Order Code IB94041
CRS Issue Brief for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
Pakistan-U.S. Relations
Updated June 5, 2003
K. Alan Kronstadt
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

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CONTENTS
SUMMARY
MOST RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS
Historical Background
Pakistan-India Rivalry
The China Factor
Pakistan Political Setting
Recent Developments
Background
Pakistan-U.S. Relations and Key Country Issues
Security
Nuclear Weapons and Missile Proliferation
U.S. Nonproliferation Efforts
Kashmir Dispute
Pakistan-U.S. Security Cooperation
Democratization and Human Rights
Democratization Efforts
Human Rights Problems
Economic Issues
Overview
Trade Issues
Narcotics
Terrorism
U.S. Aid and Congressional Action
CHRONOLOGY

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Pakistan-U.S. Relations
SUMMARY
Major areas of U.S. concern regarding
mir region continues unabated. India blames
Pakistan include regional terrorism; weapons
Pakistan for the ongoing infiltration of Islamic
proliferation; the ongoing Kashmir dispute
militants into Indian Kashmir, a charge
and Pakistan-India tensions; human rights
Islamabad denies. The United States received
protection; and economic development. A
a June 2002 pledge from Islamabad that all
U.S.-Pakistan relationship marked by distance
“cross-border terrorism” will be ended, and it
and discord was transformed by the Septem-
encourages a cease-fire along the Line of
ber 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States
Control and renewed dialogue between
and the ensuing enlistment of Pakistan as a
Islamabad and New Delhi.
key ally in U.S.-led anti-terrorism efforts. Top
U.S. officials regularly praise Pakistan for its
The United States considers a stable,
ongoing cooperation, although there exist
democratic, economically thriving Pakistan as
renewed doubts about Islamabad’s commit-
key to U.S. interests in South and Central
ment to core U.S. concerns in the region.
Asia. Democracy has faired poorly in Paki-
stan; the country has endured three full-scale
A potential Pakistan-India nuclear arms
military coups and military rule for half of its
race continues to be the focus of U.S.
existence. In October 1999, the government
nonproliferation
efforts
in
South
Asia.
of Prime Minister Sharif was ousted in an
Attention to this issue intensified following
extra-constitutional coup led by Army Chief
nuclear tests by both countries in May 1998.
Gen. Pervez Musharraf. Musharraf has since
South Asia is viewed by many analysts as a
assumed the title of President, a move
potential arena for the use of such weapons, as
ostensibly legitimized by a controversial April
both countries have institutionalized nuclear
2002 referendum. The United States strongly
command structures and deployed nuclear-
urges the Musharraf government to restore the
capable ballistic missiles. India and Pakistan
country to civilian democratic rule. National
have fought three full-scale wars since 1947.
elections held in October 2002 resulted in no
clear majority party emerging but were
Close Pakistan-U.S. relations began in
marked by significant gains for a coalition of
the mid-1950s as a security arrangement
Islamic parties. A civilian parliament and
growing from U.S. concerns about Soviet
Prime Minister Jamali were seated in Novem-
expansionism and Pakistan’s fear of neigh-
ber 2002.
Congress granted the President
boring India. Cooperation peaked during the
authority to waive coup-related sanctions on
1979-89 Soviet occupation of Afghanistan.
Pakistan through FY2003; pending legislation
Ties weakened following the 1990 cutoff of
may extend this authority though FY2005.
most U.S. aid to Pakistan, aid suspended by
then-President Bush under Section 620E(e) of
Pakistan continues to face serious prob-
the Foreign Assistance Act (the Pressler
lems, including a weak economy and domestic
Amendment). Further U.S. sanctions were
terrorism. Pakistan received more than $1.5
imposed on Pakistan (and India) as a result of
billion in U.S. assistance for FY2002 and
the nuclear tests. Nuclear-related sanctions on
FY2003.
For more discussion, see CRS
Pakistan and India have since been waived.
Report RS21299, Pakistan’s Domestic Politi-
cal Developments, and CRS Report RL31624,
Separatist violence in the disputed Kash-
Pakistan-U.S. Anti-Terrorism Cooperation.
Congressional Research Service
˜ The Library of Congress

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MOST RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
Developments in May — including the reopening of some important transportation links
and restoration of full diplomatic relations — continued the thaw in Pakistan-India relations
begun in April.
The two governments are taking measured steps aimed at building
confidence, and the Indian Defense Minister recently noted “slow, but definite” movement
toward a summit meeting. National Security Advisor Rice stated in May that the United
States is “encouraged by recent trends.” Assistant Secretary of State for Arms Control
Rademaker, Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs Bloomfield, and F.B.I.
Director Mueller all visited Pakistan in May. Pakistani President Musharraf is scheduled to
visit Washington in June, even as he faces difficult and potentially critical problems at home.
Concurrent with improved relations between India and Pakistan — and perhaps in
response — separatist violence in Kashmir continued unabated. Indian security forces
launched a major counterinsurgency operation in April that is reported to have killed at least
100 separatist militants and destroyed 90 terrorist bases in Indian Kashmir. Islamabad claims
that 296 Kashmiris were “martyred” in May. During his early-May visit to Islamabad,
Deputy Secretary of State Armitage was assured by Musharraf that any existing terrorist
camps in Pakistani Kashmir would be closed, and there are signs that Pakistan is taking
action against terrorist groups on its territory.
Pakistan’s civilian government remains hamstrung by an increasingly fractious dispute
between the Musharraf-allied PML-Q party and the opposition MMA Islamist coalition. At
issue are President Musharraf’s continued role as Army Chief and the status of controversial
constitutional amendments imposed without parliamentary approval in August 2002. The
deadlock may be headed toward a “showdown,” and has raised critical concerns about the
viability of Pakistan’s still-fragile democratic institutions.
In a development related to the MMA’s clash with the pro-military government, in early
June, the Islamist-controlled legislature of the North West Frontier Province passed a bill
introducing Sharia (Islamic) law in the region. Plans exist to create a Department of Vice
and Virtue to implement the new laws. The events add to U.S. concerns about Pakistan’s
cooperation in apprehending remnants of Al Qaeda and the Taliban that have regrouped in
Pakistan, and that continue to interfere with efforts to stabilize Afghanistan while enjoying
significant support among the region’s Pashtuns.
For more information, see Chronology, below.
BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS
Historical Background
The long and checkered Pakistan-U.S. relationship has its roots in the Cold War and
South Asia regional politics of the 1950s. U.S. concerns about Soviet expansionism and
Pakistan’s desire for security assistance against a perceived threat from India prompted the
two countries to negotiate a mutual defense assistance agreement in 1954. By the end of
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1955, Pakistan had further aligned itself with the West by joining two regional defense pacts,
the South East Asia Treaty Organization and the Central Treaty Organization. As a result
of these alliances, and a 1959 U.S.-Pakistan cooperation agreement, Islamabad received $508
million in U.S. military assistance from 1953 to 1961. Total U.S. economic and military
assistance to Pakistan between 1947 and 2000 totaled nearly $11.8 billion.
