Order Code IB10089
Issue Brief for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
Military Pay and Benefits:
Key Questions and Answers
Updated April 10, 2003
Robert L. Goldich
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress
CONTENTS
SUMMARY
MOST RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS
1. Why Did the Adequacy of Active Duty Military Pay Become a Major Issue
Beginning in the Late 1990s?
2. What Effects Could the September 11, 2001 Terrorist Attacks on the United States,
the U.S. Military Response to Them, and the Iraq War That Began on March 19,
Have on Military Benefits?
3. What Kinds of Increases in Military Pay and Benefits Have Been Considered or Used
in the Past?
4. How Are Each Year’s Increases in Military Pay Computed?
Annual Percentage Increases in Military Basic Pay
5. What Have Been the Annual Percentage Increases in Active Duty Military Basic Pay
Since 1993 (FY1994)? What Were Each Year’s Major Executive and Legislative
Branch Proposals and Actions on the Annual Percentage Increase in Military Basic
Pay?
2003 (FY2004)
2002 (FY2003)
2001 (FY2002)
2000 (FY2001)
1999 (FY2000)
1998 (FY1999)
1997 (FY1998)
1996 (FY1997)
1995 (FY1996)
1994 (FY1995)
1993 (FY1994)
6. Is There a “Pay Gap” Between Military and Civilian Pay, So That Generally Military
Pay Is Less than That of Comparable Civilians? If So, What Is the Extent of the
“Gap”?
Measuring and Confirming a “Gap”
Estimates of a Military-Civilian Pay Gap
If There Is a Pay Gap, Does It Necessarily Matter?
7. What Recent Changes Have Been Made in Active Duty Military Pay and Benefits
(Other Than the Annual Percentage Increase in Basic Pay)?
Recent Major Changes in Active Duty Pay and Benefits
8. Congressional Action in 2003 on Military Pay and Benefits (Other than the Across-
the-Board Pay Raise)
FY2003 Emergency Wartime Supplemental Appropriations Bill
Other Military Compensation Bills
Armed Forces Tax Fairness Act of 2003
FOR ADDITIONAL READING
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Military Pay and Benefits: Key Questions and Answers
SUMMARY
In the late1990s, the military services
The across-the-board increases in mili-
were facing considerable recruiting and career
tary pay discussed each year relate to military
retention problems. Reasons for these in-
basic pay, which is the one element of mili-
cluded the end of the Cold War, private-sector
tary compensation that all military personnel
job opportunities in the 1990s boom,
in the same pay grade and with the same
increasing desire for and availability of a
number of years of service receive. However,
college education, rising living standards that
there are numerous other elements in the total
put military housing and lifestyles at a disad-
military compensation “package.” These other
vantage, and greater sensitivity among person-
elements are important in determining
nel to frequent family separation and overseas
whether a “pay gap” exists between military
rotations.
and civilian pay that favors civilians, because
the numerous different elements of military
In responding, Congress was mindful of
pay makes it difficult to compare to civilian
how low pay had contributed to decreased
salaries and other benefits.
recruit quality in the late 1970s. It responded
with larger pay raises, increased special pays
Since the early 1990s, in addition to each
and bonuses, more recruiting resources, and
year’s across-the-board raise, most changes in
repeal of planned military retired pay reduc-
benefits have favored individual members.
tions for future retirees. In the midst of these
These include changes in the cash allowance
efforts, the terrorist attacks of September 11,
received by personnel not living in military
2001, took place, providing a sense of
housing; a drastic overhaul of military health
national unity and military purpose.
care; and repeal of military retired pay cuts
Recruiting has since improved substantially.
first enacted in 1986.
Career retention is difficult to measure, due to
the services having suspended separation and
Military personnel last received an
retirement of many personnel since 09/11/01,
across-the-board pay raise on January 1, 2003;
the Iraq war that began on March 19, and the
all members received at least a 4.1% increase,
virtual impossibility of disaggregating the
and some got as much as 6.5%. For January
effects of each of these factors.
1, 2004, DOD has proposed a military pay
raise averaging 4.1%, ranging between 2.0%
Debate continues over what kinds of pay
and 6.5%. A variety of other increases in
and benefit increases are best for improving
various special pays and benefits are making
recruiting and retention. Of particular interest
their way through initial stages of the legisla-
is the balance between across-the-board pay
tive process, in many cases accelerated be-
raises on the one hand, and ones targeted by
cause of the Iraq war.
grade, years of service, and occupational skill,
on the other; and between cash compensation
on the one hand and improvements in benefits
such as housing, health care, and installation
services on the other.
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress
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MOST RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
On April 3, 2003, the House and Senate each approved their versions of the FY2003
emergency wartime supplemental appropriations bill; the Senate bill contains several
provisions, occasioned by the Iraq war, to increase various elements of military
compensation related to combat, family separation, overseas deployments, and similar
situations. Other war-generated pay bills were approved by the Senate on April 1, and
several tax provisions related to military personnel have been approved by both the House
(March 20) and the Senate (March 27).
BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS
1. Why Did the Adequacy of Active Duty Military Pay Become a
Major Issue Beginning in the Late 1990s?
