Order Code RL31811
Report for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
Appropriations for FY2004:
Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and
Related Programs
June 2, 2003
Larry Nowels
Specialist in Foreign Affairs
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

Appropriations are one part of a complex federal budget process that includes budget
resolutions, appropriations (regular, supplemental, and continuing) bills, rescissions, and
budget reconciliation bills. The process begins with the President’s budget request and is
bound by the rules of the House and Senate, the Congressional Budget and Impoundment
Control Act of 1974 (as amended), the Budget Enforcement Act of 1990, and current
program authorizations.
This report is a guide to one of the 13 regular appropriations bills that Congress considers
each year. It is designed to supplement the information provided by the House and Senate
Foreign Operations Appropriations Subcommittees. It summarizes the current legislative
status of the bill, its scope, major issues, funding levels, and related legislative activity. The
report lists the key CRS staff relevant to the issues covered and related CRS products.
This report is updated as soon as possible after major legislative developments, especially
following legislative action in the committees and on the floor of the House and Senate.
NOTE: A Web version of this document with active links is
available to congressional staff at:
[http://www.crs.gov/products/appropriations/apppage.shtml].


Appropriations for FY2004:
Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and
Related Programs
Summary
The annual Foreign Operations appropriations bill is the primary legislative
vehicle through which Congress reviews the U.S. foreign aid budget and influences
executive branch foreign policy making generally. It contains the largest share —
about two-thirds — of total U.S. international affairs spending.
President Bush has asked Congress to appropriate $18.89 billion for FY2004
Foreign Operations. The budget proposal is $2.7 billion, or 16.7% higher than
regular (non-supplemental) Foreign Operations appropriations for FY2003. If
enacted, the President’s recommendation would result in one of the largest increases
of regular Foreign Operations funding in at least two decades. Congress
subsequently approved in mid-April an additional $7.5 billion FY2003 supplemental
foreign aid spending in P.L. 108-11, for Iraq reconstruction, assistance to coalition
partners, and other activities supporting the global war on terrorism. Including the
supplemental brings Foreign Operations appropriations in FY2003 to $23.67 billion.
The FY2004 budget blueprint continues to highlight foreign aid in support of
the war on terrorism as the highest priority, with about $4.7 billion recommended.
But a notable characteristic of the submission is the request for funding four new
foreign aid initiatives which together account for most of the $2.7 billion increase
over regular FY2003 levels. Combined, the Millennium Challenge Account, a new
structure for delivering foreign aid, the State Department’s Global AIDS Initiative,
and two new contingency funds, total $2.05 billion. Other Foreign Operations
programs are left with a more modest 4% increase.
In total, the request includes $1.2 billion for HIV/AIDS, about $350 million
more than enacted for FY2003, and $7.1 billion for military and security-related
economic aid, up nearly $650 million or 10% from regular FY2003 appropriations.
“Core” bilateral development assistance funding, however, would fall by 8%,
although recipients of these accounts are likely to benefit significantly from the new
Millennium Challenge Account and Global AIDS Initiative. Funding for Eastern
Europe and former Soviet programs is cut by 21%.
The FY2004 budget resolution approved by Congress in mid-April (H.Con.Res.
95) includes $28.65 billion in discretionary budget authority for International Affairs
programs, the same as the President’s request. This means that House and Senate
Appropriations Committees will receive sufficient resources to fully fund the
Administration’s foreign policy budget proposal, including the Foreign Operations
request. The Committees, however, may choose to allocate the funds in ways that
could increase or decrease resources for Foreign Operations.
The FY2004 Foreign Operations debate will include discussion of several
significant policy issues, including foreign aid as a tool in the global war on
terrorism, the Millennium Challenge Account, international family planning
programs, and Afghan reconstruction.

Key Policy Staff
Area of Expertise
Name
Tel.
E-Mail
General: Policy issues & budget
Larry Nowels
7-7645
lnowels@crs.loc.gov
General: Policy issues
Curt Tarnoff
7-7656
ctarnoff@crs.loc.gov
Afghanistan reconstruction aid
Rhoda Margesson
7-0425
rmargesson@crs.loc.gov
Africa Aid
Raymond Copson
7-7661
rcopson@crs.loc.gov
Agency for Intl Development
Larry Nowels
7-7645
lnowels@crs.loc.gov
Curt Tarnoff
7-7656
ctarnoff@crs.loc.gov
Andean Regional Initiative
Larry Storrs
7-7672
lstorrs@crs.loc.gov
Debt Relief
Larry Nowels
7-7645
lnowels@crs.loc.gov
Development Assistance
Larry Nowels
7-7645
lnowels@crs.loc.gov
Curt Tarnoff
7-7656
ctarnoff@crs.loc.gov
Disaster aid
Rhoda Margesson
7-0425
rmargesson@crs.loc.gov
Drug/counternarcotics programs
Raphael Perl
7-7664
rperl@crs.loc.gov
Drug/counternarcotics, Colombia
Nina Serafino
7-7667
nserafino@crs.loc.gov
Export-Import Bank
James Jackson
7-7751
jjackson@crs.loc.gov
Family planning programs
Larry Nowels
7-7645
lnowels@crs.loc.gov
Health programs
Rhoda Margesson
7-0425
rmargesson@crs.loc.gov
Tiaji Salaam
7-7677
tsalaam@crs.loc.gov
HIV/AIDS
Raymond Copson
7-7661
rcopson@crs.loc.gov
International affairs budget
Larry Nowels
7-7645
lnowels@crs.loc.gov
International Monetary Fund
Jonathan Sanford
7-7682
jsanford@crs.loc.gov
Jeff Hornbeck
7-7782
jhornbeck@crs.loc.gov
Iraq reconstruction
Curt Tarnoff
7-7656
ctarnoff@crs.loc.gov
Rhoda Margesson
7-0425
rmargesson@crs.loc.gov
Kosovo/Yugoslavia aid
Curt Tarnoff
7-7656
ctarnoff@crs.loc.gov
Microenterprise
Curt Tarnoff
7-7656
ctarnoff@crs.loc.gov
Middle East assistance
Clyde Mark
7-7681
cmark@crs.loc.gov
Military aid/Arms sales
Richard Grimmett
7-7675
rgrimmett@crs.loc.gov
Multilateral Development Banks
Jonathan Sanford
7-7682
jsanford@crs.loc.gov
North Korea/KEDO
Larry Niksch
7-7680
lniksch@crs.loc.gov
Overseas Private Investment Corp
James Jackson
7-7751
jjackson@crs.loc.gov
Peace Corps
Curt Tarnoff
7-7656
ctarnoff@crs.loc.gov
Peacekeeping
Marjorie Browne
7-7695
mbrowne@crs.loc.gov
Refugee aid
Larry Nowels
7-7645
lnowels@crs.loc.gov
Russia/East Europe Aid
Curt Tarnoff
7-7656
ctarnoff@crs.loc.gov
Terrorism
Raphael Perl
7-7664
rperl@crs.loc.gov
Audrey Cronin
7-7676
acronin@crs.loc.gov
Trafficking in Women/Children
Francis Miko
7-7670
fmiko@crs.loc.gov
U.N. Voluntary Contributions
Vita Bite
7-7662
vbite@crs.loc.gov

Contents
Most Recent Developments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Status . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Foreign Operations Funding Trends . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Foreign Operations, the FY2004 Budget Resolution, and Sec.
302(b) Allocations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Foreign Operations Appropriations Request for FY2004 and
Congressional Consideration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Request Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Fighting the War on Terrorism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
New Initiative: The Millennium Challenge Account . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
New Initiative: The Global AIDS Initiative . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
New Initiative: The Famine Fund . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
New Initiative: The U.S. Emergency Fund for Complex Crises . . . . . 11
Other Key Elements of the FY2003 Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Leading Foreign Aid Recipients Proposed for FY2004 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Iraq War Supplemental for FY2003 and Foreign Operations Funding . . . . . . . . 16
Reconstruction Efforts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Congressional Action on Iraq Reconstruction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
International Assistance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
Congressional Action on International Assistance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
DOD Authorities to Provide Military Aid . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
Congressional Action on DOD Authorities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
Selected Major Issues in the FY2004 Foreign Operations Debate . . . . . . . . . . . 26
Combating Terrorism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
Anti-Terrorism Assistance (ATA) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
Terrorist Interdiction Program (TIP) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
Counterterrorism Engagement with Allies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
Terrorist Financing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
USAID Physical Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
Aid Restrictions for Terrorist States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
Millennium Challenge Account . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
Congressional Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
International Family Planning and UNFPA Funding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
UNFPA Funding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
“Mexico City” Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
Congressional Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
Afghanistan Reconstruction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
Situation Prior to September 11 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
Current Operating Environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
Tokyo Pledging Conference . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41

Subsequent U.S. Aid Transfers, FY2002 and FY2003 . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
FY2004 Afghanistan Aid Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
For Additional Reading . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
Selected World Wide Web Sites . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
List of Figures
Figure 1. Foreign Policy Budget, FY2004
By Appropriation Bills - $s billions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Figure 2. Foreign Operations Funding Trends . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Figure 3. Supplemental Funding for Foreign Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
List of Tables
Table 1. Status of Foreign Operations Appropriations, FY2004 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Table 2. Foreign Operations Appropriations, FY1995 to FY2004 . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Table 3. Foreign Operations New Initiatives FY2004 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Table 4. Summary of Foreign Operations Appropriations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Table 5. Leading Recipients of U.S. Foreign Aid . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Table 6. Iraq Reconstruction, International Aid, and Related Activities . . . . . . 18
Table 7. Proposed Recipients of Supplemental Foreign Aid . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
Table 8. U.S. Assistance to Front-Line States in War on Terrorism . . . . . . . . . 27
Table 9. U.S. Assistance to Afghanistan, FY2002-FY2004 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
Table 10. Foreign Operations: Discretionary Budget Authority . . . . . . . . . . . . 47

Appropriations for FY2004:
Foreign Operations, Export Financing,
and Related Programs
Most Recent Developments
On April 12, 2003, Congress approved a $78.4 billion Iraq War supplemental
appropriation (H.R. 1559; P.L. 108-11) that included an additional $7.5 billion in
Foreign Operations funding for FY2003. The foreign aid portion of the supplemental
was roughly divided into three components: Iraq post-conflict relief, reconstruction,
and security (about $2.5 billion); aid to coalition partners and other nations engaged
in the war on terrorism (about $4.5 billion); and funds to replenish regular aid
accounts that had been drawn from to pre-position commodities in the region (about
$550 million). (P.L. 108-11 also included $369 million to replenish international
food aid accounts drawn from the Agriculture portion of the supplemental.) While
Congress generally approved amounts requested by the President, most controversy
centered on which agency would manage the $2.475 billion Iraq Relief and
Reconstruction Fund. The White House requested broad authority so the President
could designate the Defense Department (DOD) to administer the funds while many
in Congress felt the traditional aid agency managers — the Department of State and
the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) — should control Fund
resources. As approved, the supplemental legislation appropriates the funds to the
President, allowing him to directly apportion the money to five Federal agencies,
including DOD.
Earlier, on February 3, the President submitted his FY2004 budget request to
Congress that included one of the largest increases for Foreign Operations programs
in several decades. The $18.9 billion proposal is $2.7 billion, or 16.7% higher than
regular foreign aid funds enacted for FY2003 (excluding the $7.5 billion provided in
the FY2003 Iraq War supplemental). Most of the add-ons reflect several new
initiatives proposed for FY2004, including the Millennium Challenge Account ($1.3
billion) and the Global AIDS Initiative ($450 million). Excluding these new
initiatives, the FY2004 request for continuing Foreign Operations programs is a more
modest 4% higher than funding for regular foreign aid activities in FY2003
(excluding the supplemental). In total, the request includes $1.2 billion for
HIV/AIDS, about $350 million more than enacted for FY2003, and $7.1 billion for
military and security-related economic aid, up nearly $650 million or 10% from
regular FY2003 appropriations. “Core” bilateral development assistance funding,
however, would fall by 8%, although recipients of these accounts are likely to benefit
significantly from the new Millennium Challenge Account and Global AIDS
Initiative. Funding for Eastern Europe and former Soviet programs is cut by 21%.

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Introduction
The annual Foreign Operations appropriations bill is the primary legislative
vehicle through which Congress reviews and votes on the U.S. foreign assistance
budget and influences major aspects of executive branch foreign policy making
generally.1 It contains the largest share — about two-thirds — of total international
affairs spending by the United States (see Figure 1).
The legislation funds all U.S. bilateral development assistance programs,
managed mostly by the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID),
together with several smaller independent foreign aid agencies, such as the Peace
Corps and the Inter-American and African Development Foundations. Most
humanitarian aid activities are funded within Foreign Operations, including USAID’s
disaster program and the State Department’s refugee relief support. Foreign
Operations includes separate accounts for aid programs in the former Soviet Union
(also referred to as the Independent States account) and Central/Eastern Europe,
activities that are jointly managed by USAID and the State Department.
Security assistance (economic and military aid) for Israel and Egypt is also part
of the Foreign Operations spending measure, as are other security aid programs
administered largely by the State Department, in conjunction with USAID and the
Pentagon. U.S. contributions to the World Bank and other regional multilateral
development banks, managed by the Treasury Department, and voluntary payments
to international organizations, handled by the State Department, are also funded in
the Foreign Operations bill. Finally, the legislation includes appropriations for three
export promotion agencies: the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC),
the Export-Import Bank, and the Trade and Development Agency.
For nearly two decades, the Foreign Operations appropriations bill has been the
principal legislative vehicle for congressional oversight of foreign affairs and for
congressional involvement in foreign policy making. Congress has not enacted a
comprehensive foreign aid authorization bill since 1985, leaving most foreign
assistance programs without regular authorizations originating from the legislative
oversight committees. As a result, Foreign Operations spending measures developed
by the appropriations committees increasingly have expanded their scope beyond
spending issues and played a major role in shaping, authorizing, and guiding both
executive and congressional foreign aid and broader foreign policy initiatives. It has
been largely through Foreign Operations appropriations that the United States has
modified aid policy and resource allocation priorities since the end of the Cold War.
1 Although the Foreign Operations appropriations bill is often characterized as the “foreign
aid” spending measure, it does not include funding for all foreign aid programs. Food aid,
an international humanitarian aid program administered under the P.L. 480 program, is
appropriated in the Agriculture appropriations bill. Foreign Operations also include funds
for the Export-Import Bank, an activity that is regarded as a trade promotion program, rather
than “foreign aid.” In recent years, funding for food aid and the Eximbank have been about
the same, so that Foreign Operations and the official “foreign aid” budget are nearly
identical. Throughout this report, the terms Foreign Operations and foreign aid are used
interchangeably.