Differing expectations of the security relationship have long bedeviled bilateral ties.
During the Indo-Pakistani wars of 1965 and 1971, the United States suspended military
assistance to both sides, resulting in a cooling of the Pakistan-U.S. relationship. In the
mid-1970s, new strains arose over Pakistan’s apparent efforts to respond to India’s 1974
underground test of a nuclear device by seeking its own nuclear weapons capability. Limited
U.S. military aid was resumed in 1975, but was suspended again by the Carter
Administration in April 1979 in response to Pakistan’s covert construction of a uranium
enrichment facility. Following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979,
Pakistan was again viewed as a frontline state in the effort to block Soviet expansionism.
In September 1981, the Reagan Administration negotiated a $3.2 billion, 5-year economic
and military aid package with Islamabad. Pakistan became a key transit country for arms
supplies to the Afghan resistance, as well as a camp for some three million Afghan refugees,
many of whom have yet to return home.
Despite the renewal of U.S. aid and close security ties, many in Congress remained
concerned about Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program. Concern was based in part on
evidence of U.S. export control violations that suggested a crash Pakistani program to
acquire a nuclear capability. In 1985, Section 620E(e) (the Pressler amendment) was added
to the Foreign Assistance Act, requiring the President to certify to Congress that Pakistan
does not possess a nuclear explosive device during the fiscal year for which aid is to be
provided. This amendment represented a compromise between those in Congress who
thought that aid to Pakistan should be cut off because of evidence that it was continuing to
develop its nuclear option and those who favored continued support for Pakistan’s role in
opposing Soviet occupation of Afghanistan.
With Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan beginning in May 1988, Pakistan’s nuclear
activities again came under closer U.S. scrutiny, and in October 1990 President Bush
suspended aid to Pakistan. Under the provisions of the Pressler amendment, most economic
and all military aid to Pakistan was stopped and deliveries of major military equipment
suspended. Narcotics assistance of $3-5 million annually was exempted from the aid cutoff.
In 1992, Congress partially relaxed the scope of the aid cutoff to allow for P.L.480 food
assistance and continuing support for nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). One of the
most serious results of the aid cutoff for Pakistan was the nondelivery of some 71 F-16
fighter aircraft ordered by Pakistan in 1989. In December 1998, the United States agreed to
pay Pakistan $324.6 million from the Judgment Fund of the U.S. Treasury — a fund used to
settle legal disputes that involve the U.S. government — as well as provide Pakistan with
$140 million in goods, including agricultural commodities.
Pakistan-India Rivalry
Three wars — in 1947-48, 1965, and 1971 — and a constant state of military
preparedness on both sides of the border have marked the half-century of bitter rivalry
between India and Pakistan. The acrimonious nature of the partition of British India into two
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successor states in 1947 and the continuing dispute over Kashmir have been major sources
of tension. Both Pakistan and India have built large defense establishments at the cost of
economic and social development. The Kashmir problem is rooted in claims by both
countries to the former princely state, divided since 1948 by a military line of control into
the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir and Pakistan-held Azad (Free) Kashmir. India
blames Pakistan for supporting a violent separatist rebellion in the Muslim-dominated
Kashmir Valley that has claimed more than 60,000 lives since 1989. Pakistan admits only
to lending moral and political support to the rebellion (for further discussion see below).
The China Factor
India and China fought a brief border war in 1962, and an oftentimes tense border
dispute remains unresolved. A strategic rivalry also exists between these two large nations.
Pakistan and China, on the other hand, have enjoyed a generally close and mutually
beneficial relationship over recent decades. Pakistan served as a link between Beijing and
Washington in 1971, as well as a bridge to the Muslim world for China during the 1980s.
China’s continuing role as a major arms supplier for Pakistan began in the 1960s, and
included helping to build a number of arms factories in Pakistan, as well as supplying
complete weapons systems. In 1990, China agreed to supply Pakistan with components for
M-11 surface-to-surface missiles, which brought warnings from the United States. Although
it is not a member of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), China repeatedly has
agreed to abide by the restrictions of the regime. In 1993, the United States determined that
China had transferred to Pakistan prohibited missile technology and imposed trade sanctions
on one Pakistani and 11 Chinese entities (government ministries and aerospace companies)
for 2 years. The U.S. intelligence community reportedly has evidence of PRC provision of
complete M-11 ballistic missiles to Pakistan. In 1996, leaked U.S. intelligence reports
alleged that in 1995 China sold ring magnets to Pakistan that could be used in enriching
uranium for nuclear weapons. Pakistan denied the reports (see CRS Report RL31555, China
and Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and Missiles: Policy Issues).
Pakistan Political Setting
Recent Developments. Gen. Musharraf’s April 2002 assumption of the title of
President ostensibly was legitimized by a controversial referendum that many observers
claimed was marked by “excessive fraud and coercion.”
In August, the Musharraf
government announced sweeping changes in the Pakistani constitution under a “Legal
Framework Order” (LFO). These changes provide the office of President and the armed
forces powers not previously available in the country’s constitutional history, including
provisions for Presidential dissolution of the National Assembly and appointment of the
Army Chief and provincial governors, among others. The United States expressed concerns
that the changes “could make it more difficult to build strong, democratic institutions in
Pakistan.”
In October 2002, the country held its first national elections since 1997, thus fulfilling
in a limited fashion Musharraf’s promise to restore the National Assembly that was dissolved
in the wake of his extra-constitutional seizure of power in October 1999. Opposition parties
contesting the elections — along with Pakistani rights groups and European Union observers
— complained that the exercise was “deeply flawed” and that the military government’s pre-
poll machinations skewed the results. No party won a majority of parliamentary seats,
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though a pro-Musharraf alliance won a plurality while a coalition of Islamist parties made
a surprisingly strong showing. Low turnout rates caused many to identify significant levels
of voter apathy affecting Pakistan’s electoral politics.
In an unexpected outcome of the October elections, the United Action Forum (known
as MMA in its Urdu-language acronym), a coalition of six Islamic parties, won 68 seats —
about 20% of the total — in the national assembly and controls the provincial assembly in
the North West Frontier Province (NWFP) and leads a coalition in the Baluchistan assembly.
These provinces are Pashtun-majority regions that border Afghanistan and where important
U.S. anti-terror operations are ongoing. This result has led to concerns that a major shift in
Pakistan’s foreign policy may be in the offing, most especially with growing anti-American
sentiments and renewed indications of the “Talibanization” of western border regions.
