Order Code RL31701
Report for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
Iraq: U.S. Military Operations
Updated May 14, 2003
Steve Bowman
Specialist in National Defense
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

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Iraq: U.S. Military Operations
Summary
Iraq’s chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons programs, together with Iraqi
long-range missile development and support for terrorism, are the primary
justifications put forward for military action. On March 17, 2003 President Bush
issued an ultimatum demanding that Saddam Hussein and his sons depart from Iraq
within 48 hours. On March 19, offensive operations began with air strikes against
Iraqi leadership positions.
By April 15, after 27 days of operations, coalition forces were in relative control
of all major Iraqi cities. Iraqi political and military leadership had disintegrated. The
major challenge to coalition forces is now the restoration of civil order and the
provision of basic services to the urban population. As the U.S. ground offensive
approached Baghdad, DOD civilian leadership came under criticism for not
permitting the deployment of sufficient U.S. ground forces to maintain the offensive,
protect lines of supply, and secure rear areas where sporadic Iraqi resistance
continues. With the fall of Baghdad, Mosul, and Kirkuk, this criticism muted.
There was no use of chemical or biological (CB)weapons, and no CB weapons
stockpiles have been found, though two mobile labs believed to be biological agent
production facilities have been discovered.
Though press reports differ somewhat, and DOD has not released official
figures, it appears that over 300,000 U.S. military personnel are in the Persian Gulf
region (ashore and afloat). Ground forces include the 3rd Infantry Division, the 101st
Airborne Division, the 7th Cavalry Regiment, and the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force.
The U.S. Navy is sending two aircraft carrier battle groups back to their home station,
leaving three in the region. The Air Force is recalling some of the 15 air wings in
the region, and strategic bombers are operating from the British airbase at Diego
Garcia, and airbases in the Middle East, Europe , and the United States. (See CRS
Report RL31763, Iraq: A Summary of U.S. Forces.) The United Kingdom deployed
an task force of approximately 47,000 troops. Australia deployed 2,000 troops, and
200 Polish special operations forces are also engaged. Key arrangements for the use
of regional military facilities are in place with Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, and Oman.
Saudi Arabia is permitting limited overflight rights and use of air command centers,
and Turkey has granted limited overflight rights and permission for humanitarian aid
transit. (See CRS Report RL31843, Iraq Foreign Stances Toward US. Policy).
The Administration submitted a $62.6 billion FY2003 DOD supplemental
appropriation request for military operations. The House and Senate have approved
the conference report (H.Rept. 108-76) to H.R. 1559 granting $62.37 billion of the
request.
This report will be updated as events warrant.

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Contents
Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Military Planning and Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Options Considered . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Combat Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Issues for Consideration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Roles and Attitudes of Other Nations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Improved U.S. Military Technology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Chemical and Biological Weapons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Post-War Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Costs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

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Iraq: U.S. Military Operations
Background
Iraq’s chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons programs, together with Iraqi
long-range missile development, and support for terrorism are the primary
justifications put forward by the Bush Administration for military action. Since Iraq
originally ended cooperation with U.N. inspectors in 1998, there has been little
information on the state of Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction (WMD) arsenal;
however, Administration officials are convinced that Iraq has reconstituted
significant capabilities. Initially, leading Administration officials, most notably Vice-
President Cheney, Defense Secretary Rumsfeld, and his Deputy Paul Wolfowitz,
stressed that “regime change” or the removal of Saddam Hussein from power. Later
in 2002, WMD disarmament was emphasized as the primary objective. Expanding
on this theme, President Bush, in his speech before the United Nations on September
12, 2002 specified the following conditions for Iraq to meet to forestall military
action against it:
! Immediately and unconditionally forswear, disclose, and remove or
destroy all weapons of mass destruction, long-range missiles, and all
related material.
! End all support for terrorism and act to suppress it.
! Cease persecution of its civilian population.
! Release or account for all Gulf War missing personnel.
