certain troops — the so-called increase in Operational tempo (optempo) and
personnel tempo (perstempo).
Training Effects. The effects of peace operations on a soldier’s ability to maintain
military and combat skills through training has been a source of concern; military analysts
and personnel have noticed mixed effects on soldiers’ skills, and thus on readiness. For
some types of military activities and skills, participation in peacekeeping operations is
considered to be a good substitute for normal training activities. This is true for many
activities short of high-intensity combat skills, e.g., support functions, such as intelligence,
medical, logistics, transportation and engineering, where units deployed in peacekeeping
perform tasks that are quite similar to their wartime tasks, and in an environment that
approaches a wartime environment.
Many military officers and analysts state that
peacekeeping operations provide far superior opportunities for small unit commanders to
develop leadership skills than do normal training exercises. Nevertheless, for combat
personnel, it is indisputable that some combat skills may deteriorate and the “warrior” spirit
may be taxed by the mundane tasks performed and the restraint required by peacekeeping.
All acknowledge that participation in peacekeeping operations significantly “degrades”
crucial combat skills such as shooting (“live firepower”) skills, coordination of the use of
weapons and equipment (combined arms skills), and large unit maneuver ability, which
cannot be practiced in a peace operation. (The longer the deployment, the greater the
deterioration of skills, according to some analysts.) To reduce such deterioration, efforts are
made for troops to continue some level of combat training during peacekeeping deployments.
For instance, the Army provides opportunities for those deployed to Bosnia and Kosovo to
practice wartime skills while on duty.
Deployment Strains. The increased “optempo” demanded by peacekeeping takes
time from necessary maintenance, repairs, and combat training, and can shorten the useful
life of equipment. The “perstempo” problem is regarded as particularly severe for the Army.
For several years, the Army was deploying the same units over and over to peacekeeping
operations, and the pace of deployment was viewed as too demanding, affecting morale by
keeping personnel away from families for too long, and, some argue, affecting recruitment.
In one of the first publicly-available studies of the stresses caused by peacekeeping, a March
1995 GAO report (GAO/NSIAD-95-51) found that the increasing “op tempo,” deployments
due to peacekeeping, and reduced force structure taxed certain Navy and Marine Corps units,
and “heavily” stressed certain Army support forces, such as quartermaster and transportation
units, and specialized Air Force aircraft critical to the early stages of an MRC, to an extent
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that could endanger DOD’s ability to respond quickly to MRCs. DOD disagreed at the time,
but the pace of operations subsequently became a source of concern throughout the services
and DOD, as well as in Congress. A July 2000 GAO report (GAO/NSIAD-00-164) found
shortages in forces needed for contingency operations, including an inadequate number of
active-duty civil affairs personnel, Navy/Marine Corps land-based EA-6B squadrons, fully
trained, available Air Force AWACs aircraft crews, and fully-trained U-2 pilots.
The Army has also taken steps to deal with some of its problems by the realignment
and better management of its resources, as has the Air Force. In recent years, the army has
addressed perstempo strains by limiting deployments to 6 months, and including national
guard and reserve units among those on the roster to serve in Bosnia, thus attempting to
reduce the optempo of combat duty units. The Air Force, since 1999, has established Air
Expeditionary Units that deploy under a predictable rotation system in an attempt to reduce
the stresses of deployment to enforce no-fly zones over northern and southern Iraq and to
meet other disaster and humanitarian assistance demands as they arise. Nevertheless, in July
2000, the GAO issued a report noting that the Air Force was unable to meet the demand for
aerial surveillance with AWAC aircraft because of a shortage of AWAC crews. In some
cases, however, these solutions may generate other problems. For instance, the Army’s
attempts to relieve the stresses of frequent deployments on its active forces by instead
deploying reservists may, some analysts worry, affect Guard and Reserve personnel
recruitment and retention. Some analysts suggest, however, that continued improvements
in resource management could ease stresses. Others prefer to change force size or structure.
