Order Code RL31701
Report for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
Iraq: U.S. Military Operations
Updated April 14, 2003
Steve Bowman
Specialist in National Defense
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

Iraq: U.S. Military Operations
Summary
Iraq’s chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons programs, together with Iraqi
long-range missile development and support for terrorism, are the primary
justifications put forward for military action. On March 17, 2003 President Bush
issued an ultimatum demanding that Saddam Hussein and his sons depart from Iraq
within 48 hours. On March 19, offensive operations began with air strikes against
Iraqi leadership positions.
As of April 13, after 25 days of operations, coalition forces are in relative
control of all major Iraqi cities. Iraqi political and military leadership has
disintegrated, though few of these officials have been captured Though sporadic
firefights continue, the major challenge to coalition forces is now the restoration of
civil order and the provision of basic services to the urban population. As the U.S.
ground offensive approached Baghdad, DOD civilian leadership came under criticism
for not permitting the deployment of sufficient U.S. ground forces to maintain the
offensive, protect lines of supply, and secure rear areas where sporadic Iraqi
resistance continues. With the fall of Baghdad, Mosul, and Kirkuk, this criticism
has been muted. There has been no use of chemical or biological (CB)weapons, and
no confirmed CB weapons caches have been found.
Though press reports differ somewhat, and DOD has not released official
figures, it appears that over 340,000 U.S. military personnel are in the Persian Gulf
region (ashore and afloat) or en route. Ground forces include the 3rd Infantry
Division, the 101st Airborne Division, the 7th Cavalry Regiment, and the 1st Marine
Expeditionary Force. Elements of three other Army divisions are en route or on alert
for deployment. The U.S. Navy is sending two aircraft carrier battle groups back to
their home station, leaving three in the region. The Air Force has about 15 air wings
in the region, and strategic bombers are operating from the British airbase at Diego
Garcia, and airbases in the Middle East, Europe , and the United States. (See CRS
Report RL31763, Iraq: A Summary of U.S. Forces.) The United Kingdom has
deployed an task force of approximately 47,000 troops. Australia has deployed 2,000
troops, and 200 Polish special operations forces are also engaged. Key arrangements
for the use of regional military facilities are in place with Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, and
Oman. Saudi Arabia is permitting limited overflight rights and use of air command
centers, and Turkey has granted limited overflight rights and permission for
humanitarian aid transit. (See CRS Report RL31843, Iraq Foreign Stances Toward
US. Policy)
.
The Administration submitted a $62.6 billion FY2003 DOD supplemental
appropriation request for military operations. The House and Senate have approved
the conference report (H.Rept. 108-76) to H.R. 1559 granting $62.37 billion of the
request.
This report will be updated as events warrant.

Contents
Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Military Planning and Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Options Considered . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Current Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Factors for Consideration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Roles and Attitudes of Other Nations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Improved U.S. Military Technology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Iraqi Military Capabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Conventional Forces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Chemical and Biological Weapons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Post-War Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Other U.S. Military Resource Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Costs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

Iraq: U.S. Military Operations
Background
Iraq’s chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons programs, together with Iraqi
long-range missile development, and support for terrorism are the primary
justifications put forward by the Bush Administration for military action. Since Iraq
originally ended cooperation with U.N. inspectors in 1998, there has been little
information on the state of Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction (WMD) arsenal;
however, Administration officials are convinced that Iraq has reconstituted
significant capabilities. Initially, leading Administration officials, most notably Vice-
President Cheney, Defense Secretary Rumsfeld, and his Deputy Paul Wolfowitz,
stressed that “regime change” or the removal of Saddam Hussein from power. Later
in 2002, WMD disarmament was emphasized as the primary objective. Expanding
on this theme, President Bush, in his speech before the United Nations on September
12, 2002 specified the following conditions for Iraq to meet to forestall military
action against it:
! Immediately and unconditionally forswear, disclose, and remove or
destroy all weapons of mass destruction, long-range missiles, and all
related material.
! End all support for terrorism and act to suppress it.
! Cease persecution of its civilian population.
! Release or account for all Gulf War missing personnel.
! End all illicit trade outside the oil-for-food program and allow
United Nations administration of its funds.1
On March 17, 2003 President Bush issued an ultimatum demanding that
Saddam Hussein and his sons depart from Iraq within 48 hours. On March 19,
offensive operations commenced with air strikes against Iraqi leadership positions.
Military Planning and Operations
The Department of Defense officially released limited official information
concerning war planning or preparations against Iraq prior to the onset of offensive
operations. There were, however, frequent and significant news leaks which
provided a range of details. News reports indicated that the military options that
were under discussion varied significantly in their assumptions regarding Iraq
military capabilities, the usefulness of Iraqi opposition groups, the attitude of regional
governments, and the U.S. military resources that would be required.
1 President Bush’s Address to the U.N. General Assembly, September 12, 2002.

