Order Code IB91121
Issue Brief for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
China-U.S. Trade Issues
Updated April 11, 2003
Wayne M. Morrison
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

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CONTENTS
SUMMARY
MOST RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS
U.S. Trade with China
Major U.S. Exports to China
Major U.S. Imports from China
China’s Economy
Major U.S.-China Trade Issues
China and the World Trade Organization
Background on U.S.-China WTO Negotiations
The U.S.-China WTO Agreement
China Joins the WTO
WTO Implementation Issues
China’s NTR Status and WTO Accession
Violations of U.S. Intellectual Property Rights
Prison Labor Exports
Outlook for U.S.-China Trade Relations

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China-U.S. Trade Issues
SUMMARY
U.S.-China economic ties have expanded
China’s entry into the WTO requires it to
substantially over the past several years. Total
significantly reform its trade regime by elimi-
U.S.-China trade rose from $5 billion in 1980
nating or reducing an extensive array of tariff
to $147 billion in 2002. China is now the
and non-tariff barriers on goods, services, and
fourth-largest U.S. trading partner. With a
foreign investment. The removal of these
huge population and a rapidly expanding
barriers could result in significant new oppor-
economy, China is a potentially huge market
tunities for U.S. exporters.
for U.S. exporters. Yet, U.S.-China commer-
cial relations have been strained by a number
In order to ensure that the WTO agree-
of issues, including a surging U.S. trade defi-
ments would fully apply between the United
cit with China ($102.3 billion in 2002), Chi-
States and China (once China joined the
na’s restrictive trade and investment practices,
WTO), the 106th Congress passed legislation
and its failure to provide adequate protection
(H.R. 4444, P.L. 106-286) authorizing the
for U.S. intellectual property rights (IPR).
President to grant China permanent normal

trade relations (PNTR) status after it joined
During the 1990s, the United States
the WTO (the President extended PNTR
actively pressed China to liberalize its trade
status to China on December 27, 2001). The
regime and improve protection of U.S. IPR.
Act also requires the U.S. Trade Representa-
Under the threat of U.S. trade sanctions, China
tive (USTR) to annually issue a report assess-
signed bilateral trade agreements with the
ing China’s compliance with its WTO trade
United States on market access (1992) and
obligations. Finally, the Act and established a
IPR protection (1992 and 1995). These agree-
special Congressional-Executive Commission
ments produced mixed results.
to examine China’s human rights policies.
In recent years, the U.S. has sought to use
Many Members of Congress have called
China’s application to join the World Trade
on the Bush Administration to closely moni-
Organization (WTO) to gain greater market
tor China’s compliance with its WTO com-
access in China. The U.S. insisted that China
mitments. In December 2002, the USTR
could join the WTO only if it substantially cut
issued its first annual China WTO compliance
trade barriers. After many years of negotia-
report, finding that, although China had made
tions, a consensus was reached in the WTO on
significant progress in meeting its WTO
the terms of China’s membership. China’s
obligations, a number of major problems
entry was formally approved by the WTO on
remained, especially in regards to agriculture,
November 10, 2001, and on December 11,
services, IPR protection, and transparency of
2001, it formally became a WTO member.
trade laws and regulations.
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

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MOST RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
On December 11, 2002, the USTR released its first annual China WTO compliance
report, finding that, although China had made significant overall progress in meeting its
WTO obligations, a number of problems remained, especially in regards to China’s
commitments on agriculture, services, IPR protection, and transparency of trade laws and
regulations.
BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS
U.S. Trade with China
U.S.-China trade rose rapidly after the two nations established diplomatic relations
(January 1979), signed a bilateral trade agreement (July 1979), and provided mutual MFN
treatment beginning in 1980. Total trade (exports plus imports) between the two nations rose
from $4.8 billion in 1980 to $147.2 billion in 2002, making China the 4th largest U.S.
trading partner. The U.S. trade deficit with China has grown significantly in recent years,
due largely to a surge in U.S. imports of Chinese goods relative to U.S. exports to China.
That deficit rose from $10.4 billion in 1990 to $103.1 billion in 2002 (see Table 1). The
U.S. trade deficit with China is now larger than that of any other U.S. trading partner,
including Japan (at $70.1 billion), Canada ($49.8 billion), or Mexico ($37.2 billion).
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Table 1. U.S. Merchandise Trade with China: 1988-2002
($billions)
Year
U.S. Exports
U.S. Imports
U.S. Trade Balance
1988 5.0
8.5
-3.5
1989 5.8
12.0
-6.2
1990 4.8
15.2
-10.4
1991 6.3
19.0
-12.7
1992 7.5
25.7
-18.2
1993 8.8
31.5
-22.8
1994 9.3
38.8
-29.5
1995 11.7
45.6
-33.8
1996
12.0 51.5
-39.5
1997 12.8

62.6
-49.7
1998
14.3 71.2
-56.9
1999 13.1
81.8
-68.7
2000 16.3
100.1
-83.8
2001 19.2
102.3
-83.1
2002 22.1
125.2
-103.1
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce.