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Figure 1. Foreign Policy Budget, FY2004
By Appropriation Bills - $s billions
State Dept/Commerce - $8.5
Food Aid, Agriculture - $1.24
4.3%
29.7%
66.0%
Foreign Operations - $18.89
The legislation has also been the channel through which the President has utilized
foreign aid as a tool in the global war on terrorism since the attacks of September 11,
2001. The appropriations measure has also been a key instrument used by Congress
to apply restrictions and conditions on Administration management of foreign
assistance, actions that have frequently resulted in executive-legislative clashes over
presidential prerogatives in foreign policy making.

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Status
Table 1. Status of Foreign Operations Appropriations, FY2004
Subcomm.
Conf. Report
Markup
House
House
Senate
Senate
Conf.
Approval
Public
Report
Passage
Report
Passage
Report
Law
House
Senate
House
Senate










President Bush submitted his FY2004 federal budget request to Congress on
February 3, 2003, including funding proposals for Foreign Operations Appropriations
programs. Subsequently, on March 25, the White House requested FY2003
emergency supplemental funds for costs of military operations in Iraq, relief and
reconstruction of Iraq, ongoing U.S. costs in Afghanistan, additional aid to coalition
partners and nations cooperating in the global war on terrorism, and homeland
security. House and Senate Appropriations Committees held several hearings on
both the FY2004 and FY2003 supplemental requests, and approved the supplemental
(P.L. 108-11) on April 12. The Committees have not begun work on the FY2004
appropriations request.
Foreign Operations Funding Trends
As shown in Figure 2 below, Foreign Operations funding levels, expressed in
real terms taking into account the effects of inflation, have fluctuated widely over the
past 26 years.2 After peaking at over $33 billion in FY1985 (constant FY2004
dollars), Foreign Operations appropriations began a period of decline to $13.9 billion
in FY1997, with only a brief period of higher amounts in the early 1990s due to
special supplementals for Panama and Nicaragua (1990), countries affected by the
Gulf War (1991), and the former Soviet states (1993).
2 Some of these swings, however, are not the result of policy decisions, but due to technical
budget accounting changes involving how Congress “scores” various programs. For
example, the large increase in FY1981 did not represent higher funding levels, but rather the
fact that export credit programs began to be counted as appropriations rather than as “off-
budget” items. Part of the substantial rise in spending in FY1985 came as a result of the
requirement to appropriate the full amount of military aid loans rather than only the partial
appropriation required in the past. Beginning in FY1992, Congress changed how all Federal
credit programs are “scored” in appropriation bills which further altered the scoring of
foreign aid loans funded in Foreign Operations. All of these factors make it very difficult
to present a precise and consistent data trend line in Foreign Operations funding levels.
Nevertheless, the data shown in Figure 2 can be regarded as illustrative of general trends in
Congressional decisions regarding Foreign Operations appropriations over the past 25 years.


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Figure 2. Foreign Operations Funding Trends
Arguing that declining international affairs resources seriously undermined U.S.
foreign policy interests and limited the ability of American officials to influence
overseas events, Clinton Administration officials and other outside groups vigorously
campaigned to reverse the decade-long decline in the foreign policy budget. Foreign
aid spending increased slightly in FY1998, but beginning the following year and
continuing to the present, Foreign Operations appropriations have trended upward
due in large part to the approval of resources for special, and in some cases
unanticipated foreign policy contingencies and new initiatives. While funding for
regular, continuing foreign aid programs also rose modestly during this period,
supplemental spending for special activities, such as Central American hurricane
relief (FY1999), Kosovo emergency assistance (FY1999), Wye River/Middle East
peace accord support (FY2000), a counternarcotics initiative in Colombia and the
Andean region (FY2000 and FY2002), aid to the front line states in the war on
terrorism and Iraq-war related assistance (FY2003), was chiefly responsible for the
growth in foreign aid appropriations. The average annual funding level during the
FY1999-FY2003 period of $18.68 billion represents a level 36% higher than the low
point in Foreign Operations appropriation in FY1997.
At present, the $24.2 billion appropriated for FY2003 Foreign Operations
programs (real terms) is the largest amount since FY1985. This substantial FY2003
funding level is made up of a combination of the highest regular Foreign Operations
spending bill in over a decade, plus the largest supplemental ($7.5 billion) since
approval of an FY1979 supplemental aid package in support of the Camp David
peace accords signed by Israel and Egypt.
Due to the unpredictability and significant size of foreign aid supplementals in
recent years, it is becoming increasingly difficult to compare a new budget request
with the previous year when the latter includes a large supplemental. This is

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especially true when evaluating the FY2004 Foreign Operations budget plan, which
could also substantially increase through supplementals enacted next year. In this
case, a more informative assessment might compare regular FY2003 and FY2004
Foreign Operations budgets, keeping in mind that FY2003 has already been
augmented with significant supplemental funding. Using this point of reference,
despite falling well short of total amounts appropriated for FY2003, including the
supplemental, the FY2004 Foreign Operations request, if enacted, would be the
highest regular foreign aid spending measure in at least 15 years (in real terms) and
represent the largest single-year increase for regular Foreign Operations
appropriations over the entire 26 year period.
Table 2. Foreign Operations Appropriations, FY1995 to FY2004
(discretionary budget authority in billions of current and constant dollars)

FY95 FY96 FY97 FY98 FY99 FY00 FY01 FY02 FY03 FY04
nominal $s
13.61 12.46 12.27 13.15 15.44 16.41 16.31 16.54 23.67 18.89
constant FY04 $s
16.12 14.46 13.95 14.76 17.08 17.71 17.17 17.21 24.15 18.89
Note. FY1999 excludes $17.861 billion for the IMF.
The significance of supplemental resources for Foreign Operations programs in
recent years is illustrated in Figure 3 below. Due to the nature of rapidly changing
international events and the emergence of unanticipated contingencies to which it is
in the U.S. national interest to respond, it is not surprising that foreign aid and
defense resources from time to time are the major reason for considering and
approving supplemental spending outside the regular appropriation cycle.
Supplementals have provided resources for such major foreign policy events as the
Camp David accords (FY1979), Central America conflicts (FY1983), Africa famine
and a Middle East economic downturn (FY1985), Panama and Nicaragua
government transitions (FY1990), the Gulf War (FY1991), and Bosnia relief and
reconstruction (FY1996).
But after a period of only one significant foreign aid supplemental in eight years,
beginning in FY1999 Congress has approved Foreign Operations supplemental
appropriations exceeding $1 billion in each of the past five years. Relief for Central
American victims of Hurricane Mitch, Kosovo refugees, and victims of the embassy
bombings in Kenya and Tanzania in FY1999 totaled $1.6 billion, and was followed
in FY2000 by a $1.1 billion supplemental, largely to fund the President’s new
counternarcotics initiative in Colombia. As part of a $40 billion emergency
supplemental to fight terrorism enacted in September 2001, President Bush and
Congress allocated $1.4 billion for foreign aid activities in FY2001 and FY2002.
Another $1.15 billion supplemental cleared Congress in FY2002 to augment Afghan
reconstruction efforts and assist other “front-line” states in the war on terrorism.
Until FY2003, these additional resources have accounted for between 7% and 11%
of total Foreign Operations spending. The $7.5 billion Iraq War supplemental for

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FY2003, however, goes well beyond these standards, representing nearly one-third
of the FY2003 Foreign Operations budget.
Figure 3. Supplemental Funding for Foreign Operations
25
20
15
10
5
0
'98
'99
'00
'01
'02
'03
'04
Supplemental
Regular
As a share of the entire $2.24 trillion U.S. budget for FY2003, Foreign
Operations currently represents a 1.06% share, significantly higher than the
traditional level of around 0.75%. This is due largely to enactment of the $7.5
billion supplemental for Iraq reconstruction, aid to coalition partners, and assistance
to other front-line states in the war on terrorism. The FY2004 Foreign Operations
request is projected to total 0.84% of total U.S. federal spending. As a portion of
discretionary budget authority — that part of the budget provided in annual
appropriation acts (other than appropriated entitlements) — Foreign Operations
consumes 2.8% in FY2003, a level that would drop back to 2.4% under the FY2004
budget proposal. By comparison, at the high point of Foreign Operations spending
in FY1985, foreign aid funds represented 2% of the total U.S. budget and 4.6% of
discretionary budget authority. Foreign aid as a percent of discretionary budget
authority remained above 3% in most years between FY1978 and FY1991. In the last
decade, however, it has stood below 3%, with the low point falling in FY2002 to
2.25%.

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Data Notes
Unless otherwise indicated, this report expresses dollar amounts in terms of
discretionary budget authority. The Foreign Operations Appropriations bill
includes one mandatory program that is not included in figures and tables —
USAID’s Foreign Service retirement fund. The retirement fund is scheduled to
receive $43.9 million for FY2004.
In addition, funding levels and trends discussed in this report exclude U.S.
contributions to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), proposals that are enacted
periodically (about every five years) in Foreign Operations bills. Congress
approved $17.9 billion for the IMF in FY1999, the first appropriation since
FY1993. Including these large, infrequent, and uniquely “scored” IMF
appropriations tends to distort a general analysis of Foreign Operations funding
trends. Although Congress provides new budget authority through appropriations
for the full amount of U.S. participation, the transaction is considered an exchange
of assets between the United States and the IMF, and results in no outlays from the
U.S. treasury. In short, the appropriations are off-set by the creation of a U.S.
counterpart claim on the IMF that is liquid and interest bearing. For more, see
CRS Report 96-279, U.S. Budgetary Treatment of the IMF.
Foreign Operations, the FY2004 Budget Resolution, and
Sec. 302(b) Allocations

Usually, Appropriations Committees begin markups of their spending bills only
after Congress has adopted a budget resolution and funds have been distributed to the
Appropriations panels under what is referred to as the Section 302(a) allocation
process, a reference to the pertinent authority in the Congressional Budget Act.
Following this, House and Senate Appropriations Committees separately decide how
to allot the total amount available among their 13 subcommittees, staying within the
functional guidelines set in the budget resolution. This second step is referred to as
the Section 302(b) allocation. Foreign Operations funds fall within the International
Affairs budget function (Function 150), representing in most years about 65% of the
function total. Smaller amounts of Function 150 are included in four other
appropriation bills.
How much International Affairs money to allocate to each of the five
subcommittees, and how to distribute the funds among the numerous programs are
decisions exclusively reserved for the Appropriations Committees. Nevertheless,
overall ceilings set in the budget resolution can have significant implications for the
budget limitations within which the House and Senate Foreign Operations
subcommittees will operate when they meet to mark up their annual appropriation
bills.
On April 11, 2003, the House and Senate agreed to a budget framework for
FY2004 (H.Con.Res. 95) that includes $784.5 billion in discretionary budget
authority. The discretionary budget authority target for the International Affairs
function is $28.65 billion, the same as the President’s request (as re-estimated by

CRS-9
CBO). This means that the House and Senate Appropriations Committees will
receive sufficient resources to fully fund the Administration’s foreign policy budget
proposal, including the Foreign Operations request. The Committees, however, may
choose to allocate the $28.65 billion among the five subcommittees with jurisdiction
over the International Affairs programs differently than what the President proposed.
The Foreign Operations Subcommittee, for example, could receive more or less
funding than the $18.89 billion budget recommendation. House and Senate
Committees decide separately on how to distribute discretionary budget authority so
that the Foreign Operations Subcommittees may work with different totals when they
mark up their bills. Usually, the Appropriations Committees approve an initial Sec.
302(b) allocation in May or June immediately prior to considering the first of the 13
appropriation measures.
Foreign Operations Appropriations Request for
FY2004 and Congressional Consideration
Request Overview
On February 3, 2003, President Bush asked Congress to appropriate $18.89
billion for FY2004 Foreign Operations. The budget proposal is $2.7 billion, or
16.7% higher than regular Foreign Operations appropriations for FY2003, as enacted
in P.L. 108-7. If enacted, the President’s recommendation would result in one of the
largest increases of regular (non-supplemental) Foreign Operations funding in
several decades. Congress subsequently approved in mid-April an additional $7.5
billion FY2003 supplemental foreign aid spending in P.L. 108-11, for Iraq
reconstruction, assistance to coalition partners, and other activities supporting the
global war on terrorism. Including the supplemental brings Foreign Operations
appropriations in FY2003 to $23.67 billion.
The FY2004 budget blueprint continues to highlight foreign aid in support of
the war on terrorism as the highest priority. But a notable characteristic of the
submission is the request for funding four new foreign aid initiatives which together
account for most of the $2.7 billion increase over regular FY2003 levels. Combined,
the Millennium Challenge Account (a new structure for delivering foreign aid), the
State Department’s Global AIDS Initiative, and two new contingency funds (Famine
and Complex Crises), total $2.05 billion. Other Foreign Operations programs are left
with a more modest 4% increase.

