Order Code RL31988
CRS Report for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
Polygraph Use by the Department of Energy:
Issues for Congress
July 8, 2003
Alfred Cumming
Specialist in Intelligence and National Security
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

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Polygraph Use by the Department of Energy:
Issues for Congress
Summary
In the aftermath of the Wen Ho Lee case and the growing concern over the
Department of Energy’s (DOE) counterintelligence program that followed, DOE in
March 1999 began developing its first-ever polygraph screening program affecting an
estimated 800 DOE employees with access to sensitive and classified information.
Congress in October 1999 mandated DOE polygraph testing (P.L. 106-65, Sec.
3154) and expanded the program to cover 13,000 DOE employees with access to
sensitive and classified information. The following year, Congress further expanded
polygraph testing to cover approximately 20,000 DOE employees (P.L. 106-398, Sec.
3135) with the addition of new eligibility categories. In part because of continuing
opposition by some DOE nuclear weapons laboratory employees, Congress in 2001
requested that the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) review the scientific evidence
regarding the validity and reliability of the polygraph, particularly when used for
personnel security screening. Congress directed DOE to institute a new polygraph
program based upon the NAS findings (P.L. 107-107, Sec. 3152).
NAS completed its study in October 2002, concluding that while polygraph testing
is more effective when used in connection with event-specific investigations, its
accuracy is insufficient to justify reliance on its use in screening current and prospective
federal agency employees — DOE’s principal purpose in using the polygraph.
According to NAS, in populations such as DOE’s, where there is an extremely low level
of major security violations, the polygraph has serious limitations for use in security
screening to identify security risks. NAS also reported that there is a realistic possibility
that the polygraph might be defeated with countermeasures.
Although acknowledging the NAS findings, Energy Secretary Spencer Abraham
announced on April 14, 2003, that DOE would continue to use the polygraph for
screening purposes, citing it as an effective component of DOE’s counterintelligence
program. He said that DOE does not use the polygraph on a stand-alone basis but as
part of a larger fabric of investigative and analytical reviews to help security personnel
determine if someone is suitable to access to classified data. He also asserted that
polygraphs have value in deterring unauthorized disclosures of classified information.
Pointing to the NAS findings, some Members of Congress have called on the
Energy Secretary to review his decision, and have expressed a desire for a more focused
polygraph program that would subject fewer DOE employees to testing. Others have
cautioned that a false sense of confidence can arise from reliance on a technique they
believe is inaccurate. They also cited NAS’s warning that the polygraph can be defeated
by countermeasures.
There are several possible approaches Congress might assess, including retention
of the status quo, the establishment of a more focused polygraph program under which
those occupying only the most sensitive positions would be polygraphed; more research
into alternatives to the polygraph; and the elimination of the polygraph for screening
purposes altogether. This report will be updated as warranted.

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Contents
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Some See Polygraph’s Utility But Many DOE Scientists Are Skeptical . . . . 4
Dearth of Scientific Evidence Underlying the Polygraph . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
What The Available Evidence Does Show . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
DOE Proposes To Maintain Current Polygraph Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Issues for Congress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
A More Focused Polygraph . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Additional Research . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Discard Use Of Polygraph For Screening . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

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Polygraph Use by the Department of
Energy: Issues for Congress
Introduction
Since its establishment in 1977, the Department of Energy (DOE) has been
frequently criticized for adopting a lax approach to countertintelligence (CI),
particularly in connection with its nuclear weapons laboratories.1 Years of
increasingly critical CI reviews culminated in 1998 when intelligence evidence
suggested that the People’s Republic of China (PRC) had stolen secrets from DOE’s
national security laboratories.2 President Clinton responded by issuing Presidential
Decision Directive (PDD) 61, which fundamentally restructured DOE’s CI program.
The President directed DOE to develop and implement specific security measures,
including the possible use of polygraph testing, to reduce the threat to classified
information.
In March 1999, DOE began to develop a CI-scope polygraph to screen
employees occupying security-sensitive positions. Questions asked as part of a CI-
scope polygraph are limited to topics concerning the individuals’ involvement in
espionage, sabotage, terrorism, unauthorized disclosure of classified information,
unauthorized foreign contacts, and deliberate damage to or malicious misuse of a
U.S. Government information or defense system. In August 1999, DOE proposed
expanding the CI polygraph program to contractor and Federal employees at its
facilities in positions with access to the most sensitive categories of classified
information and materials, as well as to applicants for such positions.3 In October
1999, Congress mandated what until then had been a DOE-discretionary polygraph
testing program (P.L. 106-65, Section 3154). Congress also expanded the number
of those required to take the polygraph to 13,000.4 In December 1999, Energy
Secretary Bill Richardson announced that CI interests could be satisfied with
1DOE has three nuclear weapons laboratories where classified nuclear weapons research
is conducted: Los Alamos National Laboratory, Los Alamos, NM; Lawrence Livermore
National Laboratory, Livermore, CA; and Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque, NM
and Livermore, CA.
2For a comprehensive review of this issue, see CRS Report RL30143, China, Suspected
Acquisition of U.S. Nuclear Weapons Secrets, by Shirley Kan. See also Attorney General’s
Review Team on the Handling of the Los Alamos Laboratory Investigation, May, 2000, at
[http:\\www.FAS.org].
3Federal Register 64, no. 242 (Dec. 17, 1999), p. 70963.
4See United States Department of Energy News, DOE Polygraph Implementation Plan
Announced, Dec. 13, 1999.

