Order Code RL30957
Report for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
Taiwan: Major U.S. Arms Sales Since 1990
Updated April 18, 2003
Shirley A. Kan
Specialist in National Security Policy
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

Taiwan: Major U.S. Arms Sales Since 1990
Summary
This CRS Report discusses U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, or Republic of China
(ROC), including policy issues for Congress and legislation. The Taiwan Relations
Act (TRA), P.L. 96-8, has governed U.S. arms sales to Taiwan since 1979, when the
United States recognized the People’s Republic of China (PRC) instead of the ROC.
There are two other relevant elements of the “one China” policy: the August 17, 1982
U.S.-PRC Joint Communique and the “Six Assurances” made to Taiwan. (For more
discussion, see CRS Report RL30341, China/Taiwan: Evolution of the “One China”
Policy – Key Statements from Washington, Beijing, and Taipei
, by Shirley Kan.)
Despite the absence of diplomatic relations, U.S. arms sales to Taiwan have
been increasingly significant. In addition to transfers of hardware, the United States
has expanded military exchanges with Taiwan after the PRC’s missile exercises in
1995-1996, and has conducted assessments of Taiwan’s defense needs.
At the U.S.-Taiwan arms sales talks on April 24, 2001, President George W.
Bush approved for sale to Taiwan: diesel-electric submarines (perhaps a foreign
design with U.S. systems), P-3 anti-submarine warfare (ASW) aircraft (linked to the
submarine sale), 4 decommissioned U.S. Kidd-class destroyers, and other items. He
also deferred approval for Aegis-equipped destroyers and other items, while denying
other requests. Since then, attention has turned to Taiwan, where the military,
civilian officials, and legislators from competing political parties have debated
contentious issues about how much to spend on defense and which U.S. weapons
systems to acquire, despite the increasing threat from the People’s Liberation Army
(PLA), as described in the Pentagon’s July 2002 report to Congress on PRC military
power. The Administration and others have questioned Taiwan’s seriousness about
its self-defense and protection of national security information.
Several policy issues are of concern to Congress for legislation, oversight, or
other action. One policy issue concerns the effectiveness of the Administration in
assisting Taiwan’s defense – including arms sales as well as military exchanges –
as Taiwan faces the PLA’s missile buildup and arms acquisitions, primarily from
Russia. Another issue is the role of Congress in determining arms sales to Taiwan.
A third issue concerns whether trends in the Taiwan Strait are stabilizing or
destabilizing and how the Administration’s policy has affected these trends, including
any policy reviews or changes concerning arms sales to and military relations with
Taiwan. A question arose in 2001 when President Bush committed the United States
to do “whatever it took to help Taiwan defend herself.” Another catalyst for this
debate arose out of the Bush-Jiang summit in Crawford, TX, in October 2002, when
President Jiang reportedly offered in vague terms a freeze or reduction in China’s
buildup of missiles targeted at Taiwan, in return for restraints in U.S. security
assistance for Taiwan. In February 2003, the Administration pointed to three
priorities for Taiwan: command and control, missile defense, and ASW.

This CRS Report concludes with a table on major defense sales to Taiwan, as
approved by the President, proposed in Letters of Offer and Acceptance, and notified
to Congress since 1990. This report will be updated as warranted.

Contents
U.S. Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Policy Statements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Broad Indicators of Arms Transfers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Military Relationship . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
April 2001 Arms Requests and Status of Arms Sales . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Submarines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Kidd-Class Destroyers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Missile Defense . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Early Warning Radars . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
C4ISR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
AMRAAMs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Taiwan’s Decisions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Policy Issues for Congress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Congressional Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
105th Congress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
106th Congress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
107th Congress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
108th Congress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Major U.S. Defense Sales . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
List of Tables
Table: Estimated Costs of Taiwan’s Arms Acquisitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

Taiwan: Major U.S. Arms Sales Since 1990
U.S. Policy
This CRS Report discusses U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, or Republic of China
(ROC), including policy issues for Congress. It also lists sales of major defense
articles and services to Taiwan, as approved by the Administration, proposed in
Letters of Offer and Acceptance, and notified to Congress since 1990. Based on
unclassified notices and news reports, this list includes the date of notification, major
item proposed for sale, and estimated value of the defense package.
Policy Statements
The Taiwan Relations Act (TRA), P.L. 96-8, has governed U.S. arms sales to
Taiwan since 1979, when the United States recognized the People’s Republic of
China (PRC) instead of the ROC.1 The TRA specifies that it is U.S. policy “to
provide Taiwan with arms of a defensive character” and “to maintain the capacity of
the United States to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion” threatening
Taiwan’s security, or social or economic system. Sec. 3(a) states that “the United
States will make available to Taiwan such defense articles and defense services in
such quantity as may be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-
defense capability.” The TRA also specifies a congressional role in decision-making
on security assistance for Taiwan. Sec. 3(b) stipulates that both the President and the
Congress shall determine the nature and quantity of such defense articles and services
based solely upon their judgment of the needs of Taiwan. Sec. 3(b) also says that
“such determination of Taiwan’s defense needs shall include review by United States
military authorities in connection with recommendations to the President and the
Congress.” The TRA set up the American Institute in Taiwan (AIT), a nonprofit
corporation, to handle the relationship with Taiwan. AIT implements policy as
directed by the Departments of Defense and State, and the National Security Council.
There are two other elements of the “one China” policy relevant to the issue of
arms sales to Taiwan. In 1982, President Reagan issued the August 17 Joint
Communique on reducing arms sales to Taiwan, but he also stated that those sales
will continue in accordance with the TRA and with the full expectation that the
PRC’s approach to the resolution of the Taiwan issue will be peaceful. In referring
to what have been known as the “Six Assurances” made to Taipei, U.S. policy-
makers have said that, in 1982, Washington did not agree to set a date for ending
arms sales to Taiwan nor to consult with Beijing on arms sales to Taiwan. The “Six
Assurances” also included the assurance of not revising the TRA.
1 For more on policy, see CRS Report RL30341, China/Taiwan: Evolution of the “One
China” Policy – Key Statements From Washington, Beijing, and Taipei
, by Shirley Kan.