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Options Considered
In the wake of the successful operations in Afghanistan against the Taliban,
some Administration officials advocated a similar operation, entailing use of special
operations forces in cooperation with indigenous Iraqi opposition forces, coupled
with an extensive air offensive to destroy Hussein’s most reliable Republican Guard
units, command & control centers, and WMD capabilities. This approach assumed
that the regular Iraqi army would prove unreliable, and could even join opposition
forces once it is clear that defeat is imminent. To encourage this, significant emphasis
would be placed on an intensive psychological warfare or “psyops” campaign to
undermine the morale of Iraqi soldiers and unit commanders, persuading them of the
hopelessness of resistance.2
While having the advantage of not requiring large staging areas (though some
regional air basing would be required) or months to prepare, this was generally
considered the riskiest approach. The weakness of Iraqi opposition military forces
and their competing political agendas place their effectiveness in question, and
predicting the behavior of regular Iraqi Army units under attack is problematic. This
option also did not address the possibility of stiff resistance by Republican Guard
units in the environs of Baghdad, nor the troop requirements of a post-conflict
occupation.
This “lite” option stood in contrast to the operations plan originally offered by
U.S. Central Command. This option, often called the “Franks Plan”, after Army Gen.
Tommy Franks, the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) commander who first
briefed it to the President, calls for a large-scale ground force invasion. News
reports initially indicated, however, that this “heavy” approach did not receive the
support of the DOD civilian leadership or White House advisors. Questions over the
reliability of the regional support that would be necessary for staging areas and the
length of time required for deployment were the major concerns.3 However, the
White House rejection of the “Franks Plan” came prior to the decision to take the Iraq
issue to the United Nations Security Council. When it became clear that Security
Council deliberations and the re-introduction of U.N. inspectors to Iraq could delay
the possibility of military action for several months, it was apparently decided that
this interlude would allow time both to negotiate regional cooperation and to deploy
more substantial forces to the Persian Gulf region, and military operations today
appear to adhere closer to CENTCOM’s original recommendations. As the ground
force offensive has slowed, however, there is now increasing criticism of DOD’s
civilian leadership for not permitting the deployment of even more ground forces
prior to onset of operations.4
2 “Timing, Tactics on Iraq War Disputed; Top Bush Officials Criticize Generals'
Conventional Views “, Washington Post, August 1, 2002. p. 1
3 “The Iraq Build-up, II”, National Journal, October 5, 2002. p. 2866.
4 “Rumsfeld’s Role as War Strategist Under Scrutiny”, Reuters, March 30, 2003.

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Current Operations
Current offensive operations combine an air offensive and simultaneous ground
offensive, in contrast to the 1991 campaign which saw weeks of air attacks to soften
Iraqi resistance. U.S. Central Command’s operational plan is employing a smaller
ground force than the 1991 Desert Storm operation, reflecting an assessment that
Iraqi armed forces are neither as numerous nor as capable as they were ten years ago,
and that U.S. forces are significantly more capable. This option is dependent upon
the continued cooperation of regional nations for substantial staging areas/airbases
and required months to deploy the necessary forces.
Though press reports differ somewhat, it appears that over 340,000 U.S. military
personnel are in the Persian Gulf region (ashore and afloat) and more en route.
Currently the 3rd Mechanized Infantry Division, the 101st Airborne Division (Air
Assault) , the 7th Cavalry Regiment, and the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force form the
bulk of the U.S. ground offensive. The 4th Mechanized Infantry Division has arrived
in theater, but not yet entered Iraq. Ships bearing its equipment remained off Turkey
for weeks awaiting the outcome of negotiations to permit establishing a northern
front attacking from Turkey, and then were diverted to the Persian Gulf when these
negotiations fell through. It is anticipated that it will be late April before the 4th
Infantry will be ready to enter action. The 1st Cavalry Division, 1st Armored Division,
and 1st Mechanized Infantry Division have all been alerted for deployment, but
reportedly most elements of these divisions still remain at home bases in Europe and
the United States or have just begun to deploy. Some aviation and armor elements
of the 1st Air Cavalry and 1st Armored Division have, however, already deployed
The U.S. Navy deployed five of its twelve naval aircraft carrier battle groups, and has
now ordered two of these to return to home stations. The Air Force now has
approximately 15 air wings operating in the region. Strategic bombers are operating
from the British airbase at Diego Garcia, and airbases in the Middle East, Europe ,
and the United States. The United Kingdom has deployed over 47,000 personnel,
including a naval task force, an armored task force, a Royal Marine brigade, a
parachute brigade, a Special Air Service regiment, and a Special Boat Squadron. The
majority of these British forces are engaged in southeastern Iraq, securing the Umm
Qasr and Basra region. Australia has deployed approximately 2,000 personnel,
including special operations personnel in western Iraq, and one F/A-18 attack aircraft
squadron. Poland has 200 special operations troops around Basra. (For more
detailed information, see CRS Report RL31763, Iraq: A Summary of U.S. Forces
and CRS Report RL31843, Iraq Foreign Stances Toward US. Policy)
The invasion of Iraq was expected to begin with a 72-96 hour air offensive to
paralyze the Iraqi command structure, and demoralize Iraqi resistance across the
military-civilian spectrum. Intelligence reports indicating the possibility of striking
Saddam Hussein and his immediate circle led to an acceleration of the operations
plan, and an almost simultaneously onset of air and ground offensive operations.
CENTCOM air commanders have stressed that significant efforts will continue to be
made to minimize civilian casualties and damage to Iraqi physical infrastructure.
With twenty-five days of offensive operations, coalition forces have relative
control of all major Iraqi cities, including Baghdad, Basra, Mosul, Kirkuk, and Tikrit.
The Iraqi political and military leadership has disintegrated, although the

