Order Code RS21488
Updated April 10, 2003
CRS Report for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
Navy-Marine Corps Tactical Air Integration
Plan: Background and Issues for Congress
Christopher Bolkcom and Ronald O’Rourke
Specialists in National Defense
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Summary
As part of its FY2004 budget submission, the Department of the Navy (DoN) has
proposed implementing a Navy-Marine Corps Tactical Air Integration (TAI) plan that
would manage the Navy’s strike fighters and the Marine Corps’ strike fighters more like
a common pool of strike fighters. DoN officials say the TAI plan would permit DoN to
perform its stated missions with a smaller total number of operational strike fighters,
and thereby permit DoN to reduce its planned buy of F/A-18E/F and F-35 strike fighters
by 497 aircraft. Not procuring these 497 aircraft, DoN officials say, would save DoN
about $35 billion in aircraft procurement costs and significantly reduce DoN’s projected
approaching procurement “bow wave.” The TAI plan poses potential issues for
Congress regarding its effect on total DoN strike fighter capability, its cost effectiveness,
and its possible significance in terms of further integration of U.S. military aviation
assets in the future. This report will be updated.
Background
Navy and Marine Corps Strike Fighters. The Navy and Marine Corps, which
make up the Department of the Navy (DoN), each operate hundreds of strike fighters,
which are planes capable of both air-to-air and air-to-ground combat. The Navy fields
F/A-18C/D Hornets, F/A-18E/F Super Hornets, and F-14 Tomcats. The Marine Corps
fields F/A-18C/Ds and AV-8B Harrier VSTOL (vertical/short takeoff and landing) “jump
jets.” The Navy plans to shift to a combination of Super Hornets and F-35 Joint Strike
Fighters (JSFs), while the Marine Corps plans to shift to an all-JSF strike fighter force.
Consistent with these plans, DoN in FY2004 and subsequent years plans to procure
additional F/A-18E/Fs for the Navy and JSFs for the Navy and Marine Corps.1
Proposed Tactical Air Integration Plan. As part of its FY2004 budget
submission, the DoN has proposed implementing a Navy-Marine Corps Tactical Air
1 For more on the F/A-18E/F and JSF programs, see CRS Report RL30624, Military Aircraft, the
F/A-18E/F Super Hornet Program: Background and Issues for Congress, and CRS Report
RL30563, Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) Program: Background, Status, and Issues, both by
Christopher Bolkcom. See also CRS Issue Brief IB92115, Tactical Aircraft Modernization:
Issues for Congress, by Christopher Bolkcom.
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

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Integration (TAI) plan that would more fully integrate the Navy and Marine Corps strike
fighter forces. Key elements of the plan, which would be carried out between late-
FY2003 and FY2012, include the following:
! Operate a smaller total number of DoN strike fighters. The planned
total number of operational DoN strike fighters would be reduced. This
smaller force would be made more effective through increased spending
on aircraft readiness and modernization, as described below.
! Reduce planned procurement of strike fighters. Consistent with the
reduction in the total number of operational strike fighters, planned
purchases of F/A-18E/Fs and JSFs would be reduced.
! Increase the readiness of Navy strike fighters. To increase the
capability of the numerically reduced strike fighter force, DoN would use
some of the savings from reduced F/A-18E/F and JSF procurement to
increase the readiness of Navy strike fighters. Navy strike fighter
squadrons, whose readiness traditionally has been allowed to decline
between the times that they are assigned to deploying Navy aircraft
carriers, would be maintained at a more consistently high level of
readiness over time (like Marine Corps strike fighters), so that they
would be available in times of emergency for surge deployments aboard
Navy carriers or with deploying Marine Corps units.
! Enhance funding for DoN strike fighter modernization and ancillary
equipment. To further increase the capability of the smaller strike
fighter force, DoN would use some of the savings from reduced F/A-
18E/F and JSF procurement to enhance funding for DoN strike fighter
modernization (i.e., upgrade) programs and procurement of DoN strike
fighter ancillary equipment (such as targeting pods).
! Cross-assign Navy and Marine Corps strike fighter squadrons. On
a day-to-day basis, 3 Navy strike fighter squadrons would be assigned to
deploying Marine Corps units, and 6 Marine Corps strike fighter
squadrons would be assigned to help fill out Navy carrier air wings. This
is intended in part to familiarize pilots from each service with the
operations of the other service and thereby ensure that in times of
emergency, strike fighters from one service could be readily surged to
meet the strike fighter needs of the other service. The cross-assignment
of the 6 Marine Corps squadrons would add to the 4 Marine Corps strike
fighter squadrons that, since the 1990s, have been assigned to help fill
out Navy carrier air wings, bringing the total number of cross-assigned
Marine Corps squadrons to 10.
Reduced Number of Operational DoN Strike Fighters. As can be seen in
the table below, the TAI plan would reduce the total number of operational DoN strike
fighters from 872 to 562, a reduction of 310 aircraft, or about 36%. As indicated by the
shaded cells in the table, most of this change comes from reducing the planned number
of active-duty Navy and Marine Corps JSF squadrons.