In November 2002, the new National Assembly chose Musharraf supporter and former
Baluchistan Chief Minister Mir Zafarullah Jamali to serve as Pakistan’s Prime Minster.
Jamali’s coalition later won a required vote of confidence. February 2003 senate elections
gave the PML-Q-led coalition a simple majority in that 100-seat body. Most analysts believe
that the current pro-Musharraf coalition, while fragile and potentially unstable, likely will
mean continuity in Islamabad’s economic and foreign policy orientations. As of June 2003,
the civilian government has remained hamstrung by a fractious dispute over Musharraf’s
continued role as Army Chief and the legality of the LFO amendments to the constitution.
Background. Military regimes have ruled Pakistan for more than half of its 55 years
of existence, interspersed with periods of generally weak civilian governance. After 1988,
Pakistan had democratically elected governments, and the army appeared to have moved
from its traditional role of “kingmaker” to one of power broker or referee. During the past
decade, Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif each served twice as prime minister. Bhutto was
elected prime minister in October 1988, following the death of military ruler Mohammad
Zia-ul Haq in a plane crash. Gen. Zia had led a coup in 1977 deposing Bhutto’s father, PM
Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, who was later executed. Despite the restoration of democratic process
to Pakistan, the succeeding years were marred by political instability, economic problems,
and ethnic and sectarian violence. In August 1990, President Ishaq Khan dismissed Bhutto
for alleged corruption and inability to maintain law and order. The president’s power to
dismiss the prime minister derived from Eighth Amendment provisions of the Pakistan
constitution, which dated from the era of Zia’s presidency. Elections held in October 1990
brought to power Nawaz Sharif, who himself was ousted in 1993 under the Eighth
Amendment provisions. Ensuing elections returned Bhutto and the PPP to power. The new
Bhutto government faced even more serious economic problems and, according to some
observers, performance also was hampered by the reemergence of Bhutto’s husband, Asif
Ali Zardari, in a decisionmaking role. In November 1996, President Farooq Leghari
dismissed the Bhutto government for corruption and nepotism.
Nawaz Sharif’s PML won a landslide victory in the February 1997 parliamentary
elections, which were judged by international observers to be generally free and fair. Sharif
moved quickly to consolidate his power by curtailing the powers of the President and the
judiciary.
In April 1997, the Parliament passed the Thirteenth Amendment to the
constitution, removing the President’s Eighth Amendment powers to dismiss the government
and to appoint armed forces chiefs and provincial governors. After replacing the chief
Justice of the Supreme Court and seeing the resignation of President Leghari — and with the
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PML in control of parliament — Sharif emerged as one of Pakistan’s strongest elected
leaders since independence. Critics accused him of further consolidating his power by
intimidating the opposition and the press. In April 1999, a two-judge Bench of the Lahore
High Court convicted former PM Bhutto and her husband of corruption and sentenced them
each to 5 years in prison, fined them $8.6 million, and disqualified them from holding public
office. Bhutto was out of the country at the time.
Pakistan-U.S. Relations and Key Country Issues
U.S. policy interests in Pakistan encompass a wide range of issues, including nuclear
weapons and missile proliferation; South Asian regional stability; democratization and
human rights; economic reform and market opening; and efforts to counter terrorism and
narcotics traffic. These concerns have been affected by several key developments in recent
years, including the cutoff of U.S. aid to Pakistan in 1990, 1998, and 1999 over nuclear and
democracy issues; a worsening Pakistan-India relationship over Kashmir since 1989 and a
continuing bilateral nuclear standoff; Pakistan’s halting attempts to develop a stable
democratic government and strong economy; and, most recently, the September 2001
terrorist attacks against the United States.
On September 13, 2001, President Musharraf — under strong U.S. diplomatic pressure
— offered President Bush Pakistan’s “unstinted cooperation in the fight against terrorism.”
Because of its shared border with Afghanistan and former close ties with the Taliban,
Pakistan is considered key to U.S.-led efforts to combat terrorism in the region. The Taliban
and Osama bin Laden enjoy strong support among a substantial percentage of the Pakistan
population, who share not only conservative Islamic views but also ethnic and cultural ties
with Afghanistan. A major issue facing the Administration is how to make use of Pakistan’s
support — including for military operations in Afghanistan — without seriously destabilizing
an already fragile, nuclear-armed state.
In an effort to shore up the Musharraf government, sanctions relating to Pakistan’s
1998 nuclear tests and 1999 military coup were waived in the autumn of 2001. In October
2001, large amount of U.S. aid began flowing into Pakistan. Direct assistance programs
include aid for health, education, food, democracy promotion, child labor elimination,
counter-narcotics, border security and law enforcement, as well as trade preference benefits.
The United States also has supported grant, loan, and debt rescheduling programs for
Pakistan by the various international financial institutions, including the World Bank,
International Monetary Fund, and Asian Development Bank. In September 2002, President
Bush met with President Musharraf in New York City, after both leaders had addressed the
U.N. General Assembly. The U.S. President reportedly urged his Pakistani counterpart to
ensure that his government take all necessary steps to end the movement of militants into
Indian-controlled Kashmir, and also to ensure that the country remain on the path to full
democracy.
Security
Nuclear Weapons and Missile Proliferation. U.S. policy analysts consider the
apparent arms race between India and Pakistan as posing perhaps the most likely prospect
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for the future use of nuclear weapons. In May 1998, India conducted five underground
nuclear tests, breaking a 24-year, self-imposed moratorium on such testing. Despite U.S. and
world efforts to dissuade it, Pakistan quickly followed, claiming five tests of its own before
month’s end. The tests created a global storm of criticism, and represented a serious setback
for two decades of U.S. nuclear nonproliferation efforts in South Asia. India currently is
believed to have enough fissile material for 75-100 nuclear weapons; Pakistan is thought to
have approximately half that number. Both countries have aircraft capable of delivering
nuclear bombs. India’s military has inducted short- and intermediate-range ballistic missiles,
while Pakistan itself possesses short- and medium-range missiles (allegedly acquired from
China and North Korea). All are assumed to be capable of delivering small nuclear warheads
over significant distances.
Press reports in late 2002 suggested that Pakistan assisted Pyongyang’s covert nuclear
weapons program by providing North Korea with uranium enrichment materials and
technologies beginning in the mid-1990s and as recently as July 2002. Islamabad adamantly
rejects such reports as “baseless,” and Secretary of State Powell has been assured that no
such transfers are occurring. If such assistance is confirmed by President Bush, all non-
humanitarian U.S. aid to Pakistan may be suspended, although the President has the authority
to waive any sanctions that he determines would jeopardize U.S. national security. In March
2003, the Administration determined that the relevant facts “do not warrant imposition of
sanctions under applicable U.S. laws.”
