Order Code IB92117
Issue Brief for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
Iraq: Weapons Programs,
U.N. Requirements, and U.S. Policy
Updated April 16, 2003
Kenneth Katzman
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

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CONTENTS
SUMMARY
MOST RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS
Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)
1997-1998 Crises
Operation Desert Fox and Aftermath
“Axis of Evil” and U.S. Policy
Resolution 1441
Wartime and Post-War Inspections
Nuclear Program
Current Status
Older Unresolved Questions
Chemical Weapons
Current Status
Older Unresolved Questions
Biological Weapons
Current Status
Older Unresolved Questions
Ballistic Missiles
Current Status
Unresolved Questions
Human Rights/War Crimes Issues
War Crimes Trials
International Terrorism/September 11
Iraq-Kuwait Issues
Border Issues/Kuwaiti Sovereignty
Kuwaiti Detainees and Property
Reparations Payments
U.S. Policy, Sanctions, and the Oil-for-Food Program
“Smart Sanctions” Initiative
Protecting/Supporting Iraq’s Opposition
Military Action and Long-Term Containment
Kurds/Operation Northern Watch (ONW)
Shiite Muslims/Operation Southern Watch
Costs of Containment

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Iraq: Weapons Programs, U.N. Requirements, and U.S. Policy
SUMMARY
After accusing Iraq of failing to comply
major combat against Iraq has wound down,
with U.N. Security Council resolutions that
the U.S. military is increasing its focus on
require Iraq to rid itself of WMD, the Bush
finding banned WMD programs in Iraq,
Administration began military action against
although no clear WMD finds have been
Iraq on March 19, 2003. In the wake of the
reported.
September 11 attacks, there was heightened
U.S. concern about the potential threat posed
On November 10, 1994, as required, Iraq
by Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction pro-
accepted the U.N.-designated land border with
grams and alleged ties to terrorist groups, to
Kuwait (confirmed by Resolution 833) as well
which Iraq might transfer WMD. However,
as Kuwaiti sovereignty. Iraq has not detailed
many governments did not support U.S.
the fate of about 600 Kuwaitis still missing
military action to disarm Iraq because it failed
from the war and has not returned all Kuwaiti
to receive U.N. authorization.
property taken. Iraq initially rejected a 1991
U.N.-sponsored “oil-for-food” program to
Part of the debate over U.S. policy
address humanitarian needs, but it later ac-
centered on whether Iraq’s WMD programs
cepted a revised version of that plan, opera-
could be ended through U.N. weapons inspec-
tional since December 1996 but suspended
tions. During 1991-1998, a U.N. Special
due to the war.
Commission on Iraq (UNSCOM) made con-
siderable progress in dismantling and moni-
Iraq was widely deemed non-compliant
toring Iraq’s but was unable to finish verifying
in other areas, especially human rights issues.
Iraq’s claim that it has destroyed all its WMD
A U.S.-led no-fly zone provided some protec-
or related equipment. Iraq’s refusal of full
tion to Kurdish northern Iraq after April 1991.
cooperation with UNSCOM eventually
Since August 1992, a no-fly zone was en-
prompted U.S.-British military action in
forced over southern Iraq, where historically
December 1998. All inspectors withdrew and
repressed Iraqi Shiites are concentrated. The
Iraq was uninspected during 1998-2002,
zone was expanded in August 1996, but Iraq
leaving uncertainty as to the status of Iraq’s
nonetheless maintained a substantial ground
WMD programs. At the start of military
presence in the south. Iraq openly challenged
action, many of the questions about those
both no-fly zones after December 1998.
programs remained unresolved. Now that
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

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MOST RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
On November 8, 2002, the Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 1441,
giving U.N. weapons inspectors new authorities; inspections began November 27. After
several reports by the U.N. weapons inspectors on their work, the U.N. Security Council did
not agree to authorize use of force against Iraq. All inspectors were withdrawn, and the
United States, Britain, and a few other allies began a military offensive against Iraq on March
19, 2003. Saddam Hussein’s regime vacated Baghdad on April 9.
BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS
In response to Iraq’s August 2, 1990 invasion of Kuwait, U.N. Security Council
Resolution 678 (November 29, 1990) authorized the use of force to expel Iraq from Kuwait.
After the Persian Gulf war (January 16 - February 28, 1991), a ceasefire was declared in
Security Council Resolution 686 (March 2, 1991). The primary ceasefire resolution is
Security Council Resolution 687 (April 3, 1991), which required Iraq – in return for a
graduated easing of sanctions – to end its weapons of mass destruction programs, recognize
Kuwait, account for missing Kuwaitis, return Kuwaiti property, and end support for
terrorism. Iraq accepted the resolution. Iraq was required by Resolution 688 (April 5, 1991)
to end repression of its people. In forty reviews (at 60-day intervals) of Iraqi compliance
from the end of the Gulf war in 1991 until August 20, 1998, the U.N. Security Council
maintained the comprehensive international sanctions on Iraq’s imports and exports imposed
by Security Council Resolution 661 (August 6, 1990). After the breakdown of the original
weapons inspections regime in December 1998, two additional major resolutions (1284 of
December 17, 1999 and 1441 of November 8, 2002) were adopted in an effort to resume
U.N. disarmament efforts. Including Resolution 1441, a total of 17 U.N. resolutions required
Iraq’s complete dismantlement of its WMD programs. (See CRS Report RL30472, Iraq:
Oil-for-Food Program, Sanctions, and Illicit Trade; and CRS Report RL31339, Iraq: U.S.
Efforts to Change the Regime, the Iraqi Opposition, and Post-War Iraq.)
Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)
During 1991-1998, a U.N. Special Commission (UNSCOM) and the International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) attempted to verify that Iraq had ended all its prohibited
WMD programs and to establish a long-term monitoring program of WMD facilities
(Resolution 715, October 11, 1991). The monitoring program, accepted by Iraq in
November 1993, consisted of visitations and technical surveillance of about 300 sites. Under
Resolution 1051 (March 27, 1996), U.N. weapons inspectors monitored, at point of entry
and at end-use destination, Iraq’s imports of any dual use items.