Since the end of the draft in 1972-1973, the “adequacy” of military pay has tended to
become an issue for Congress for one or both of two reasons: if it appears that
! the military services are having trouble recruiting enough new personnel, or
keeping sufficient career personnel, of requisite quality; or
! the standard of living of career personnel is perceived to be less fair or
equitable than that which demographically comparable civilians (in terms
of age, education, skills, responsibilities, and similar criteria) can maintain.
The first issue is an economic inevitability on at least some occasions. In the absence
of a draft, the services must compete in the labor market for new enlistees, and — a fact
often overlooked — have always had to compete in the labor market for more mature
individuals to staff the career force. There are always occasions when unemployment is low,
and hence recruiting is more difficult, and others when unemployment is high and military
service a more attractive alternative. The second situation, while often triggered by the first,
is frequently stated in moral or ethical terms. From that viewpoint, even if quantitative
indexes of recruiting and retention appear to be satisfactory, it is argued that the crucial
character of the military’s mission of national defense, and its acceptance of the professional
ethic that places survival below mission accomplishment, demands certain levels of
compensation.
The last time Congress dealt with inadequate active duty pay levels was in the early
1980s. Problems in recruiting sufficient new enlistees, and retaining enough career personnel
of adequate quality, led to what most of those involved with the issue considered a real crisis.
Congressional response over the next several years included back-to-back pay raises in 1980
(11.7%) and 1981 (14.3%) that increased basic pay by almost 28%, raised special pays and
bonuses, and created (over DOD objections) the new, and immediately highly successful,
Montgomery GI Bill. These factors, coupled with a rise in unemployment in the early 1980s,
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led to a complete turnaround in recruiting and retention. By the mid-1980s recruit quality
was judged to be at unprecedented high levels, recruiters could be selective in taking young
men and women, and career force shortages had vanished.
Beginning in the mid-1990s, several new factors caused recruiting and retention
problems severe enough to force Congress to once again deal with this issue. Among the
factors cited by analysts were (1) a public impression that the end of the Cold War, meant
that military service was no longer interesting, relevant, or even available as a career option;
(2) the post-Cold War drawdown in active duty military manpower by 40%, which greatly
reduced real and perceived enlistment and career retention opportunities; (3) the 1990s
economic expansion, which led to the explosive growth of actual and perceived civilian
career options; (4) a rise in civilian consumer living standards against which military families
measure their own economic success or failure; (5) concerns over increased family separation
due to more operations and training away from home, whether “home” was in the United
States or in foreign countries; and (6) a decreased propensity for military service among
young people for other reasons, such as anti-military parents and educators; skepticism about
new missions such as “operations other than war,” “peacekeeping,” or “peace enforcement”;
and the availability of government educational assistance from other sources (“the GI Bill
without the GI”).
2. What Effects Could the September 11, 2001 Terrorist Attacks on
the United States, the U.S. Military Response to Them, and the Iraq
War That Began on March 19, Have on Military Benefits?
It is not yet clear what effects the ongoing war against terrorism and the more recent
Iraq war will have on military pay and benefits. Recruiting and career retention, especially
the former, began to improve in FY2000 and have continued their upward trend in FY2001-
FY2002. However, the wars make it difficult to disaggregate the effects of recruiting and
retention initiatives from other policies that have affected personnel strengths and quality,
such as the invoking of “stop-loss” restrictions (authorized by 10 USC 12305, formerly
673c) that prevent military personnel in occupational specialties designated by DOD from
separating or retiring from active duty; anticipation of future pay increases in addition to
those that have actually taken effect, and the sense of national unity and military purpose that
a direct attack on the homeland can produce.
A wide range of possible additional effects on military compensation of the current
situation can therefore be postulated, many of them related to future combat operations.
Continued popular support for the President, for the war against terrorism, and for the Armed
Forces could continue to make recruiting easier and improve career retention, decreasing the
requirement for special pays and bonuses and diminishing pressure to increase the annual
comparability raise above what the permanent statutory formula provides each year.
However, the requirement to pay active duty pay rates to the tens of thousands of reservists
brought on active duty will push manpower costs up, as will large-scale overseas
deployments. If it is decided that a permanent increase in active duty manpower strengths
is required to support long-term anti-terrorism capabilities, then that too will increase total
active duty pay costs.
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The events of September 11 contributed to raising both actual and perceived
unemployment--attitudes always good for recruiting, if bad for the country as a whole. Such
recruiting might be even more popular, in that psychologically, those who join the armed
forces, or decide to stay in, would do so to strike at the cause of America’s problems. These
factors would reduce the need for spending on both bonuses and higher across-the-board pay
increases, in terms of military pay being competitive. They would not, however, affect
countervailing desires that might be felt to provide more liberal pay and benefit increases as
a way of showing gratitude to the armed forces.
The effects of the war with Iraq on military pay and benefits can be expected to have
broadly similar effects as the effects of the war on terrorism have actually had over the past
year: Congress is always attentive to the personal and financial status and problems of
military personnel in time of war. The eventual length of the war, indeed, if it has a decisive
“end,” and the nature of the ending, will all effect on recruiting and retention. During
Operations Desert Shield (the 7-month period from August 2, 1990, the Iraqi conquest of
Kuwait, and the beginning of the war against Iraq that liberated Kuwait), and Desert Storm
(the actual 42-day Persian Gulf War, January 17-February 28, 1991), enlistments dipped in
the first few months of Desert Shield, then rose to roughly prewar levels and shot up in the
year or two following the victory in the war. Similar predictions for the current war can thus
be seen as very hard to do. Although the victories achieved against organized Iraqi military
forces and the rapid advance to and seizure of Baghdad may well have positive effects on
recruiting, the public display by “embedded” journalists about the human and material costs
of the war could dissuade others from enlisting.