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CRS-2
approximately 800 polygraphs.5 DOE originally had intended its program to cover
approximately 3,000 employees, but the number was reduced after protests from
national laboratory employees.6 Richardson said he would seek legislation to ensure
consistency between DOE’s implementation plan and congressional direction.7
Instead, Congress in 2000, prompted by continuing security concerns, approved
legislation (P.L. 106-398, Section 3135) further expanding, by statute, the program
to cover approximately 20,000 DOE employees.8 By subsequently eliminating
overlapping categories of covered employees, DOE today polygraphs approximately
16,000 employees.
In 2002, Congress instructed the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) to
review the scientific evidence regarding the polygraph’s validity and reliability and
directed DOE to institute a new program based upon NAS findings ( P.L. 107-107,
Section 3152). Congress said a new program should “minimize the potential for
release or disclosure of classified data, materials, or information.”
Background
Debate continues over the validity and reliability of the modern polygraph, first
developed early in the 1900s. What is undisputed is that the polygraph machine does
not measure deception but rather is an instrument that charts changes in a
individual’s respiration, heart rate, blood pressure, and sweat gland activity in
response to a series of yes/no answers.9 Polygraph examiners determine whether a
person’s physiological reaction is stronger in responding to certain questions when
contrasted with recorded reactions to a series of comparison “control” questions.
Stronger reactions indicate that the individual may be deceptive. It is these
physiological responses which are at the heart of the ongoing debate over the validity
of polygraph testing.10 Scientists studying the polygraph further note a distinction
between the polygraph test and the polygraph examination, which includes the test
and the interrogation surrounding it. The first represents an attempt to capture
5Ibid.
6Andrea Widner, “DOE Lab Employees Protest New Law Mandating Polygraph Tests,”
Knight Ridder/Tribune News, Nov. 9, 2000.
7See United States Department of Energy News, DOE Polygraph Implementation Plan
Announced, Dec. 13, 1999.
8Federal Register 68, no. 71 (April 14, 2003), p. 17887.
9A polygraph instrument will collect physiological data from at least three systems in the
human body. Convoluted rubber tubes that are placed over the examinee’s chest and
abdominal areas will record respiratory activity. Two small metal plates, attached to the
fingers, will record sweat gland activity, and a blood pressure cuff, ro similar device will
record cardiovascular activity.
10See the National Research Council of the National Academy of Sciences, The Polygraph
and Lie Detection, 2002, p. 13.