! End all illicit trade outside the oil-for-food program and allow
United Nations administration of its funds.1
On March 17, 2003 President Bush issued an ultimatum demanding that
Saddam Hussein and his sons depart from Iraq within 48 hours. On March 19,
offensive operations commenced with air strikes against Iraqi leadership positions.
Military Planning and Operations
The Department of Defense officially released limited official information
concerning war planning or preparations against Iraq prior to the onset of offensive
operations. There were, however, frequent and significant news leaks which
provided a range of details. News reports indicated that the military options that
were under discussion varied significantly in their assumptions regarding Iraq
military capabilities, the usefulness of Iraqi opposition groups, the attitude of regional
governments, and the U.S. military resources that would be required.
1 President Bush’s Address to the U.N. General Assembly, September 12, 2002.

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Options Considered
In the wake of the successful operations in Afghanistan against the Taliban,
some Administration officials advocated a similar operation, entailing use of special
operations forces in cooperation with indigenous Iraqi opposition forces, coupled
with an extensive air offensive to destroy Hussein’s most reliable Republican Guard
units, command & control centers, and WMD capabilities. This approach assumed
that the regular Iraqi army would prove unreliable, and could even join opposition
forces once it is clear that defeat is imminent. To encourage this, significant emphasis
would be placed on an intensive psychological warfare or “psyops” campaign to
undermine the morale of Iraqi soldiers and unit commanders, persuading them of the
hopelessness of resistance.2
While having the advantage of not requiring large staging areas (though some
regional air basing would be required) or months to prepare, this was generally
considered the riskiest approach. The weakness of Iraqi opposition military forces
and their competing political agendas place their effectiveness in question, and
predicting the behavior of regular Iraqi Army units under attack is problematic. This
option also did not address the possibility of stiff resistance by Republican Guard
units in the environs of Baghdad, nor the troop requirements of a post-conflict
occupation.
This “lite” option stood in contrast to the operations plan originally offered by
U.S. Central Command. This option, often called the “Franks Plan”, after Army Gen.
Tommy Franks, the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) commander who first
briefed it to the President, calls for a large-scale ground force invasion. News
reports initially indicated, however, that this “heavy” approach did not receive the
support of the DOD civilian leadership or White House advisors. Questions over the
reliability of the regional support that would be necessary for staging areas and the
length of time required for deployment were the major concerns.3 However, the
White House rejection of the “Franks Plan” came prior to the decision to take the Iraq
issue to the United Nations Security Council. When it became clear that Security
Council deliberations and the re-introduction of U.N. inspectors to Iraq could delay
the possibility of military action for several months, it was apparently decided that
this interlude would allow time both to negotiate regional cooperation and to deploy
more substantial forces to the Persian Gulf region, and military operations today
appear to adhere closer to CENTCOM’s original recommendations. As the ground
force offensive has slowed, however, there is now increasing criticism of DOD’s
civilian leadership for not permitting the deployment of even more ground forces
prior to onset of operations.4
2 “Timing, Tactics on Iraq War Disputed; Top Bush Officials Criticize Generals'
Conventional Views “, Washington Post, August 1, 2002. p. 1
3 “The Iraq Build-up, II”, National Journal, October 5, 2002. p. 2866.
4 “Rumsfeld’s Role as War Strategist Under Scrutiny”, Reuters, March 30, 2003.

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Combat Operations
Offensive operations combined an air offensive and simultaneous ground
offensive, in contrast to the 1991 campaign which saw weeks of air attacks to soften
Iraqi resistance. U.S. Central Command’s operational plan employed a smaller
ground force than the 1991 Desert Storm operation, reflecting an assessment that
Iraqi armed forces were neither as numerous nor as capable as they were ten years
ago, and that U.S. forces are significantly more capable. This option depended upon
the continued cooperation of regional nations for substantial staging areas/airbases
and required months to deploy the necessary forces.
Though press reports differ somewhat, it appears that over 340,000 U.S. military
personnel are in the Persian Gulf region (ashore and afloat) and more en route. The
3rd Mechanized Infantry Division, the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) , the 7th
Cavalry Regiment, and the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force formed the bulk of the
U.S. ground offensive. The 4th Mechanized Infantry Division arrived late in theater.
