Order Code RL31339
CRS Report for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
Iraq: U.S. Regime Change Efforts
and Post-War Governance
Updated August 4, 2003
Kenneth Katzman
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

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Iraq: U.S. Regime Change Efforts
and Post-War Governance
Summary
In his 2002 and 2003 State of the Union messages, President Bush characterized
Iraq as a grave potential threat to the United States because of its refusal to abandon
its weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs as required by U.N. Security
Council resolutions and the potential for it to transfer WMD to terrorist groups. In
September 2002, the President told the U.N. General Assembly that unless Iraq fully
disarmed in cooperation with United Nations weapons inspectors, the United States
would lead a coalition to achieve that disarmament militarily, making clear that this
would include the ouster of Iraq’s President Saddam Hussein’s regime. After a
November 2002 - March 2003 round of U.N. inspections in which Iraq’s cooperation
was mixed, on March 19, 2003, the United States launched “Operation Iraqi
Freedom,” to disarm Iraq and change its regime. The regime fell on April 9, 2003.
In the months prior to the war, the Administration stressed that regime change
through U.S.-led military action would yield benefits beyond disarmament and
reduction of support for terrorism; benefits such as liberation of the Iraqi people
from an oppressive regime and promotion of stability and democracy throughout the
Middle East. The goal of regime change in Iraq had been declared U.S. policy since
November 1998, and U.S. efforts to oust Saddam had been pursued, with varying
degrees of intensity, since the end of the Gulf war in 1991. These efforts primarily
involved U.S. financial backing for opposition groups inside and outside Iraq, several
of which are now contending for power in post-Saddam Iraq. Past efforts to change
the regime floundered because of limited U.S. commitment, disorganization of the
Iraqi opposition, and the efficiency and ruthlessness of Iraq’s several overlapping
intelligence and security forces. Previous U.S. Administrations ruled out major U.S.
military action to change Iraq’s regime, believing such action would be costly, risky,
and not necessarily justified by the level of Iraq’s lack of compliance on WMD
disarmament.
The leadership and precise shape of the permanent government that will replace
Saddam Hussein’s Baath Party are yet to be determined. Some Administration
officials reportedly had hoped that major military and governmental defections from
the Hussein regime would serve as the core of a successor government. However,
no senior Hussein regime figures defected, and formerly exiled opposition groups
form the core of a U.S.-appointed 25-seat “governing council” that was unveiled on
July 13, 2003. It is hoped by the Administration that the formation of the council
will signal that Iraq is moving toward self rule and calm some of the resistance
against U.S. occupation forces in Iraq; resistance has killed 54 U.S. soldiers since
President Bush declared major combat operations ended on May 1, 2003.
This report will be updated as warranted by major developments.

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Contents
Past Attempts to Oust Saddam . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Emergence of An Anti-Saddam Coalition
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
The Iraqi National Congress/Ahmad Chalabi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Ahmad Chalabi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
The Kurds/KDP and PUK . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Ansar al-Islam/Al Qaeda . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Shiite Islamist Organizations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
SCIRI/Badr Corps . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Da’wa Party . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Sadr Movement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Ayatollah Sistani/Hawza al-Ilmiyah . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Islamic Amal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Schisms Among Anti-Saddam Groups . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
The Iraqi National Accord (INA) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Attempting to Rebound from 1996 Setbacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Iraq Liberation Act . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
The First Eligibility Designations Under the ILA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Monarchists/Sharif Ali . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Continued Doubts About the Capabilities of the Anti-Saddam Groups . . . 11
Bush Administration Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Pre-September 11 Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Post-September 11, 2001: Moving to Change the Regime . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Iraq and Al Qaeda . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
WMD Threat Perception . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Broadening the Internal Opposition to Saddam . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Second ILA Designations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Decision to Take Military Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Post-War Governance Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Establishing Iraqi Self-Rule . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
The Governing Council . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Post-War U.S. Operations and the Coalition Provisional
Authority (CPA) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
The Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
Building Security Institutions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
Searching for Regime Violations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
Recruiting Other Peacekeepers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
U.N. Role . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
Reviving the Oil Industry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
Continuation of the Oil-for-Food Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
War Crimes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
Congressional Reactions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
Appendix. U.S. Assistance to the Opposition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32

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Iraq: U.S. Regime Change Efforts
and Post-War Governance
The United States has sought to change Iraq’s regime since the 1991 Persian
Gulf war, although achieving this goal was not declared policy until 1998. In
November 1998, amid a crisis with Iraq over U.N. weapons of mass destruction
(WMD) inspections, the Clinton Administration stated that the United States would
seek to go beyond containment to promoting a change of regime. A regime change
policy was endorsed by the Iraq Liberation Act (P.L. 105-338, October 31, 1998).
Bush Administration officials have emphasized regime change as the cornerstone of
U.S. policy toward Iraq since shortly after the September 11, 2001, attacks.
Operation Iraqi Freedom was launched on March 19, 2003, and had effectively
removed Saddam Hussein from power by April 9, 2003.
Past Attempts to Oust Saddam
Prior to the launching on January 16, 1991 of Operation Desert Storm, an
operation that reversed Iraq’s August 1990 invasion of Kuwait, President George
H.W. Bush called on the Iraqi people to overthrow Saddam. Within days of the end
of the Gulf war (February 28, 1991), opposition Shiite Muslims in southern Iraq and
Kurdish factions in northern Iraq, emboldened by the regime’s defeat and the hope
of U.S. support, launched significant rebellions. The revolt in southern Iraq reached
the suburbs of Baghdad, but the well-trained and loyal Republican Guard forces had
survived the war largely intact, having been withdrawn from battle prior to the U.S.
ground offensive, and it defeated the Shiite rebels by mid-March 1991. Many Shiites
blamed the United States for not supporting their uprising and standing aside as the
regime retaliated against those who participated in the rebellion. Kurds, benefitting
from a U.S.-led “no fly zone” established in April 1991, were able to drive Iraqi
troops out of much of northern Iraq and establish an autonomous zone there and
subsequently remained largely free of Baghdad’s rule.
According to press reports, about two months after the failure of the Shiite
uprising, President George H.W. Bush forwarded to Congress an intelligence finding
stating that the United States would undertake efforts to promote a military coup
against Saddam Hussein; a reported $15 million to $20 million was allocated for that
purpose. The Administration apparently believed — and this view apparently was
shared by many experts and U.S. officials — that a coup by elements within the
current regime could produce a favorable new government without fragmenting Iraq.
Many observers, however, including neighboring governments, feared that Shiite and
Kurdish groups, if they ousted Saddam, would divide Iraq into warring ethnic and
tribal groups, opening Iraq to influence from neighboring Iran, Turkey, and Syria.

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Emergence of An Anti-Saddam Coalition
Reports in July 1992 of a serious but unsuccessful coup attempt suggested that
the U.S. strategy might ultimately succeed. However, there was disappointment
within the George H.W. Bush Administration that the coup had failed and a decision
was made to shift the U.S. approach from promotion of a coup to supporting the
diverse opposition groups that had led the post-war rebellions. At the same time, the
Kurdish, Shiite, and other opposition elements were coalescing into a broad and
diverse movement that appeared to be gaining support internationally.
This
opposition coalition was seen as providing a vehicle for the United States to build a
viable overthrow strategy. Congress more than doubled the budget for covert
support to the opposition groups to about $40 million for FY1993.1
The Iraqi National Congress/Ahmad Chalabi
The growing opposition coalition took concrete shape in an organization called
the Iraqi National Congress (INC). The INC was formally constituted when the two
main Kurdish militias, the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic
Union of Kurdistan (PUK), participated in a June 1992 meeting in Vienna of dozens
of opposition groups. In October 1992, major Shiite Islamist groups came into the
coalition when the INC met in Kurdish-controlled northern Iraq.
The INC appeared viable because it brought under one banner varying Iraqi
ethnic groups and diverse political ideologies, including nationalists, ex-military
officers, and defectors from Iraq’s ruling Baath Party. The Kurds provided the INC
with a source of armed force and a presence on Iraqi territory. Its constituent groups
publicly united around a platform that appeared to match U.S. values and interests,
including human rights, democracy, pluralism, “federalism” (see below), the
preservation of Iraq’s territorial integrity, and compliance with U.N. Security Council
resolutions on Iraq.2
However, many observers doubted its commitment to
democracy, because most of its groups have an authoritarian internal structure, and
because of inherent tensions among its varied ethnic groups and ideologies. The
INC’s first Executive Committee consisted of KDP leader Masud Barzani, ex-Baath
Party and military official Hassan Naqib, and moderate Shiite cleric Mohammad
Bahr al-Ulum. (Barzani and Bahr al-Ulum are now on the 25-member post-war
Governing Council, and both are part of the nine member rotating presidency of the
Council.
Ahmad Chalabi. When the INC was formed, its Executive Committee
selected Ahmad Chalabi, who is about 58 years old, a secular Shiite Muslim from
a prominent banking family, to run the INC on a daily basis. Chalabi was educated
in the United States as a mathematician. He fled Iraq to Jordan in 1958, when the
Hashemite monarchy was overthrown in a military coup. This coup occurred 10
1 Sciolino, Elaine. “Greater U.S. Effort Backed To Oust Iraqi.” New York Times, June 2,
1992.
2 The Iraqi National Congress and the International Community. Document provided by
INC representatives, February 1993.

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CRS-3
years before the Baath Party took power in Iraq (July 1968). In 1978, he founded the
Petra Bank in Jordan but later ran afoul of Jordanian authorities on charges of
financial malfeasance and he left Jordan, possibly with some help from members of
Jordan’s royal family, in 1989.
The Jordanian government subsequently re-
capitalized the bank with national funds. In 1992, he was convicted in absentia of
embezzling $70 million from the bank and sentenced to 22 years in prison. Chalabi
maintains that the Jordanian government was pressured by Iraq to turn against him,
and he asserts that he has since rebuilt ties to the Jordanian government. In April
2003, senior Jordanian officials, including King Abdullah, called Chalabi “divisive”
and stopped just short of saying he would be unacceptable to Jordan as leader of Iraq.
Chalabi’s critics acknowledge that, despite allegations about his methods, he has
been single-minded in his determination to overthrow Saddam Hussein, and he is
said to be the favorite of those Administration officials, particularly in the
Department of Defense, that were the most supportive of changing Iraq’s regime by
force.
Since Chalabi returned to Iraq, there have been no large public demonstrations
supportive of him or the INC, indicating that he does not have a large following
inside Iraq. However, anecdotal press reporting suggest that he has attracted some
support from those Iraqis that most welcome the U.S. military offensive against Iraq
as liberation from Saddam Hussein’s regime and who believe the U.S. presence is
needed to ensure security and facilitate reconstruction. On April 6, Chalabi and
about 700 INC fighters (“Free Iraqi Forces”) were airlifted by the U.S. military from
their base in the north to the Nasiriya area, purportedly to help stabilize civil affairs
in southern Iraq. Chalabi and some Free Iraqi Forces later deployed to Baghdad and
other parts of Iraq. After establishing his headquarters in Baghdad, Chalabi tried to
build support by searching for members of the former regime and arranging for U.S.
military forces in Iraq to provide security or other benefits to his potential supporters.
However, the Free Iraqi Forces accompanying Chalabi were disbanded following the
U.S. decision in mid-May 2003 to disarm independent militias and to temporarily
delay the formation of an Iraqi self-rule authority.
A prominent INC intellectual is Kanaan Makiya, who wrote a 1989 book
“Republic of Fear: The Politics of Modern Iraq,” detailing alleged Iraqi regime
human rights abuses. Makiya supports a Western-style democracy for Iraq, including
full rights for women and Iraq’s minorities. A self-described atheist, he teaches
Middle Eastern politics at Brandeis University. Another INC activist, Mohammed
al-Zubaidi, declared himself in charge of Baghdad in mid-April, but U.S. officials did
not recognize him as mayor and detained him in April 2003.
Chalabi is part of a grouping of seven major party leaders that have been
meeting since the period prior to the war. As discussed below, the seven-party
leadership grouping was hoping to become the core of a successor regime, and the
seven parties are represented on the 25 seat Governing Council unveiled on July 13,
2003. Chalabi is a member of the Governing Council and one of the nine selected
to rotate the presidency of the Council.
The Kurds/KDP and PUK. The Kurds, probably the most pro-U.S. of all
the groups in Iraq, do not have ambitions to play a major role in governing Arab Iraq,
but Iraq’s neighbors have always been fearful that the Kurds might still seek outright