Proliferation in South Asia may be part of a chain of rivalries — India seeking to
achieve deterrence against China, and Pakistan seeking to gain an “equalizer” against a larger
and conventionally stronger India. India began its nuclear program in the mid-1960s, after
its 1962 defeat in a short border war with China and China’s first nuclear test in 1964.
Despite a 1993 Sino-Indian troop reduction agreement and some easing of tensions, both
nations continue to deploy forces along their border. Pakistan’s nuclear program was
prompted by India’s 1974 nuclear test and by Pakistan’s defeat by India in the 1971 war and
consequent loss of East Pakistan, now independent Bangladesh.
Since the September 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States, U.S. and Pakistani
officials have held talks on improving security and installing new safeguards on Pakistan’s
nuclear weapons and nuclear power plants. Fears that Pakistan could become destabilized
by the U.S. anti-terrorism war efforts in Afghanistan have heightened U.S. nuclear
proliferation concerns in South Asia (see CRS Reports RS21237, Indian and Pakistani
Nuclear Weapons Status, and RL30623, Nuclear Weapons and Ballistic Missile Proliferation
in India and Pakistan).
U.S. Nonproliferation Efforts. In May 1998, following the South Asian nuclear
tests, President Clinton imposed full restrictions on non-humanitarian economic and military
aid to both India and Pakistan as mandated under Section 102 of the Arms Export Control
Act (AECA). In November 1998, the U.S. Department of Commerce published a list of
more than 300 Indian and Pakistani government agencies and companies suspected of
working on nuclear, missile, and other weapons programs. Any U.S. exports to these entities
required a Commerce Department license, and most license requests reportedly were denied.
In some respects, Pakistan was less affected by the sanctions than was India, since most U.S.
assistance to Pakistan had been cut off in 1990. At the same time, Pakistan’s much smaller
and more fragile economy was more vulnerable to the negative effects of aid restrictions.
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During the latter years of the Clinton administration, the United States set forth five
nonproliferation “benchmarks” for India and Pakistan, including the following: halt further
nuclear testing and sign and ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT); halt fissile
material production and pursue Fissile Material Control Treaty negotiations; refrain from
deploying nuclear weapons and testing ballistic missiles; restrict any and all exportation of
nuclear materials or technologies; and take steps to reduce bilateral tensions, especially on
the issue of Kashmir. The results of U.S. efforts have been mixed, at best: Neither India nor
Pakistan are signatories to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) or the CTBT. India
has consistently rejected both treaties as discriminatory, calling instead for a global nuclear
disarmament regime. Pakistan traditionally has maintained that it will sign the NPT and
CTBT only when India does so. Aside from security concerns, the governments of both
countries are faced with the prestige factor attached to their nuclear programs (see CRS
Reports RS20995, India and Pakistan: Current U.S. Economic Sanctions, and RL31589,
Nuclear Threat Reduction Measures for India and Pakistan).
Kashmir Dispute. Bilateral relations between Pakistan and India remain deadlocked
on the issue of Kashmiri sovereignty. The prospects for India-Pakistan detente suffered a
severe setback in mid-1999, when the two countries teetered on the brink of their fourth full-
scale war, once again in Kashmir. In the worst fighting since 1971, Indian soldiers sought
to dislodge some 700 Pakistan-supported infiltrators who were occupying fortified positions
along mountain ridges on the Indian side of the line of control (LOC) near Kargil. Following
a meeting between then Pakistani PM Sharif and President Clinton in Washington on July
4, 1999, the infiltrators withdrew across the LOC.
Tensions between India and Pakistan remained extremely high in the wake of the Kargil
conflict, which cost more than 1,100 lives. Throughout 2000-2002, intermittent cross-border
firing and shelling has caused scores of both military and civilian deaths. New Delhi
accuses Pakistan of sponsoring the movement of “terrorists” into Indian Kashmir; Islamabad
accuses India of human rights violations there. The United States strongly urged India and
Pakistan to create the proper climate for peace, respect the LOC, reject violence, and return
to the Lahore peace process. A six-month-long unilateral cease-fire and halt to offensive
military operations in Kashmir was undertaken by India in 2000-2001, and the Pakistani
government responded by announcing that its forces deployed along the LOC in Kashmir
would observe “maximum restraint.” Kashmir’s main militant groups, however, rejected the
cease-fire as a fraud and continued to carry out attacks on military personnel and government
installations. As security forces conducted counter-operations, deaths of Kashmiri civilians,
militants, and Indian security forces continued to rise.
In May 2001, the Indian government announced that it was ending its unilateral cease-
fire in Kashmir but that Prime Minister Vajpayee would invite President Musharraf to India
for talks. A July summit meeting between Musharraf and Vajpayee in Agra failed to produce
a joint communique, reportedly as a result of pressure from hardliners on both sides. Major
stumbling blocks were India’s refusal to acknowledge the “centrality of Kashmir” to future
talks and Pakistan’s objection to references to “cross-border terrorism.” U.S. Secretary of
State Colin Powell visited the region in an effort to ease escalating tensions over Kashmir,
but an October terrorist attack on the Jammu and Kashmir state assembly was followed by
a December 2001 terrorist attack on the Indian Parliament in New Delhi. Both incidents
were blamed on Pakistan-based militant groups. The Indian government responded by
mobilizing some 700,000 troops to forward stations along the Pakistan-India frontier and
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threatening war unless Islamabad put an end to all cross-border infiltrations of Islamic
militants. Under significant international diplomatic pressure and the threat of India’s use
of possibly massive force, President Musharraf in January 2002 vowed to end the presence
of terrorist entities on Pakistani soil and upwards of 2,000 radicals were jailed (many of these
have since been released).
Despite the Pakistani pledge, infiltrations into Indian-held Kashmir continued, and a
May 2002 terrorist attack on an Indian army base at Kaluchak killed 34, most of them women
and children. This event again brought Pakistan and India to the brink of full-scale war, and
caused Islamabad to recall army troops from both patrol operations along the Pakistan-
Afghanistan border as well as from international peacekeeping operations. Pakistan also
tested three ballistic missiles in late-May 2002, sending an implicit message to India that it
would employ nuclear weapons in a conflict. A flurry of intensive diplomatic missions to
South Asia appears to have reduced tensions during the summer of 2002 and prevented the
outbreak of war. Numerous top U.S. diplomats were involved in this effort. The U.S.
government continues to strenuously urge the two countries to renew a bilateral dialogue that
has been moribund since the summer of 2001. New Delhi refuses to engage such dialogue
until it is satisfied that Pakistan has ended all militant infiltration into its Jammu and
Kashmir state (for further reading, see RL31587, Kashmiri Separatists: Origins, Competing
Ideologies, and Prospects for Resolution of the Conflict).