Confrontations over access to suspected WMD sites began almost as soon as UNSCOM
began operations in April 1991, prompting adoption of Resolution 707 (August 15, 1991)
requiring unfettered access to all sites and disclosure by Iraq of all its WMD suppliers.
During March 1996 - October 1997, Iraq impeded inspectors from entering Iraqi security
service and military facilities, and it interfered with some UNSCOM flights. These actions,
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which were not resolved by a March 1996 side agreement between UNSCOM and Iraq
governing pre-notification of inspections of defense and security sites, prompted
Resolution 1060 (June 12, 1996) and other Council statements (such as on June 13, 1997)
demanding Iraqi cooperation. Resolution 1115 (June 21, 1997) threatened travel restrictions
against Iraqi officials committing the infractions, and Resolution 1134 (October 23, 1997)
again threatened a travel ban and suspended sanctions reviews until April 1998.
1997-1998 Crises. Six days after that vote, Iraq barred American UNSCOM
personnel from conducting inspections, and on November 13, 1997, it expelled the
Americans. Resolution 1137 ( November 12, 1997), imposed travel restrictions on Iraqi
officials. (On November 13, 1997, the House adopted H.Res. 322, backing unilateral U.S.
military action as a last resort. The Senate did not act on a similar resolution, S.Con.Res. 71,
because some Senators wanted it to call for the United States to overthrow Saddam Hussein.)
In November 1997 and February 1998, Russia and U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan,
respectively, brokered temporary compromises that enabled UNSCOM to resume
inspections. The February 23, 1998 U.N.-Iraq agreement provided for access to eight
“presidential sites” by weapons inspectors and diplomatic observers. Resolution 1154
(March 2, 1998) accepted that agreement, threatening “the severest consequences” if Iraq
reneged. Iraq allowed presidential site inspections (1,058 buildings) during March 26-April
3, 1998, the travel ban on Iraqi officials was lifted, and sanctions reviews resumed.
Iraq subsequently refused to implement an UNSCOM plan for completing its work and,
in August 1998, barred UNSCOM from inspecting previously inspected facilities. The
Senate and House passed a resolution, S.J.Res. 54 (P.L. 105-235, signed August 14, 1998),
declaring Iraq in “material breach” of the ceasefire. The Security Council adopted
Resolution 1194 (September 9, 1998) demanding full unfettered inspections access and
suspending sanctions reviews. On October 30, 1998, the Security Council offered an easing
of sanctions if Iraq fulfilled WMD and other outstanding requirements, but Iraq demanded
an immediate end to sanctions and it ceased cooperation with UNSCOM (but not the IAEA).
The U.N. Security Council adopted Resolution 1205 (November 5, 1998), deeming the Iraqi
action a “flagrant violation” of the February 1998 U.N.-Iraq agreement. On November 14,
1998, with the United States about to launch airstrikes, Iraq pledged cooperation, averting
airstrikes but prompting President Clinton to openly declare a U.S. policy of regime change.
Operation Desert Fox and Aftermath. After a month of testing Iraq’s cooperation,
UNSCOM said on December 15, 1998 that Iraq refused to yield known WMD-related
documents and that it was obstructing inspections. All inspectors withdrew and a 70-hour
U.S. and British bombing campaign followed (Operation Desert Fox, December 16-19,
1998), directed against Iraqi WMD-capable facilities and military and security targets. After
almost one year of negotiations, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1284 (December
17, 1999) by a vote of 11- 0 (Russia, France, China, and Malaysia abstained), providing,
subject to a vote of the Security Council, for the suspension of most sanctions if Iraq “fully
cooperates” with a new WMD inspection body (UNMOVIC, U.N. Monitoring, Verification
and Inspection Commission). The resolution called for inspectors to determine within 60
days of reentering Iraq what WMD elimination tasks remain and to report to the Council
every three months. In January 2000, former IAEA director Hans Blix was named head of
UNMOVIC. In the absence of Iraq’s agreement to allow in-country inspections during 1999-
2002, UNMOVIC’s staff of 63 – all employees of the United Nations and not their individual
governments – reviewed documents and imagery, interviewed informants, and reviewed
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civilian contracts for goods purchased by Iraq to determine whether certain items subject to
review (“Goods Review List” items) were included.
“Axis of Evil” and U.S. Policy. Amid a growing debate over whether to expand the
post-September 11 “war on terrorism” to Iraq, based partly on fears that Iraq would not
hesitate to use WMD or provide WMD to terrorist groups, in early 2002 President Bush
began to build a case that the United States must act preemptively to change Iraq’s regime
and prevent its re-emergence as a threat. In his January 2002 State of the Union speech he
described Iraq as part of an “axis of evil,” along with Iran and North Korea. One month prior
to that speech, the House passed H.J.Res. 75 on December 20, 2001, by a vote of 392-12.
The resolution called Iraq’s refusal to readmit U.N. inspectors a “material breach” of its
international obligations and a mounting threat to peace and security. The resolution, not
taken up in the Senate, did not explicitly authorize U.S. military action.
Resolution 1441. After an internal debate, the Administration decided to work
through the U.N. Security Council to force Iraq to eliminate its suspected WMD. In a
September 12, 2002 speech before the United Nations, President Bush implicitly threatened
U.S. military action, unilateral if necessary, if the United Nations did not enforce existing
resolutions on Iraq. Four days later, Iraq pledged to admit UNMOVIC inspectors without
conditions, reversing a position taken during several meetings with the United Nations in
2002. On October 11, Congress completed work on a resolution (H.J.Res. 114, P.L. 107-
243) authorizing the use of U.S. armed forces against Iraq.