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Table 1. Planned DoN Operational Strike Fighter Force Structure
(Number of squadrons x number of operational aircraft per squadron = number of
operational aircraft, known as Primary Authorized Aircraft, or PAA)
Previous plan
New TAI plan
Navy
F/A-18 (active)
20 x 12 = 240
20 x 12 = 240
JSF (active)
20 x 12 = 240
13 x 10 = 130
F/A-18 (reserve)
3 x 12 = 36
1 x 12 = 12
JSF (reserve)
0 x 12 = 0
1 x 10 = 10
USN squadrons
43
35
USN aircraft
516
392
Marine
JSF (active)
14 x 12 = 168
Corps
14 x 10 = 140

JSF (active)
7 x 20 = 140
F/A-18 (reserve)
4 x 12 = 48
0 x 12 = 0
JSF (reserve)
0 x 10 = 0
3 x 10 = 30
USMC squadrons
25
17
USMC aircraft
356
170
TOTAL
Squadrons
68
52
DoN

Aircraft
872
562
Source: U.S. Navy data supplied to CRS, March 3 and April 10, 2003.
Reduced Overall Strike Fighter Procurement. The 310-aircraft reduction in
the planned number of operational strike fighters translates into a 497-aircraft reduction
in planned overall strike fighter procurement. This is because DoN procures additional
strike fighters to account for the small percentage of the force that is lost each year due
to training accidents, and because DoN’s total inventory of strike fighters includes not
only operational strike fighters (i.e., those shown in the table above), but additional strike
fighters that are in the repair pipeline, in training squadrons, and in research and
development activities. DoN officials say that the TAI plan would permit DoN to reduce
procurement of F/A-18E/Fs to 460 from 548 (a reduction of 88 aircraft, or about 16%)
and procurement of JSFs to 680 from 1,089 (a reduction of 409 aircraft, or about 38%).
The combined F/A-18E/F and JSF buy would thus be reduced to 1,140 aircraft from
1,637, a reduction of 497 aircraft, or about 30%. Not procuring these 497 aircraft, DoN
officials say, would save DoN about $35 billion in constant (i.e., inflation-adjusted)
FY2002 dollars in aircraft procurement costs through FY2021 and thereby significantly
help DoN in addressing a “bow wave” (i.e., a difficult-to-afford accumulation) of ship and
aircraft procurement needs that is projected to begin a few years from now.