Major U.S. Exports to China
U.S. exports to China in 2002 totaled $22.1 billion, accounting for 3.2% of total U.S.
exports to the world, and making China the 7th largest market for U.S. exports. The top five
U.S. exports to China in 2002 were transport equipment (mainly aircraft and parts),
electrical machinery, office machines (mainly computers), general industrial machinery and
equipment, and specialized machinery. Together, these five commodities accounted for
about 57% of total U.S. exports to China in 2002. U.S. exports to China in 2001 were 18.3%
higher than 2000 levels. Much of that increase was accounted for by a surge in U.S. exports
of transport equipment. U.S. exports to China grew by 14.6% over 2001 levels. Increases
in U.S. exports of transport equipment (up 29.4%) and electrical machinery (up 26%)
accounted for much of this growth.
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Table 2. Top 5 U.S. Exports to China: 1999-2002
($ in millions)
SITC Commodity
2001/2002 %
Groupings
1999
2000
2001
2002
Change
Total All Commodities
13,118
16,253
19,235
22053
14.6
Transport equipment (mainly
2,326
1,698
2,471
3,444
39.4
aircraft and parts)
Electrical machinery,
1,381
1,747
2,110
2,658
26.0
apparatus and appliances, and
parts
Office machines and
843
1,498
1,602
1,193
-25.5
automatic data processing
machines
General industrial machinery
685
839
1,081
1,146
6.0
& equipment and parts
Specialized machinery
481
758
820
1,124
37.2
Total Top 5
5,716
6,540
8,084
9,565
18.3
Commodities sorted by top 5 exports in 2002.
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce.
Many trade analysts argue that China could prove to be a significant market for U.S.
exports in the future. China is one of the world’s fastest growing economies, and rapid
economic growth is likely to continue in the near future, provided that economic reforms are
continued. China’s goal of modernizing its infrastructure and upgrading its industries is
predicted to generate substantial demand for foreign goods and services. According to a U.S.
Department of Commerce report: “China’s unmet infrastructural needs are staggering.
Foreign capital, expertise, and equipment will have to be brought in if China is to build all
the ports, roads, bridges, airports, power plants, telecommunications networks and rail lines
that it needs.” Finally, economic growth has substantially improved the purchasing power
of Chinese citizens, especially those living in urban areas along the east coast of China. It
is projected that by the year 2005, China will have more than 230 million middle-income
consumers (i.e., those earning $1,000 or more annually), whose combined retail spending
will exceed $900 billion. Chinese officials predict that the cumulative value of China’s
imports over the next 5 years will be between $1.5 and $2.0 trillion. China’s growing
economy and large population make it a potentially enormous market. To illustrate:
! China currently has the world’s largest market mobile phone network (with
145 million cellular phone uses), even though only 13% of the population
uses mobile phones.
! Boeing Corporation predicts that China will be the largest market for
commercial air travel outside the U.S. for the next 20 years; during this
period, China will purchase 1,912 aircraft valued at $165 billion.
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! In 2002, China replaced Japan as the world’s second largest PC market.
China also became the world’s second largest internet user (after the U.S.)
with over 56 million users.
! Demand for autos in China is rising so quickly (20 to 30% annually) that
some analysts predict that China will become the third largest market for
autos by 2003 or 2004.
Major U.S. Imports from China
China is a relatively large source of many U.S. imports, especially labor-intensive
products. In 2002, imports from China totaled $125.2 billion, accounting for 10.8% of total
U.S. imports, and making China the 3rd largest supplier of U.S. imports. U.S. imports from
China increased by 22.4% in 2002. The top five U.S. imports from China were
miscellaneous manufactured articles (such as toys, games, etc.); office machines;
telecommunications equipment, sound recording, and reproducing equipment (such as
telephone answering machines, radios, tape recorders and players, televisions, VCRs,
etc.);electrical machinery; and footwear (see Table 3). Together, imports of these five
commodities accounted for about 59% of total U.S. imports from China in 2002.
Traditionally, nearly all of U.S. imports from China have been low value, labor intensive,
products such as toys and games, footwear, and textiles. Over the past few years, however,
an increasing level of U.S. imports from China have consisted of more technologically
advanced products, such as computers and parts.
Table 3. Top 5 U.S. Imports from China: 1999-2002
($ in millions)
2001/2002
SITC Commodity
1999
2000
2001
2002
% Change
Total All Commodities
81,786
100,063
102,280
125,168
22.4
Miscellaneous manufactured arti-
17,273
19,441
19,764
23,492
18.9
cles (e.g., toys, games, etc.)
Office machines and automatic
8,259
11,000
10,764
15,256
41.7
data processing machines
Telecommunication & sound
7,502
9,935
10,118
14,254
40.9
record & reproduce app. & equip.
Electrical machinery, apparatus
7,062
9,119
9,111
10,253
12.5
and appliances, and parts
Footwear
8,434
9,195
9,758
10,227
4.8
Total Top 5
48,529
58,690
59,515
73,482
23.5
Commodities sorted by top 5 imports in 2002.
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce.