Pakistan-U.S. Security Cooperation. The close U.S.- Pakistan security ties of the
cold war era — which had come to near halt after the 1990 aid cutoff — appear to be in the
process of restoration as a result of Pakistan’s role in U.S.-led anti-terrorism campaign. In
the spring of 2002, U.S. military and law enforcement personnel reportedly began engaging
in direct, low-profile efforts to assist Pakistani security forces in tracking and apprehending
fugitive Al Qaeda and Taliban fighters on Pakistani territory. Press reports indicate that
Pakistan has remanded to U.S. custody nearly 500 such fugitives to date.
In July 2002, Congress was notified of two Foreign Military Sales arrangements with
Pakistan reportedly worth $230 million. Under the deals, Pakistan is to receive 7 used C-
130E transport aircraft (one being for spare parts) and six Aerostat surveillance radars.
These mark the first notable arms sales to Pakistan in more than a decade and are intended
to bolster Islamabad’s counterterrorism capabilities. Islamabad continues to seek U.S.
weapons and technology, especially in an effort to bolster its air forces. Several Members
of Congress are reported to be supportive of these efforts. A revived high-level U.S.-
Pakistan defense consultative group — moribund for the past 5 years — met in late-
September 2002 and included high-level discussions of military cooperation, security
assistance, and anti-terrorism. The two countries also have planned regular joint military
exercises (see CRS Report RL31624, Pakistan-U.S. Anti-Terrorism Cooperation).
Democratization and Human Rights
Democratization Efforts. There had been hopes that national elections in October
2002 would reverse Pakistan’s historic trend toward unstable governance and military
interference in democratic institutions. Such hopes were eroded by the passage of a number
of highly restrictive election laws — including those that prevented the country’s two
leading civilian politicians from participating — as well as President Musharraf’s unilateral
imposition of major constitutional amendments in August 2002. While praising Pakistan’s
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recent electoral exercises as moves in the right direction, the United States has expressed
concern that these seemingly nondemocratic developments may make the realization of true
democracy in Pakistan more elusive (see CRS Report RS21299, Pakistan’s Domestic
Political Developments).
Human Rights Problems. The U.S. State Department, in its Pakistan Country
Report on Human Rights Practices, 2002 (issued March 2003), determined that the
Islamabad government’s record on human rights remains “poor.” Along with concerns about
anti-democratic practices, the United States identifies “acute” corruption, extrajudicial
killings, lack of judicial independence, “extremely poor” prison conditions, and increased
violence against Christians as serious problems. Police have abused and raped citizens with
apparent impunity. Improvement in some areas is noted, however, particularly with press
freedoms and governmental efforts to curb religious extremism.
The Human Rights Commission of Pakistan, Amnesty International, and Human Rights
Watch have issued reports critical of Pakistan’s lack of political freedoms and of the
country’s perceived abuses of the rights of women and minorities. Discrimination against
women is widespread, and traditional constraints — cultural, legal, and spousal — have kept
women in a subordinate position in society. “Honor killings” continue to occur throughout
the country. The adult literacy rate for men in Pakistan is more than 50%, while half as many
women are literate. Religious minorities — mainly Christians and Ahmadi Muslims —
reportedly are subjected to discriminatory laws and social intolerance. Blasphemy laws,
instituted under the Zia regime and strengthened in 1991, carry a mandatory death penalty
for blaspheming the Prophet or his family. Blasphemy charges reportedly are commonly
brought as a result of personal or religious vendettas. Anti-Christian and anti-Western
violence, which peaked in the summer of 2002, has cost scores of lives. In 2003, Islamist
lawmakers in the NWFP have launched efforts to impose harsh penalties under Sharia, such
as amputating the hands of thieves and stoning adulterers, as well as establish a Department
of Vice and Virtue to implement Islamic law.
Economic Issues
Overview. Pakistan is a poor country with great extremes in the distribution of wealth.
The long-term economic outlook for Pakistan continues to be rather bleak, given a low
national savings rate (10%) and high labor force growth rates (2.4%) in a country that
remains highly dependent on foreign lending and the importation of basic commodities
(public debt is equal to more than 86% of GDP). In the middle-term, greater political
stability following October 2002 elections could brighten the outlook by providing President
Musharraf with a political base for the further pursuit of economic reform, but conflict with
India is an ever-present risk. In the short-run, substantial fiscal deficits and the still urgent
dependency on external aid donations counterbalance a major overhaul of the tax collection
system and have been notable gains in the Karachi Stock Exchange, the world’s best
performer in 2002. Per capita GDP is $425 (or $2,000 when accounting for purchasing
power parity).
Output from both the industrial and service sectors grew in 2002, but the agricultural
sector’s output has been weak and significantly slowed growth overall (in part due to severe
drought). Agricultural labor accounts for nearly half of the country’s work force. Pakistan’s
real GDP for the fiscal year ending June 2002 grew by some 3.6% over FY2001 (but 4.5%
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for the calendar year). An industrial sector recovery and the end of a 3-year drought have
some foreseeing even more robust growth ahead, with predictions putting the growth rate at
around 4.5% or less for FY2003, up to 5% for FY2004.
The Pakistani government had stabilized the country’s external debt at about $36.3
billion by the end of 2002. The country’s total liquid reserves grew to $10.3 billion by April
2003 — an all-time high and an increase of more than $8 billion since October 1999. In
December 2001, the Paris Club of creditor nations agreed to reschedule $12.5 billion in
repayments on Pakistan’s external debt — one-third of the country’s total burden. Foreign
remittances for FY2002 exceeded $2.3 billion — more than twice the amount in 2001.
Inflation, at about 4.5%, is at a relatively low level, largely as a result of weak consumer
demand. Interest on public debt and defense spending together consume 70% of total
revenues, thus squeezing out development expenditure, including social spending.
Many analysts believe that Pakistan’s resources and comparatively well-developed
entrepreneurial skills may hold promise for more rapid economic growth and development
in coming years. This is particularly true for Pakistan’s textile industry, which accounts for
60% of Pakistan’s exports. Analysts point to the pressing need to broaden the country’s tax
base in order to provide increased revenue for investment in improved infrastructure, health,
and education, all prerequisites for economic development. Only 1.4% of Pakistanis
currently pay income taxes. Agricultural income has not been taxed in the past, largely
because of the domination of parliament and the provincial assemblies by wealthy landlords.
Attempts at economic reform historically have floundered due to political instability.
The Musharraf government has had some modest successes in effecting economic reform.