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Issues for Congress
The TAI plan poses potential issues for Congress regarding its effect on total DoN
strike fighter capability, its cost effectiveness, and what it may mean for further
integration of U.S. military aviation assets in the future. Each of these is discussed below.
Total DoN Strike Fighter Capability. What effect would the TAI plan have on
total DoN strike fighter capability, including the ability of the DoN strike fighter fleet to
fulfill its part of the U.S. military’s requirement to be able to fight and win two
overlapping regional conflicts? DoN officials argue that the TAI plan’s operational strike
fighter force, though numerically smaller than the previously planned force, would
provide more forward-deployed DoN strike fighter capability on a day-to-day basis due
to the enhanced individual capability of all DoN strike fighters. They also argue that the
TAI plan would improve DoN’s ability to surge additional strike fighter capability in
times of emergency due to the increased surge readiness of Navy strike fighters, the
improved ability to assign surged aircraft from one service to meet the needs of the other
service, if need be, and the enhanced individual capability of all DoN strike fighters.
Skeptics of the TAI plan may question whether the numerically smaller TAI force, even
with its improvements in readiness, modernization, and ancillary equipment, would have
enough aircraft to fight and win two regional conflicts at the same time.
In assessing the effects of the TAI plan on total DoN strike fighter capability, one
potential issue concerns the plan’s enhanced funding for DoN strike fighter modernization
programs and ancillary equipment. Although “enhanced funding” might be understood
to mean increased funding, DoN officials state that in the case of the TAI plan, enhanced
funding refers, to a significant degree, to an increased likelihood that DoN in coming
years would be able to afford certain strike fighter modernization programs and ancillary
equipment that were included under its old strike fighter plan. For Congress, potential
questions include the following: How much of the TAI plan’s enhanced funding
represents increased funding, and how much represents an increased likelihood of being
able to afford strike fighter modernization programs and ancillary equipment included in
DoN’s old strike fighter plan? If the increase in funding likelihood is less than DoN
believes, would the TAI force still provide more capability than the previously planned
force?
Another potential issue concerns the measurement of individual aircraft capability.
Assuming the TAI plan would result in a strike fighter force reflecting greater amounts
of spending for modernization and ancillary equipment, what is the resulting amount of
improvement in individual aircraft capability? To what extent has DoN quantified this
improvement? If the improvement is less than DoN believes, would the TAI force still
be more effective than the previously planned force?
An additional potential issue concerns the TAI plan’s impact on pilot training.
Marine Corps pilots are trained as infantrymen before they become pilots, so that they will
better understand the battlefield needs of ground forces. As pilots, they then receive
extensive training in close air support (CAS) – the mission of supporting friendly troops
on the ground by attacking nearby enemy ground forces. Navy pilot training, in contrast,
has traditionally focused more on air-to-air combat and on interdiction – the mission of
attacking enemy forces and assets in locations away from friendly ground forces. The
cross-assignment of strike fighters under the TAI plan suggests that DoN strike fighter

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pilots might need to either increase their total training load (so as to achieve greater
proficiency in the other service’s most prominent missions while retaining proficiency in
their own service’s most prominent missions) or spend less time training in their own
service’s most prominent missions (so as to spend more time training for their other
service’s most prominent missions). What effect would the TAI plan have on individual
pilot training loads or the ability of DoN pilots to achieve high levels of proficiency in
specific mission areas?
Cost Effectiveness. A second potential issue for Congress is the cost
effectiveness of the TAI plan. When all the cost impacts of the TAI plan are taken into
account, would the net cost impact of the plan be worth the resulting change in overall
DoN strike fighter capability?
Regarding net cost impact, although DoN estimates that the TAI plan would reduce
DoN strike fighter procurement costs by about $35 billion in constant FY2002 dollars
through FY2021, the plan would create additional expenditures in other areas. Most
prominently, the plan would require additional operation and maintenance spending to
increase the readiness rates of Navy strike fighters. DoN estimates that increased
spending for strike fighter readiness under the plan would total about $16.5 billion in
constant FY2002 dollars through FY2021 and would continue to accumulate thereafter.2
For the 6 years covered by the FY2004-FY2009 Future Years Defense Plan (FYDP),
DoN estimates that the TAI plan would reduce DoN aircraft procurement costs by about
$1 billion and increase aircraft readiness spending by about $3.7 billion. The TAI plan
might thus complicate, rather than ease, DoN’s challenge in addressing the part of its
procurement bow wave that may fall within the FYDP.
Annual military aircraft operation and maintenance costs have been growing in
recent years, particularly for older aircraft. And new models of DoD aircraft have
sometimes, if not often, proven to be more expensive to operate and maintain than
planned. This raises the possibility that the increased readiness costs of the TAI plan may
be underestimated. On the other hand, since the costs of at least some (if not many) past
DoD aircraft procurement programs have also been underestimated, there is also a
possibility that the procurement cost savings of the TAI plan may be underestimated.
A second potential source of additional expenditures under the TAI plan would be
increased spending for DoN strike fighter modernization and ancillary equipment.
Although, as mentioned earlier, much (perhaps most) of the enhancement of funding in
these areas under the TAI plan refers to an increased likelihood of being able to afford
modernization and ancillary equipment programs included under DoN’s previous strike
fighter plan, some of the enhancement would come in the form of increased amounts of
spending in these areas.
A third potential source of additional expenditures under the TAI plan would be
increased unit JSF procurement costs. The 409-aircraft reduction in DoN purchases of
JSFs that would occur under the TAI plan would reduce the total planned buy of JSFs
2 The $35 billion and $16.5 billion figures would change if computed on a discounted basis to
reflect the investment value of money over time.