CRS-10
Table 3. Foreign Operations New Initiatives FY2004
FY2003
FY2004
FY2004 +/-
Enacted*
Request
FY2003
Foreign Operations
$16.192
$18.889
16.7%
New Initiatives for FY2004:
Millennium Challenge Acct

$1.300

Global AIDS Initiative

$0.450

Famine Fund

$0.200

Complex Crises Fund

$0.100

Total New Initiatives FY2004

$2.050

Foreign Operations, Less New Initiatives
$16.192
$16.839
4.0%
* Enacted regular appropriations. Excludes $7.5 billion appropriated for Foreign Operations and food
aid in the Iraq War supplemental (P.L. 108-11).
Fighting the War on Terrorism. Since the terrorist attacks in September
2001, American foreign aid programs have shifted focus toward more direct support
for key coalition countries and global counter-terrorism efforts. In total, Congress
has appropriated approximately $17.9 billion in FY2002 and FY2003 Foreign
Operations funding to assist the 26 “front-line” states in the war on terrorism,
implement anti-terrorism training programs, and address the needs of post-conflict
Iraq and other surrounding countries. Nearly half of all Foreign Operations
appropriations the past two years has gone for terrorism or Iraq war-related purposes.
The FY2004 budget continues the priority of fighting terrorism with $4.7
billion, or 25% of Foreign Operations resources assisting the front-line states. Unlike
a year ago when the President’s FY2003 budget was viewed by many as an
inadequate request, especially for Afghanistan, the FY2004 proposal includes
substantial aid packages for a number of the front-line states. Although the levels for
most countries will not increase much beyond what was provided from regular
FY2003 foreign aid funding, the request largely sustains amounts that have grown
substantially during the past two years. Anti-terrorism training and technical
assistance programs also rise by 45% above FY2003 levels.
The FY2004 submission does not, however, include follow-on funding for Iraq
relief and reconstruction. Congress approved $2.5 billion in FY2003 supplemental
resources, an amount many view as a down payment of long-term needs in Iraq.
With great uncertainty surrounding the costs of Iraq reconstruction, how much of the
financial burden the United States will shoulder, and the process by the
reconstruction operations will be managed, the Administration has not amended its
pending FY2004 request to include additional amounts.
New Initiative: The Millennium Challenge Account. The largest of the
new initiatives is the Millennium Challenge Account (MCA), a program designed to
radically transform the way the United States provides economic assistance to a small
number of “best performing” developing nations. The request for FY2004 is $1.3

CRS-11
billion with a promise that the MCA will grow to $5 billion by FY2006 and remain
at least at that level in the future. Some MCA supporters argue that the FY2004 level
is too low, saying that the President pledged to implement the initiative in equal
installments over three years and that an appropriation of $1.67 billion is what they
had anticipated. The Administration says that the added MCA funding will be in
addition to and not a substitute for existing U.S. economic aid, but development
advocates are concerned that given the tight budget environment, trade-offs between
regular economic programs and the MCA may be required. (See separate page under
Funding and Policy Issues for more discussion of the MCA.)
New Initiative: The Global AIDS Initiative. In his January 2003 State of
the Union address, President Bush pledged to substantially increase U.S. financial
assistance for preventing and treating HIV/AIDS, especially in the most heavily
inflicted countries in Africa and the Caribbean. The President promised $15 billion
over 5 years, $10 billion of which would be money above and beyond current
funding. The Global AIDS Initiative, which will be housed in the State Department,
represents a portion of that pledge — $450 million in FY2004 — that when
combined with other resources managed by USAID and the Department of Health
and Human Services (HHS), would raise total international HIV/AIDS resources in
FY2004 to about $1.9 billion. Some observers note, however, that this falls well
short of the anticipated $3 billion per year implied in the President’s speech and
would represent only $500 million in new money to fight AIDS above the FY2003
level. Some further question whether the State Department should be coordinator of
international HIV/AIDS programs, as envisioned in the Initiative, rather than USAID
or HHS. (See separate page under Funding and Policy Issues for more discussion of
the Global AIDS Initiative.)
New Initiative: The Famine Fund. This new contingency fund, with $200
million requested for FY2004, would allow the Administration to provide, under
more flexible authorities, emergency food and other disaster relief support as needs
arise. Executive officials argue that greater flexibility would permit them to respond
rapidly to the human consequences of natural disasters and conflict without having
to divert resources from other economic aid accounts. Critics note, however, that the
existing international disaster assistance account and P.L. 480 food aid program, plus
legislative authorities that allow for temporary borrowing of funds from other aid
accounts perform the same functions as the proposed Famine Fund and question
whether it is necessary.
New Initiative: The U.S. Emergency Fund for Complex Crises. The
Administration proposes to establish within the Executive Office of the President a
$100 million contingency fund allowing the United States to respond quickly to
unforseen complex foreign crises. The resources would not be used to address
victims of natural disasters, but rather would support peace and humanitarian
intervention in conflict situations, including acts of ethnic cleansing, mass killing, or
genocide. In the past, Congress has been reluctant to approve this type of
contingency fund over which it can apply little oversight. The Administration had
asked lawmakers to launch the Complex Crisis Fund with $150 million as part of the
FY2003 Iraq War supplemental. Congress, however, chose to defer consideration
of establishing such a Fund until the FY2004 appropriation cycle, and instead

CRS-12
allocated the requested resources among various accounts for Iraq reconstruction and
aid to regional states affected by the war.
Other Key Elements of the FY2003 Request. Beyond these specific and
prominent issues, the Foreign Operations proposal for FY2004 seeks to substantially
increase aid activities in a few areas while cutting resources for several programs.
Significant appropriation increases when compared with regular FY2003
appropriations (excluding the Iraq War supplemental) include:
! Security assistance — Economic Support Fund and Foreign
Military Financing. These two core security aid accounts that aim
to support countries strategically important to the U.S., would grow
by a combined $648 million, or 10% above regular FY2003 levels.
Much of the add-on is targeted for a $250 million security aid
package for Turkey and a $145 million new Middle East Partnership
Initiative.
! Peace Corps funding would rise by $64 million, or 22% in an effort
to place 10,000 volunteers by the end of FY2004 and to keep on
track the President’s longer term plan of having 14,000 Americans
serving in the Peace Corps by FY2007.
! Contributions to the World Bank and other international financial
institutions would grow by $259 million, or 17%, covering all
scheduled U.S. payments to the multilateral development banks, plus
clearing $196 million of U.S. arrears owed to these institutions. The
request further includes an 18% increase for the World Bank’s
International Development Association and the African
Development Fund as a “results-based Incentive Contribution” that
had been promised last year if the banks implemented certain
reforms.
! Debt reduction, which received no funding in FY2003 except by a
transfer of $40 million from another aid account, would grow to
$395 million under the Administration’s budget submission. There
are three components to the request: $300 million to cancel bilateral
debt owed by the Democratic Republic of the Congo under the
Heavily Indebted Poor Country (HIPC) initiative; $75 million as a
contribution to the HIPC Trust Fund to make up for unanticipated
shortfalls in implementing the program; and $20 million for the
Tropical Forestry Conservation debt relief activity.
! International narcotics control would grow by $89 million, or
45%, largely to expand significantly programs in Pakistan and
Mexico. The Administration further seeks $731 million for the
Andean Counterdrug Initiative (ACI), an increase from the $700
million regular appropriation for FY2003. The ACI proposal would
generally restore amounts that were cut from the FY2003 request for
Colombia, Ecuador, Brazil, Venezuela, and Panama.

CRS-13
The largest reduction proposed in the President’s Foreign Operations budget
targets assistance to Former Soviet states and Eastern Europe. Collectively, aid
to these countries would decline by $266 million, or 21% from current levels. The
request reflects a reorientation in the former Soviet aid account to focus more on
Central Asian states, linked to the war on terrorism, and to begin the process of
graduation for Russia and Ukraine. Aid to these two nations would fall by 40% from
FY2003 allocations. The request further would cut Armenia’s aid by nearly half,
from $89 million to $49 million. For Eastern Europe, aid levels would fall for nearly
every recipient, with some of the largest reductions scheduled for Serbia,
Montenegro, and Macedonia.
Funding for the Export-Import Bank would also decline under the President’s
budget — from $565 million to $43 million in FY2004 (as re-estimated by CBO).
But because of substantial “carry-forward” resources that were not spent in prior
years, Eximbank officials say that Bank lending can total $14.6 billion in FY2004,
which is at least $2 billion higher than the anticipated level for FY2003.
Assessing the Administration’s request for bilateral development and health
assistance is more complicated and has led to varying interpretations. With
implementation of the President’s new Global AIDS Initiative in FY2004,
development and health resources, including funds from USAID’s “core” accounts
for development assistance and child survival/health, and the State Department’s
Global AIDS Initiative, would increase by $205 million, or 6.4% over regular
FY2003 levels. Depending on the purposes for which Millennium Challenge
Account funds are spent, further additions to development and health programs
might also be expected from MCA allocations.
But excluding the new Global AIDS Initiative and MCA from the equation,
overall funding for USAID’s two “core” accounts would decline in FY2004 by a
combined $245 million, or 7.6%. The implication of this reduction is that with the
exception of HIV/AIDS, nearly all other development programs, including those for
agriculture, basic education, family planning, malaria and tuberculosis, and
democracy programs would be at or slightly below amounts allocated for FY2003.
Some critics charge that this violates the executive’s pledge that MCA funding
would be in addition to and not in place of continuing economic aid programs.
Others express concern that the growth in HIV/AIDS resources comes at the expense
of other key health activities for which resources would decline.

CRS-14
Table 4. Summary of Foreign Operations Appropriations
(Discretionary funds — in millions of dollars)
FY2002
FY2003
FY2003
FY2003
FY2004
Bill Title & Program
Enacted* Regular*
Supp*
Total
Request
Title I - Export Assistance
528
369

369
(103)
Title II - Bilateral Economic
10,399
10,094
5,322
15,416
12,642
Aid
Development/Child Survival
2,612
3,205
90
3,295
2,960
aid
Global AIDS Initiative




450
Iraq Relief & Reconstruction


2,475
2,475

Israel/Egypt
1,375
1,207
300
1,507
1,055
Millennium Challenge Acct




1,300
Title III - Military Assistance
4,232
4,239
2,159
6,398
4,601
Israel/Egypt
3,340
3,378
1,000
4,378
3,460
Title IV - Multilateral Aid
1,383
1,490

1,490
1,749
Total Foreign Operations
16,542
16,192
7,481
23,673
18,889
Source: House Appropriations Committee and CRS calculations.
* FY2002 levels include $15.346 billion in regular Foreign Operations appropriations enacted in P.L.
107-115 plus $1.1 billion (net $50 million in rescissions), provided in P.L. 107-206, the FY2002
emergency supplemental appropriation. FY2003 regular includes amounts provided in P.L.
108-7 and are adjusted for a 0.65% across-the-board rescission required by the Act. FY2003
supplemental includes amounts provided in P.L. 108-11.
Leading Foreign Aid Recipients Proposed for FY2004
Israel and Egypt remain the largest U.S. aid recipients, as they have been for
many years. However, in the aftermath of the September 11 terrorist attacks, foreign
aid allocations have changed in several significant ways. The request for FY2004
largely continues the patterns of aid distribution of the past two years.
Since September 11, the Administration has used economic and military
assistance increasingly as a tool in efforts to maintain a cohesive international
coalition to conduct the war on terrorism and to assist nations which have both
supported U.S. forces and face serious terrorism threats themselves. Pakistan, for
example, a key coalition partner on the border with Afghanistan, had been ineligible
for U.S. aid, other than humanitarian assistance, due to sanctions imposed after India
and Pakistan conducted nuclear tests in May 1998 and Pakistan experienced a
military coup in 1999. Since lifting aid sanctions in October 2001, the United States
has transferred over $1.5 billion to Pakistan. Jordan, Turkey, Indonesia, the
Philippines, and India also are among the top aid recipients as part of the network of
“front-line” states in the war on terrorism.

CRS-15
The other major cluster of top recipients are those in the Andean region where
the Administration maintains a large counternarcotics initiative that combines
assistance to interdict and disrupt drug production, together with alternative
development programs for areas that rely economically on the narcotics trade.
Several countries in the Balkans and the former Soviet Union — Federal Republic
of Yugoslavia, Kosovo, Russia, Ukraine, and Georgia — would continue to be
among the top recipients, although at somewhat lower funding levels.
Table 5. Leading Recipients of U.S. Foreign Aid
(Appropriation Allocations; $s in millions)

FY2002
FY2003
FY2003
FY2003
FY2004
Actuala
Regulara
Suppa
Total
Request
Israel
2,788
2,682
1,000
3,682
2,640
Egypt
1,956
1,904
300
2,204
1,876
Iraq
25
10
2,475
2,485

Jordan
355
449
1,106
1,555
462
Pakistan
1,045
295
22
317
389
Afghanistan
527
322b
325
647
531
Colombia
406
527
68
595
575
Turkey
253
20
1,000
1,020
255
Peru
197
179

179
161
FRYugoslavia
165
151

151
114
Ukraine
167
143
2
145
104
Bolivia
134
138

138
133
Indonesia
137
132

132
122
Russia
164
149

149
74
Philippines
131
88
60
148
90
Georgia
124
91

91
88
West Bank/Gaza
72
75
50
125
75
Kosovo
118
85

85
79
India
80
93

93
94
Source: U.S. Department of State.
Note: Because of the significant way in which supplementals have affected the ranking of top U.S. aid
recipients, this table lists countries in order of the combined FY2002-FY2004 amounts.
a FY2002 includes funds allocated from the regular Foreign Operations appropriation, plus funds
drawn from the Emergency Response Fund appropriated in P.L. 107-38 and allocated from the
FY2002 Supplemental Appropriation (P.L. 107-206). FY2003 regular appropriation includes
amounts allocated from the Foreign Operations Appropriation, FY2003 (P.L. 108-7). FY2003
supplemental includes funds allocated from the Iraq War Supplemental (P.L. 108-11).
b The FY2003 level for Afghanistan includes all amounts earmarked in P.L. 108-7.

CRS-16
Iraq War Supplemental for FY2003 and Foreign
Operations Funding
On March 25, 2003, the President requested a nearly $75 billion FY2003
supplemental that included $7.6 billion for near-term Iraq reconstruction and relief,
additional aid to coalition partners and other states cooperating in the global war on
terrorism, and related USAID administrative expenses. By comparison, the
supplemental request totaled a little less than half of the $16.2 billion appropriated
previously by Congress for FY2003 Foreign Operations activities. The proposal, as
detailed below in Table 6, was roughly divided into two components: Iraq relief and
reconstruction (about $2.85 billion) and aid to coalition partners and other nations
engaged in the war on terrorism (about $4.7 billion).3
Reconstruction Efforts
Normally, it would be presumed that transfers for reconstruction and post-
conflict aid would be made to USAID, the State Department, and other traditional
foreign assistance management agencies. But with plans for the Defense Department
to oversee the governing of Iraq immediately after the end of hostilities, the proposal
stimulated immediate controversy. A number of critics, including Members of
Congress, argued that aid programs should remain under the policy direction of the
State Department and under the authorities of a broad and longstanding body of
foreign aid laws. They pointed out that during other recent reconstruction initiatives
in Bosnia and Kosovo, resources and policy decisions flowed through the Secretary
of State. Others argued that groups which would play a significant role in post-war
rehabilitation efforts — non-governmental organizations (NGOs), foreign donors,
and international organizations — would be reluctant to take direction and funding
from the U.S. military. This, they contended, would hamper relief activities.
Furthermore, the placement of reconstruction funding in a Presidential account
appeared to grant the White House significant discretion in responding to changing
and unanticipated demands, unencumbered by specific programmatic allocations.
The Administration said only that $543 million would cover humanitarian expenses,
$1.7 billion would be set aside for reconstruction needs, and up to $200 million
would be available to reimburse foreign aid accounts from which funds were drawn
prior to the conflict.
As with other parts of the supplemental dealing with defense and homeland
security resources, the White House wanted to maintain maximum flexibility over
the distribution of the appropriations so that it could respond to changing
circumstances and unanticipated contingencies. Executive officials, who
acknowledged that some or all of the funding would be transferred to DOD, argued
that the military would be best situated following the conflict to immediately launch
the reconstruction efforts. Moreover, the Administration noted that the Defense
office in charge of reconstruction operations would most likely re-direct most of the
3 OMB documents estimated the total amount for Iraq reconstruction was $3.5 billion, a
figure that included nearly $500 million from DOD funding for the repair of oil facilities.