Ships bearing its equipment remained off Turkey for weeks awaiting the outcome of
negotiations to permit establishing a northern front attacking from Turkey, and then
were diverted to the Persian Gulf when these negotiations fell through. The 1st
Cavalry Division, 1st Armored Division, and 1st Mechanized Infantry Division were
all alerted for deployment, but reportedly most elements of these divisions remained
at home bases in Europe and the United States. Some aviation and armor elements
of the 1st Air Cavalry and 1st Armored Division were, however, deployed The U.S.
Navy deployed five of its twelve naval aircraft carrier battle groups, and has now
ordered two of these to return to home stations. The Air Force had approximately
15 air wings operating in the region, but many of these aircraft have returned to home
bases. Strategic bombers operated from the British airbase at Diego Garcia, and
airbases in the Middle East, Europe , and the United States. The United Kingdom
deployed over 47,000 personnel, including a naval task force, an armored task force,
a Royal Marine brigade, a parachute brigade, a Special Air Service regiment, and a
Special Boat Squadron. The majority of these British forces are engaged in
southeastern Iraq, securing the Umm Qasr and Basra region. Australia deployed
approximately 2,000 personnel, primarily special operations personnel , and one F/A-
18 attack aircraft squadron, most of whom have now returned to Australia. Poland
has 200 special operations troops around Basra. (For more detailed information, see
CRS Report RL31763, Iraq: A Summary of U.S. Forces and CRS Report RL31843,
Iraq Foreign Stances Toward US. Policy)
The invasion of Iraq was expected to begin with a 72-96 hour air offensive to
paralyze the Iraqi command structure, and demoralize Iraqi resistance across the
military-civilian spectrum. Intelligence reports indicating the possibility of striking
Saddam Hussein and his immediate circle led to an acceleration of the operations
plan, and an almost simultaneously onset of air and ground offensive operations.
CENTCOM air commanders have stressed that significant efforts would be made to
minimize civilian casualties and damage to Iraqi physical infrastructure.
With twenty-five days of offensive operations, coalition forces had relative
control of all major Iraqi cities, including Baghdad, Basra, Mosul, Kirkuk, and Tikrit.
The Iraqi political and military leadership had disintegrated, although the

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whereabouts of many senior leaders, including Saddam Hussein, remain unknown.
CENTCOM pursued a strategy of rapid advance, by-passing urban centers
when possible, pausing only when encountering Iraqi resistance. CENTCOM
spokesmen characterized Iraqi resistance as sporadic and uncohesive. Oilfields and
port facilities throughout Iraq have been secured, as have all major air bases in Iraq.
Though a few oil wells were set afire, all were quelled, and there has been no
widespread environmental sabotage. Allied forces did not encounter the mass
surrenders characteristic of the 1991 campaign, however DOD reported that over
6,000 Iraqis were taken prisoner, and believes that many more have simply deserted
their positions. Iraqi paramilitary forces, particularly the Saddam Fedayeen, engaged
in guerrilla-style attacks from urban centers in the rear areas, but did not inflict
significant damage. Nevertheless, greater attention than anticipated had to be paid
to protecting extended supply lines, and securing these urban centers, particularly
around an-Nasiriyah and Najaf, and in the British sector around Umm Qasr and
Basra. The anticipated support for the invasion from the Shiia population in southern
Iraq was slow in developing, but greater cooperation is forthcoming, despite some
outbreaks of factional fighting.
Though CENTCOM commanders expressed confidence in the adequacy of
their force structure in theater, the Iraqi attacks in rear areas and the length of the
supply lines to forward units led some to suggest that insufficient ground forces were
in place to continue the offensive while securing rear areas and ensuring
uninterrupted logistical support. These critics faulted DOD civilian leadership for
overestimating the effectiveness of a precision air offensive and curtailing the
deployment of more ground troops, suggesting that an ideological commitment to
smaller ground forces and greater reliance on high-tech weaponry had dominated
military planning.5 With collapse of the Iraqi regime, however, this criticism has
muted, and the CENTCOM operations plan appears vindicated.