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CRS-4
independence. In committing to the concept of federalism, the INC platform
assured the Kurds substantial autonomy within a post-Saddam Iraq. Turkey, which
has a sizable Kurdish population in the areas bordering northern Iraq, particularly
fears that independence for Iraq’s Kurds would likely touch off an effort to unify into
a broader “Kurdistan.” Iraq’s Kurds have been fighting intermittently for autonomy
since their region was incorporated into the newly formed Iraqi state after World War
I. (Iraq became an independent Kingdom in 1932, although it remained under British
influence until the 1958 fall of the British-installed monarchy.) In 1961, the KDP,
then led by founder Mullah Mustafa Barzani, current KDP leader Masud Barzani’s
father, began an insurgency that has continued until today, although interrupted by
periods of autonomy negotiations with Baghdad. Masud Barzani’s brother, Idris,
commanded Kurdish forces against Iraq during the Iran-Iraq war but was killed in
that war. The PUK, headed by Jalal Talabani, split off from the KDP in 1965; the
PUK’s members are generally more well-educated, urbane, and left-leaning than
those of the KDP. Together, the PUK and KDP have about 40,000-60,000 fighters,
some of which are trained in conventional military tactics. Both the KDP and the
PUK are part of the seven-party grouping that has now been incorporated into the
official 25-seat U.S.-backed Governing Council unveiled on July 13, 2003. Barzani
and Talabani are both part of the nine member rotating presidency of the Council.
Ansar al-Islam/Al Qaeda. In the mid-1990s, the two main Kurdish parties
enjoyed good relations with a small Kurdish Islamic faction, the Islamic Movement
of Iraqi Kurdistan (IMIK), which is headed by Shaykh Ali Abd-al Aziz. Based in
Halabja, Iraq, the IMIK publicized the effects of Baghdad’s March 1988 chemical
attack on that city, and it allied with the PUK in 1998.
A radical faction of the IMIK split off in 1998, calling itself the Jund al-Islam
(Army of Islam). It later changed its name to Ansar al-Islam (Partisans of Islam).
This faction, led by Mullah Krekar (who was detained in Europe in August 2002 and
now lives in Norway), reportedly is associated with Al Qaeda and hosted in its
northern Iraq enclave Al Qaeda fighters who fled the U.S.-led war in Afghanistan.
Mullah Krekar reportedly studied under Shaykh Abdullah al-Azzam, an Islamic
theologian of Palestinian origin who was the spiritual mentor of Osama bin Laden.
Prior to Operation Iraqi Freedom, during which its base was captured, about 8,000
people were in the Ansar al-Islam enclave, located near the town of Khurmal. This
included about 600 fighters.3 Fighters of Ansar al-Islam clashed with the PUK
around Halabja in December 2002, and Ansar gunmen were allegedly responsible for
an assassination attempt against PUK prime minister Barham Salih in April 2002.
The leader of the Arab contingent within Ansar al-Islam is said by U.S. officials
to be Abu Musab Zarqawi, an Arab of Jordanian origin who reputedly fought in
Afghanistan. Zarqawi has been linked to Al Qaeda plots in Jordan during the
millennium celebration, the assassination in Jordan of U.S. diplomat Lawrence Foley
(2002), and to reported attempts in 2002 to spread the biological agent ricin in
London and possibly other places in Europe. In a presentation to the U.N. Security
Council on February 5, 2003, Secretary of State Powell tied Zarqawi and Ansar al-
3 Chivers, C.J. Repulsing Attack By Islamic Militants, “Iraqi Kurds Tell of Atrocities.”
New York Times, December 6, 2002.

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CRS-5
Islam to the Iraqi regime, which might have viewed Ansar al-Islam as a means of
pressuring Baghdad’s Kurdish opponents. Many experts believed Baghdad-Ansar
links were tenuous or even non-existent; Baghdad did not control northern Iraq even
before Operation Iraqi Freedom.4 Zarqawi’s current whereabouts are unknown,
although some unconfirmed press reports indicate he might have fled to Iran after the
fall of the Ansar camp to U.S.-led forces. Some press accounts in July 2003 say Iran
might have him in custody.
Shiite Islamist Organizations
Some outside experts have had concerns about the potential strength and
ideological orientation of Iraq’s Shiite Islamic fundamentalist groups in post-
Saddam Iraq. Shiite Islamist factions hold at least five seats on the Governing
Council unveiled July 13, 2003.
SCIRI/Badr Corps. The most well known among these is called the Supreme
Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), which was a member of the INC
in the early and mid-1990s but progressively distanced itself from the INC banner.
SCIRI was set up in 1982 to increase Iranian control over Shiite opposition groups
in Iraq and the Persian Gulf states. SCIRI’s leader, Ayatollah Muhammad Baqr al-
Hakim, was the late Ayatollah Khomeini’s choice to head an Islamic Republic of
Iraq, a vision that, if realized, might conflict with U.S. plans to forge a democratic
Iraq. Baqr Al Hakim and his family fled Iraq to Iran in 1980, during a major
crackdown on Shiite activist groups by Saddam Hussein. Saddam feared that Iraqi
Shiite Islamists, inspired and emboldened by the Islamic revolution in Iran in 1979,
posed a major threat to his regime. Prior to the formation of SCIRI, Hakim and his
family were leaders of the Da’wa (Islamic Call) Party (see below). Mohammed Baqr
is the son of the late Ayatollah Muhsin Al Hakim, who was a prominent Shiite leader
in southern Iraq and an associate of Ayatollah Khomeini when Khomeini was in exile
in southern Iraq during 1964-1978. In early May 2003, there were press reports that
Mohammed Baqr might resign from his formal SCIRI leadership post and try to
establish himself in the Shiite holy city of Najaf, Iraq, as an overarching Shiite
authority figure in the image of the late Ayatollah Khomeini of Iran. He returned to
Iraq on May 10, welcomed by large crowds in Basra and Najaf, where he is now
based.
In addition to its agents and activists in the Shiite areas of Iraq, SCIRI has about
10,000-15,000 fighters/activists organized into a “Badr Corps” (named after a major
battle in early Islam) that, during the 1980s and 1990s, conducted forays from Iran
into southern Iraq to attack Baath Party officials there. The Badr Corps is headed by
Mohammed Baqr’s younger brother, Abd al-Aziz al-Hakim, who returned to Iraq on
April 20, 2003, to pave the way for Mohammed Baqr’s return. (Another Hakim
brother, Mahdi, was killed in Sudan in May 1990, allegedly by agents of Iraq’s
security services.) Iran’s Revolutionary Guard, which is politically aligned with
Iran’s hard line civilian officials, has been the key patron of the Badr Corps,
providing it with weapons, funds, and other assistance. The Badr Corps fought
4 “U.S. Uncertain About Northern Iraq Group’s Link to Al Qaida.” Dow Jones Newswire,
March 18, 2002.

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CRS-6
alongside the Guard against Iraqi forces during the Iran-Iraq war. However, many
Iraqi Shiites view SCIRI as an Iranian creation and SCIRI/Badr Corps operations in
southern Iraq prior to Operation Iraqi Freedom did not spark broad popular unrest
against the Iraqi regime. Some Badr fighters deployed inside northern Iraq on the eve
of Operation Iraqi Freedom, and the New York Times reported on May 7, 2003, that
many Badr activists have infiltrated into Iraq to build support for SCIRI.
A variety of press reports say that individual militias now providing security in
many towns in southern Iraq are linked to the Badr Corps. One such militia is
derived from the fighters who challenged Saddam Hussein’s forces in the marsh
areas of southern Iraq, around the town of Amara, north of Basra. It goes by the
name Hizbollah (Party of God)-Amara, and it is headed by marsh guerrilla leader
Abdul Karim Muhammadawi, nicknamed “Prince of the Marshes” who was named
to the Governing Council on July 13, 2003. He is widely perceived as an ally of
SCIRI.
Until August 2002 when Abd al-Aziz al-Hakim joined other opposition figures
for meetings in Washington, D.C., SCIRI had publicly refused to work openly with
the United States or accept U.S. assistance. Since the fall of the regime on April 9,
SCIRI leaders have criticized what they called an illegitimate U.S. occupation of Iraq
and have called for the rapid establishment of an Iraqi self-rule authority, while at the
same time opposing the use of violence against the occupation. Even though
Mohammed Baqr Al Hakim says he is for a democracy and would not seek to
establish an Iranian-style Islamic republic, U.S. officials are said to be mistrustful
of SCIRI and have been seeking to disarm its fighters. Suggesting that SCIRI sees
its interests in a degree of cooperation with the occupation, Abd al-Aziz al Hakim did
meet with other opposition leaders in late April 2003 at a post-war governance
planning session sponsored by U.S. officials. He has since helped constitute the
seven-party grouping that now constitutes a part of the 25-seat Governing Council.
Abd al-Aziz is part of the nine-person rotating presidency of the Council. Unlike
some other Shiite Islamist groups, SCIRI has had good working relations with some
Sunni oppositionists and the Kurds.
SCIRI might get additional support from the family of the late Ayatollah
Khomeini. In July 2003, Khomeini’s grandson, Hassan Khomeini, who is about 45,
relocated from Qom, Iran to Najaf. Hassan Khomeini is believed to be an opponent
of the more militant Shiite clerics such as Moqtada Sadr (see below), who is also
considered a rival of SCIRI.
Da’wa Party. The Da’wa Party, perhaps Iraq’s oldest Shiite Islamist grouping,
continues to exist as a separate group, but many Da’wa activists appear to be at least
loosely allied with SCIRI. The party was founded in 1957 by a revered Iraqi Shiite
cleric, Ayatollah Mohammed Baqr Al Sadr, a like-minded associate of Ayatollah
Khomeini. Baqr Al Sadr was hung by the Iraqi regime in 1980 for the Da’wa’s
alleged responsibility in fomenting Shiite anti-regime unrest following Iran’s 1979
Islamic revolution. That unrest included an attempted assassination of senior Iraqi
leader Tariq Aziz. Da’wa was part of the seven-party council grouping that is now
been incorporated into the Governing Council. Da’wa’s spokesman, Ibrahim Jafari,
and its leader in Basra, Abdal Zahra Othman, are on the Governing Council, as is a
former Da’wa activist turned human rights activist, Muwaffaq Al-Ruba’i. Jafari is