After several weeks of negotiations, on November 8, 2002 the Security Council
unanimously adopted Resolution 1441, with the following key provisions:
(1) declaring Iraq in material breach of pre-existing resolutions;
(2) giving Iraq 7 days to accept the resolution and 30 days (until December 8) to provide a
full declaration of all WMD programs;
(3) requiring new inspections to begin within 45 days (December 23) and an interim progress
report within 60 days thereafter (no later than February 21, 2003);
(4) declaring all sites, including presidential sites, subject to unfettered inspections;
(5) giving UNMOVIC the right to interview Iraqis in private, including taking them outside
Iraq, and to freeze activity at a suspect site;
(6) forbidding Iraq from taking hostile acts against any country upholding U.N. resolutions,
a provision that appeared to cover Iraq’s defiance of the “no fly zones;” and
(7) giving UNMOVIC the authority to report Iraqi non-compliance and the Security Council
as a whole the opportunity to meet to consider how to respond to Iraqi non-compliance.
This was interpreted by France and some other countries as requiring a second
resolution to authorize force, although the United States disputed that interpretation.
Iraq accepted the resolution on November 13 in a defiant letter, and inspections began
on November 27. Blix said the inspectors received full access in their inspections of about
450 sites (over 300 by UNMOVIC and 140 by the IAEA). On December 7, Iraq submitted
its required declaration, but after comparing the Iraqi declaration to U.S. intelligence
assessments, the Bush Administration said on December 19, 2002 that there were material
omissions that constituted a further material breach of Iraq’s obligations. Blix criticized the
declaration as failing to clear up outstanding questions, although he did not call the
declaration a material breach of Resolution 1441.
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President Bush and other senior U.S. officials maintained that Iraq did not actively
cooperate with the new disarmament effort. In briefings to the Security Council on January
27, February 14, and March 7, Blix and IAEA head Mohammad Baradei said that Iraq had
failed to fully comply with Resolution 1441 but that Iraq had been providing more active
cooperation in February - March and that inspections were making progress, including some
substantive disarmament (destruction of the Al Samoud II missile).
Maintaining that the inspections process would not lead to Iraq’s disarmament, the
United States, Britain, and Spain called for a Security Council vote on a resolution to set a
short deadline for Iraq to clearly demonstrate full cooperation and voluntary disarmament or
face use of force. After a few weeks of diplomacy, on March 17, 2003, the three countries
determined that the Security Council would not vote in favor of the resolution, and they
withdrew it. That night, President Bush issued an ultimatum for Saddam Hussein and his
sons Uday and Qusay to leave Iraq or face military action. At the same time, Secretary
General Annan ordered the U.N. inspectors out of Iraq. Saddam rebuffed the ultimatum, and
on March 19, U.S. military action (Operation Iraqi Freedom) began. On April 9, 2003, the
Baathist regime vacated Baghdad, signaling the fall of the regime.
Wartime and Post-War Inspections. With almost all of Iraq under the control of
U.S.-led forces, U.S. teams are currently attempting to detect and catalogue any WMD
uncovered. As of April 16, the teams and the U.S. military have found chemical weapons
protections equipment and some suspect equipment, including buried dual use labs found
near Karbala, but no clear WMD stockpiles or clearly dedicated WMD production facilities.
U.S officials say the effort to find banned WMD is in its early stages and that they are certain
they will find banned WMD. Several U.N. Security Council members want UNMOVIC and
the IAEA to return to Iraq to conduct the search, rather than U.S.-led forces, and the Council
asked Blix to brief it on April 22 on the possibility of future inspections. The United States
and Britain are said to oppose the return of UNMOVIC and IAEA to Iraq. Just after the war
started, IAEA Director Baradei said the IAEA should have a role to play in post-war Iraq.
Blix said he will retire at the end of June but that UNMOVIC still exists and has not been
dismantled, although the United States reportedly has recruited some UNMOVIC or other
former inspectors to work in a U.S.-led WMD search effort in Iraq. Blix has expressed regret
that his inspections were cut off by the U.S.-British decision to take military action.
The following summarizes outstanding issues on Iraq’s WMD.
Nuclear Program
Current Status. The United States believes that Iraq retained the expertise (about
7,000 scientists and engineers) and intention to rebuild its nuclear program. Administration
officials pointed particularly to reputed attempts to purchase materials abroad, including
uranium from Niger and aluminum tubes that could be used in a nuclear weapons program.
IAEA chief Mohammad Baradei said March 7 that the IAEA believes the tubes were for use
in conventional rocket programs, although their importation was not legal under the
international sanctions regime. He also said documents alleging attempted procurement of
uranium from Niger were “not authentic.” The IAEA said on January 27, 2003 that it had
found no evidence Iraq had restarted a nuclear program, and it repeated that assessment
March 7, 2003.
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Older Unresolved Questions. During 1991-1994, despite Iraq’s initial declaration
that it had no nuclear weapons facilities or unsafeguarded material, UNSCOM/IAEA
uncovered and dismantled a previously-undeclared network of about 40 nuclear research
facilities, including three clandestine uranium enrichment programs (electromagnetic,
centrifuge, and chemical isotope separation) as well as laboratory-scale plutonium separation
program. Inspectors found and dismantled (in 1992) Iraq’s nuclear weapons development
program, and they found evidence of development of a radiological weapon (“dirty bomb”),
which scatters nuclear material without an explosion. UNSCOM removed from Iraq all
discovered nuclear reactor fuel, fresh and irradiated. Following the defection of Hussein
Kamil (Saddam’s son-in-law and former WMD production czar) in August 1995, Iraq
revealed it had launched a crash program in August 1990 to produce a nuclear weapon as
quickly as possible by diverting fuel from its reactors for a nuclear weapon. The IAEA
report of December 1, 1995 said that, if Iraq had proceeded with its crash program, Iraq
might have produced a nuclear weapon by December 1992.
