Order Code RL31339
CRS Report for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
Iraq: U.S. Regime Change Efforts
and Post-War Governance
Updated June 27, 2003
Kenneth Katzman
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

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Iraq: U.S. Regime Change Efforts
and Post-War Governance
Summary
In his 2002 and 2003 State of the Union messages, President Bush characterized
Iraq as a grave potential threat to the United States because of its refusal to abandon
its weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs as required by U.N. Security
Council resolutions and the potential for it to transfer WMD to terrorist groups. In
September 2002, the President warned that unless Iraq fully disarmed in cooperation
with United Nations weapons inspectors, the United States would lead a coalition to
achieve that disarmament militarily. U.S. officials made clear that this would
include the ouster of Iraq’s President Saddam Hussein’s regime. After making a
final demand that Iraq fully rid itself of WMD, on March 19, 2003, the United States
launched “Operation Iraqi Freedom,” a war effort to disarm Iraq and change its
regime. The regime fell on April 9.
In the months prior to the war, the Administration stressed that regime change
through U.S.-led military action would yield benefits beyond disarmament, including
liberation of the Iraqi people from an oppressive regime and enhancement of the
prospects for peace and democracy throughout the Middle East. The goal of regime
change in Iraq had been declared U.S. policy since November 1998, and U.S. efforts
to oust Saddam had been pursued, with varying degrees of intensity, since the end of
the Gulf war in 1991. These efforts primarily involved U.S. financial backing for
opposition groups inside and outside Iraq, several of which are now contending for
power in post-Saddam Iraq. Past efforts to change the regime floundered because of
limited U.S. commitment, disorganization of the Iraqi opposition, and the efficiency
and ruthlessness of Iraq’s several overlapping intelligence and security forces.
Previous U.S. administrations ruled out major U.S. military action to change Iraq’s
regime, believing such action would be costly, risky, and not necessarily justified by
the level of Iraq’s lack of compliance on WMD disarmament.
The character of the government that will replace Saddam Hussein’s Baath
Party, and the exact process by which that government will be chosen, are yet to be
determined. Some Administration officials reportedly had hoped that major military
and governmental defections from the Hussein regime would serve as the core of a
successor government. However, no senior Hussein regime figures defected, and
established opposition groups and emerging local leaders will likely form the core
of a new regime. Some of these groups are urging the United States to begin
establishing a self-rule authority soon, but the Bush Administration has delayed plans
to do so, apparently believing that democratic institutions must be built before power
can be handed to an all-Iraqi authority.
This report will be updated as warranted by major developments.

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Contents
Past Attempts to Oust Saddam . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Emergence of An Anti-Saddam Coalition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
The Iraqi National Congress/Ahmad Chalabi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Ahmad Chalabi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
The Kurds/KDP and PUK . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Ansar al-Islam . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Shiite Islamist Organizations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
SCIRI/Badr Corps . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Da’wa Party . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Sadr Grouping . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Ayatollah Sistani/Hawza al-Ilmiyah . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Islamic Amal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Schisms Among Anti-Saddam Groups . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
The Iraqi National Accord (INA) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Attempting to Rebound from 1996 Setbacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Iraq Liberation Act . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
The First Eligibility Designations Under the ILA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Continued Doubts About the Capabilities of the Anti-Saddam Groups . . . 10
Bush Administration Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Pre-September 11 Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Post-September 11, 2001: Moving to Change the Regime . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Iraq and Al Qaeda . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
WMD Threat Perception . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Broadening the Internal Opposition to Saddam . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Second ILA Designations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Decision to Take Military Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Post-War Governance Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Establishing an Iraqi Interim Administration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
“Leadership Council” of Seven . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Post-War U.S. Operations in Iraq/Coalition Provisional Authority . . . 20
Recruiting Other Peacekeepers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
U.N. Role . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Reviving the Oil Industry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
Continuation of the Oil-for-Food Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
War Crimes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
Congressional Reactions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
Appendix. U.S. Assistance to the Opposition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26

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Iraq: U.S. Regime Change Efforts
and Post-War Governance
The United States has been attempting to change Iraq’s regime since the 1991
Persian Gulf war, although achieving this goal was not declared policy until 1998.
In November 1998, amid a crisis with Iraq over U.N. weapons of mass destruction
(WMD) inspections, the Clinton Administration stated that the United States would
seek to go beyond containment to promoting a change of regime. A regime change
policy was endorsed by the Iraq Liberation Act (P.L. 105-338, October 31, 1998).
Bush Administration officials have emphasized regime change as the cornerstone of
U.S. policy toward Iraq since shortly after the September 11, 2001, attacks.
Operation Iraqi Freedom was launched on March 17, 2003, and achieved the
objective of regime change by April 9, 2003.
Past Attempts to Oust Saddam
Prior to the launching on January 16, 1991 of Operation Desert Storm, an
operation that reversed Iraq’s August 1990 invasion of Kuwait, President George
H.W. Bush called on the Iraqi people to overthrow Saddam. Within days of the end
of the Gulf war (February 28, 1991), opposition Shiite Muslims in southern Iraq and
Kurdish factions in northern Iraq, emboldened by the regime’s defeat and the hope
of U.S. support, launched significant rebellions. The revolt in southern Iraq reached
the suburbs of Baghdad, but the well-trained and loyal Republican Guard forces had
survived the war largely intact, having been withdrawn from battle prior to the U.S.
ground offensive, and it defeated the Shiite rebels by mid-March 1991. Many Shiites
blamed the United States for not supporting their uprising and standing aside as the
regime retaliated against those who participated in the rebellion. Kurds, benefitting
from a U.S.-led “no fly zone” established in April 1991, were able to drive Iraqi
troops out of much of northern Iraq and establish an autonomous zone there and
subsequently remained largely free of Baghdad’s rule.
According to press reports, about two months after the failure of the Shiite
uprising, President George H.W. Bush forwarded to Congress an intelligence finding
stating that the United States would undertake efforts to promote a military coup
against Saddam Hussein; a reported $15 million to $20 million was allocated for that
purpose. The Administration apparently believed — and this view apparently still
is shared by many experts and U.S. officials — that a coup by elements within the
current regime could produce a favorable new government without fragmenting Iraq.
Many observers, however, including neighboring governments, feared that Shiite and
Kurdish groups, if they ousted Saddam, would divide Iraq into warring ethnic and
tribal groups, opening Iraq to influence from neighboring Iran, Turkey, and Syria.

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Emergence of An Anti-Saddam Coalition
Reports in July 1992 of a serious but unsuccessful coup attempt suggested that
the U.S. strategy might ultimately succeed. However, there was disappointment
within the George H.W. Bush Administration that the coup had failed and a decision
was made to shift the U.S. approach from promotion of a coup to supporting the
diverse opposition groups that had led the post-war rebellions. At the same time, the
Kurdish, Shiite, and other opposition elements were coalescing into a broad and
diverse movement that appeared to be gaining support internationally. This
opposition coalition seemed to provide a vehicle for the United States to build a
viable overthrow strategy. Congress more than doubled the budget for covert
support to the opposition groups to about $40 million for FY1993.1
The Iraqi National Congress/Ahmad Chalabi
The growing opposition coalition took concrete shape in an organization called
the Iraqi National Congress (INC). The INC was formally constituted when the two
main Kurdish militias, the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic
Union of Kurdistan (PUK), participated in a June 1992 meeting in Vienna of dozens
of opposition groups. In October 1992, major Shiite Islamist groups came into the
coalition when the INC met in Kurdish-controlled northern Iraq.
The INC appeared viable because it brought under one banner varying Iraqi
ethnic groups and diverse political ideologies, including nationalists, ex-military
officers, and defectors from Iraq’s ruling Baath Party. The Kurds provided the INC
with a source of armed force and a presence on Iraqi territory. Its constituent groups
publicly united around a platform that appeared to match U.S. values and interests,
including human rights, democracy, pluralism, “federalism” (see below), the
preservation of Iraq’s territorial integrity, and compliance with U.N. Security Council
resolutions on Iraq.2 However, many observers doubted its commitment to
democracy, because most of its groups have an authoritarian internal structure, and
because of inherent tensions among its varied ethnic groups and ideologies.
Ahmad Chalabi. Selected to chair the INC’s Executive Committee was
Ahmad Chalabi, who is about 58 years old, a secular Shiite Muslim from a prominent
banking family. He was educated in the United States as a mathematician. He fled
Iraq to Jordan in 1958, when the Hashemite monarchy was overthrown in a military
coup. This coup occurred 10 years before the Baath Party took power in Iraq (July
1968). In 1978, he founded the Petra Bank in Jordan but later ran afoul of Jordanian
authorities on charges of financial malfeasance and he left Jordan, possibly with
some help from members of Jordan’s royal family, in 1989. The Jordanian
government subsequently re-capitalized the bank with national funds. In 1992, he
was convicted in absentia of embezzling $70 million from the bank and sentenced
1 Sciolino, Elaine. “Greater U.S. Effort Backed To Oust Iraqi.” New York Times, June 2,
1992.
2 The Iraqi National Congress and the International Community. Document provided by
INC representatives, February 1993.

