Order Code IB94041
CRS Issue Brief for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
Pakistan-U.S. Relations
Updated May 6, 2003
K. Alan Kronstadt
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

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CONTENTS
SUMMARY
MOST RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS
Historical Background
Pakistan-India Rivalry
The China Factor
Pakistan Political Setting
Recent Developments
Background
Pakistan-U.S. Relations and Key Country Issues
Security
Nuclear Weapons and Missile Proliferation
U.S. Nonproliferation Efforts
Kashmir Dispute
Pakistan-U.S. Security Cooperation
Democratization and Human Rights
Democratization Efforts
Human Rights Problems
Economic Issues
Overview
Trade Issues
Narcotics
Terrorism
U.S. Aid and Congressional Action
CHRONOLOGY

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Pakistan-U.S. Relations
SUMMARY
Major areas of U.S. concern regarding
Separatist violence in the disputed Kash-
Pakistan include regional terrorism; weapons
mir region continues unabated. India blames
proliferation; the ongoing Kashmir dispute
Pakistan for the ongoing infiltration of Islamic
and Pakistan-India tensions; human rights
militants into Indian Kashmir, a charge
protection; and economic development. A
Islamabad denies. The United States received
U.S.-Pakistan relationship marked by distance
a June 2002 pledge from Islamabad that all
and discord was transformed by the Septem-
“cross-border terrorism” will be ended, and it
ber 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States
encourages a cease-fire along the Line of
and the ensuing enlistment of Pakistan as a
Control and renewed dialogue between
key ally in U.S.-led anti-terrorism efforts. Top
Islamabad and New Delhi.
U.S. officials regularly praise Pakistan for its
ongoing cooperation, although there exist
The United States considers a stable,
renewed doubts about Islamabad’s commit-
democratic, economically thriving Pakistan as
ment to core U.S. concerns in the region.
key to U.S. interests in South and Central
Asia. Democracy has faired poorly in Pakista-
A potential Pakistan-India nuclear arms
n; the country has endured three full-scale
race continues to be the focus of U.S.
military coups and military rule for half of its
nonproliferation efforts in South Asia.
existence. In October 1999, the government
Attention to this issue intensified following
of Prime Minister Sharif was ousted in an
nuclear tests by both countries in May 1998.
extra-constitutional coup led by Army Chief
South Asia is viewed by many analysts as an
Gen. Pervez Musharraf. Musharraf has since
arena for the possible use of such weapons, as
assumed the title of President, a move
both countries have deployed nuclear-capable
ostensibly legitimized by a controversial April
ballistic missiles and institutionalized nuclear
2002 referendum. The United States strongly
command structures. India and Pakistan have
urges the Musharraf government to restore the
fought three full-scale wars since 1947.
country to civilian democratic rule. National

elections held in October 2002 resulted in no
Close Pakistan-U.S. relations began in
clear majority party emerging but were
the mid-1950s as a security arrangement
marked by significant gains for a coalition of
growing from U.S. concerns about Soviet
Islamic parties. A civilian parliament and
expansionism and Pakistan’s fear of neigh-
Prime Minister Jamali were seated in Novem-
boring India. Cooperation peaked during the
ber 2002. Congress granted the President
1979-89 Soviet occupation of Afghanistan.
authority to waive coup-related sanctions on
Pakistan-U.S. Ties weakened following the
Pakistan through FY2003.
October 1990 cutoff of most U.S. assistance to
Pakistan, assistance suspended by then-
Pakistan continues to face serious prob-
President Bush under Section 620E(e) of the
lems, including a weak economy and domestic
Foreign Assistance Act (the Pressler Amend-
terrorism. Pakistan has received more than $1
ment). Further U.S. sanctions were imposed
billion in U.S. assistance since September
on Pakistan (and India) as a result of the
2001. For more detailed discussion, see CRS
nuclear tests. Nuclear-related sanctions on
Reports RS21299, Pakistan’s Domestic Politi-
Pakistan and India have since been waived.
cal Developments, and RL31624, Pakistan-
U.S. Anti-Terrorism Cooperation.
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

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MOST RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
An April thaw in Pakistan-India relations began with Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee’s
rhetorical extension of a “hand of friendship” to Pakistan, then peaked with an April 28
telephone conversation between the two countries’ prime ministers and the announced
restoration of full diplomatic ties. U.S. Secretary of State Powell called “very, very
promising” recent signs that Pakistan and India are prepared to engage in a bilateral dialogue
aimed at resolving outstanding issues. Deputy Secretary of State Armitage and Assistant
Secretary of State for South Asia Rocca are traveling to the region in May in an effort to
assist in further easing tensions and fostering such dialogue. On April 16, President Bush
signed into law P.L. 108-11 (the Emergency Wartime Supplemental Appropriations Act,
2003), allocating $200 million in additional security-related assistance to Pakistan for
FY2003.
President Musharraf, the Pakistani military, and the influential intelligence agency are
all said to support the current peace initiatives. Pakistan’s civilian government remains
hamstrung by an increasingly fractious dispute between the Musharraf-allied PML-Q party
and the opposition MMA Islamist coalition. At issue are Musharraf’s continued role as
Army Chief and the status of controversial constitutional amendments imposed without
parliamentary approval in August 2002. The deadlock has raised new concerns about the
viability of Pakistan’s still-fragile democratic institutions.
On April 29, Pakistani authorities arrested six Al Qaeda suspects in Karachi, including
Khallad, said to be a leading suspect in terrorists attacks against the United States. Top U.S.
officials are concerned that Al Qaeda and pro-Taliban forces remain active near the
Afghanistan-Pakistan border, stating that Afghani stability is a key U.S. interest and
requesting that Pakistan “do more” to halt the “infiltration” of these operatives across the
frontier. While militant infiltration across the Kashmiri Line of Control appears to have been
static during April, separatist violence in the region continued unabated, and the spring thaw
may lead to an increase in such activity.
For more information, see Chronology, below.
BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS
Historical Background
The long and checkered Pakistan-U.S. relationship has its roots in the Cold War and
South Asia regional politics of the 1950s. U.S. concerns about Soviet expansionism and
Pakistan’s desire for security assistance against a perceived threat from India prompted the
two countries to negotiate a mutual defense assistance agreement in 1954. By the end of
1955, Pakistan had further aligned itself with the West by joining two regional defense pacts,
the South East Asia Treaty Organization and the Central Treaty Organization. As a result
of these alliances, and a 1959 U.S.-Pakistan cooperation agreement, Islamabad received $508
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million in U.S. military assistance from 1953 to 1961. Total U.S. economic and military
assistance to Pakistan between 1947 and 2000 totaled nearly $11.8 billion.