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one of the nine members of the Council that is rotating the presidency, and Jafari is
the first to take that post.
The Kuwaiti branch of the Da’wa Party allegedly was responsible for a May
1985 attempted assassination of the Amir of Kuwait and the December 1983 attacks
on the U.S. and French embassies in Kuwait. The Hizballah organization in Lebanon
was founded by Lebanese clerics loyal to Ayatollah Baqr Al Sadr and the late
Ayatollah Khomeini, and there continue to be linkages between Hizballah and the
Da’wa Party. The Hizballah activists who held U.S. hostages in that country during
the 1980s often linked release of the Americans to the release of 17 Da’wa Party
prisoners held by Kuwait for those offenses. Some Iraqi Da’wa members look to
Lebanon’s senior Shiite cleric Mohammed Hossein Fadlallah, who was a student and
protege of Ayatollah Mohammed Baqr Al Sadr, for spiritual guidance.
Sadr Movement. Members of the clan of the late Ayatollah Mohammed Baqr
Al Sadr have become highly active in post-Saddam Iraq. Although the Al Sadr clan
has been closely identified with the Da’wa Party, it appears that members of the clan
and their followers currently are operating in post-war Iraq as grouping separate from
the Da’wa. Another revered member of the clan, Mohammed Sadiq Al Sadr, and
two of his sons, were killed by Saddam’s security forces in 1999. A surviving son,
Moqtada al-Sadr, who is about 27 years old, has attempted to rally his followers to
attain a prominent role in post-Saddam Shiite politics. He and his clan apparently
have a large following in the Shiite neighborhoods of Baghdad, which, after the fall
of the regime on April 9, renamed their district “Sadr City,” from the former name
of “Saddam City.” However, Moqtada is viewed by Iran and many Iraqi Shiites as
a young radical who lacks religious and political weight. To compensate for his lack
of religious credentials, he has sought spiritual authority for his actions from exiled
Iraqi senior cleric, Ayatollah Kazem Haeri, who is living in Qom, Iran. An alternate
interpretation by some experts is that Haeri is acting at the direction of Iran’s
leadership to keep Moqtada Sadr under a measure of control. Moqtada’s reputation
may have been tarnished in early April when Moqtada al Sadr reportedly killed Abd
al-Majid Khoi, the son of the late Grand Ayatollah Abdol Qasem Musavi-Khoi,
shortly after his return to Najaf from exile in London. Abd al-Majid Khoi headed the
Khoi Foundation, based in London, and he returned to Iraq after U.S.-led forces took
Najaf. Grand Ayatollah Khoi differed with the political doctrines of Ayatollah
Khomeini of Iran.
The Sadr grouping was not part of the seven-party grouping that has been
incorporated into the U.S.-backed Governing Council. Neither Moqtada nor any
other known Sadr faction members are on the Governing Council. In July 2003, Sadr
began giving sermons in and around Najaf stridently opposing the U.S. occupation,
and his aides began recruiting for an “Islamic army,” for now unarmed, that Sadr says
must challenge U.S. occupation forces. He is also openly calling for a cleric-led
Islamic state similar to that of Iran.
Ayatollah Sistani/Hawza al-Ilmiyah. The revered Grand Ayatollah Ali al-
Sistani, based in Najaf, is also emerging as a major potential force in post-war Iraq.
He is the most senior of the four Shiite clerics that lead the Najaf- based “Hawza al-
Ilmiya,” a major grouping of seminaries and Shiite clerics. The Hawza, which is well
funded through donations, is becoming an important source of political authority in

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CRS-8
the Shiite regions of Iraq, hiring Iraqis to perform functions performed by the former
regime and issuing directives, often obeyed, for some Iraqi civil servants to return to
work. Sistani himself, now free of a long house arrest at the hands of Baghdad, has
a large following of former students throughout the Shiite portions of Iraq. During
the U.S.-led war against Iraq, Moqtada al-Sadr and his followers reportedly tried to
intimidate Sistani by surrounding his office in Najaf with armed gunmen, a tactic that
many experts say has led Sistani and the Hawza to ally with SCIRI in the intra-Shiite
power struggle. Sistani, who is of Iranian ethnicity, is considered to be in the
tradition of Ayatollah Khoi in opposing a direct role for clerics in governmental
affairs, and Sistani and the Hawza have spoken against a direct role for the clerics in
governing post-war Iraq. However, in early July 2003, Sistani began to take a more
active role in Iraq’s post-war decision-making by issuing a statement that only
elected Iraqis — not a U.S.-appointed governing council — should draft a
constitution.
Islamic Amal. SCIRI has been allied with another Shiite Islamist organization
called the Islamic Amal (Action) Organization. In the early 1980s, Islamic Amal was
under the SCIRI umbrella but later broke with it. It is headed by Mohammed Taqi
Modarassi, who returned to Iraq from exile in Iran in April 2003, after Saddam
Hussein’s regime fell. Islamic Amal, which has a following among Shiite Islamists
mainly in Karbala, conducted attacks against Saddam Hussein’s regime in the 1980s.
However, it does not appear to have a following nearly as large as SCIRI or the other
Shiite Islamist groups. Modarassi’s brother, Abd al-Hadi, headed the Islamic Front
for the Liberation of Bahrain, which tried to stir up Shiite unrest against the Bahrain
regime in the 1980s and 1990s (see below). Since returning to Iraq, Mohammad
Taqi has argued against violent opposition to the U.S. occupation, saying that such
a challenge would plunge Iraq into civil warfare.
Schisms Among Anti-Saddam Groups
The differences among the various anti-Saddam organizations led to the near
collapse of the U.S. regime change effort the mid-1990s. In May 1994, the KDP and
the PUK began clashing with each other over territory, customs revenues levied at
border with Turkey, and control over the Kurdish enclave’s government based in
Irbil. The PUK lined up support from Iran while the KDP sought and received
countervailing backing from its erstwhile nemesis, the Baghdad government. The
infighting contributed to the defeat of an INC offensive against Iraqi troops in March
1995; the KDP pulled out of the offensive at the last minute. Although it was
repelled, the offensive did initially overrun some of the less well-trained and poorly
motivated Iraqi units facing the Kurds. Some INC leaders point to the battle as an
indication that the INC could have succeeded militarily, without direct U.S. military
help, had it been given additional resources and training in the 1990s.
The Iraqi National Accord (INA). The infighting in the opposition in the
mid-1990s caused the United States to briefly
revisit the “coup strategy” by

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CRS-9
renewing ties to a non-INC group, Iraq National Accord (INA).5 The INA, originally
founded in 1990 with Saudi support, consists of military and security defectors who
were perceived as having ties to disgruntled officials currently serving within their
former organizations. It is headed by Dr. Iyad Alawi, former president of the Iraqi
Student Union in Europe and a physician by training. He is a secular Shiite Muslim,
but most of the members of the INA are Sunni Muslims. The INA’s prospects
appeared to brighten in August 1995 when Saddam’s son-in-law Hussein Kamil al-
Majid — architect of Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction programs — defected to
Jordan, suggesting that Saddam’s grip on the military and security services was
weakening. Jordan’s King Hussein agreed to allow the INA to operate from there.
The INA was ultimately penetrated by Iraq’s intelligence services and, in June 1996,
Baghdad dealt it a serious setback by arresting or executing over 100 INA
sympathizers in the military.
Iraq’s counteroffensive against the opposition was expanded two months after
the arrests of the INA sympathizers. In late August 1996, the KDP asked Baghdad
to provide armed support for its capture of Irbil from the rival PUK. Iraq took
advantage of the request to strike against the INC base in Salahuddin, a city in
northern Iraq, as well as against remaining INA operatives throughout northern Iraq.
In the course of its incursion in the north, Iraq reportedly executed two hundred
oppositionists and arrested as many as 2,000 others. The United States evacuated
from northern Iraq and eventually resettled in the United States 650 oppositionists,
mostly from the INC.
Prior to Operation Iraqi Freedom, Alawi claimed that the INA continued to
operate throughout Iraq, and it apparently had rebuilt itself to some extent since the
June 1996 arrests. However, it does not appear to have a large following in the Iraqi
regime and did not announce any key defections from the regime during Operation
Iraqi Freedom, nor has it since found or captured any former regime leaders.
Although it has was cooperating with the INC at the start of the U.S.-led 2003 war,
there is a history of friction between the two groups; the INA reportedly bombed an
INC facility in northern Iraq in October 1995. Iyad Alawi represented the INA in the
seven-party grouping that negotiated the formation of the U.S.-backed Governing
Council; and Alawi has been named a member of that Council. He is also one of the
nine Council members that will rotate its presidency.
Attempting to Rebound from 1996 Setbacks
For the two years following the anti-Saddam opposition groups’ 1996 setbacks,
the Clinton Administration had little contact with these groups. In those two years,
the INC, INA, and other opposition groups attempted to rebuild their organizations
and their ties to each other, although with mixed success. On February 26, 1998,
then Secretary of State Madeleine Albright testified to a Senate Appropriations
subcommittee that it would be “wrong to create false or unsustainable expectations”
about what U.S. support for the opposition could accomplish.
5 An account of this shift in U.S. strategy is essayed in Hoagland, Jim. “How CIA’s Secret
War On Saddam Collapsed.” Washington Post, June 26, 1997.

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CRS-10
Iraq’s obstructions of U.N. weapons of mass destruction (WMD) inspections
during 1997-1998 led to growing congressional calls for overthrowing Saddam
Hussein. A formal congressional push for a regime change policy began with an
FY1998 supplemental appropriation (P.L. 105-174, signed May 1, 1998) that, among
other provisions, earmarked $5 million in Economic Support Funds (ESF) for the
opposition and $5 million for a Radio Free Iraq, under the direction of Radio Free
Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL). The radio service began broadcasting in October
1998, from Prague. Of the ESF, $3 million was devoted to an overt program to
coordinate and promote cohesion among the various opposition factions, and to
highlighting Iraqi violations of U.N. resolutions. The remaining $2 million was used
to translate and publicize documented evidence of alleged Iraqi war crimes; the
documents were retrieved from the Kurdish north, placed on 176 CD-ROM diskettes,
and translated and analyzed by experts under contract to the U.S. government. In
subsequent years, Congress has appropriated funding for the Iraqi opposition and for
war crimes issues, as shown in the appendix. Some of the war crimes funding has
gone to the opposition-led INDICT (International Campaign to Indict Iraqi War
Criminals) organization for publicizing Iraqi war crimes issues.
Iraq Liberation Act
The clearest indication of congressional support for a more active U.S.
overthrow effort was encapsulated in another bill introduced in 1998: the Iraq
Liberation Act (ILA, H.R. 4655, P.L. 105-338, signed into law October 31, 1998).
The ILA gave the President authority to provide up to $97 million in defense articles
(and authorized $2 million in broadcasting funds) to opposition organizations to be
designated by the Administration. (An FY2003 supplemental appropriation, P.L.
108-11, added $86.5 million to the allowed draw-down ceiling to enable additional
funds to flow to groups helping the United States in Operation Iraqi Freedom. The
supplemental brought the total authorized under the Act to $183 million.) The Act’s
passage was widely interpreted as an expression of congressional support for the
concept of promoting an insurgency by using U.S. air-power to expand opposition-
controlled territory. This idea was advocated by Chalabi and some U.S. experts, such
as General Wayne Downing, who subsequently became a National Security Council
official on counter-terrorism in the first two years of the George W. Bush
Administration. President Clinton signed the legislation despite reported widespread
doubts within the Clinton Administration about the chances of success in promoting
an opposition insurgency inside Iraq.
The Iraq Liberation Act made the previously unstated policy of promoting
regime change in Iraq official, declared policy. A provision of the ILA states that it
should be the policy of the United States to “support efforts” to remove the regime
headed by Saddam Hussein. In mid-November 1998, President Clinton publicly
articulated that regime change was a component of U.S. policy toward Iraq.
The signing of the ILA and the declaration of the overthrow policy came at the
height of the one-year series of crises over U.N. weapons inspections in Iraq, in
which inspections were repeatedly halted and restarted after mediation by the United
Nations, Russia, and others.
On December 15, 1998, U.N. inspectors were
withdrawn for the final time, and a three-day U.S. and British bombing campaign
against suspected Iraqi WMD facilities followed (Operation Desert Fox, December