In 1997, the IAEA said that Iraq’s nuclear program had been ended and that it had a
relatively complete picture of Iraq’s nuclear suppliers. A May 15, 1998 Security Council
statement reflected a U.S.-Russian agreement to close the nuclear file if Iraq cleared up
outstanding issues (nuclear design drawings, documents, and the fate of some nuclear
equipment). An IAEA report of July 1998 indicated that some questions still remained, and
the United States did not agree to close the file. In May 2000, the IAEA destroyed a nuclear
centrifuge that Iraq had stored in Jordan in 1991. In January 2002, as it has in each of the
past 3 years, IAEA inspectors verified that several tons of uranium remained sealed, acting
under Iraq’s commitments under the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
Chemical Weapons
Current Status. In January 2003, UNMOVIC and Iraq found 16 chemical artillery
munitions, believed empty. Iraq included an Iraqi Air Force document in its December 7
declaration that indicated that 6,500 chemical bombs were unaccounted for (13,000 bombs
the document says were used versus 19,500 bombs Iraq previously said were used). An
October 2002 CIA assessment, released by the Administration, said Iraq had renewed
chemical weapons production and probably stocked a few hundred tons of agent. An
UNMOVIC workplan on unresolved issues, submitted March 7, 2003, said UNMOVIC had
found in Iraq a previously undeclared type of cluster munition that could deliver chemical
or biological agents.
Older Unresolved Questions. UNSCOM destroyed all chemical weapons materiel
uncovered — 38,500 munitions, 480,000 liters of chemical agents, 1.8 million liters of
precursor chemicals, and 426 pieces of production equipment items — and the destruction
operation formally ended on June 14, 1994. In February 1998 UNSCOM discovered that
shells taken from Iraq in 1996 contained 97% pure mustard gas, indicating it was freshly
produced. However, the fate of about 31,600 chemical shells, 550 mustard gas bombs, and
4,000 tons of chemical precursors remains unknown. The primary remaining chemical
weapons questions center on VX nerve agent, which Iraq did not include in its initial 1991
declarations and of which no stockpile was ever located. Iraq did not prove it destroyed the
chemical precursors. By 1995 UNSCOM had uncovered enough circumstantial evidence to
force Iraq to admit to producing about 4 tons of VX, but UNSCOM believed that Iraq had
imported enough precursor — about 600 tons — to produce 200 tons of the agent. In late
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June 1998, UNSCOM revealed that some unearthed missile warheads, tested in a U.S. Army
lab, contained traces of VX, contradicting Iraq’s assertions that it had not succeeded in
stabilizing the agent. Separate French and Swiss tests did not find conclusive evidence of
VX. In March 2003, Iraq proposed a technical method to prove its assertions that it
destroyed its VX in 1991. About 170 chemical sites were under long-term monitoring. Iraq
has not signed the Chemical Weapons Convention that took effect April 29, 1997.
Biological Weapons
Current Status. There are more unresolved questions about Iraq’s biological
weapons than about any other WMD category; Iraq’s biological declarations during 1991-
1998 were considered neither credible nor verifiable, and very little new was apparently
included in Iraq’s December 7, 2002 declaration. The October 2002 CIA assessment said
that Iraq had reactivated its biological program and that most elements of the program are
larger and more advanced than they were before the Gulf war. U.S. officials say Iraq has
developed unmanned aerial vehicles that could be used to deliver biological or chemical
weapons, and Secretary of State Powell showed an artist’s sketch, based on intelligence
information, of a mobile biological weapons production facility in his February 5, 2003
briefing to the Security Council. Blix said on March 7, 2003 that UNMOVIC had found
mobile labs used for food testing, but no biological weapons labs. In February 2003, Iraq
dug up, under UNMOVIC’s supervision, fragments of over 100 R-400 biological bombs
(anthrax, botulinum, and aflatoxin) destroyed in 1991 and declared in August 1995.
Older Unresolved Questions. Iraq did not initially (1991) declare any biological
materials, weapons, research, or facilities, and no biological weapons stockpile was ever
uncovered. UNSCOM focused its investigation initially on the major biological research and
development site at Salman Pak, but Iraq partially buried that facility shortly before the first
inspections began. In August 1991, Iraq admitted that it had a biological weapons research
program. In July 1995, Iraq modified its admission by acknowledging it had an offensive
biological weapons program and that it had produced 19,000 liters of botulinum, 8,400 liters
of anthrax, and 2,000 liters of aflatoxin, clostridium, and ricin. According to UNSCOM,
Iraq imported a total of 34 tons of growth media for producing biological agents during the
1980s, of which 4 tons remained unaccounted for. Iraq did not give UNSCOM information
on its development of drop tanks and aerosol generators for biological weapons. UNSCOM
had 86 biological sites under long-term monitoring. UNSCOM discovered and dismantled
the Al Hakam facility on June 20, 1996. The White House said in late December 2001 that
the anthrax used in the October 2001 mailings appeared to be from a domestic source, such
as a U.S. military laboratory.
Ballistic Missiles
Current Status. Iraq made progress in developing permitted-range missiles – the
Ababil and Samoud programs – according to the January 2002 CIA report to Congress and,
prior to Desert Fox, UNSCOM had been monitoring about 63 missile sites and 159 items of
equipment, as well as 2,000 permitted missiles. Iraq’s December 7 declaration said some
flight tests of these missiles did exceed the allowed range by about 50 km, and Blix ordered
the destruction of the Al Samoud (about 120 missiles) and related production equipment.
Iraq began the destruction by the deadline of March 1, and about half of the missile force was
destroyed by the time the war started. Iraq’s “Fatah” program was being studied to see if
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its range exceeds allowed limits. Some of these missiles were fired by Iraq into Kuwait
during the war thus far, but almost all were intercepted by U.S. Patriot systems.
Unresolved Questions. U.N. Security Council Resolution 687 required the
destruction of all Iraqi ballistic missiles with a range greater than 150 kilometers. UNSCOM
accounted for 817 of 819 Soviet-supplied Scud missiles, 130 of which survived the Gulf war,
as well as all 14 declared mobile launchers and 60 fixed launch pads. U.S. analysts believe
Iraq might have concealed as many as 12 Scud-like missiles and that it was manufacturing
propellants for missiles of ranges longer than those allowed. Thus far in the current war
against Iraq, no firing of any Scud or Scud-range missiles by Iraq have been announced, and
Iraq has not fired any missiles at Israel thus far.