Differing expectations of the security relationship have long bedeviled bilateral ties.
During the Indo-Pakistani wars of 1965 and 1971, the United States suspended military
assistance to both sides, resulting in a cooling of the Pakistan-U.S. relationship. In the
mid-1970s, new strains arose over Pakistan’s apparent efforts to respond to India’s 1974
underground test of a nuclear device by seeking its own nuclear weapons capability. Limited
U.S. military aid was resumed in 1975, but was suspended again by the Carter
Administration in April 1979 in response to Pakistan’s covert construction of a uranium
enrichment facility. Following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979,
Pakistan was again viewed as a frontline state in the effort to block Soviet expansionism.
In September 1981, the Reagan Administration negotiated a $3.2 billion, 5-year economic
and military aid package with Islamabad. Pakistan became a key transit country for arms
supplies to the Afghan resistance, as well as a camp for some three million Afghan refugees,
many of whom have yet to return home.
Despite the renewal of U.S. aid and close security ties, many in Congress remained
concerned about Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program. Concern was based in part on
evidence of U.S. export control violations that suggested a crash Pakistani program to
acquire a nuclear capability. In 1985, Section 620E(e) (the “Pressler amendment”) was
added to the Foreign Assistance Act, requiring the President to certify to Congress that
Pakistan does not possess a nuclear explosive device during the fiscal year for which aid is
to be provided. This amendment represented a compromise between those in Congress who
thought that aid to Pakistan should be cut off because of evidence that it was continuing to
develop its nuclear option and those who favored continued support for Pakistan’s role in
opposing Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. A $4 billion, six-year aid package for Pakistan
was signed in 1986.
With Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan beginning in May 1988, Pakistan’s nuclear
activities again came under closer U.S. scrutiny, and in October 1990 President Bush
suspended aid to Pakistan. Under the provisions of the Pressler amendment, most economic
and all military aid to Pakistan was stopped and deliveries of major military equipment
suspended. Narcotics assistance of $3-5 million annually was exempted from the aid cutoff.
In 1992, Congress partially relaxed the scope of the aid cutoff to allow for P.L.480 food
assistance and continuing support for nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). One of the
most serious results of the aid cutoff for Pakistan was the nondelivery of some 71 F-16
fighter aircraft ordered by Pakistan in 1989. In December 1998, the United States agreed to
pay Pakistan $324.6 million from the Judgment Fund of the U.S. Treasury — a fund used to
settle legal disputes that involve the U.S. government — as well as provide Pakistan with
$140 million in goods, including agricultural commodities.
Pakistan-India Rivalry
Three wars — in 1947-48, 1965, and 1971 — and a constant state of military
preparedness on both sides of the border have marked the half-century of bitter rivalry
between India and Pakistan. The acrimonious nature of the partition of British India into two
successor states in 1947 and the continuing dispute over Kashmir have been major sources
of tension. Both Pakistan and India have built large defense establishments at the cost of
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economic and social development. The Kashmir problem is rooted in claims by both
countries to the former princely state, divided since 1948 by a military line of control into
the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir and Pakistan-held Azad (Free) Kashmir. India
blames Pakistan for supporting a violent separatist rebellion in the Muslim-dominated
Kashmir Valley that has claimed more than 60,000 lives since 1989. Pakistan admits only
to lending moral and political support to the rebellion (for further discussion see below).
The China Factor
India and China fought a brief border war in 1962, and an oftentimes tense border
dispute remains unresolved. A strategic rivalry also exists between these two large nations.
Pakistan and China, on the other hand, have enjoyed a generally close and mutually
beneficial relationship over recent decades. Pakistan served as a link between Beijing and
Washington in 1971, as well as a bridge to the Muslim world for China during the 1980s.
China’s continuing role as a major arms supplier for Pakistan began in the 1960s, and
included helping to build a number of arms factories in Pakistan, as well as supplying
complete weapons systems. In 1990, China agreed to supply Pakistan with components for
M-11 surface-to-surface missiles, which brought warnings from the United States. Although
it is not a member of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), China repeatedly has
agreed to abide by the restrictions of the regime. In 1993, the United States determined that
China had transferred to Pakistan prohibited missile technology and imposed trade sanctions
on one Pakistani and 11 Chinese entities (government ministries and aerospace companies)
for 2 years. The U.S. intelligence community reportedly has evidence of PRC provision of
complete M-11 ballistic missiles to Pakistan. In 1996, leaked U.S. intelligence reports
alleged that in 1995 China sold ring magnets to Pakistan that could be used in enriching
uranium for nuclear weapons. Pakistan denied the reports (see CRS Report RL31555, China
and Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and Missiles: Policy Issues).
Pakistan Political Setting
Recent Developments. Gen. Musharraf’s April 2002 assumption of the title of
President ostensibly was legitimized by a controversial referendum that many observers
claimed was marked by “excessive fraud and coercion.” In August, the Musharraf
government announced sweeping changes in the Pakistani constitution under a “Legal
Framework Order” (LFO). These changes provide the office of President and the armed
forces powers not previously available in the country’s constitutional history, including
provisions for Presidential dissolution of the National Assembly and appointment of the
Army Chief and provincial governors, among others. The United States expressed concerns
that the changes “could make it more difficult to build strong, democratic institutions in
Pakistan.”
In October 2002, the country held its first national elections since 1997, thus fulfilling
in a limited fashion Musharraf’s promise to restore the National Assembly that was dissolved
in the wake of his extra-constitutional seizure of power in October 1999. Opposition parties
contesting the elections — along with Pakistani rights groups and European Union observers
— complained that the exercise was “deeply flawed” and that the military government’s pre-
poll machinations skewed the results. No party won a majority of parliamentary seats,
though a pro-Musharraf alliance won a plurality while a coalition of Islamist parties made
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a surprisingly strong showing. Low turnout rates caused many to identify significant levels
of voter apathy affecting Pakistan’s electoral politics.
In an unexpected outcome of the October elections, the United Action Forum (known
as MMA in its Urdu-language acronym), a coalition of six Islamic parties, won 68 seats —
about 20% of the total — in the national assembly and now controls the provincial assembly
in the North West Frontier Province (NWFP) and leads the coalition ruling the Baluchistan
assembly. These provinces are Pashtun-majority regions that border Afghanistan and where
important U.S. anti-terror operations are ongoing. This result has led to concerns that a
major shift in Pakistan’s foreign policy may be in the offing, most especially with growing
anti-American sentiments and renewed indications of the “Talibanization” of western border
regions.
In November 2002, the new National Assembly chose Musharraf supporter and former
Baluchistan Chief Minister Mir Zafarullah Jamali to serve as Pakistan’s Prime Minster.