Debate Over Force Size and Structure. Many defense analysts and military
officers have questioned whether the military is appropriately sized and structured to fight
two MRCs and also take on peacekeeping and other so-called “non-combat” missions. For
several years, many Members have expressed concern that the U.S. military is too small and
too stretched to take on peacekeeping operations. Since the mid-1990s, several policymakers
and military experts have suggested that 540,000 would be an appropriate size for the army
to prepare for two MRCs while undertaking peacekeeping missions, i.e., considerably more
than the current 480,000 troop army end strength.
The President’s proposed budget for FY2004 estimates total active forces for FY2004
below actual 2002 levels for the Army (480,000 compared to 486,542 troops), Navy
(373,800 compared to 383,108), and Air Force (359,300 compared to 368,251), while
slightly higher than FY2002 (but at FY2003 estimated levels, for the Marine Corps (175,000
compared to 173,733).
For several years, analysts have advanced proposals to restructure U.S. forces. These
include proposals to increase the total number of personnel most heavily taxed by
peacekeeping, and to establish special dedicated units for peacekeeping. Some military
analysts suggest that the overall force might be restructured to include more of the
specialities needed for peacekeeping, and in units sized for peace operations. For instance,
civil affairs, psychological operations (PSYOPS), and military police units are specialties
that are particularly needed in peace operations, but are in short supply in the active military.
This could entail increasing the number of such specialties in the active force and reserve.
The Bush Administration’s current plans for “transforming” the army into a lighter,
more flexible, and more mobile force would have implications for the military’s ability to
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perform peacekeeping operations. Although the proposed reconfiguration of army forces
into more rapidly deployable units was designed to enhance combat, not peacekeeping
capabilities, such a restructuring might also facilitate deployments to peacekeeping
operations. However, given reports that current transformation plans call for a sharp cut in
the number of active duty army troops, the army’s capacity to undertake and sustain peace
operations may well be substantially reduced.
Use of the Reserves in Peacekeeping. Increasing use of Army reservists and
National Guardsmen in peacekeeping operations over the late 1990s culminated in the Texas
Army National Guard’s 49th Armored Division’s assumption of command of the U.S. Bosnia
SFOR contingent on March 7, 2000. Some 1,200 Texas guardsmen were in charge until
October 2000, when they were replaced by the active duty Third Infantry Division.
Reportedly, it was the first time since World War II that a National Guard General had
commanded active duty Army troops, of which there were some 3,000. Through October
2002, Army National Guard divisions alternated with active duty divisions in commanding
the U.S. SFOR contingent, after which Guardsmen were to lead through 2005.
Two areas of concern have been the cost of their use and the effect on recruitment and
retention. The costs of increasing the use of the Reserves and Guard for peacekeeping can
vary substantially, depending on the size of the active duty force and on the “tempo” of
operations, i.e., the size, length, and frequency of deployments, according to defense experts.
Prior to the call-ups for homeland after Sept. 11, 2001, many defense experts feared that
repeated call-ups for the Guard and Reserves was affecting their recruitment and retention,
thus depleting the pool available for such operations and for deployment to a major regional
conflict. To mitigate that prospect, the Army announced on March 6, 2000, that future
deployments of active and reserve components for operations other than war would be
limited to 179 days. This, however, displeased some reservists who desire longer tours for
promotion and other career reasons. The recent call-ups for duty related to U.S. military
action in Iraq is likely to have implications for the use of reservists as peacekeepers in the
near future.