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CRS-3
accurate psychophysiological indicators of deception. The second is a tool for
revealing truth.11
The polygraph is used for three principal purposes: event specific or exculpatory
— for example, when a crime has been committed; preemployment screening; and
screening current employees. The Intelligence Community uses the polygraph as a
screening device and investigative tool. The Department of Defense (DOD) uses it
almost exclusively as an investigative tool. DOD does use polygraphs for employee
screening, but only for individuals granted exceptional clearances for highly sensitive
programs.12
Although DOE has long used the polygraph as an investigative tool, only since
1999 has it employed it as a screening tool. The Energy Department turned to
polygraph testing after President Clinton issued PDD 61 in response to long-standing
concerns about security at DOE weapons labs and specifically because of intelligence
evidence indicating that the PRC may have stolen secrets from DOE’s weapons labs.
The President directed DOE to consider establishing a polygraph program as one
component of a comprehensive CI program that could include background checks,
periodic reinvestigations, monitoring of financial records, restrictions on publishing
materials, and, for some employees, mandatory drug testing and medical
assessments.13 Under current DOE regulations, neither DOE nor its contractors may
take an adverse personnel action against an individual solely on the basis of a
polygraph result indicating deception.14
DOE cited three principal reasons when it proposed polygraph screening in
1999.15 First, a CI-scope polygraph, according to DOE, serves both as means to
deter unauthorized disclosures of classified information and to detect early any
disclosure of classified or sensitive information. The latter, DOE argues, allows it
to promptly take steps to mitigate any damage to the national security. Second, DOE
suggested that the polygraph examination is essential in granting interim personnel
security clearances on an expedited basis. Finally, DOE argued that a polygraph
examination provides an important tool that is available upon employee request to
expeditiously resolve any outstanding issues in a CI or personnel security
investigation.
11Ibid., p. 21.
12See Commission on Science and Security, Science and Security in the 21st Century, A
Report to the Secretary of Energy on the Department of Energy Laboratories, Apr., 2002,
p. 54.
13Federal Register 64, no. 242 (Dec. 17, 1999), p. 70962.
14 Ibid., p. 70962.
15 Ibid., p. 70963.

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CRS-4
Some See Polygraph’s Utility But Many DOE Scientists Are
Skeptical
Many DOE laboratory personnel have a “very negative” attitude towards the
polygraph, according to the report of the Redmond Panel, a panel of experts which
reviewed DOE CI capabilities at DOE’s national security laboratories on behalf of
the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence.16 The attitude toward
polygraphs at the laboratories, according to panel findings, runs the gamut from
cautiously and rationally negative to emotionally and irrationally negative.17 The
Panel noted in its findings that never before have so many cleared employees of a
government organization had to have their clearances threatened by the institution of
the polygraph.18 The Panel also noted that scientists do, in fact, represent a particular
problem with regard to the administration of polygraphs. “They are most
comfortable when dealing with techniques that are scientifically precise and reliable,”
according to the Panel. “The polygraph, useful as it is as one of several tools in a CI
regimen, does not meet this standard. Accordingly, many scientists who have had no
experience with it are skeptical of its utility.”19 The Panel went on to note, however,
that “...polygraphs, while not definitive in their results, are of significant utility in a
broader comprehensive CI program. The polygraph is an essential element of the CI
program and it will not work until it is accepted by those who are subject to it.”20 In
its report, NAS said that polygraph testing has some utility in “deterring security
violations, increasing the frequency of admissions of such violations, deterring
employment applications from potentially poor security risks, and increasing public
confidence in national security organizations....Such utility derives from beliefs about
the procedure’s validity, which are distinct from actual validity or accuracy.”21
The Society of Professional Scientists and Engineers, an association of current
and retired scientists at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, argues that the
polygraph is not only scientifically invalid and unreliable but lacks utility as well.
“Their unreliability renders polygraphs incapable of catching spies and can lead to
false accusations of innocent workers who may find themselves defenseless against
the machine’s oscillations,” according to the Society.22 Other critics argue that the
polygraph has failed to uncover such prominent spies as Aldrich Ames and indeed
maintain that spies know how to employ countermeasures against the polygraph.
16U.S. Congress, House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Report of the
Redmond Panel, June 21, 2000, pp. 7-8.
17Ibid., p. 7.
18Ibid., p. 7.
19Ibid., p. 8.
20Ibid., p. 8.
21See the National Research Council of the National Academy of Sciences, The Polygraph
and Lie Detection, 2002, p. 6.
22Society of Professional Scientists and Engineers, SPSE Speaks Out on Polygraphs, Aug.
13, 1999.