CRS-2
Broad Indicators of Arms Transfers
From worldwide sources, including the United States, Taiwan received $20.7
billion in arms deliveries in the 8-year period from 1994 to 2001 – with Taiwan
ranked 2nd behind Saudi Arabia among leading recipients in the developing world.
Of that total, Taiwan received $10.6 billion in arms in 1994-1997, and $10.1 billion
in 1998-2001.2 (The PRC, by comparison, received $8 billion in arms during the
same 8-year period.) In 2001, Taiwan received $1.2 billion in arms deliveries, while
the PRC received arms deliveries valued at $2.2 billion.
As for U.S. arms transfers to Taiwan, they have been significant despite the
absence of diplomatic relations or a treaty alliance. Deliveries of U.S. defense
articles and services to Taiwan totaled $4 billion in the 1993-1996 period, and $7.6
billion in 1997-2000, ranking first among Asian recipients. Worldwide, Taiwan
ranked third (behind Saudi Arabia and Egypt) in 1993-1996, and second (behind
Saudi Arabia) in 1997-2000. In 2000 alone, Taiwan received $1.2 billion in U.S.
defense articles and services.3
Military Relationship
In addition to transfers of hardware, beginning after tensions in the Taiwan
Strait in 1995-1996, the Clinton Administration quietly expanded the sensitive
military relationship with Taiwan to levels unprecedented since 1979.4 The broader
exchanges reportedly have increased attention to “software,” including discussions
over strategy, training, logistics, command and control, and plans in the event of an
attack from the PRC. These increased exchanges were prompted by U.S. concerns
over how well Taiwan has upgraded its capabilities to defend itself.
The Pentagon has also conducted its own assessments of Taiwan’s defense
needs. Congress could inquire about these and any other assessments. In September
1999, to enhance cooperation, a Pentagon team was said to have visited Taiwan to
assess its air defense capability.5 The Pentagon reportedly completed its classified
assessment in January 2000, finding a number of problems in the Taiwan military’s
ability to defend against aircraft, ballistic missiles, and cruise missiles, and those
problems included international isolation, inadequate security, and sharp inter-service
2 CRS Report RL31529, Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing Nations, 1994-2001,
August 6, 2002, by Richard F. Grimmett.
3 CRS Report RL31113, U.S. Arms Sales: Agreements with and Deliveries to Major Clients,
1993-2000
, September 5, 2001, by Richard Grimmett, compiled from U.S. official,
unclassified data as reported by the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA).
4 Mann, Jim, “U.S. Has Secretly Expanded Military Ties with Taiwan,” LA Times, July 24,
1999; Kurt M. Campbell (former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and
Pacific Affairs) and Derek J. Mitchell, “Crisis in the Taiwan Strait?”, Foreign Affairs,
July/August 2001.
5 “U.S. Military Team Arrives in Taiwan for Visit,” Lien-ho Pao [United Daily News], Sept.
19, 1999, in FBIS.

CRS-3
rivalries.6 In September 2000, the Pentagon reportedly conducted a classified
assessment of Taiwan’s naval defense needs – as the Clinton Administration had
promised in April 2000 while deferring a sale of Aegis-equipped destroyers. The
report, “Taiwan Naval Modernization,” was said to have found that Taiwan’s navy
needed the Aegis radar system, Kidd-class destroyers, submarines, an anti-submarine
underwater sonar array, and P-3 anti-submarine aircraft.7 In January 2001, a
Pentagon team reportedly examined Taiwan’s command and control, air force
equipment, and air defense against a first strike.8 In September 2001, a Defense
Department team reportedly visited Taiwan to assess its army, as the Bush
Administration promised in the April 2001 round of arms sales talks.9 In August
2002, a U.S. military team studied Taiwan’s Po Sheng command, control,
communication, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR)
program.10 In November 2002, another U.S. team visited Taiwan to assess its
marine corps and security at ports and harbors.11
The George W. Bush Administration has continued and expanded the closer
military ties at different levels. In April 2001, President Bush announced he would
drop the 20-year-old annual arms talks process used to discuss arms sales to Taiwan’s
military in favor of normal, routine considerations of Taiwan’s requests on an as-
needed basis – similar to interactions with other governments. In July 2001, after
U.S. and Taiwan media reported on a U.S.-Taiwan military meeting in Monterey,
CA, the Pentagon revealed it was the seventh meeting (since 1997) held with Taiwan
military authorities “to discuss issues of interaction and means by which to provide
for the defense of Taiwan.”12 Another round of such strategic talks took place in July
2002.13 U.S. military officers observed Taiwan’s Hankuang 17 annual exercise in
2001, the first time since 1979.14 The Pacific Command’s Asia-Pacific Center for
Security Studies accepted fellows from Taiwan in its Executive Course for the first
time in the summer of 2002.15
6 Ricks, Thomas, “Taiwan Seen as Vulnerable to Attack,” Washington Post, March 31,
2000.
7 Tsao, Nadia, “Pentagon Report Says Taiwan Can Handle AEGIS,” Taipei Times, Sept. 27,
2000; Michael Gordon, “Secret U.S. Study Concludes Taiwan Needs New Arms,” New York
Times
, April 1, 2001.
8 China Times (Taiwan), January 14, 2001; Taipei Times, January 15, 2001.
9 Taipei Times (Taiwan), September 10, 2001.
10 Taiwan Defense Review (Taiwan), August 27, 2002.
11 Taipei Times (Taiwan), November 21, 2002; January 1, 2003; Tzu-Yu Shih-Pao [Liberty
Times]
(Taiwan), April 14, 2003.
12 China Times (Taiwan), July 18, 2001; Washington Times, July 18, 2001; Department of
Defense News Briefing, July 19, 2001.
13 Central News Agency (Taiwan), July 17, 2002.
14 Chung-Kuo Shih-Pao [China Times] (Taiwan), July 18, 2001.
15 CNN.com, March 18, 2002.

CRS-4
As for high-level visits, the Bush Administration granted a visa for Defense
Minister Tang Yiau-ming to visit the United States to attend a private conference
held by the U.S.-Taiwan Business Council on March 10-12, 2002, in St. Petersburg,
FL, making him the first ROC defense minister to come to the United States on a
non-transit purpose since 1979.16 Tang met with Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul
Wolfowitz, who told the conference that the United States is willing to help Taiwan’s
military to strengthen civilian control, enhance jointness, and rationalize arms
acquisitions.17 In September 2002, Taiwan’s Vice Minister of Defense Kang Ning-
hsiang visited Washington and became the first senior Taiwan defense official to
have meetings inside the Pentagon since U.S.-ROC diplomatic ties severed in 1979,
although a meeting with Wolfowitz took place outside the Pentagon building.18 In
addition, in 2002, the Administration requested legislation be passed to authorize the
assignment of personnel from U.S. departments (including the Defense Department)
to AIT, with implications for the assignment of active-duty military personnel to
Taiwan for the first time since 1979. (See the discussion below of the Foreign
Relations Authorization Act for FY2003, P.L. 107-228.)
In January 2003, a Taiwanese newspaper leaked information that a U.S. military
team planned to participate in – beyond observe – the Hankuang 19 military exercise
and be present at Taiwan’s Hengshan Command Center for the first time since
1979.19 On the same day, Gen. Chen Chao-min, a defense vice minister, confirmed
to Taiwan’s legislature a U.S. plan for a non-combatant evacuation operation (NEO).
However, the leak and confirmation reportedly prompted annoyance in Washington
and contributed to a U.S. decision to limit Chen’s visit to the United States in
February 2003 to attendance at a private sector conference on Taiwan’s defense in
San Antonio, TX (without a visit to Washington, DC).20 The exercise reportedly
began on April 15, 2003, with U.S. defense personnel present at the sites.21
April 2001 Arms Requests and Status of Arms Sales
In 2001, arms sales talks took place on April 24 in Washington, DC, and Taiwan
was represented by its Vice Chief of General Staff, General Huoh Shou-yeh.
According to the Administration and news reports,22 President Bush approved
16 In December 2001, the previous ROC Defense Minister, Wu Shih-wen, made a U.S.
transit on his way to the Dominican Republic.
17 Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, “Remarks to the U.S.-Taiwan Business
Council,” March 11, 2002.
18 Reuters, September 10, 2002.
19 Chung-Kuo Shih-Pao [China Times], January 2, 2003.
20 Taiwan Defense Review, January 18, 2003; Straits Times (Singapore), January 21, 2003.
21 Lien-Ho Pao [United Daily News] (Taiwan), April 16, 2003.
22 White House, press briefing, April 24, 2001; Department of Defense, news briefing, April
24, 2001;David Sanger, “Bush is Offering Taiwanese Some Arms, But Not the Best,” New
York Times
, April 24, 2001; Steven Mufson and Dana Milbank, “Taiwan to Get Variety of
Arms,” Washington Post, April 24, 2001; Neil King Jr., “Bush Defers Sale of Aegis to
(continued...)