All of these factors may operate at the same time and in a crude sense may cancel each
other out. A need to raise pay to attract recruits affected negatively by the prospect of
combat could be counterbalanced by those attracted to service out of patriotism, anger, and
likely adventure. Career personnel who stay in to fulfill their lifetime missions in a time of
need, and because of liberal retention bonuses and special pays, could be balanced by those
who feel ready to “pass the torch” to younger people and retire rather than face more combat
or overseas deployments, regardless of how much money they were offered.
3. What Kinds of Increases in Military Pay and Benefits Have Been
Considered or Used in the Past?
Many military compensation analysts have strongly criticized across-the-board rather
than selective pay raises. They argue that across-the-board increases fail to bring resources
to bear where they are most needed. Percentage increases targeted on particular pay grades
and number of years of service (often referred to as “pay table reform”) and special pays and
bonuses targeted on particular occupational skills, they suggest, would maximize the
recruiting and retention gains for the compensation dollars spent. Across-the-board increases
also affect a variety of other costs; retired pay, for instance, is computed as a percentage of
basic pay. (However, there have been proposals to include special pays and bonuses in retired
pay calculations, precisely to provide an additional incentive for the recipients to stay in
service.)
The services already do a great deal of such targeting, having maintained a large system
of special pays and bonuses since the end of conscription almost 30 years ago. Personnel
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managers report no indication that such targeted compensation has had the deleterious effects
on morale and cohesion that some had feared. Across-the-board pay increases, however, are
believed by many to have the advantages of simplicity, visibility, and equity. If everyone
gets a similar percentage increase, nobody feel, or can claim, that he or she has been left out.
It also shows up immediately, in the person’s next paycheck, rather than months or years
later when a particular individual is next eligible for a lump sum special pay or bonus (some
special pays and bonuses are paid monthly or biweekly, as part of regular pay). It appears
certain that, as in the past, overall increases in military cash compensation over the next
several years will combine both across-the-board and targeted increases. Both of these
increases, because of their broad appeal, may well be the most psychologically sound
approach in improving recruiting and retention as much as possible. In addition, there is
bipartisan support for major increases in Montgomery GI Bill benefits, although these tend
to be among the most costly benefit increases being considered.
Recruiting and retention problems are not necessarily solved only by increasing military
pay. Many components of the military compensation system that are important to recruiting
and retention efforts, especially the latter, do not involve cash pay. These include health
care; housing; permanent change of station (PCS) moving costs and policies; exchanges,
commissaries, and other retail facilities; and recreational facilities. A wide range of views
about existing military personnel management practices suggest that the services’
requirements for both new enlistees and career people could be significantly reduced by
changing often long-standing and inter-related assignment, promotion, career development,
or retirement policies. Survey research also reveals that the sense of patriotism, public
service, and esprit de corps found in capable and combat-ready armed forces is extremely
significant to both new enlistees and career members.
Furthermore, there are always limits to what increased compensation, whether cash or
in-kind, can do to help any organization cope with personnel difficulties. Job and career
satisfaction; public and elite views of the importance and legitimacy of the military as an
institution; unit morale; success in operational deployments and especially in combat – these
may well be independent of compensation variables. High “scoring” in these intangibles,
especially for a unique organization and culture like the Armed Forces, can and frequently
does balance more tangible problems in compensation. However, few analysts believe that
recruiting and retention rates can be brought up to service target levels without substantial
increases in pay, so long as an economic expansion continues to generate higher-paying job
opportunities in the civilian sector. Many long-time observers seem to feel that money alone
cannot keep a person in the military for a full career if the person does not like the military
culture; they assert that the lifestyle is too demanding and too arduous for most. At the same
time, it is argued that people can be driven out of the military if their compensation and
living standards are not at least somewhat close to those of their demographic and
educational counterparts in civilian life.
4. How Are Each Year’s Increases in Military Pay Computed?
Definitions. The across-the-board increases in military pay discussed each year relate
to military basic pay. Basic pay is the one element of military compensation that all military
personnel in the same pay grade and with the same number of years of service receive. Basic
allowance for housing, or BAH, is received by military personnel not living in military
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housing, either family housing or barracks). Basic allowance for subsistence, or BAS, is
the cost of meals. All officers receive the same BAS; enlisted BAS varies, based on the type
and place of assignment. A federal income tax advantage accrues because the BAH and
BAS are not subject to federal income tax.
Basic pay, BAH, BAS, and the federal income tax advantage all comprise what is
known as Regular Military Compensation (RMC). RMC is that index of military pay
which tends to be used most often in comparing military with civilian compensation;
analyzing the standards of living of military personnel; and studying military compensation
trends over time, or by service geographical area, or skill area. Basic pay is between 65 and
75% of RMC, depending on individual circumstances. RMC specifically excludes all special
pays and bonuses, reimbursements, educational assistance, deferred compensation (i.e., an
economic valuation of future retired pay), or any kind of attempt to estimate the cash value
of non-monetary benefits such as health care or military retail stores.