CRS-17
resources to the State Department and USAID who would then be responsible for
managing rehabilitation projects. Officials further argued that it was too early to
identify specific reconstruction activities and that it was possible to only provide the
most general outlines of how the money would be spent until assessment teams could
report on the extent of needs throughout the country.
Congressional Action on Iraq Reconstruction. As cleared by Congress,
H.R. 1559 appropriates $2.475 billion for the Relief and Reconstruction Fund,
slightly higher than requested. The President will be able to apportion Fund
resources directly to five federal agencies: the Departments of Defense, State, Health
and Human Services, Treasury, and USAID. In previous congressional debate, the
House and Senate had each expressed their expectations that these funds would be
channeled to the Secretary of State, and in most instances, further directed to USAID.
The report accompanying S. 762 specifically noted that the funds were not expected
to be transferred to the Secretary of Defense. Nevertheless, the White House
continued to argue for greater flexibility and authority to place reconstruction
resources under DOD auspices, and ultimately conference committee members
agreed.

CRS-18
Table 6. Iraq Reconstruction, International Aid, and Related Activities
(in millions of dollars)
Activity
Request
House
Senate
Enacted
Iraq Relief and Reconstruction:
Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund
$2,443.3
$2,483.3
$2,468.3
$2,475.0
Of which:
Reconstruction priorities for public health, water and sanitation, seaports/airports, food-
$1,700.0



distribution networks, and electricity. Post-conflict emphasis on education, governance,
economic institutions, agriculture, and infrastructure repair.
Humanitarian aid, refugee and displaced persons relief, demining
$543.0



Reimbursement to USAID’s Development, Child Survival and ESF aid accounts previously
fully
fully
$200.0
$260.0
drawn upon to provide food commodities.
reimbursea
reimburse
Reimbursement to USAID’s International Disaster Assistance account for previously drawn
upon resources for food distribution, mainly through the UN WFP, and for immediate
$80.0
$160.0 $112.5 $143.8
reconstruction.
Reimbursement to USAID’s Child Survival/Health account for previously drawn upon
$40.0
$40.0 $90.0 $90.0
resources for water and sanitation reconstruction.
Reimbursement to USAID’s Economic Support Fund account for previously drawn upon
$40.0

$40.0
$40.0
resources for emergency relief and non-health reconstruction.
Reimbursement of PL480 food assistance, including the Bill Emerson Humanitarian Trust

$319.0
$600.0
$369.0
Replenishment of the Emergency Refugee and Migration Aid (ERMA) fund to restore $17.9
million that has been drawn down for Middle East contingencies and to have funds available
$50.0
$80.0 $75.0 $80.0
for needs worldwide.
Peacekeeping funds for coalition partners engaged in post-conflict Iraq
$200.0
$115.0
$150.0
$100.0
Subtotal, Iraq Reconstruction
$2,853.3
$3,197.3 $3,535.8
$3,297.8

CRS-19
Activity
Request
House
Senate
Enacted
Assistance to Coalition Partners & Cooperating States in War on Terrorism
Israel military grant.
$1,000.0
$1,000.0 $1,000.0 $1,000.0
Israel economic loan guarantees. Israel will pay all fees associated with the cost of $9 billion
[$9,000.0]b
[$9,000.0]b
[$9,000.0]b
[$9,000.0]b
in loan guarantees.
Egypt economic grant, a portion of which can be used for up to $2 billion in loan guarantees.
$300.0
$300.0
$300.0
$300.0
Jordan economic and military grants.c
$1,106.0
$1,106.0 $1,106.0 $1,106.0
Palestinian economic grant.
$50.0
NS
NS
NS
Turkey economic grant, a portion of which can be used for up to $8.5 billion in direct loans.
$1,000.0
$1,000.0
$1,000.0
$1,000.0
Philippines economic and military grant.
$30.0
NS
$80.0
$60.0
Pakistan military grant and law enforcement aid.c
$200.0
$200.0
d $200.0
Djibouti economic and military grants.
$30.0
NS
NS
NSe
Oman military grant.
$62.0
NS
NS
NSe
Bahrain military grant.
$90.0
NS
NS
NSe
Colombia military and counter-narcotics grants to support unified campaign against drugs and
$71.0
NS
NS NSe
terrorism.f
Afghanistan economic, military, anti-terrorism, and demining grants.
$325.0
$325.0
d $365.0
Middle East Partnership Initiative and Muslim World Outreach.h
$200.0
$105.0
d NSg
Central Europe military grants.i
$84.1
NS
d NSi
US Emergency Fund for Complex Foreign Crises — aid to support contingencies for coalition
$150.0
$0.0
$150.0
$0.0
countries .
Subtotal, Aid to Coalition Partners & Cooperating States
$4,698.1
$4,488.1
$4,604.0
$4,518.1

CRS-20
Activity
Request
House
Senate
Enacted
State Department Administration & Other Activities
State Department Diplomatic and Consular Affairs
$101.4
$106.4
$93.4
$98.4
Of which:
$5.0
$5.0
NS
$5.0
Task Force Surge Support operations.
Baghdad embassy reopening; enacted amount includes diplomatic security
$17.9
$17.9
$17.9
$35.8
Medical supplies
$15.6
$15.6
$15.6
$15.6
Security upgrades
$10.0
$10.0
$10.0
$10.0
Machine Readable Visa fee shortfalls
$35.0
$35.0
$30.0
$32.0
Consular Affairs


$2.0

Worldwide emergency response

$30.6


State Department embassy construction
$20.0
$71.5
$82.0
$149.5
Of which:
$20.0

$20.0
$61.5
Temporary facilities in Iraq.
Non-official facilities frequented by U.S. citizens overseas


$10.0
$10.0
Facilities and security in Rome, Italy



$78.0
USAID mission in Iraq, and, as enacted, IG monitoring of the Iraq Fund, and USAID security
$22.0
$23.0 $23.6 $24.5
needs in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Indonesia.
Potential emergency evacuations of US government employees, families, and private
$65.7
$65.7 $40.0 $50.0
American citizens.
Radio broadcasting to Iraq and Middle East Television Network
$30.5
$30.5
$62.5
$30.5
Iraq War Crimes Tribunal and investigations into war crimes allegations


$10.0
$10.0
Subtotal, State Department & Other
$239.6
$297.1
$311.5
$362.9
TOTAL, Iraq Reconstruction, International Aid, & Related Activities
$7,791.0
$7,982.5
$8,451.3
$8,178.8

CRS-21
NS = Not specified.
a The House Appropriations Committee stated that up to $495 million in reimbursements was included in H.R. 1559.
b No appropriation required.
c DOD funds ($1.3 billion) were requested and enacted for Jordan, Pakistan, and other “key cooperating states” providing logistical and military support to U.S. military operations
in Iraq and in the global war on terrorism.
d Request “supported” in Senate bill.
e Although the enacted supplemental does not set a specific level for this country, the Administration has allocated the full amount requested.
f DOD funds ($34 million) were also requested and enacted for drug interdiction and counter-drug activities in Colombia.
g Due to Congressional reductions in overall ESF funding and increases for Afghanistan and the Philippines, the Administrations allocated $100 million for MEPI.
h House bill funded an Islamic Partnership and Outreach Program.
i The Administration requested funds for 10 Central European nations but has altered the list of recipients and the allocation of military grants following enactment of the supplemental,
as follows: Poland ($15 million requested and allocated); Hungary ($15 million requested; $8 million allocated); Czech Republic ($15 million requested and allocated); Estonia
($2.5 million requested, $2.75 million allocated); Latvia ($2.5 requested, $2.75 million allocated); Slovakia ($6 million requested, $6.5 million allocated); Romania ($15 million
requested and allocated); Slovenia ($5 million requested, $0 allocated ); Lithuania ($3.5 million requested, $4 million allocated); Bulgaria ($5 million requested, $10 million
allocated); Albania $0 requested, $3 million allocated); Macedonia ($0 requested, $1 allocated); and Ukraine ($0 requested, $1.5 million allocated).

CRS-22
The enacted bill further directs higher and more specific amounts that should be
used to replenish several foreign aid accounts that had been drawn upon in order to
preposition food and medicine stocks in the region and for other pre-conflict
humanitarian purposes. The conference agreement directs “full and prompt”
reimbursement of USAID and State Department accounts from the Iraq Fund. The
supplemental provides $143.8 million for international disaster assistance, $112.5
million of which will restore funds diverted previously for Iraq. The remaining
balance will augment USAID disaster relief resources to respond to foreign
contingencies that may arise through the end of FY2003. Similarly, Congress
increased the State Department’s refugee reserve account from the $50 million
requested to $80 million in order to address needs in the Persian Gulf region as well
as other global requirements.
International Assistance
The Administration’s supplemental appropriation proposal, which was only slightly
modified by Congress, provided about $4.7 billion in additional aid to 23 countries
and regional programs that are contributing to the war in Iraq and cooperating in the
global fight against terrorism. See the table below for a complete list of proposed
recipients. Among the largest and most complex aid packages would be:
! Jordan — $700 million in economic grants and $406 million in
military transfers. This would be on top of Jordan’s regular $452 aid
package from the U.S.
! Israel — $1 billion in supplemental military aid (on top of the $2.7
billion regular FY2003 assistance) and $9 billion in economic loans
guaranteed by the U.S. government over the next three years. Israel
would pay all costs — fees that may total several hundred millions
of dollars — associated with these economic stabilization loans.
Conditions on how the funds would be spent, similar to those that
were applied in the early 1990s when Israel drew on a $10 billion
U.S.-backed loan package, would be employed.
! Turkey — $1 billion for economic grants which could be applied to
fees associated with $8.5 billion in direct loans or loan guarantees.
! Afghanistan — $325 million in economic grants, anti-terrorism,
demining, and military transfers. This would be in addition to
roughly $350 million already scheduled for Afghanistan this year.
! Egypt — $300 million for economic grants, a portion of which could
be used to gain access to up to $2 billion in loan guarantees.
Depending on the terms of the loan, if Egypt chose to receive the full
$2 billion, about $120 million or more of the $300 million would be
applied to the costs faced by the United States of guaranteeing the
loans. The Administration further proposed to reprogram $379.6
million in previously appropriated commodity import program aid
to Egypt as a cash transfer. The supplemental would come on top of
$1.9 billion in regular U.S. aid to Egypt.

CRS-23
! Pakistan — $200 million in military grants and law enforcement
assistance. Pakistan currently receives $305 million in FY2003.
The Administration further requested $150 million to initiate a U.S. Emergency Fund
for Complex Emergencies, a contingency account that would allow the President to
address quickly unforseen needs of coalition partners. The Fund, which would be
managed by the White House, had originally been proposed for an FY2004 startup
of $100 million.
Congressional Action on International Assistance. H.R. 1559, as
approved, includes $4.52 billion in additional aid to countries and regional programs,
about $180 million less than requested. Nearly all of this reduction, however, comes
from Congress’ decision not to fund the President’s $150 million emergency account
for complex crises. In most other cases, the Administration has been able to allocate
these foreign aid resources as it had intended. Congress earmarked funding at the
requested levels for Israel, Egypt, Jordan, and Pakistan, while adding resources for
Afghanistan and the Philippines. Turkey may receive “not to exceed” $1 billion in
aid that is conditioned on a requirement for the Secretary of State to certify that
Turkey is cooperating with the United States in Operation Iraqi Freedom (including
facilitating the movement of humanitarian aid into Iraq), and has not unilaterally
deployed forces in northern Iraq. The restriction on Turkey’s aid package, the size
of which could grow to $8.5 billion if the loan option is implemented, combines text
in House and Senate-passed bills. Earlier, the House had defeated two amendments
that would have eliminated aid to Turkey or reduced it by $207 million.
For Israeli loan guarantees, the enacted supplemental includes the full $9 billion
proposal, but adds conditions not included in the Administration’s proposal. Loans
may be issued in $3 billion allotments in each of FY2003 to FY2005, a provision that
will allow the President to reduce disbursements in the second and third years if
Israel violates any of the loan conditions. One such condition added by Congress
prohibits loan resources from supporting any activity in geographic areas that were
not administered by Israel prior to June 5, 1967. This is similar to a condition
attached to the 1992 $10 billion loan guaranty package for Israel, some of which was
not disbursed because of continued Israeli settlement activity in the West Bank area.

CRS-24
Table 7. Proposed Recipients of Supplemental Foreign Aid
($s millions)
Anti-
Narcotics/
Economic
Loans
Military
TOTAL
Terrorism
Law
Jordan
$700a

$406a


$1,106
Israel

[$9,000]
$1,000a


$1,000
Turkey
$1,000a
[$8,500]*



$1,000
Afghanistan
$127b

$170a
$28a

$325
Egypt
$300a
[$2,000]*



$300
Pakistan


$175a

$25a
$200
Bahrain


$90


$90
Colombia


$37

$34a
$71
Oman


$62


$62
Palestinians
$50




$50
Djibouti
$25

$5


$30
Philippines
— c

$30


$30
Czech Rep.