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China’s Economy
China’s economic reforms and open investment policies (which were begun in 1978)
have contributed to a surge in economic growth. From 1979 to 2002, China’s real gross
domestic product (GDP) grew at an average annual rate of 9.3%, making it one of the
world’s fastest growing economies; real GDP grew by about 8.0% in 2002. Many
economists predict that, if China continues to implement economic reforms, its annual real
GDP growth will likely average at least 7% over the next two decades. If such growth is
achieved, China will be able to double the size of its economy every 10 years (see CRS Issue
Brief IB98014, China’s Economic Conditions).
China has quickly become a major recipient of foreign direct investment (FDI), a key
factor in its rapid economic growth. Much of that investment has gone into export-oriented
production facilities. Annual utilized FDI in China grew from $636 million in 1983 to about
$54 billion in 2002. There are now over 420,000 foreign-invested firms in China. A
significant share of FDI in China has come from overseas Chinese, especially Hong Kong
and Taiwan. The United States is the second largest investor in China. Major U.S. corporate
investors in China include Motorola, Atlantic Richfield, Coca Cola, Amoco, United
Technologies, Pepsi Cola, Lucent Technologies, General Electric, General Motors, and Ford
Motor Company.
China has quickly become a major world trading power. Total Chinese trade (exports
plus imports) rose from $21 billion in 1978 to $621 billion in 2002. Large foreign
investment and the surging exports have enabled China to accumulate a significant level of
foreign exchange reserves, which reached $243 billion at the end of June 2002.
Major U.S.-China Trade Issues
Although China’s economic reforms and rapid economic growth have expanded U.S.-
China commercial relations in recent years, disputes have arisen over a wide variety of
issues, including, China’s failure to provide adequate protection of U.S. intellectual property
rights (IPR), the widespread and pervasive use by China of trade and investment barriers,
and China’s alleged use of prison labor for various exported products to the United States.
Current U.S. concerns over trade and IPR issues have focused on China’s implementation
of its obligations under its accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO).
China and the World Trade Organization
The rapid rise of China as an economic and trade power during the 1980s led U.S. trade
officials to take a greater interest in China’s trade regime. U.S. officials complained that,
while U.S. markets were generally open to Chinese products, Chinese markets were largely
closed to U.S. products, due to China’s extensive use of tariff and non-tariff barriers. In
1991, the United States threatened to impose $3.9 billion in trade sanctions against China
unless it removed specific trade barriers. In October 1992, the United States and China
settled the trade dispute after China agreed to reduce or eliminate a wide variety of trade
barriers, make its trade regime more transparent, and to eliminate scientific standards and
testing barriers to agricultural imports. The 1992 accord was somewhat successful in getting
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China to liberalize its trade regime. Thereafter, U.S. officials sought to use China’s desire
to join the World Trade Organization (WTO) as a means to negotiate even greater access to
China’s markets.
Negotiations for China’s accession to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT) and its successor organization, the WTO, began in 1986 and took over 15 years to
complete. During the WTO negotiations, Chinese officials insisted that China was a
developing country and should be allowed to enter under fairly lenient terms. The United
States insisted that China could enter the WTO only if it substantially liberalized its trade
regime. In the end, a compromise agreement was reached that requires China to make
immediate and extensive reductions in various trade and investment barriers, but allowing
it to maintain some level of protection (or a transitionary period of protection) for certain
sensitive sectors.
Background on U.S.-China WTO Negotiations. China and the United States
reportedly made significant progress towards resolving major differences in their bilateral
WTO negotiations during Chinese Premier Zhu Rongji’s meeting with President Clinton on
April 8, 1999. According to U.S. officials, China offered to cut tariffs significantly and
remove non-tariff barriers on U.S. trade in agriculture, industrial goods, and services, and to
eliminate various restrictions on foreign investment, trading rights, and distribution for U.S.
firms in China. Separately, China agreed to eliminate unjustified sanitary and phytosanitary
(SPS) bans on wheat, citrus, and beef immediately.
Although the Clinton Administration stated that China’s market access offer would
bring China into the WTO at above existing WTO standards on issues and sectors of major
concern to the U.S., it concluded that an agreement could not be finalized until certain
outstanding issues could be resolved, namely market access in China for banking, securities,
and audio visual services, and safeguard provisions on potential import surges. However,
the United States and China did reach an agreement (the Bilateral Agricultural Cooperation
Agreement) under which China agreed to remove technical barriers to trade (such SPS
restrictions) on U.S. meat, citrus, and wheat exports to China.
On April 13, 1999, the two sides agreed to intensify negotiations towards reaching a
final agreement. However, following the accidental NATO bombing of the Chinese embassy
in Belgrade on May 7, 1999, China suspended the WTO talks (as well as its implementation
of the bilateral agreements on wheat, citrus, and beef). These talks were officially resumed
on September 11, 1999, during a meeting between President Clinton and Chinese President
Jiang Zemin in New Zealand.
The U.S.-China WTO Agreement. On November 15, 1999, U.S. and Chinese
officials announced that a bilateral agreement relating to China’s WTO bid was reached. The
Clinton Administration released the full text of the agreement on March 14, 2000. Under the
agreement, China promised that after gaining WTO membership it would take the following
steps (some on accession and others over specified phase-in periods):
! Provide full trading and distribution rights (including the ability to provide
services auxiliary to distribution) for U.S. firms in China.