CRS-4
whereabouts of senior leaders, including Saddam Hussein, remain unknown. Though
pockets of resistance continue to be encountered, and individual suicide attacks
remain a threat, the major elements of the military campaign appear near completion.
CENTCOM has pursued a strategy of rapid advance, by-passing urban centers
when possible, pausing only when encountering Iraqi resistance. CENTCOM
spokesmen have characterized Iraqi resistance as sporadic and uncohesive. Oilfields
and port facilities in southern Iraq have been secured, as have two air bases in
western Iraq. Though a few oil wells were set afire, all were quelled, and there has
been no widespread environmental sabotage. Allied forces have not encountered the
mass surrenders characteristic of the 1991 campaign, however DOD reports that over
4,000 Iraqis have been taken prisoner, and believes that many more have simply
deserted their positions. Iraqi paramilitary forces, particularly the Saddam Fedayeen,
have engaged in guerrilla-style attacks from urban centers in the rear areas, but have
reportedly not inflicted significant damage, and have now declined significantly in
frequency. Nevertheless, greater attention than anticipated had to be paid to
protecting extended supply lines, and securing these urban centers, particularly
around an-Nasiriyah and Najaf, and in the British sector around Umm Qasr and
Basra. The anticipated support for the invasion from the Shiia population in southern
Iraq was slow in developing, but now greater cooperation is forthcoming, despite
some outbreaks of factional fighting.
Though CENTCOM commanders expressed confidence in the adequacy of
their force structure in theater, the Iraqi attacks in rear areas and the length of the
supply lines to forward units led some to suggest that insufficient ground forces are
in place to continue the offensive while securing rear areas and ensuring
uninterrupted logistical support. These critics fault DOD civilian leadership for
overestimating the effectiveness of a precision air offensive and curtailing the
deployment of more ground troops, suggesting that an ideological commitment to
smaller ground forces and greater reliance on high-tech weaponry has dominated
military planning.5 With collapse of the Iraqi regime, however, this criticism has
muted, and the CENTCOM operations plan appears vindicated.
Without permission to use Turkish territory, CENTCOM was unable to carry
out an early ground offensive in Northern Iraq. However, Special operations forces,
the 173rd Airborne Brigade, and air-lifted U.S. armor, operating with Kurdish
irregulars have now seized Mosul and Kirkuk. Cooperation with Kurdish militias in
the north has been excellent. Even a recent mistaken airstrike against a allied Kurdish
vehicle convoy, killing or wounding senior Kurdish leaders, has not adversely
affected this cooperation. Potentially complicating the situation in the north, has
been the Turkish desire to possibly augment the 8,000+ troops it has had stationed
in Kurdish-held territory in order to block possible Kurdish refugees and influence
the accommodations made to the Kurds in a post-conflict Iraq. Turkish miliary
spokesmen have indicated that no additional Turkish forces will move into Iraq at
this time. The U.S. has assured Turkey that the Kurdish forces involved in seizing
Mosul and Kirkuk will be withdrawn and replaced with U.S. troops.
5 “Questions Raised About Invasion Force”, Washington Post, March 25, 2003. p. 17