Without permission to use Turkish territory, CENTCOM was unable to carry
out an early ground offensive in Northern Iraq. However, Special operations forces,
the 173rd Airborne Brigade, and air-lifted U.S. armor, operating with Kurdish
irregulars seized Mosul, Kirkuk, and Tikrit. Cooperation with Kurdish militias in the
north has been excellent. Even a mistaken airstrike against a allied Kurdish vehicle
convoy, killing or wounding senior Kurdish leaders, has not adversely affected this
cooperation. Potentially complicating the situation in the north, was a Turkish desire
to possibly augment the 8,000+ troops it has had stationed in Kurdish-held territory
in order to block possible Kurdish refugees and influence the accommodations made
to the Kurds in a post-conflict Iraq. Turkish miliary spokesmen have indicated that
no additional Turkish forces will move into Iraq at this time. The U.S. has assured
Turkey that the Kurdish forces involved in seizing Mosul and Kirkuk will be
withdrawn and replaced with U.S. troops.
5 “Questions Raised About Invasion Force”, Washington Post, March 25, 2003. p. 17

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CENTCOM headquarters reported that intelligence sources indicated authority
for the use of chemical and biological weapons was issued to Iraqi regional
subordinate commanders.6 CENTCOM headquarters consequently believed that the
possibility of CB weapons use would increase as coalition forces moved closer to
Baghdad, but it never materialized. Indeed, the failure to find any confirmed CB
weapons caches has led to questions about the existence of the suspected Iraqi CB
arsenal.
Issues for Consideration
Roles and Attitudes of Other Nations7
The State Department has identified those nations whom it characterizes as
having “agreed to be part of the coalition for the immediate disarmament of Iraq”.
The list includes those contributing combat units (noted above), those offering basing
or overflight rights, and those who simply “ want to be publically associated with
efforts to disarm Iraq” – Afghanistan, Albania, Angola, Australia, Azerbaijan,
Bulgaria, Colombia, Costa Rica, Czech Republic, Denmark, Dominican Republic,
El Salvador, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Georgia, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Italy,
Japan (post conflict),Korea, Kuwait, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Marshall Islands,
Micronesia, Mongolia, Netherlands, Nicaragua, Palau, Panama, Philippines, Poland,
Portugal, Romania, Rwanda, Singapore, Slovakia, Solomon Islands, South Korea,
Spain, Tonga, Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine, United Kingdom, and Uzbekistan. In
addition to the countries listed, the State Department stated that there are 15 countries
who have requested their support of military operations not be made public.8
The fluctuating international political environment regarding cooperation with
U.S. offensive operations against Iraq confronted military planners with complex
challenges. It has been suggested that some nations’ public opposition to military
action against Iraq does not reflect the nature of “private” diplomatic conversations
which indicated a greater willingness to support U.S. policy. If true, this may have
resulted in unacknowledged or covert assistance, or perhaps more overt cooperation
after a U.S. victory became assured.
Saudi Arabia, a previous opponent of military action, is permitting use of the
U.S. air command center located on its territory, and the use of other air force
facilities for non-strike aircraft (e.g., aerial tankers, search and rescue). After
malfunctioning cruise missiles from U.S. ships operating in the Mediterranean landed
in Saudi Arabian, the Saudi government limited overflight rights.
Concerned that U.S. facilities in Saudi Arabia would not be available for full
operations against Iraq, the United States established defense agreements, and
expanded or upgraded airbase and logistics facilities in Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman,
6 “Lightening Strikes, Then March to Baghdad”, Washington Times, March 18, 2003.
7 See also, CRS Report RL31843, Iraq Foreign Stances Toward US. Policy
8 Department of State, “Excerpt: Boucher Announces Coalition for Immediate Disarmament
of Iraq”, Washington File, March 18, 2003.