Annual Percentage Increases in Military Basic Pay.
Military Basic Pay Raises Linked to Federal General Schedule (GS) Civil
Service Pay Raises. Permanent law (37 USC 1009) provides that monthly basic pay is
to be adjusted upward by the same “overall average percentage increase in the General
Schedule [GS] rates of both basic pay and locality pay for [federal] civilian employees,” and
is to “carry the same effective date.” The upward adjustment is based on the GS pay increase
calculated in accordance with the permanent statutory GS pay raise formula, regardless of
whether later statutes modify the actual GS raise paid in any particular year. It is not,
however, as is noted below, identical to the percentage increase in GS pay.
How GS Civil Service Pay Raises Are Computed. The GS formula employed
here is that specified in 5 USC 5303(a). It is based on (but is not identical to, as will be
discussed below) the increase in the Employment Cost Index (ECI) calculated by the
Department of Labor’s Bureau of Labor Statistics. The ECI measures annual percentage
increases in wages for all private-sector employees, although it can be subdivided to measure
increases in specific categories of such employees. The precise ECI increase used for pay
purposes is computed by comparing the ECI for the third quarter of the calendar year
preceding that in which the pay increase is budgeted with the ECI for the third quarter of the
year preceding the latter year. For example, assume the GS civilian pay raise for fiscal and
calendar year 2005, under current law to be first paid on January 1, 2005, is being computed.
The FY2005 federal budget that includes this pay raise will be debated and enacted in
calendar year 2004, beginning with the transmittal of the Administration’s FY2005 budget
to Congress in early 2004. This latter budget, however, was prepared beginning in the
middle of 2003. The pay raise in this budget can only be based on the extent to which the
ECI for the third quarter of 2003 had increased over that for the third quarter of 2002. There
is thus a lag of approximately 6 months between the end of the ECI increase measuring
period and the transmittal of the proposed pay raise based on it to Congress and a lag of 15
months between the end of the ECI measuring period and the actual percentage increase in
civil service pay, and hence active duty military pay, on which it is based.
The actual percentage increase in GS pay is not the percentage increase in the ECI over
the time frame described. The applicable statute [5 USC 5303(a)]provides that the overall
increase in federal GS pay will be 0.5% less than the percentage increase in the ECI. The
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money thus saved is frequently cited as being available to provide larger pay raises to federal
civilians in high-cost-of-living metropolitan areas within the United States, although there
is no statutory requirement than the “saved” money be used for this purpose. For example,
if there is a 5% increase in the ECI from the previous year, and the cost of raising all federal
GS pay by 5% would be $5 billion yearly, federal GS civil servants would actually be
guaranteed only a pay raise of 4.5%, costing a total of $4.5 billion. The $500 million thus
saved could, if the executive branch and/or Congress so desired, be applied to pay for raises
higher than 4.5% in high-cost-of-living areas. In this example, military personnel could thus
get a 4.5% pay raise. This formula led to the actual pay raises received in 1993 (FY1994),
1994 (FY1995), 1995 (FY1996), 1997 (FY1998), and 1999 (FY2000). [The statute does
allow the overall percentage increase to be allocated among the different pay grade and years-
of-service categories, subject to various limitations, rather than giving all personnel identical
percentage increases. This was in fact done in 2000. See 37 USC 1009(d).]
Temporary Suspension of Permanent Law to Give the Military Higher Pay
Raises. In 1999, the FY2000 National Defense Authorization Act in effect temporarily
suspended the above pay computation formula for the period FY2001-FY2006. Instead of
the military basic pay increase being 0.5% less than the full ECI increase, the amending
language provides that the annual raise will be the full ECI plus an additional 0.5% (i.e., a
full percentage point above what the longstanding permanent formula provides). Thus, in the
hypothetical example used in the above paragraph, under this 6-year suspension of the
permanent formula, the annual pay raise that military personnel would receive would be
5.5% rather than 4.5%.
Congress Usually Passes a Military Pay Raise Anyhow, Despite the
Permanent Formula. Despite the existence of this statutory formula, which would
operate each year without any further statutory intervention, Congress has legislated a
particular percentage increase in military pay every year since 1980, with the exception of
1982. The percentage increase in military pay has been identical to that granted GS civilians
in all but three years since 1980 (1981, 1985, and 1994, when Congress provided a larger
percentage increase in military pay). Even when the percentage increase has been identical,
however, in most cases Congress has explicitly reiterated the increase in law rather than
simply allowing the permanent statutory linkage to operate. Therefore, although Congress
may legislate the pay raise percentage, until recently it was been a pro forma matter, and the
operation of the permanent formula remains important in determining what the percentage
will actually be.