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! Cut average tariffs for U.S. priority agriculture products (beef, grapes, wine,
cheese, poultry, and pork) from 31.5% to 14.5% by 2004. Overall industrial
tariffs would fall from an average of 24.6% to 9.4% by 2005 (tariffs on U.S.
“priority products,” such as wood, paper, chemicals, and capital and medical
equipment, would fall even further). Tariffs on information technology
products, such as computers, semiconductors, and telecommunications
equipment, would be cut from an average level of 13.3% to zero by 2005.
! Establish a tariff-rate quota system for imports of agricultural bulk
commodities (such as wheat, corn, cotton, barley, and rice), i.e., imports up
to a specified quota level would be assessed a low tariff (1-3%), while
imports above a certain level would be assessed a much higher tariff rate.
Private trade in agricultural products would be permitted for the first time.
! Phase out quotas and other quantitative restrictions (some upon accession,
many within two years, and most within five years). Quota levels for many
products would expand by 15% each year until the elimination of the quota.
! Eliminate unscientifically based SPS restrictions on agricultural products
and end export subsidies.
! Open service sectors (many of which are currently closed to foreign firms),
including distribution, value-added telecommunications, insurance, banking,
securities, and professional services (including legal, accountancy, taxation,
management consultancy, architecture, engineering, urban planning, medical
and dental, and computer-related services). China would expand (over
various transitional periods) the scope of allowed services and gradually
remove geographical restrictions on foreign service providers. The amount
of permitted foreign ownership in service industries would vary (and in
some cases expand over time) from sector to sector.
! Reduce restrictions on auto trade. Tariffs on autos would fall from 80-100%
to 25% (tariffs on auto parts reduced to an average rate of 10%) by 2006.
Auto quotas would be eliminated by 2005. U.S. financial firms would be
allowed to provide financing for the purchase of cars in China.
! Provide fair treatment for foreign firms operating in China by removing
government rules requiring technology transfer, local content, and export
performance conditions.
! Provide that Chinese state-owned firms make purchases and sales based on
commercial considerations and give U.S. firms the opportunity to compete
for sales on a non-discriminatory basis.
! Accept the use by the United States of certain safeguard, countervailing, and
antidumping provisions (over transitionary periods) to respond to possible
surges in U.S. imports from China of various products, such as textiles, that
might cause or threaten to cause market disruption to a U.S. industry.
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China Joins the WTO. On September 13, 2001, China concluded a WTO bilateral
trade agreement with Mexico, the last of the original 37 WTO members that had requested
such an accord. On September 17, 2001, the WTO Working Party handling China’s WTO
application announced that it had resolved all outstanding issues regarding China’s WTO
accession. On November 10, 2001, China’s WTO membership was formally approved at the
WTO Ministerial Conference in Doha, Qatar on November 10, 2001 (Taiwan’s WTO
membership was approved the next day). On November 11, 2001, China notified the WTO
that it had formally ratified the WTO agreements, which enabled China to enter the WTO
on December 11, 2001.
Under the WTO accession agreement, China agreed to:
! Bind all tariffs. The average tariff for industrial goods will fall to 8.9% (and
range from 0 to 47%) and to 15% for agriculture (and range from 0 to 65%).
Most tariff cuts will be made by 2004; all cuts will occur by 2010.
! Limit subsidies for agricultural production to 8.5% of the value of farm
output and will not maintain export subsidies on agricultural exports.
! Within three years of accession, grant full trade and distribution rights to
foreign enterprises (with some exceptions, such as for certain agricultural
products, minerals, and fuels).
! Provide non-discriminatory treatment to all WTO members. Foreign firms
in China will be treated no less favorably than Chinese firms for trade
purposes. Duel pricing practices will be eliminated as well as differences
in the treatment of goods produced in China for the domestic market as
oppose to those goods produced for export. Price controls will not be used
to provide protection to Chinese firms.
! Implement the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
(TRIPs) Agreement upon accession.
! Accept a 12-year safeguard mechanism, available to other WTO members
in cases where a surge in Chinese exports cause or threaten to cause market
disruption to domestic producers.
! Fully open the banking system to foreign financial institutions withing five
years. Joint ventures in insurance and telecommunication will be permitted
(with various degrees of foreign ownership allowed).
WTO Implementation Issues
It has now been over a year since China joined the WTO. On December 11, 2002, the
USTR released its first annual China WTO compliance report. While stating that China had
made significant overall progress in meeting its WTO obligations, the report raised serious
concerns over China’s compliance with its commitments on agriculture, services, IPR
protection, and transparency of trade laws and regulations. China’s compliance with its
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WTO obligations have often been hampered by resistance to reforms by central and local
government officials seeking to protect or promote industries under their jurisdictions,
government corruption, and lack of resources devoted by the central government to ensure
that WTO reforms are carried out in a uniform and consistent manner (especially in regards
to IPR enforcement). Although Chinese government officials have promised to implement
WTO related reforms, they have raised concerns that such reforms could cause major
employment disruptions in certain sensitive sectors, especially agriculture, that could result
in social instability.