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CRS-11
16-19, 1998). (For information on these crises, see CRS Issue Brief IB92117, Iraq:
Weapons Programs, U.N. Requirements, and U.S. Policy.)
The First Eligibility Designations Under the ILA. Further steps to
promote regime change followed Operation Desert Fox. In January 1999, a career
diplomat, Frank Ricciardone, was named as a State Department’s “Coordinator for
the Transition in Iraq” — the chief liaison with the opposition. On February 5, 1999,
after consultations with Congress, the President issued a determination (P.D. 99-13)
that the following organizations would be eligible to receive U.S. military assistance
under the Iraq Liberation Act: the INC; the INA; SCIRI; the KDP; the PUK; the
Islamic Movement of Iraqi Kurdistan (IMIK); and the Movement for Constitutional
Monarchy (MCM). Because of its possible role in contributing to the formation of
Ansar al-Islam, the IMIK did not receive U.S. support after 2001, although it was not
formally taken off the ILA eligibility list.
Monarchists/Sharif Ali. The MCM is led by Sharif Ali bin al-Hussein, a
relative of the Hashemite monarchs (cousin of King Faysal II, the last Iraqi monarch)
that ruled Iraq from the end of World War I until 1958. Sharif Ali claims to be the
leading heir to the former Hashemite monarchy, although there are other claimants,
mostly based in Jordan. The MCM was considered a small movement that could not
contribute much to the pre-war overthrow effort. In the post-war period, Sharif Ali
returned to Iraq on June 10, 2003, to a small but apparently enthusiastic welcome.
He did not participate in the seven-party grouping that negotiated with the U.S.-led
occupation authority on the formation of the Governing Council, and neither Sharif
Ali nor any of his followers was appointed to the Governing Council.
In May 1999, in concert with an INC visit to Washington, the Clinton
Administration announced it would draw down $5 million worth of training and
“non-lethal” defense equipment under the ILA. During 1999 - 2000, about 150
opposition members underwent civil administration training at Hurlburt air base in
Florida, including attending Defense Department-run courses providing civil affairs
training,
including
instruction
in
field
medicine,
logistics,
computers,
communications, broadcasting, power generation, and war crimes issues. However,
the Clinton Administration asserted that the opposition was not sufficiently organized
to merit U.S. provision of lethal military equipment or combat training. This
restriction reflected divisions within and outside the Clinton Administration over the
effectiveness and viability of the opposition, and over the potential for the United
States to become militarily embroiled in civil conflict in Iraq. The trainees during
1999-2000 are not believed to have been brought into the Operation Iraqi Freedom
effort against the regime, or into the Free Iraqi Forces that deployed to Iraq toward
the end of the active combat phase of the war.
Continued Doubts About the Capabilities
of the Anti-Saddam Groups
During 1999-2000, U.S. efforts to rebuild and fund the opposition did not end
the debate within the Clinton Administration over the regime change component of
Iraq policy. In hearings and statements, several Members of both parties expressed
disappointment with the Clinton Administration’s
decision not
to give the

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CRS-12
opposition lethal military aid or combat training. Many took those decisions as an
indication that the Clinton Administration was skeptical that a renewed overthrow
effort would fare better than previous attempts.
The Clinton Administration
maintained that the Iraqi opposition would not succeed unless backed by direct U.S.
military involvement, and that direct U.S. military action was risky and not justified
by the degree of threat posed by Iraq. Critics of the Clinton Administration policy
on Iraq maintained that the potential threat from Saddam Hussein’s regime was
sufficiently grave that direct U.S. military action should be taken. Others suggested
the Clinton Administration should focus instead on rebuilding containment of Iraq
by threatening force if Iraq refused to permit re-entry into Iraq of the U.N. weapons
inspectors that left Iraq in December 1998.
As a reflection of continued congressional support for the overthrow effort, a
provision of the FY2001 foreign aid appropriation (H.R. 4811, P.L. 106-429, signed
November 6, 2000) earmarked $25 million in ESF for “programs benefitting the
Iraqi people,” of which at least $12 million was for the INC to distribute
humanitarian aid inside Iraq; $6 million was for INC broadcasting; and $2 million
was for war crimes issues. According to the appropriation, the remaining $5 million
could be used to provide additional ESF to the seven groups then eligible to receive
assistance under the ILA.
Taking note of congressional sentiment for INC
distribution of aid inside Iraq, on September 29, 2000, the Clinton Administration
reached agreement with the INC to provide the organization with $4 million in
FY1999 ESF (one half the total earmark available) to develop an aid distribution plan
and to gather information in Iraq on Iraqi war crimes. However, three days before
it left office, the Clinton Administration issued a required report to Congress that
noted that any INC effort to distribute aid in areas of Iraq under Baghdad’s control
would be fraught with security risks to the INC, to Iraqi recipients of such aid, and
to any relief distributors with which the INC contracts.6
Bush Administration Policy
Bush Administration policy toward Iraq changed after the September 11, 2001
terrorist attacks, even though no significant evidence linking Iraq to those attacks
came to light. The shift toward a more assertive policy first became clear in
President Bush’s State of the Union message on January 29, 2002, when he
characterized Iraq as part of an “axis of evil,” along with Iran and North Korea.
Pre-September 11 Policy
Throughout most of its first year, the Bush Administration continued the basic
elements of Clinton Administration policy on Iraq. With no immediate consensus
within the new Administration on how forcefully to proceed with an overthrow
strategy, Secretary of State Powell focused on strengthening containment of Iraq,
which the Bush Administration said had eroded substantially in the year prior to its
taking office. Secretary Powell visited the Middle East in February 2001 to enlist
6 U.S. Department of State. Washington File. “Clinton Sends Report on Iraq to Congress.”
January 17, 2001.

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CRS-13
regional support for a so-called “smart sanctions” plan: a modification of the U.N.
sanctions regime to ensure that no weapons-related technology reached Iraq. His
plan offered to alter the U.N.-sponsored “oil-for-food” program by relaxing U.N.
restrictions on exports to Iraq of civilian equipment and needed non-military
technology.7
The Administration believed that the proposal, by easing the suffering of the
Iraqi people, would cause Iraq’s neighbors and other countries to cease unilateral
violations of the sanctions regime. Powell, who had openly expressed skepticism
about the opposition’s prospects, barely raised the regime change issue during his trip
or in his March 7, 2001, testimony before the House International Relations
Committee, at which he was questioned about Iraq.8
After about a year of
negotiations among the Security Council permanent members, the major feature of
the smart sanctions plan — new procedures that virtually eliminate U.N. review of
civilian exports to Iraq — was adopted on May 14, 2002 (U.N. Security Council
Resolution 1409).
Even though several senior officials had been strong advocates of a regime
change policy, many of the questions about the wisdom and difficulty of that strategy
that had faced previous administrations were debated early in the Bush
Administration.9 Aside from restating the U.S. policy of regime change, the Bush
Administration did little to promote that outcome throughout most of its first year.
During his confirmation hearings as Deputy Secretary of Defense, a leading advocate
of overthrowing Iraq’s regime, Paul Wolfowitz, said that he did not yet see a
“plausible plan” for changing the regime.
Like its predecessor, the Bush
Administration initially declined to provide the opposition with lethal aid, combat
training, or a commitment of direct U.S. military help. It eliminated the separate
State Department position of “Coordinator for the Transition in Iraq,” further casting
doubt on its enthusiasm for the overthrow strategy. On February 2, 2001, the Bush
Administration confirmed that, shortly after President Bush took office, the Treasury
Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) granted the INC a license to
proceed with information gathering inside Iraq only, and not actual distribution of
humanitarian aid inside Iraq. This decision by the Administration amounted to a
withholding of U.S. backing for the INC plan to rebuild its presence inside Iraq.
Many in Congress, on the other hand, continued to support the INC as the
primary vehicle for achieving regime change. Partly in deference to congressional
sentiment, the Bush Administration continued to expand its ties to the INC despite
doubts about its capabilities. In August 2001, the INC began satellite television
broadcasts into Iraq, from London, called Liberty TV. The station was funded by the
7 For more information on this program, see CRS Report RL30472, Iraq: Oil For Food
Program.
8 Perlez, Jane. “Powell Goes on the Road and Scores Some Points.” New York Times,
March 2, 2001.
9 One account of Bush Administration internal debates on the strategy is found in, Hersh,
Seymour. “The Debate Within.” The New Yorker, March 11, 2002.

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CRS-14
ESF aid appropriated by Congress, with start-up costs of $1 million and an estimated
additional $2.7 million per year in operating costs.10
Post-September 11, 2001: Moving to Change the Regime
Bush Administration policy toward Iraq became notably more assertive after the
September 11, 2001 attacks, stressing regime change far more than containment.
Almost immediately after the U.S.-led war on the Taliban and Al Qaeda in
Afghanistan began in early October 2001, speculation began building that the
Administration might try to change Iraq’s regime through direct use of military force
as part of a “phase two” of the war on terrorism. Some U.S. officials reportedly
believed that the United States needed to respond to the September 11 attacks by
ending any or all regimes that support terrorist groups, including Iraq. As noted
above, in his January 29, 2002 State of the Union message, President Bush named
Iraq as part of an “axis of evil,” along with North Korea and Iran. Vice President
Cheney visited the Middle East in March 2002 reportedly to consult regional
countries about the possibility of confronting Iraq militarily, although the countries
visited reportedly urged greater U.S. attention to the Arab-Israeli dispute and opposed
confrontation with Iraq.
The two primary themes in the Bush Administration’s public case for
confronting Iraq were (1) its purported refusal to end its WMD programs, and (2) its
ties to terrorist groups, to which Iraq might transfer WMD for the purpose of
conducting a catastrophic attack on the United States. The Administration added that
regime change would have the further benefit of liberating the Iraqi people and
promoting stability in the Middle East, possibly facilitating a resolution to the Arab-
Israeli dispute.
Iraq and Al Qaeda. Although they did not assert that Saddam Hussein’s
regime had a direct connection to the September 11 attacks or the subsequent anthrax
mailings, senior U.S. officials said in the runup to the war that there was evidence
of Iraqi linkages to Al Qaeda. Secretary of State Powell, as noted above, cited
intelligence information that Ansar al-Islam and its enclave leader Abu Musab al-
Zarqawi (see above) had links to Saddam Hussein’s regime.11 Other senior officials
cited intelligence information that Iraq provided advice and training to Al Qaeda in
the manufacture and use of chemical weapons, although Administration information
appears to date to the early 1990s when Iraq, largely isolated after the first Gulf war,
was politically close to Sudan. Al Qaeda founder Osama Bin Laden was based in
Sudan during that time (1991-1996). The Bush Administration did not extensively
cite reports that Czech intelligence believed that Iraqi intelligence had met with lead
September 11 hijacker Mohammad Atta in Prague in spring 2001, suggesting official
skepticism of those reports. Some outside commentators believed that those reports
indicated a direct Iraqi connection to the September 11 attacks.
10 Sipress, Alan. “U.S. Funds Satellite TV to Iraq.” Washington Post, August 16, 2001.
11 Goldberg, Jeffrey. “The Great Terror.” The New Yorker, March 25, 2002.