Jamali’s coalition later won a required vote of confidence. February 2003 senate elections
gave the PML-Q-led coalition a simple majority in that 100-seat body. Most analysts believe
that the current pro-Musharraf coalition, while fragile and potentially unstable, likely will
mean continuity in Islamabad’s economic and foreign policy orientations. As of May 2003,
the civilian government has remained hamstrung by a fractious dispute over Musharraf’s
continued role as Army Chief and the legality of the LFO amendments to the constitution.
Background. Military regimes have ruled Pakistan for more than half of its 55 years
of existence, interspersed with periods of generally weak civilian governance. After 1988,
Pakistan had democratically elected governments, and the army appeared to have moved
from its traditional role of “kingmaker” to one of power broker or referee. During the past
decade, Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif each served twice as prime minister. Bhutto was
elected prime minister in October 1988, following the death of military ruler Mohammad
Zia-ul Haq in a plane crash. Gen. Zia had led a coup in 1977 deposing Bhutto’s father, PM
Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, who was later executed. Despite the restoration of democratic process
to Pakistan, the succeeding years were marred by political instability, economic problems,
and ethnic and sectarian violence. In August 1990, President Ishaq Khan dismissed Bhutto
for alleged corruption and inability to maintain law and order. The president’s power to
dismiss the prime minister derived from Eighth Amendment provisions of the Pakistan
constitution, which dated from the era of Zia’s presidency. Elections held in October 1990
brought to power Nawaz Sharif, who himself was ousted in 1993 under the Eighth
Amendment provisions. Ensuing elections returned Bhutto and the PPP to power. The new
Bhutto government faced even more serious economic problems and, according to some
observers, performance also was hampered by the reemergence of Bhutto’s husband, Asif
Ali Zardari, in a decisionmaking role. In November 1996, President Farooq Leghari
dismissed the Bhutto government for corruption and nepotism.
Nawaz Sharif’s PML won a landslide victory in the February 1997 parliamentary
elections, which were judged by international observers to be generally free and fair. Sharif
moved quickly to consolidate his power by curtailing the powers of the President and the
judiciary. In April 1997, the Parliament passed the Thirteenth Amendment to the
constitution, removing the President’s Eighth Amendment powers to dismiss the government
and to appoint armed forces chiefs and provincial governors. After replacing the chief
Justice of the Supreme Court and seeing the resignation of President Leghari — and with the
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PML in control of parliament — Sharif emerged as one of Pakistan’s strongest elected
leaders since independence. Critics accused him of further consolidating his power by
intimidating the opposition and the press. In April 1999, a two-judge Bench of the Lahore
High Court convicted former PM Bhutto and her husband of corruption and sentenced them
each to 5 years in prison, fined them $8.6 million, and disqualified them from holding public
office. Bhutto was out of the country at the time.
Pakistan-U.S. Relations and Key Country Issues
U.S. policy interests in Pakistan encompass a wide range of issues, including nuclear
weapons and missile proliferation; South Asian regional stability; democratization and
human rights; economic reform and market opening; and efforts to counter terrorism and
narcotics traffic. These concerns have been affected by several key developments in recent
years, including the cutoff of U.S. aid to Pakistan in 1990, 1998, and 1999 over nuclear and
democracy issues; a worsening Pakistan-India relationship over Kashmir since 1989 and a
continuing bilateral nuclear standoff; Pakistan’s halting attempts to develop a stable
democratic government and strong economy; and, most recently, the September 2001
terrorist attacks against the United States.
On September 13, 2001, President Musharraf — under strong U.S. diplomatic pressure
— offered President Bush Pakistan’s “unstinted cooperation in the fight against terrorism.”
Because of its shared border with Afghanistan and former close ties with the Taliban,
Pakistan is considered key to U.S.-led efforts to combat terrorism in the region. The Taliban
and Osama bin Laden enjoy strong support among a substantial percentage of the Pakistan
population, who share not only conservative Islamic views but also ethnic and cultural ties
with Afghanistan. A major issue facing the Administration is how to make use of Pakistan’s
support — including for military operations in Afghanistan — without seriously destabilizing
an already fragile, nuclear-armed state.
In an effort to shore up the Musharraf government, sanctions relating to Pakistan’s
1998 nuclear tests and 1999 military coup were waived in the autumn of 2001. In October
2001, large amount of U.S. aid began flowing into Pakistan. Direct assistance programs
include aid for health, education, food, democracy promotion, child labor elimination,
counter-narcotics, border security and law enforcement, as well as trade preference benefits.
The United States also has supported grant, loan, and debt rescheduling programs for
Pakistan by the various international financial institutions, including the World Bank,
International Monetary Fund, and Asian Development Bank. In September 2002, President
Bush met with President Musharraf in New York City, after both leaders had addressed the
U.N. General Assembly. The U.S. President reportedly urged his Pakistani counterpart to
ensure that his government take all necessary steps to end the movement of militants into
Indian-controlled Kashmir, and also to ensure that the country remain on the path to full
democracy.
Security
Nuclear Weapons and Missile Proliferation. U.S. policy analysts consider the
apparent arms race between India and Pakistan as posing perhaps the most likely prospect
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for the future use of nuclear weapons. In May 1998, India conducted five underground
nuclear tests, breaking a 24-year, self-imposed moratorium on such testing. Despite U.S. and
world efforts to dissuade it, Pakistan quickly followed, claiming five tests of its own before
month’s end. The tests created a global storm of criticism, and represented a serious setback
for two decades of U.S. nuclear nonproliferation efforts in South Asia. India currently is
believed to have enough fissile material for 75-100 nuclear weapons; Pakistan is thought to
have approximately half that number. Both countries have aircraft capable of delivering
nuclear bombs. India’s military has inducted short- and intermediate-range ballistic missiles,
while Pakistan itself possesses short- and medium-range missiles (allegedly acquired from
China and North Korea). All are assumed to be capable of delivering small nuclear warheads
over significant distances.
Press reports in late 2002 suggested that Pakistan assisted Pyongyang’s covert nuclear
weapons program by providing North Korea with uranium enrichment materials and
technologies beginning in the mid-1990s and as recently as July 2002. Islamabad adamantly
rejects such reports as “baseless,” and Secretary of State Powell has been assured that no
such transfers are occurring. If such assistance is confirmed by President Bush, all non-
humanitarian U.S. aid to Pakistan may be suspended, although the President has the authority
to waive any sanctions that he determines would jeopardize U.S. national security. In March
2003, the Administration determined that the relevant facts “do not warrant imposition of
sanctions under applicable U.S. laws.”