Annual Increases in Basic Allowances for Housing (BAH) and
Subsistence (BAS). Housing (37 USC 403) and subsistence (37 USC 402) allowances
are paid to all personnel not living in military housing or eating in military facilities or using
field rations. Monthly BAH varies by rank, by whether the person has dependents, and, most
importantly, by location. Monthly BAS is uniform for all officers regardless of rank or
dependents, but BAS for enlisted personnel is computed daily and varies by locations and
the kind of eating facilities, military and civilian, deemed available. Annual increases in
BAH and BAS are both based on surveys of local housing and national food costs
respectively, and thus are not affected by the annual percentage increase in the ECI. (For
many years BAH and its predecessors and BAS were subject to the annual percentage
increase; this was not changed until the late 1990s.) There have been some proposals in
recent weeks, mentioned in the defense trade press, that BAH housing costs be surveyed
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more frequently than once a year, due to rising housing costs generally. Particular emphasis
is placed by supporters of more frequent surveys on fast-rising electricity costs, notably for
heating and cooling, being faced by military personnel. In addition, the fact that BAS is a
fairly small amount and has long since ceased to bear any real relationship to food and dining
costs for individual servicemembers has led to some calls to merge BAS with basic pay and
reduce the complexity of military compensation and the need for BAS computations each
year.
5. What Have Been the Annual Percentage Increases in Active
Duty Military Basic Pay Since 1993 (FY1994)? What Were Each
Year’s Major Executive and Legislative Branch Proposals and
Actions on the Annual Percentage Increase in Military Basic Pay?
The following subsections itemize action on the active duty military basic pay increase
going back to 1993 (the FY1994 budget). Unless otherwise noted, all increases were
proposed to be effective on January 1 of the fiscal year indicated. The same is true of
discussions of future pay raises.
2003 (FY2004). Statutory formula: 3.7%. Administration request: The FY2004
defense budget request, released on February 3, 2003, proposed an FY2004 military pay raise
averaging 4.1%. Depending on rank and years of service, military pay would be increased
by a minimum of 2.0% and a maximum of 6.5%. Personnel in pay grade E-1 (new recruits)
would get the minimum 2.0% raise, and enlisted members in pay grade E-2, and newly-
commissioned junior officers in pay grade O-1, would get 3.2%. Most officers would get
3.7%, and the highest percentage raises, up to the 6.25% figure, would be given to career
enlisted personnel in pay grades E-5 through E-9.
2002 (FY2003). Statutory formula: 4.1%. Administration request: Minimum 4.1%;
average 4.8%; for some mid-level and senior noncommissioned officers, warrant officers,
and mid-level commissioned officers, between 5.0% and 6.5%. Final increase: identical to
the Administration request, embodied, as usual, in the FY2003 National Defense
Authorization Act (P.L. 107-314, December 2, 2002; 116 Stat. 2458). The House and Senate
had also approved the Administration request.
2001 (FY2002). Statutory formula: 4.6%. Administration request: numerous figures
for the “Administration request” were mentioned in the pay raise debate, depending on when
and which agency produced the figures. In general, however, they all proposed increases of
at least 5% and no more than 15% (the latter applying only to a very few individuals),
depending on pay grade and years of service. Final increase: Eventually, the FY2002
National Defense Authorization Act (Sec. 601, P.L. 107-107, December 28, 2001)endorsed
an “Administration request” of between 5 and 10%, depending on pay grade and years of
service. These increases are the largest across-the-board percentage raises since that of
FY1982, which took effect on October 1, 1981. The latter was a 14.3% across-the-board
raise, which followed an 11.7% raise the previous year, FY1981, resulting in a 2-year raise
of almost 28%. This was principally in response to the high inflation of the late 1970s.
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2000 (FY2001). Statutory formula: 3.7% (based on the 1999/FY2000 legislation,
above; the original statutory formula would have led to a proposed raise of 2.7%).
Administration request: 3.7%. Final increase: The FY2001 National Defense Authorization
Act (Section 601, P.L. 106-398, October 30, 2000; 114 Stat. 1654A-1 at A-143) approved
the 3.7% figure. In addition, as was the case in the previous year, additional increases
averaging 0.4% (based on the size of the across-the-board raise the amount of money used
would have funded; the range of additional percentage raises was between 1.0 and 5.5%)
were provided to middle-grade officer and enlisted personnel, to be effective July 1, 2001.
1999 (FY2000). Statutory formula: 4.8%. Administration request: 4.4% on January
1, 2000, but in addition, on July 1, 2000, a wide range of targeted increases averaging an
additional 1.4% (again, based on the size of across-the-board raise the cost of the targeted
increases would finance) in mid-level officer and enlisted grades’ pay levels. Final increase:
The FY2000 National Defense Authorization Act (Section 601, P.L. 106-65; October 5,
1999) raised the January 1, 2000 increase to 4.8%, and accepted the July 1, 2000 targeted
increases.
Suspension of Statutory Formula during FY2001-FY2006. The FY2000
defense authorization contained a 6-year suspension of the existing statutory formula, which
became effective in FY2001. In enacting this suspension, the House version would have
required that the full ECI increase (not the ECI less 0.5%) be used in calculating the annual
pay raise starting in FY2001 and thereafter. The Senate version would have required that the
annual raise be the full ECI plus 0.5% (i.e., a full percentage point above what permanent
law then read) during FY2001-FY2006. The Senate version prevailed in conference.
1998 (FY1999). Statutory formula: 3.1%. Administration request: 3.6%. The House
approved 3.6%, or whatever percentage increase was approved for federal GS civilians,
whichever was higher. The Senate approved 3.6%. Final increase: The FY1999 Strom
Thurmond National Defense Authorization Act (Section 601, P.L. 105-261; October 17,
1998; 112 Stat. 1920 at 2036) approved the House alternative, which resulted in a 3.6%
military increase, as GS civilians also received 3.6%.