U.S. officials have raised a number of implementation issues with Chinese officials over
the past year:
! Soybeans. China is a major soybean importer. The United States exports
about $1 billion in soybeans to China annually, making it the top foreign
purchaser of U.S. soybeans. In June 2001, China announced it would
implement new rules on bio-engineered foods, effective in 2002. However,
China did not provide details of these rules which led to a disruption in U.S.
soybean exports to China from January-March 2002. President Bush raised
the issue with Chinese President Jiang Zemin in October 2001 and in March
2002, which led China to agree to the interim use of U.S. and foreign safety
certificates until China implements its new biotechnology regulations. On
October 18, 2002, China issued regulations applying this policy through
September 2003. U.S. officials stated that the regulation “should remove the
threat of an interruption of U.S. soybean sales to China.” However, U.S.
exporters have complained that the regulations require each GMO shipment
to have an interim biotech safety certificate and a Chinese government
import license. Additionally, in January 2003, the Chinese government
indicated that it might delay permanent approval of various GMO crops and
might require another round of food safety studies, a move that led the U.S.
to issue an official protest. Some analysts charge that China may be
attempting to use such regulations to limit biotech imports in order to
protect its domestic producers as well as its own biotech industries. U.S.
officials have warned that they make take this issue to the WTO for
resolution.
! Tariff-rate quotas. In November 2001, the Chinese government
developed new rules on tariff- rate-quotas on certain agricultural products
that the U.S. charged were discriminatory and violated WTO rules because
they created two categories of import quota licenses: one for domestic
consumption and one for “processing” trade. The U.S. further charged that
China has failed to provide adequate information on the administration of
its tariff-rate quotas (TRQs) for farm commodities. In July 2002, the U.S.
Department of Agriculture (USDA) reported that China’s TRQ licenses had
authorized relatively small levels of imports, making their use impractical.
For example, under the WTO accession agreement, China’s TRQ for cotton
in 2002 was 818,500 tons. In June 2002, China announced that the TRQ
would be distributed as follows: 500,000 tons for processing trade, 270,000
tons for state-owned mills, and 48,500 tons for private mills. U.S. firms
charge that this allocation policy violates WTO rules on national treatment.
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In other instances, China announced TRQs for various agriculture and
manufactured products several months after their required implementation
date. In December 2002, USTR Robert Zoellick sent a letter to China’s
Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation (MOFTEC)
expressing U.S. concern over China’s administration of TRQs. In January
2003, Zoellick was quoted in the press as saying that the TRQ issue was
“one of the areas we’re most frustrated with” in terms of China’s WTO
compliance.
! Export subsidies and discriminatory taxes. U.S. officials charge that
China has subsidized grain exports (mainly corn) and cotton, and uses its tax
system to promote exports and discourage imports, contrary to its WTO
commitments. For example, China continues to give rebates on value-added
taxes (VAT) for certain exports, especially high tech. In some instances,
China imposes higher VAT rates on certain imported products (such as
fertilizers and various agricultural products) than it does for similar products
produced domestically.
! Tariffs. China has been given relatively high marks for its tariff reductions.
However, U.S. officials have charged that China has failed to fully comply
with its commitment to eliminate tariffs for all products covered under the
WTO’s Information Technology Agreement (ITA). Instead, China has
extended zero tariffs only to producers in China that import ITA products in
the manufacture of items for export.
! Autos. Some U.S. businesses claim that China has failed to fully implement
its commitments on autos (especially in regards to quota allocations, trading
rights for foreign firms, local content requirements, and auto financing).
! Services. U.S. firms have complained that Chinese regulations on services
are confusing and often discriminatory. China maintains high capital
requirements, restrictions on branching, and prudential requirements (e.g.,
already operating in China for a certain number of years, profit
requirements, etc.) in order for firms to enter the market. In addition, many
U.S. firms have complained that they have not been afforded the extent of
market access promised under China’s WTO accord, especially regarding
geographic market access and the amount of foreign ownership allowed for
insurance and telecommunications companies in China.
! Health and safety requirements. U.S. officials charge that China
continues to use a variety of health and safety regulations to effectively bar
foreign imports, especially food products (such as wheat, poultry and meats,
and citrus). Many of these issues where supposed to have been resolved
under a 1999 agreement with China.

! IPR. While China has enacted a variety of new IPR laws, enforcement of
those laws remains relatively weak (see section on IPR below).