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CENTCOM headquarters reported that intelligence sources indicated authority
for the use of chemical and biological weapons was issued to Iraqi regional
subordinate commanders.6 CENTCOM headquarters consequently believed that the
possibility of CB weapons use would increase as coalition forces moved closer to
Baghdad, but now that possibility appears remote Indeed, the failure to find any
confirmed CB weapons caches (though some defensive equipment has been
encountered) has led to questions about the existence of the suspected Iraqi CB
arsenal.
The most significant unknowns remain the extent and intensity of Iraqi
resistance within Baghdad, and whether chemical or biological weapons will be
employed.
Factors for Consideration
Roles and Attitudes of Other Nations7
On March 18, the State Department released a list of thirty nations whom it
characterizes as having “agreed to be part of the coalition for the immediate
disarmament of Iraq”. The list includes those contributing combat units (noted
above), those offering basing or overflight rights, and those who simply “ want to be
publically associated with efforts to disarm Iraq” – Afghanistan, Albania, Australia,
Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Colombia, Czech Republic, Denmark, El Salvador, Eritrea,
Estonia, Ethiopia, Georgia, Hungary, Italy, Japan (post conflict),Korea, Latvia,
Lithuania, Macedonia, Netherlands, Nicaragua, Philippines, Poland, Romania,
Slovakia, Spain, Turkey, United Kingdom, and Uzbekistan. In addition to the
countries listed, the State Department stated that there are 15 countries who have
requested their support of military operations not be made public.8 On December 20,
Administration officials referred to 35 nations as members of the coalition, without
specifying nations.
The fluctuating international political environment regarding cooperation with
U.S. offensive operations against Iraq confronted military planners with complex
challenges. It has been suggested that some nations’ public opposition to military
action against Iraq does not reflect the nature of “private” diplomatic conversations
which indicate a greater willingness to support U.S. policy. If true, this may have
resulted in unacknowledged or covert assistance, or perhaps more overt cooperation
after a U.S. victory appears assured.
Saudi Arabia, a previous opponent of military action, is permitting use of the
U.S. air command center located on its territory, and the use of other air force
6 “Lightening Strikes, Then March to Baghdad”, Washington Times, March 18, 2003.
7 See also, CRS Report RL31843, Iraq Foreign Stances Toward US. Policy
8 Department of State, “Excerpt: Boucher Announces Coalition for Immediate Disarmament
of Iraq”, Washington File, March 18, 2003.

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facilities for non-strike aircraft (e.g., aerial tankers, search and rescue). After
malfunctioning cruise missiles from U.S. ships operating in the Mediterranean landed
in Saudi Arabian, the Saudi government limited overflight rights.
Concerned that U.S. facilities in Saudi Arabia would not be available for full
operations against Iraq, the United States established defense agreements, and
expanded or upgraded airbase and logistics facilities in Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman,
Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates – countries whose support of U.S. policy in the
region is judged the most reliable.9 Each of these countries permitted use of airbases
to support U.S. military operations in Afghanistan, while Saudi Arabia allowed only
the use of the air operations command center on its territory. Given the range of
facilities and prepositioned U.S. equipment in these countries, their continued
cooperation will be crucial to the military offensive against Iraq. The extent of
cooperation from these nations was thought to probably greatly depend upon the
results of U.N. arms inspections and the further approval of the U.N. Security
Council. However, with the onset of conflict, there appears to be no diminution of
support for U.S. operations.
The United States and Bahrain have a defense cooperation agreement regarding
prepositioning war materiel. The U.S. Navy 5th Fleet headquarters is in Bahrain, and
the Air Force currently has use of Bahrain’s Shaikh airbase. Since the Gulf War, the
United States has maintained a troop presence in Kuwait and it is serving as the main
staging area for coalition ground forces. The U.S. Air Force has use of two Kuwaiti
airfields – Ali al Salem and Ali al-Jabiru. In Oman, through a cooperative
agreement, the Air Force has access to four airbases – al-Musnanah, Masirah, Seeb,
and Thumrait – which it has been upgrading to handle a full range of air operations.
Qatar has developed a very close cooperative defense relationship with the United
States, permitting the prepositioning of enough equipment for three U.S. Army
brigades and the construction of an operations command center at al-Udaid airbase
comparable to that located at Prince Sultan airbase in Saudi Arabia. This facility has
been extensively used to support operations in Afghanistan, and Central Command
Headquarters deployed there in mid-September, 2002. In the United Arab Emirates,
the U.S. Navy has access to port facilities and the Air Force is using the al-Dhafra
airbase. 10
The attitude of the Turkish government towards U.S. military action against Iraq
was a very important consideration for U.S. military planners. The Turkish
parliament’s rejection of a proposal allowing U.S. ground troops to operate from
Turkey delivered a setback to CENTCOM planners, though CENTCOM spokesmen
have downplayed the impact of the Turkish decision upon their prospects for a
successful operation.11 Turkey has granted only overflight rights, and will not permit
basing or offensive operations from its soil. As noted, the 4th Mechanized Infantry
9 For further information, see CRS Report RL31533, Persian Gulf: Issues for U.S. Policy,
2003.