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CRS-3
to 22 years in prison. Chalabi maintains that the Jordanian government was
pressured by Iraq to turn against him, and he asserts that he has since rebuilt ties to
the Jordanian government. In April 2003, senior Jordanian officials, including King
Abdullah, called Chalabi “divisive” and stopped just short of saying he would be
unacceptable to Jordan as leader of Iraq. Chalabi’s critics acknowledge that, despite
allegations about his methods, he has been single-minded in his determination to
overthrow Saddam Hussein, and he is said to be the favorite of those Administration
officials, particularly in the Department of Defense, that were the most supportive of
changing Iraq’s regime by force.
Since Chalabi returned to Iraq, there have been no large public demonstrations
supportive of him or the INC, indicating that he does not have a large following
inside Iraq. However, anecdotal press reporting suggest that he has attracted some
support from those Iraqis that most welcome the U.S. military offensive against Iraq
as liberation from Saddam Hussein’s regime and who believe the U.S. presence is
needed to ensure security and facilitate reconstruction. On April 6, Chalabi and
about 700 INC fighters (“Free Iraqi Forces”) were airlifted by the U.S. military from
their base in the north to the Nasiriya area, purportedly to help stabilize civil affairs
in southern Iraq. Chalabi and some Free Iraqi Forces later deployed to Baghdad and
other parts of Iraq. Since establishing his headquarters in Baghdad, Chalabi has tried
to build support by searching for members of the former regime and arranging for
U.S. military forces in Iraq to provide security or other benefits to his potential
supporters. However, the Free Iraqi Forces accompanying Chalabi have largely
disbanded following the U.S. decisions in mid-May 2003 to disarm independent
militias and to delay the formation of an Iraqi self-rule authority.

A prominent INC intellectual is Kanaan Makiya, who wrote a 1989 book
“Republic of Fear: The Politics of Modern Iraq,” detailing alleged Iraqi regime
human rights abuses. Makiya supports a Western-style democracy for Iraq, including
full rights for women and Iraq’s minorities. A self-described atheist, he teaches
Middle Eastern politics at Brandeis University. Another INC activist, Mohammed
al-Zubaidi, declared himself in charge of Baghdad in mid-April, but U.S. officials did
not recognize him as mayor and detained him in April 2003.
Chalabi is part of a grouping of major party leaders, now numbering seven, that
have been meeting since prior to the war. As discussed below, the seven-party
leadership council hopes to become the core of a successor regime, although the
United States has, for now, prevented the grouping from assuming any formal powers
inside Iraq.
The Kurds/KDP and PUK. The Kurds, probably the most pro-U.S. of all
the groups in Iraq, do not have ambitions to play a major role in governing Arab Iraq,
but Iraq’s neighbors have always been fearful that the Kurds might still seek outright
independence. In committing to the concept of federalism, the INC platform
assured the Kurds substantial autonomy within a post-Saddam Iraq. Turkey, which
has a sizable Kurdish population in the areas bordering northern Iraq, particularly
fears that independence for Iraq’s Kurds would likely touch off an effort to unify into
a broader “Kurdistan.” Iraq’s Kurds have been fighting intermittently for autonomy
since their region was incorporated into the newly formed Iraqi state after World War
I. (Iraq became an independent Kingdom in 1932, although it remained under British

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CRS-4
influence until the 1958 fall of the British-installed monarchy.) In 1961, the KDP,
then led by founder Mullah Mustafa Barzani, current KDP leader Masud Barzani’s
father, began an insurgency that has continued until today, although interrupted by
periods of autonomy negotiations with Baghdad. Masud Barzani’s brother, Idris,
commanded Kurdish forces against Iraq during the Iran-Iraq war but was killed in
that war. The PUK, headed by Jalal Talabani, split off from the KDP in 1965; the
PUK’s members are generally more educated, urbane, and left-leaning than those of
the KDP. Together, the PUK and KDP have about 40,000-60,000 fighters, some of
which are trained in conventional military tactics. Both the KDP and the PUK are
on the seven-party “leadership council.”
Ansar al-Islam. In the mid-1990s, the two main Kurdish parties enjoyed good
relations with a small Kurdish Islamic faction, the Islamic Movement of Iraqi
Kurdistan (IMIK), which is headed by Shaykh Ali Abd-al Aziz. Based in Halabja,
Iraq, the IMIK publicized the effects of Baghdad’s March 1988 chemical attack on
that city, and it allied with the PUK in 1998.
A radical faction of the IMIK split off in 1998, calling itself the Jund al-Islam
(Army of Islam). It later changed its name to Ansar al-Islam (Partisans of Islam).
This faction, led by Mullah Krekar (who was detained in Europe in August 2002 and
now lives in Norway), reportedly is associated with Al Qaeda and hosted in its
northern Iraq enclave Al Qaeda fighters who fled the U.S.-led war in Afghanistan.
Mullah Krekar reportedly studied under Shaykh Abdullah al-Azzam, an Islamic
theologian of Palestinian origin who was the spiritual mentor of Osama bin Laden.
Prior to Operation Iraqi Freedom, during which its base was captured, about 8,000
people were in the Ansar al-Islam enclave, located near the town of Khurmal. This
included about 600 fighters.3 Fighters of Ansar al-Islam clashed with the PUK
around Halabja in December 2002, and Ansar gunmen were allegedly responsible for
an assassination attempt against PUK prime minister Barham Salih in April 2002.
The leader of the Arab contingent within Ansar al-Islam is said by U.S. officials
to be Abu Musab Zarqawi, an Arab of Jordanian origin who reputedly fought in
Afghanistan. Zarqawi has been linked to Al Qaeda plots in Jordan during the
millenium celebration, the assassination in Jordan of U.S. diplomat Lawrence Foley
(2002), and to reported attempts in 2002 to spread the biological agent ricin in
London and possibly other places in Europe. In a presentation to the U.N. Security
Council on February 5, 2003, Secretary of State Powell tied Zarqawi and Ansar al-
Islam to the Iraqi regime, which might have viewed Ansar al-Islam as a means of
pressuring Baghdad’s Kurdish opponents. Many experts believed Baghdad-Ansar
links were tenuous or even non-existent; Baghdad did not control northern Iraq even
before Operation Iraqi Freedom.4 Zarqawi’s current whereabouts are unknown,
although some unconfirmed press reports indicate he might have fled to Iran after the
fall of the Ansar camp to U.S.-led forces.
3 Chivers, C.J. Repulsing Attack By Islamic Militants, “Iraqi Kurds Tell of Atrocities.”
New York Times, December 6, 2002.
4 “U.S. Uncertain About Northern Iraq Group’s Link to Al Qaida.” Dow Jones Newswire,
March 18, 2002.

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CRS-5
Shiite Islamist Organizations
Some outside experts have had concerns about the potential strength and
ideological orientation of Iraq’s Shiite Islamic fundamentalist groups in post-
Saddam Iraq.
SCIRI/Badr Corps. The most well known among these is called the Supreme
Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), which was a member of the INC
in the early and mid-1990s but progressively distanced itself from the INC banner.
SCIRI was set up in 1982 to increase Iranian control over Shiite opposition groups
in Iraq and the Persian Gulf states. SCIRI’s leader, Ayatollah Muhammad Baqr al-
Hakim, was the late Ayatollah Khomeini’s choice to head an Islamic Republic of
Iraq, a vision that, if realized, might conflict with U.S. plans to forge a democratic
Iraq. Baqr Al Hakim and his family fled Iraq to Iran in 1980, during a major
crackdown on Shiite activist groups by Saddam Hussein. Saddam feared that Iraqi
Shiite Islamists, inspired and emboldened by the Islamic revolution in Iran in 1979,
posed a major threat to his regime. Prior to the formation of SCIRI, Hakim and his
family were leaders of the Da’wa (Islamic Call) Party (see below). Mohammed Baqr
is the son of the late Ayatollah Muhsin Al Hakim, who was a prominent Shiite leader
in southern Iraq and an associate of Ayatollah Khomeini when Khomeini was in exile
in southern Iraq during 1964-1978. In early May 2003, there were press reports that
Mohammed Baqr might resign from his formal SCIRI leadership post and try to
establish himself in the Shiite holy city of Najaf, Iraq, as an overarching Shiite
authority figure in the image of the late Ayatollah Khomeini of Iran. He returned to
Iraq on May 10, welcomed by large crowds in Basra and Najaf, where he is now
based.
In addition to its agents and activists in the Shiite areas of Iraq, SCIRI has about
10,000-15,000 fighters/activists organized into a “Badr Corps” (named after a major
battle in early Islam) that, during the 1980s and 1990s, conducted forays from Iran
into southern Iraq to attack Baath Party officials there. The Badr Corps is headed by
Mohammed Baqr’s younger brother, Abd al-Aziz al-Hakim, who returned to Iraq on
April 20, 2003, to pave the way for Mohammed Baqr’s return. (Another Hakim
brother, Mahdi, was killed in Sudan in May 1990, allegedly by agents of Iraq’s
security services.) Iran’s Revolutionary Guard, which is politically aligned with
Iran’s hard line civilian officials, has been the key patron of the Badr Corps,
providing it with weapons, funds, and other assistance. The Badr Corps fought
alongside the Guard against Iraqi forces during the Iran-Iraq war. However, many
Iraqi Shiites view SCIRI as an Iranian creation and SCIRI/Badr Corps operations in
southern Iraq prior to Operation Iraqi Freedom did not spark broad popular unrest
against the Iraqi regime. Some Badr fighters deployed inside northern Iraq on the eve
of Operation Iraqi Freedom, and the New York Times reported on May 7, 2003, that
many Badr activists have infiltrated into Iraq to build support for SCIRI.
Until August 2002 when Abd al-Aziz al-Hakim joined other opposition figures
for meetings in Washington, SCIRI had publicly refused to work openly with the
United States or accept U.S. assistance. Since the fall of the regime on April 9,
SCIRI leaders have criticized what they called an illegitimate U.S. occupation of Iraq
and have called for the rapid establishment of an Iraqi self-rule authority. SCIRI
initially refused to join a U.S.-led process to establish an interim post-Saddam