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DOD Incremental Costs of U.S. International Peace and Security Commitments, FY1991-FY2004
(Budget authority in millions of current year dollars)
FY2004
Operation
FY1991 FY1992 FY1993 FY1994 FY1995 FY1996 FY1997 FY1998 FY1999 FY2000 FY2001 FY2002 FY2003 TOTALS Request
AREAS OF ONGOING OPERATIONS
Southwest Asia/Iraq
Provide Comfort/Northern Watch
325.0
101.5
116.6
91.8
138.2
88.9
93.1
136.0
156.4
143.7
148.6
1,372.4
1,293.5 11,691.0
1,379.2
Southern Watch/Air Expeditionary Force
—
—
715.9
333.0
468.4
576.3
597.3
1,497.2
954.8
755.4
963.5
(These
Desert Strike/Intrinsic Action/Desert Spring
—
—
—
—
—
—
102.7
5.6
13.8
239.8
261.6
operations)
Vigilant Warrior
—
—
—
—
257.7
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
257.7
—
Desert Thunder (Force Buildup 11/98)
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
43.5
—
—
—
—
43.5
—
Desert Fox (Air Strikes, 12/98)
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
92.9
—
—
—
—
92.9
—
UNIKOM (UN/Iraq Observer Group)
21.5
4.9
6.0
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
32.4
—
Total Southwest Asia/Iraq
346.5
106.4
838.5
424.8
864.3
665.2
793.1
1,638.8
1,261.4
1,138.9
1,373.5
1,372.4
1,293.5 12,117.5
1,379.2
Former Yugoslavia (Bosnia)
IFOR/SFOR/Joint Forge
—
—
—
—
—
2,231.7
2,087.5
1,792.8
1,431.2
1,381.8
1,213.4
932.9
930.7 13,775.3
913.0
Other Former Yugoslavia Operations*
—
5.8
138.8
292.0
347.4
288.3
195.0
169.9
155.4
101.3
79.4
Total Bosnia
—
5.8
138.8
292.0
347.4
2,520.0
2,282.5
1,962.7
1,586.6
1,483.1
1,292.6
932.9
930.7 13,775.3
913.0
Former Yugoslavia (Kosovo)
Balkan Calm (Observer Mission, Pre-Air War)
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
34.6
—
—
—
—
34.6
—
Eagle Eye (Air Verification, 10/98-03/99)
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
20.3
—
—
—
—
20.3
—
Noble Anvil (Air War)
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
1,891.4
—
—
—
—
1,891.4
—
Joint Guardian (KFOR)
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
1,044.5
1,803.1
1,383.9
938.2
938.1
5,233.9
936.0
Sustain Hope (Refugee Assistance)
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
141.6
—
—
—
—
141.6
—
Total Kosovo
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
3,132.4
1,803.1
1,383.9
938.2
938.1
8,195.7
936.0
Korea Readiness*
—
—
—
69.7
90.9
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
160.6
—
COMPLETED OPERATIONS (Includes Haiti, Somalia, Rwanda, Angola, Cambodia, Western Sahara, and East Timor)
Subtotal Completed Operations
—
12.8
947.8
906.4
591.2
86.9
—
—
1.5
56.8
—
—
—
2,603.4
—
GRAND TOTALS
346.5
125.0
1,925.1
1,692.9
1,893.8
3,272.1
3,075.6
3,601.5
5,981.9
4,481.8
4,050.0
3,243.5
3,162.3 36,852.0
3,228.2
Source: Defense Finance and Accounting System data. As of this date, data by operation for FY2002 and FY2003 has not been available to CRS. Notes: This chart consists of DOD incremental costs
involved in U.S. support for and participation in peacekeeping and in related humanitarian and security operations, including U.S. unilateral operations, NATO operations, U.N. operations, and ad hoc
coalition operations. U.N. reimbursements are not deducted. Some totals do not add due to rounding. Other Former Yugoslavia operations include Able Sentry (Macedonia), Deny Flight/Decisive Edge,
UNCRO (Zagreb), Sharp Guard (Adriatic). Provide Promise (Humanitarian assistance), Deliberate Forge. Because Korea Readiness has long been considered an on-going peacetime function of U.S.troops,
DOD only counts above-normal levels of activity there as incremental costs. For figures in constant FY2002 dollars, and for a breakdown of completed operations, see CRS Report RS21013, Costs of
Major U.S. Wars and Recent U.S. Overseas Military Operations.
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