1 0 “ C u r r e n t U . S . O r d e r o f B a t t l e ” , G l o b a l S e c u r i t y . O r g
[http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/iraq_orbat_030120.htm]
11 “General Dismisses Rebuff by Turkey”, Washington Post, March 4, 2003, p. 1

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Division, originally intended to attack from Turkey, is now being diverted to Kuwait
as follow-on support for ground units in the south of Iraq. There have been press
reports, however, that Turkey has facilitated U.S. upgrading of airfields located
inside northern Iraq. Aside from permitting air operations from Incirlik and other
bases, Turkish cooperation would also have provided an easier approach for a
northern front for U.S. ground operations. Northern operations, though proceeding
more slowly than would have been the case with Turkish cooperation, have gone
well. The major cities and oilfields are under coalition control and, after extended
bombardment of Iraqi defensive positions, were seized without significant resistance.
Improved U.S. Military Technology
Significant technological advancements, particularly in precision-guided
munitions, have led DOD spokesmen to emphasize that the air campaign against Iraq
will be considerably more efficient and more militarily devastating than Operation
Desert Storm. In 1991 only ten percent of the aerial munitions used were precision-
guided. That ratio could well be the inverse in the air campaign today. This would
allow a greater number of targets to be destroyed far more rapidly, using fewer
aircraft and with less chance of collateral damage. The greater availability of
precision-guided munitions (PGMs) bodes well for attacks against stationary targets,
and moving targets in open terrain. There have been some question raised about the
level of PGM inventories after the Afghanistan campaign, but DOD has insisted they
remain adequate for operations against Iraq.12 Major improvements have also been
achieved in the ability of the intelligence community to communicate targeting
information directly to combat platforms (e.g. attack aircraft, missile launchers) in
almost real time. This has greatly enhanced the value of PGMs, providing them with
critical targeting data when the information is most useful. Military operations in an
urban environment would ,however, limit the effectiveness of air power and armor
units. Rules of target engagement and avoidance of “friendly fire” casualties remain
prime concerns.
U.S. military planners have paid particular attention to the problem of Iraqi
missiles. In 1991, the allied coalition was unable to locate and destroy any SCUD
mobile launchers, and U.S. intelligence believes that Iraq still possesses at least 24
missiles, some possibly armed with chemical or biological warheads. Using new
equipment, such as the Tactical Airborne Warning System (TAWS) and the PAC-3
air defense missiles, DOD has greatly reduced the time from missile launch
detection to intercept, improving the chance of both destroying the launched missile
and the missile launcher. Improvements in satellite reconnaissance, communications,
and unmanned aerial vehicles now available to ground commanders are also seen as
major advances over Desert Storm capabilities. The PAC-3 air defense system has
so far worked well in Kuwait in intercepting the few Iraqi missiles which threatened
populated areas, though it has also downed a British fighter aircraft in a “friendly
fire” incident. Though initial reports indicated some of the Iraqi missiles were the
prohibited SCUDs, this identification was later retracted.
12 “The Tools Of War Expecting a rerun of Gulf War I? Think again, thanks to high tech and
smart bombs”, Time, October 21, 2002.