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CRS-15
Some outside observers expressed skepticism about Iraq-Al Qaeda connections
because of the ideological differences between Saddam Hussein’s secular regime and
Al Qaeda’s Islamist character. Others noted that bin Laden sought to raise an Islamic
army to fight Saddam’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990, arguing against the need for U.S.
troops, and that he was more an enemy of Saddam Hussein than an ally. Those
differences were evident in a February 12, 2003, bin Laden statement referring to
Saddam Hussein’s regime as socialist and infidel, although the statement exhorted
Iraq to resist impending U.S. military action. In the Administration view, the two
shared similar anti-U.S. goals, which outweighed ideological differences and
propelled them into tactical or strategic cooperation.
WMD Threat Perception. In arguing for military action, U.S. officials
maintained that Iraq’s purported commitment to developing WMD — coupled with
its support for terrorist groups to which Iraq might transfer WMD — constituted an
unacceptable potential threat to the United States and that major U.S. military action
was justified if Iraq refused to disarm voluntarily. U.S. officials said the September
11, 2001 attacks demonstrated that the United States could not wait for threats to
gather before acting, but must instead act preemptively or preventively. Senior U.S.
officials asserted a WMD threat as follows:
! Iraq had worked to rebuild its WMD programs in the nearly 4 years
since U.N. weapons inspectors left Iraq and had failed to comply
with 17 U.N. resolutions, including Resolution 1441 (November 8,
2002), calling for its complete elimination of all WMD programs.
However, statements by U.N. weapons inspectors after inspections
resumed November 27, 2002 indicated they believed Iraq did not
have an active nuclear weapons program, and that inspections on
other weapons categories were making progress.
! Iraq used chemical weapons against its own people (the Kurds) and
against Iraq’s neighbors (Iran), implying that Iraq would not
necessarily be deterred from using WMD against the United States
or its allies. Others noted that Iraq did not use such weapons against
adversaries, such as the United States, that have the capability of
destroying Iraq’s government in retaliation. Under the U.S. threat of
massive retaliation, Iraq did not use WMD against U.S. troops in the
1991 Gulf war. On the other hand, Iraq defied U.S. warnings of
retaliation and did burn Kuwait’s oil fields in that war.
! Iraq could transfer its WMD to terrorists such as Al Qaeda who
could use these weapons to cause hundreds of thousands of deaths
in the United States or elsewhere.
Critics of this view cited
presentations by CIA Director Tenet to Congress in October 2002,
portions of which were released publicly, stating the CIA view that
Iraq was likely to transfer WMD to terrorists if the United States
were to attack Iraq. At that point, according to that argument,
Saddam Hussein would be left with little incentive not to cooperate
with terrorist groups capable of striking at U.S. interests. No WMD
was used against Iraq during Operation Iraqi Freedom, and little
evidence of in-country weapons of mass destruction have thus far

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CRS-16
been found, although the Administration asserts that such weapons
will eventually be found in Iraq by the U.S.-led coalition.
Broadening the Internal Opposition to Saddam
As it began in mid-2002 to prepare for possible military action against Iraq, the
Bush Administration tried to broaden the Iraqi opposition and build up its
capabilities. On June 16, 2002, the Washington Post reported that, in early 2002,
President Bush authorized stepped up covert activities by the CIA and special
operations forces to destabilize Saddam Hussein. In early August 2002, the State and
Defense Departments jointly invited six major opposition groups — the INC, the
INA, the KDP, the PUK, SCIRI, and the MCM — to Washington for meetings with
senior officials, including a video link to Vice President Cheney. The meetings were
held to show unity within the opposition and among different agencies of the U.S.
government, which tended to favor different opposition groups.
In conjunction with the stepped up engagement with the opposition, on August
15, 2002, the State Department agreed to provide $8 million in ESF to the Iraqi
National Congress (INC), funds that had been held up due to differences between the
State Department and the INC over what activities would be funded. The $8 million
was to be used to fund the INC, during May 2002 to December 2002, to run its
offices in Washington, London, Tehran, Damascus, Prague, and Cairo, and to operate
its Al Mutamar newspaper and Liberty TV. The Defense Department agreed to fund
the information gathering portion of the INC’s activities; the State Department had
refused to fund those activities, which are conducted inside Iraq, because of strains
between the INC and other opposition groups and questions about INC use of U.S.
funds.
In addition, the Administration expanded its ties to Shiite Islamist groups and
to groups composed of ex-military and security officers, as well as to some ethnic-
based groups. The groups and individuals with which the Bush Administration had
increasing contact include the following:
! Iraqi National Movement. It formed in 2001 as an offshoot of the
INC. Its leaders include ex-senior military officer Hassan al-Naqib
(who was part of an early leadership body of the INC); Hatim
Mukhlis, who claimed support of some in Saddam’s Tikriti clan; and
ex-senior military officer Khalid al-Ubaydi.
! Iraqi National Front.
Another grouping of ex-military officers,
founded in March 2000 by Tawfiq al-Yasseri. Yasseri, a Shiite
Muslim ex-military officer, headed Iraq’s military academy and
participated and was wounded in the anti-Saddam uprisings
immediately following the 1991 Gulf war.
! Iraqi Free Officers and Civilians Movement. Established in 1996 by
ex-military officer Najib al-Salhi. This group worked closely with
the INC. Salhi defected in 1995 after serving as commander of
several tank units in the Republican Guard and regular military.

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CRS-17
! Higher Council for National Salvation. Based in Denmark, it was
formally established on August 1, 2002, and was headed by Wafiq
al-Samarra’i, a former head of Iraqi military intelligence. Ex-chief
of staff of Iraq’s military (1980-1991) Nizar al-Khazraji, who was
based in Denmark since fleeing Iraq in 1996, may also be a member.
Khazraji was placed under travel restrictions by Danish officials in
late November 2002 after saying he wanted to leave Denmark. He
is under investigation there for alleged involvement in Iraq’s use of
chemical weapons against the Kurds in 1988. Danish authorities
said on March 17, 2003 that Khazraji had unexpectedly left his
home there,12 although his current whereabouts are unknown.
! Iraqi Turkmen Front. A small, ethnic Turkomen-based grouping,
generally considered aligned with Turkish policy on Iraq.
Turkomens number about 350,000 and live mainly in northern Iraq.
! The Islamic Accord of Iraq. Based in Damascus, this is another
Shiite Islamic Party, but it is considered substantially less pro-
Iranian than SCIRI or the Da’wa Party (see above). The Islamic
Accord is headed by Jamil Wakil. Many Accord members are
followers of Ayatollah Shirazi, an Iranian cleric who was the
spiritual leader of a group called the Islamic Front for the Liberation
of Bahrain (IFLB), which allegedly attempted to overthrow the
government of Bahrain in the early 1980s.
! The Assyrian Democratic Movement, an ethnic-based movement
headed by Secretary-General Yonadam Yousif Kanna.
Iraq’s
Assyrian community is based primarily in northern Iraq. There is a
strong diaspora presence in the United States as well. After building
ties to this group over the past year, the Bush Administration
formally began incorporating the Assyrian Democratic Movement
into its meetings with the Iraqi opposition in September 2002.
(Kanna is on the 25-seat Governing Council.)
Second ILA Designations. The Bush Administration applauded efforts
during 2001 and 2002 by these groups to hold meetings to coordinate with each
other and with the INC and other groups. One such meeting, in July 2002 in London
and jointly run with the INC, attracted over 70 ex-military officers. However, since
the regime vacated Baghdad on April 9, 2003, virtually none of the ex-military led
groups listed above has openly sought a major role in post-Saddam Iraq.
On December 9, 2002, as the decision whether to launch military action
approached, President Bush issued a determination to draw down the remaining $92
million in defense articles and services authorized under the Iraq Liberation Act for
the INA, the INC, the KDP, the PUK, SCIRI, and the MCM “and to such other Iraqi
opposition groups designated by me under the Act before or after this determination.”
That same day, the Bush Administration added six of the factions discussed above
12 ‘Missing’ Iraqi General Now in Kuwait: Paper. Agence France Press, April 7, 2003.

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CRS-18
(except the Higher Council for National Salvation) to the list of “democratic
opposition organizations” eligible to receive draw downs under the ILA. This latter
phrase suggested that some of the draw downs would go to the six additional groups
designated on December 9, 2002, as eligible to receive ILA draw downs. The
announcement appeared to be part of reported plan to train about 5,000 oppositionists
in tasks that could assist U.S. forces, possibly including combat units.13 An initial
group of 3,000 was selected, but only about 70 oppositionists completed training at
an air base (Taszar) in Hungary, according to press reports.14 These oppositionists
served with U.S. forces in Operation Iraqi Freedom as translators and mediators
between U.S. forces and local leaders, and most did not stay in Iraq, according to
observers.
As the prospects for military action against Iraq grew, the opposition began
planning its role in the war and the post-war period. During December 14-17, 2002,
with U.S. officials attending, major Iraqi opposition groups held a conference in
London. In advance of the meeting, the Bush Administration appointed NSC official
Zalmay Khalilzad to be a liaison to the Iraqi opposition. The conference was
organized by the same six groups whose leaders visited Washington in August 2002,
but included other groups as well, and they discussed whether the opposition should
declare a provisional government. The Administration opposed that step on the
grounds that doing so was premature and would give the impression that outside
powers were determining Iraq’s political structure.
The meeting ended with agreement to form a 65-member follow-up committee,
which some criticized as weighted heavily toward Shiite Islamist groups such as
SCIRI. The opposition met again during February 24-27, 2003, in northern Iraq.
Against the urging of U.S. representatives at the meeting, the opposition agreed to
form a six man committee that would prepare for a transition regime, although it
stopped short of declaring a provisional government. The six-person committee
included PUK leader Jalal Talabani, KDP leader Masud Barzani, SCIRI leader
Mohammed Baqr Al Hakim, Chalabi, INA leader Iyad Alawi, and a former Iraqi
foreign minister Adnan Pachachi. All six groups of the above groups or personalities
are now on the U.S.-backed Governing Council named July 13, 2003.
Decision to Take Military Action. As inspectors worked in Iraq under the
new mandates provided in Resolution 1441, the Administration demanded complete
disarmament and full cooperation by Iraq if that country wanted to avert military
action. The Administration had been downplaying the goal of regime change after
President Bush’s September 12, 2002, speech before the United Nations General
Assembly, in which he focused on enforcing U.N. resolutions that require Iraqi
disarmament. However, the Administration resumed stressing the regime change
goal after February 2002 as diplomacy at the United Nations ran its course. In the
Administration view, a friendly government in Baghdad was required if the
international community is to rid Iraq of WMD and links to terrorist groups.
13
Deyoung, Karen, and Daniel Williams.
“Training of Iraqi Exiles Authorized.”
Washington Post, October 19, 2002.
14 Williams, Daniel. “U.S. Army to Train 1,000 Iraqi Exiles.” Washington Post, December
18, 2002.