$15


$15
Hungary


$15


$15d
Poland


$15


$15
Romania


$15


$15
Slovakia


$6


$6d
Bulgaria


$5


$5d
Slovenia


$5


$5d
Estonia


$3


$3d
Latvia


$3


$3d
Lithuania


$3


$3d
* Up to this amount. Loans would not require additional appropriations since economic grants would
be used to pay for loan fees.
a Amount is earmarked or recommended in the enacted supplemental appropriation.
b The enacted supplemental appropriation provides $167 million.
c The enacted supplement appropriation includes $30 million for economic aid for the Philippines.
d Following enacted of the supplemental, the Administration has modified its plans to allocate funds
for this recipient. See footnote “i” in Table 6, above, for the allocated amounts.

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While most of the President’s request for international assistance is supported
in the enacted emergency supplemental, the Administration had to reduce economic
assistance in one instance. Congress cut Economic Support Fund appropriations by
$20 million, but because of earmarks and additions for Afghanistan and the
Philippines, and $10 million to investigate possible Iraqi leadership war crimes,
executive officials had $100 million less than requested in economic assistance for
countries not protected by legislative directives. Non-earmarked programs included
$50 million for the Palestinians, $25 million for Djibouti, and $200 million for the
Middle East Partnership Initiative. The Administration chose to fully allocate
amounts for the Palestinians and Djibouti, but cut resources for the Middle East
Partnership Initiative (including Muslim Outreach) to $100 million, half of the level
requested.
The State Department also chose to modify its distribution of military aid grants
to several Central Europe states. Most significantly, the executive branch decided
to add funds (not requested) for Albania, Macedonia, and Ukraine, and increase
amounts above the requested levels for Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Bulgaria. As
off-sets, the State Department cut funds for Hungary and eliminated the $5 million
request for Slovenia. These alterations appear to reflect Administration views on the
extent to which selected countries supported or did not support U.S. operations in
Iraq. See footnote “i” in Table 6 above for specific amounts allocated to each
recipient.
DOD Authorities to Provide Military Aid
Under sections relating to Defense Department funds and authorities, the
supplemental proposed two items that drew particular congressional attention. The
key issue was whether they infringed on congressional oversight and the State
Department’s traditional role in directing foreign aid policy and resource allocations.
They were both similar to proposals made last year in the FY2002 supplemental that
focused on the war on terrorism and were closely scrutinized by Congress.
The first would provide $1.4 billion for the Defense Department,
“notwithstanding any provision of law,” to pay Jordan, Pakistan, and other nations
that have provided logistical and military-related support to U.S. military operations
in Iraq or in the global war on terrorism. In the past, Defense officials argue,
competing demands on regular military aid resources have delayed reimbursement
to key friends that provide services to American forces. Congress approved funding
in the FY2002 supplemental for this purpose, but included a 15-day prior notification
requirement that is not part of the FY2003 supplemental draft legislation.
The more controversial authority concerned DOD’s request for $150 million to
support “indigenous forces” assisting U.S. military operations, including those aimed
at the global war on terrorism. Decisions to draw on these funds would be made by
the Secretary of Defense, with the concurrence of the Secretary of State. The
Defense Department defines indigenous forces as “irregular forces and resistance
movements” and notes that such forces “generally conduct military and para-military
operations in enemy-held or hostile territory and conduct direct offensive low-

CRS-26
intensity, cover, or clandestine operations.”4 Although it was unclear from the budget
justification and bill text exactly what groups and under what scenarios the
Administration would utilize these resources, a senior Administration official
suggested that the intent was to have resources available for groups in Iraq. Deputy
Secretary of State Richard Armitage testified on March 27 that because of the
uncertainty of the war’s duration, it might be necessary to transfer additional arms
and equipment to Kurdish and other forces, and that the $150 million would provide
a “hedge” in case of a more prolonged conflict. In last year’s supplemental
appropriation debate, DOD asked for $30 million to support indigenous forces, funds
that would be exclusively under the control of the Secretary of Defense. Congress
rejected the proposal, however. At that time, the House Appropriations Committee
observed in deleting the request that the Secretary of State’s primary responsibility
over U.S. military assistance programs is well established and that the Administration
had the necessary authorities under existing foreign aid laws to undertake the
requested activities.5
Congressional Action on DOD Authorities. H.R. 1559, as enacted,
provides the $1.4 billion for nations supporting U.S. military operations in the global
war on terrorism, but does not authorize the $150 million for aid to indigenous
forces.
Selected Major Issues in the FY2004 Foreign
Operations Debate
While the Foreign Operations appropriations bill can include virtually any
foreign policy issue of interest to Congress, the annual debate usually focuses on
several major policy and spending issues. Among those for FY2004 are likely to
include the following.
Combating Terrorism
Since the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks and the initiation of military
operations in Afghanistan, combating global terrorism has become one of the top
priorities of American foreign assistance. Indeed, Secretary of State Powell has said
at several 2003 congressional hearings that fighting terrorism is the most important
objective of the FY2004 Foreign Operations request.
While there is disagreement regarding the extent to which foreign aid can
directly contribute to reducing the threat of terrorism, most agree that economic and
security assistance aimed at reducing poverty, promoting jobs and educational
opportunities, and helping stabilize conflict-prone nations can indirectly address
some of the factors that terrorists use in recruiting disenfranchised individuals for
their cause. As illustrated in the table below, the United States has provided more
4 U.S. Office of Management and Budget, FY2003 Request for Supplemental
Appropriations
, March 25, 2003.
5 H.Rept. 107-480, May 22, 2002.

CRS-27
than $5.9 billion to 26 so-called “front-line” states in the global war on terrorism in
immediate post-September 11 and FY2002 appropriations, while FY2003 regular and
supplemental spending bills have provided $7.1 billion. The Administration
proposes $4.8 billion for the “front-line” states in FY2004. (None of these figures
includes post-conflict reconstruction assistance for Iraq which totals about $2.5
billion.)
While increased levels of foreign aid are only one sign of the importance the
United States assigns to the support provided by these front-line states, the amounts
allocated since September 11 are in sharp contrast to the $3.4 billion provided to
these 26 countries prior to the attacks in regular FY2001 appropriations. Additional
economic and military assistance has been particularly evident in a few countries,
including Jordan, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Turkey, the Philippines, Kyrgystan,
Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Oman, Yemen, and Djibouti.
Foreign aid can be programmed in a number of ways that contribute to the war
on terrorism. Assistance can be transferred, as has occurred in Pakistan and
Afghanistan, to bolster efforts of a coalition-partner government, to counter domestic
dissent and armed attacks by extremist groups, and to promote better health care,
education, and employment opportunities to its people. Security assistance can
finance the provision of military equipment and training to nations facing threats
from their own internally-based terrorist movements.
While there has been congressional support for additional foreign aid resources
aimed at countering terrorism, some warn that the United States needs to be cautious
about the risks of creating a close aid relationship with governments that may have
questionable human rights records, are not accountable to their people, and are
possibly corrupt. Some Members have been especially critical of Administration
efforts to include in aid proposals for “front-line” states legislative language that
would waive all existing restrictions and prohibitions on the transfers. Instead, these
critics argue, the Administration should specifically identify any obstacles to
proceeding with a country aid program and seek a congressional waiver for those
particular problems. For example, in late 2001 when the Administration wanted to
provide Pakistan with $600 million in fast-disbursing economic aid, instead of
providing a blanket waiver of legislative obstacles, Congress approved in P.L. 107-57
specific waivers of aid prohibitions that applied to countries that engaged in missile
proliferation, whose leaders came to power through a military coup, and which were
behind in debt payments to the United States.
Table 8. U.S. Assistance to Front-Line States in War on
Terrorism
($s in millions)

FY2001
FY2001
FY2002
FY2003
FY2004
Pre-9/11a
Post-9/11a
Enacted
Estimate
Request
Egypt
1,992

1,960
2,204
1,876
Jordan
229

355
1,555
462
Afghanistan
32
194
492
647
658

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FY2001
FY2001
FY2002
FY2003
FY2004
Pre-9/11a
Post-9/11a
Enacted
Estimate
Request
Pakistan
5
993
153
317
395
Turkey
2
20 233
1,020
255
India
138

174
184
140
Indonesia
133

137
132
137
Philippines
49

131
148
90
Bangladesh
127

113
123
104
Ethiopia
144

103
144
80
Georgia
109

124
93
90
Armenia
93

98
97
56
Kenya
86

78
63
75
Kyrgyzstan
36
4
81
45
50
Tajikistan
30

94
27
47
Azerbaijan
41

56
56
50
Uzbekistan
31
80
80
52
57
Kazakhstan
51
2
56
52
42
Yemen
5

30
14
32
Oman
1

26
20
26
Morocco
17

18
16
21
Turkmenistan
9

20
11
11
Djibouti
1

3
29
2
Tunisia
5

5
7
12
Algeria
0

2
1
1
Malaysia
1

1
1
1
TOTAL
3,367
1,293
4,623
7,058
4,770
Source: U.S. Department of State and CRS calculations. Countries are listed in order of the size of
aid provided and requested since September 11, 2001. Amounts include funds appropriated for
programs under jurisdiction of the Foreign Operations spending measure, plus food assistance
provided in the Agriculture appropriation bill.
a. FY2001 pre-September 11 are amounts allocated from regular FY2001 appropriations. FY2001
post-September 11 are amounts distributed from the Emergency Response Fund, funding for which
was provided in P.L. 107-38, enacted in September 2001.
Beyond substantial amounts of bilateral aid for “front-line” states, the Foreign
Operations appropriation bill funds several global programs specifically aimed at
anti-terrorism efforts overseas and the provision of security for USAID employees
living abroad.
Anti-Terrorism Assistance (ATA). Since FY1984, the State Department
has maintained the ATA program designed to maximize international cooperation in
the battle against global terrorism. Through training, equipment transfers, and

CRS-29
advice, the ATA program is intended to strengthen anti-terrorism capabilities of
foreign law enforcement and security officials. Since its initiation in 1984, over
23,000 officials from 112 countries have participated in ATA projects. ATA funding
is included within the Foreign Operations account of Non-proliferation, Anti-
terrorism, Demining, and Related Programs (NADR).
Resources for the $38 million annual ATA program (FY2001) rose sharply
following September 11, with an additional $45.5 million allocated out of the
Terrorism Emergency Response Fund. Congress approved $38 million for FY2002
and $64.2 million for FY2003. Increased funding for FY2003 is intended to finance
three ATA program strategies:
! expanding existing U.S.-based training activities;
! initiating new in-country programs in participant nations; and
! adding program flexibility to respond rapidly to changing global
circumstances.
For FY2004, the State Department seeks $106.4 million for ATA programs, up
nearly two-thirds from existing levels. Most FY2004 training will continue for
training of officials from the “front-line” states, with a focus on in-country training
in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Indonesia. The ATA program further plans to launch
a Mobile Emergency Training Teams (METT) initiative ($10 million) which will
deliver in-country instruction for VIP protection, bomb squads, and crisis response
operations. The State Department had planned to begin METT in FY2002 but
reprogrammed a $20 million appropriation in order to provide protective service for
Afghan President Karzai.
Terrorist Interdiction Program (TIP). As one response to the 1998
bombings of American embassies in East Africa, the State Department launched the
TIP, an activity intended to restrict the ability of terrorists to cross international
borders, launch attacks, and escape. TIP strengthens border security systems in
particularly vulnerable countries by installing border monitoring technology, training
border security and immigration officials in its use, and expanding access to
international criminal information to participating nations. Like ATA, funds for TIP
are part of the NADR account in the Foreign Operations spending bill.
Since September 11, the State Department has expanded from 34 to 60 the
number of countries where it believes TIP would immediately contribute to the
global counterterrorism campaign. The $4 million TIP budget doubled for FY2001
following September 11, and grew to $14 million in FY2002. After falling back to
$5 million for FY2003, the request for FY2004 is $11 million. The Administration
plans to expand operations in up to ten new countries with the additional resources.
Counterterrorism Engagement with Allies. Following the September 11
attacks, the United States began to conduct Senior Official Policy Workshops and
multilateral conferences in order to better respond to terrorist incidents involving
weapons of mass destruction overseas. With $3 million from emergency FY2002
supplemental spending, the State Department conducted workshops in 18 countries
as well as several regional conferences. The $2.5 million budget request for FY2004

CRS-30
would finance ten scheduled workshops, including three in Greece in advance of the
2004 Olympic games.
Terrorist Financing. In December 2001, an interagency review group
identified 19 countries where a significant terrorist financing threat existed, and with
$3 million allocated from the Emergency Response Fund, launched a training and
technical assistance program. The State Department allocated $10 million out of the
FY2002 supplemental appropriation to expand the program, while the Treasury
Department is utilizing approximately half of its $10 million FY2003 “Technical
Assistance” program for these purposes. In FY2004, Treasury proposes $5 million
for combating terrorist financing activities.
USAID Physical Security. USAID maintains about 97 overseas facilities
where much of its workforce — including both Americans and foreign nationals —
is located. Many missions are based in places where there is a high threat of terrorist
activity, and especially since the 1998 embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania,
agency officials have been concerned about insuring adequate security. In countries
where USAID is or is scheduled to be co-located with the U.S. embassy, the State
Department’s Foreign Buildings Operations office had been responsible for financing
USAID secure facilities. These funds are appropriated in the Departments of
Commerce, Justice, and State appropriations. Nevertheless, there have been serious
construction delays for USAID co-located facilities — especially in Uganda — due
to competing State Department building priorities and conflicting congressional
directives.
In an effort to overcome these problems, USAID requested for FY2003 a new
Foreign Operations account — the Capital Investment Fund — that would support
enhanced information technology ($13 million) and facility construction ($82
million) specifically at co-located sites where security enhancements are needed.
USAID planned to use the money in FY2003 for construction projects in Kenya,
Guinea, Cambodia, and Georgia. Congress, however, reduced funding for this
account to $43 million, with $30 million assumed for Kenya and $10 million for a
new facility in Afghanistan.
With reductions made to the FY2003 request, USAID is proposing a $146.3
million Capital Investment Fund request for FY2004. Of the total, $20 million will
support information technology needs, while the balance will finance construction
of seven co-located facilities where the State Department is already building new
embassies. In addition to Guinea, Cambodia, and Georgia, which went unfunded in
FY2003, USAID requests resources for co-located missions in Zimbabwe, Armenia,
Mali, and Uganda. For construction of co-located missions at embassies where
building will begin in FY2004 or later, resources for USAID facilities will be drawn
from State Department appropriations under the Capital Surcharge Proposal.
Security upgrades for the 64 overseas missions situated some distance from
American embassies have been provided out of USAID operating expenses, a
Foreign Operations account that has been under funding stress in recent years due to
agency relocation costs in Washington, D.C., replacement of failed financial
management systems, and dwindling non-appropriated trust funds used to finance
some in-country costs. As a result, security upgrades for some USAID missions have