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CRS-5
Dearth of Scientific Evidence Underlying the
Polygraph
As distinct from the utility of the polygraph, supporters and critics of the
polygraph agree that the scientific evidence relevant to the accuracy of polygraph
screening tests — the principal purpose of DOE’s polygraph program — is extremely
limited. The NAS said it found only one flawed field study that provided evidence
directly relevant to accuracy for preemployment screening.23 The American
Polygraph Association (APA), the largest polygraph association consisting of
examiners in the private, law enforcement, and government fields, blames the paucity
of research into the scientific basis for the polygraph or any other deception detection
technique on a lack of resources.24 The NAS agreed, noting that the lack of serious
investment in such research is “striking,” given the heavy reliance of the government
on the polygraph, especially for screening for espionage and sabotage. 25
What The Available Evidence Does Show
The NAS, in its study, arrived at a number of conclusions. First, it concluded
that polygraph testing, particularly with regard to personnel screening, yields an
unacceptable choice for DOE employee security screening between too many loyal
employees falsely judged deceptive and too many major security threats left
undetected. The polygraph’s accuracy, according to the NAS, in distinguishing
actual or potential security violators from innocent test takers is insufficient to justify
reliance on its use in employee security screening in federal agencies.26
Second, the NAS concluded that, based upon field reports and indirect scientific
evidence, polygraph screening may have some utility for achieving such objectives
as deterring security violations, increasing the frequency of admissions of such
violations, deterring employment applications from potentially poor security risks,
and increasing public confidence in national security organizations. Such utility,
however, derives from beliefs about the validity of the procedure, and are distinct
from “actual validity or accuracy,” according to NAS.27 The NAS also concluded
that the proportion of spies, terrorists and other major national security threats among
the employees subject to polygraph testing in the DOE labs presumably is very low,
and that polygraphs therefore should not be counted on for detection when screening
population with low rates of the target transgressions, because “screening populations
23See the National Research Council of the National Academy of Sciences, The Polygraph
and Lie Detection, 2002, p. 3.
24American Polygraph Association, Statement of the American Polygraph Association
Pertaining to the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) Report on the Use of the Polygraph,
undated.
25See the National Research Council of the National Academy of Sciences, The Polygraph
and Lie Detection, 2002, p. 8.
26Ibid., p. 6
27Ibid., p. 8.

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CRS-6
with very low rates of the target transgressions (e.g., less than 1 in 1,000) requires
diagnostics of extremely high accuracy, well beyond what can be expected from
polygraph testing.”28 NAS also stated that countermeasures pose a potentially serious
threat to the performance of polygraph testing because all the physiological
indicators measured by the polygraph can be altered by conscious efforts through
cognitive or physical means. NAS noted that “there is enough empirical evidence to
justify concern that successful countermeasures may be learnable.”29
The NAS findings essentially track the results of a similar research review
completed by the Congressional Office of Technical Assessment (OTA) in 1983,
which concluded that there was not adequate evidence at that time to establish the
scientific validity of the polygraph test for personnel security screening. OTA went
on to more broadly state that the establishing the overall validity of the polygraph is
not possible. OTA cited two reasons. First, the polygraph is a very complex process
that is much more than the instrument. The types of individuals tested, examiner’s
training, purpose of the test, and types of questions asked, among other factors can
differ substantially, according to the OTA report. Second, OTA noted, the research
on polygraph validity varies widely in terms of results and the quality of the research
design and methodology. “... conclusions about scientific validity can be made only
the context of specific applications and even then must be tempered by the
limitations of available research evidence,” according to OTA.30
Polygraph supporters such as the APA in turn cite 80 research projects,
published since 1980, showing accuracy ranges for the polygraph from 80 to 98
percent.31 While conceding that there has been only a limited number of research
projects on the accuracy of polygraph testing for screening, the APA argues that “real
world conditions are difficult if not impossible to replicate in a mock crime or
laboratory environment for the purpose of assessing effectiveness.”32 The APA
further argues that the same physiological measures are recorded and the same basic
psychological principles may apply in both the event specific and pre-employment
screening examinations and therefore there is no reason to believe that there is a
substantial decrease in the accuracy rate for the preemployment circumstance. The
few studies that have been conducted on pre-employment testing support this
contention, according to the APA.33
U.S. intelligence community agencies, however, continue to believe the
polygraph is a useful screening tool. The CIA claimed to have classified research to
28Ibid., pp. 5-6.
29Ibid., p. 216.
30Office of Technology Assessment, Scientific Validity of Polygraph Testing, Nov. 1983, p.
4.
31American Polygraph Association, Polygraph Issues and Answers, undated.
32American Polygraph Association, Statement of the American Polygraph Association
Pertaining to the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) Report on the Use of the Polygraph,
undated.
33American Polygraph Association, Polygraph Issues and Answers, undated.