CRS-5
Taiwan’s request for: 8 diesel-electric submarines, 12 P-3C Orion anti-submarine
warfare (ASW) aircraft (linked to the submarine sale), 54 Mark-48 ASW torpedoes,
44 Harpoon submarine-launched anti-ship cruise missiles, 144 M109A6 Paladin self-
propelled howitzers, 54 AAV7A1 amphibious assault vehicles, AN/ALE-50
electronic countermeasure (ECM) systems for F-16s, and 12 MH-53 mine-sweeping
helicopters. Also approved for sale were 4 decommissioned Kidd-class destroyers
(considered as Excess Defense Articles (EDA), not FMS). The Administration also
decided to brief Taiwan’s military on the PAC-3 missile defense missile.23
Deferred for approval were destroyers equipped with the Aegis combat system.
The U.S. Navy currently deploys the Aegis combat system (e.g., on the Arleigh
Burke-class destroyer) for air defense and applies it in development of a future Navy
missile defense system. An alternative to the Arleigh Burke that retains the Aegis
Spy-1D radar, called the Evolved Advanced Combat System (EACS) has been
considered. (By October 2002, Taiwan reportedly re-submitted a request for Aegis-
equipped destroyers.24 In March 2003, its defense minister proposed a program for
acquiring 4 Arleigh Burke-class destroyers with Aegis systems beginning in 2009.25)
Also deferred for approval were M1A2 Abrams main battle tanks and AH-64D
Apache Longbow attack helicopters, pending a U.S. assessment of Taiwan’s army.
(In May 2002, the Bush Administration approved the request for Apaches, and
Taiwan began negotiations to purchase 30 helicopters.26)
President Bush denied approval for Taiwan’s requests for Joint Direct Attack
Munitions (JDAM) and HARM anti-radiation missiles. (At the U.S.-Taiwan
Business Council’s conference in February 2003, however, Deputy Under Secretary
of the Air Force Willard Mitchell indicated that these requests were under review.)
Submarines. Despite initial press reports skeptical about the sale of
submarines (because the United States no longer manufactures diesel-electric
submarines), the Department of Defense has discussed options for the program with
industry and Taiwan. In November 2001, seven companies submitted bids and
concept papers to the Department of the Navy. Companies interested in the contract
reportedly include U.S. manufacturers, Northrop Grumman (with its Ingalls
Shipbuilding) and General Dynamics (with its Electric Boat); Germany’s HDW; the
Netherlands’ RDM (which sold its Zwaardvis-class submarine design to Taiwan in
the 1980s for 2 Hai Lung [Sea Dragon]-class submarines); France’s DCN; and
Spain’s IZAR. Taiwan’s China Shipbuilding Corporation also is interested in a part
22 (...continued)
Taiwan, Will Offer Four Kidd-Class Destroyers,” Wall Street Journal, April 24, 2001; “U.S.
Refuses Taiwan Request for JDAM, HARM, and PAC-3 Missiles,” Aerospace Daily, April
25, 2001; and “U.S. Formally Informs ROC of Arms Sales Decision,” Central News Agency
(Taiwan), April 25, 2001.
23 Taiwan Defense Review, January 18, 2003, reported the briefing took place in late 2001.
24 Lien-Ho Pao [United Daily News] (Taiwan), October 29, 2002.
25 Taiwan Defense Review, March 12, 2003.
26 Taipei Times, May 26, 2002; Jane’s Defence Weekly, June 5, 2002.

CRS-6
of the contract, with support from some of Taiwan’s legislators. The Department of
Navy discussed options with Taiwan’s Navy in July 2002 and planned to select the
manufacturer(s) to design and build the submarines in the latter half of 2003 with the
first submarine delivered perhaps in 2010.27 The Navy held a second industry day on
December 17, 2002, with General Dynamics, Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman,
and Raytheon interested in being the prime contractor.28
In addition to the military and political implications of selling submarines to
Taiwan’s navy, issues for Congress include potential technology transfers to Taiwan
and Europeans, and leaks to the PRC, that could involve U.S. submarine secrets and
implications for the U.S. Navy. In a report to Congress, as required by the National
Defense Authorization Act for FYs 1992-1993, the Secretary of the Navy reported
in May 1992 that “to the extent that a potential diesel submarine construction project
would draw on U.S. resources, it has the potential to tap into the state-of-the-art
technology used in U.S. nuclear powered submarines.” The report also noted “the
fact that the diesel submarine is not a viable asset in the U.S. Navy” and that
“construction of diesel submarines for export in U.S. shipyards would not support the
U.S. submarine shipbuilding base and could encourage future development and
operation of diesel submarines to the detriment of our own forces.” The report also
said that “it may be possible to control the release of the most important information
and specific technologies of concern, but an effective system would also have
significant costs. The problem will be more difficult, however, if a foreign entity is
present in the shipyards during submarine construction.”
Kidd-Class Destroyers. In October 2002, the Defense Committee of
Taiwan’s legislature engaged in a sharp partisan debate over whether to approve
funding to buy the U.S. Navy’s currently available Kidd-class destroyers, ending with
18 lawmakers from the ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) and Taiwan
Solidarity Union (TSU) voting in favor, against 16 legislators from the Kuomintang
(KMT) and People’s First Party (PFP).29 Afterwards, legislators conditioned funding
on bargaining with the U.S. Navy on a 15 percent reduction in price.
Missile Defense. After U.S. approval in 1992, Taiwan in 1997 acquired
three Patriot missile defense fire units with PAC-2 Guidance Enhanced Missiles.
After the Bush Administration in 2001 decided to brief Taiwan on the advanced
PAC-3 hit-to-kill missile, Taiwan has not finalized a deal on the PAC-3 system
(which may include upgrading the 3 current units while adding 3 or 6 fire units). The
U.S. Army completed developmental testing of the PAC-3 in October 2001 and
conducted operational tests in 2002. The PAC-3 has been deployed with the U.S.
Army, as seen in Operation Iraqi Freedom in March-April 2003. The Patriot system
is called the world’s most advanced ground-based system for defense against aircraft,
theater ballistic missiles, and cruise missiles. In late 2002, the Pentagon reportedly
27 Central News Agency (Taiwan), July 30, 2002; Taipei Times, July 31, 2002; Defense
Daily
, September 16, 2002.
28 Knight-Ridder/Tribune Business News, December 17, 2002.
29 Taipei Times and China Post (Taiwan), November 1, 2002.