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China’s NTR Status and WTO Accession
Prior to January 2002, U.S. law required China’s normal trade relations (NTR) status
(formally referred to in U.S. law as most-favored-nation, or MFN, status) to be renewed on
an annual basis, based on the freedom-of-emigration requirements under the so-called
Jackson-Vanik amendment, and was subject to possible congressional disapproval through
passage and enactment of a joint resolution. From 1980 (when NTR status was restored to
China after being suspended in 1951) to 1989, the renewal of China’s NTR status was
relatively noncontroversial and was relatively unopposed by Congress. However,
congressional concern over the Tiananmen Square incident in 1989 and subsequent
crackdown on human rights led many Members to support legislation terminating the
extension of China’s NTR status or to condition that status on additional requirements,
mainly dealing with human rights. Although none of these measures were enacted, many
Members sought to use the annual renewal of China’s NTR status as a focal point to express
concerns, as well as to pressure the executive branch, over a wide range of Chinese trade
(e.g., trade barriers and failure to protect IPR) and non-trade (e.g., human rights, prison labor,
Taiwan security, and weapons proliferation) issues. Several members opposed such linkage,
arguing that it had little effect on Chinese policies and that the often rancourous
congressional debate over China’s trade status undermined long-term U.S.-Chinese relations
and added uncertainty to the trade relationship.
During its negotiations with China over the terms of its WTO accession, the Clinton
Administration pledged that, in return for significant market opening commitments on the
part of China, it would press the Congress to enact PNTR legislation. Once a satisfactory
bilateral agreement was reached with China in November 1999, the Clinton Administration
began to push for PNTR legislation.
The Clinton Administration and its supporters argued that China would get into the
WTO with or without congressional approval of PNTR status for China, and that failure to
pass such legislation would prevent the United States and China from having an official trade
relationship in the WTO. As a result, it was contended, U.S. firms would be excluded from
the trade concessions made by China to gain entry into the WTO, while U.S. competitors in
the WTO would be able to take full advantage of new business opportunities in China, and
the United States would be unable to use the WTO dispute resolution process to resolve trade
disputes with China. The Clinton Administration further maintained that China’s accession
to the WTO would promote U.S. economic and strategic interests, namely by inducing China
to deepen market reforms, promote the rule of law, reduce the government’s role in the
economy, and further integrate China into the world economy, making it a more reliable and
stable partner. Finally, the Administration contended that congressional rejection of PNTR
would be viewed by the Chinese as an attempt to isolate China economically; such a move
would seriously damage U.S.-China commercial relations and undermine the political
position of economic reformers in China.

Despite these arguments and strong lobbying by various U.S. business interests, passage
of China PNTR was highly uncertain when Congress began consideration of legislation in
May 2000. Many Members raised concerns over the effects China’s WTO membership
would have on U.S. import sensitive industries, while others expressed reservations over
giving up what they perceived as leverage over China’s human rights policies. The Clinton
Administration and congressional supporters of PNTR legislation sought to craft a
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compromise that would gain support of undecided members without alienating members who
wanted a “clean” PNTR bill.
H.R. 4444, as originally introduced by Representative Bill Archer, would have granted
PNTR status to China upon its accession to the WTO as long as the President certified that
the terms of its accession were at least equivalent to the November 1999 U.S.-China trade
agreement. Several provisions were added by the House to H.R. 4444 in response to various
congressional concerns. In addition to the provisions contained in the original version of
H.R. 4444, the final bill (which passed in the House on May 24, 2000, in the Senate on
September 19, 2000, and signed into law on October 10, 2000):
! established a special Congressional-Executive commission to monitor, and
report on, various aspects of China’s policies on human rights, including
labor practices and religious freedom;
! requires the USTR to issue a report annually assessing China’s compliance
with its WTO trade obligations;
! codified the anti-surge mechanism established under the November 1999
U.S.-China trade agreement and establishes procedures for obtaining relief
from import surges;
! authorized additional funding for various U.S. government agencies to
monitor and seek enforcement of China’s compliance with its WTO trade
commitments;
! set up a special government task force to halt U.S. imports from China of
products suspected of using prison labor; and
! authorized funding for programs to promote the development of the rule of
law in China.
On November 10, 2001, President Bush certified that the terms of China’s WTO
accession agreement were at least equivalent to the November 1999 U.S.-China trade
agreement, and on December 27, 2001, he issued a proclamation extending PNTR status to
China, effective January 1, 2002.
Violations of U.S. Intellectual Property Rights
Section 182 of the Trade Act of 1974 as amended (also known as “Special 301"),
requires the USTR to identify “priority foreign countries” that fail to provide adequate and
effective protection of U.S. intellectual property rights (IPR), such as patents, copyrights,
trademarks, and trade secrets, or deny fair and equitable market access to U.S. firms that rely
on IPR protection. The USTR is directed to seek negotiations with the priority foreign
countries to end such violations and, if necessary, to impose trade sanctions if such
negotiations fail to produce an agreement.
In April 1991, China (along with India and Thailand) was named as a “priority foreign
country” under Special 301. The USTR began a Section 301 investigation in May 1991,
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claiming China’s laws failed to provide adequate protection of patents, copyrights, and trade
secrets. In November 1991, the USTR threatened to impose $1.5 billion in trade sanctions
if an IPR agreement was not reached by January 1992. Last-minute negotiations yielded an
agreement on January 16, 1992. China promised to strengthen its patent, copyright, and trade
secret laws, and to improve protection of U.S. intellectual property, especially computer
software, sound recordings, chemicals, and pharmaceuticals.