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CRS-7
support their use of polygraph tests but would not share it with OTA at the time of
its study. According to OTA, in its 1983 report, CIA and NSA use the polygraph not
to determine deception or truthfulness per se, but as a technique of interrogation to
encourage admissions. OTA reported that the polygraph examination results that are
most important to NSA security adjudicators are the data provided by the individual
during the pre-test or post-test phase of examination. The Director of Central
Intelligence Security Committee concluded that polygraph was the most productive
all background investigation techniques. But OTA pointed out that the study was one
of utility, not validity.
DOE Proposes To Maintain Current
Polygraph Program
The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002 (P.L. 107-107,
Section 3152) directed DOE to issue a notice of proposed rule-making for a new
polygraph program based upon the findings of the NAS polygraph review. The Act
also stated that the purpose of any such new program would be to minimize the
potential for release or disclosure of classified data, materials, or information.
On April 14, 2003, DOE, to satisfy the congressional directive, published a
notice of proposed rule-making “to begin a proceeding to consider whether to retain
or modify [DOE’s] current Polygraph Examination Regulations.”34 Secretary
Abraham made clear that DOE intended to retain polygraph screening as a
component of the Department’s CI program. In doing so, he acknowledged NAS’s
recommendation against using the polygraph for employee screening and the
congressional directive that he take NAS’s views into account. But he said that
maintaining polygraph testing was “consistent with the statutory purpose of
minimizing the risk of disclosure of classified data.”35 He also said that DOE’s use
of the polygraph only as a trigger for a detailed follow-up investigation, and not as
a basis for personnel action, was compatible with NAS’s conclusion that if polygraph
screening is to be used at all, it should be used in this fashion.36
Critics of the Secretary’s decision, including Senator Bingaman (D-NM), said
relying on a technique as inaccurate as the polygraph could produce a false sense of
confidence. That overconfidence, Bingaman suggested, “can be the real danger to
national security.” Applying polygraphs to employee screening could lead to either
too many loyal employees who will judged deceptive, or too many major security
threats undetected, Bingaman noted.37 Senator Pete Domenici said, “I continue to
believe that the system is too much an affront[,] especially since the polygraph
34Federal Register 68, no. 71, p. 17886.
35U.S. Department of Energy, “DOE Issues Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on Polygraph
Use,” press release, Apr. 14, 2003.
36Ibid.
37See press statement of Senator Bingaman, Apr. 14, 2003

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CRS-8
program was so thoroughly criticized by the National Academy of Sciences. I hope
the department will rethink this situation.”38
Issues for Congress
A More Focused Polygraph
One issue for Congress is whether DOE’s polygraph screening program should
focus on a smaller number of individuals occupying only the most sensitive
positions. Approximately 16,000 DOE employees, falling into eight separate
categories, currently are polygraphed. Critics argue that the program requires a
screening polygraph for virtually every DOE employee and contractor who holds a
security clearance, without regard to the level of sensitivity of that persons’s
activities or access. Such a program exposes a large population to polygraph
examination without regard to the risk associated with that person’s access. One
result, according to critics, is that polygraphs have caused, and may continue to
cause, severe morale problems and thereby ultimately undermine the very goal of
good security.39
DOE counters by saying that the Department’s classified information consists
in significant measure of information regarding nuclear weapons of mass destruction
and that the consequences of compromise could be profoundly significant. DOE
contends it is under a particular obligation to make sure that no action that it takes
be susceptible to misinterpretation as a relaxation of controls over information
concerning these kinds of weapons.40
Additional Research
Critics and supporters alike agree that further research into the scientific basis
for psychophysiological detection of deception by any technique is warranted. The
NAS, in its report, suggests that if the government continues to rely heavily on the
polygraph, some research effort should focus on putting the polygraph on a firmer
scientific foundation. NAS cautions, however, that given the inherent ambiguity of
the physiological measures used in the polygraph suggest that further investments in
38See news release of Senator Domenici, “Domenici: DOE Worries Shouldn’t Mean
Continuation of Flawed Polygraph Policy,” Apr. 15, 2003.
39See Commission on Science and Security, Science and Security in the 21st Century, A
Report to the Secretary of Energy on the Department of Energy Laboratories, April 2002,
pp. 55-56. The Commission points out in its report that DOD does use the polygraph for
screening purposes, but only for individuals granted exceptional clearances for highly
sensitive programs. In the case of the Intelligence Community, according to the
Commission, the polygraph is an integral — “and more important, an accepted — part of
the intelligence community’s security practices and culture. People are aware of this
practice before accepting employment in intelligence organizations, and they accept it as an
integral part of a more comprehensive security architecture.”
40Federal Register 68, no. 71, pp. 17888-17889.