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government. However, suggesting that SCIRI does not want to confront the United
States, Abd al-Aziz al Hakim did meet with other opposition leaders in late April
2003 at a post-war governance planning session sponsored by U.S. officials. He has
since helped constitute the seven-party “leadership council” that is discussing Iraqi
self-rule with U.S. occupation authorities. Even though Mohammed Baqr Al Hakim
says he is for a democracy and would not seek to establish an Iranian-style Islamic
republic, U.S. officials are said to be mistrustful of SCIRI and have been seeking to
disarm its fighters. Unlike some other Shiite Islamist groups, SCIRI has had good
working relations with some Sunni oppositionists and the Kurds. On June 27,
Muhammad Baqr told his followers that the U.S. occupation of Iraq should be
resisted by peaceful means only.
Da’wa Party. The Da’wa Party, perhaps Iraq’s oldest Shiite Islamist grouping,
continues to exist as a separate group, but it lacks its own strong, visible leadership,
and many Da’wa activists appear to be at least loosely allied with SCIRI. Da’wa
was given a place on the seven-party “leadership council” in May 2003. The party
was founded in 1957 by a revered Iraqi Shiite cleric, Ayatollah Mohammed Baqr Al
Sadr, a like-minded associate of Ayatollah Khomeini. Baqr Al Sadr was hung by the
Iraqi regime in 1980 for the Da’wa’s alleged responsibility in fomenting Shiite anti-
regime unrest following Iran’s 1979 Islamic revolution. That unrest included an
attempted assassination of senior Iraqi leader Tariq Aziz.
The Kuwaiti branch of the Da’wa Party allegedly was responsible for a May
1985 attempted assassination of the Amir of Kuwait and the December 1983 attacks
on the U.S. and French embassies in Kuwait. The Hizballah organization in Lebanon
was founded by Lebanese clerics loyal to Ayatollah Baqr Al Sadr and the late
Ayatollah Khomeini, and there continue to be linkages between Hizballah and the
Da’wa Party. The Hizballah activists who held U.S. hostages in that country during
the 1980s often linked release of the Americans to the release of 17 Da’wa Party
prisoners held by Kuwait for those offenses. Some Iraqi Da’wa members look to
Lebanon’s senior Shiite cleric Mohammed Hossein Fadlallah, who was a student and
protege of Ayatollah Mohammed Baqr Al Sadr, for spiritual guidance.
Sadr Grouping. Members of the clan of the late Ayatollah Mohammed Baqr
Al Sadr have become highly active in post-Saddam Iraq. Although the Al Sadr clan
has been closely identified with the Da’wa Party, it appears that members of the clan
and their followers currently are operating in post-war Iraq as grouping separate from
the Da’wa. Another revered member of the clan, Mohammed Sadiq Al Sadr, and
two of his sons, were killed by Saddam’s security forces in 1999. A surviving son,
Moqtada al-Sadr, who is about 27 years old, has attempted to rally his followers to
attain a prominent role in post-Saddam Shiite politics. He and his clan apparently
have a large following in the Shiite neighborhoods of Baghdad, which, after the fall
of the regime on April 9, renamed their district “Sadr City,” from the former name
of “Saddam City.” However, he is viewed by Iran and many Iraqi Shiites as a young
radical who lacks religious and political weight. To compensate for his lack of
religious credentials, he has sought spiritual authority for his actions from exiled Iraqi
senior cleric, Ayatollah Kazem Haeri, who is living in Qom, Iran. An alternate
interpretation by some experts is that Haeri is acting at the direction of Iran’s
leadership to keep Moqtada Sadr under a measure of control. Moqtada’s reputation
may have been tarnished in early April when Moqtada al Sadr reportedly killed Abd

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CRS-7
al-Majid Khoi, the son of the late Grand Ayatollah Abdol Qasem Musavi-Khoi,
shortly after his return to Najaf from exile in London. Abd al-Majid Khoi headed the
Khoi Foundation, based in London, and he returned to Iraq after U.S.-led forces took
Najaf. Grand Ayatollah Khoi differed with the political doctrines of Ayatollah
Khomeini of Iran.
Ayatollah Sistani/Hawza al-Ilmiyah. The revered Grand Ayatollah Ali al-
Sistani, based in Najaf, is also emerging as a major potential force in post-war Iraq.
He is the most senior of the four Shiite clerics that lead the Najaf- based “Hawza al-
Ilmiya,” a major grouping of seminaries and Shiite clerics. The Hawza, which is well
funded through donations, is becoming an important source of political authority in
the Shiite regions of Iraq, hiring Iraqis to perform functions performed by the former
regime and issuing directives, often obeyed, for some Iraqi civil servants to return to
work. Sistani himself, now free of a long house arrest at the hands of Baghdad, has
a large following of former students throughout the Shiite portions of Iraq. During
the U.S.-led war against Iraq, Moqtada al-Sadr and his followers reportedly tried to
intimidate Sistani by surrounding his office in Najaf with armed gunmen, a tactic that
many experts say is leading Sistani and the Hawza to ally with the Hakims in the
intra-Shiite power struggle. Sistani, who is said to be of Iranian ethnicity, is
considered to be in the tradition of Ayatollah Khoi in opposing a direct role for
clerics in governmental affairs, and it is therefore likely that Sistani and the Hawza
would not seek a direct or public role in the post-war regime. Some Sistani
pronouncements suggest he is increasingly willing to defer to Mohammed Baqr Al
Hakim in political decision-making.
Islamic Amal. SCIRI has been allied with another Shiite Islamist organization
called the Islamic Amal (Action) Organization. It is headed by Mohammed Taqi
Modarassi. Islamic Amal conducted attacks against Saddam Hussein’s regime in the
1980s, although it does not appear to have a following nearly as large as SCIRI or the
other Shiite Islamist groups. Modarassi’s brother, Abd al-Hadi, headed the Islamic
Front for the Liberation of Bahrain, which tried to stir up Shiite unrest against the
Bahrain regime in the 1980s and 1990s (see below).
Schisms Among Anti-Saddam Groups
The differences among the various anti-Saddam organizations led to the near
collapse of the U.S. regime change effort the mid-1990s. In May 1994, the KDP and
the PUK began clashing with each other over territory, customs revenues levied at
border with Turkey, and control over the Kurdish enclave’s government based in
Irbil. The PUK lined up support from Iran while the KDP sought and received
countervailing backing from its erstwhile nemesis, the Baghdad government. The
infighting contributed to the defeat of an INC offensive against Iraqi troops in March
1995; the KDP pulled out of the offensive at the last minute. Although it was
repelled, the offensive did initially overrun some of the less well-trained and poorly
motivated Iraqi units facing the Kurds. Some INC leaders point to the battle as an
indication that the INC could have succeeded militarily, without direct U.S. military
help, had it been given additional resources and training in the 1990s.

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The Iraqi National Accord (INA). The infighting in the opposition in the
mid-1990s caused the United States to briefly revisit the “coup strategy” by
renewing ties to a non-INC group, Iraq National Accord (INA).5 The INA, originally
founded in 1990 with Saudi support, consists of military and security defectors who
were perceived as having ties to disgruntled officials currently serving within their
former organizations. It is headed by Dr. Iyad Alawi, former president of the Iraqi
Student Union in Europe and a physician by training. He is a secular Shiite Muslim,
but most of the members of the INA are Sunni Muslims. The INA’s prospects
appeared to brighten in August 1995 when Saddam’s son-in-law Hussein Kamil al-
Majid — architect of Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction programs — defected to
Jordan, suggesting that Saddam’s grip on the military and security services was
weakening. Jordan’s King Hussein agreed to allow the INA to operate from there.
The INA became penetrated by Iraq’s intelligence services and, in June 1996,
Baghdad dealt it a serious setback by arresting or executing over 100 INA
sympathizers in the military.
Iraq’s counteroffensive against the opposition was completed two months after
the arrests of the INA sympathizers. In late August 1996, the KDP asked Baghdad
to provide armed support for its capture of Irbil from the rival PUK. Iraq took
advantage of the request to strike against the INC base in Salahuddin, a city in
northern Iraq, as well as against remaining INA operatives throughout northern Iraq.
In the course of its incursion in the north, Iraq reportedly executed two hundred
oppositionists and arrested as many as 2,000 others. The United States evacuated
from northern Iraq and eventually resettled in the United States 650 oppositionists,
mostly from the INC.
Prior to Operation Iraqi Freedom, Alawi claimed that the INA continued to
operate throughout Iraq, and it apparently had rebuilt itself to some extent since the
June 1996 arrests. However, it does not appear to have a large following in the Iraqi
regime and did not announce any key defections from the regime during Operation
Iraqi Freedom, nor has it since found or captured any former regime leaders.
Although it has was cooperating with the INC at the start of the U.S.-led 2003 war,
there is a history of friction between the two groups; the INA reportedly bombed an
INC facility in northern Iraq in October 1995. Iyad Alawi represents the INA on the
seven-party “leadership council” that is discussing self rule with the U.S. occupation
authorities. However, since the fall of Saddam Hussein’s regime, there has been little
evident popular support for Alawi.
Attempting to Rebound from 1996 Setbacks
For the two years following the anti-Saddam opposition groups’ 1996 setbacks,
the Clinton Administration had little contact with these groups. In those two years,
the INC, INA, and other opposition groups attempted to rebuild their organizations
and their ties to each other, although with mixed success. On February 26, 1998,
then Secretary of State Madeleine Albright testified to a Senate Appropriations
5 An account of this shift in U.S. strategy is essayed in Hoagland, Jim. “How CIA’s Secret
War On Saddam Collapsed.” Washington Post, June 26, 1997.