Proliferation in South Asia may be part of a chain of rivalries — India seeking to
achieve deterrence against China, and Pakistan seeking to gain an “equalizer” against a larger
and conventionally stronger India. India began its nuclear program in the mid-1960s, after
its 1962 defeat in a short border war with China and China’s first nuclear test in 1964.
Despite a 1993 Sino-Indian troop reduction agreement and some easing of tensions, both
nations continue to deploy forces along their border. Pakistan’s nuclear program was
prompted by India’s 1974 nuclear test and by Pakistan’s defeat by India in the 1971 war and
consequent loss of East Pakistan, now independent Bangladesh.
Since the September 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States, U.S. and Pakistani
officials have held talks on improving security and installing new safeguards on Pakistan’s
nuclear weapons and nuclear power plants. Fears that Pakistan could become destabilized
by the U.S. anti-terrorism war efforts in Afghanistan have heightened U.S. nuclear
proliferation concerns in South Asia (see CRS Reports RS21237, Indian and Pakistani
Nuclear Weapons Status, and RL30623, Nuclear Weapons and Ballistic Missile Proliferation
in India and Pakistan).
U.S. Nonproliferation Efforts. In May 1998, following the South Asian nuclear
tests, President Clinton imposed full restrictions on non-humanitarian economic and military
aid to both India and Pakistan as mandated under Section 102 of the Arms Export Control
Act (AECA). In November 1998, the U.S. Department of Commerce published a list of
more than 300 Indian and Pakistani government agencies and companies suspected of
working on nuclear, missile, and other weapons programs. Any U.S. exports to these entities
required a Commerce Department license, and most license requests reportedly were denied.
In some respects, Pakistan was less affected by the sanctions than was India, since most U.S.
assistance to Pakistan had been cut off in 1990. At the same time, Pakistan’s much smaller
and more fragile economy was more vulnerable to the negative effects of aid restrictions.
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During the latter years of the Clinton administration, the United States set forth five
nonproliferation “benchmarks” for India and Pakistan, including the following: halt further
nuclear testing and sign and ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT); halt fissile
material production and pursue Fissile Material Control Treaty negotiations; refrain from
deploying nuclear weapons and testing ballistic missiles; restrict any and all exportation of
nuclear materials or technologies; and take steps to reduce bilateral tensions, especially on
the issue of Kashmir. The results of U.S. efforts have been mixed, at best: Neither India nor
Pakistan are signatories to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) or the CTBT. India
has consistently rejected both treaties as discriminatory, calling instead for a global nuclear
disarmament regime. Pakistan traditionally has maintained that it will sign the NPT and
CTBT only when India does so. Aside from security concerns, the governments of both
countries are faced with the prestige factor attached to their nuclear programs (see CRS
Reports RS20995, India and Pakistan: Current U.S. Economic Sanctions, and RL31589,
Nuclear Threat Reduction Measures for India and Pakistan).
Kashmir Dispute. Bilateral relations between Pakistan and India remain deadlocked
on the issue of Kashmiri sovereignty. The prospects for India-Pakistan detente suffered a
severe setback in mid-1999, when the two countries teetered on the brink of their fourth full-
scale war, once again in Kashmir. In the worst fighting since 1971, Indian soldiers sought
to dislodge some 700 Pakistan-supported infiltrators who were occupying fortified positions
along mountain ridges on the Indian side of the line of control (LOC) near Kargil. Following
a meeting between then Pakistani PM Sharif and President Clinton in Washington on July
4, 1999, the infiltrators withdrew across the LOC.
Tensions between India and Pakistan remained extremely high in the wake of the Kargil
conflict, which cost more than 1,100 lives. Throughout 2000-2002, intermittent cross-border
firing and shelling has caused scores of both military and civilian deaths. New Delhi
accuses Pakistan of sponsoring the movement of “terrorists” into Indian Kashmir; Islamabad
accuses India of human rights violations there. The United States strongly urged India and
Pakistan to create the proper climate for peace, respect the LOC, reject violence, and return
to the Lahore peace process. A six-month-long unilateral cease-fire and halt to offensive
military operations in Kashmir was undertaken by India in 2000-2001, and the Pakistani
government responded by announcing that its forces deployed along the LOC in Kashmir
would observe “maximum restraint.” Kashmir’s main militant groups, however, rejected the
cease-fire as a fraud and continued to carry out attacks on military personnel and government
installations. As security forces conducted counter-operations, deaths of Kashmiri civilians,
militants, and Indian security forces continued to rise.
In May 2001, the Indian government announced that it was ending its unilateral cease-
fire in Kashmir but that Prime Minister Vajpayee would invite President Musharraf to India
for talks. A July summit meeting between Musharraf and Vajpayee in Agra failed to produce
a joint communique, reportedly as a result of pressure from hardliners on both sides. Major
stumbling blocks were India’s refusal to acknowledge the “centrality of Kashmir” to future
talks and Pakistan’s objection to references to “cross-border terrorism.” U.S. Secretary of
State Colin Powell visited the region in an effort to ease escalating tensions over Kashmir,
but an October terrorist attack on the Jammu and Kashmir state assembly was followed by
a December 2001 terrorist attack on the Indian Parliament in New Delhi. Both incidents
were blamed on Pakistan-based militant groups. The Indian government responded by
mobilizing some 700,000 troops to forward stations along the Pakistan-India frontier and
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threatening war unless Islamabad put an end to all cross-border infiltrations of Islamic
militants. Under significant international diplomatic pressure and the threat of India’s use
of possibly massive force, President Musharraf in January 2002 vowed to end the presence
of terrorist entities on Pakistani soil and upwards of 2,000 radicals were jailed (many of these
have since been released).
Despite the Pakistani pledge, infiltrations into Indian-held Kashmir continued, and a
May 2002 terrorist attack on an Indian army base at Kaluchak killed 34, most of them women
and children. This event again brought Pakistan and India to the brink of full-scale war, and
caused Islamabad to recall army troops from both patrol operations along the Pakistan-
Afghanistan border as well as from international peacekeeping operations. Pakistan also
tested three ballistic missiles in late-May 2002, sending an implicit message to India that it
would employ nuclear weapons in a conflict. A flurry of intensive diplomatic missions to
South Asia appears to have reduced tensions during the summer of 2002 and prevented the
outbreak of war. Numerous top U.S. diplomats were involved in this effort. The U.S.
government continues to strenuously urge the two countries to renew a bilateral dialogue that
has been moribund since the summer of 2001. New Delhi refuses to engage such dialogue
until it is satisfied that Pakistan has ended all militant infiltration into its Jammu and
Kashmir state (for further reading, see CRS Report RS20277, Recent Developments in
Kashmir and U.S. Concerns, and RL31587, Kashmiri Separatists: Origins, Competing
Ideologies, and Prospects for Resolution of the Conflict).