In June 1994, the USTR again designated China as a Special 301 “priority foreign
country,” because it had failed to enforce recently enacted IPR laws. In particular, the USTR
cited the establishment of several factories in China producing pirated compact and laser
disks, as an example of China’s “egregious” violation of U.S. IPR. In addition, the USTR
stated that trade barriers had restricted access to China’s market for U.S. movies, videos, and
sound recordings, and that such restrictions encouraged piracy of such products in China.
On February 4, 1995, the USTR announced that insufficient progress had been made in talks
with Chinese officials and issued a list of Chinese products, with an estimated value of $1.1
billion, which would be subject to 100% import tariffs. However, a preliminary agreement
was reached on February 26, 1995, and a formal agreement was signed on March 11, 1995.
The new agreement pledged China to substantially beef up its IPR enforcement regime and
to remove various import and investment barriers to IPR-related products. Specifically,
China agreed to:
Take immediate steps to stem IPR piracy in China over the course of the next 3 months
by taking action against large-scale producers and distributors of pirated materials, and
prohibiting the export of pirated products.
Establish mechanisms to ensure long-term enforcement of IPR laws, such as banning the
use of pirated materials by the Chinese government, establishing a coordinated IPR
enforcement policy among each level of government, beefing up IPR enforcement agencies,
creating an effective customs enforcement system, establishing a title verification system in
China to ensure that U.S. audio visual works are protected against unauthorized use,
reforming China’s judicial system to ensure that U.S. firms can obtain access to effective
judicial relief, establishing a system of maintaining statistics concerning China’s enforcement
efforts and meeting with U.S. officials on a regular basis to discuss those efforts, improving
transparency in Chinese laws concerning IPR, and strictly enforcing IPR laws.
Provide greater market access to U.S. products by removing import quotas on U.S. audio
visual products, allowing U.S. record companies to market their entire works in China
(subject to Chinese censorship concerns), and allowing U.S. intellectual property-related
industries to enter into joint production arrangements with Chinese firms in certain cities.
Several U.S. firms charged that IPR piracy in China worsened in 1995, despite the 1995
IPR agreement, and pressed the USTR to take tougher action against China. The
International Intellectual Property Alliance (IIPA), an association of major U.S.
copyright-based industries, estimated that IPR piracy by Chinese firms cost U.S. firms $2.3
billion in lost trade during 1995.
On April 30, 1996, the USTR again designated China as a Special 301 “priority foreign
country” for not fully complying with the February 1995 IPR agreement. According to the
USTR, while China had cracked down on piracy at the retail level (launching raids and
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destroying millions of pirated CDs and hundreds of thousands of pirated books, sound
recordings, and computer software), it had failed to take effective action against an estimated
30 or so factories in China that were mass-producing and exporting pirated products. U.S.
officials called on the Chinese government to close such factories, prosecute violators, and
destroy equipment used in the production of pirated products. Further, the USTR stated that
China failed to establish an effective border enforcement mechanism within its customs
service to prevent the export of pirated products. Finally, the USTR indicated that China
failed to provide sufficient market access to U.S. firms, due to high tariffs, quotas, and
regulatory restrictions. Shortly after, the USTR indicated it would impose U.S. sanctions on
$2 billion worth of Chinese products by June 17, 1996, unless China took more effective
action to fully implement the IPR agreement. On June 17, 1996, USTR Charlene Barshefsky
announced that the United States was satisfied that China was taking steps to fulfill the 1995
IPR agreement. Barshefsky cited the Chinese government’s recent closing of 15 plants
producing illegal CDs and China’s pledge to extend a period of focused enforcement of
anti-piracy regulations against regions of particularly rampant piracy, such as Guangdong
Province. The Chinese government also promised to improve border enforcement to halt
exports of pirated products as well as illegal imports of presses used to manufacture CDs.
Further, the Chinese government reaffirmed its pledge to open up its market to imports of
IPR-related products. Finally, Chinese officials promised to improve monitoring and
verification efforts to ensure that products made by Chinese CD plants and publishing houses
are properly licensed.
The USTR has stated that China has made great strides in improving its IPR protection
regime, noting that it has passed several new IPR-related laws, closed or fined several
assembly operations for illegal production lines, seized millions of illegal audio-visual
products, curtailed exports of pirated products, expanded training of judges and law
enforcement officials on IPR protection, and has expanded legitimate licensing of film and
music production in China.
U.S. business groups continue to experience significant IPR problems in China,
especially in terms of illegal reproduction of software, retail piracy, and trademark
counterfeiting. It is estimated that counterfeits account for 15 to 20% of all products made
in China and totals and accounts for about 8% of China’s GDP. Chinese enforcement
agencies and judicial system often lack the resources (or the will) needed to vigorously
enforce IPR laws; convicted IPR offenders generally face minor penalties. In addition, while
market access for IPR-related products has improved, high tariffs, quotas, and other barriers
continue to hamper U.S. exports; such trade barriers are believed to be partly responsible for
illegal IPR-related smuggling and counterfeiting in China. Industry analysts estimate that
IPR piracy in China cost U.S. firms $1.85 billion in lost sales in 2002. The piracy rate for
IPR-related products in China (such as motion pictures, software, and sound recordings) is
estimated at around 90%. Under the terms of China’s WTO accession (see above), China
agreed to immediately bring its IPR laws in compliance with the WTO agreement on Trade
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS). In September 2002, the WTO
members gave a positive review of China’s new IPR laws related to the TRIPS agreement.