UNSCOM’s October 1998 report said it had been able to account for at least 43 of the
45 chemical and biological (CBW) warheads Iraq said it unilaterally destroyed in 1991. (The
warheads were unearthed in mid-1998.) An additional 30 chemical warheads were destroyed
under UNSCOM supervision. UNSCOM also accounted for all but 50 conventional Scud
warheads and said it made progress establishing a material balance for Scud engine
components. Unresolved issues include missile program documentation, 300 tons of special
propellant, and indigenous production (30 indigenously-made warheads and 7 missiles).
There is evidence of past Iraqi cheating on missile issues. In December 1995, after
Jordan reported seizing 115 Russian-made missile guidance components allegedly bound for
Iraq, UNSCOM said Iraq had procured some missile components since 1991, a violation of
sanctions. (That month, UNSCOM retrieved prohibited missile guidance gyroscopes,
suitable for a 2,000 mile range missile, from Iraq’s Tigris River, apparently procured from
Russia’s defense-industrial establishment.)
Human Rights/War Crimes Issues
U.S. and U.N. human rights reports since the Gulf war have repeatedly described the
Baath regime as a gross violator of human rights. In 1994, the Clinton Administration said
it was considering presenting a case against Iraq to the International Court of Justice under
the 1948 Genocide Convention. U.N. Rapporteur for Iraq Max Van der Stoel’s February
1994 report said that Convention might be violated by Iraq’s abuses against the Shiite
“Marsh Arabs” in southern Iraq, including drainage of the marshes where they live. In
February 2002, Iraq allowed the U.N. human rights rapporteur for Iraq, Andreas Mavromatis
of Cyprus, to visit Iraq, the first such visit since 1992. On October 20, 2002, Saddam
Hussein granted an amnesty and released virtually all prisoners in Iraq, calling the move
gratitude for his purported “100%” victory in a referendum (no opponent) on his leadership
on October 15, 2002.
War Crimes Trials. U.N. Security Council Resolution 674 (October 29, 1990) calls
on all states or organizations to provide information on Iraq’s 1991 Gulf war-related
atrocities to the United Nations. The Foreign Relations Authorization Act for FY1992, (P.L.
102-138, October 28, 1991, section 301) stated the sense of Congress that the President
should propose to the U.N. Security Council a war crimes tribunal for Saddam Hussein.
Similar legislation was later passed, including H.Con.Res. 137, (passed the House November
13, 1997); S.Con.Res. 78, (passed the Senate March 13, 1998); and a provision of the Iraq
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Liberation Act (P.L. 105-338, signed October 31, 1998). Analysis of this issue and
information on U.S. funding for Iraqi war crimes issues, see CRS Report RL31339, Iraq:
U.S. Efforts to Change the Regime and Post-War Iraq.
International Terrorism/September 11
U.N. Resolution 687 required Iraq to end support for international terrorism, and Iraq
made a declaration that it would do so in 1991. FBI Director Robert Mueller said in early
May 2002 that, after an exhaustive FBI and CIA investigation, no direct link has been found
between Iraq and any of the September 11 hijackers, although some still assert that hijacker
Mohammad Atta met with Iraqi intelligence in Prague in April 2001. Senior U.S. officials
said in September 2002, and again in January 2003, that there are contacts between Al Qaeda
members and Iraq, that Iraq had helped Al Qaeda train with chemical weapons in the past,
and that the Ansar Islam faction in northern Iraq has contacts with Baghdad. In a February
5, 2003 briefing to the Security Council, Secretary Powell offered additional U.S.
intelligence of these linkages. U.S. forces bombed the Ansar enclave in northern Iraq in the
opening days of the current war.
Others maintain that Baghdad has had little contact with Al Qaeda because it differs
with Al Qaeda’s Islamist ideology and because doing so would hurt Iraq’s efforts to improve
relations with moderate Arab states that are threatened by Al Qaeda. Al Qaeda founder
Osama bin Laden, in a February 12, 2003 audiotape, exhorted the Iraqi people to resist a U.S.
invasion but also criticized Saddam and his ruling Ba’th Party as socialist “infidels.” The
CIA told Congress on October 7, 2002 that Iraq would likely not conduct a terrorist attack
using WMD against the United States unless there were a U.S.-Iraq war.
Iraq remains on the U.S. list of state sponsors of terrorism and, according to the State
Department’s reports on international terrorism (most recently the report for 2001, issued
May 21, 2002), continues to harbor the Abu Nidal Organization and the Palestine Liberation
Front of Abu Abbas. In August 2002, Abu Nidal died (committed suicide or was killed) as
Iraqi police went to arrest him for alleged contacts with foreign governments opposed to
Baghdad. U.S. forces captured Abu Abbas in Baghdad on April 15, 2003, and his legal
status is now being discussed. During 2000 - 2003, Iraq was paying the families of
Palestinian suicide bombers $25,000, and Iraq reportedly welcomed a few thousand Arab
volunteers to fight against the United States or commit terrorist acts in the course of
Operation Iraqi Freedom. (See CRS Report RL31119, Terrorism: Near Eastern Groups and
State Sponsors, 2002.)
Iraq-Kuwait Issues
Resolution 1284 required reports on the issues discussed below but, unlike Resolution
687, did not link the easing of any sanctions to Iraqi compliance on Kuwait-related issues.
Resolution 1441 did not impose any new Kuwait-related requirements on Iraq.
Border Issues/Kuwaiti Sovereignty. Resolution 687 required Iraq to annul its
annexation of Kuwait, directed the U.N. Secretary-General to demarcate the Iraq-Kuwait
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border, and established a demilitarized zone 10 kilometers into Iraq and 5 kilometers into
Kuwait. Resolution 773 (August 26, 1992) endorsed border decisions taken by the
Iraq-Kuwait Boundary Demarcation Commission (established May 2, 1991) that, in
November 1992, finished demarcating the Iraq-Kuwait border as described in an October
1963 agreement between Iraq and Kuwait. The border took effect January 15, 1993. The
new line deprived Iraq of part of Umm Qasr port and a strip of the Rumaylah oil field, which
straddles the border. On March 18, 1993, the Commission determined the sea border,
allowing both countries access to the Gulf. Resolution 833 (May 27, 1993) demanded that
Iraq and Kuwait accept the final border demarcation. On November 10, 1994, Iraq formally
recognized Kuwait in a motion signed by Saddam Hussein. At the Arab summit in Beirut
(March 27-29, 2002), Iraq reaffirmed its commitment to Kuwait’s territorial integrity and
pledged to cooperate to determine the fate of missing Kuwaitis (see below). On December
7, 2002, Saddam Hussein issued an “apology” to Kuwait for the invasion, but Kuwait
rejected it as insincere.