1997 (FY1998). Statutory formula: 2.8%. Administration request: 2.8%. Final
increase: FY1998 National Defense Authorization Act (Section 601, P.L. 105-85, November
18, 1997; 111 Stat. 1629 at 1771): 2.8%.
1996 (FY1997). Statutory formula: 2.3%. Administration request: 3.0%. Final
increase: The House and Senate both approved the higher Administration request of 3.0%,
and it was therefore included in the FY1997 National Defense Authorization Act (Section
601, P.L. 104-201, September 23, 1996; 110 Stat. 2422 at 2539).
1995 (FY1996). Statutory formula: 2.4%. Administration request: 2.4%. Final
increase: Congress also approved 2.4% in the FY1996 National Defense Authorization Act
(Section 601, P.L. 104-106, February 10, 1996; 110 Stat. 186 at 356).
1994 (FY1995). Statutory formula: 2.6%. Administration request: 1.6%; one percent
less than the statutory formula. Final increase: The FY1995 National Defense Authorization
Act (Section 601, P.L. 103-337, October 5, 1994; 108 Stat. 2663 at 2779) authorized the
statutory formula figure of 2.6%.
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1993 (FY1994). Statutory formula: 2.2%. Administration request: No increase;
military (and civil service) pay would have been frozen in FY1994. The Administration also
proposed limiting future civil service – and hence active duty military – pay raises to one
percentage point less than that provided by the existing statutory formula. None of these
proposals was adopted. Final increase: The FY1994 National Defense Authorization Act
(Section 601, P.L. 103-160, November 30, 1993, 107 Stat. 1547 at 1677) authorized 2.2%.
6. Is There a “Pay Gap” Between Military and Civilian Pay, So That
Generally Military Pay Is Less than That of Comparable Civilians?
If So, What Is the Extent of the “Gap”?
The allegations of a military-civilian “pay gap” beg several questions:
! How can the existence of a gap be determined and the gap be measured?
! Is there a gap, with civilians or the military being paid more? If so, how
much of a gap?
! If there is a gap, does that in itself require action?
! What are the effects of such a gap?
A wide range of studies over the past several decades have compared military and
civilian (both federal civil service and private sector) compensation. In general, the markedly
different ways in which civilian public and private sector compensation and benefit systems
are structured, compared to that of the armed forces, makes it difficult to validate any across-
the-board generalizations about whether there is a “gap” between military and civilian pay.
Some advocates for federal civil servants suggest that federal civilian pay lags behind private
sector pay, which in turn leads some people, given the linkage between civil service and
military pay percentage increases, to infer that military pay lags behind private sector pay.
However, because the current statistic used to measure private sector pay, the ECI, measures
annual percentage increases and not dollar amounts, no such inference is really possible.
Measuring and Confirming a “Gap”. It is extremely difficult to find a common
index or indicator to compare the dollar values of military and civilian compensation. First,
military compensation is much more complicated and composed of many more different
elements than is civilian compensation. Military cash pay include numerous separate
components; some are received by all military personnel and some, such as a wide range of
special pays and bonuses, are paid to select groups. One aspect of military pay, the federal
income tax advantage that accrues due to housing and meals allowances not being taxable,
has a dollar amount that is entirely dependent on each military member’s personal tax
situation. Which of these should be included in a military-civilian pay comparison? How can
some be included at all? Furthermore, total military compensation includes a wide range of
non-monetary benefits: the extensive military health care facility network, military retail
stores such as commissaries and exchanges; and military recreational facilities such as
theaters, gymnasia, hotels, and lodges. Few civilians work in organizations where analogous
benefits are provided. Attempts to facilitate a comparison by assigning a cash value to non-
cash benefits almost always founder on the large number of often arbitrary assumptions that
must be made to generate such an estimate.
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Second, it is also extremely difficult, for obvious reasons, to establish a solid
comparison between military ranks and pay grades on the one hand, and civil service and
private sector job titles and pay levels on the other. The range of knowledge and skills,
degree of supervision, and scope of professional judgment required of military personnel and
civilians performing similar duties in a standard peacetime industrial or office milieu may
well be similar. When the same military member’s likely job in the field, possibly in combat,
is concerned, comparisons become difficult.
Third, generally speaking, with some exceptions, the conditions of military service are
frequently much more arduous than those of civilian employment, even in peacetime, for
families as well as military personnel themselves. This aspect of military service is
sometimes cited as a rationale for military compensation being at a higher level than it
otherwise might be. These conditions include frequent moves for which moving allowances
never completely reimburse the military member; lengthy family separations, which are not
confined to overseas deployments but also result from field training or service at sea even
while stationed in the United States; and family disruption resulting from constant changes
of occupations and schools by dependents. On the other hand, the military services all
mention travel and adventure in exotic places as a positive reason for enlistment and/or a
military career, so it may be misleading to automatically assume it is only a liability.
Fourth, comparisons between different sets of compensation statistics, and the use of
these comparisons to determine what military pay should be, can yield very different results.
Comparing dollar amounts of pay received by various military pay grades with the dollar
amounts received by comparable federal civil service and private-sector positions (as noted
above, in itself a difficult comparison to make) may lead to different conclusions than
comparing the annual increases in pay for each position. The percentage increase in pay over
different time periods – in particular, the percentages that result from picking different base
years from which increases or decreases are computed – is more often than not very different.