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Iraqi Military Capabilities
Conventional Forces. There is little disagreement that Iraqi armed forces
are significantly degraded from their condition during the Persian Gulf War in 1991.
Manpower stands at roughly 50% or less of its 1991 level or about 350,000-400,000.
Unclassified estimates put equipment levels at about 2,000-2,600 tanks, 3,700
armored vehicles, and 300 combat aircraft.13 A number of factors are believed to
hamper Iraqi military effectiveness. A decade of arms embargo has resulted in much
equipment now being obsolete or inoperable. Many of Iraq’s regular army divisions
were undermanned and all comprised mostly conscripts. Large unit and combined
arms training is lacking, and combat experienced non-commissioned officers and
commanders were relatively few. Logistical support was almost non-existent, was
very vulnerable to air interdiction.
Saddam Hussein’s fear of internal coups has served to make regime security a
paramount concern, which could have a detrimental effect on Iraq’s military
effectiveness. Most of the best equipped and most reliable troops, the Republican
Guard, were kept near Baghdad for regime protection. The officer corps was subject
to intense scrutiny for loyalty and subject to unpredictable purges. The distribution
of weaponry and supplies was curtailed among regular army units to forestall
attempts to overthrow the regime. There also exist tensions, to some extent
purposely encouraged, between regular and Republican Guard units, which could
have hampered coordination.14
The Iraqi military, including Republican Guard divisions, have been unable to
mount a coherent, organized defense against coalition forces. Iraq’s leadership turned
to an urban strategy to reduce the effectiveness of U.S. airpower. By choosing to
defend primarily urban centers with irregular forces, Iraq appears to be trying to force
the United States and Britain to commit troops to urban combat – one of the most
difficult types to conduct – and simultaneously constrain U.S. Air Force targeting
because of concerns over collateral damage and casualties. But even within urban
areas, no Iraqi forces were able to mount sustained resistance. With little operational
leadership, limited equipment and supplies, and subjected intense aerial
bombardment, Iraqi forces simply disintegrated in the face of coalition operations.
Chemical and Biological Weapons. Iraq is believed to have possibly
retained chemical and biological stockpiles from before the Persian Gulf War, and
may have continued covert CBW development and/or production since. Some CBW
facilities that were destroyed during the Persian Gulf War reportedly have been re-
built. Iraq is known to have produced blister agents (“mustard gas”) and both
persistent and non-persistent nerve agents (VX and Sarin). Biological agents
produced include anthrax, aflatoxin, and the toxin agents botulinum and ricin.
Though unconfirmed, it is possible that Iraq may also possess the smallpox virus
cultured from natural outbreaks of the disease in Iraq prior to its world-wide
13 For a detailed examinations, see Cordesman, Anthony. Iraq’s Military Capabilities in
2002
, Center for Strategic and International Studies. September 2002.; and The Military
Balance 2002-2003.
International Institute of Strategic Studies, October 2002.
14 See also, CRS Report RL31339, U.S. Efforts to Change the Regime.

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eradication in the early 1970s. Iraq is known to have developed a variety of means
to disseminate CBW, including bombs, artillery shells, missile warheads, mines, and
aerial sprayers for both manned and unmanned aircraft. There have been some
questions about the effectiveness of these delivery systems, but they remain
unanswered. 15
One of the unique qualities of CB weapons is that the employment of even a
small number or amount can have an effect significantly out of proportion to the
casualties actually inflicted. Trace amounts will force military units to “suit up” and
can severely degrade their performance. Logistics facilities (e.g. ports), often staffed
by unprotected civilians, could be shut down by relatively small amounts of
persistent nerve agent because the workforce refuses to return. Civilian ships
chartered for military transport are particularly vulnerable to threats of chemical or
biological attacks and, as occurred in the Persian Gulf War, civilian crews may refuse
to enter the war zone. In short, the psychological effects of these weapons could
prove just as disruptive as their physical effects.
Though Iraq did not use CBW in the Persian Gulf War, many believe that
Saddam Hussein’s restraint in this regard would be not repeated. This view was
based on the assumption that, given that the U.S. objective would now be the
destruction of his regime rather than the more limited objectives in the Persian Gulf
War, Hussein would have “nothing to lose” by their employment. As events turned
out, there has been no use of CB weapons, and no confirmed CBW munitions have
been discovered. Given that operational planning called for suspected CBW sites
to be among the first objectives to be seized or neutralized, the apparent failure to
find any of these weapons, though certainly heartening to combat commanders, has
led to questions about the Administration’s assertions of Iraq’s CBW capabilities.
Secretary Rumsfeld noted that intelligence reports indicated a greater probability of
encountering these weapons as allied forces move closer to Baghdad.16 However,
now that coalition forces are within Baghdad, that possibility is being discounted.
CENTCOM spokesmen have suggested that more extensive searches for these
weapons will take place after offensive operations have stabilized.17
Though perhaps better prepared than any other military to deal with CB
warfare, U.S. forces have not actually encountered the use of CB weapons since
World War I. U.S. commanders have had to ensure adequate supplies of protective
and decontamination equipment for an invasion force, and may again be confronted
with the possibly problematic issue of vaccinations and prophylactic pharmaceuticals
that has led to the “Gulf War illnesses” controversy. Indicative of this latter problem,
even though production of anthrax vaccine has been restored, DOD has still not re-
instated its service-wide vaccination policy. This concern may be compounded with
the smallpox vaccine. In October 2002, the General Accounting Office reiterated its
15 Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction: A Net Assessment. Center for International and
Strategic Studies. September 2002.
Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction Programs. Central Intelligence Agency. October
2002.
16 DOD Press Conference, March 25, 2003.
17 CENTCOM Press Briefing , March 25, 2002