CRS-7
was disappointed with Taiwan’s delay in acquiring the PAC-3.30 At a private sector
conference on Taiwan’s defense in February 2003, Bush Administration officials
openly stressed to Taiwan’s visiting Vice Defense Minister Chen Chao-min the
imperative of acquiring advanced missile defense systems. (See Policy Issues for
Congress
below.) In March 2003, Mary Tighe, the Director of Asian and Pacific
Affairs, led a Defense Department delegation to Taiwan to urge its acquisition of
missile defense systems, including the PAC-3.31 After Vice Minister Chen criticized
the Patriot’s performance in Operation Iraqi Freedom, a Pentagon spokesperson, Jeff
Davis, publicly corrected Chen to Taiwan’s media on March 27, 2003.32
Early Warning Radars. In 1999, some in Congress encouraged the Clinton
Administration to approve a sale of early warning radars (see 106th Congress below).
Taiwan has not concluded a contract for this procurement, while the Pentagon has
stressed the importance of long-range early warning and tracking of any missile
attacks against Taiwan. In March 2003, Taiwan reportedly was considering two
options: the Pave Paws radar system sold by Raytheon and the Advanced Digital
Surveillance Radar proposed by Lockheed Martin.33
C4ISR. In addition, after approval in 1999, the United States reportedly has
assisted Taiwan’s C4ISR program (named Po Sheng), involving sales of datalink
systems and integration of the services into a joint command and control system.34
In July 2001, the Administration notified Congress of a proposed sale of Joint
Tactical Information Distribution Systems (JTIDS)/Link 16 terminals.
AMRAAMs. In April 2000, the Clinton Administration approved the sale of
AIM-120 Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missiles (AMRAAMS) to Taiwan,
with the understanding that the missiles would be kept in storage on U.S. territory
and transferred later to Taiwan, if/when the People’s Liberation Army (PLA)
acquires a similar Russian missile, like the R-77 (AA-12) air-to-air missile, or
threatens to attack Taiwan. On July 1, 2002, the Washington Times reported that, in
June, two SU-30 fighters of the PLA Air Force test-fired AA-12 medium-range air-
to-air missiles acquired from Russia. The report raised questions as to whether the
PLA already deployed the missiles. According to Reuters (July 10, 2002), Raytheon
Co. planed to finalize production of the AMRAAMs for Taiwan by the fall of 2003.
Some in Congress then urged the Administration to transfer the AMRAAMs to
Taiwan after production. (See 107th Congress.) By the end of 2002, the
Administration authorized delivery of the AMRAAMs to Taiwan and briefed its air
force on ground-launched AMRAAMs.35
30 Taiwan Defense Review, December 6, 2002.
31 Central News Agency (Taiwan), March 11, 2003.
32 Taipei Times, March 29, 2003.
33 Jane’s Defense Weekly, March 26, 2003.
34 Chung-Kuo Shih-Pao [China Times] (Taiwan), July 18, 2001; Defense and Aerospace
(U.S.-Taiwan Business Council), 2001; Taiwan Defense Review, August 27, 2002.
35 Lien-Ho Pao [United Daily News] (Taiwan), January 5, 2003; Remarks of Deputy Under
(continued...)

CRS-8
Taiwan’s Decisions. Thus, since the U.S. response to Taiwan’s requests in
2001, attention has turned to Taiwan, where the military, civilian leadership, a newly
assertive legislature (Lifa Yuan), and competing political parties have debated
contentious issues about how much to spend on defense and which U.S. weapons
systems to acquire. The debate has taken place as the Pentagon has warned of the
PLA’s accelerated buildup in a coercive strategy targeting Taiwan. In 2002,
Taiwan’s defense ministry said that it needed the legislature to approve NT$700
billion (about US$21 billion) over the next 10 years for arms procurement.36 After
the Administration stressed to Taiwan the imperatives of missile defense, C4ISR, and
anti-submarine warfare, Taiwan’s minister of defense in March 2003 issued a new
procurement plan emphasizing those priorities.37 The table summarizes Taiwan’s
estimates of costs for procuring major items over the next 10 years or longer.
Table: Estimated Costs of Taiwan’s Arms Acquisitions
Major Item
NT$ billion
US$ billion
PAC-3 missile defense system
120.0
3.5
Long-range early warning radars
47.0
1.4
Po Sheng C4ISR program
47.3
1.4
Kidd-class destroyers
28.4
0.8
Aegis-equipped destroyers
160.0
4.6
Submarines
210.0
6.1
P-3 ASW aircraft
96.0
2.9
Minesweeping helicopters
36.0
1.0
AAV7 amphibious assault vehicles
6.0
0.2
Apache Longbow attack helicopters
90.0
2.6
M1A2 main battle tanks
27.9
0.8
Signals intelligence (SIGINT) aircraft
12.5
0.4
M109A6 Paladin howitzers
28.0
0.8
Note: The exchange rate is about 34 New Taiwan dollars (NT$) for 1 U.S. dollar.
35 (...continued)
Secretary of the Air Force Willard Mitchell at the U.S.-Taiwan Business Council’s
conference in February 2003.
36 Chung-Kuo Shih-Pao [China Times] (Taiwan), May 17, 2002; Taiwan Defense Review,
August 30, 2002.
37 Taiwan Defense Review, March 12, 2003.