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(2,912 aircraft, including 60 for the Royal Navy) by about 14%. Any Air Force or Royal
Navy JSFs that were scheduled to be procured after these 409 DoN JSFs would now occur
earlier on the production learning curve and therefore be more expensive for these
services to procure (though perhaps only marginally so). In addition, if the reduction in
the planned DoN JSF buy results in reduced annual JSF procurement rates in certain years
compared to the old JSF procurement plan, then the JSFs produced during those years
could be more expensive due to reduced spreading of manufacturer and supplier fixed
overhead costs. The resulting increase in unit procurement cost would be incurred by
whatever services are procuring these JSFs. Some observers note that anticipated foreign
sales of the JSF will increase the overall production of the aircraft beyond the planned
U.S.-British total and thereby reduce the per-unit cost. While export of the JSF is likely
– in fact part of the plan – the number of JSFs that will be sold abroad is uncertain. The
impact of these exports on JSF production economies of scale is therefore difficult to
measure.
Implications for Further Aviation Integration. A third potential issue for
Congress is the potential implications of the TAI plan, if implemented, for further
integration of U.S. military assets in the future. As noted earlier, the TAI plan builds on
a 1990s initiative to assign 4 Marine Corps strike fighter squadrons to Navy carrier air
wings. Could implementing the TAI plan in turn lead to additional integration of Navy
and Marine Corps aviation assets in the future? If so, what form might this further
integration take, and what would be its potential impact on DoN capabilities and costs?
The Marine Corps by law (10 U.S.C. 5063(a)) is to be a combined-arms force that
includes its own aviation assets. Even so, there have been proposals from time to time
for turning the Marine Corps’ fixed-wing aircraft over to the Navy. In light of these
proposals, some observers may wonder whether the TAI plan, if implemented, could
become the first step on a “slippery slope” toward total integration of Navy and Marine
Corps fixed-wing aviation. Advocates of such integration have argued that it could
reduce DoN costs and would be consistent with the Army’s reliance on Air Force and
Navy fixed-wing aircraft for close air support. Marine Corps officials and others have
opposed the idea on the grounds that maintaining a separate Marine fixed-wing aviation
capability is critical to the service’s success as a combined-arms force, particularly in
expeditionary operations where the Marine Corps’ fixed-wing aircraft serve as the
equivalent of the Army’s more extensive artillery support units.
More broadly, the TAI plan in the longer run could renew discussions from earlier
years over the cost-effectiveness of maintaining separate aviation components in the Air
Force, Navy, Army, and Marine Corps – the so-called “4 air forces” issue. Advocates of
DoD aviation integration have argued in previous years that operating 4 separate aviation
components is wasteful. Supporters of the current arrangement have argued that the
potential savings of DoD aviation integration have been exaggerated, and that there are
operational advantages in maintaining separate aviation components that train for the
different operating environments and mission requirements of each service.3
3 For a discussion, see archived CRS Report 93-823 F, Four U.S. “Air Forces:” Overlap and
Alternatives, by Allan W. Howey. Washington, 1993. (September 10, 1993) 30 p.

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