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CRS-19
The possibility of war became clearer following the mid-March breakdown of
U.N. diplomacy over whether the U.N. Security Council should authorize war against
Iraq for failing to comply with Resolution 1441. The diplomatic breakdown followed
several briefings for the U.N. Security Council by the director of the U.N. inspection
body UNMOVIC (U.N. Monitoring, Verification, and Inspection Commission) Hans
Blix and the director of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA),
Mohammad al-Baradei, most recently on March 7, 2003. The briefings were
generally critical of Iraq for failing to pro-actively cooperate to clear up outstanding
questions about Iraq’s WMD program, but the latter two briefings (February 24 and
March 7) noted progress in clearing up outstanding WMD questions.
The
Blix/Baradei briefings said Iraq had not accounted for its past WMD, but the two did
not state that they were certain that Iraq had retained WMD, or that they had
uncovered any banned WMD. Iraq declared short range ballistic missiles that were
determined by Blix to be of prohibited ranges, and Blix ordered Iraq to destroy them.
Iraq began the destruction prior to the launching of the U.S.-led war. (For more
detail on the final round of inspections and evidence of WMD programs found in the
post-war period, see CRS Issue Brief IB92117: Iraq: Weapons Programs, U.N.
Requirements, and U.S. Policy.)
Security Council opponents of war, including France, Russia, China, and
Germany, said the briefings indicated that Iraq could be disarmed peacefully and that
inspections should be given more time. They noted that Iraq was well contained by
sanctions and the U.S./British enforced no-fly zones. Those who agreed with this
view maintained that, as long as Iraq allowed access to U.N. weapons inspections
under Resolution 1441, Iraq could not pose an immediate threat to U.S. national
security. The inspectors reported few, if any, Iraqi obstructions in about 700
inspections of about 400 different sites, as of mid-March 2003. Others experts
believed that, even if Iraq were to acquire major new WMD capabilities, Iraq could
have been deterred by U.S. overall strategic superiority, presumably including the
U.S. nuclear arsenal.
The United States, Britain, Spain, and Bulgaria disagreed, maintaining that Iraq
had not fundamentally decided to disarm, and was attempting to preserve WMD
capabilities. The Administration asserted on March 17, 2003, that diplomatic options
to disarm Iraq peacefully had failed and turned its full attention to military action.
That evening, President Bush gave Saddam Hussein and his sons, Uday and Qusay,
an ultimatum to leave Iraq within 48 hours to avoid war.
They refused the
ultimatum, and Operation Iraqi Freedom was launched on March 19, 2003.
In the war, Iraq’s conventional military forces were overwhelmed by U.S. and
British forces in Operation Iraqi Freedom, although the Iraqi military, at times, put
up stiff resistance using unconventional tactics. No major Iraqi military commanders
or Baathist political figures came forward to try to establish a post-Saddam
government, but senior regime leaders fled Baghdad, and the whereabouts of some
of the top leadership, including Saddam Hussein, is unknown. The outcome of a
post-war debate on the results of the war might depend on such factors as the pace
of reconstruction; the degree of resistance to the U.S.-led occupation; the amount
of WMD ultimately found, if any; and whether a new government is stable and
democratic.

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CRS-20
Post-War Governance Issues
Since Saddam Hussein’s regime vacated Baghdad on April 9, 2003, there has
been increasing debate about governing post-war Iraq. The same U.S. concerns about
fragmentation of and instability in Iraq that existed in prior years are present in the
current debate over how to establish a post-war interim regime. Although some Iraqi
civilians have welcomed U.S. and British troops in areas captured, many Iraqis now
want U.S. and British forces to leave Iraq, and the top U.S. military commander in
the Persian Gulf theater, General John Abizaid, says that U.S. forces now face a
“classic guerrilla war.” Other experts fear that a post-war Iraq will inevitably fall
under control of SCIRI and other Shiite Islamist forces who, as noted above, are well-
organized and are asserting growing control over areas inhabited by Iraq’s Shiites.
Shiites constitute about 60% of Iraq’s population but have traditionally been under-
represented in Iraq’s Sunni Muslim-dominated government.
Establishing Iraqi Self-Rule
The Administration says that it will stay in Iraq until there is a stable,
democratic successor regime that is at peace with its neighbors. However, there has
been some debate between U.S. authorities and key anti-Saddam groups over how
and when to establish a successor regime. Senior U.S. officials, including deputy
Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz, had said in early April 2003 that they hoped to
have a successor regime in place within six months of the fall of the regime.
However, in mid-May 2003, U.S. officials, apparently fearing that existing major
groups could not form a stable regime, or that Shiite Islamists would dominate a
successor authority, backed away from any deadlines for establishing an Iraqi self-
rule authority.
The anti-Saddam groups, led by the seven most active exile
opposition parties, asserted that Iraqis are sufficiently competent and unified to
rebuild Iraq after a war with the United States.
Shortly after the war, the United States began a process of establishing a
successor regime. The Administration organized an April 15 meeting, in Nasiriyah,
of about 100 Iraqis of varying ideologies, present by U.S. invitation. Many of the
attendees were representatives of Iraqi tribal groupings that had not been politically
active before.
However, SCIRI, along with several Shiite clerics that have
appropriated authority throughout much of southern Iraq since the fall of the regime,
boycotted the meeting and called for an Islamic state and the withdrawal of U.S.
forces. Another meeting of about 250 delegates was held in Baghdad on April 26,
which ended in agreement to hold a broader meeting, within a month, to name an
interim Iraqi administration.
In parallel with the late April meeting in Baghdad, the five most prominent
exiled opposition groups met, with U.S. envoys present: SCIRI, the INC, the INA,
the PUK, and the KDP. At a subsequent meeting on May 9, 2003, the five agreed to
expand their grouping to seven, adding to their ranks the little known Nasir al-
Chadirchy, head of a party called the National Democratic Party of Iraq, as well as
the Da’wa Party. The “seven-party grouping” strongly criticized the U.S. decision
in mid-May 2003 to delay the formation of an Iraqi self-rule authority indefinitely
and to instead establish a purely advisory body of 25 to 30 Iraqis. The grouping

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CRS-21
subsequently began meeting among itself and with U.S. occupation authorities to try
to obtain at least a partial reversal of that decision.
With U.S. casualties in Iraq mounting and a growing sense of resentment among
the Iraqi population, the U.S.-led occupation authority (Coalition Provisional
Authority, CPA) incorporated the views of the seven-party grouping.
U.S.
administrator for Iraq Paul Bremer (see below) said on June 23, 2003, that the
planned 25-30 member body would have “real authority” from its first days. He said
it would nominate ministry heads, recommend policies, and convene a “constitutional
conference” to draft a new constitution.15
The Governing Council. On July 13, 2003, a Governing Council was
unveiled to the Iraqi public, appointed by the U.S.-led Coalition Provisional
Authority (CPA) but reflecting the influence of the seven-party grouping, as well as
prominent Iraqis who were never in exile and were not affiliated with the exiled
opposition. The Council has 25 members, of which 3 are women and 13 are Shiite
Muslims.
Of the 13 Shiite Muslims on the Council, one seat is held by SCIRI directly
(Abd al-Aziz Al Hakim, younger brother of Mohammad Baqr), one is held by a
guerrilla affiliated with SCIRI (Abdul Karim al-Muahmmadawi), two are Da’wa
Party (Ibrahim al-Jafari and Abdul Zahra Othman) leaders, and considered allies of
SCIRI, and one is a former Da’wa activist (Muwaffaq al-Ruba’i). Also on the
Council is a moderate Shiite cleric, Mohammad Bahr al-Ulum, considered pro-U.S.
and not affiliated with SCIRI or the Da’wa. He headed the Ahl al-Bayt charity center
in London since the 1980s. The remaining Shiite Muslims, such as Chalabi and Iyad
al-Alawi, are mostly considered secular. Appointed to the Council was one Sunni
Muslim Islamist, Muhsin Abdul Hamid, who heads the Iraqi Islamic Party, but he
does not have a clear affiliation or relationship with the Shiite Islamists on the
Council.
The Council includes five Kurds, including the two main Kurdish leaders Jalal
Talabani and Masud Barzani. The Kurds are generally considered pro-U.S. and
might be expected to vote the way the U.S.-led coalition wants.
Although not a cohesive bloc, the Council includes exiles and non-exiles who
generally want a liberal democracy and would be considered pro-U.S.
Most
prominent among them is Chalabi, but this grouping includes National Democratic
Party leader Nasir al-Chadirchy and former foreign minister Adnan Pachachi, both
of whom are Sunni Muslims, as well as former foreign ministry official Akila al-
Hashimi, a Shiite woman. Others most likely to affiliate with this bloc include
Sunni businessman Samir Shakir al-Sumaidy; Sunni civil engineer Ghazi al-Yawar,
who is president of Saudi-based Hicap Technology; the Shiite coordinator for the
Human Rights Association of Babel, Ahmad al-Barak; and the two other women
Council members — Songul Chapouk, a member of the Turkomen minority, who
15 Transcript: Bremer Reviews Progress, Plans for Iraq Reconstruction. Washington File,
June 23, 2003.

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CRS-22
heads the Iraqi Women’s Association, and Raja al-Khuza’i, a Shiite who heads the
maternity hospital in Diwaniyah.
A member of the Assyrian Christian community is on the Council. Yonadam
Kanna, the secretary-general of the Democratic Assyrian Movement, is on the body.
It is not known what other members of the Council, if any, he might be aligned with,
although it is reasonable to believe that he might have an affinity for fellow residents
of northern Iraq, the Kurds. Also unclear is whether or not Hamid al-Musa, the
Shiite head of the Iraqi Communist Party, is allied with anyone else on the Council.
In late July 2003, the Council decided that nine Council members will rotate as
chairpersons, each for one month. Ibrahim al-Jafari of the Da’wa Party is the first
chairman. The other eight who will rotate that post are Chalabi, Alawi of the INA,
Hakim of SCIRI, Pachachi, Barzani of the KDP, Talabani of the PUK, Bahr al-Ulum,
and Abdul Hamid, the Sunni Islamist figure.
Among its first actions, the Council has authorized the establishment of an Iraqi
war crimes tribunal for Saddam and associates accused of major human rights abuses.
It also has empowered a three member delegation to seek formal U.N. recognition.
The grouping, Chalabi, Pachachi, and Akila Hashimi, traveled to the United Nations
in July 2003 and received a supportive statement from Secretary General Kofi
Annan. No decision on seating the Governing Council at the United Nations was
announced.
The Governing Council is expected to work with the Coalition Provisional
Authority to appoint a constitutional drafting commission. On July 17, 2003, CPA
head Bremer said that a constitution could conceivably be drafted in time to have
national elections by summer of 2004. He has linked the potential length of the U.S.
occupation to the completion of successful national elections and the restoration of
security in Iraq.
As part of the planning process that took place before the war, the U.S. State
Department supported a group of Iraqi exiles to address issues that would confront
a successor government.16 However, the State Department working group (the
“Future of Iraq Project”) does not appear to have significant influence on any post-
war regime decision-making in Iraq. Some experts believe the Defense Department
was promoting a competing or separate group of exiles.17 The State Department
project, which cost $5 million, consisted of working groups that discussed (1)
transitional justice; (2) public finance; (3) public and media outreach; (4) democratic
principles; (5) water, agriculture, and the environment; (6) health and human
services; (7) economy and infrastructure; (8) education; (9) refugees, internally-
displaced persons, and migration policy; (10) foreign and national security policy;
(11) defense institutions and policy; (12) free media; (13) civil society capacity-
building; (14) anti-corruption measures; and (15) oil and energy.
16
“State Department Hosts Working Group Meeting for Future of Iraq Project,”
Washington File, December 11, 2002.
17 Fineman, Mark, Robin Wright, and Doyle McManus. Preparing for War, Stumbling to
Peace. Los Angeles Times, July 18, 2003.