CRS-9
Policy Issues for Congress
Since the early 1990s, the PLA has modernized with a missile buildup and
foreign arms acquisitions, primarily from Russia.38 As a result of the PLA’s
provocative exercises and missile test-firings in 1995 and 1996 that were directed
against Taiwan, Congress has increasingly asserted its role vis-a-vis the
Administration in determining security assistance for Taiwan, as stipulated by
Section 3(b) of the TRA, as well as in exercising its oversight of Section 2(b)(6) of
the TRA on the U.S. capacity to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion
against Taiwan. Congress has increasingly asserted its role in determining arms sales
to Taiwan before sales are announced.39 Policy issues center on how effectively the
Administration is helping Taiwan’s defense, the role of Congress in determining
security assistance for Taiwan, and whether aspects of U.S. defense assistance for
Taiwan are stabilizing or destabilizing, and should be reviewed or changed.
Some have called for a clear commitment to help Taiwan’s defense,
interoperability with Taiwan’s military, combined operational training, high-level
exchanges, and visits by U.S. flag and general officers to Taiwan. Others have argued
that the United States needs a cooperative China, that trends in the Taiwan Strait are
destabilizing, and that the United States should review its policy of enhancing
security assistance to Taiwan.
A question arose in April 2001 when President Bush committed the United
States to do “whatever it took to help Taiwan defend herself.” Supporters have
viewed such clarity as needed to prevent misperceptions in Beijing and deter attacks
against Taiwan. However, critics have argued that Bush encouraged provocations
from Taipei and weakened willingness in Taiwan to spend on its own defense.
Moreover, while there has been much interest among U.S. academic circles and
think tanks for Washington to pursue talks with Beijing on its military buildup and
U.S. arms sales to Taiwan (instead of simply enhancing security assistance to
Taiwan),40 a catalyst for this debate among policymakers arose out of the U.S.-PRC
38 See CRS Report 97-391, China: Ballistic and Cruise Missiles, by Shirley Kan, and CRS
Report RL30700, China’s Foreign Conventional Arms Acquisitions, by Shirley Kan,
Christopher Bolkcom, and Ronald O’Rourke.
39 As for all U.S. arms sales, months or years after the President’s decision on Taiwan’s
requests and Taiwan’s subsequent decisions on which sales to pursue, the role of Congress
includes review of major proposed FMS deals notified to Congress (during which Congress
may enact a joint resolution of disapproval) as stipulated under Section 36(b) of the Arms
Export Control Act (AECA) (P.L. 90-629). See CRS Report RL31675, Arms Sales:
Congressional Review Process
, December 20, 2002, by Richard Grimmett.
40 See: David Lampton and Richard Daniel Ewing, “U.S.-China Relations in a Post-
September 11th World,” Nixon Center, August 2002; David Shambaugh’s arguments at
conference by Carnegie Endowment, Stanford University, Center for Strategic and
International Studies, and National Committee on U.S.-China Relations, on “Taiwan and
U.S. Policy: Toward Stability or Crisis?,” October 9, 2002; Michael Swaine, “Reverse
Course? The Fragile Turnaround in U.S.-China Relations,” Carnegie Endowment Policy
(continued...)

CRS-10
summit in Crawford, TX, on October 25, 2002. As confirmed to Taiwan’s legislature
by its envoy to Washington, C.J. Chen, and reported in Taiwan’s media, PRC
President Jiang Zemin offered in vague terms a freeze or reduction in China’s
deployment of missiles targeted at Taiwan, in return for restraints in U.S. arms sales
to Taiwan.41 President Bush reportedly did not respond to Jiang’s linkage. Editorials
in Taiwan were divided on whether to pursue Jiang’s offer.
Some argued that confidence building measures, such as a freeze or reduction
in PLA missile and other military deployments, would improve the chances for cross-
strait political dialogue and lead to greater stability. They said that the United States
could explore how the PRC might reduce the threat against Taiwan, such as
dismantling missile brigades in a verifiable manner, since sales of U.S. systems are
based on Taiwan’s defense needs. Others said that a freeze or redeployment of
missiles would not eliminate the PRC’s continuing and broader military threat
against Taiwan (including mobile missiles) and that the PRC still refused to hold
talks with leaders in Taipei. They argued that Jiang did not seek to reduce the PLA’s
coercive threat but to undermine the relationship between Washington and Taipei,
including sales and deliveries of weapons systems which take years to complete.
One issue for congressional oversight has concerned whether and how the
Administration might discuss with Beijing the question of U.S. arms sales to Taiwan.
Policy considerations include the TRA, the 1982 Joint Communique (which
discussed reductions in U.S. arms sales to Taiwan premised on the PRC’s peaceful
unification policy), and the 1982 “Six Assurances” to Taiwan (including one of not
holding prior consultations with the PRC on U.S. arms sales to Taiwan). At a
hearing in March 2001, Secretary of State Powell assured Senator Helms that the
“Six Assurances” remain U.S. policy and that the Administration would not favor
consulting the PRC on arms sales to Taiwan.42 The Bush Administration reportedly
did not respond to Jiang’s verbal offer, noting the accelerated missile buildup,
continued military threats against Taiwan, the need for the PRC to talk directly to
Taiwan, the TRA, and the “Six Assurances” to Taiwan.
Since 2002, concern has increased about Taiwan’s commitment to its self-
defense. The Pentagon’s report to Congress submitted in July 2002 said that reforms
in Taiwan’s military were needed to achieve a joint service capability to meet “the
growing challenge from the PLA’s modernizing air, naval, and missile forces,” but
the Pentagon warned that the steady decline in Taiwan’s defense budget (as a
percentage of total government spending) posed a challenge to its force
40 (...continued)
Brief, February 2003.
41 Chung-Kuo Shih-Pao [China Times], November 22, 2002; Taipei Times, November 23,
2002.
42 Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Hearing on U.S. Foreign Policy, March 8, 2001.

CRS-11
modernization.43 (Taiwan’s defense budget for 2002 was NT$261 billion44 (about
US$7.6 billion), which accounted for 17 percent of government spending and 2.7
percent of GDP. Taiwan foreign exchange reserves totaled almost $170 billion in
March 2003, the third largest foreign exchange reserves after Japan’s and China’s.)
In January 2003, supporters of Taiwan at the conservative Heritage Foundation urged
Taiwan’s leaders to be serious about its own defense.45
In late 2002, the Pentagon reportedly conducted a policy review of cooperation
with Taiwan that examined whether its leaders have taken defense seriously, whether
defense cooperation with Taiwan has been effective, and whether U.S. policy should
change.46 (The NSC, State Department, and AIT would have input into any review
by the Administration of policy toward Taiwan.47) At the U.S.-Taiwan Business
Council’s conference on Taiwan’s defense in February 2003, in San Antonio, TX,
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Richard Lawless told Taiwan’s Vice Defense
Minister Chen Chao-min and others that, while the President said that we will do
whatever it takes to help Taiwan defend itself, Taiwan “should not view America’s
resolute commitment to peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait as a substitute for
investing the necessary resources in its own defense.” At the same occasion, Deputy
Assistant Secretary of State Randall Schriver indicated a proactive U.S. approach
towards Taiwan, stressing three priorities to Taiwan’s military: missile defense,
C4ISR, and anti-submarine warfare.
Congressional Action
105th Congress. In the 105th Congress, the FY1999 National Defense
Authorization Act (P.L. 105-261) required the Secretary of Defense to study the U.S.
missile defense systems that could protect and could be transferred to “key regional
allies,” defined as Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan.48 In addition, the conference
report (H.Rept. 105-746 of the FY1999 Defense Appropriations Act, P.L. 105-262)
43 Department of Defense, “Annual Report on the Military Power of the People’s Republic
of China,” July 12, 2002.
44 Taiwan’s Defense White Paper 2002.
45 Peter Brookes, “The Challenges and Imperatives in Taiwan’s Defense,” Heritage Lectures,
January 9, 2003; John Tkacik, “Taiwan Must Get Serious About Defense,” Defense News,
January 27, 2003.
46 Taiwan Defense Review, January 18, 2003.
47 The Nelson Report (January 31, 2003) reported there was an interagency East Asia Policy
Review.
48 Department of Defense, “Report to Congress on Theater Missile Defense Architecture
Options for the Asia-Pacific Region,” unclassified version, May 1999; CRS Report
RL30379, Missile Defense Options for Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan: A Review of the
Defense Department Report to Congress
, November 30, 1999, by Robert D. Shuey and
Shirley A. Kan.