Pakistan-U.S. Security Cooperation. The close U.S.- Pakistan security ties of the
cold war era — which had come to near halt after the 1990 aid cutoff — appear to be in the
process of restoration as a result of Pakistan’s role in U.S.-led anti-terrorism campaign. In
the spring of 2002, U.S. military and law enforcement personnel reportedly began engaging
in direct, low-profile efforts to assist Pakistani security forces in tracking and apprehending
fugitive Al Qaeda and Taliban fighters on Pakistani territory. Press reports indicate that
Pakistan has remanded to U.S. custody nearly 500 such fugitives to date.
In July 2002, Congress was notified of two Foreign Military Sales arrangements with
Pakistan reportedly worth $230 million. Under the deals, Pakistan is to receive 7 used C-
130E transport aircraft (one being for spare parts) and six Aerostat surveillance radars.
These mark the first notable arms sales to Pakistan in more than a decade and are intended
to bolster Islamabad’s counterterrorism capabilities. Islamabad continues to seek U.S.
weapons and technology, especially in an effort to bolster its air forces. Several Members
of Congress are reported to be supportive of these efforts. A revived high-level U.S.-
Pakistan defense consultative group — moribund for the past 5 years — met in late-
September 2002 and included high-level discussions of military cooperation, security
assistance, and anti-terrorism. The two countries also have planned regular joint military
exercises (see CRS Report RL31624, Pakistan-U.S. Anti-Terrorism Cooperation).
Democratization and Human Rights
Democratization Efforts. There had been hopes that national elections in October
2002 would reverse Pakistan’s historic trend toward unstable governance and military
interference in democratic institutions. Such hopes were eroded by the passage of a number
of highly restrictive election laws — including those that prevented the country’s two
leading civilian politicians from participating — as well as President Musharraf’s unilateral
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imposition of major constitutional amendments in August 2002. While praising Pakistan’s
recent electoral exercises as moves in the right direction, the United States has expressed
concern that these seemingly nondemocratic developments may make the realization of true
democracy in Pakistan more elusive (see CRS Report RS21299, Pakistan’s Domestic
Political Developments).
Human Rights Problems. The U.S. State Department, in its Pakistan Country
Report on Human Rights Practices, 2002 (issued March 2003), determined that the
Islamabad government’s record on human rights remains “poor.” Along with concerns about
anti-democratic practices, the United States identifies “acute” corruption, extrajudicial
killings, lack of judicial independence, “extremely poor” prison conditions, and increased
violence against Christians as serious problems. Police have abused and raped citizens with
apparent impunity. Improvement in some areas is noted, however, particularly with press
freedoms and governmental efforts to curb religious extremism.
The Human Rights Commission of Pakistan, Amnesty International, and Human Rights
Watch have issued reports critical of Pakistan’s lack of political freedoms and of the
country’s perceived abuses of the rights of women and minorities. Discrimination against
women is widespread, and traditional constraints — cultural, legal, and spousal — have kept
women in a subordinate position in society. “Honor killings” continue to occur throughout
the country. The adult literacy rate for men in Pakistan is more than 50%, while half as many
women are literate. Religious minorities — mainly Christians and Ahmadi Muslims —
reportedly are subjected to discriminatory laws and social intolerance. Blasphemy laws,
instituted under the Zia regime and strengthened in 1991, carry a mandatory death penalty
for blaspheming the Prophet or his family. Blasphemy charges reportedly are commonly
brought as a result of personal or religious vendettas. Anti-Christian and anti-Western
violence, which peaked in the summer of 2002, has cost scores of lives. In 2003, Islamist
lawmakers in the NWFP have launched efforts to impose harsh penalties under Sharia, such
as amputating the hands of thieves and stoning adulterers.
Economic Issues
Overview. Pakistan is a poor country with great extremes in the distribution of wealth.
The long-term economic outlook for Pakistan continues to be rather bleak, given a low
national savings rate (10%) and high labor force growth rates (2.4%) in a country that
remains highly dependent on foreign lending and the importation of basic commodities
(public debt is equal to more than 86% of GDP). In the middle-term, greater political
stability following October 2002 elections could brighten the outlook by providing President
Musharraf with a political base for the further pursuit of economic reform, but conflict with
India is an ever-present risk. In the short-run, substantial fiscal deficits and the still urgent
dependency on external aid donations counterbalance a major overhaul of the tax collection
system and were notable gains in the Karachi Stock Exchange, the world’s best performer
in 2002. Per capita GDP is $425 (or $2,000 when accounting for purchasing power parity).
Output from both the industrial and service sectors grew in 2002, but the agricultural
sector’s output has been weak and significantly slowed growth overall (in part due to severe
drought). Agricultural labor accounts for nearly half of the country’s work force. Pakistan’s
real GDP for the fiscal year ending June 2002 grew by some 3.6% over FY2001 (but 4.5%
for the calendar year). An industrial sector recovery and the end of a 3-year drought have
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some foreseeing even more robust growth ahead, with predictions putting the growth rate at
around 4.5% or less for FY2003, up to 5% for FY2004.
The Pakistani government had stabilized the country’s external debt at $36.3 billion by
the end of 2002. The country’s total liquid reserves grew to $10.3 billion by April 2003 —
an all-time high and an increase of more than $8 billion since October 1999. In December
2001, the Paris Club of creditor nations agreed to reschedule $12.5 billion in repayments on
Pakistan’s external debt — one-third of the country’s total burden. Foreign remittances for
FY2002 exceeded $2.3 billion — more than twice the amount in 2001. Inflation, below 4%,
is at the lowest level in three decades, largely as a result of weak consumer demand. Interest
on public debt and defense spending together consume 70% of total revenues, thus squeezing
out development expenditure, including social spending.
Many analysts believe that Pakistan’s resources and comparatively well-developed
entrepreneurial skills may hold promise for more rapid economic growth and development
in coming years. This is particularly true for Pakistan’s textile industry, which accounts for
60% of Pakistan’s exports. Analysts point to the pressing need to broaden the country’s tax
base in order to provide increased revenue for investment in improved infrastructure, health,
and education, all prerequisites for economic development. Only 1.4% of Pakistanis
currently pay income taxes. Agricultural income has not been taxed in the past, largely
because of the domination of parliament and the provincial assemblies by wealthy landlords.
Attempts at economic reform historically have floundered due to political instability.
The Musharraf government has had some modest successes in effecting economic reform.
As of April 2003, the Islamabad appears to be maintaining general continuity in its economic
policies since the previous year’s elections, and the seating of a pro-Musharraf ruling
coalition in the Parliament has added to analysts’ confidence that reforms will remain on
track. Moreover, participation in the post-September 2001 anti-terror coalition had the effect
of easing somewhat Islamabad’s severe national debt situation, with many countries,
including the United States, boosting bilateral assistance efforts and large amounts of
external aid flowing into the country.