As of April 2003, the Islamabad appears to be maintaining general continuity in its economic
policies since the previous year’s elections, and the seating of a pro-Musharraf ruling
coalition in the Parliament has added to analysts’ confidence that reforms will remain on
track. Moreover, participation in the post-September 2001 anti-terror coalition had the effect
of easing somewhat Islamabad’s severe national debt situation, with many countries,
including the United States, boosting bilateral assistance efforts and large amounts of
external aid flowing into the country.
An October 2002 World Bank report commended Pakistan for bringing about
macroeconomic stability and implementing wide-ranging structural reforms to spur economic
growth, while also noting that the country’s poverty levels are both high and static. A
November 2002 IMF report identifies a “worrisome trend of declining growth” linked in part
to “a turbulent domestic and regional political environment.” A December 2002 World Bank
report claims that “Pakistan’s economic revival program is beginning to produce good
results,” but also notes numerous problems that seem to require further implementation of
structural reforms. An April 2003 report of the Asian Development Bank noted that
continued macroeconomic stability is enhancing Pakistan’s medium-term economic
prospects, but warns that renewed tensions with India and/or domestic political instability
could quickly dampen current optimism.
Trade Issues. Pakistan’s primary exports are cotton, textiles and apparel, rice, and
leather products. During 2002, total U.S. imports from Pakistan were worth about $2.3
billion, a slight increase over the previous year. Nearly 90% of this value came from the
purchase of textiles, clothing, and related articles. U.S. exports to Pakistan during 2002 were
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worth $694 million, a major increase of 28% over 2001. The U.S. trade deficit with Pakistan
has been approximately $1.7 billion for each of the past three years.
Legislation in the 107th Congress included S.1675 to authorize the President to reduce
or suspend duties on Pakistani textiles (the bill was not voted upon). During a February 2003
visit to the United States, the Pakistani foreign minister requested greater access to U.S.
markets as a means of reducing poverty and thus also the forces of extremism in Pakistan.
He made a direct link between poverty and the continued existence of Islamic schools
(madrassas) that are implicated in teaching militant anti-American values.
Several
nongovernmental Western analysts have made similar arguments.
According to the report of the U.S. Trade Representative for 2002, Pakistan has made
progress in reducing import tariff schedules, though a number of trade barriers remain. Some
items are either restricted or banned from importation for reasons related to religion, national
security, luxury consumption, or protection of local industries. The U.S. pharmaceutical
industry believes that Pakistan maintains discriminatory practices that impede U.S.
manufacturer profitability, while several U.S. companies have complained about Pakistani
violations of their intellectual property rights.
The International Intellectual Property
Alliance estimated trade losses of $116 million in 2002, and widespread piracy, especially
of copyrighted materials (Pakistan is a world leader in the pirating of CDs), has kept Pakistan
on the U.S. Trade Representative’s “Special 301" watch list for 13 consecutive years.
Narcotics
Pakistan is a major transit country for opiates that are grown and processed in
Afghanistan and western Pakistan, then distributed throughout the world by Pakistan-based
traffickers. The region has in the past supplied up to 40% of heroin consumed in the United
States and 70% of that consumed in Europe, and has been second only to Southeast Asia’s
Golden Triangle as a top source of the world’s heroin. The U.S. Department of State
indicates that Pakistan’s cooperation on drug control with the United States “remains
excellent.” The Islamabad government has made impressive strides in eradicating opium
poppy cultivation. Estimated production in 2001 was only 5 metric tons, down 59% from
2000 and less than one-thirtieth of the estimated 155 tons produced in 1995. In March 2003,
the Acting Assistant Secretary of State for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement
Affairs claimed that Pakistan has “essentially eliminated opium production,” but the State
Department’s International Narcotics Control Strategy Report for 2002 (March 2003)
indicates that Pakistan still remains a “substantial trafficking country” and notes that opium
production rose slightly in 2002 from a record low in 2001.
Pakistan’s counter-narcotics efforts continue to be hampered by a number of factors,
including lack of total government commitment; scarcity of funds; poor infrastructure in
drug-producing regions; government wariness of provoking unrest in tribal areas; and “acute”
corruption. In March 2003, former U.S. Ambassador to Pakistan Wendy Chamberlain stated
that the role of Pakistan’s intelligence service in the heroin trade over the past six years has
been “substantial.” Direct U.S. counter-narcotics aid to Pakistan totaled $2.4 million in
2002. The program is administered by the State Department’s Bureau of International
Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL), which oversaw Pakistan projects with more
than $90 million in FY2002, including $73 million in emergency supplemental
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appropriations for border security efforts that continue in FY2003. The INL allocation for
FY2003 was $6 million; rising to $38 million requested for FY2004.
Terrorism
After the September 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States, Pakistan pledged and
has provided support for the U.S.-led anti-terror coalition.
According to the U.S.
Departments of State and Defense, Pakistan has afforded the United States unprecedented
levels of cooperation by allowing the U.S. military to use bases within the country, helping
to identify and detain extremists, and tightening the border between Pakistan and
Afghanistan. In a landmark speech in January 2002, Musharraf vowed to end Pakistan’s use
as a base for terrorism of any kind, and banned numerous militant groups, including Lashkar-
e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Muhammad, both blamed for terrorist violence in Kashmir and India.
In the wake of the speech, thousands of extremists were arrested and detained, though many
of these have since been released (see CRS Report RL31624, Pakistan-U.S. Anti-Terrorism
Cooperation).
In January 2002, Wall Street Journal reporter Daniel Pearl was kidnaped in Karachi and
later found murdered. May and June car bomb attacks on Western targets, including the U.S.
consulate in Karachi, killed 29 people — 11 French military technicians and 18 Pakistani
nationals. These attacks were widely viewed as expressions of militants’ anger with the
Musharraf regime for its cooperation with the United States. The incidents were linked to
Al Qaeda, as well as to indigenous militant groups. In September 2002, Pakistani authorities
announced a series of high-profile arrests of those deemed responsible for the car bombings,
and they claimed to have “broken the back” of the Al Qaeda network in Pakistan. Yet press
reports indicate that Al Qaeda and Taliban fugitives still are numerous in Pakistan and may
be attempting to re-establish their organizations in Pakistani cities such as Karachi. Alleged
Al Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden may himself be in Pakistan.