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Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates – countries whose support of U.S. policy in the
region is judged the most reliable.9 Each of these countries permitted use of airbases
to support U.S. military operations in Afghanistan, while Saudi Arabia allowed only
the use of the air operations command center on its territory. The Department of
Defense has announced its intention to move its air operations center from Saudi
Arabia to newly constructed facilities located in Qatar. Given the range of facilities
and prepositioned U.S. equipment in these countries, their continued cooperation will
be crucial to the military operations in Iraq. The extent of cooperation from these
nations was thought to probably greatly depend upon the results of U.N. arms
inspections and the further approval of the U.N. Security Council. However, since
the onset of conflict, there has been no diminution of support for U.S. operations.
The United States and Bahrain have a defense cooperation agreement regarding
prepositioning war materiel. The U.S. Navy 5th Fleet headquarters is in Bahrain, and
the Air Force currently has use of Bahrain’s Shaikh airbase. Since the Gulf War, the
United States has maintained a troop presence in Kuwait and it is serving as the main
staging area for coalition ground forces. The U.S. Air Force has use of two Kuwaiti
airfields – Ali al Salem and Ali al-Jabiru. In Oman, through a cooperative
agreement, the Air Force has access to four airbases – al-Musnanah, Masirah, Seeb,
and Thumrait – which it has been upgrading to handle a full range of air operations.
Qatar has developed a very close cooperative defense relationship with the United
States, permitting the prepositioning of enough equipment for three U.S. Army
brigades and the construction of an operations command center at al-Udaid airbase
comparable to that located at Prince Sultan airbase in Saudi Arabia. This facility has
been extensively used to support operations in Afghanistan, and Central Command
Headquarters deployed there in mid-September, 2002. In the United Arab Emirates,
the U.S. Navy has access to port facilities and the Air Force is using the al-Dhafra
airbase. 10
The attitude of the Turkish government towards U.S. military action against Iraq
was a very important consideration for U.S. military planners. The Turkish
parliament’s rejection of a proposal allowing U.S. ground troops to operate from
Turkey delivered a setback to CENTCOM planners, though CENTCOM spokesmen
downplayed the impact of the Turkish decision upon their prospects for a successful
operation.11 Turkey granted only overflight rights, and would not permit basing or
offensive operations from its soil. As noted, the 4th Mechanized Infantry Division,
originally intended to attack from Turkey, was diverted to Kuwait as follow-on
support for post-conflict operations. There have been press reports, however, that
Turkey has did facilitate U.S. upgrading of airfields located inside northern Iraq.
Aside from permitting air operations from Incirlik and other bases, Turkish
cooperation would also have provided an easier approach for a northern front for U.S.
ground operations. Northern operations, though proceeding more slowly than would
9 For further information, see CRS Report RL31533, Persian Gulf: Issues for U.S. Policy,
2003.
1 0 “ C u r r e n t U . S . O r d e r o f B a t t l e ” , G l o b a l S e c u r i t y . O r g
[http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/iraq_orbat_030120.htm]
11 “General Dismisses Rebuff by Turkey”, Washington Post, March 4, 2003, p. 1

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have been the case with Turkish cooperation, have gone well. The major cities and
oilfields are under coalition control and, after extended bombardment of Iraqi
defensive positions, were seized without significant resistance.
Improved U.S. Military Technology
Significant technological advancements, particularly in precision-guided
munitions, led DOD spokesmen to emphasize that the air campaign against Iraq will
be considerably more efficient and more militarily devastating than Operation Desert
Storm. In 1991 only ten percent of the aerial munitions used were precision-guided.
That ratio was almost reversed in this air campaign. This allowed a greater number
of targets to be destroyed far more rapidly, using fewer aircraft and with less
collateral damage. The greater availability of precision-guided munitions (PGMs)
worked well for attacks against stationary targets, and moving targets in open terrain.
There was some question raised about the level of PGM inventories after the
Afghanistan campaign, but stockpiles remained adequate for operations against
Iraq.12 Major improvements have also been achieved in the ability of the intelligence
community to communicate targeting information directly to combat platforms (e.g.
attack aircraft, missile launchers) in almost real time. This greatly enhanced the
value of PGMs, providing them with critical targeting data when the information is
most useful. Military operations in an urban environment were anticipated to limit
the effectiveness of air power and armor units, however the relatively open
configuration of Iraqi cities permitted quite effective use of these systems. Rules of
target engagement and avoidance of “friendly fire” casualties remained prime
concerns throughout the campaign.