Until it ended operations on the eve of the current war, the 32-nation U.N. Iraq-Kuwait
Observer Mission (UNIKOM), established by Resolutions 687 and 689 April 9, 1991),
monitored border violations. The United States contributed 11 personnel to the 197
observers in UNIKOM, which was considered a U.N. peacekeeping operation. Under
Resolution 806 (February 5, 1993), passed after Iraqi incursions into the demilitarized zone
in January 1993 (and other incidents), a 908-member Bengali troop contingent supplemented
the observer group. Kuwait furnished two-thirds of UNIKOM’s $51 million annual budget.
The United States contributed about $4.5 million per year to UNIKOM.
Kuwaiti Detainees and Property. Security Council Resolutions 686 and 687
require Iraq to account for Kuwaiti and other nationals detained in Iraq during the Persian
Gulf crisis. Of an initial 628 Kuwaiti cases, 608 are unresolved (ICRC figure as of May
2000), as are the cases of an additional 17 Saudi nationals. Iraq admitted to having arrested
and detained 126 Kuwaitis, but did not provide enough information to resolve their fate.
Only three cases were resolved since 1995. Since January 1995, Iraq and Kuwait were
meeting every month on the Iraq-Kuwait border, along with U.S., British, French, and Saudi
representatives, but Iraq has boycotted the meetings since Operation Desert Fox. In February
2000, retired Russian diplomat Yuli Vorontsov was appointed to a new post (created by
Resolution 1284) of U.N. coordinator on the issue of missing Kuwaiti persons and
unreturned property. Iraq has not allowed him to visit Iraq, and in April, June, and August
2000, as well as in March, April, and June 2001, the Security Council has issued statements
of concern about the lack of progress. On December 12, 2002, Iraq publicly invited
Vorontsov to visit, but no visit occurred. In January 2003, Iraq held a few meetings with
Kuwait and Saudi Arabia on the issue, pledging to bring forward new information on the fate
of the missing, but no outstanding cases were resolved. In April 2002, Iraq offered to receive
a U.S. team to discuss the case of missing Gulf war Navy pilot Michael Speicher, but
Defense Department officials declined on doubts of the benefits of a visit. One unconfirmed
press report from the United Arab Emirates on April 15 said that U.S.-led forces found 18
Kuwaiti detainees in an Iraq prison, but no information has yet emerged to confirm that.
U.N. Security Council Resolutions 686 and 687 require Iraq to return all property
seized from Kuwait. In the first few years after the cease-fire, Iraq returned some Kuwaiti
civilian and military equipment, including U.S.-made Improved Hawk air defense missiles,
and a June 2000 Secretary General report and a June 19, 2000 Security Council statement did
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note that Iraq had returned “a substantial amount of property.” However, since 1994, U.S.
officials have accused Iraq of returning to Kuwait some captured Iranian equipment that was
never part of Kuwait’s arsenal and of using Kuwaiti missiles and armored personnel carriers
during Iraq’s October 1994 troop move toward the Kuwait border. The United Nations and
Kuwait say Iraq has not returned extensive Kuwaiti state archives and museum pieces, as
well as military equipment including eight Mirage F-1 aircraft, 245 Russian-made fighting
vehicles, 90 M113 armored personnel carriers, one Hawk battery, 3,750 Tow anti-tank
missiles, and 675 Russian-made surface-to-air missile batteries. Iraq claimed the materiel
was left behind or destroyed when Iraq evacuated Kuwait. In July 2002, an agreement was
reached on a “mechanism” for Iraq to return Kuwait’s state archives (six truckloads of
documents) to Kuwait. Iraq began the return of tons of documents on October 20, 2002,
although Kuwait said key archives were not returned. Iraq returned some additional property
in early February 2003.
Reparations Payments
The U.N. Security Council has set up a mechanism for compensating the victims of
Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait (individuals, governments, and corporations), using 25% (reduced
from 30% in December 2000) of the proceeds from Iraqi oil sales. As of April 16, 2003,
the Compensation Commission (UNCC) has approved claims worth about $43.6 billion, of
a total asserted value of $320 billion claims submitted. Following an April 2003 payout of
about $860 million, which included $780 million in payments to Kuwait, $23 million for
British companies, and $20 million for the Israeli government, the UNCC has paid out about
$17.5 billion. Awards to U.S. claimants thus far total over $666 million. In September
2000, the UNCC governing council approved an award to Kuwait of $15.9 billion for oil
revenues lost because of the Iraqi occupation and the aftermath of the war (burning oil wells).
In June 2001, the UNCC approved $243 million in payments to all of Iraq’s immediate
neighbors (except Turkey) for studies of Gulf war environmental damage. Of this amount,
$5 million was approved for Iraq’s legal expenses to counter the expected environmental
reparations claims. Kuwait was awarded $700 million in October 2002 to cover the cost of
removing Iraqi mines laid in the Gulf war.
Several legislative proposals (“Iraq Claims Act”) to distribute Iraq’s frozen assets (about
$2.4 billion) in the United States (separate from the U.N. compensation process) were not
enacted, because of differences over categories of claimants that should receive priority. In
the 107th Congress, H.R. 1632 proposes to distribute Iraq’s frozen assets primarily to U.S.
victims of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. Some might argue that this group of claimants is
covered under the U.N. process discussed above and that the frozen assets in the United
States should be used for those with claims resulting from events prior to the Iraqi invasion.
On March 20, 2003, President Bush issued an executive order for the U.S. government to
confiscate the frozen Iraqi assets and to hold them for reconstruction of Iraq following the
current war. (See CRS Report 98-240, Iraq: Compensation and Assets Issues.)