Different indexes with different components can be used to determine compensation
changes. The yearly increase in the Consumer Price Index (CPI), which measures the cost
of a fixed list of various goods and products at any one time, is used to compute the annual
cost-of-living-adjustment (COLA) to military retired pay (and several other federal
retirement payments to individuals). The annual Employment Cost Index (ECI) determines
not pay levels, but percentage pay increases.
Finally, the level of specificity used in a pay comparison can lead to sharply differing
results, especially when the comparison is between private sector and federal pay as a whole,
both civil service and military. For instance, all Army colonels may, according to some
indexes, be paid roughly as much as federal civil service GS-15s, or as much as private sector
managers with certain responsibilities. Thus, those occupational specialties that are highly
paid in the private sector – health care, information technology, some other scientific and
engineering skills, are examples – are frequently paid considerably less in the military or in
the civil service. Other common subcategories for comparison, in addition to occupational
skill, include age, gender, years in the labor force, and educational levels.
Estimates of a Military-Civilian Pay Gap. Numerous comparisons of military and
civilian compensation in recent years have been cited to illustrate a gap that favors civilian
pay levels or refutes the existence of such a gap. Many of these reports lack precision in
identifying what aspects of military pay were compared with civilian pay; what indexes were
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used to make the comparison, or the length of time covered by the comparison. Although
it is difficult to generalize, it would appear that most of those estimates which assert that
there is a pay gap in favor of higher civilian pay quote a percentage difference of between 7
and 15% in recent years. Most, if not all, of these estimates are across-the-board, comparing
all military personnel with all civilian workers in a very broad category.
Some estimates have been made that question the existence of a gap favoring civilians.
These tend to compare specific populations of military personnel with equally specific
subcategories of civilians, using such criteria as age, occupational skill, and educational
level. Analyses of this nature appear to be less common than the across-the-board
comparisons, almost certainly because they are much more difficult to do in terms of time,
cost, and availability of skilled analysts with the competence to perform them. In 1998, for
instance, a Rand Corporation study that broke down military personnel and civilians along
these lines asserted that when all of these differing factors were taken into account, there was
no pay gap for all enlisted personnel except for senior enlisted members, where the gap was
about 3%, and that for officers the gap favoring civilians was about 7%, with some officer
subgroups making considerably more money than there civilian counterparts.
In April 2002, in testimony before the Manpower and Personnel Subcommittee of the
Senate Armed Services Committee, General Accounting Office (GAO) analysts itemized the
components of the military benefit package – i.e., military retirement, health care,
Servicemember’s Group Life Insurance; base recreational facilities, and the like – and
compared them with the private sector. It found that the range of benefits available to
military personnel was generally comparable to, and in some cases superior to, benefits
available in the private sector. The GAO study did not appear to have made dollar-figure
comparisons or compared in military non-cash benefits – such as health care, commissaries
or exchanges, or annual leave – with similar benefits in the private sector, either by figuring
out their dollar worth or by itemizing their exact provisions in great detail.
If There Is a Pay Gap, Does It Necessarily Matter? Some have suggested that
the emphasis on the pay gap, whether real or imagined, or if real, how much, is unwarranted
and not a good guide to arriving at sound policy. They argue that the key issue is, or should
be, not comparability of military and civilian compensation, but the competitiveness of the
former. Absent a draft, the armed forces must compete in the labor market for new enlisted
and officer personnel. The career force by definition has always been a “volunteer force,”
and thus has always had to compete with civilian opportunities, real or perceived. Given
these facts of life, it is asked what difference it makes whether military pay is much lower,
the same, or higher than that of civilians? If the services are having recruiting difficulties,
then pay increases may be required, even if the existing “gap” favors the military.
Conversely, if military compensation is lower than equivalent civilian pay, and if the services
are doing well in recruiting and retaining sufficient numbers of qualified personnel, then
there may be no reason to raise military pay at all.
However, some believe that explicitly basing military compensation on “purely
economic” competitiveness with civilian pay could have undesirable consequences: for
instance, in a time of economic difficulty, the military might be receiving lower pay than
most civilians but still recruiting satisfactorily due to high unemployment. This situation,
last existed, to a degree, during the Great Depression of 1929-1941.
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For further discussion of the “pay gap” issue, see Congressional Budget Office, What
Does the Military “Pay Gap” Mean? June 1999; and Association of the U.S. Army, Closing
the Pay Gap, Arlington, VA, October 2000.
7. What Recent Changes Have Been Made in Active Duty Military
Pay and Benefits (Other Than the Annual Percentage Increase in
Basic Pay)?
Recent Major Changes in Active Duty Pay and Benefits. During the late
1990s, several structural changes in active duty military compensation took place, mostly to
the benefit of the individual. Three of the most significant are listed below.
Complete Restructuring of In-U.S. Housing Allowances. By1997, DOD and
Congress had completed combining several separate military housing allowances into one,
so that all military personnel in the United States not living in military housing have an area-
tailored housing allowance. This has greatly reduced out-of-pocket housing costs, as DOD
continues to budget progressive decreases in those costs as it has over the past several years.
Total Overhaul of Military Health Care Obtained from Civilian Sources.