U.S. military planners paid particular attention to the problem of Iraqi missiles.
In 1991, the allied coalition was unable to locate and destroy any SCUD mobile
launchers, and U.S. intelligence believes that Iraq still possesses at least 24 missiles,
some possibly armed with chemical or biological warheads. Using new equipment,
such as the Tactical Airborne Warning System (TAWS) and the PAC-3 air defense
missiles, DOD greatly reduced the time from missile launch detection to intercept,
improving the chance of both destroying the launched missile and the missile
launcher. Improvements in satellite reconnaissance, communications, and unmanned
aerial vehicles now available to ground commanders are also seen as major advances
over Desert Storm capabilities. The PAC-3 air defense system worked well in
Kuwait in intercepting the few Iraqi missiles which threatened populated areas,
though it has also downed a British fighter aircraft in a “friendly fire” incident.
Though initial reports indicated some of the Iraqi missiles were the prohibited
SCUDs, this identification was later retracted.
Chemical and Biological Weapons. The Bush Administration believed
that Iraq retained chemical and biological stockpiles from before the Persian Gulf
War, and continued covert CBW development and/or production since. Some CBW
facilities that were destroyed during the Persian Gulf War were been re-built. Iraq
is known to have produced blister agents (“mustard gas”) and both persistent and
12 “The Tools Of War Expecting a rerun of Gulf War I? Think again, thanks to high tech and
smart bombs”, Time, October 21, 2002.

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non-persistent nerve agents (VX and Sarin). Biological agents produced include
anthrax, aflatoxin, and the toxin agents botulinum and ricin. Though unconfirmed,
it is possible that Iraq may also possess the smallpox virus cultured from natural
outbreaks of the disease in Iraq prior to its world-wide eradication in the early 1970s.
Iraq is known to have developed a variety of means to disseminate CBW, including
bombs, artillery shells, missile warheads, mines, and aerial sprayers for both manned
and unmanned aircraft. 13 Though Iraq did not use CBW in the Persian Gulf War,
many believed that Saddam Hussein’s restraint in this regard would be not repeated.
This view was based on the assumption that, given that the U.S. objective would now
be the destruction of his regime rather than the more limited objectives in the Persian
Gulf War, Hussein would have “nothing to lose” by their employment.
As events turned out, there was no use of CB weapons, and no CBW stockpiles
have been discovered. Given that operational planning called for suspected CBW
sites to be among the first objectives to be seized or neutralized, the apparent failure
to find any of these weapons, though certainly heartening to combat commanders, has
led to questions about the Administration’s assertions of Iraq’s CBW capabilities.
CENTCOM spokesmen have indicated that more extensive searches for these
weapons will take place over time.14
Though perhaps better prepared than any other military to deal with CB
warfare, U.S. forces have not actually encountered the use of CB weapons since
World War I. U.S. commanders had to ensure adequate supplies of protective and
decontamination equipment for an invasion force, and may again be eventually
confronted with the possibly problematic issue of vaccinations and prophylactic
pharmaceuticals that has led to the “Gulf War illnesses” controversy. Indicative of
this latter problem, even though production of anthrax vaccine has been restored,
DOD has still not re-instated its service-wide vaccination policy. This concern may
be compounded with the smallpox vaccine. To date, however, no controversy has
developed, despite the vaccination of all troops deployed the Persian Gulf.
In October 2002, the General Accounting Office reiterated its concerns over
“serious problems” in the adequacy of the armed forces CBW training, availability
of specialist personnel, and defensive equipment inventories 15 Given that chemical
and biological weapons were not used in the conflict, the adequacy of training and
specialist personnel were not tested. With regard to GAO’s concerns over CBW suit
defects, DOD spokesmen have noted that troops deployed to the Persian Gulf have
all been issued the newly-designed Joint Service Lightweight Integrated Suit
13 Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction: A Net Assessment. Center for International and
Strategic Studies. September 2002.
Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction Programs. Central Intelligence Agency. October
2002.
14 CENTCOM Press Briefing , March 25, 2002
15 General Accounting Office. Chemical and Biological Defense: Observations on DOD's
Risk Assessment of Defense Capabilities GAO-03-137T, October 1, 2002

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Technology (JSLIT), which does not have the manufacturing defects detected in
some of the older Battle Dress Overgarment.16
Post-War Requirements
With the onset of widespread looting and the breakdown of public services
(electricity, water) in the cities, coalition forces were confronted with the challenges
of restoring public order and infrastructure even before combat operations have
ceased. Though U.S. forces have come under some criticism for not having done
more to prevent looting, the transition from combat to police roles is a difficult one,
particularly when an important objective is winning popular support. Harsh reactions
risk alienation of the population, yet inaction reduces confidence in the ability of
coalition forces to maintain order. Indicative of the seriousness of the civil disorder,
U.S. officials in Iraq have authorized U.S. troops to shoot looters if necessary.17 In
addition to looting, coalition forces also have to ensure that factional violence and
retribution against former government supporters do not derail stabilization efforts.
CENTCOM headquarters intends to “greatly increase” the number of troops
patrolling Iraqi cities.18 U.S. forces, however, are spread relatively thin throughout
Iraq, it is clear that additional troops in theater could improve the pace and breadth
of stabilization operations. The question of how many military personnel will be
required for stabilization operations has been a subject of controversy since well
before the onset of operations. This controversy reflects the great difficulty in
predicting how the political and military situation in post-war Iraq will evolve, and
how long a. military presence would be required before an acceptable and stable Iraqi
government could be established.
The attitude of the Iraq population is the key element, and will depend upon a
variety of factors, such as the nature and extent of war damage, the demands of ethnic
and religious minorities, and the speed with which a credible government can be
established. Though a short-term post-war occupation may be a possibility, given
that so far the Iraqi population has not demonstrated an unqualified acceptance of
coalition forces, it is possible that a continued deployment of substantial military
ground force will be necessary for several years. For comparison, in the relatively
benign environment and considerably smaller areas of Bosnia and Kosovo, after eight
years of peacekeeping operations, NATO still maintains a deployment of about
60,000 troops.
In testimony before the House Armed Services Committee on September 18,
2002 Defense Secretary Rumsfeld declined to speculate upon what might be the
military requirements for the United States in post-war Iraq, assuming Saddam
Hussein’s ouster. On February 25, 2003, testifying before the Senate Armed
Services Committee, Army Chief of Staff. General Eric Shinseki expressed the
16 “U.S. Troops’ Chemical Suits Do Not Leak, Army Insists”, Washington Post, March 4,
2003. Department of Defense Press Briefing, March 3, 2003.
17 “U.S. Military Chief Vows More Troops to Quell Iraqi Looting”, New York Times, May
15. p. 21.
18 Ibid.

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opinion that up to “several hundred thousand” troops could be required to maintain
an occupation of Iraq. This estimate was almost immediately dismissed by DOD’s
civilian leadership.19 Currently, there are about 158,000 coalition ground troops in
Iraq. Their commander, Lt. Gen. McKiernan, has acknowledged that is an
insufficient number to secure the entire country.20 Not only the number of troops, but
also the type is of critical importance. The vast majority of coalition forces are
combat troops, but there is general agreement that military police or constabulary-
type forces (e.g. the Italian Carabinieri, or Spanish Guarda Civil) are better suited to
stabilization operations. However, as the Army’s Deputy Chief of Staff testified
before the House Armed Services Committee, there is now a DOD-wide shortage of
military police personnel, given the heightened security environment since the
September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. Nevertheless, about 8,000 MP’s are being
deployed to Iraq.21
The Bush Administration is seeking to recruit other nations to supply troops for
stabilization operations in Iraq, but there has been a limited number of responses. On
May 3, Secretary Rumsfeld announced that 10 nations will contribute forces to
stabilization operations in Iraq. Poland, which may assume command of operations
in northern Iraq, plans to deploy about 1,500 troops, contingent upon U.S. financing
their support. Spain intends to send 1,500 troops, but will prohibit their participation
in any combat operations. Honduras and Nicaragua will contribute to the Spanish
deployment, if reimbursed for the costs. Italy will send about 1,500 army and
carabinieri personnel, and Denmark is deploying approximately 380 troops. Ukraine
has agreed to send a battalion to assist in the search for chemical and biological
weapons. Both Bulgaria and Romania are contributing about 500 personnel apiece.
Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia may also contribute small units to stabilization
operations.
Costs22
Predicting the cost of military operations is a task that DOD did not undertake
prior to the peace-keeping deployments to the Balkans, and it remains a highly
conjectural exercise. Methodologies tend to be relatively crude and based upon
historical experience, i.e. “the last war”. Though initially Secretary Rumsfeld
expressed his opinion that “it is unknowable what a war or conflict like that would
cost”, in early 2003 he estimated a cost of under $50 billion. Other DOD officials
anticipated an $80-85 billion cost, assuming a 6-month follow-on occupation.23
19 Secretary Rumsfeld, Defense Press Briefing, February 28, 2003.
20 “Baghdad Anarchy Spurs Call for Help”, Washington Post, May 13, 2003. p. 1
21 “Shortage of MPs Complicates Iraq Occupation”, Newhouse.com ., May 12, 2003.
22 For greater detail on cost estimates, see CRS Report RL31715, Iraq War: Background
Issues and Overview. Updated periodically.
23 “War Could Cost More Than $40 billion”, Knight-Ridder Wire Service, September 18,
2002; “Iraq War Costs Could Soar, Pentagon Says”, Los Angeles Times, February 26, 2003.

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CRS-11
On March 25, 2003 The Administration submitted a $74.7 billion FY2003
supplemental appropriations request, of which $62.6 billion was for Department of
Defense expenses related to the war in Iraq through September 2003. Specifically,
this request includes funds for preparatory costs incurred, costs associated with
military operations, replenishing munitions, and funds to support other nations. The
Administration stated that this supplemental request was “built on the key
assumption that U.S. military action in Iraq will be swift and decisive.”24 Both the
House and Senate have approved the legislative conference report to H.R. 1559
(H.Rept. 108-76), which provides $62.37 billion.
Michael O’Hanlon of the Brookings Institution, pegged a 250,000-strong
invasion at between $40-$50 billion with a follow-up occupation costing $10-$20
billion a year. Former White House economic advisor Lawrence Lindsay estimated
the high limit on the cost to be 1-2% of GNP, or about $100-$200 billion. Mitch
Daniels, Director of the Office of Management and Budget subsequently discounted
this estimate as “very, very high”, and stated that the costs would be between$50-$60
billion, though no specific supporting figures were provided for the estimate.25 In
its most recent cost estimate, the Congressional Budget Office put deployment costs
at about $14 billion, with combat operations costing $10 billion for the first month
and $8 billion a month thereafter. CBO cited the cost of returning combat forces to
home bases at $9 billion, and the costs of continued occupation of Iraq to run
between $1-4 billion.26
The American Academy of Arts and Sciences has published a much more wide-
ranging report which covers the possibility of an extended occupation, in addition to
potential long-term economic consequences and concludes that potential costs could
range from $99 billion to $1.2 trillion.27 For comparison, the cost to the United
States of the Persian Gulf War in 1990-91 was approximately $60 billion, and almost
all of this cost was offset by international financial contributions.
24 Office of Management and Budget, Press Release No. 2003-6, March 25, 2002.
25 Bumiller, Elisabeth. “Budget Director Lowers Estimate of Cost of War”, New York
Times, December 31, 2002. p. 1
26 Congressional Budget Office. An Analysis of the President’s Budgetary Proposals for
Fiscal Year 2004: An Interim Report. March 2003
27 War with Iraq: Costs, Consequences, and Alternatives. American Academy of Arts and
Sciences. Dec. 2002. [http://www.amacad.org/publications/monographs/Iraq_Press.pdf]

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