Islamabad has been under continuous pressure from the United States and numerous
other governments to terminate the infiltration of insurgents across the Kashmiri Line of
Control. Such pressure elicited an explicit promise from President Musharraf to U.S. Deputy
Secretary of State Armitage that all such movements would cease. After confirmations from
both U.S. and Indian government officials that infiltration was down significantly in the
summer of 2002, the rate reportedly rose again in the autumn, and in December 2002 the
U.S. envoy to New Delhi claimed that the problem in Kashmir is “cross-border terrorism”
that is “almost entirely externally driven.” President Musharraf adamantly insists that his
government is doing everything possible to stop such movements. Critics contend, however,
that Islamabad has provided active support for the insurgents in Kashmir as a means to both
maintain strategically the domestic backing of Islamists who view the Kashmir issue as
fundamental to the Pakistani national idea, as well as to disrupt tactically the state
government in Indian Kashmir and so seek to erode New Delhi’s legitimacy there.
U.S. Aid and Congressional Action
The Bush Administration requested a total of $505 million in assistance to Pakistan for
FY2003, including supplemental appropriations. Congress allocated about $495 million of
this. Security-related assistance in the amount of $56.5 million was allocated in P.L. 108-7,
as was $188 million in Economic Support Funds that Congress authorized Pakistan to use
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to cancel approximately $1 billion in concessional debt to the U.S. government. (At the end
of 2002, Pakistan’s international debt was estimated at $36.3 billion. P.L. 107-57 allowed
Pakistan to reschedule $379 million of its debt to the United States thereby enabling it to
cancel its arrearage.) In April 2003, President Bush signed into law P.L. 108-11 (the
Emergency Wartime Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2003), allocating $200 million in
additional security-related assistance to Pakistan for FY2003. Actual U.S. assistance to
Pakistan in FY2002 was just over $1 billion, up from about $5 million in FY2001. The
current Administration request for FY2004 stands at $395 million.
Some Members of the 107th Congress introduced legislation to reimpose restrictions on
aid to Pakistan in light of perceived to be continuing anti-democratic practices by the
Musharraf government. These resolutions were not were voted upon. In the 108th Congress,
H.R.1403 seeks to remove the democracy-related sanctions exemption with respect to
Pakistan (i.e., to repeal the President’s waiver authority). Some Members of the 108th
Congress also have urged reinstatement of proliferation-related sanctions in response to
reports of Pakistani assistance to the North Korean nuclear weapons program, though no
relevant legislation is pending.
Through a series of legislative measures, Congress incrementally lifted sanctions on
Pakistan and India resulting from their 1998 nuclear tests. President Clinton signed into law
P.L. 106-79 (the Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2000) in October 1999. Title
IX of the act gives the President authority to waive sanctions applied against Pakistan and
India in response to the nuclear tests. In a presidential determination on Pakistan and India
issued on October 27, 1999, the President waived economic sanctions on India. Pakistan,
however, remained under sanctions triggered under Section 508 of the annual foreign
assistance appropriations act as a result of the October 1999 coup. The Foreign Operations
Export Financing and Related Appropriations Agencies Act, 2001 provided an exception
under which Pakistan could be provided U.S. foreign assistance funding for basic education
programs (P.L. 106-429; Section 597). After the September 2001 terrorist attacks on the
United States, and in recognition of Pakistan’s cooperation with the U.S.-led coalition being
assembled, policymakers searched for new means of providing assistance to Pakistan.
President Bush’s issuance of a final determination on September 22, 2001 removed
remaining sanctions on Pakistan and India resulting from their 1998 nuclear tests, finding
that denying export licences and assistance was not in the national security interests of the
United States. P.L. 107-57 granted presidential authority to waive coup-related sanctions on
Pakistan through FY2003. In the 108th Congress, pending legislation may extend that
authority through FY2004 or FY2005 (see CRS Report RS20995, India and Pakistan:
Current U.S. Economic Sanctions).
CHRONOLOGY
06/03/03 — A Pew Center opinion poll found that 72% of Pakistanis were “very worried”
or “somewhat worried” about a perceived military threat from the United
States, and that 45% had at least “some confidence” in Osama bin Laden’s
ability to “do the right thing regarding world affairs.”
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06/02/03 — The MMA-ruled legislature of the NWFP passed a bill introducing Sharia
(Islamic) law in the region. They plan to follow with the creation of a
Department of Vice and Virtue to implement the new laws. On the same day,
while visiting Islamabad, F.B.I. Director Mueller met with President
Musharraf and other top officials to discuss ongoing Pakistan-U.S. anti-
terrorism cooperation.
06/01/03 — Hundreds of Pakistanis reportedly demonstrated against the presence of U.S.
military forces at an airport in western Pakistan.
05/29/03 — For the third day in a row, police arrested opposition legislators in Punjab to
prevent them from protesting against a package of constitutional changes.
05/28/03 — National Security Advisor Rice stated that the United States is “encouraged
by recent trends” in the Pakistan-India relationship.
05/27/03 — India announced that it would resume a popular bus service between New
Delhi and Lahore, as well as release 130 Pakistani prisoners in an effort to
make further progress toward a Pakistan-India dialogue.
05/26/03 — President Musharraf stated that he would “not become an obstacle” in
anticipated talks between PM Jamali and his Indian counterpart.
05/24/03 — While visiting Islamabad, Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military
Affairs Bloomfield met with the Pakistani Defense Minister and others to
discuss “matters of mutual interest.”
05/23/03 — A top Indian military officer accused Pakistani troops of providing covering
fire to help Islamic militants sneak into Indian territory.
05/20/03 — While visiting Islamabad, Assistant Secretary of State for Arms Control
Rademaker met with top Pakistani officials to discuss regional security and
arms control issues. On the same day, Pakistan’s military leadership declared
that they would not “sideline” the core issue of Kashmir.
05/19/03 — A meeting of Commonwealth foreign ministers rejected Pakistan’s request
for readmission due to “insufficient efforts toward democracy.”
05/18/03 — A series of small explosions at 21 different Western-owned gas stations in the
Karachi area caused minor damage and no injuries.
05/17/03 — One week after India appointed its new Ambassador to Islamabad, Pakistan
appointed its own new envoy to New Delhi, completing full restoration of
diplomatic ties that had been severed in December 2001.
05/15/03 — Pakistan’s Ambassador to the United States conferred his country’s highest
civil award on Sen. Brownback for his “services to enhance bilateral ties.”
05/14/03 — Pakistan barred the leader of the outlawed Jaish-e-Mohammed terrorist group
from addressing a religious conference in Pakistan-held Kashmir. Reports
also indicated that Pakistani authorities began disarming Hizbul Mujahideen
fighters at their training camp in Muzaffarabad. On the same day, the
founder of the outlawed Lashkar-i-Taiba terrorist group rejected any dialogue
and called for continued “jihad” against India.
05/13/03 — Three Pakistan opposition party legislators criticized President Musharraf for
“stabbing the Kashmiri freedom fighters in the back” with his efforts to close
down training camps in Pakistan-held Kashmir.