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CRS-9
subcommittee that it would be “wrong to create false or unsustainable expectations”
about what U.S. support for the opposition could accomplish.
Iraq’s obstructions of U.N. weapons of mass destruction (WMD) inspections
during 1997-1998 led to growing congressional calls for overthrowing Saddam
Hussein. A formal congressional push for a regime change policy began with an
FY1998 supplemental appropriation (P.L. 105-174, signed May 1, 1998) that, among
other provisions, earmarked $5 million in Economic Support Funds (ESF) for the
opposition and $5 million for a Radio Free Iraq, under the direction of Radio Free
Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL). The radio service began broadcasting in October
1998, from Prague. Of the ESF, $3 million was devoted to an overt program to
coordinate and promote cohesion among the various opposition factions, and to
highlighting Iraqi violations of U.N. resolutions. The remaining $2 million was used
to translate and publicize documented evidence of alleged Iraqi war crimes; the
documents were retrieved from the Kurdish north, placed on 176 CD-ROM diskettes,
and translated and analyzed by experts under contract to the U.S. government. In
subsequent years, Congress has appropriated funding for the Iraqi opposition and for
war crimes issues, as shown in the appendix. Some of the war crimes funding has
gone to the opposition-led INDICT (International Campaign to Indict Iraqi War
Criminals) organization for publicizing Iraqi war crimes issues.
Iraq Liberation Act
The clearest indication of congressional support for a more active U.S.
overthrow effort was encapsulated in another bill introduced in 1998: the Iraq
Liberation Act (ILA, H.R. 4655, P.L. 105-338, signed into law October 31, 1998).
The ILA gave the President authority to provide up to $97 million in defense articles
(and authorized $2 million in broadcasting funds) to opposition organizations to be
designated by the Administration. (An FY2003 supplemental appropriations, P.L.
108-11, added $86.5 million to the allowed draw-down ceiling to enable additional
funds to flow to groups helping the United States in Operation Iraqi Freedom. The
supplemental brought the total authorized under the Act to $183 million.) The Act’s
passage was widely interpreted as an expression of congressional support for the
concept of promoting an insurgency by using U.S. air-power to expand opposition-
controlled territory. This idea was advocated by Chalabi and some U.S. experts, such
as General Wayne Downing. President Clinton signed the legislation despite
reported widespread doubts within the Clinton Administration about the chances of
success in promoting an opposition insurgency inside Iraq.
The Iraq Liberation Act made the previously unstated policy of promoting
regime change in Iraq official, declared policy. A provision of the ILA states that it
should be the policy of the United States to “support efforts” to remove the regime
headed by Saddam Hussein. In mid-November 1998, President Clinton publicly
articulated that regime change was a component of U.S. policy toward Iraq.
The signing of the ILA and the declaration of the overthrow policy came at the
height of the one-year series of crises over U.N. weapons inspections in Iraq, in
which inspections were repeatedly halted and restarted after mediation by the United
Nations, Russia, and others. On December 15, 1998, U.N. inspectors were
withdrawn for the final time, and a three-day U.S. and British bombing campaign

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against suspected Iraqi WMD facilities followed (Operation Desert Fox, December
160-19, 1998). (For information on these crises, see CRS Issue Brief IB92117, Iraq:
Weapons Programs, U.N. Requirements, and U.S. Policy.)
The First Eligibility Designations Under the ILA. Further steps to
promote regime change followed Operation Desert Fox. In January 1999, a career
diplomat, Frank Ricciardone, was named as a State Department’s “Coordinator for
the Transition in Iraq” — the chief liaison with the opposition. On February 5, 1999,
after consultations with Congress, the President issued a determination (P.D. 99-13)
that the following organizations would be eligible to receive U.S. military assistance
under the Iraq Liberation Act: the INC; the INA; SCIRI; the KDP; the PUK; the
Islamic Movement of Iraqi Kurdistan (IMIK); and the Movement for Constitutional
Monarchy (MCM), which is led by Sharif Ali bin al-Hussein, a relative of the
Hashemite monarchs that ruled Iraq from the end of World War I until 1958. The
IMIK and the MCM, in particular, were considered small movements that cannot
contribute much to an overthrow effort. Because of its possible role in contributing
to the formation of Ansar al-Islam, the IMIK did not receive U.S. support after 2001,
although it was not formally taken off the ILA eligibility list.
Sharif Ali returned to Iraq on June 10 to a small but apparently enthusiastic
welcome. He does not have a seat on the seven-party “leadership council.”
In May 1999, in concert with an INC visit to Washington, the Clinton
Administration announced it would draw down $5 million worth of training and
“non-lethal” defense equipment under the ILA. During 1999 - 2000, about 150
opposition members underwent civil administration training at Hurlburt air base in
Florida, including attending Defense Department-run courses provided civil affairs
training, including instruction in field medicine, logistics, computers,
communications, broadcasting, power generation, and war crimes issues. However,
the Clinton Administration asserted that the opposition was not sufficiently organized
to merit U.S. provision of lethal military equipment or combat training. This
restriction reflected divisions within and outside the Clinton Administration over the
effectiveness and viability of the opposition, and over the potential for the United
States to become militarily embroiled in civil conflict in Iraq. The trainees during
1999-2000 are not believed to have been brought into the Operation Iraqi Freedom
effort against the regime, or into the Free Iraqi Forces that deployed to Iraq toward
the end of the active combat phase of the war.
Continued Doubts About the Capabilities of the Anti-Saddam
Groups
During 1999-2000, U.S. efforts to rebuild and fund the opposition did not end
the debate within the Clinton Administration over the regime change component of
Iraq policy. In hearings and statements, several Members of both parties expressed
disappointment with the Clinton Administration’s decision not to give the
opposition lethal military aid or combat training. Many took those decisions as an
indication that the Clinton Administration was skeptical that a renewed overthrow
effort would fare better than previous attempts. Most of those who argued against
increased U.S. support for the opposition maintained that the Iraqi opposition would

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CRS-11
not succeed unless backed by direct U.S. military involvement, and that direct U.S.
military action was risky and not justified by the threat posed by Iraq. Some
observers maintained that the potential threat from Saddam Hussein’s regime was
sufficiently grave that direct U.S. military action should be taken. Other critics
suggested the United States focus instead on rebuilding containment of Iraq by
threatening force against Iraq in order to obtain re-entry into Iraq of the U.N.
weapons of mass destruction inspectors that had been absent from Iraq since
December 15, 1998.

As a reflection of continued congressional support for the overthrow effort, a
provision of the FY2001 foreign aid appropriation (H.R. 4811, P.L. 106-429, signed
November 6, 2000) earmarked $25 million in ESF for “programs benefitting the
Iraqi people,” of which at least $12 million was for the INC to distribute
humanitarian aid inside Iraq; $6 million was for INC broadcasting; and $2 million
was for war crimes issues. According to the appropriation, the remaining $5 million
could be used to provide additional ESF to the seven groups then eligible to receive
assistance under the ILA. Taking note of congressional sentiment for INC
distribution of aid inside Iraq, on September 29, 2000, the Clinton Administration
reached agreement with the INC to provide the organization with $4 million in
FY1999 ESF (one half the total earmark available) to develop an aid distribution plan
and to gather information in Iraq on Iraqi war crimes. However, three days before
it left office, the Clinton Administration issued a required report to Congress that
noted that any INC effort to distribute aid in areas of Iraq under Baghdad’s control
would be fraught with security risks to the INC, to Iraqi recipients of such aid, and
to any relief distributors with which the INC contracts.6
Bush Administration Policy
Bush Administration policy toward Iraq changed after the September 11 terrorist
attacks, even though no significant evidence linking Iraq to those attacks came to
light. The shift toward a more assertive policy first became clear in President Bush’s
State of the Union message on January 29, 2002, when he characterized Iraq as part
of an “axis of evil,” along with Iran and North Korea.
Pre-September 11 Policy
Throughout most of its first year, the Bush Administration continued the basic
elements of Clinton Administration policy on Iraq. With no immediate consensus
within the new Administration on how forcefully to proceed with an overthrow
strategy, Secretary of State Powell focused on strengthening containment of Iraq,
which the Bush Administration said had eroded substantially in the year prior to its
taking office. Secretary Powell visited the Middle East in February 2001 to enlist
regional support for a so-called “smart sanctions” plan: a modification of the U.N.
sanctions regime to ensure that no weapons-related technology reaches Iraq. His plan
offered to alter the U.N.-sponsored “oil-for-food” program by relaxing U.N.
6 U.S. Department of State. Washington File. “Clinton Sends Report on Iraq to Congress.”
January 17, 2001.

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restrictions on exports to Iraq of civilian equipment and needed non-military
technology.7
The Administration believed that the proposal, by easing the suffering of the
Iraqi people, would cause Iraq’s neighbors and other countries to cease unilateral
violations of the sanctions regime. Powell, who had openly expressed skepticism
about the opposition’s prospects, barely raised the regime change issue during his trip
or in his March 7, 2001, testimony before the House International Relations
Committee, at which he was questioned about Iraq.8 After about a year of
negotiations among the Security Council permanent members, the major feature of
the smart sanctions plan — new procedures that virtually eliminate U.N. review of
civilian exports to Iraq — was adopted on May 14, 2002 (U.N. Security Council
Resolution 1409).
Even though several senior officials had been strong advocates of a regime
change policy, many of the questions about the wisdom and difficulty of that strategy
that had faced previous administrations were debated early in the Bush
Administration.9 Aside from restating the U.S. policy of regime change, the Bush
Administration said and did little to promote that outcome throughout most of its first
year. During his confirmation hearings as Deputy Secretary of Defense, a reported
strong advocate of overthrow, Paul Wolfowitz, said that he did not yet see a
“plausible plan” for changing the regime. Like its predecessor, the Bush
Administration initially declined to provide the opposition with lethal aid, combat
training, or a commitment of direct U.S. military help. It eliminated the separate
State Department position of “Coordinator for the Transition in Iraq,” further casting
doubt on its enthusiasm for the overthrow strategy. On February 2, 2001, the Bush
Administration confirmed that, shortly after President Bush took office, the Treasury
Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) granted the INC a license to
proceed with information gathering inside Iraq only, and not actual distribution of
humanitarian aid inside Iraq. This decision by the Administration amounted to a
withholding of U.S. backing for the INC plan to rebuild its presence inside Iraq.