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U.S. Policy, Sanctions, and the Oil-for-Food Program
As international concerns for the plight of the Iraqi people grew, the United States had
increasing difficulty maintaining support for international sanctions. The oil-for-food
program (OFF), established by Resolution 986 (April 15, 1995) and in operation since
December 1996, has been progressively modified to improve Iraq’s living standards, and the
United States has eased its own sanctions to align them with the program. Of the Security
Council permanent members, the United States set the highest standards for full Iraqi
compliance that would trigger a lifting of sanctions. The United States ruled out direct
dialogue with Iraq on the grounds that Iraq’s level of compliance did not justify talks. (See
CRS Report RL30472, Iraq: Oil-For-Food Program, Sanctions, and Illicit Trade, which also
covers U.S. trade regulations for Iraq and Iraq’s illicit trade with its neighbors.)
“Smart Sanctions” Initiative. During a February 2001 trip to the Middle East,
Secretary of State Powell presented a U.S. plan to facilitate exports of civilian equipment to
Iraq in exchange for measures to ensure that no militarily useful goods reach Iraq. The Bush
Administration portrayed its initiative as an effort to rebuild containment by narrowing
differences within the Security Council and limiting sanctions erosion. After a year of debate
within the Council on the U.S. plan, on May 14, 2002, the Security Council adopted
Resolution 1409, providing for goods to be exported to Iraq without Sanctions Committee
scrutiny, largely removing the opportunity for Sanctions Committee members to place
contracts for Iraq on “hold.” Military items remained banned outright and a defined list of
items (Goods Review List, GRL) remained subject to export after review by UNMOVIC.
The new export procedures were placed into effect in late July 2002. Resolution 1447
(December 4) rolled the program over for another six months and contained a pledge to add,
within 30 days, certain items to the GRL, items that the United States said could be used by
Iraq to counter a U.S. military offensive. The Security Council added 36 U.S.-suggested
items to the GRL on December 30, 2002 (Resolution 1454).
Comprehensive U.S. trade sanctions against Iraq have been in place since Iraq’s 1990
invasion (Executive Order 12722 of August 2, 1990, Executive Order 12724 of August 6,
1990, and the Iraq Sanctions Act of 1990, Section 586 of P.L. 101-513). Since then, U.S.
trade regulations have been amended to align them with the OFF program. U.S. imports of
Iraqi oil have increased since 1999 and, at the time of the start of Operation Iraqi Freedom,
now accounted for almost half of Iraq’s oil exports, amounting to about 1.1 million barrels
per day as of January 2003. The imports are purchased by U.S. refiners through other
companies and are not bought directly from Iraq.
Prior to the OFF program, funds for civilian goods and the implementation of U.N.
resolutions on Iraq were drawn from frozen Iraqi assets transferred — or direct contributions
— to a U.N. escrow account pursuant to Resolution 778 (October 2, 1992). Total U.S.
transfers to the escrow account, which matched contributions from other countries, reached
$200 million, the maximum required under Resolution 778. These transfers were being
repaid to the United States from proceeds of the OFF program. Resolutions 1284 and 1302
(June 8, 2000) suspended reimbursements until the end of 2000; about $173 million was due
back to the United States. Repayments resumed in 2001.
The oil-for-food program was suspended on the eve of the current war, but, in
accordance with Resolution 1472, is to be restarted for a 45-day period. The Administration,
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in its request for supplemental funding to pay for the current war, has also requested that
Congress approve legislation repealing or enabling the waiving of U.S. sanctions on Iraq in
the post-war period. Most of that sanctions easing request was provided for in the FY2003
supplemental appropriations, H.R. 1559/P.L. 108-11.
Protecting/Supporting Iraq’s Opposition
The debate on Iraq policy included the question of the role, if any, for the Iraqi
opposition in U.S. military action against Iraq and in a post-Saddam Iraq. In the runup to the
war, during August 9 and 10, 2002, senior members of six major Iraqi opposition groups
visited Washington for meetings with senior U.S. officials. These groups sponsored a major
meeting in London ( December 13-17, 2002) that established a 65-member “follow-up
committee,” in which Iranian-backed Shiite Islamists are heavily represented. The Bush
Administration opposed the formation of a provisional government in advance of Saddam’s
overthrow. The “follow-up committee” met in northern Iraq in late February 2003 and
named a smaller six person “leadership” committee, although it stopped short of declaring
itself a provisional government. The six are Iraqi National Congress director Ahmad
Chalabi; PUK leader Talabani (see below); KDP leader Masud Barzani (see below); Shiite
leader Mohammad Baqr Al Hakim, who heads the Supreme Council for the Islamic
Revolution in Iraq, SCIRI; Iraq National Accord leader Iyad Alawi; and former Iraqi foreign
minister Adnan Pachachi. Representatives of some, but not all, of these groups attended a
U.S.-sponsored meeting in Nasiriyah on April 15 to begin discussing the formation of an
interim government; SCIRI publicly boycotted the meeting as U.S.-dominated.
Military Action and Long-Term Containment
Prior to the 2003 war, U.S. deployments had focused on containing Iraq. The United
States and Britain enforced two “no fly zones” to provide a measure of protection for Iraq’s
Kurdish minority and other objects of regime repression and to contain Iraq militarily. To
enforce the no-fly zones, the two allies invoked U.N. Resolution 678 (November 29, 1990,
authorizing use of force to expel Iraq from Kuwait), 687 (the main ceasefire resolution), 688
(human rights), and the Safwan Accords (the March 3, 1991 cease-fire agreements between
Iraq and the coalition forces that banned Iraqi interference with allied air operations).
Resolutions 678 and 687 were written under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, dealing with
peace and security, and were interpreted as allowing military action to enforce these
resolutions. Resolution 688 was not written under Chapter VII, nor did that or any other
resolution specifically establish no fly zones. With Operation Iraqi Freedom now winding
down, U.S. officials said in mid-April that the no fly zones are no longer enforced and some
of the U.S. aircraft involved in those operations are being redeployed. Presumably, if Iraq
emerges stable and relatively sympathetic to the West, the United States will draw down
force in Saudi Arabia, estimated at about 6,000 before the war. Those forces had been a
source of some strain in light of the resentment of Saudi citizens to the presence of non-
Muslim forces in the Kingdom.