However, U.S. government officials continue to hold that China’s enforcement of its IPR
remains inadequate.
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Prison Labor Exports
Some analysts charge that the use of forced labor is widespread and a long-standing
practice in China, and that such labor is used to produce exports, a large portion of which
may be targeted to the United States. The importation from any country of commodities
produced through the use of forced labor is prohibited by U.S. law, although obtaining proof
of actual violations for specific imported products is often extremely difficult.
On August 7, 1992, the United States and China signed a Memorandum of
Understanding (MOU) to ensure that prison labor products were not exported to the United
States. However, U.S. disputes with China over its implementation of the MOU led to the
signing of a “statement of cooperation” (SOC) on March 14, 1994, which included
provisions which clarify procedures for U.S. officials to gain access to Chinese production
facilities suspected of exporting prison labor products. President Clinton’s May 1994 report
to Congress on renewing China’s MFN status stated that China had generally abided by the
agreements on prison labor. However, the U.S. Department of State’s China Country Report
on Human Rights Practices for 1998 states that: “Although the signing of the SOC initially
helped foster a more productive relationship between the U.S. Customs and Chinese
authorities, cooperation overall has been inadequate.” According to the 2001 State
Department Human Rights report, between 1997 and 2001, the Chinese government allowed
U.S. officials to conduct only one visit to a prison labor facility, and that eight other prison
visit requests (some dating back to 1992) were still pending. The Chinese government
contends that these facilities are reeducation-through-labor camps, not prisons, and has
denied access to them under the prison labor MOU. On February 28, 2001, the U.S. Customs
Service announced that it had seized and destroyed 24 million binder clips (valued at $2
million) that were documented as having been made in China using prison labor. In May
2002, the U.S.-China Security Review Commission recommended that Congress enact
legislation requiring firms to certify that goods imported into the U.S. do not utilize prison
labor.
Outlook for U.S.-China Trade Relations
China’s entry into the WTO and the U.S. extension of PNTR to China are likely to have
important ramifications for U.S.-China economic relations. First, Congress will no longer
vote annually on China’s trade status, which could help bring greater stability and
predictability to the relationship than has been the case over the past several years. Second,
the United States (as well as China) will be able to use the WTO dispute resolution process
to resolve trade disputes. Many analysts believe China would more likely comply with a
ruling from a multilateral institution than from a threat of unilateral U.S. sanctions. Third,
subjecting China’s trade regime to multilateral rules and agreements will mean that the
United States would no longer have to “go it alone” in trying to get China to open its
markets; other WTO members would have an equally strong stake in ensuring China’s
compliance with its WTO commitments. Finally, China’s accession to the WTO will likely
improve the business climate in China, leading to greater trade and investment opportunities
for U.S. firms. A sizable increase in U.S. exports to China would help reduce tensions over
trade issues. On the other hand, China can use the WTO to deal with its trade disputes with
the United States. For example, on May 27, 2002, China formally requested the WTO to
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establish a dispute resolution panel to examine U.S. safeguard measures implemented in
March 2002 that raised tariffs on certain steel imports.
Congress will likely continue to play an active role in U.S.-China commercial relations.
For example, it will likely press the Bush Administration to ensure China’s trade compliance
with its WTO commitments after its accession. If U.S. exports fail to increase significantly,
and the USTR finds serious problems with China’s compliance, Congress may press the
Administration to file dispute resolution cases against China in the WTO.
Congressional Members concerned with China’s human rights conditions will likely
focus their attention on the Congressional-Executive Commission on China, which will
monitor China’s human rights policies. The Commission will issue annual reports to
Congress, including findings and recommendations. The first report was issued on October
2, 2002 (see [http://www.cecc.gov]). The House International Relations Committee is
required to hold hearings on the content of the Commission’s report. Members may seek to
use this process to focus attention on China’s human rights abuses, and possibly to develop
legislative responses to such abuses. The Chinese government would likely respond
negatively to the findings of the commission (and any subsequent action by Congress); it has
tended to condemn foreign pressure over its human rights policies as interference into its
internal affairs. (For further information on this issue, see CRS Issue Brief IB98019, China-
U.S. Relations.)
Congressional concerns over U.S. national security could also affect U.S.-China
commercial relations. In 2000, Congress established the U.S.-China Security Review
Commission to examine the national security aspects of growing U.S.-China economic
relations. In July 2002, the commission issued its first annual report to Congress. The
commission recommended that Congress renew the Super 301 provision of U.S. trade law
to deal with unfair Chinese trade practices, toughen U.S. enforcement of laws and regulations
to stop prison labor imports, increase funding for U.S. government programs in China that
promote compliance with WTO rules and strengthen the rule of law, and deny access to U.S.
capital markets of foreign firms engaged in weapons proliferation.
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