Many in Congress, on the other hand, continued to support the INC as the
primary vehicle for achieving regime change. Partly in deference to congressional
sentiment, the Bush Administration continued to expand its ties to the INC despite
doubts about its capabilities. In August 2001, the INC began satellite television
broadcasts into Iraq, from London, called Liberty TV. The station was funded by the
ESF aid appropriated by Congress, with start-up costs of $1 million and an estimated
additional $2.7 million per year in operating costs.10
7 For more information on this program, see CRS Report RL30472, Iraq: Oil For Food
Program.
8 Perlez, Jane. “Powell Goes on the Road and Scores Some Points.” New York Times,
March 2, 2001.
9 One account of Bush Administration internal debates on the strategy is found in, Hersh,
Seymour. “The Debate Within.” The New Yorker, March 11, 2002.
10 Sipress, Alan. “U.S. Funds Satellite TV to Iraq.” Washington Post, August 16, 2001.

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Post-September 11, 2001: Moving to Change the Regime
Bush Administration policy toward Iraq became notably more assertive after the
September 11, 2001 attacks, stressing regime change far more than containment.
Almost immediately after the U.S.-led war on the Taliban and Al Qaeda in
Afghanistan began in early October 2001, speculation began building that the
Administration might try to change Iraq’s regime through direct use of military force
as part of a “phase two” of the war on terrorism. Some U.S. officials reportedly
believed that the United States needed to respond to the September 11 attacks by
ending any or all regimes that support terrorist groups, including Iraq. As noted
above, in his January 29, 2002 State of the Union message, President Bush named
Iraq as part of an “axis of evil,” along with North Korea and Iran. Vice President
Cheney visited the Middle East in March 2002 reportedly to consult regional
countries about the possibility of confronting Iraq militarily, although the countries
visited reportedly urged greater U.S. attention to the Arab-Israeli dispute and opposed
confrontation with Iraq.
The two primary themes in the Bush Administration’s public case for
confronting Iraq were (1) its alleged refusal to end its WMD programs, and (2) its
ties to terrorist groups, to which Iraq might transfer WMD for the purpose of
conducting a catastrophic attack on the United States. The Administration added that
regime change would have the further benefit of liberating the Iraqi people.
Iraq and Al Qaeda. Although they did not assert that Saddam Hussein’s
regime had a direct connection to the September 11 attacks or the subsequent anthrax
mailings, senior U.S. officials said in September 2002, and again in January and
February 2003, that there was evidence of Iraqi linkages to Al Qaeda. Some outside
observers expressed skepticism about such connections because of the ideological
differences between Saddam Hussein’s secular regime and Al Qaeda’s Islamist
character. Secretary of States Powell, as noted above, cited intelligence information
that Ansar al-Islam (see above) had links to Saddam Hussein’s regime.11 Other
senior officials cited intelligence information that Iraq provided advice and training
to Al Qaeda in the manufacture and use of chemical weapons, although
Administration information appears to date to the early 1990s when Iraq, largely
isolated after the first Gulf war, was politically close to Sudan. Al Qaeda founder
Osama Bin Laden was based in Sudan during that time (1991-1996).
Others noted that bin Laden sought to raise an Islamic army to fight Saddam’s
invasion of Kuwait in 1990, arguing against the need for U.S. troops, and that he was
more an enemy of Saddam Hussein than an ally. In the Administration view, the two
shared similar anti-U.S. goals, which outweighed ideological differences and
propelled them into tactical or strategic cooperation. Those differences were evident
in a February 12, 2003, bin Laden statement referring to Saddam Hussein’s regime
as socialist and infidel, although the statement exhorted Iraq to resist impending U.S.
military action.

11 Goldberg, Jeffrey. “The Great Terror.” The New Yorker, March 25, 2002.

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CRS-14
WMD Threat Perception. In arguing for military action, U.S. officials
maintained that Iraq’s purported commitment to developing WMD — coupled with
its support for terrorist groups to which Iraq might transfer WMD — constituted an
unacceptable potential threat to the United States and that major U.S. military action
was justified if Iraq refused to disarm voluntarily. U.S. officials said the September
11, 2001 attacks demonstrated that the United States could not wait for threats to
gather before acting, but must instead act preemptively or preventively. Senior U.S.
officials asserted a WMD threat as follows:
! Iraq had worked to rebuild its WMD programs in the nearly 4 years
since U.N. weapons inspectors left Iraq and had failed to comply
with 17 U.N. resolutions, including Resolution 1441 (November 8,
2002), calling for its complete elimination of all WMD programs.
However, statements by U.N. weapons inspectors after inspections
resumed November 27, 2002 indicated they believed Iraq did not
have an active nuclear weapons program, and that inspections on
other weapons categories were making progress.

! Iraq used chemical weapons against its own people (the Kurds) and
against Iraq’s neighbors (Iran), implying that Iraq would not
necessarily be deterred from using WMD against the United States
or its allies. Others noted that Iraq did not use such weapons against
adversaries, such as the United States, that have the capability of
destroying Iraq’s government in retaliation. Under the U.S. threat of
massive retaliation, Iraq did not use WMD against U.S. troops in the
1991 Gulf war. On the other hand, Iraq defied U.S. warnings and
did burn Kuwait’s oil fields in that war.
! Iraq could transfer its WMD to terrorists such as Al Qaeda who
could use these weapons to cause hundreds of thousands of deaths
in the United States or elsewhere. Critics of this view cited
presentations by CIA Director Tenet to Congress in late 2002,
stating the CIA view that Iraq was likely to transfer WMD to
terrorists if the United States were to attack Iraq. At that point,
according to that argument, Saddam Hussein would be left with little
incentive not to cooperate with terrorist groups capable of striking
at U.S. interests. (No WMD was used against Iraq during Operation
Iraqi Freedom, although the Administration asserts that such
weapons will eventually be found in Iraq by the U.S.-led coalition.)
Broadening the Internal Opposition to Saddam
As it began in mid-2002 to prepare for possible military action against Iraq, the
Bush Administration tried to broaden the Iraqi opposition and build up its
capabilities. On June 16, 2002, the Washington Post reported that, in early 2002,
President Bush authorized stepped up covert activities by the CIA and special
operations forces to destabilize Saddam Hussein. In early August 2002, the State and
Defense Departments jointly invited six major opposition groups — the INC, the
INA, the KDP, the PUK, SCIRI, and the MCM — to Washington for meetings with
senior officials, including a video link to Vice President Cheney. The meetings were

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CRS-15
held to show unity within the opposition and among different agencies of the U.S.
government, which tended to favor different opposition groups.
In conjunction with the stepped up engagement with the opposition, on August
15, 2002, the State Department agreed to provide $8 million in ESF to the INC, funds
that had been held up due to differences between the State Department and the INC
over what activities would be funded. The $8 million was to be used to fund the
INC, during May 2002 to December 2002, to run its offices in Washington, London,
Tehran, Damascus, Prague, and Cairo, and to operate its Al Mutamar newspaper and
Liberty TV. The Defense Department agreed to fund the information gathering
portion of the INC’s activities; the State Department had refused to fund those
activities, which are conducted inside Iraq, because of strains between the INC and
other opposition groups and questions about INC use of U.S. funds.
In addition, the Administration expanded its ties to Shiite Islamist groups and
to groups composed of ex-military and security officers, as well as to some ethnic-
based groups. On December 9, 2002, the Bush Administration added six of the
factions discussed below (except the Higher Council for National Salvation) to the
list of “democratic opposition organizations” eligible to receive draw downs under
the ILA. The groups and individuals with which the Bush Administration had
increasing contact include the following:
! Iraqi National Movement. It formed in 2001 as an offshoot of the
INC. Its leaders include ex-senior military officer Hassan al-Naqib
(who was part of an early leadership body of the INC); Hatim
Mukhlis, who claimed support of some in Saddam’s Tikriti clan; and
ex-senior military officer Khalid al-Ubaydi.
! Iraqi National Front. Another grouping of ex-military officers,
founded in March 2000 by Tawfiq al-Yasseri. Yasseri, a Shiite
Muslim ex-military officer, headed Iraq’s military academy and
participated and was wounded in the anti-Saddam uprisings
immediately following the 1991 Gulf war.
! Iraqi Free Officers and Civilians Movement. Established in 1996 by
ex-military officer Najib al-Salhi. This group worked closely with
the INC. Salhi defected in 1995 after serving as commander of
several tank units in the Republican Guard and regular military.
! Higher Council for National Salvation. Based in Denmark, it was
formally established on August 1, 2002. It is headed by Wafiq al-
Samarra’i, a former head of Iraqi military intelligence. Ex-chief of
staff of Iraq’s military (1980-1991) Nizar al-Khazraji, who was
based in Denmark since fleeing Iraq in 1996, may also be a member.
Khazraji was placed under travel restrictions by Danish officials in
late November 2002 after saying he wanted to leave Denmark. He
is under investigation there for alleged involvement in Iraq’s use of
chemical weapons against the Kurds in 1988. Danish authorities
said on March 17, 2003 that Khazraji had unexpectedly left his
home there, raising questions about whether he is defying the travel