CRS-12
required a report from the Pentagon on the security situation in the Taiwan Strait, in
both classified and unclassified forms.49
106th Congress. In the 106th Congress, Representative Gilman, Chairman of
the House International Relations Committee, wrote President Clinton on April 19,
1999, urging approval for the sale of long-range early warning radars to Taiwan. He
also wrote Secretary of State Albright on April 22, 1999, saying that if the
Administration did not approve the sale, he would introduce legislation to do so. In
the end, the Clinton Administration decided in principle to sell early warning radars
to Taiwan. The State Department spokesperson confirmed that the United States
agreed on the request in principle and acknowledged that under the TRA, “the
President and Congress determined which defense articles and services Taiwan
needs.”50 The Pentagon spokesperson also confirmed that the United States “agreed
to work with the Taiwanese to evaluate their early warning radar needs, and that will
take place over the next year or so, but there is no specific agreement on a specific
type of radar, specific sale, or specific terms of sale at this time.”51
Also, Members debated whether the House-passed “Taiwan Security
Enhancement Act (TSEA)” (S. 693, Helms; H.R. 1838, DeLay) was needed to better
assist Taiwan or was unnecessary and counterproductive in a delicate situation, as the
Clinton Administration maintained. The TSEA also increased attention to U.S.-
Taiwan military exchanges, including that on communication and training. The
Pentagon is said to have supported the spirit of the bill, although not its passage.52
The TSEA was not enacted, although the House passed H.R. 1838 on February 1,
2000, by 341-70.
Seeking more information from the Pentagon on which to base its
considerations, Congress passed the FY2000 National Defense Authorization Act
(P.L. 106-65), requiring annual reports on PRC military power and the security
situation in the Taiwan Strait.53 Also, in consolidated appropriations legislation for
FY2000 (P.L. 106-113), Congress required a report on the operational planning of
the Department of Defense to implement the TRA and any gaps in knowledge about
PRC capabilities and intentions affecting the military balance in the Taiwan Strait.54
49 Department of Defense, “Report to Congress Pursuant to the FY99 Appropriations Bill,
The Security Situation in the Taiwan Strait,” unclassified version, February 1, 1999; CRS
Report RS20187, Taiwan’s Defense: Assessing the U.S. Department of Defense Report,
“The Security Situation in the Taiwan Strait,”
April 30, 1999, by Robert Sutter.
50 Shenon, Philip, “U.S. Plans to Sell Radar to Taiwan to Monitor China,” New York Times,
April 30, 1999; Department of State, Daily Press Briefing, April 29, 1999.
51 Defense Department News Briefing, April 30, 1999.
52 Steven M. Goldstein and Randall Schriver (former official in the Office of the Assistant
Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs), “An Uncertain Relationship: The
United States, Taiwan, and the Taiwan Relations Act,” China Quarterly, March 2001.
53 Department of Defense, “Annual Report on the Military Power of the People’s Republic
of China,” unclassified version, June 2000 and July 2002.
54 Department of Defense, “Report to Congress on Implementation of the Taiwan Relations
(continued...)

CRS-13
Concerning Congress’ role before the Administration’s decisions on arms sales,
the 106th Congress passed language, introduced by Senator Lott, in the FY2000
Foreign Operations Appropriations Act (in Div. B of P.L. 106-113), requiring the
Secretary of State to consult with Congress to devise a mechanism for congressional
input in determining arms sales to Taiwan. Again, in the FY2001 Foreign Operations
Appropriations Act (P.L. 106-429), Congress passed the Taiwan Reporting
Requirement, requiring the President to consult on a classified basis with Congress
30 days prior to the next round of arms sales talks. (Those required consultations
took place on March 16, 2001.)
107th Congress. In the 107th Congress, some Members opposed the sale of
Aegis-equipped destroyers, because they could be interpreted as offensive rather than
defensive sales and could involve significant interaction with the U.S. military, as
Senators Feinstein and Thomas (chairman of the Foreign Relations Subcommittee on
East Asian and Pacific Affairs) wrote in the Washington Times on March 28, 2001.
Other Members – 83 in the House (led by Representatives Cox and Wu) and 20 in
the Senate (led by Senators Helms and Torricelli) – wrote letters to President Bush
on April 3, 2001, urging approval of the sale of those destroyers. A March 2001 staff
report to Senator Helms of the Foreign Relations Committee called for meeting
Taiwan’s defense needs, particularly for submarines and destroyers.55
In addition, some in Congress urged the Administration to deliver AMRAAMs
to Taiwan after the Washington Times on July 1, 2002, reported that, in June, two
SU-30 fighters of the PLA Air Force test-fired AA-12 medium-range air-to-air
missiles acquired from Russia. The report raised questions as to whether the PLA
already deployed the missiles, meeting one of the conditions by which the United
States would deliver the AMRAAMs to Taiwan – rather than keep them in storage
– as approved for sale by the Clinton Administration in 2000. On July 16, 2002,
Senators Kyl, Helms, Bob Smith, and Torricelli wrote Secretary of State Colin
Powell, urging the Bush Administration to allow the transfer of AMRAAMS to
Taiwan “as soon as they are produced” rather than “quibble over whether the AA-12
tests mean that China has an ‘operational’ capability.”
The National Defense Authorization Act for FY2002 (P.L. 107-107), enacted
December 28, 2001, authorized the President to transfer (by sale) the four Kidd-class
destroyers to Taiwan (Sec. 1011), under Section 21 of the AECA. Also, Section
1221 of the act required a new section in the annual report on PRC military power
(as required by P.L. 106-65 discussed above) to assess the PLA’s military
acquisitions and any implications for the security of the United States and its friends
and allies. The scope of arms transfers to be covered was not limited to those from
54 (...continued)
Act,” unclassified version, December 2000.
55 Senate Foreign Relations Committee, “U.S. Defense Policy Toward Taiwan: In Need of
an Overhaul,” a Staff Trip Report to the Committee on Foreign Relations, S. Prt. 107-26, by
James Doran, printed April 2001.