CRS-31
been deferred due to funding shortfalls. For FY2003, USAID estimates that it will
spend $7.1 million for security needs out of its operations account, compared to
$6.75 million in FY2002. USAID is requesting the same amount — $7.1 million —
for FY2004 as it has available this year.
Aid Restrictions for Terrorist States. Annual Foreign Operations
spending bills routinely include general provisions prohibiting U.S. assistance to
countries engaged in terrorist activities or providing certain types of support to
terrorist groups. Included in the FY2003 funding measure are two:
! Sec. 527 prohibits bilateral U.S. assistance to any country that the
President determines grants sanctuary from prosecution to any
individual or group which has committed an act of international
terrorism, or otherwise supports international terrorism. The
President could waive the restrictions for national security or
humanitarian reasons.
! Sec. 543 prohibits U.S. aid to a government which provides lethal
military equipment to a country that the Secretary of State has
determined is headed by a terrorist supporting government. The
President could waive the requirement if it is important to U.S.
national interests.
Despite these restrictions, however, certain types of humanitarian foreign assistance
may be provided “notwithstanding” other provisions of law, which would override
the terrorism restrictions. Disaster and refugee relief, child survival and HIV/AIDS
programs, emergency food and medicine, and demining operations are among the
categories of U.S. assistance that could potentially be provided to a country that
would otherwise be ineligible.
Millennium Challenge Account
In a speech on March 14, 2002, at the Inter-American Development Bank,
President Bush outlined a proposal for the United States to increase foreign economic
assistance beginning in FY2004 so that by FY2006 American aid would be $5 billion
higher than three years earlier. The funds would be placed in a new Millennium
Challenge Account (MCA) and be available to developing nations that are pursing
political and economic reforms in three areas:
! Ruling justly — promoting good governance, fighting corruption,
respecting human rights, and adhering to the rule of law.
! Investing in people — providing adequate health care, education,
and other opportunities promoting an educated and healthy
population.
! Fostering enterprise and entrepreneurship — promoting open
markets and sustainable budgets.
If fully implemented, the initiative would represent one of the largest increases in
foreign aid spending in half a century, outpaced only by the Marshall Plan following

CRS-32
World War II and the Latin America-focused Alliance for Progress in the early
1960s.
The concept is based on the premise that economic development succeeds best
where it is linked to free market economic and democratic principles and policies.
Conditioning assistance on policy performance and accountability by recipient
nations is not new to U.S. aid programs. Since the late 1980s at least, portions of
American development assistance have been allocated to some degree on a
performance-based system. What is different about the MCA is the size of the
commitment; the competitive process that will reward countries for what they have
already achieved not just what is promised for the future; the pledge to segregate the
funds from U.S. strategic foreign policy objectives that often strongly influence
where U.S. aid is spent; and to the decision to solicit program proposals developed
solely by qualifying countries.
If Congress fully funds the President’s MCA request and assuming that FY2003
will be the baseline from which to compare growth in foreign aid spending during
implementation of the MCA, a $5 billion increase by FY2006 would result in a $17.2
billion foreign aid budget. In real terms (constant FY2003 dollars), taking into the
account the estimated effects of inflation, U.S. economic assistance in FY2006 would
be $16.14 billion, the highest amount since FY1979 and the signing of the Camp
David Middle East peace accords, and FY1985, an unusual year in which the United
States responded to special Middle East economic stabilization and African famine
requirements. The nominal increase between FY2003 and FY2006 would be about
41%, while in real terms, FY2006 funding would be nearly 32% more. These figures
are less than Administration claims of a 50% increase in funding due to the MCA,
a figure that is apparently calculated using the $10 billion aid level in FY2000 as the
base year. Because of the size of the U.S. economy and continued growth projected
over the next several years, the MCA increases will have minimal impact on the
amount of U.S. aid as a percent of GDP. According to current projections, assistance
would rise from the 2002 level of 0.11% of GDP to 0.13%.
During the first year of the MCA, participation will be limited to the 74 poorest
nations that are eligible to borrow from the World Bank’s International Development
Association and have per capita incomes below $1,435. The list will expand to
include all lower-middle income countries by FY2006 with per capita incomes below
$2,975. Participants will be selected largely based on 16 performance indicators
related to the three categories of good governance, economic freedom, and investing
in people. Countries that score above the median on half of the indicators in each of
the three areas will qualify. Emphasizing the importance of fighting corruption,
however, should a country fall below the median on the corruption indicator (based
on the World Bank Institute’s Control of Corruption measure), it will be
automatically disqualified from consideration.
To manage the MCA, the Administration has proposed the creation of a
Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC), a new independent government entity
separate from the Departments of State and the Treasury and from the U.S. Agency
for International Development (USAID). The White House envisions a staff of about
100, drawn from various government agencies and non-governmental organizations,
led by a CEO confirmed by the Senate. A review board, chaired by the Secretary of

CRS-33
State and composed of the Secretary of the Treasury and the Director of OMB, would
oversee operations of the MCC.
The decision to house the MCA in a new organization has been one of the most
debated issues during early congressional deliberations of the President’s foreign aid
initiative. The Administration argues that because the MCA represents a new
concept in aid delivery, it should have a “fresh” organizational structure,
unencumbered by bureaucratic authorities and regulations that would interfere in
effective management. Critics, however, contend that if the MCA is placed outside
the formal U.S. government foreign aid structure, it will lead to further fragmentation
of policy development and consistency. Some believe USAID, the principal U.S. aid
agency, should manage the MCA, while others say that the MCA should reside in the
State Department where more U.S. foreign policy entities have been integrated in
recent years. At least, some argue, the USAID Administrator should be a member
of the MCC Board, possibly in place of the OMB Director.
For FY2004, the Administration seeks $1.3 billion for the MCA’s first year and
remains committed to a $5 billion budget by FY2006. Some believe, however, that
the FY2004 request is less than promised a year ago. At the time, Administration
officials implied that funding might be phased in over three years in equal
increments, resulting in a $1.67 billion program in FY2004, a $3.34 billion level in
FY2005, and $5 billion in FY2006. In the President’s budget submission this year,
however, budget officials say the pace at which resources will rise was never
specifically set, and that only the $5 billion target for FY2006 is a firm commitment.
Congressional Action. On May 29, 2003, in legislation related to the
Foreign Operations appropriations bill, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
reported S. 1160, a bill authorizing $1 billion for the MCA in FY2004, $2.3 billion
in FY2005, and $5 billion in FY2006. On a vote of 11-8, the Committee further
approved an amendment by Senators Biden and Hagel that would establish the MCA
inside the State Department under the complete direction of the Secretary of State.
The legislation abandons the separate corporation proposal put forward by the
Administration. Secretary of State Powell wrote the Committee saying he would
advise the President to veto the legislation if this provision to locate the MCA in the
State Department remained in the bill. S. 1160 also would permit low-middle
income nations to participate in the MCA program only if appropriations in FY2006
and beyond exceed $5 billion annually. In such years, these relatively wealthier
countries may compete for only 20% of the total appropriation. In many other areas,
however, the legislation adopts most of the broad concepts recommended by the
executive.
International Family Planning and UNFPA Funding
U.S. population assistance and family planning programs overseas have sparked
continuous controversy during Foreign Operations debates for nearly two decades.
For FY2004, the Administration requests $425 million for bilateral population
assistance, the same as proposed last year, but below the $446.5 million appropriated
by Congress for FY2003. Although funding considerations have at times been
heatedly debated by Congress, the most contentious family planning issues addressed
in nearly every annual congressional consideration of Foreign Operations bills have

CRS-34
focused on two matters: whether the United States should contribute to the U.N.
Population Fund (UNFPA) if the organization maintains a program in China where
allegations of coercive family planning have been widespread for many years, and
whether abortion-related restrictions should be applied to bilateral USAID population
aid grants (commonly known as the “Mexico City” policy).
UNFPA Funding. The most contentious issue usually concerns the abortion
restriction question, but most recent attention has focused on UNFPA and a White
House decision in July 2002 to block the $34 million U.S. contribution to the
organization. During the Reagan and Bush Administrations, the United States did
not contribute to UNFPA because of concerns over practices of forced abortion and
involuntary sterilization in China where UNFPA maintains programs. In 1985,
Congress passed the so-called Kemp-Kasten amendment which has been made part
of every Foreign Operations appropriation since, barring U.S. funds to any
organization that supports or participates “in the management” of a program of
coercive abortion or involuntary sterilization. In 1993, President Clinton determined
that UNFPA, despite its presence in China, was not involved in the management of
a coercive program. In most years since 1993, Congress has appropriated about $25
million for UNFPA, but added a directive that required that the amount be reduced
by however much UNFPA spent in China. Consequently, the U.S. contribution has
fluctuated between $21.5 million and $25 million.
For FY2002, President Bush requested $25 million for UNFPA. As part of a
larger package concerning various international family planning issues, Congress
provided in the FY2002 Foreign Operations bill “not more than” $34 million for
UNFPA. While members of the Appropriations Committees say it was their intent
to provide the full $34 million, the language allowed the President to allocate
however much he chose, up to a $34 million ceiling. According to February 27,
2002, testimony by Arthur Dewey, Assistant Secretary of State for Population,
Refugees, and Migration before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the White
House placed a hold on UNFPA funds in January 2002 because new evidence
suggested that coercive practices were continuing in Chinese counties where UNFPA
concentrates its programs. A September 2001 investigation team, sponsored by the
Population Research Institute, concluded that a consistent pattern of coercion
continued in “model” UNFPA counties, including forced abortions and involuntary
sterilizations. Refuting these findings, a UNFPA-commissioned review team found
in October 2001 “absolutely no evidence that the UN Population Fund supports
coercive family planning practices in China or violates the human rights of Chinese
people in any way.” (See House International Relations Committee hearing,
Coercive Population Control in China: New Evidence of Forced Abortion and
Forced Sterilization
, October 17, 2001. See also testimony of Josephine Guy and
Nicholaas Biegman before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, February 27,
2002.)
Although most observers agree that coercive family planning practices continue
in China, differences remain over the extent to which, if any, UNFPA supports
involuntary activities and whether UNFPA should operate at all in a country where
such conditions exist. Given the conflicting reports, the State Department sent its
own investigative team to China for a two-week review of UNFPA programs on May
13, 2002. The team, which was led by former Ambassador William Brown and

CRS-35
included Bonnie Glick, a former State Department official, and Dr. Theodore Tong,
a public health professor at the University of Arizona, made three findings and
recommendations in its report dated May 31:
Findings:
! There is no evidence that UNFPA “knowingly supported or
participated in the management of a program of coercive abortion or
involuntary sterilization” in China;
! China maintains coercive elements in its population programs; and
! Chinese leaders view “population control as a high priority” and
remain concerned over implications of loosening controls for
socioeconomic change.
Recommendations:
! The United States should release not more than $34 million of
previously appropriated funds to UNFPA;
! Until China ends all forms of coercion in law and practice, no U.S.
government funds should be allocated to population programs in
China; and
! Appropriate resources, possibly from the United States, should be
allocated to monitor and evaluate Chinese population control
programs.
Despite the team’s recommendation to release the $34 million, Secretary of
State Powell decided on July 22, 2002, to withhold funds to UNFPA and to
recommend that they be re-directed to other international family planning and
reproductive health activities. (The authority to make this decision had been
delegated previously by the President to the Secretary of State.) The State
Department’s analysis of the Secretary’s determination found that even though
UNFPA did not “knowingly” support or participate in a coercive practice, that alone
would not preclude the application of Kemp-Kasten. Instead, a finding that the
recipient of U.S. funds — in this case UNFPA — simply supports or participates in
such a program, whether knowingly or unknowingly, would trigger the restriction.
The team found that the Chinese government imposes fines and penalties on
families that have children exceeding the number approved by the government, a
practice that in some cases coerces women to have abortions they would not
otherwise undergo. The State Department analysis concluded that UNFPA’s
involvement in China’s family planning program “allows the Chinese government
to implement more effectively its program of coercive abortion.” (The full text of the
State Department’s analysis is online at the State Department’s web site at
[http://www.state.gov/g/prm/rls/other/12128.htm]. The State Department’s
a s s e s s m e n t t e a m r e p o r t i s a l s o o n l i n e , a t
[http://www.state.gov/g/prm/rls/rpt/2002/12122.htm].)
Critics of the Administration’s decision oppose it not only because of the
negative impact it may have on access to voluntary family planning programs by
persons in around 140 countries where UNFPA operates, but also because of the
possible application of the determination for other international organizations that
operate in China and to which the U.S. contributes.