To justify Operation Desert Fox, the Administration cited additional justification from
Resolution 1154 (see above), which warned of “the severest consequences” for non-
compliance. Section 1095 of P.L. 102-190, the Defense Authorization Act for FY1992,
signed December 5, 1991, expressed Congress’ support for “all necessary means” to achieve
the goals of U.N. Security Council Resolution 687. In instances of strikes on Iraq for no fly
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zone or other infractions, the Administration also cited congressional action (primarily P.L.
102-1 of January 12, 1991), authorizing military action to expel Iraq from Kuwait. (For
information on the U.S. military posture in the Gulf, see CRS Report RL31533, Persian
Gulf: Issues for U.S. Policy, 2003.)
Kurds/Operation Northern Watch (ONW). The northern no fly zone was set up
in April 1991 to protect the Kurds in northern Iraq. The zone extended north of the 36th
parallel. After the September 1996 Iraqi incursion into northern Iraq, humanitarian aspects
of ONW were ended and France ended its ONW participation. In December 2002, Turkey
renewed for six months basing rights at Incirlik Air Base for the 24 American aircraft and
about 1,300 U.S. forces (plus allied forces). However, Turkey feared that ONW protected
the anti-Turkish Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), which takes refuge in parts of northern
Iraq, and Turkey has made repeated attacks against the PKK there since May 1997.
The two leading Iraqi Kurdish parties, the KDP led by Masud Barzani and the Patriotic
Union of Kurdistan (PUK) led by Jalal Talabani, agreed in May 1992 to share power after
parliamentary and executive elections. In May 1994, tensions between them flared into
clashes, and the KDP turned to Baghdad for backing. In August 1996, Iraqi forces helped
the KDP capture Irbil, seat of the Kurdish regional government. With U.S. mediation, the
Kurdish parties agreed on October 23, 1996, to a cease-fire and the establishment of a
400-man peace monitoring force composed mainly of Turkomens (75% of the force). The
United States funded the force with FY1997 funds of $3 million for peacekeeping (Section
451 of the Foreign Assistance Act), plus about $4 million in DOD drawdowns for vehicles
and communications gear (Section 552 of the FAA).
Also set up was a peace supervisory group consisting of the United States, Britain,
Turkey, the PUK, the KDP, and Iraqi Turkomens. A tenuous cease-fire held since November
1997 and the KDP and PUK leaders signed an agreement in Washington in September 1998
to work toward resolving the main outstanding issues (sharing of revenues and control over
the Kurdish regional government). Reconciliation efforts showed substantial progress in
2002; on October 4, 2002, the two Kurdish factions jointly reconvened the Kurdish regional
parliament for the first time since their 1994 clashes. In June 2002, the United States gave
the Kurds $3.1 million in new assistance to help continue the reconciliation process. Both
parties are represented in the opposition umbrella Iraqi National Congress, and both also
maintained a dialogue with Baghdad. The Kurds threatened to fight against any Turkish
forces that might deploy inside northern Iraq as part of a U.S.-led war, but Turkey did not
deploy in large numbers during Operation Iraqi Freedom because U.S.-led forces largely kept
Kurdish forces minimal in areas of Iraq that are of concern to Turkey, such as Kirkuk. It is
not clear what role the Kurds will play in a post-war regime; most likely the Kurds will push
to administering their northern areas with minimal interference from Baghdad.
Shiite Muslims/Operation Southern Watch. Shiites constitute a majority in Iraq
but historically have been repressed. The U.S.-led coalition declared a no-fly zone over
southern Iraq (south of the 32nd parallel) to protect the Shiites on August 26, 1992
(Operation Southern Watch), although the overflights are primarily part of the U.S.
containment strategy. The United States and the United Kingdom (but not France) expanded
the zone up to the 33rd parallel on September 4, 1996; France ended its participation entirely
after Desert Fox. In response to Iraq’s movement of troops toward Kuwait in October 1994,
Security Council Resolution 949 (October 15, 1994) demanded Iraq not deploy forces to
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threaten its neighbors. The United States and Britain interpreted this as authorizing military
action if Iraq enhanced (numbers or quality of armament) its forces below the 32nd parallel.
Such enhancements included Iraq’s movement of air defense equipment into the zones.
During March 2000-March 2001, Iraqi air defenses fired at or near fixed radar or allied
aircraft enforcing both zones on 500 occasions, in many cases provoking U.S. strikes on the
activated missile batteries. On February 16, 2001, the United States and Britain struck
elements of that network north of the southern no fly zone, in response to Iraq’s increasing
ability to target U.S. aircraft. U.S. aircraft did not go beyond the zone. During 2002, Iraqi
air defenses and related infrastructure were bombed about 60 times in response to about 200
provocations, and U.S. strikes on Iraqi facilities have become more frequent since late 2002
in conjunction with U.S. preparations for possible military action against Iraq. During the
U.S. buildup to Operation Iraqi Freedom, the target list was expanded to include those
systems, such as surface-to-surface missiles, that could be used against U.S. ground forces.
Costs of Containment. Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates
contributed a total of $37 billion to the $61.1 billion in incremental costs of Desert Storm,
all of which has been paid. From the end of the Gulf war until the end of FY2002, the
Defense Department has incurred about $10.5 billion in costs to contain Iraq and provide
humanitarian aid to the Kurds. About $1.2 billion was spent in FY2002, and an additional
$2 billion was been spent to deploy U.S. forces to the Gulf for the current war. The
Department of Defense, under the Weapons of Mass Destruction Control Act of 1992 (22
U.S.C. 5859a), assisted UNSCOM by providing U-2 surveillance flights (suspended since
the December 15, 1998 UNSCOM pullout), intelligence, personnel, equipment, and logistical
support, at a cost of about $15 million per year. (See CRS Issue Brief IB94040,
Peacekeeping: Issues of U.S. Military Involvement.)
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