CRS-14
Russia and other former Soviet states, as in the original House language (H.R.
2586).56
The Foreign Operations Appropriations Act for FY2002 (P.L. 107-115),
enacted on January 10, 2002, brought unprecedented close coordination between the
Executive and Legislative branches on arms sales to Taiwan. Section 573 required
the Departments of State and Defense to provide detailed briefings (not specified as
classified) to congressional committees (including those on appropriations) within
90 days of enactment and not later than every 120 days thereafter during FY2002.
The briefings were required to report on U.S.-Taiwan discussions on potential sales
of defense articles or services to Taiwan.
Some Members called for ensuring regular and high-level consultations with
Taiwan and a role for Congress in determining arms sales to Taiwan, after President
Bush announced on April 24, 2001 (the day of the last annual arms sales talks), that
he would drop the annual arms talks process with Taiwan in favor of normal, routine
considerations on an “as-needed” basis.57 Due to the absence of diplomatic relations,
successive administrations used a process in determining arms sales to Taiwan that
was institutionalized in the early 1980s as annual rounds of talks with Taiwan
defense authorities consisting of several phases leading up to final meetings usually
in April.58 In overseeing the new process, factors or implications to consider
included the following:
! Congress’ role in decision-making and ability to exercise oversight
! role of arms sales talks in the broader long-range and joint defense
strategy for Taiwan (vs. a narrower focus on specific requests)
! role of arms sales in U.S. diplomatic and defense policies (including
various elements of the “one China” policy)
! U.S. objectives for the Taiwan military
! nature of the U.S.-Taiwan military relationship
! extent of high-level U.S.-Taiwan military exchanges
! effect of an annual high-profile controversy on U.S. interests
! usefulness to Congress and Taiwan of a deadline for decisions
! influence of various interest groups in a more defused process
! changes in high-level, intensive attention given by the White House
and its coordination of the inter-agency debates
! changes in the Pentagon’s basis for recommendations
! Taiwan’s desire to receive similar treatment given to others
! consultations with allies, including Japan.
The Foreign Relations Authorization Act for FYs 2002 and 2003 (H.R. 1646),
passed in the House on May 16, 2001, contained provisions on arms sales to Taiwan.
56 Still, the Pentagon’s report, issued on July 12, 2002, discussed China’s military
acquisitions from states of the former Soviet Union, and not other countries (e.g., Israel).
57 Milbank, Dana and Mike Allen, “Bush to Drop Annual Review of Weapons Sales to
Taiwan,” Washington Post, April 25, 2001.
58 See CRS Report RS20365, Taiwan: Annual Arms Sales Process, October 21, 1999,
updated June 5, 2001, by Shirley Kan.

CRS-15
First, H.R. 1646 included authority (in Section 851) for the President to sell the four
Kidd-class destroyers to Taiwan. Second, as proposed by Representative Brad
Sherman in the House International Relations Committee, Section 813 sought to
require that Taiwan be treated as the “equivalent of a major non-NATO ally” for
defense transfers under the AECA or the Foreign Assistance Act, while the language
stopped short of designating Taiwan as a major non-NATO ally. According to the
Member’s office, the provision would show tangible support for Taiwan’s defense,
provide it with status similar to that given to Australia, New Zealand, and Argentina,
offer it the “right of first refusal” for EDA, and treat it with enhanced status for anti-
terrorism assistance, cooperative research and development projects in the defense
area, and expedited review in satellite licensing. Third, Representative Gary
Ackerman introduced Section 814 to require the President to consult annually with
Congress and Taiwan about the availability of defense articles and services for
Taiwan. The consultations with Taiwan would occur at a level not lower than that
of the Vice Chief of General Staff and in Washington, D.C. – as has been the case.
Finally enacted as P.L. 107-228 on September 30, 2002, the Foreign Relations
Authorization Act for FY2003 authorized – at the Bush Administration’s request –
the Department of State and other departments or agencies (including the Department
of Defense) to detail employees to AIT (Section 326); required that Taiwan be
“treated as though it were designated a major non-NATO ally” (Section 1206);
required consultations with Congress on U.S. security assistance to Taiwan every 180
days (Section 1263); and authorized the sale to Taiwan of the four Kidd-class
destroyers (Section 1701).59 Section 326, amending the Foreign Service Act of 1980,
has significant implications for the assignment of government officials to AIT,
including active-duty military personnel for the first time since 1979. (Employees
have been separated from government service for a period of time in the name of
“unofficial” relations, but personnel issues have affected AIT and its contractors.
Defense Department personnel, including those supporting security assistance, have
been civilian staff and retired or resigned military personnel.)
In signing the bill into law on September 30, 2002, President Bush issued a
statement that included criticism of Section 1206. He said that “Section 1206 could
be misconstrued to imply a change in the ‘one China’ policy of the United States
when, in fact, that U.S. policy remains unchanged. To the extent that this section
could be read to purport to change United States policy, it impermissibly interferes
with the President’s constitutional authority to conduct the Nation’s foreign affairs.”
The FY2003 National Defense Authorization Act, passed in the House on May
10, 2002, contained Section 1202 seeking to require the Secretary of Defense to
implement a comprehensive plan to conduct combined training and exchanges of
senior officers with Taiwan’s military and to “enhance interoperability” with
Taiwan’s military. The language was similar to that of Section 5(b) in the Taiwan
Security Enhancement Act proposed in the 106th Congress. The Senate’s version,
passed on June 27, 2002, did not have the language. The Washington Times reported
59 For more details on proposed House and Senate language, see: “Arms Sales to Taiwan,”
in CRS Report RL31046, Foreign Relations Authorization, FY2003: An Overview.

CRS-16
on August 9, 2002, that the Department of State opposed the language as unnecessary
(given U.S. support under the TRA).
As Members worked out differences in conference, Deputy Defense Secretary
Paul Wolfowitz wrote in a letter to the House and Senate Armed Services
Committees on September 27, 2002, that “while we welcome Congress’ support for
the U.S. commitments under the Taiwan Relations Act and for the President’s
commitment to the defense of Taiwan, we believe that the objectives of Section 1202
are best achieved by preserving the traditional statutory role of the Secretary to
exercise authority, direction, and control over the Department of Defense to conduct
such activities as are needed to support those commitments, including his authority
to preserve the confidentiality of those activities.” The Pentagon “strongly
recommends that this provision be deleted, although we would not object to language
that would call upon the Department to brief the Congress periodically on progress
we are making to meet our commitments to Taiwan security,” Wolfowitz wrote. As
enacted on December 2, 2002, the legislation (P.L. 107-314) contained a revised
section (1210), requiring a Presidential report 180 days after the act’s enactment (due
May 31, 2003) on the feasibility and advisability of conducting combined operational
training and exchanges of senior officers with Taiwan’s military. (U.S. policy has
allowed Taiwan’s senior military officers and defense officials to visit the United
States, while not sending U.S. flag and general officers to Taiwan.)
108th Congress. On March 26, 2003, Representative Vitter introduced H.R.
1454 to establish policy to provide missile defense systems capable of defending
Taiwan (and Israel, Japan, Republic of Korea, and North Atlantic Treaty
Organization countries) against ballistic missile attacks; and to seek burdensharing
agreements with them.
Major U.S. Defense Sales
The following table provides information on U.S. sales (not deliveries) of major
defense articles and services to Taiwan, as approved by the President, proposed in
Letters of Offer and Acceptance, and notified to Congress since 1990. Based on
unclassified notices and news reports, this list includes the date of notification, major
item or service proposed for sale, and estimated value of the defense package. The
list was compiled based on unclassified notifications to Congress or announcements
by the Administration as well as press reports. These were primarily government-to-
government FMS. Major FMS are notified to Congress as required by Section 36(b)
of the AECA. Not all of these approved sales were necessarily purchased by Taiwan.
There have been other transfers of U.S. defense articles and services not included in
this list (that amounted to billions of dollars), including sales and technical assistance
with smaller individual values not required to be notified to Congress, those with
classified notifications, and other direct commercial sales licensed for export by the
Department of State and notified to Congress under section 36(c) of the AECA (but
subject to the confidentiality requirements of section 38(e)). There have also been
leases of naval vessels and other equipment. Moreover, each year, hundreds of
Taiwan’s military personnel at different levels receive training and education at U.S.
military institutions and facilities.