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CRS-16
restrictions placed on him. A press report on April 7, 2003, said he
went to Kuwait, possibly to play a part in a post-Saddam regime
there,12 although his current whereabouts are unknown.
! Iraqi Turkmen Front. A small, ethnic Turkomen-based grouping,
generally considered aligned with Turkish policy on Iraq.
Turkomens number about 350,000 and live mainly in northern Iraq.
! The Islamic Accord of Iraq. Based in Damascus, this is another
Shiite Islamic Party, but it is considered substantially less pro-
Iranian than SCIRI or the Da’wa Party (see above). The Islamic
Accord is headed by Jamil Wakil. Many Accord members are
followers of Ayatollah Shirazi, an Iranian cleric who was the
spiritual leader of a group called the Islamic Front for the Liberation
of Bahrain (IFLB), which allegedly attempted to overthrow the
government of Bahrain in the early 1980s.
! The Assyrian Democratic Movement, an ethnic-based movement
headed by Secretary-General Yonadam Yousif Kanna. Iraq’s
Assyrian community is based primarily in northern Iraq. There is a
strong diaspora presence in the United States as well. After building
ties to this group over the past year, the Bush Administration
formally began incorporating the Assyrian Democratic Movement
into its meetings with the Iraqi opposition in September 2002.
Second ILA Designations. The Bush Administration applauded efforts
during 2001 and 2002 by these groups to hold meetings to coordinate with each
other and with the INC and other groups. One such meeting, in July 2002 in London
and jointly run with the INC, attracted over 70 ex-military officers. However, since
the regime vacated Baghdad on April 9, 2003, none of the groups listed immediately
above has openly sought a major role in post-Saddam Iraq, and the whereabouts of
many of their leaders are not known.
As the decision whether to launch military action approached, on December 9,
2002, President Bush issued a determination to draw down the remaining $92 million
in defense articles and services authorized under the Iraq Liberation Act for the INA,
the INC, the KDP, the PUK, SCIRI, and the MCM “and to such other Iraqi
opposition groups designated by me under the Act before or after this determination.”
This latter phrase suggested that some of the draw downs would go to the six groups
designated above as eligible to receive ILA draw downs. The announcement
appeared to be part of reported plan to train about 5,000 oppositionists in tasks that
could assist U.S. forces, possibly including combat units.13 An initial group of 3,000
was selected, but only about 70 oppositionists completed training at an air base
12 ‘Missing’ Iraqi General Now in Kuwait: Paper. Agence France Press, April 7, 2003.
13 Deyoung, Karen, and Daniel Williams. “Training of Iraqi Exiles Authorized.”
Washington Post, October 19, 2002.

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CRS-17
(Taszar) in Hungary, according to press reports.14 These oppositionists served with
U.S. forces in Operation Iraqi Freedom as translators and mediators between U.S.
forces and local leaders.
As the prospects for military action against Iraq grew, the opposition began
planning its role in the war and the post-war period. During December 14-17, 2002,
with U.S. officials attending, major Iraqi opposition groups held a conference in
London. In advance of the meeting, the Bush Administration appointed NSC official
Zalmay Khalilzad to be a liaison to the Iraqi opposition. The conference was
organized by the same six groups whose leaders visited Washington in August 2002,
but included other groups as well, and they discussed whether the opposition should
declare a provisional government. The Administration opposed that step on the
grounds that doing so was premature and would give the impression that outside
powers were determining Iraq’s political structure.
The meeting ended with agreement to form a 65-member follow-up committee,
which some criticized as weighted heavily toward Shiite Islamist groups such as
SCIRI. The opposition met again during February 24-27, 2003 in northern Iraq.
Against the urging of U.S. representatives at the meeting, the opposition agreed to
form a six man committee that would prepare for a transition regime, although it
stopped short of declaring a provisional government. The six included PUK leader
Jalal Talabani, KDP leader Masud Barzani, SCIRI leader Mohammed Baqr Al
Hakim, Chalabi, INA leader Iyad Alawi, and a former Iraqi foreign minister Adnan
Pachachi. Iran allowed Iraqi oppositionists to cross from Iran into northern Iraq to
hold that session. With the exception of Pachachi, these groups and figures are the
core five figures in the current seven-party “leadership council” that is pushing U.S.
authorities to speed the transition to Iraqi self-rule.
Decision to Take Military Action. As inspectors worked in Iraq under the
new mandates provided in Resolution 1441, the Administration demanded complete
disarmament and full cooperation by Iraq if Iraq wanted to avert military action. The
Administration had been downplaying the goal of regime change after President
Bush’s September 12, 2002 speech before the United Nations General Assembly, in
which he focused on enforcing U.N. resolutions that require Iraqi disarmament.
However, the Administration resumed stressing the regime change goal after
February 2002 as diplomacy at the United Nations ran its course. In the
Administration view, a friendly government in Baghdad was required if the
international community is to rid Iraq of WMD and links to terrorist groups.
The possibility of war became clearer following the mid-March breakdown of
U.N. diplomacy over whether the U.N. Security Council should authorize war against
Iraq for failing to comply with Resolution 1441. The diplomatic breakdown followed
several briefings for the U.N. Security Council by the director of the U.N. inspection
body UNMOVIC (U.N. Monitoring, Verification, and Inspection Commission) Hans
Blix and the director of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), most
recently on March 7, 2003. The briefings were generally critical of Iraq for failing
14 Williams, Daniel. U.S. Army to Train 1,000 Iraqi Exiles. Washington Post, December
18, 2002.

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to pro-actively cooperate to clear up outstanding questions about Iraq’s WMD
program, but the latter two briefings (February 24 and March 7) noted progress in
clearing up outstanding WMD questions.
Security Council opponents of war, including France, Russia, China, and
Germany, said the briefings indicated that Iraq could be disarmed peacefully and that
inspections should be given more time. They noted that Iraq was well contained by
sanctions and the U.S./British enforced no-fly zones. Those who agreed with this
view maintained that, as long as Iraq allowed access to U.N. weapons inspections
under Resolution 1441, Iraq could not pose an immediate threat to U.S. national
security. Inspections encountered few, if any, Iraqi obstructions in about 700
inspections of about 400 different sites, as of mid-March 2003. Others experts
believed that, even if Iraq were to acquire major new WMD capabilities, Iraq could
have been deterred by U.S. overall strategic superiority, presumably including the
U.S. nuclear arsenal.
The United States, Britain, Spain, and Bulgaria disagreed, maintaining that Iraq
had not fundamentally decided to disarm, and was attempting to preserve WMD
capabilities. The Administration asserted on March 17, 2003, that diplomatic options
to disarm Iraq peacefully had failed and turned its full attention to military action.
That evening, President Bush gave Saddam Hussein and his sons, Uday and Qusay,
an ultimatum to leave Iraq within 48 hours to avoid war. They refused the
ultimatum, and Operation Iraqi Freedom was launched on March 19, 2003.
In the war, Iraq’s conventional military forces were overwhelmed by U.S. and
British forces in Operation Iraqi Freedom, although the regime, at times, put up stiff
resistance using unconventional tactics. No major Iraqi military commanders or
Baathist political figures came forward to try to establish a post-Saddam government,
but senior regime leaders fled Baghdad, and the whereabouts of many of them, as
well as the fate of Saddam Hussein, are unknown. The outcome of a post-war debate
on the results of the war might depend on such factors as the pace of reconstruction;
the future degree of resistance, if any, to a U.S. and British occupation; the amount
of WMD ultimately found, if any; and whether a new government is democratic.
Post-War Governance Issues
After the fall of Saddam Hussein’s regime on April 9, 2003, there is increasing
debate about governing post-war Iraq. The same U.S. concerns about fragmentation
of and instability in Iraq that existed in prior years are present in the current debate
over how to establish a post-war interim regime. Although some Iraqi civilians have
welcomed U.S. and British troops in areas captured, many Iraqis now want U.S. and
British forces to leave Iraq. Other experts fear that a post-war Iraq will inevitably fall
under control of SCIRI and other Shiite Islamist forces who, as noted above, are well-
organized and are asserting growing control over areas inhabited by Iraq’s Shiites.
Shiites constitute about 60% of Iraq’s population but have traditionally been under-
represented in Iraq’s Sunni Muslim-dominated government.