An October 2002 World Bank report commended Pakistan for bringing about
macroeconomic stability and implementing wide-ranging structural reforms to spur economic
growth, while also noting that the country’s poverty levels are both high and static. A
November 2002 IMF report identifies a “worrisome trend of declining growth” linked in part
to “a turbulent domestic and regional political environment.” A December 2002 World Bank
report claims that “Pakistan’s economic revival program is beginning to produce good
results,” but also notes numerous problems that seem to require further implementation of
structural reforms. An April 2003 report of the Asian Development Bank noted that
continued macroeconomic stability is enhancing Pakistan’s medium-term economic
prospects, but warns that renewed tensions with India and/or domestic political instability
could quickly dampen current optimism.
Trade Issues. Pakistan’s primary exports are cotton, textiles and apparel, rice, and
leather products. During 2002, total U.S. imports from Pakistan were worth about $2.3
billion, a slight increase over the previous year. Nearly 90% of this value came from the
purchase of textiles, clothing, and related articles. U.S. exports to Pakistan during 2002 were
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worth $694 million, a major increase of 28% over 2001. The U.S. trade deficit with Pakistan
has been approximately $1.7 billion for each of the past three years.
Legislation in the 107th Congress included S.1675 to authorize the President to reduce
or suspend duties on Pakistani textiles (the bill was not voted upon). During a February 2003
visit to the United States, the Pakistani foreign minister requested greater access to U.S.
markets as a means of reducing poverty and thus also the forces of extremism in Pakistan.
He made a direct link between poverty and the continued existence of Islamic schools
(madrassas) that are implicated in teaching militant anti-American values. Several
nongovernmental Western analysts have made similar arguments.
According to the report of the U.S. Trade Representative for 2002, Pakistan has made
progress in reducing import tariff schedules, though a number of trade barriers remain. Some
items are either restricted or banned from importation for reasons related to religion, national
security, luxury consumption, or protection of local industries. The U.S. pharmaceutical
industry believes that Pakistan maintains discriminatory practices that impede U.S.
manufacturer profitability, while several U.S. companies have complained about Pakistani
violations of their intellectual property rights. The International Intellectual Property
Alliance estimated trade losses of $116 million in 2002, and widespread piracy, especially
of copyrighted materials (Pakistan is a world leader in the pirating of CDs), has kept Pakistan
on the U.S. Trade Representative’s “Special 301" watch list for 13 consecutive years.
Narcotics
Pakistan is a major transit country for opiates that are grown and processed in
Afghanistan and western Pakistan, then distributed throughout the world by Pakistan-based
traffickers. The region has in the past supplied up to 40% of heroin consumed in the United
States and 70% of that consumed in Europe, and has been second only to Southeast Asia’s
Golden Triangle as a top source of the world’s heroin. The U.S. Department of State
indicates that Pakistan’s cooperation on drug control with the United States “remains
excellent.” The Islamabad government has made impressive strides in eradicating opium
poppy cultivation. Estimated production in 2001 was only 5 metric tons, down 59% from
2000 and less than one-thirtieth of the estimated 155 tons produced in 1995. In March 2003,
the Acting Assistant Secretary of State for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement
Affairs claimed that Pakistan has “essentially eliminated opium production,” but the State
Department’s International Narcotics Control Strategy Report for 2002 (March 2003)
indicates that Pakistan still remains a “substantial trafficking country” and notes that opium
production rose slightly in 2002 from a record low in 2001.
Pakistan’s counter-narcotics efforts continue to be hampered by a number of factors,
including lack of total government commitment; scarcity of funds; poor infrastructure in
drug-producing regions; government wariness of provoking unrest in tribal areas; and “acute”
corruption. In March 2003, former U.S. Ambassador to Pakistan Wendy Chamberlain stated
that the role of Pakistan’s intelligence service in the heroin trade over the past six years has
been “substantial.” Direct U.S. counter-narcotics aid to Pakistan totaled $2.4 million in
2002. The program is administered by the State Department’s Bureau of International
Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL), which oversaw Pakistan projects with more
than $90 million in FY2002, including $73 million in emergency supplemental
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appropriations for border security efforts that continue in FY2003. The INL allocation for
FY2003 was $6 million; rising to $38 million requested for FY2004.
Terrorism
After the September 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States, Pakistan pledged and
has provided support for the U.S.-led anti-terror coalition. According to the U.S.
Departments of State and Defense, Pakistan has afforded the United States unprecedented
levels of cooperation by allowing the U.S. military to use bases within the country, helping
to identify and detain extremists, and tightening the border between Pakistan and
Afghanistan. In a landmark speech in January 2002, Musharraf vowed to end Pakistan’s use
as a base for terrorism of any kind, and banned numerous militant groups, including Lashkar-
e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Muhammad, both blamed for terrorist violence in Kashmir and India.
In the wake of the speech, thousands of extremists were arrested and detained, though many
of these have since been released (see CRS Report RL31624, Pakistan-U.S. Anti-Terrorism
Cooperation).
In January 2002, Wall Street Journal reporter Daniel Pearl was kidnaped in Karachi and
later found murdered. May and June car bomb attacks on Western targets, including the U.S.
consulate in Karachi, killed 29 people — 11 French military technicians and 18 Pakistani
nationals. These attacks were widely viewed as expressions of militants’ anger with the
Musharraf regime for its cooperation with the United States. The incidents were linked to
Al Qaeda, as well as to indigenous militant groups. In September 2002, Pakistani authorities
announced a series of high-profile arrests of those deemed responsible for the car bombings,
and they claimed to have “broken the back” of the Al Qaeda network in Pakistan. Yet press
reports indicate that Al Qaeda and Taliban fugitives still are numerous in Pakistan and may
be attempting to re-establish their organizations in Pakistani cities such as Karachi. Alleged
Al Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden may himself be in Pakistan.
Islamabad has been under continuous pressure from the United States and numerous
other governments to terminate the infiltration of insurgents across the Kashmiri Line of
Control. Such pressure elicited an explicit promise from President Musharraf to U.S. Deputy
Secretary of State Armitage that all such movements would cease. After confirmations from
both U.S. and Indian government officials that infiltration was down significantly in the
summer of 2002, the rate reportedly rose again in the autumn, and in December 2002 the
U.S. envoy to New Delhi claimed that the problem in Kashmir is “cross-border terrorism”
that is “almost entirely externally driven.” President Musharraf adamantly insists that his
government is doing everything possible to stop such movements. Critics contend, however,
that Islamabad has provided active support for the insurgents in Kashmir as a means to both
maintain strategically the domestic backing of Islamists who view the Kashmir issue as
fundamental to the Pakistani national idea, as well as to disrupt tactically the state
government in Indian Kashmir and so seek to erode New Delhi’s legitimacy there.