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CRS-23
Post-War U.S. Operations and the Coalition Provisional
Authority (CPA)
Experts note that projections about U.S. operations in post-war Iraq, including
the duration of the U.S. military occupation and the numbers of occupation troops,
are largely dependent on the amount of continuing Iraqi resistance, the number of
U.S. casualties taken, and the rate at which such U.S. objectives as the establishment
of a stable and democratic successor regime are accomplished. At present, about
160,000 U.S. and British troops remain in Iraq, according to a June 2003 report to
Congress mandated by P.L. 108-11. Of those, 148,000 are U.S. personnel and 12,000
are British. There were 2,000 Australian troops as part of the war fighting coalition,
but many of those are now on their way home. Earlier press reports said the
Administration wanted to draw the U.S. force level down to about 35,000 by the end
of 2003, but continued unrest and insecurity in Iraq appears to have made that goal
untenable, and some U.S. commanders do not rule out an increase in U.S. force
levels if necessary.
There are indications that resistance to the U.S. governance of Iraq is growing,
judging by the frequency of attacks on U.S. forces over the past few weeks. U.S.
military operations are focused on hunting down guerrilla resistance leaders and their
suspected Baathist financiers, as well as finding former leader Saddam Hussein. The
new Centcom commander John Abizaid said on July 17, 2003, that the United States
faces a “classic guerrilla war” led by “mid-level Baath Party activists organized
regionally.” Such attacks have killed 54 U.S. military personnel since President Bush
declared an end to “major combat operations” in Iraq on May 1, 2003. The Bush
Administration says resistance comes not only from remnants of the Baath Party but
also from Arab volunteers — possibly linked to or supportive of Al Qaeda — who
have come to Iraq from other countries to fight the U.S. occupation. Attacks have
been more frequent in the Sunni areas of central Iraq, where support for Saddam
Hussein’s regime was traditionally stronger than elsewhere. Some elements of the
resistance appear to want to restore the old regime, while others appear to be
motivated by opposition to foreign rule. Others appear to be motivated by the
difficulty the U.S. and British authorities have had in restoring civilian services. U.S.
military officials put the resistance numbers at about 5,000, although they do not
explain precisely how they arrive at that figure. In late June, some opponents of the
occupation began identifying themselves as distinct groups, scribbling graffiti
warnings and faxing statements to the Arab satellite television network Al Jazeera,
UAE-based Al Arabiya TV, and other outlets. They are using such names as:
! Al Awda (the Return);
! the Snakes;
! the Movement of the Victorious Sect;
! Iraq’s Revolutionaries - Al Anbar’s Armed Brigades;
! The Popular Resistance for the Liberation of Iraq;
! the Salafist Jihad Group (Salafi is a Sunni extremist Islamic
movement): and
! Armed Islamic Movement for Al Qaeda - Falluja Branch. Actual
linkages to Al Qaeda, if any, are not known.

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CRS-24
The continuing resistance has complicated the U.S. mission. In addition to
targeting U.S. forces, resistance fighters have assassinated
Iraqis who are
cooperating with the United States. In addition, U.S. officials say that the costs of
the ongoing U.S. operations are about $3.9 billion per month, about double what was
anticipated for the occupation period. On the other hand, CPA said on July 18 that
acts of sabotage against pipelines and other infrastructure appears to have declined
over the past six weeks.
The Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA). The Bush Administration
initially tasked Lt. Gen. Jay Garner (ret.) to direct civilian reconstruction, working
through a staff of U.S. diplomats and other U.S. government personnel who are
serving as advisers and administrators in Iraq’s various ministries. He headed the
Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA), within the
Department of Defense, created by a January 20, 2003 executive order. After
spending the combat phase of the war in neighboring Kuwait, Garner and some of his
staff of about 200 deployed to Baghdad on April 21, 2003, to begin work. Former
Ambassador to Yemen Barbara Bodine was responsible for a “central” region; and
retired generals Buck Walters and Bruce Moore were responsible for “southern” and
“northern” regions, respectively.
Press reports said that senior U.S. officials were dissatisfied with the slow pace
of reconstruction under Garner, and on May 6, 2003, the Administration appointed
former ambassador L. Paul Bremer to lead the overall reconstruction effort, with a
focus on political reconstruction. He arrived on May 12 to head the Coalition
Provisional Authority (CPA), which subsumed ORHA, and Bodine and then Garner
departed shortly thereafter. The appointment represented an apparent adjustment
from the original structure of the U.S. reconstruction effort, although
the
Administration stated that it was always envisioned that a civilian would eventually
take over the U.S. effort. U.S. officials now refer to the CPA as an occupying
authority legitimized by U.N. Security Council Resolution 1483 of May 22, 2003.
Among other provisions, the resolution lifted U.N. sanctions on Iraq. U.S. officials,
including President Bush, have expressed confidence in Ambassador Bremer,
although a Washington Post article on July 26, 2003, said the Administration was
considering appointing a well known former official such as former Secretary of
State James Baker to help the CPA by coordinating international assistance to Iraq.
U.S. officials later said such a move is not now under consideration.
Building Security Institutions. While attempting to restore security to Iraq,
the CPA is beginning to build new Iraqi institutions that can eventually take over the
security function from the United States. The United States is planning to train a
40,000 person Iraqi army, about 10% the size of the pre-war Iraqi force. About
12,000 are expected to be in the force by mid-2004. Former Defense Department
official Walter Slocombe is in charge of forming the new Iraqi army. The CPA is
also trying to turn basic policing functions over to Iraqis. Overall, about 32,000 Iraqi
policemen have returned to their jobs, about half the total goal. The CPA official
responsible for the new police force, former New York City police commissioner
Bernard Kerik, says it will take about 18 months (end of 2004) to reach the goal of

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CRS-25
65,000 policemen nationwide.18 The CPA is also recruiting a 7,000 man, all- Iraqi
civil defense force to guard installations.
Searching for Regime Violations. Organs of the CPA and the U.S.
government are attempting to uncover abuses and violations of the regime of Saddam
Hussein. A 1,500 person “Iraq Survey Group,” headed by a U.S. military commander
but composed of many civilian technical experts, including former U.N. weapons
inspector David Kay, is attempting to uncover alleged weapons of mass destruction.
The Survey Group, commanded by Major General Keith Dayton, is also searching
for mass graves of victims of the former regime. Kay and Dayton briefed Members
of Congress on July 30, 2003, saying they were making substantial progress in
uncovering the fate of suspected WMD programs. Thus far, the Survey Group has
found at least 60 mass graves, some with hundreds of corpses. Most appear to
contain bodies of Kurdish and Shiite opponents of the former regime, but some
might contain the bodies of about 600 Kuwaitis missing from the first Gulf war.
(The fate of the Kuwaiti missing is discussed in CRS Issue Brief IB92117.)
Recruiting Other Peacekeepers. The relatively slow pace of establishing
Iraqi security institutions, coupled with ongoing security difficulties and continued
U.S. casualties, has led to calls from Members of Congress and others to try to enlist
other countries to help with the stabilization of Iraq. Negotiations with other
countries is proceeding for a multinational peacekeeping force in Iraq that would
presumably spread some of the peace-keeping and stabilization burden now borne
mostly by U.S. forces. According to the Administration, more than 30 countries are
discussing offers of forces for a multilateral stabilization force, and several countries
have made begun implementing pledges of troops and or police or support personnel.
The commitments of several nations, including Germany, France, India, and Turkey
appear to be dependent on whether the U.N. Security Council authorizes such a force,
and several nations appear to require U.S. or other funding in order to participate.
Secretary of State Powell said on July 16 that the United States is discussing with
other countries the possibility of seeking formal U.N. backing for a multilateral
peacekeeping force.
The United Kingdom and Poland have offered to lead multinational divisions
in that mission in southern Iraq and central Iraq, respectively. The United States and
Poland reached agreement in late July 2003 for the United States to fund the
deployment of the Polish force, support valued at about $250 million. The UK-led
force is to number about 14,000, of which all but 2,000 are British forces. The
Polish-led force is to number about 9,200, of which 2,300 will be Polish. The
pledged forces listed below have begun deploying to Iraq as of early August 2003,
and U.S. officials say there are now 13,400 non-U.S. troops on the ground, as of July
31, 2003. Confirmed pledges include those shown in Table 1.
18 Schmitt, Eric. Wolfowitz on Visit to Iraq to Assess Rebuilding Effort. New York Times,
July 18, 2003.

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CRS-26
Table 1. Multinational Division Force Pledges
Azerbaijan
150
Bulgaria
500
Czech Republic
400
Denmark
380
Dominican Republic
300
El Salvador
300
Estonia
55
Georgia
100
Honduras
300
Hungary
300
Italy
3,000 (mostly military police)
Japan
1,000 (logistics and combat support)
Latvia
150
Lithuania
85
Macedonia
28
Mongolia
200
Netherlands
1,100
Nicaragua
300
Norway
150
Philippines
500
Poland
2,300
Portugal
120
Romania
150
Slovakia
85
South Korea
700 (mostly medical)
Spain
1,300
Ukraine
1650
Total Non-U.S./U.K
16,600

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CRS-27
The United States has discussed with NATO whether it would take on Iraq as
a fifth peacekeeping mission. However, on July 17, NATO secretary general George
Robertson said the body had no plans for a greater role beyond providing logistical
help to the Polish-led force in Iraq. On July 10, 2003, the Senate adopted an
amendment, by a vote of 97-0, to a State Department authorization bill (S. 925)
calling on the Administration to formally ask NATO to lead a peacekeeping force for
Iraq. A related bill (H.R. 2112) was introduced in the House on May 15, 2003.
Other countries have also agreed to provide funding for reconstruction.
According to the June 30, 2004, report to Congress by the Administration, the
following countries have made financial pledges for Iraq reconstruction: United
Kingdom ($177.1 million); Japan ($101.8 million); Australia ($60.5 million); UAE
($47.6 million); Canada ($41.2 million); Saudi Arabia ($36.6 million); Spain ($32.2
million); Kuwait ($27.5 million); the European Commission ($26.3 million); and
Italy ($22.4 million).
U.N. Role. Just after the fall of Saddam Hussein’s regime, the United States
and its European allies and other countries reached a measure of agreement on a
U.N. role in post-war Iraq. Resolution 1483, which was adopted unanimously,
provides for a U.N. special representative to coordinate the activities of U.N.
personnel in Iraq and to help establish a successor government. The Secretary
General subsequently (May 27, 2003) appointed Brazilian diplomat Sergio Vieira
de Mello for that post. The resolution also gave the United Nations a monitoring role
over the Development Fund for Iraq, a fund that will handle Iraq’s oil revenues until
there is a successor government. The resolution did not authorize a return to Iraq of
U.N. weapons inspectors, although the resolution provides for deliberations on that
issue. Some International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors returned to Iraq in June
2003 on a limited nuclear mission in Baghdad. As noted above, some countries are
conditioning any contribution of peacekeeping troops to Iraq on a formal U.N.
authorization, a step the Administration now appears to be weighing. On the other
hand, the Washington Post reported on August 2, 2003, that the Administration does
not want to agree to a U.N. resolution that dilutes its prerogatives in Iraq, particularly
its authority in determining a new political structure. The World Bank, which visited
Iraq in late July 2003, said it would resume lending to Iraq after it conducts national
elections.
Reviving the Oil Industry.19 As the driver of Iraq’s economy, the rebuilding
of the oil industry is receiving substantial U.S. attention. Ambassador Bremer said
in a press interview on July 31, 2003, that it could take $50 - $100 billion to
reconstruct Iraq, and a $1.6 billion plan to rehabilitate Iraq’s oil industry was agreed
in late July. It has been widely assumed that Iraq’s vast oil reserves, believed second
only to those of Saudi Arabia, would be used to fund much of the costs of
reconstruction. Presidential spokesman Ari Fleischer said on February 18, 2003,
referring to Iraq’s oil reserves, that Iraq has “a variety of means ... to shoulder much
of the burden for [its] own reconstruction.” Many observers had been concerned that
an Iraqi regime on the verge of defeat could destroy its own oil fields, but coalition
19 For information on the prospects for Iraq’s post-war economy, see CRS Report RL31944.
Iraq’s Economy: Past, Present, Future.