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concerns over “serious problems” in the adequacy of the armed forces CBW training,
availability of specialist personnel, and defensive equipment inventories 18 With
regard to GAO’s concerns over CBW suit defects, DOD spokesmen have noted that
troops deployed to the Persian Gulf have all been issued the newly-designed Joint
Service Lightweight Integrated Suit Technology (JSLIT), which does not have the
manufacturing defects detected in some of the older Battle Dress Overgarment.19
The Bush Administration’s announced policy of possible nuclear retaliation if
WMD are used against U.S. forces may serve as a deterrent, as more veiled
references to nuclear force were felt to forestall their use in 1991.20 On the other
hand, the U.S. emphasis upon ousting Hussein could induce a “nothing to lose”
attitude conducive to using CB weapons.
Post-War Requirements
With the onset of widespread looting and some breakdown of public services
(electricity, water) in the cities, coalition forces are confronted with the challenges
of restoring public order and infrastructure even before combat operations have
ceased. Though U.S. forces have come under some criticism for not having done
more to prevent looting, the transition from combat to police roles is a difficult one,
particularly when an important objective is winning popular support. Harsh reactions
risk alienation of the population, yet inaction reduces confidence in the ability of
coalition forces to maintain order. The situation is further complicated by continuing
small-scale attacks on coalition troops in relatively secure areas. Increased patrols,
the return of many Iraqi policemen to duty, and the emergence of civilian “watch
groups” are assisting what appears to be a natural abatement of looting. In addition
to looting, coalition forces will also have to ensure that factional violence and
retribution against former government supporters do not derail stabilization efforts.
With combat operations still on-going in some areas, and U.S. forces spread
relatively thin throughout Iraq, it is clear that the addition of additional troops, (e.g.
the 4th Infantry moving in from Kuwait) could improve the pace and breadth of
stabilization operations.
In testimony before the House Armed Services Committee on September 18,
2002 Defense Secretary Rumsfeld declined to speculate upon what might be the
military requirements for the United States in post-war Iraq, assuming Saddam
Hussein’s ouster. On February 25, testifying before the Senate Armed Services
Committee, Army Chief of Staff. General Eric Shinseki expressed the opinion that
up to “several hundred thousand” troops could be required to maintain an occupation
of Iraq. This estimate was almost immediately dismissed by DOD’s civilian
18 General Accounting Office. Chemical and Biological Defense: Observations on DOD's
Risk Assessment of Defense Capabilities
GAO-03-137T, October 1, 2002
19 “U.S. Troops’ Chemical Suits Do Not Leak, Army Insists”, Washington Post, March 4,
2003. Department of Defense Press Briefing, March 3, 2003.
20 National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction, December 2002. p. 5
[http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/12/WMDStrategy.pdf]

CRS-11
leadership.21 This controversy reflects the great difficulty in predicting what the
political and military situation would be in a post-war Iraq, and how long a U.S.
military presence would be required before an acceptable and stable Iraqi government
could be established. The reaction of the Iraq population is the key element, and will
depend upon a variety of factors, such as the nature and extent of war damage and
casualties, the demands of ethnic and religious minorities, and the speed with which
a credible government can be established. Though a short-term post-war occupation
may be a possibility, given that so far the Iraqi population has not demonstrated an
acceptance of coalition forces, it is possible that a continued deployment of
substantial military ground force will be necessary for several years. For comparison,
in the relatively benign environment and considerably smaller areas of Bosnia and
Kosovo, NATO currently maintains a deployment of about 60,000 troops. It is
possible, however, that some nations unwilling to participate in military action
against Iraq may be willing to contribute to a post-war stabilization force, thus
alleviating some of the burden on U.S. forces. Given the current international
political climate regarding U.S. military operations against Iraq, it is difficult to
estimate the possible extent of such assistance.
Other U.S. Military Resource Requirements
Aside from the deployments in the Balkans where the United States has about
12,000 troops, operations continue in Afghanistan where U.S. troops number about
7,000. DOD has not released information on the current deployment situation for
U.S. Air Force units: however many air assets could possibly respond to operational
requirements for either Iraq or Afghanistan from their current bases, if aerial re-
fueling is possible. While the Department of Defense can meet the overall manpower
requirements of an Iraqi invasion, an issue of particular concern is whether sufficient
“low density-high demand” assets are available. These include assets such as aerial
re-fueling tankers, the EA-6B aircraft used to engage air defense radars, the AWACS
and JSTARS reconnaissance/air control aircraft, unmanned aerial vehicles, Combat-
Air-Search and rescue (CSAR), and all special operations forces (SOF). Demands
on special operations forces have been particularly high over the last year. Most
notably in Afghanistan, but there have also been training/advisory missions in the
Philippines, Georgia (Gruzia), and Yemen as part of a world-wide antiterrorism
campaign, in addition to anti-drug operations in Columbia. And, Secretary Rumsfeld
indicated that he intends to increase further the SOF commitment to the war on
terrorism .22 It is in this context, that some have suggested that the invasion of Iraq
is detracting from the resources available to continue efforts to pursue the world-wide
war on terrorism, which they view as currently a greater threat to U.S. security than
Iraq.23
21 Secretary Rumsfeld, Defense Press Briefing, February 28, 2003.
22 See CRS Report RS21048, U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF): Background and
Issues for Congress.