The post-Cold War reduction in the size of the Armed Forces and the closure of many
military bases has greatly reduced the size of the military health care establishment and its
ability to deliver health care to eligible beneficiaries, particularly military retirees and their
families. This has led to large increases in military retiree health care costs and attempts to
restrain such costs through administrative and managerial reforms. These initiatives have
evolved into the new TRICARE program, which offers beneficiaries a wider range of health
care insurance costs and benefits. It is too soon to know if any of these programs will save
money or improve health care; as of now, the latter seems more likely than the former. For
further information, see CRS Issue Brief IB93103, Military Medical Care Services:
Questions and Answers, CRS Report 98-1006, Military Health Care: the Issue of
“Promised” Benefits; CRS Report 96-207, Military Medical Care and Medicare Subvention
Funding; and CRS Report 95-435, Military Retiree Health Care: Base Closures and
Realignments.
Repeal of the 1986 “Redux” Retirement Cuts. In late 1999, Congress repealed
the Military Retirement Reform Act of 1986 (P.L. 99-348; July 1, 1986), which had made
compulsory cuts in the future retired pay of those military personnel who first entered
military service on or after August 1, 1986. (These cuts have come to be called the “Redux”
system.) Redux had represented a success for those who had argued that the pre-1986
military retirement system, established in the late 1940s, cost too much, had lavish benefits,
and contributed to inefficient personnel management. Others had argued that the existing
system – particularly, its central feature of allowing career personnel with 20 years of service
to retire at any age – was essential to recruiting and maintaining sufficient high-quality career
personnel. The 1999 repeal of Redux was thus a success for those who felt that Redux was
a major factor in growing retention problems. (See CRS Issue Brief IB85159, Military
Retirement: Major Legislative Issues.)
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8. Congressional Action in 2003 on Military Pay and Benefits (Other
than the Across-the-Board Pay Raise)
FY2003 Emergency Wartime Supplemental Appropriations Bill. On April
3, 2003, the House and the Senate approved their versions of the FY2003 emergency wartime
supplemental appropriations bill. The Senate version (S. 762), has the following military
compensation-related features: (1) it increases imminent danger/hazardous duty pay, known
colloquially as “combat pay,” from $150/month to $225/month; and (2) it increases the
military family separation allowance from $100 per month to $200 per month.
Other Military Compensation Bills. On April 1, 2003, the Senate passed four
military pay and benefits bills (all on voice votes): S. 704 would increase the amount of death
gratuity paid to the designated beneficiary of a deceased military member rom $6,000 to
$12,000. S. 711 would continue payment of a reserve reenlistment bonus to a reservist who
was mobilized. S. 712 would authorize payment of a military Survivor Benefit Plan annuity
to the surviving spouse of a reservist not yet eligible for retirement who died during reserve
inactive duty training (colloquially often known as “weekend drill). S. 718 would authorize
up to $40 monthly in long distance telephone fees for military personnel directly supporting
military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Armed Forces Tax Fairness Act of 2003. Both the House and the Senate have
now enacted different versions of the proposed Armed Forces Tax Fairness Act of 2003 in
the 108th Congress. Both versions include the following six matters of interest to substantial
numbers of military personnel: (1) exemption of the full $6,000 of the military death gratuity
from income tax, rather than just $3,000 of it; (2) authorization of military personnel to not
count periods spent outside the United States in claiming the $250,000 (or $500,000 per
couple) capital gains tax exclusion from the sale of real estate; currently, such time spent
abroad must be used in determining if the people involved have lived in the residence in
question for at least 2 of the preceding 5 years; (3) exclusion from taxation payments made
to military home sellers to compensate them for the lowered price of houses in an area where
a base has been closed; (4) inclusion of contingency operations in the extended period for
which a military member can postpone filing tax returns; currently, the member can postpone
the filing only if he or she is in a combat zone; (5) liberalization of the ability of reservists
to claim various travel and lodging expenses as unreimbursed business expenses on their tax
returns; and (6) clarification of the treatment of certain child care costs for exclusion from
taxable income. Both bills also include very specialized provisions relating to veterans’
organizations and service academy cadets and midshipmen. The Senate bill, however,
includes a wide range of other tax provisions that are not related to military personnel that
are absent from the House bill. The House version (H.R. 1307) passed March 20, 2003 (422-
0; Roll Call No. 76); the Senate (H.R. 1307, as amended), March 27 (97-0, Record Vote No.
110).
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FOR ADDITIONAL READING
Army Times, Navy Times, Marine Times, Air Force Times, weekly issues, dated Monday of
each week.
Congressional Budget Office. What Does the Military “Pay Gap” Mean? June 1999.
CRS Issue Brief IB85159. Military Retirement: Major Legislative Issues.
CRS Issue Brief IB93103. Military Medical Care Services: Questions and Answers.
CRS Report 95-469. Military Retirement and Veterans’ Compensation: Concurrent Receipt
Issues. April 7, 1995.
Department of Defense. Morale and Quality of Life Study Issues Document/Briefing Slides
and Study Overview. Located online at the DOD’s Web site at
[http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jun2001/d20010621qoli.pdf].
Uniformed Services Almanac; National Guard Almanac, Reserve Forces Almanac, Retired
Military Almanac. 2003 Editions. Falls Church, VA, Uniformed Services Almanac,
Inc., 2003.
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