CRS-36
For FY2003, the President proposed no funding for UNFPA, although $25
million was requested in “reserve” for the account from which UNFPA receives its
funding. Presumably, this could be made available to UNFPA if it is found not to be
in violation of Kemp-Kasten. Following several legislative attempts to reverse the
Administration’s denial of UNFPA — in both FY2002 supplemental appropriations
and regular FY2003 Foreign Operations measures — Congress approved in P.L. 108-
7, the Consolidated Appropriations Act for FY2003, a provision allocating $34
million to UNFPA, the same as in FY2002, so long as several conditions were met.
The most significant requirement is that the President must certify that UNFPA is no
longer involved in the management of a coercive family planning program. The
President has not yet issued a determination regarding the status of UNFPA funding
for FY2003.
Like for FY2003, the FY2004 Foreign Operations request does not propose
funding for UNFPA, but places $25 million in “reserve” for unidentified voluntary
contributions to international organizations.
“Mexico City” Policy. The debate over international family planning policy
and abortion began nearly three decades ago, in 1973, when Congress added a
provision to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 prohibiting the use of U.S.
appropriated funds
for abortion-related activities and coercive family planning
programs. During the mid-1980s, in what has become known as the “Mexico City”
policy (because it was first announced at the 1984 Mexico City Population
Conference), the Reagan Administration, and later the George H. W. Bush
Administration restricted funds for foreign non-governmental organizations (NGOs)
that were involved in performing or promoting abortions in countries where they
worked, even if such activities were undertaken with non-U.S. funds. Several groups,
including International Planned Parenthood Federation-London (IPPF-London),
became ineligible for U.S. financial support. In some subsequent years, Congress
narrowly approved measures to overturn this prohibition, but White House vetoes
kept the policy in place. President Clinton in 1993 reversed the position of his two
predecessors, allowing the United States to resume funding for all family planning
organizations so long as no U.S. money was used by those involved in abortion-
related work.
Between 1996 and 2000, the House and Senate took opposing positions on the
Mexico City issue, actions that repeatedly held up enactment of the final Foreign
Operations spending measures. The House position, articulated by Representative
Chris Smith (N.J.) and others, supported reinstatement of the Mexico City policy
restricting U.S. aid funds to foreign organizations involved in performing abortions
or in lobbying to change abortion laws or policies in foreign countries. The Senate,
on the other hand, rejected in most cases House provisions dealing with Mexico City
policy, favoring a position that left these decisions in the hands of the
Administration. Unable to reach an agreement satisfactory to both sides, Congress
adopted interim arrangements during this period that did not resolve the broad
population program controversy, but permitted the stalled Foreign Operations
measure to move forward. The annual “compromise” removed House-added Mexico
City restrictions, but reduced population assistance to $385 million, and in several
years, “metered” the availability of the funds at a rate of one-twelfth of the $385
million per month.

CRS-37
In FY2000, when the issue became linked with the separate foreign policy
matter of paying U.S. arrears owed to the United Nations, a reluctant President
Clinton agreed to a modified version of abortion restrictions, marking the first time
that Mexico City conditions had been included in legislation signed by the President
(enacted in the Foreign Operations Act for FY2000, H.R. 3422, incorporated into
H.R. 3194, the Consolidated Appropriations Act for FY2000, P.L. 106-113).
Because the President could waive the restrictions for $15 million in grants to
organizations that refused to certify, there was no major impact on USAID family
planning programs in FY2000, other than the reduction of $12.5 million in
population assistance that the legislation required if the White House exercised the
waiver authority.
When Congress again came to an impasse in FY2001, lawmakers agreed to
allow the new President to set policy. Under the FY2001 Foreign Operations
measure, none of the $425 million appropriation could be obligated until after
February 15, 2001.
Subsequently, on January 22, 2001, two days after taking office, President Bush
issued a Memorandum to the USAID Administrator rescinding the 1993
memorandum from President Clinton and directing the Administrator to “reinstate
in full all of the requirements of the Mexico City Policy in effect on January 19,
1993.” The President further said that it was his “conviction that taxpayer funds
should not be used to pay for abortions or to advocate or actively promote abortion,
either here or abroad.” A separate statement from the President’s press secretary
stated that President Bush was “committed to maintaining the $425 million funding
level” for population assistance “because he knows that one of the best ways to
prevent abortion is by providing quality voluntary family planning services.” The
press secretary further emphasized that it was the intent that any restrictions “do not
limit organizations from treating injuries or illnesses caused by legal or illegal
abortions, for example, post abortion care.” On February 15, 2001, the day on which
FY2001 population aid funds became available for obligation, USAID issued specific
policy language and contract clauses to implement the President’s directive. The
guidelines are nearly identical to those used in the 1980s and early 1990s when the
Mexico City policy applied.
Critics of the certification requirement oppose it on several grounds. They
believe that family planning organizations may cut back on services because they are
unsure of the full implications of the restrictions and do not want to risk losing
eligibility for USAID funding. This, they contend, will lead to higher numbers of
unwanted pregnancies and possibly more abortions. Opponents also believe the new
conditions undermine relations between the U.S. Government and foreign NGOs and
multilateral groups, creating a situation in which the United States challenges their
decisions on how to spend their own money. They further argue that U.S. policy
imposes a so-called “gag” order on the ability of foreign NGOs and multilateral
groups to promote changes to abortion laws and regulations in developing nations.
This would be unconstitutional if applied to American groups working in the United
States, critics note.
Supporters of the certification requirement argue that even though permanent
law bans USAID funds from being used to perform or promote abortions, money is

CRS-38
fungible; organizations receiving American-taxpayer funding can simply use USAID
resources for permitted activities while diverting money raised from other sources to
perform abortions or lobby to change abortion laws and regulations. The certification
process, they contend, closes the fungibility “loophole.”
Since re-instatement of the Mexico City policy in early 2001, several bills have
been introduced to reverse the policy, but none has passed either the House or Senate.
The policy continues to apply to FY2003 family planning aid programs and will
presumably continue in FY2004.
Congressional Action. In authorizing legislation related to portions of the
Foreign Operations appropriation bill, the House International Relations Committee
approved on May 8, 2003, an amendment by Congressman Crowley that authorizes
$50 million for a U.S. contribution to UNFPA for each of FY2004 and FY2005 (H.R.
1950). The Crowley amendment further alters existing law for determining UNFPA
eligibility by requiring that the President find that UNFPA does not “directly”
support or participate in coercive or involuntary activities. This would appear to
make it more difficult for the President to block funding for UNFPA than under
conditions that apply for this year. Not only does the Crowley amendment add the
word “directly,” but also defines the circumstances under which UNFPA would be
found ineligible as “knowingly and intentionally working with a purpose to continue,
advance or expand the practice of coercive abortion or involuntary sterilization, or
playing a primary and essential role in a coercive or involuntary aspect of a country’s
family planning program.”
Afghanistan Reconstruction6
The conditions in Afghanistan represent a challenging mix of ongoing security
concerns, infrastructure destruction, and humanitarian needs likely requiring a robust
and sustained intervention. While the hunt for Al Qaeda forces within Afghanistan
continues, transitional and reconstruction assistance has also moved ahead. An
examination of the progress of reconstruction efforts and aid priorities since
December 2001 reveals the complexity of the tasks at hand and the important roles
to be played by the United States and the international community. The case of
Afghanistan may present a special category of international crisis response, in which
the United States and others pursue the war on terrorism in a country while
simultaneously providing humanitarian and reconstruction assistance.
So far, the international community has continued to provide large amounts of
aid and resources for the reconstruction effort. A long-term commitment will likely
be necessary to ensure that a stable, democratic Afghanistan emerges and will not fall
prey to the twin evils of drugs and terrorism. The outcomes of the international
donors conference in January 2002 and other donor conferences since then indicate
a strong willingness on the part of the international community to assist in the
restoration of Afghanistan. However, reconstruction costs are estimated by some to
be more than $15-$30 billion over the next decade.
6 This section was prepared by Rhoda Margesson.

CRS-39
Situation Prior to September 11. Even before the current crisis,
Afghanistan had suffered twenty-two years of war, which included a long Soviet
occupation, followed by civil war, and, beginning in 1996, harsh Taliban rule in most
of the country. With a devastated infrastructure and minimal government and social
services, even basic health care and education were almost nonexistent. As of
September 10, 2001, according to the United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees (UNHCR), nearly four million Afghans (out of a total population of about
26 million) were refugees with a majority located in Pakistan and Iran. Nearly one
million other Afghans were internally displaced persons (IDPs).
Humanitarian assistance programs have been a key part of the overall
multilateral effort to relieve human suffering and assist refugees and internally
displaced persons. The United States has been the largest provider of humanitarian
assistance to the people of Afghanistan through direct programs and through its
contributions to the UNHCR, other U.N. agencies and international organizations,
and NGOs. From 1994 until just recently, U.S. aid was provided mainly through
U.N. agencies and NGOs. Via the World Food Program (WFP), the United States
provided more than 80% of all food shipments to Afghanistan during FY2001 and
more than 47% in FY2002. The humanitarian needs, although becoming less critical,
remain significant.
Key developments since September 11, 2001, and the collapse of the Taliban
focus on three main pillars: First, the development of plans for security including the
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), and in the future, an Afghan National
Army and police force; second, establishing the political framework through the
Bonn Conference and Afghanistan Interim Administration (AIA), the loya jirga and
Islamic Transitional Government of Afghanistan (ITGA), and renewed diplomatic
ties with the international community; and third, the creation of a strategy for
reconstruction beginning with the Tokyo Reconstruction Conference in January 2002.
Current Operating Environment. The current operating environment
continues to highlight the importance of these three themes and the work that remains
to be done to assure Afghanistan’s recovery.
The most serious challenge facing Afghanistan today is the lack of security.
Former commanders maintain control over their own areas and continue fighting with
their rivals, making difficult the extension of control by the national government, the
provision of humanitarian assistance, and the implementation of plans for
reconstruction. With the continued fighting and insecurity, the process of
demobilization and integration of combatants has also been slow. U.S. forces are
continuing to train a new Afghan National Army that it is hoped will ultimately allow
the Kabul government to maintain security on its own, and enable foreign forces to
depart Afghanistan. With about 4,500 recruits trained so far, the U.S. government
estimates that it will be at least five years until the army reaches full strength,
currently planned for 70,000.
Ensuring a secure environment for reconstruction gained greater attention with
an initiative by the Pentagon to expand the role of the U.S. military in Afghanistan.
In December 2002, DOD announced that it would be setting up eight “provincial
reconstruction teams” (PRTs), composed of U.S. combat and civil affairs officers,

CRS-40
to provide security for reconstruction workers and to extend the influence of the
Kabul government. Three of these PRTs are already in operation and observers say
NGOs are gravitating to areas where they are present due to improved security. This
marks a departure from the previous policy of relying solely on security through the
development of an Afghan national army or expansion of the ISAF, and engages U.S.
forces beyond military action to oust the Taliban and Al Qaeda.
Still, factional fighting and increased criminal activity have undermined
humanitarian operations. In some cases, where operations were directly targeted,
this has led to the temporary suspension of U.N. missions or withdrawal of aid
agencies from certain areas. The United Nations has begun a database to record
national security incidents and to provide more effective, timely information and
situation assessments.
The strength and influence of the central government is viewed as a key factor
that will determine the success of the intervention and assistance on the part of the
international community. Humanitarian and reconstruction programs face the
challenge of maintaining their foothold despite the complex humanitarian
requirements (such as population returns and resettlement, food security, shelter, and
winter assistance) and reconstruction problems (such as rebuilding the infrastructure,
economy and agricultural base; addressing landmines and environmental damage;
and reestablishing health, education, and community centers.) At the end of 2003,
Afghanistan is to begin preparing for national elections to take place by June 2004.
A loya jirga in October 2003 is to consider a draft permanent constitution.
Apart from the security problems, the current operating environment presents
a number of other urgent challenges. The collapsed infrastructure, rugged terrain, and
extreme weather are significant factors with regard to access, food aid, logistics, and
plans for reconstruction. The humanitarian needs and support required for recovery
in Afghanistan must be understood in the context of the continuing vast numbers of
refugees and IDPs, the differences among the regions in which they are located, and
the political and security situation throughout the country. There is a need for
stronger links between humanitarian and reconstruction projects so that Afghans can
begin to move beyond initial reintegration to more permanent resettlement. UNHCR
plans to assist 1.2 million refugees and 300,000 IDPs during 2003, although some
have raised concerns that the infrastructure may not yet be able to support this many
returnees.
The United States has international help in carrying out the reconstruction of
Afghanistan. The United States is training the new army and about 9,000 U.S. troops
continue to combat Taliban/Al Qaeda remnants. The U.S. Treasury Department is
advising the government on its budget and other financial affairs. Among
contributions by other countries, Italy is providing advice on judicial reform and
Germany is helping establish a national police force. The United States, Japan and
Saudi Arabia are financing the rebuilding of the Kabul-Qandahar-Herat major
roadway.
There have been some reports that Afghanistan officials have complained about
the slow pace at which pledged funds were being paid. In a similar vein, the United
States has been critical of other donors for not meeting their “fair share” of the cost

CRS-41
of recovery and for not doing enough on a multilateral level. On the one hand,
determining the “fair share” of the costs of reconstruction for any one country or
group of countries varies from conflict to conflict and depends in part on the
resources being spent on conflicts elsewhere. On the other hand, the way in which
funds are distributed — be it multilaterally through U.N. agencies or bilaterally with
funds supporting international organizations and NGOs directly — appears to be at
issue in Afghanistan. Others are concerned that international donors might shift their
focus to Iraq reconstruction, and lose interest or run too low on resources to continue
to participate in Afghan reconstruction.
Tokyo Pledging Conference. According to USAID, during FY2001 the
U.S. government provided $184.3 million in humanitarian assistance to Afghanistan
ranging from airlifts of tents and blankets to assistance with polio eradication, from
tons of wheat to crop substitution assistance for poppy growers. On October 4, 2001,
President Bush announced that for FY2002 the United States would provide $320
million in humanitarian assistance to Afghans both inside and outside Afghanistan’s
borders. Multiple U.S. agencies provide some form of humanitarian and
reconstruction assistance, covering a wide variety of aid, services, and projects.
The International Conference on Reconstruction Assistance to Afghanistan held
in Tokyo in January 2002 gave the AIA a chance to demonstrate its commitment to
the next phase of Afghanistan’s recovery and provided the international donor
community an opportunity to come together and formally demonstrate support for
this initiative. The sixty-one countries and twenty-one international organizations
represented pledged $1.8 billion for 2002. The U.S. government pledged $297
million, drawn from existing sources — either from the $40 billion Emergency
Terrorism Response supplemental (P.L. 107-38) that was passed shortly after the
September 11, 2001 attacks or from regular FY2002 appropriations. The total
pledged at Tokyo was $4.5 billion, with some states making pledges over multiple
years and commitments to be carried out in different time frames. Some countries
offered support in kind but placed no monetary value on that.
Subsequent U.S. Aid Transfers, FY2002 and FY2003. Since the Tokyo
pledging conference, through supplemental and regular appropriation bills, Congress
has approved an additional $970 million in U.S. assistance to Afghanistan, making
Kabul one of the largest recipients of American aid. An emergency FY2002
supplemental measure (P.L. 107-206) added $258 million for Afghanistan to amounts
previously allocated, bringing the total amount of U.S. assistance in FY2002 to $686
million, well in excess of funding pledged at the Tokyo conference. Thus far in
FY2003, Congress has passed in regular (P.L. 108-7) and supplemental (P.L. 108-11)
appropriation acts over $700 million, of which $647 million falls under Foreign
Operations programs. In each of these actions, Congress has increased levels beyond
those requested by the Administration. The $40 million add-on in P.L. 108-11 will
permit USAID to accelerate the Kabul-Qandahar-Herat road construction project that
is jointly financed with Japan and Saudi Arabia.
In related legislation, the Afghanistan Freedom Support Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-
327, S. 2712), passed by congress on November 15, 2002, and signed by the
President on December 4, 2002, authorizes an additional $3.3 billion for Afghanistan
over four years. Included is $2 billion for humanitarian, reconstruction, and