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CRS-28
forces quickly secured Iraq’s southern oil fields after combat began. Only about 9
oil wells were set on fire, of a total of over 500 oil fields in that region, and all were
put out quickly. The northern oil fields in Kirkuk and Mosul were not set afire.
In early May 2003, the U.S.-led coalition set up an advisory board, headed by
former Shell executive Phillip Carroll, to oversee the rebuilding of Iraq’s oil sector.
An Iraqi oil industry professional, Thamer Ghadhban, was named to serve as head
of the interim management team that will run Iraq’s oil ministry and report to the
advisory board. The first exports began in late June 2003, and Ghadhban said that
Iraq would be up to about 1 million barrels per day of exports by mid-July. In late
July, Iraq contracted to sell oil, about 750,000 barrels per day, slightly below the
target rate. Its pre-war export rate was about 2.2 million barrels per day, a level that
U.S. officials and Iraqi oil appointees hope to reach by late 2003. The CPA-produced
budget for Iraq assumes that oil exports will yield about $3.6 billion through the end
of 2003, and provide about half of the approximately $6.6 billion budget for Iraq for
the period. The deficit will be covered from funds in the Development Fund for Iraq,
set up by the post-war Resolution 1483 (see below).
A related issue is long-term development of Iraq’s oil industry and which
foreign energy firms, if any, might receive preference for contracts to explore Iraq’s
vast reserves. Russia, China, and others are said to fear that the United States will
seek to develop Iraq’s oil industry with minimal participation of firms from other
countries.
Continuation of the Oil-for-Food Program. About 60% of Iraqis have
been receiving all their foodstuffs from the U.N.-supervised Oil-for-Food Program.
The program, which is an exception to the comprehensive U.N. embargo on Iraq put
in place after the 1991 Persian Gulf war, began operations in December 1996. It was
suspended just before hostilities began, when U.N. staff in Iraq that run the various
aspects of the program departed Iraq. As of the start of the war, about $9 billion
worth of humanitarian goods were in the process of being delivered or in production.
(See CRS Report RL30472, Iraq: Oil-for-Food Program, Sanctions, and Illicit
Trade.)
On March 28, 2003, the U.N. Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution
1472 that restarted the program’s operations and empowered the United Nations, for
a 45-day period (until May 12), to take direct control of all aspects of the program.
Under the new resolution, the United Nations is setting priorities for and directing the
delivery of already contracted supplies. The enhanced U.N. authority was extended
on April 25, 2003, to last at least until the six-month phase of the program expired
on June 3, 2003.
On April 17, 2003, the Administration called for a lifting of U.N. sanctions
against Iraq, signaling that the Administration wanted to focus on restoring normal
international commerce with Iraq rather than extending the oil-for-food program.
Resolution 1483 lifted sanctions and provided for the phasing out of the oil for food
program within six months after adoption of that resolution on May 22. The
resolution also provided for the United Nations to transfer to the new Development
Fund for Iraq $1 billion in funds held by the oil-for-food program escrow fund. That
Development Fund contained about $7 billion in June 2003, consisting of captured

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Iraqi assets, Iraqi assets abroad, the monies transferred from the oil-for-food account,
and U.S. funds available for reconstruction. (For more information, see CRS Report
RL30472, Iraq: Oil-for-Food Program, International Sanctions, and Illicit Trade.)
War Crimes. An issue related to regime change but somewhat separate is
whether Saddam Hussein and his associates should be prosecuted for war crimes and
crimes against humanity, if and when they are caught. The Administration said in
early April 2003 that Saddam and his inner circle should be tried by Iraqis if they are
captured, although others might be tried by a U.S.-led process for any crimes
committed in the course of the 2003 war.
In the year prior to the war, the
Administration was gathering data for a potential trial of Saddam and 12 of his
associates. Those it had sought for trial include Saddam; his two sons Uday and
Qusay (killed after discovery by and a firefight with U.S. forces in Mosul on July 22,
2003); Ali Hassan al-Majid, for alleged use of chemicals against the Kurds (he was
reported by British officers to have died in an early April air strike on his home in
Basra, although that is now in question); Muhammad Hamza al-Zubaydi (surrendered
in mid-April 2003); Taha Yasin Ramadan; first Vice President and number three in
the regime; Izzat Ibrahim, Vice Chairman of the Revolutionary Command Council
and formally number two in the regime; Barzan al-Tikriti, Saddam’s half brother
(captured in mid-April 2003); Watban al-Tikriti (captured in April 2003) and Sabawi
al-Tikriti, both other half brothers of Saddam and former leaders of regime
intelligence bureaus; Tariq Aziz, deputy Prime Minister and foremost regime
spokesman (surrendered in May 2003); and Aziz Salih Noman, governor of Kuwait
during Iraq’s occupation of that country (apprehended in May 2003).
Others not on the list of twelve, but part of a list of 55 former regime officials
sought by the United States for questioning and possible arrest, have been captured
or surrendered. As of mid-July 2003, according to Coalition Provisional Authority
officials, more than half of the Iraqis on the list of 55 are now in custody or are
confirmed killed. Among the others apprehended are Amir al-Saadi, chief science
adviser to Saddam; Jamal Mustafa al-Tikriti, a son-in-law of Saddam; Vice President
Taha Muhi ad-Din Ma’ruf; and suspected WMD manager Hoda Mahdi Salih al-
Ammash.
The war crimes issue has been addressed by previous U.S. administrations and
the international community. U.N. Security Council Resolution 674 (October 29,
1990) calls on all states or organizations to provide information on Iraq’s war-related
atrocities to the United Nations. The Foreign Relations Authorization Act for
FY1992 (P.L. 102-138, October 28, 1991, Section 301) stated the sense of Congress
that the President should propose to the U.N. Security Council a war crimes tribunal
for Saddam Hussein. Similar legislation was later passed, including H.Con.Res. 137
(passed the House November 13, 1997); S.Con.Res. 78 (passed the Senate March
13, 1998); and a provision of the Iraq Liberation Act (P.L. 105-338, signed October
31, 1998).
A U.S. Army report on possible war crimes was released on March 19, 1993,
after Clinton took office.
Since April 1997, the United States has supported
INDICT, a private organization that publicizes alleged Iraqi war crimes and seeks the
arrest of the 12 alleged Iraqi war criminals mentioned above. In August 2000, the
Clinton Administration’s Ambassador-At-Large for War Crimes, David Scheffer,

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said that the United States wanted to see an Iraq war crimes tribunal established,
focusing on “nine major criminal episodes.” These included the use of chemical
weapons against Kurdish civilians at Halabja (March 16, 1988, killing 5,000 Kurds)
and the forced relocation of Kurds in the “Anfal” campaign (February 1988, in which
an estimated 50,000 to 182,000 Kurds died); the use of chemical weapons against
Iran; post-war crimes against humanity (the Kurds and the Marsh Arabs); war crimes
against Kuwait (including oil field fires) and coalition forces; and other allegations.
In FY2001 and again in FY2002, the State Department contributed $4 million to a
U.N. “Iraq War Crimes Commission,” to be spent if a U.N. tribunal for Iraq war
crimes is formed.
Congressional Reactions
Congress, like the Administration, had divergent views on the mechanisms for
promoting regime change, although there was widespread agreement in Congress that
regime change was desirable and an appropriate U.S. policy. There was substantial
disagreement over whether a major military offensive was the most desirable option
for achieving that objective. On December 20, 2001, the House passed H.J.Res. 75,
by a vote of 392-12, calling Iraq’s refusal to readmit U.N. weapons inspectors a
“mounting threat” to the United States. The resolution did not call for new U.S. steps
to overthrow Saddam Hussein but a few Members called for the overthrow of
Saddam Hussein in their floor statements in support of the resolution.
In early 2002, prior to the intensified speculation about possible war with Iraq,
some Members expressed support for increased aid to the opposition. In a joint
appearance with Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Joseph Biden on
Cable News Network on February 17, 2002, House International Relations
Committee Chairman Henry Hyde said that “...supporting the underground, the
opposition, the internal opposition, is to me the procedure of choice. That is an
option that is being worked on. All of these options are under consideration.” In
early December 2001, a bipartisan group of nine Members — Senators John
McCain, Jesse Helms, Richard Shelby, Sam Brownback, Joseph Lieberman, and
Trent Lott and Representatives Henry Hyde, Benjamin Gilman, and Harold Ford Jr.
— wrote to President Bush to urge that U.S. assistance be provided to the INC for
operations inside Iraq itself. According to the letter,
Despite the express wishes of the Congress, the INC has been denied U.S.
assistance for any operations inside any part of Iraq, including liberated Kurdish
areas. Instead, successive Administrations have funded conferences, offices and
other intellectual exercises that have done little more than expose the INC to
accusations of being “limousine insurgents” and “armchair guerrillas.”
As discussion of potential military action
increased in the fall of 2002,
Members debated the costs and risks of an all-out U.S. effort to achieve that result.
Congress adopted H.J.Res. 114, authorizing the President to use military force
against Iraq if he determines that doing so is in the national interest and will enforce
U.N. Security Council resolutions on Iraq. The measure passed the House on
October 11, 2002 by a vote of 296-133, and the Senate the following day by a vote
of 77-23. The legislation was signed into law on October 16, 2002 (P.L. 107-243).

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The 108th Congress was sworn in on January 7, 2003. Prior to the war, it held
several hearings on the progress of post-war reconstruction. During the war and in
its aftermath, several Members applauded the performance of the U.S. military and
the overthrow of the regime.
Some Members, however, have criticized the
Administration for inadequate planning for the post-war period in light of major
looting and disorder in Iraq’s cities after the fall of the regime. Criticism of post-war
planning has escalated as attacks on U.S. occupation forces have mounted, although
the Administration and others say U.S. casualties are relatively light and that the
resistance is not jeopardizing overall U.S. objectives for Iraq. Several Committees
are conducting inquiries into why substantial amounts of WMD have not been found
in Iraq to date. Some Members of both parties have also expressed concern about the
costs of the U.S. occupation, and several Members have called on the Administration
to take greater steps to persuade other countries to share the burden of peacekeeping
in and reconstruction of Iraq.

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Appendix. U.S. Assistance to the Opposition
Appropriated Economic Support Funds (E.S.F.)
to the Opposition
(Figures in millions of dollars)
Unspecified
War
INC
Broadcasting
Opposition
Total
Crimes
Activities
FY 1998
2.0
5.0
3.0
10.0
(P.L. 105-174)
(RFE/RL)
FY 1999
3.0
3.0
2.0
8.0
(P.L. 105-277)
FY 2000
2.0
8.0
10.0
(P.L. 106-113)
FY 2001
12.0
2.0
6.0
5.0
25.0
(P.L. 106-429)
(aid
(INC radio)
distribution
inside Iraq)
FY 2002
25.0
25.0
(P.L. 107-115)
Total,
15.0
9.0
11.0
43.0
78.0
FY1998-FY2002
FY2003
3.1
6.9
10.0
(no earmark)
(announced
(remaining
April 2003)
to be
allocated)
FY2004
0
0
(request)
Notes: The figures above do not include defense articles and services provided under the Iraq
Liberation Act. During FY1999-FY2000, approximately $5 million worth of services, out of the $97
million authorized by the Act, was obligated to the opposition, and $1 million of that has been spent,
as of late December 2002. The figures provided above also do not include any covert aid provided,
the amounts of which are not known from open sources. In addition, during each of FY2001 and
FY2002, the Administration has donated $4 million to a “U.N. War Crimes Commission” fund, to be
used if a war crimes tribunal is formed. Those funds were drawn from U.S. contributions to U.N.
programs.

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