05/12/03 — Pakistan’s Foreign Minister stated that President Musharraf, and the
country’s military and intelligence agency are “on board” for talks with India.
05/10/03 — Indian intelligence sources claimed that “about 110 “ terrorist training camps
exist in Pakistan-held Kashmir.
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05/09/03 — H.R. 2063, which seeks to authorize the use of Cooperative Threat Reduction
funds to address proliferation threats outside the states of the former Soviet
Union, was introduced. This potentially could include Pakistan and India.
On the same day, S.Con.Res. 26, condemning the punishment of execution
by stoning as a gross violation of human rights, was introduced. One Senator
noted that Pakistani law permits this “cruel and unusual punishment.”
05/08/03 — While visiting South Asia, Deputy Secretary of State Armitage said that
“infiltration and cross-border violence [in Kashmir] are down from this time
last year.” On the same day, 12 Pakistani members of parliament crossed the
border into India on a week-long “peace visit.”
05/07/03 — Sec. 708 of H.R. 1950 (the Foreign Relations Authorization Act) would
require the President to report to Congress on Pakistan’s progress in closing
terrorist training camps, prohibiting infiltration across the Kashmiri LOC, and
ceasing the transfers of WMD materials and/or technologies.
04/03
— A significant thaw in Pakistan-India relations came with a 10-minute
telephone conversation between PM Jamali and PM Vajpayee, the first such
direct contact since the July 2001 summit in Agra, India. The two agree to
restore full diplomatic relations, reopen key transportation links, and pursue
further confidence-building measures.
03/03
— Alleged top Al Qaeda leader Khalid Mohammed was arrested in Rawalpindi.
Also, President Bush declined to take action related to alleged Pakistani
assistance to North Korea’s nuclear weapons program, and he waived coup-
related sanctions on Islamabad through FY2003.
Islamabad expressed
disapproval of the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq and hundreds of thousands of
Pakistanis marched in several cities in opposition to the war. In Indian
Kashmir, 24 Hindu villagers were killed by apparent Muslim militants. India
blamed Pakistan for the attack. Near the end of the month, the United States
imposed sanctions on Pakistan’s Khan Research Laboratories for its role in
receiving missile-related technology from North Korea.
11/02
— A fragile coalition of pro-military parties elected veteran politician Mir
Zafarullah Jamali to be the Pakistan’s new prime minister, the first since
Nawaz Sharif was ousted in an October 1999 military coup. The coalition
unexpectedly excluded both the Islamist MMA parties and the secular PPP.
10/02
— Pakistan held its first national elections since an October 1999 military coup
brought Gen. Musharraf to power. The pro-military PML-Q party won a
plurality of parliamentary seats while an Islamist coalition made a
surprisingly strong showing, especially in Baluchistan and the NWFP along
the border with Afghanistan. The secular PPP of former PM Bhutto was shut
out of both the national and provincial coalitions. Following the elections,
both India and Pakistan announced major troop redeployments, signaling the
end of a tense 10-month-long military face-off along their shared border.
09-10/02 — State elections in India’s Jammu and Kashmir resulted in the ousting of the
long-ruling National Conference party and the seating of a new government
ruled by a coalition that vows to “soften” policy toward separatist militants.
The Kashmiri separatist All Parties Hurriyat Conference, which has political
ties to Islamabad, found itself marginalized after boycotting the elections.
09/02
— A moribund U.S.-Pakistan security relationship was revived when officials
from both countries met in Islamabad for the first Defense Cooperation
Group session since 1997.
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08/02
— President Musharraf issued a “Legal Framework Order” of controversial
constitutional changes that greatly enhance the governance powers of both the
President and the Pakistani military.
07/02
— Congress was notified of two pending U.S. arms sales to Pakistan, the first
in more than a decade. The 7 C-130 aircraft and 6 Aerostat surveillance
radars are meant to bolster Islamabad’s counterterrorism capabilities.
06/02
— Intense international diplomatic pressure — including multiple visits to the
region by senior U.S. government officials — apparently persuaded India to
refrain from taking military action against Pakistan. Key to the effort were
explicit promises by Pakistani President Musharraf to U.S. Deputy Secretary
of State Armitage that all infiltration of militants across the Line of Control
would be halted. Also, a car bomb exploded outside the U.S. consulate in
Karachi, killing 12 Pakistani nationals. The attack was blamed on Islamic
radicals who may have had links to Al Qaeda.
05/02
— A terrorist attack on an Indian army base in Jammu and Kashmir killed 34,
mostly women and children. New Delhi blamed the attack on the “cross-
border terrorism” of Pakistani-sponsored militants and vowed to fight a
“decisive war” against Pakistan. Also, a car bomb killed 14, including 11
French military technicians, outside a Karachi hotel. The attack was blamed
on Islamic radicals who may have had links to Al Qaeda.
04/02
— A controversial referendum ostensibly legitimized Gen. Musharraf’s status
as Pakistani President, though Musharraf later apologized to the nation for
acknowledged irregularities in the process.
Spring
— U.S. military and law enforcement personnel began engaging in direct, but
low-profile efforts to assist Pakistani security forces in tracking and
apprehending fugitive Al Qaeda and Taliban fighters on Pakistani territory.
03/02
— A major U.S. military offensive (Operation Anaconda) in Afghanistan’s
eastern mountains apparently prompted two waves of up to 5,000 Al Qaeda
fighters fleeing into Pakistan. Press reports indicated that Al Qaeda set up
new bases of operations in western Pakistan and in the city of Karachi.
01/02
— President Musharraf delivered a landmark address in which he vowed to end
all Islamic extremism and terrorist activity originating from Pakistani soil.
Also, Wall Street Journal reporter Daniel Pearl was kidnaped in Karachi and
later found dead. Four Islamic radicals with possible links to Al Qaeda
subsequently were arrested and convicted of his murder.
12/01
— A terrorist attack on the Indian Parliament complex in New Delhi killed 14.
New Delhi blamed the attack on Pakistani-backed Islamic militants and
began a massive military mobilization. Also, the United States designated
two Pakistan-based militant groups — Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-
Mohammed — as Foreign Terrorist Organizations under U.S. law.
10/01
— A terrorist attack on the assembly building in Indian Kashmir killed 34. India
blamed the attack on Pakistan-backed separatist militants.
09/01
— Terrorist attacks on the United States, and ensuing U.S. diplomatic pressure,
transformed the Pakistan-U.S. relationship, spurring the Islamabad
government to sever ties with the Afghani Taliban and join in the U.S.-led
anti-terrorism campaign as a key front-line state. Within one month, all
remaining proliferation- and democracy-related restrictions on U.S. aid to
Pakistan were removed or waived, and large amounts of U.S. economic and
military assistance began flowing into the country.
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