CRS-42
enterprise fund assistance through FY2006 and $300 million in drawdown from U.S.
military stocks of defense articles and equipment for Afghanistan and other countries
and organizations participating in restoring Afghan security. The legislation also
includes a Sense of Congress that calls for an expanded International Security
Assistance Force with an authorization of an additional $1 billion over two years.
FY2004 Afghanistan Aid Request. For FY2004, the Administration
requests $550 million for Afghanistan, an amount that would make Kabul the fourth
largest recipient of U.S. aid next year. Although the FY2004 proposal is less than for
FY2002 and FY2003, when funding for humanitarian programs in FY2004 (food,
refugees, disaster relief) are added, the total sum is likely to be near or above
previous years. (Humanitarian funds are usually not allocated on a country basis
until the fiscal year begins.) Nearly half of the $321 million FY2004 economic aid
request would continue infrastructure rehabilitation, focusing largely on roads,
bridges, schools, health clinics, and waste water facilities.
Table 9. U.S. Assistance to Afghanistan, FY2002-FY2004
($s — millions)

FY2002
FY2003
FY2003
FY2003
FY2004
Actual
Regular
Supp
Total
Request
Development/Health
39.7
89.9

89.9
171.0
Disaster relief
191.0
94.0

94.0
a
Food aid
159.5
26.7

26.7
a
Refugee relief

55.0

55.0
a
Economic/Security (ESF)
105.3
49.5
167.0
216.5
150.0
Anti-terrorism/Demining
43.4
5.0
28.0
33.0
19.0
Narcotics/Law Enforcement
66.0


0.0
40.0
Military aid
57.3
21.3
170.0
191.3
150.0
Peacekeeping
23.9
4.9

4.9
20.0
TOTAL
686.1
346.3
365.0
711.3
550.0
a. Although Afghanistan is likely to receive assistance from these humanitarian aid accounts, the
FY2004 request does not provide specific amounts for most countries.
For Additional Reading
Overview
CRS Report 98-916. Foreign Aid: An Introductory Overview of U.S. Programs and
Policy, by Curt Tarnoff and Larry Nowels.
CRS Report RL31687. The Millennium Challenge Account: Congressional
Consideration of a New Foreign Aid Initiative, by Larry Nowels.

CRS-43
CRS Report RL31829, Supplemental Appropriations FY2003: Iraq Conflict,
Afghanistan, Global War on Terrorism, and Homeland Security, by Amy
Belasco and Larry Nowels.
Foreign Operations Programs
CRS Report RS20329. African Development Bank and Fund, by Raymond Copson.
CRS Issue Brief IB10050. AIDS in Africa, by Raymond Copson.
CRS Issue Brief IB88093. Drug Control: International Policy and Approaches, by
Raphael Perl.
CRS Report 98-568, Export-Import Bank: Background and Legislative Issues, by
James Jackson.
CRS Report RL31712. The Global Fund to Fight to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and
Malaria: Background and Current Issues, by Raymond Copson and Tiaji
Salaam.
CRS Report RS21181. HIV/AIDS International Programs: Appropriations, FY2002-
FY2004, by Raymond Copson.
CRS Report RS20622. International Disasters: How the United States Responds,
by Lois McHugh.
CRS Report RL30830. International Family Planning: The “Mexico City” Policy,
by Larry Nowels.
CRS Report RL30932, Microenterprise and U.S. Foreign Assistance, by Curt
Tarnoff.
CRS Issue Brief IB96008. Multilateral Development Banks: Issues for the 108th
Congress, by Jonathan Sanford.
CRS Report 98-567. The Overseas Private Investment Corporation: Background
and Legislative Issues, by James Jackson.
CRS Report RS21168. The Peace Corps: USA Freedom Corps Initiative, by Curt
Tarnoff.
CRS Report RL30545. Trafficking in Women and Children: The U.S. and
International Response, by Francis Miko.
CRS Issue Brief IB96026. U.S. International Population Assistance: Issues for
Congress, by Larry Nowels.
CRS Report RL31689. U.S. International Refugee Assistance: Issues for Congress,
by Rhoda Margesson.

CRS-44
CRS Report RL31433. U.S. Global Health Priorities: USAID’s Global FY2003
Budget, by Tiaji Salaam.
Country and Regional Issues
CRS Report RL31355. Afghanistan’s Path to Reconstruction: Obstacles,
Challenges, and Issues for Congress, by Rhoda Margesson.
CRS Report RL30883. Africa: Scaling up the Response to the HIV/AIDS Pandemic,
by Raymond Copson.
CRS Issue Brief IB95052. Africa: U.S. Foreign Assistance Issues, by Raymond
Copson.
CRS Report RL31383. Andean Regional Initiative (ARI): FY2002 Supplemental and
FY2003 Assistance for Colombia and Neighbors, by Nina Serafino and K. Larry
Storrs.
CRS Report RS21213. Colombia: Summary and Tables on U.S. Assistance, by Nina
Serafino.
CRS Issue Brief IB93087. Egypt-United States Relations, by Clyde Mark.
CRS Report RS21301. The Food Crisis in Southern Africa: Background and Issues,
by Charles Hanrahan.
CRS Issue Brief IB95077. The Former Soviet Union and U.S. Foreign Assistance,
by Curt Tarnoff.
CRS Report RL31833. Iraq: Recent Developments in Humanitarian and
Reconstruction Assistance, by Rhoda Margesson and Curt Tarnoff.
CRS Issue Brief IB85066. Israel: U.S. Foreign Assistance, by Clyde Mark.
CRS Issue Brief IB93085. Jordan: U.S. Relations and Bilateral Issues, by Alfred
Prados.
CRS Report RL31412. Mexico’s Counter-Narcotics Efforts Under Fox, December
2000 to April 2002, by K. Larry Storrs.
CRS Report RL31744. Middle East: U.S. Foreign Assistance, FY2002, FY2003, and
FY2004 request, by Clyde Mark.
CRS Report RS21353. New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), by
Nicholas Cook.
CRS Report RS20895. Palestinians: U.S. Assistance, by Clyde Mark.
CRS Report RL31814. Potential Humanitarian Issues in Post-War Iraq: An
Overview for Congress, by Rhoda Margesson and Johanna Bockman.

CRS-45
CRS Report RL31759. Reconstruction Assistance in Afghanistan: Goals, Priorities,
and Issues for Congress, by Rhoda Margesson.
CRS Issue Brief IB98043. Sudan: Humanitarian Crisis, Peace Talks, Terrorism and
U.S. Policy, by Ted Dagne.
CRS Report RL31785. U.S. Assistance to North Korea, by Mark Manyin and Ryun
Jun.
CRS Report RL31362. U.S. Foreign Aid to East and South Asia: Selected
Recipients, by Thomas Lum.
Selected World Wide Web Sites
African Development Bank
[http://www.afdb.org/home.htm]
African Development Foundation
[http://www.adf.gov/]
Asian Development Bank
[http://www.adb.org/]
CRS Current Legislative Issues: Foreign Affairs
[http://www.crs.gov/products/browse/is-foreignaffairs.shtml]
Export-Import Bank
[http://www.exim.gov/]
Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria
[http://www.globalfundatm.org/]
Inter-American Development Bank
[http://www.iadb.org/]
Inter-American Foundation
[http://www.iaf.gov/index/index_en.asp]
International Fund for Agricultural Development
[http://www.ifad.org]
International Monetary Fund
[http://www.imf.org/]
Overseas Private Investment Corporation
[http://www.opic.gov/]
Peace Corps

CRS-46
[http://www.peacecorps.gov/]
Trade and Development Agency
[http://www.tda.gov/]
United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF)
[http://www.unicef.org/]
United Nations Development Program (UNDP)
[http://www.undp.org/]
United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA)
[http://www.unfpa.org/]
United Nations Program on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS)
[http://www.unaids.org/]
U.S. Agency for International Development — Home Page
[http://www.info.usaid.gov/]
U.S. Agency for International Development — Congressional Budget Justification
[http://www.usaid.gov/pubs/cbj2004/]
U.S. Agency for International Development — Emergency Situation Reports
[http://www.usaid.gov/hum_response/ofda/publications/situation_reports/index.html]
U.S. Agency for International Development — Foreign Aid Data (“Greenbook”)
[http://qesdb.cdie.org/gbk/index.html]
U.S. Department of State — Home Page
[http://www.state.gov/]
U.S. Department of State — Foreign Operations Budget Justification, FY2004
[http://www.state.gov/m/rm/rls/cbj/2004/]
U.S. Department of State — International Affairs Budget Request, FY2004
[http://www.state.gov/m/rm/rls/iab/2004/]
U.S. Department of State — International Topics and Issues
[http://www.state.gov/interntl/]
U.S. Department of the Treasury — Office of International Affairs
[http://www.ustreas.gov/offices/international-affairs/index.html]
World Bank
[http://www.worldbank.org/]
World Bank HIPC website
[http://www.worldbank.org/hipc/]

CRS-47
Table 10. Foreign Operations: Discretionary Budget Authority
(millions of dollars)
FY2003
FY2003
FY2003
FY2004
FY2004
FY2004
Program
FY200 Senate
Regulara
Supp.b
Total
Request
House
Enacted
Title I - Export and Investment Assistance:
Export-Import Bank
564.4

564.4
42.6



Overseas Private Invest Corp
(242.5)

(242.5)
(205.6)



Trade/Development Agency
46.7

46.7
60.0



Total, Title I - Export Aid
368.6
0.0
368.6
(103.0)



Title II - Bilateral Economic:
Development Assistance:
Child Survival & Health (CS/H)
1,824.6
90.0
1,914.6
1,615.0c



Global AIDS Initiative



450.0



Development Assistance Fund (DA)
1,380.0

1,380.0
1,345.0



Subtotal, CS/H, AIDS, & DA
3,204.6
90.0
3,294.6
3,410.0



Intl Disaster Aid
288.1
143.8
431.9
235.5



Famine Fund



200.0



Transition Initiatives
49.7

49.7
55.0



Development Credit Programs
7.5

7.5
8.0



Subtotal, Development Aid
3,549.9
233.8
3,783.7
3,908.5



USAID Operating Expenses
568.3
24.5
592.8
604.1



USAID Inspector General
33.1

33.1
35.0



USAID Capital Investment Fund
42.7

42.7
146.3



Subtotal, Development Aid & USAID
4,194.0
258.3
4,452.3
4,693.9




CRS-48
FY2003
FY2003
FY2003
FY2004
FY2004
FY2004
Program
FY200 Senate
Regulara
Supp.b
Total
Request
House
Enacted
Economic Support Fund (ESF)
2,255.2
2,422.0
4,677.2
2,535.0



International Fund for Ireland
24.8

24.8
[12.5]d



Eastern Europe/Baltic States
521.6

521.6
435.0



Former Soviet Union
755.1.0

755.1
576.0



Emergency Fund for Complex Crises



100.0



Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund

2,475.0
2,475.0




Inter-American Foundation
16.1

16.1
15.2



African Development Foundation
18.6

18.6
17.7



Peace Corps
295.1

295.1
359.0



Millennium Challenge Account



1,300.0



Intl Narcotics/Law Enforcement
195.7
25.0
220.7
284.6



Intl Narcotics — Andean Initiative
695.5
34.0
729.5
731.0



Migration & Refugee Assistance
781.9

781.9
760.2



Emergency Refugee Fund (ERMA)
25.8
80.0
105.8
40.0



Non-Proliferation/anti-terrorism
304.4
28.0
332.4
385.2



Treasury Dept. Technical Assistance
10.7

10.7
14.0



Debt reduction



395.0



Total Title II-Bilateral Economic
10,094.5
5,322.3
15,416.8
12,641.8



Title III - Military Assistance:
Intl Military Ed. & Training
79.5

79.5
91.7



Foreign Mil Financing (FMF)
4,045.5
2,059.1
6,104.6
4,414.0




CRS-49
FY2003
FY2003
FY2003
FY2004
FY2004
FY2004
Program
FY200 Senate
Regulara
Supp.b
Total
Request
House
Enacted
Peacekeeping Operations
114.3
100.0
214.3
94.9



Total, Title III-Military Aid
4,239.3
2,159.1
6,398.4
4,600.6



Title IV - Multilateral Economic Aid:
World Bank - Intl Develop. Assn
844.5

844.5
976.8



World Bank Environment Facility
146.9

146.9
185.0



World Bank-Multilateral Investment. Guaranty
1.6

1.6
4.0



Inter-Amer. Development Bank
42.7

42.7
63.5



Asian Development Bank
97.3

97.3
151.9



African Development Fund
107.4

107.4
118.1



African Development Bank
5.1

5.1
5.1



European Bank for R & D
35.6

35.6
35.4



Intl Fund for Ag Development
14.9

14.9
15.0



Intl Organizations & Programs
193.9

193.9
194.6c



Total, Title IV - Multilateral
1,489.9

1,489.9
1,749.4



TOTAL, Foreign Operations
16,192.3
7,481.4
23,673.7
18,888.8



Sources: House Appropriations Committee and CRS adjustments.
a. Pursuant to Sec. 601 of P.L. 108-7, the Consolidated Appropriations Act, FY2003 and within which regular Foreign Operations funds were enacted, most accounts were reduced
by 0.65%. Figures for each account in this column include the 0.65% across-the-board rescission.
b. FY2003 supplemental includes funds appropriated in P.L. 108-11, the Iraq War Supplemental.

CRS-50
c. The Child Survival and Health (CS/H) request includes a $120 million proposed contribution to UNICEF. The Administration requested these funds in title IV, International
Organizations and Programs account, but for several years Congress has made the UNICEF contribution part of the CS/H account. The $120 million UNICEF transfer is excluded
from the FY2004 International Organizations and Programs request.
d. The Administration request includes the Ireland Fund as part of the Economic Support Fund.