23 Fulgham, David. “War Preparations Reveal Problems”, Aviation Week and Space
Technology,
December 9, 2002. p. 29

CRS-12
North Korea’s decision in December 2002 to resume its nuclear weapons
program has raised tensions in that region, and brought attention to the question
whether the United States would and/or could take military action there, in addition
to a campaign in Iraq. Secretary Rumsfeld has asserted that U.S. military resources
are sufficient to fight in two theaters simultaneously, though some observers have
strongly disagreed, citing shortages of strategic air/sealift and active duty personnel.24
At a minimum, the situation on the Korean Peninsula may mean that Pacific
Command forces that may have otherwise deployed to the Persian Gulf will have to
remain in the Pacific region. Meanwhile, the Bush Administration has stressed it is
seeking a diplomatic rather than military resolution to the North Korean situation.
Costs25
Predicting the cost of military operations is a task that DOD did not undertake
prior to the peace-keeping deployments to the Balkans, and it remains a highly
conjectural exercise. Methodologies tend to be relatively crude and based upon
historical experience, i.e. “the last war”. Though initially Secretary Rumsfeld
expressed his opinion that “it is unknowable what a war or conflict like that would
cost”, in early 2003 he estimated a cost of under $50 billion. Other DOD officials
anticipated an $80-85 billion cost, assuming a 6-month follow-on occupation.26
On March 25, 2003 The Administration submitted a $74.7 billion FY2003
supplemental appropriations request, of which $62.6 billion was for Department of
Defense expenses related to the war in Iraq through September 2003. Specifically,
this request includes funds for preparatory costs incurred, costs associated with
military operations, replenishing munitions, and funds to support other nations. The
Administration stated that this supplemental request was “built on the key
assumption that U.S. military action in Iraq will be swift and decisive.”27 Both the
House and Senate have approved the legislative conference report to H.R. 1559
(H.Rept. 108-76), which provides $62.37 billion.
Michael O’Hanlon of the Brookings Institution, pegged a 250,000-strong
invasion at between $40-$50 billion with a follow-up occupation costing $10-$20
billion a year. Former White House economic advisor Lawrence Lindsay estimated
the high limit on the cost to be 1-2% of GNP, or about $100-$200 billion. Mitch
Daniels, Director of the Office of Management and Budget subsequently discounted
this estimate as “very, very high”, and stated that the costs would be between$50-$60
billion, though no specific supporting figures were provided for the estimate.28 In
24 Scarborough, Rowan. “U.S. Ability to Fight Two Wars Doubted”, Washington Times,
December 25, 2002. p. 1.
25 For greater detail on cost estimates, see CRS Report RL31715, Iraq War: Background
Issues and Overview
. Updated periodically.
26 “War Could Cost More Than $40 billion”, Knight-Ridder Wire Service, September 18,
2002; “Iraq War Costs Could Soar, Pentagon Says”, Los Angeles Times, February 26, 2003.
27 Office of Management and Budget, Press Release No. 2003-6, March 25, 2002.
28 Bumiller, Elisabeth. “Budget Director Lowers Estimate of Cost of War”, New York
(continued...)

CRS-13
its most recent cost estimate, the Congressional Budget Office put deployment costs
at about $14 billion, with combat operations costing $10 billion for the first month
and $8 billion a month thereafter. CBO cited the cost of returning combat forces to
home bases at $9 billion, and the costs of continued occupation of Iraq to run
between $1-4 billion.29
The American Academy of Arts and Sciences has published a much more wide-
ranging report which covers the possibility of an extended occupation, in addition to
potential long-term economic consequences and concludes that potential costs could
range from $99 billion to $1.2 trillion.30 For comparison, the cost to the United
States of the Persian Gulf War in 1990-91 was approximately $60 billion, and almost
all of this cost was offset by international financial contributions.
28 (...continued)
Times, December 31, 2002. p. 1
29 Congressional Budget Office. An Analysis of the President’s Budgetary Proposals for
Fiscal Year 2004: An Interim Report.
March 2003
30 War with Iraq: Costs, Consequences, and Alternatives. American Academy of Arts and
Sciences. Dec. 2002. [http://www.amacad.org/publications/monographs/Iraq_Press.pdf]