U.S. Aid and Congressional Action
The Bush Administration requested a total of $505 million in assistance to Pakistan for
FY2003, including supplemental appropriations. Congress allocated about $495 million of
this. Security-related assistance in the amount of $56.5 million was allocated in P.L. 108-7,
as was $188 million in Economic Support Funds that Congress authorized Pakistan to use
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to cancel approximately $1 billion in concessional debt to the U.S. government. (At the end
of 2002, Pakistan’s international debt was estimated at $36.3 billion. P.L. 107-57 allowed
Pakistan to reschedule $379 million of its debt to the United States thereby enabling it to
cancel its arrearage.) In April 2003, President Bush signed into law P.L. 108-11 (the
Emergency Wartime Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2003), allocating $200 million in
additional security-related assistance to Pakistan for FY2003. Actual U.S. assistance to
Pakistan in FY2002 was just over $1 billion, up from about $10 million in FY2001. The
current Administration request for FY2004 stands at $395 million.
Some Members of the 107th Congress introduced legislation to reimpose restrictions on
aid to Pakistan in light of perceived to be continuing anti-democratic practices by the
Musharraf government. These resolutions were not were voted upon. In the 108th Congress,
H.R.1403 seeks to remove the democracy-related sanctions exemption with respect to
Pakistan (i.e., to repeal the President’s waiver authority). Some Members of the 108th
Congress also have urged reinstatement of proliferation-related sanctions in response to
reports of Pakistani assistance to the North Korean nuclear weapons program, though no
relevant legislation is pending.
Through a series of legislative measures, Congress incrementally lifted sanctions on
Pakistan and India resulting from their 1998 nuclear tests. President Clinton signed into law
P.L. 106-79 (the Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2000) in October 1999. Title
IX of the act gives the President authority to waive sanctions applied against Pakistan and
India in response to the nuclear tests. In a presidential determination on Pakistan and India
issued on October 27, 1999, the President waived economic sanctions on India. Pakistan,
however, remained under sanctions triggered under Section 508 of the annual foreign
assistance appropriations act as a result of the October 1999 coup. The Foreign Operations
Export Financing and Related Appropriations Agencies Act, 2001 provided an exception
under which Pakistan could be provided U.S. foreign assistance funding for basic education
programs (P.L. 106-429; Section 597). After the September 2001 terrorist attacks on the
United States, and in recognition of Pakistan’s cooperation with the U.S.-led coalition being
assembled, policymakers searched for new means of providing assistance to Pakistan.
President Bush’s issuance of a final determination on September 22, 2001 removed
remaining sanctions on Pakistan and India resulting from their 1998 nuclear tests, finding
that denying export licences and assistance was not in the national security interests of the
United States. P.L. 107-57 granted presidential authority to waive coup-related sanctions on
Pakistan through FY2003. In the 108th Congress, a section of S. 790 seeks to extend that
authority through FY2005 (see CRS Report RS20995, India and Pakistan: Current U.S.
Economic Sanctions).
CHRONOLOGY
05/06/03 — Pakistani PM Jamali announced that Islamabad will reopen road, rail, and air
links with India, as well as allow international sports competition. On the
same day, Pakistan’s finance minister said he hoped the United States would
write off another $1.8 billion in debt to help Islamabad fight poverty.
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05/05/03 — A Pakistani government spokesman stated that Pakistan supports the idea of
creating a nuclear-free zone in South Asia.
05/02/03 — Indian PM Vajpayee announced that India will send an ambassador to
Islamabad to renew full diplomatic ties after a 17-month hiatus. Pakistan
made a corresponding announcement. U.S. Secretary of State Powell called
the developments “very, very promising.”
05/01/03 — A senior U.S. military officer in Afghanistan said that Pakistan must “do
more” to halt the “infiltration” of Taliban and Al Qaeda fighters that threaten
Afghani stability. On the same day, Pakistan assumed the presidency of the
U.N. Security Council for the month of May.
04/30/03 — The U.S. State Department’s Patterns of Global Terrorism 2002 called
Pakistan a “vital partner” in the global coalition against terrorism. Among
the 11 new militant Islamist groups on the U.S. “watch list” are three from
the Kashmir region (Hizbul Mujahideen, al-Badhr Mujahideen, and Jamiat
ul-Mujahideen) and one anti-Shia Pakistani group (Sipah-i-Shaba).
04/29/03 — In what was called a major blow to the Al Qaeda network, Pakistani
authorities captured 6 Al Qaeda suspects in Karachi, including Khallad, said
to be a leading suspect in the October 2000 attack on the U.S.S. Cole and the
September 2001 terrorists attacks on the United States. The arrests reportedly
broke up an Al Qaeda plot to fly an explosive-laden aircraft into the U.S.
consulate in Karachi. On the same day, a top U.S. military commander of
Operation Enduring Freedom said that “there are elements in Pakistan ... that
have an interest in creating instability” in Afghanistan.
04/28/03 — A brief telephone conversation between Pakistani PM Jamali and Indian PM
Vajpayee marked the first high-level talks between Pakistan and India in
nearly two years. The two leaders discussed ways to “resolve outstanding
issues through dialogue.”
04/22/03 — Afghani President Karzai returned from a visit to Islamabad and announced
that the Pakistani government had pledged to stop cross-border attacks staged
by Taliban rebels.
04/19/03 — U.S. Special Envoy to Afghanistan Khalilzad warned Pakistan to prevent
incursions of pro-Taliban militants into Afghani territory.
04/18/03 — In an historic speech in Srinagar, Kashmir, Indian PM Vajpayee extended a
“hand of friendship” to Pakistan, saying that dialogue is necessary to resolve
the Pakistan-India dispute. Enthusiasm was dampened when subsequent
statements from New Delhi reiterated India’s position that talks cannot begin
until all “cross-border terrorism” is halted. Six days later, Pakistani Foreign
Minister Kasuri said that if talks begin soon, the “feared increase in
[Kashmiri] violence won’t take place.”
04/17/03 — U.S. State Department Director of Policy Planning Haass stated that U.S.
pressure on the Pakistani government to stop infiltration across the Kashmiri
Line of Control has “not succeeded” and the U.S. is “disappointed and
frustrated with that reality.” He said the U.S.-Pakistan relationship “will
never move beyond a certain point unless this issue is adequately addressed.”
04/14/03 — A Pakistani court sentenced two Islamic militants to death and another two
to life in prison for their roles in a car bomb attack on the U.S. consulate in
Karachi that killed 12 Pakistanis in June 2002.