CRS-17
Value of
Date of
Major Item or Service as Proposed
Package
Notification (usually part of a package)
($ million)
1990
07/26
Cooperative Logistics Supply Support
$108
09/06
(1) C-130H transport aircraft
$45
1991
01/07
(100) MK-46 torpedoes
$28
07/24
(97) SM-1 Standard air defense missiles
$55
09/13
(110) M60A3 tanks
$119
11/18
Phase III PIP Mod Kits for HAWK air defense
systems
$170
1992
05/27
Weapons, ammunition, support for 3 leased ships
$212
05/27
Supply support arrangement
$107
08/04
(207) SM-1 Standard air defense missiles
$126
09/14
(150) F-16A/B fighters
$5,800
09/14
(3) Patriot-derived Modified Air Defense System
(MADS) fire units60
$1,300
09/18
(12) SH-2F LAMPS anti-submarine helicopters
$161
1993
06/17
(12) C-130H transport aircraft
$620
06/25
Supply support arrangement
$156
07/29
(38) Harpoon anti-ship missiles
$68
07/30
Logistics support services for 40 leased T-38
trainers
$70
08/
(4) E-2T Hawkeye airborne early warning aircraft61
$700
09/08
Logistics support services for MADS
$175
11/04
(150) MK-46 Mod 5 torpedoes
$54
11/09
Weapons, ammunition, and support for 3 leased
frigates
$238
60 Commercial sale. Opall Barbara and David Silverberg, “Taiwanese May Soon Coproduce
Patriot,” Defense News, February 22-28, 1993; Military Balance 1999-2000.
61 Flight International, September 1-7, 1993.

CRS-18
Value of
Date of
Major Item or Service as Proposed
Package
Notification (usually part of a package)
($ million)
11/23
MK-41 Mod (short) Vertical Launch Systems for
ship-based air defense missiles
$103
1994
08/01
(80) AN/ALQ-184 electronic counter measure
(ECM) pods
$150
09/12
MK-45 Mod 2 gun system
$21
1995
03/24
(6) MK-75 shipboard gun systems,
(6) Phalanx Close-In Weapon Systems
$75
06/07
Supply support arrangement
$192
1996
05/10
Improved Mobile Subscriber Equipment
communications system
$188
05/10
(30) TH-67 training helicopters,
(30) sets of AN/AVS-6 night vision goggles
$53
05/23
(465) Stinger missiles,
(55) dual-mounted Stinger launcher systems
$84
06/24
(300) M60A3TTS tanks
$223
08/23
(1,299) Stinger surface-to-air missiles,
(74) Avenger vehicle mounted guided missile
launchers,
(96) HMMWVs (high-mobility multi-purpose
wheeled vehicle)
$420
09/05
(110) MK-46 MOD 5 anti-submarine torpedoes
$66
1997
02/14
(54) Harpoon anti-ship missiles
$95
05/23
(1,786) TOW 2A anti-armor guided missiles,
(114) TOW launchers, (100) HMMWVs
$81
07/24
(21) AH-1W Super Cobra helicopters8
$479
09/03
(13) OH-58D Kiowa Warrior Armed Scout
helicopters
$172
11/09
Pilot training and logistics support for F-16 fighters
$280
8 Taiwan reportedly ordered 63 AH-1W helicopters, 42 of which were delivered by early
2000, and Taiwan may order an additional 24 helicopters (Defense News, March 6, 2000).

CRS-19
Value of
Date of
Major Item or Service as Proposed
Package
Notification (usually part of a package)
($ million)
11/09
Spare parts for various aircraft
$140
1998
01/28
(3) Knox-class frigates,9
(1) MK 15 Phalanx Close-In Weapons System
(CIWS)
$300
06/01
(28) Pathfinder/Sharpshooter navigation and
targeting pods for F-16 fighters10
$160
08/27
(58) Harpoon anti-ship missiles
$101
08/27
(61) Dual-mount Stinger surface-to-air missiles
$180
08/27
(131) MK 46 Mod 5(A)S anti-submarine torpedoes
$69
10/09
(9) CH-47SD Chinook helicopters
$486
1999
05/26
(240) AGM-114KS Hellfire II air-to-surface
missiles
$23
05/26
(5) AN/VRC-92E SINCGARS radio systems, (5)
Intelligence Electronic Warfare systems, (5)
HMMWVs
$64
07/30
Spare parts for F-5E/F, C-130H, F-16A/B, and
Indigenous Defense Fighter (IDF) aircraft
$150
07/30
(2) E-2T Hawkeye 2000E airborne early warning
aircraft
$400
2000
03/02
Modernization of the TPS-43F air defense radar
to TPS-75V configuration
$96
03/02
(162) HAWK Intercept guided air defense missiles11
$106
06/07
(39) Pathfinder/Sharpshooter navigation and
targeting pods for F-16 fighters
$234
06/07
(48) AN/ALQ-184 ECM pods for F-16s
$122
9 In 1992, the Bush Administration submitted legislation that Congress passed to lease 3
Knox-class frigates to Taiwan. Reports say that Taiwan leased a total of 6 (and
subsequently bought them in 1999) and purchased 2 in 1998 (plus 1 for spares).
10 The sale of the navigation/targeting pods excluded the laser designator feature, but the
Pentagon notified Congress on May 16, 2000, that 20 sets would be upgraded to include the
feature.
11 On June 23, 2000, the Pentagon notified Congress of a sale of 156 excess HAWK air
defense missiles to Taiwan for about $7 million.

CRS-20
Value of
Date of
Major Item or Service as Proposed
Package
Notification (usually part of a package)
($ million)
09/28
(146) M109A5 howitzers, 152 SINCGARS radio
systems
$405
09/28
(200) AIM-120C Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-
Air Missiles (AMRAAMs) for F-16 fighters
$150
09/28
(71) RGM-84L Harpoon anti-ship missiles
$240
09/28
Improved Mobile Subscriber Equipment (IMSE)
communication system
$513
2001
07/18
(50) Joint Tactical Information Distribution Systems
(JTIDS) terminals (a version of Link 16) for data
links between aircraft, ships, and ground stations
$725
09/05
(40) AGM-65G Maverick air-to-ground missiles for
F-16s
$18
10/26
(40) Javelin anti-tank missile systems
$51
10/30
Logistical support for spare parts for F-5E/F, C-
130H, F-16A/B, and IDF aircraft
$288
2002
06/04
(3) AN/MPN-14 air traffic control radars
$108
09/04
(54) AAV7A1 assault amphibious vehicles
$250
09/04
Maintenance of material and spare parts for aircraft,
radar systems, AMRAAMS, and other systems
$174
09/04
(182) AIM-9M-1/2 Sidewinder air-to-air missiles
$36
09/04
(449) AGM-114M3 Hellfire II anti-armor missiles
for use on AH-1W and OH-58D helicopters
$60
10/11
(290) TOW-2B anti-tank missiles
$18
11/21
(4) Kidd-class destroyers
$875