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CRS-19
Establishing an Iraqi Interim Administration. The Administration
asserts that it will do what is necessary to bring about a stable, democratic successor
regime that complies with all applicable U.N. resolutions. However, there appears
to be some debate between U.S. authorities and key anti-Saddam groups over how
and when to establish a successor regime. Senior U.S. officials, including deputy
Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz, had said in early April 2003 that they hoped to
have a successor regime in place within six months of the fall of the regime.
However, in mid-May, U.S. officials, apparently fearing that existing major groups
could not form a stable regime or that Shiite Islamists would dominate a successor
authority, backed away from any deadlines for establishing an Iraqi self-rule
authority. The anti-Saddam groups assert that Iraqis are sufficiently competent and
unified to rebuild Iraq after a war with the United States.
Shortly after the war, the United States began a process of establishing a
successor regime. The Administration organized an April 15 meeting, in Nasiriyah,
of about 100 Iraqis of varying ideologies, present by U.S. invitation. Many of the
attendees were representatives of Iraqi tribal groupings that had not been politically
active before. However, SCIRI, along with several Shiite clerics that have
appropriated authority throughout much of southern Iraq since the fall of the regime,
boycotted the meeting and called for an Islamic state and the withdrawal of U.S.
forces. Another meeting of about 250 delegates was held in Baghdad on April 26,
which ended in agreement to hold a broader meeting, within a month, to name an
interim Iraqi administration.
“Leadership Council” of Seven. In parallel with the late April meeting in
Baghdad, the five most prominent opposition groups met, with U.S. envoys present:
SCIRI, the INC, the INA, the PUK, and the KDP. At a subsequent meeting on May
9, 2003, the five agreed to expand their grouping to seven, adding to their ranks the
little known Nasir al-Chadirchy, head of a party called the National Democratic Party
of Iraq, as well as the Da’wa Party. The council of seven strongly criticized the U.S.
decision in mid-May 2003 to delay the formation of an Iraqi self-rule authority
indefinitely and to instead establish a purely advisory body of 25 to 30 Iraqis. The
leadership council has since been meeting among itself and with U.S. occupation
authorities to try to obtain at least a partial reversal of that decision. The exact
motivations for the delay were not announced, but press reports indicate that U.S.
officials believed that a self-rule authority dominated by the seven parties in the
leadership council would be unstable and insufficiently committed to democracy.
At the same time, there are indications the U.S. occupation authorities
(Coalition Provisional Authority) are incorporating the views of the seven parties.
U.S. administrator for Iraq Paul Bremer (see below) said on June 23, 2003, that the
planned 25-30 member body would have “real authority” from its first days. He said
it will nominate ministry heads, recommend policies, and convene a “constitutional
conference” to draft a new constitution.15
15 Transcript: Bremer Reviews Progress, Plans for Iraq Reconstruction. Washington File,
June 23, 2003.

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CRS-20
As part of the planning process that took place before the war, the U.S. State
Department and the Defense Department supported groups of Iraqi exiles to address
issues that will confront a successor government.16 It is not yet known what
influence, if any, these working groups are having on any post-war regime decision-
making in Iraq. The U.S. State Department project, which cost $5 million, consisted
of working groups that discussed (1) transitional justice; (2) public finance; (3)
public and media outreach; (4) democratic principles; (5) water, agriculture, and the
environment; (6) health and human services; (7) economy and infrastructure; (8)
education; (9) refugees, internally-displaced persons, and migration policy; (10)
foreign and national security policy; (11) defense institutions and policy; (12) free
media; (13) civil society capacity-building; (14) anti-corruption measures; and (15)
oil and energy.
Post-War U.S. Operations in Iraq/Coalition Provisional Authority.
Experts note that projections about U.S. operations in post-war Iraq, including the
duration of the U.S. military occupation and the numbers of occupation troops, were
largely dependent on the amount of Iraqi resistance, if any, the number of U.S.
casualties taken, and the speed with which a successor regime is chosen. At present,
about 160,000 U.S. and British troops remain in Iraq, according to a June 2003 report
to Congress mandated by P.L. 108-11. Earlier press reports said the Administration
wanted to draw the U.S. force level down to about 35,000 by the end of 2003, but
continued unrest and insecurity in Iraq appears to have made that goal untenable.
There are indications that resistance to the U.S. governance of Iraq is growing,
judging by the frequency of attacks on U.S. forces over the past few weeks. Such
attacks have killed more than 20 U.S. military personnel since President Bush
declared an end to “major combat operations” in Iraq on May 1, 2003. There is a
debate within the Administration over whether the resistance to the U.S. occupation
is organized or random. The Administration says resistance is coming from remnants
of the Baath Party, from former criminals, and from Arab volunteers who have come
to Iraq from other countries to fight the U.S. occupation. Attacks have been more
frequent in the Sunni areas of central Iraq than elsewhere, suggesting that Baathist
resistance elements are the most active, possibly in combination with foreign Arab
fighters. Some elements of the resistance might want to restore the old regime, while
others appear to be motivated by opposition to the concept of foreign rule. Others
appear to be motivated by the difficulty the U.S. and British authorities have had in
restoring civilian services. There are some indications that Shiite Islamists might
now be joining the violence against U.S. military personnel. In late June, some
opponents of the occupation have identified themselves as distinct groups, scribbling
graffiti warnings and faxing statements to the Arab satellite television network Al
Jazeera and elsewhere. They have used such names as:
! Al Awda (the Return);
! The Snakes;
! The Movement of the Victorious Sect; and
! The Popular Resistance for the Liberation of Iraq.
16 “State Department Hosts Working Group Meeting for Future of Iraq Project,”
Washington File, December 11, 2002.

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CRS-21
The Bush Administration initially tasked Lt. Gen. Jay Garner (ret.) to direct
civilian reconstruction, working through a staff of U.S. diplomats and other U.S.
government personnel who will serve as advisers and administrators in Iraq’s various
ministries. He headed the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance
(ORHA), within the Department of Defense, created by a January 20, 2003 executive
order. After spending the combat phase of the war in neighboring Kuwait, Garner
and some of his staff of about 200 deployed to Baghdad on April 21, 2003, to begin
work. Former Ambassador to Yemen Barbara Bodine was responsible for a “central”
region; and retired generals Buck Walters and Bruce Moore are responsible for
“southern” and “northern” regions, respectively.
Press reports said that senior U.S. officials were dissatisfied with the slow pace
of reconstruction under Garner, and on May 6, 2003, the Administration appointed
former ambassador L. Paul Bremer to lead the overall reconstruction effort, with a
focus on political reconstruction. He arrived on May 12 to head what is called the
Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), which subsumes ORHA, and Bodine and
then Garner departed shortly thereafter. The appointment represented an apparent
adjustment from the original structure of the U.S. reconstruction effort, although the
Administration stated that it was always envisioned that a civilian would eventually
take over the U.S. effort. U.S. officials now refer to the CPA as an occupying
authority legitimized by U.N. Security Council Resolution 1483 of May 22, 2003.
Among other provisions, the resolution lifted U.N. sanctions on Iraq.
Recruiting Other Peacekeepers. As of late June, organizing proceeds for
a multinational peacekeeping force in Iraq. According to the Administration, more
than 30 countries are discussing offers of forces for a multilateral stabilization force.
The commitments of several nations appear to be dependent on whether the U.N.
Security Council authorizes such a force, and several nations appear to require U.S.
or other funding in order to participate. The United Kingdom and Poland have
offered to lead multinational divisions in that mission. Currently about 13,000 non-
U.S. troops are in Iraq, mostly British. Some pledges were announced shortly after
the “Interim Coalition Stability Operations Conference” of 16 nations, held in
London on April 30, 2003, and hosted by the British Minister of Defence, Geoff
Hoon. (A follow-up meeting was held in London on May 8.) Other nations are
contributing relief supplies and field hospital facilities and services.
The United States has urged NATO to take on Iraq as a fifth peacekeeping
mission, but thus far, NATO has only informally discussed the U.S. proposal.
Reportedly, French president Jacques Chirac has said that formal consideration
requires an authorizing resolution from the U.N. Security Council. Neither France
nor Germany has agreed to participate outside of a NATO framework.
U.N. Role. The United States and its European allies and other countries have
reached a measure of agreement on a U.N. role in post-war Iraq. Resolution 1483,
which was adopted unanimously, provides for a U.N. special representative to
coordinate the activities of U.N. personnel in Iraq and to help establish a successor
government. The Secretary General subsequently appointed Brazilian diplomat
Sergio Vieira de Mello for that post. The resolution also gives the United Nations
a monitoring role over the Development Fund for Iraq, a fund that will handle Iraq’s
oil revenues until there is a successor government. The resolution did not authorize

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CRS-22
a return to Iraq of U.N. weapons inspectors, although the resolution provides for
deliberations on that issue. Some International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors
returned to Iraq in June 2003 on a limited nuclear mission in Baghdad.
Reviving the Oil Industry.17 As the driver of Iraq’s economy, the rebuilding
of the oil industry is receiving substantial U.S. attention. It has been widely assumed
that Iraq’s vast oil reserves, believed second only to those of Saudi Arabia, would be
used to fund much of the costs of reconstruction. Presidential spokesman Ari
Fleischer said on February 18, 2003, referring to Iraq’s oil reserves, that Iraq has “a
variety of means ... to shoulder much of the burden for [its] own reconstruction.”
Many observers had been concerned that an Iraqi regime on the verge of defeat could
destroy its own oil fields, but coalition forces quickly secured Iraq’s southern oil
fields since combat began on March 19, 2003. Only about 9 oil wells were set on
fire, of a total of over 500 oil fields in that region, and all were put out quickly. The
northern oil fields in Kirkuk and Mosul were not set afire. In early May 2003, the
U.S.-led coalition set up an advisory board, headed by former Shell executive Phillip
Carroll, to oversee the rebuilding of Iraq’s oil sector. An Iraqi oil industry
professional, Thamer Ghadhban, was named to serve as head of the interim
management team that will run Iraq’s oil ministry and report to the advisory board..
The first exports began in late June 2003, and Ghadhban has said that Iraq will be up
to about 1 million barrels per day of exports by mid-July. Its pre-war export rate was
about 2.2 million barrels per day, a level that U.S. officials and Iraqi oil appointees
hope to reach by late 2003.
A related issue is long-term development of Iraq’s oil industry and which
foreign energy firms, if any, might receive preference for contracts to explore Iraq’s
vast reserves. Russia, China, and others are said to fear that the United States will
seek to develop Iraq’s oil industry with minimal participation of firms from other
countries.
Continuation of the Oil-for-Food Program. About 60% of Iraqis have
been receiving all their foodstuffs from the U.N.-supervised Oil-for-Food Program.
The program, which is an exception to the comprehensive U.N. embargo on Iraq put
in place after the 1991 Persian Gulf war, began operations in December 1996. It was
suspended just before hostilities began, when U.N. staff in Iraq that run the various
aspects of the program departed Iraq. As of March 14, 2003, about $9 billion worth
of humanitarian goods were in the process of being delivered or in production. (See
CRS Report RL30472, Iraq: Oil-for-Food Program, Sanctions, and Illicit Trade.)
On March 28, 2003, the U.N. Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution
1472 that restarted the program’s operations and empowered the United Nations, for
a 45-day period (until May 12), to take direct control of all aspects of the program.
Under the new resolution, the United Nations is setting priorities for and directing the
delivery of already contracted supplies. The enhanced U.N. authority was extended
on April 25, 2003, to last at least until the six-month phase of the program expired
on June 3, 2003.
17 For information on the prospects for Iraq’s post-war economy, see CRS Report RL31944.
Iraq’s Economy: Past, Present, Future.