04/11/03 — Top U.S. and Pakistani officials met in Washington to discuss further U.S.
assistance to Pakistani counterterrorism and counternarcotics efforts.
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04/09/03 — Talks between the ruling PML-Q party and the opposition MMA Islamist
coalition failed to end the dispute over the future status of President
Musharraf and his August 2002 package of unilateral changes to the Pakistani
constitution. Musharraf later decided not to submit the package to Parliament
for ratification and insists that he will retain the position of Army Chief.
04/03/03 — S. 790 is introduced in the U.S. Senate. A section of the bill seeks to extend
through FY2005 the U.S. President’s authority to waive coup-related
sanctions on Pakistan under P.L. 107-57.
04/02/03 — Indian Foreign Minister Sinha said that “India has a much better case to go
for pre-emptive action against Pakistan than the U.S. had in Iraq.” Nine days
later Indian Defense Minister Fernandes says he agreed with Sinha’s
statement. Also on April 2, the Pakistani Senate unanimously passed a
strongly-worded resolution denouncing the U.S.-led war on Iraq.
03/03
— Alleged top Al Qaeda leader Khalid Mohammed was arrested by U.S. and
Pakistani security personnel in Rawalpindi. Also, the Bush Administration
declined to take action related to alleged Pakistani assistance to North
Korea’s nuclear weapons program, and it waived coup-related sanctions on
Islamabad for FY2003. The Pakistani government expressed disapproval of
the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq and hundreds of thousands of Pakistanis
marched in several cities in opposition to the war. In Indian Kashmir, 24
Hindu villagers were killed by apparent Muslim militants. India blamed
Pakistan for the attack. Near the end of the month, the United States imposed
sanctions on Pakistan’s Khan Research Laboratories for its role in receiving
missile-related technology from North Korea.
02/03
— A diplomatic row between Pakistan and India resulted in the tit-for-tat
expulsions of four envoys from each capital.
11/02
— A fragile coalition of pro-military parties elected veteran politician Mir
Zafarullah Jamali to be the Pakistan’s new prime minister, the first since
Nawaz Sharif was ousted in an October 1999 military coup. The coalition
unexpectedly excluded both the Islamist MMA parties and the secular PPP
10/02
— Pakistan held its first national elections since an October 1999 military coup
brought President Gen. Musharraf to power. The pro-military PML-Q party
won a plurality of parliamentary seats while an Islamist coalition made a
surprisingly strong showing, and exerts considerable influence in the
provincial assemblies of Baluchistan and the North West Frontier Province
along the border with Afghanistan. The secular PPP of former PM Bhutto
was shut out of both the national and four provincial ruling coalitions. Upon
completion of the elections, both India and Pakistan announced major troop
redeployments that signaled the apparent end of a tense 10-month-long
military face-off along their shared border.
09-10/02 — State elections in India’s Jammu and Kashmir result in the ousting of the
long-ruling National Conference party and the seating of a new government
ruled by a coalition that vows to “soften” policy toward separatist militants.
The Kashmiri separatist All Parties Hurriyat Conference, which has political
ties to Islamabad, found itself marginalized after boycotting the elections.
09/02
— A moribund U.S.-Pakistan security relationship is revived when officials
from both countries meet in Islamabad for the first Defense Cooperation
Group session since 1997.
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07/02
— The U.S. Congress was notified of two pending U.S. arms sales to Pakistan,
the first such sales in more than a decade. The 7 C-130 transport aircraft and
six Aerostat surveillance radars reportedly are meant to bolster Islamabad’s
counterterrorism capabilities.
06/02
— Intense international diplomatic pressure — including multiple visits to the
region by senior U.S. government officials — apparently persuaded India to
refrain from taking military action against Pakistan. Key to the effort were
explicit promises by Pakistani President Musharraf to U.S. Deputy Secretary
of State Armitage that all infiltration of militants across the Line of Control
would be halted. Also, a car bomb exploded outside the U.S. consulate in
Karachi, killing 12 Pakistani nationals. The attack was blamed on Islamic
radicals who may have had links to Al Qaeda.
05/02
— A terrorist attack on an Indian army base in Jammu and Kashmir killed 34,
mostly women and children. New Delhi blamed the attack on the “cross-
border terrorism” of Pakistani-sponsored Islamic militants and vowed to fight
a “decisive war” against Pakistan. Also, a car bomb exploded outside a
Karachi hotel, killing 14 people, including 11 French military technicians.
The attack was blamed on Islamic radicals who were later arrested and who
may have had links to Al Qaeda.
04/02
— A controversial referendum ostensibly legitimized Gen. Musharraf’s status
as Pakistani President, though Musharraf later apologized to the nation for
acknowledged irregularities in the process.
Spring
— U.S. military and law enforcement personnel began engaging in direct, but
low-profile efforts to assist Pakistani security forces in tracking and
apprehending fugitive Al Qaeda and Taliban fighters on Pakistani territory.
03/02
— A major U.S. military offensive (Operation Anaconda) in Afghanistan’s
eastern mountains — in the wake of a massive December 2002 aerial
bombardment of Afghanistan’s Tora Bora region — apparently prompted two
waves of up to 5,000 Al Qaeda fighters fleeing into Pakistan. Press reports
indicated that Al Qaeda set up new bases of operations in western Pakistan
and in the city of Karachi.
01/02
— President Musharraf delivered a landmark address in which he vowed to end
all Islamic extremism and terrorist activity originating from Pakistani soil.
Also, Wall Street Journal reporter Daniel Pearl was kidnaped in Karachi and
later found dead. Four Islamic radicals with possible links to Al Qaeda
subsequently were arrested and convicted of his murder.
12/01
— A terrorist attack on the Indian Parliament complex in New Delhi left 14
people dead. New Delhi blamed the attack on Pakistani-backed Islamic
militants and began a massive military mobilization along the Pakistan-India
frontier. Also, the United States designated two Pakistan-based militant
groups — Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed — as Foreign Terrorist
Organizations under U.S. law.
10/01
— A terrorist attack on the assembly building in India’s Jammu and Kashmir
state killed 34 people. New Delhi blamed the attack on Pakistan-backed
separatist militants.
09/01
— Terrorist attacks on the United States, and ensuing U.S. diplomatic pressure,
transformed the Pakistan-U.S. relationship, spurring the Islamabad
government to sever ties with the Afghani Taliban and join in the U.S.-led
anti-terrorism campaign as a key front-line state. Within one month, all
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remaining proliferation- and democracy-related restrictions on U.S. aid to
Pakistan were removed or waived, and large amounts of U.S. economic and
military assistance began flowing into the country.
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