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CRS-9
improving polygraph technique and interpretation will bring only modest
improvements in accuracy.41 Rather, NAS recommends the development of a
broader research program to detect and deter security threats be developed, rather
than focus on polygraph research.42 NAS points out that potential alternative
techniques such as measurements from brain activity and other physiological
indicators, facial expressions, voice quality and other aspects of demeanor show
some promise, but that “none has yet been shown to outperform the polygraph. None
shows any promise of supplanting the polygraph for screening purposes in the near
term.”43 According to NAS, any such research program should be largely
administered by “an organization or organizations with no operational responsibility
for detecting deception and no institutional commitment to using or training
practitioners of a particular technique.”44
NAS pointed out two particular areas worthy of more research — computerized
analysis of polygraph records to improve the accuracy of test results by using more
information from polygraph records than is used in traditional scoring methods; and
combining polygraph information with information from other screening techniques,.
NAS also concluded that more research needs to be conducted with regard to
countermeasures, but pointed out that policy makers must weigh the danger of public
knowledge of countermeasures against the benefits of a robust public research
program.45
Supporters, while claiming that the polygraph now provides satisfactory
detection and deterrence, favor enhanced research efforts on grounds that they will
certainly expand the capacity to improve the polygraph’s validity and reliability.46 At
the same time, supporters note that real world conditions are difficult if not
impossible to replicate in a mock crime or laboratory environment for the purpose of
assessing the polygraph’s effectiveness. A lack of resources, according to supporters,
also has impeded research efforts.
Responding to the NAS research recommendation, the Senate Select Committee
on Intelligence in its fiscal year 2004 intelligence authorization bill authorizes
$500,000 for the National Science Foundation and the Office of Science and
Technology to lead a more focused research effort on alternatives to the polygraph.47
41See the National Research Council of the National Academy of Sciences, The Polygraph
and Lie Detection, 2002, p. 213.
42Ibid., p. 9.
43See the National Research Council of the National Academy of Sciences, The Polygraph
and Lie Detection, 2002, p. 8.
44Ibid., p. 229.
45Ibid., p. 231.
46See American Polygraph Association, Statement of the American Polygraph Association
Pertaining to the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) Report on the Use of the Polygraph,
undated.
47See S.Rept. 108-44, p. 29.

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CRS-10
Discard Use Of Polygraph For Screening
Another issue for Congress is whether to discard the use of polygraph screening
— as opposed to event specific use where the accuracy is well above chance but
below perfection 48 — altogether. Critics label the screening polygraph as misguided
and suggest that it be shelved in favor of more thorough examination of staff’s
financial records and travel, and more frequent reinvestigation by traditional means.
These critics argue that the screening polygraph gives a false and dangerous sense of
over confidence to authorities that they have adequately screened for spies.49 They
believe that this, in turn, could lead to a relaxation of other methods of ensuring
security, such as periodic security re-investigation and vigilance about potential
security violations in facilities that use the polygraph for employee security
screening.50 Critics also argue that polygraph test accuracy can be undermined by
countermeasures, seriously undermining the any value of polygraph security
screening.51
Supporters argue that the polygraph is the best tool currently available to detect
deception and that it remains an important tool to detect deception in selected
national security and law enforcement matters. Some supporters distinguish between
the polygraph’s utility and its scientific validity and reliability. While not definitive
in its results, they argue, the polygraph is of significant utility in a broader
comprehensive CI program.52 Some government organizations further claim to have
classified information which supports their use of polygraph tests.53 And virtually
all supporters of polygraph screening argue that polygraph testing is just one tool
among several used as part of comprehensive CI program.
48See the National Research Council of the National Academy of Sciences, The Polygraph
and Lie Detection, 2002, p. 4.
49See comments by the Society of Professional Scientists and Engineers to proposed
polygraph examination regulations, 10 CFR Pat, 709, Federal Register 68, p. 17886, Apr.
14, 2003.
50See the National Research Council of the National Academy of Sciences, The Polygraph
and Lie Detection, 2002, p. 7
51Ibid., p. 5.
52U.S. Congress, House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Report of the
Redmond Panel, June 21, 2000, pp. 7-8.
53See Office of Technology Assessment, Scientific Validity of Polygraph Testing, Nov.
1983, p. 100. OTA said it did not review this research.

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