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CRS-23
On April 17, 2003, the Administration called for a lifting of U.N. sanctions
against Iraq, signaling that the Administration wanted to focus on restoring normal
international commerce with Iraq rather than extending the oil-for-food program.
Resolution 1483 provides for the phasing out of the oil for food program within six
months after adoption of that resolution on May 22. The resolution also provided for
the United Nations to transfer to the new Development Fund for Iraq $1 billion in
funds held by the oil-for-food program escrow fund. That Development Fund
contained about $7 billion in June 2003, consisting of captured Iraqi assets, Iraqi
assets abroad, the monies transferred from the oil-for-food account, and U.S. funds
available for reconstruction. (For more information, see CRS Report RL30472, Iraq:
Oil-for-Food Program, International Sanctions, and Illicit Trade.)

War Crimes. An issue related to regime change but somewhat separate is
whether Saddam Hussein and his associates should be prosecuted for war crimes and
crimes against humanity, if and when they are caught. The Administration said in
early April 2003 that Saddam and his inner circle should be tried by Iraqis if they are
captured, although others might be tried by a U.S.-led process for any crimes
committed in the course of the 2003 war. Over the past year, the Administration had
been gathering data for a potential trial of Saddam and 12 of his associates. Those
it had sought for trial include Saddam; his two sons Uday and Qusay; Ali Hassan al-
Majid, for alleged use of chemicals against the Kurds (he was reported by British
officers to have died in an early April air strike on his home in Basra); Muhammad
Hamza al-Zubaydi (surrendered in mid April 2003); Taha Yasin Ramadan; first Vice
President and number three in the regime; Izzat Ibrahim, Vice Chairman of the
Revolutionary Command Council and formally number two in the regime; Barzan
al-Tikriti, Saddam’s half brother (captured in mid April 2003); Watban al-Tikriti
(captured in April 2003) and Sabawi al-Tikriti, both other half brothers of Saddam
and former leaders of regime intelligence bureaus; Tariq Aziz, deputy Prime Minister
and foremost regime spokesman (surrendered in May 2003); and Aziz Salih Noman,
governor of Kuwait during Iraq’s occupation of that country (apprehended in May
2003).
Others not on the list of twelve, but part of a list of 55 former regime officials
sought by the United States for questioning and possible arrest, have been captured
or surrendered. As of early June 2003, according to Coalition Provisional Authority
officials, about half of the Iraqis on the list of 55 are now in custody or are confirmed
killed. Among the apprehended are Amir al-Saadi, chief science adviser to Saddam;
Jamal Mustafa al-Tikriti, a son-in-law of Saddam; Vice President Taha Muhi ad-Din
Ma’ruf; and suspected WMD manager Hoda Mahdi Salih al-Ammash .
The war crimes issue has been addressed by previous U.S. administrations and
the international community. U.N. Security Council Resolution 674 (October 29,
1990) calls on all states or organizations to provide information on Iraq’s war-related
atrocities to the United Nations. The Foreign Relations Authorization Act for
FY1992 (P.L. 102-138, October 28, 1991, Section 301) stated the sense of Congress
that the President should propose to the U.N. Security Council a war crimes tribunal
for Saddam Hussein. Similar legislation was later passed, including H.Con.Res. 137
(passed the House November 13, 1997); S.Con.Res. 78 (passed the Senate March
13, 1998); and a provision of the Iraq Liberation Act (P.L. 105-338, signed October
31, 1998).

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CRS-24
A U.S. Army report on possible war crimes was released on March 19, 1993,
after Clinton took office. Since April 1997, the Administration has supported
INDICT, a private organization that publicizes alleged Iraqi war crimes and seeks the
arrest of the 12 alleged Iraqi war criminals mentioned above. In August 2000, the
Clinton Administration’s Ambassador-At-Large for War Crimes, David Scheffer,
said that the United States wanted to see an Iraq war crimes tribunal established,
focusing on “nine major criminal episodes.” These included the use of chemical
weapons against Kurdish civilians at Halabja (March 16, 1988, killing 5,000 Kurds)
and the forced relocation of Kurds in the “Anfal” campaign (February 1988, in which
an estimated 50,000 to 182,000 Kurds died); the use of chemical weapons against
Iran; post-war crimes against humanity (the Kurds and the Marsh Arabs); war crimes
against Kuwait (including oil field fires) and coalition forces; and other allegations.
In FY2001 and again in FY2002, the State Department contributed $4 million to a
U.N. “Iraq War Crimes Commission,” to be spent if a U.N. tribunal for Iraq war
crimes is formed.
Congressional Reactions
Congress, like the Administration, appears to have had divergent views on the
mechanisms for promoting regime change, although there appears to be widespread
agreement in Congress that regime change was desirable and an appropriate U.S.
policy. However, there was substantial disagreement over whether a major military
offensive was the most desirable option for achieving that objective. On December
20, 2001, the House passed H.J.Res. 75, by a vote of 392-12, calling Iraq’s refusal
to readmit U.N. weapons inspectors a “mounting threat” to the United States. The
resolution did not call for new U.S. steps to overthrow Saddam Hussein but a few
Members called for the overthrow of Saddam Hussein in their floor statements in
support of the resolution.
In early 2002, prior to the intensified speculation about possible war with Iraq,
some Members expressed support for increased aid to the opposition. In a joint
appearance with Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Joseph Biden on
Cable News Network on February 17, 2002, House International Relations
Committee Chairman Henry Hyde said that “...supporting the underground, the
opposition, the internal opposition, is to me the procedure of choice. That is an
option that is being worked on. All of these options are under consideration.” In
early December 2001, a bipartisan group of nine Members — Senators John
McCain, Jesse Helms, Richard Shelby, Sam Brownback, Joseph Lieberman, and
Trent Lott and Representatives Henry Hyde, Benjamin Gilman, and Harold Ford Jr.
— wrote to President Bush to urge that U.S. assistance be provided to the INC for
operations inside Iraq itself. According to the letter,
Despite the express wishes of the Congress, the INC has been denied U.S.
assistance for any operations inside any part of Iraq, including liberated Kurdish
areas. Instead, successive Administrations have funded conferences, offices and
other intellectual exercises that have done little more than expose the INC to
accusations of being “limousine insurgents” and “armchair guerrillas.”
As discussion of potential military action increased in the fall of 2002,
Members debated the costs and risks of an all-out U.S. effort to achieve that result.

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CRS-25
Congress adopted H.J.Res. 114, authorizing the President to use military force
against Iraq if he determines that doing so is in the national interest and will enforce
U.N. Security Council resolutions on Iraq. The measure passed the House on
October 11, 2002 by a vote of 296-133, and the Senate the following day by a vote
of 77-23. The legislation was signed into law on October 16, 2002 (P.L. 107-243).
The 108th Congress was sworn in on January 7, 2003. Prior to the war, it held
several hearings on the progress of post-war reconstruction. During the war and in
its aftermath, several Members applauded the performance of the U.S. military and
the overthrow of the regime. Some Members, however, have criticized the
Administration for inadequate planning for the post-war period in light of major
looting and disorder in Iraq’s cities after the fall of the regime. Several Committees
are discussing the scope of inquiry into why substantial amounts of WMD have not
been found in Iraq to date.

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CRS-26
Appendix. U.S. Assistance to the Opposition
Appropriated Economic Support Funds (E.S.F.)
to the Opposition
(Figures in millions of dollars)
Unspecified
War
INC
Broadcasting
Opposition
Total
Crimes
Activities
FY 1998
2.0
5.0
3.0
10.0
(P.L. 105-174)
(RFE/RL)
FY 1999
3.0
3.0
2.0
8.0
(P.L. 105-277)
FY 2000
2.0
8.0
10.0
(P.L. 106-113)
FY 2001
12.0
2.0
6.0
5.0
25.0
(P.L. 106-429)
(aid
(INC radio)
distribution
inside Iraq)
FY 2002
25.0
25.0
(P.L. 107-115)
Total,
15.0
9.0
11.0
43.0
78.0
FY1998- FY 2002
FY2003
3.1
6.9 (remaining
10.0
(no earmark)
(announced
to be
April, 2003 )
allocated)
FY2004
0


0
(request)
Notes: The figures above do not include defense articles and services provided under the Iraq
Liberation Act. During FY1999-FY2000, approximately $5 million worth of services, out of the $97
million authorized by the Act, was obligated to the opposition, and $1 million of that has been spent,
as of late December 2002. The figures provided above also do not include any covert aid provided,
the amounts of which are not known from open sources. In addition, during each of FY2001 and
FY2002, the Administration has donated $4 million to a “U.N. War Crimes Commission” fund, to be
used if a war crimes tribunal is formed. Those funds were drawn from U.S. contributions to U.N.
programs.

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