Order Code RL31265
Report for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
Abu Sayyaf: Target of Philippine-U.S.
Anti-Terrorism Cooperation
Updated April 8, 2003
Larry Niksch
Specialist in Asian Affairs
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

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Abu Sayyaf: Target of Philippine-U.S. Anti-Terrorism
Cooperation
Summary
From January 2002 until July 31, 2002, the United States committed nearly
1,300 troops to the Philippines and $93 million in military aid to assist Philippine
armed forces (AFP) in operations against the Abu Sayyaf terrorist group in the
southern Philippines. The U.S. action, dubbed Operation Balikatan, partly was in
response to Philippine President Arroyo’s strong support of the United States
following the September 11 al Qaeda attack on the United States. A historic Muslim
resistance to non-Muslim rulers broke out into massive rebellion in the 1970s. Two
large resistance groups, a Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) and a Moro
Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) fought the Philippine government into the 1990s and
entered into tenuous truces in 1996 and 2001 respectively. Abu Sayyaf emerged in
1990 as a splinter group composed of former MNLF fighters and Filipinos who had
fought in Afghanistan. Abu Sayyaf resorted to terrorist tactics, including kidnapings,
executions of civilians, and bombings. As Operation Balikatan began, Abu Sayyaf
continued to hold two Americans, a missionary couple, the Burnhams. Abu Sayyaf
had links with Osamu bin Laden’s al Qaeda organization in the early 1990s, but
Philippine officials have given conflicting assessments of current links. U.S. officials
asserted that there is evidence of links between Abu Sayyaf and terrorist groups.
Philippine government policy has been to apply military pressure on Abu
Sayyaf. Operations were constrained by several factors including difficult terrain,
inadequate Philippine military equipment, avoiding clashing with the MILF and
MNLF, and consideration of the safety of the hostages. These factors complicated
the U.S. military role and created doubts among U.S. officials and apparent confusion
in U.S. policy. The Bush Administration facilitated a $300,000 ransom payment to
Abu Sayyaf for the American hostages, but it failed to secure their release. An AFP
rescue attempt on June 7, 2002, resulted in the killing of Martin Burnham but the
rescue of the wife, Gracia. U.S. military support, however, did achieve successes.
AFP operations against Abu Sayyaf became more aggressive and effective; Abu
Sayyaf strength was seriously eroded. AFP commanders praised U.S. equipment,
U.S. intelligence gathering, and U.S. assistance in planning AFP operations. The
U.S. military’s civic action project on Basilan appeared to weaken support for Abu
Sayyaf on the island and received general praise in the Philippines.
The Philippines and the United States decided against extending the U.S.
military role against Abu Sayyaf after the July 31 deadline for Operation Balikatan.
This decision was reconsidered, and the Pentagon disclosed a plan in February 2003
that would involve a potential U.S. combat role against Abu Sayyaf on the island of
Jolo. Controversy in the Philippines over such a combat role caused the U.S. and
Philippine governments to begin a re-negotiation of the plan. The Bush
Administration also considered placing the MILF on the official U.S. list of terrorist
countries amidst the breakdown of the Philippine truce with the MILF and growing
evidence of links between the MILF and Jeemah Islamiah, the al Qaeda-linked group
operating in Southeast Asia.

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Contents
The Philippine Response to September 11 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Historic Muslim Insurgency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Abu Sayyaf: Origins, Strength, and Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Connections to Al Qaeda and Other Foreign Links . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Links to the MILF and MNLF . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Philippine Government and AFP Policies and Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
The Implications of U.S. Involvement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Results of the U.S. Military Role on Basilan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
The Jolo Decision and Resultant Controversy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
The Jolo Plan and Resultant Controversy

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Abu Sayyaf: Target of Philippine-U.S. Anti-
Terrorism Cooperation
The Philippine Response to September 11
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo voiced strong support for the United States
in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attack. The Philippines, she said,
is prepared to “go every step of the way” with the United States. President Arroyo
allowed U.S. military forces to use Filipino ports and airfields to support military
operations in Afghanistan. She cited morality and Philippine national interests as
reasons for her pro-U.S. stand. She defined the national interest as linking a struggle
against international terrorism with the struggle against terrorism within the
Philippines.1 She supported the U.S. war against Iraq in March 2003, offering the
U.S. military air space and refueling facilities and preparing to send about 700
Filipino military personnel to Iraq for postwar assistance.2
Philippine terrorism has been multifaceted for at least three decades and has
been carried out by different groups with different agendas. A significant communist
insurgency, the New Peoples Army (NPA) in the 1970s and 1980s engaged in
bombings, assassinations, and kidnapings. The communists today still have an
estimated armed strength of over 10,000; and the Bush Administration designated the
NPA as a terrorist group in August 2002. Criminal syndicates have practiced
widespread kidnapings for ransom. The target of President Arroyo’s policy,
however, is Muslim insurgency and terrorism.
This report provides an overview and policy analysis of the Abu Sayyaf terrorist
group in the Philippines and the Philippine-U.S. program of military cooperation
against it. It examines the origins and operations of Abu Sayyaf, the efforts of the
Philippine government and military to eliminate it, and the implications of a greater
U.S. military role in attempts to suppress it. The report will be updated periodically.
Historic Muslim Insurgency
Located on the big southern island of Mindanao and the Sulu island chain
southwest of Mindanao, Filipino Muslims, called Moros, since the time of Spanish
1 Landler, Mark. Philippines Offers U.S. Its Troops and Bases. New York Times, October
2, 2001. P. 5.
2 Pazzibugan, Dona Z. RP to Open Air Space, Refueling Facilities to US. Philippine Daily
Inquirer (Internet version), March 22, 2003. Garcia, Danilo. 700 Soldiers to be Sent to
Iraq. Pilipino Star Ngayon (Internet version), March 29, 2003.

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CRS-2
rule, revolted against Spanish colonizers of the Philippines from the 17th century on,
the American rulers of the early 20th century, and Philippine governments since
independence in 1946. From 1899 to 1914, the U.S. military conducted a number of
campaigns to suppress Muslim insurgents in the southern Philippines–campaigns
which were controversial because of heavy civilian casualties. Muslim grievances
after 1946 focused on the growing settlement of Catholic Filipinos on Mindanao,
which reduced the geographical area of a Muslim majority (there are about 7 million
Filipino Muslims). Muslims revolted in the 1970s under a Moro National Liberation
Front (MNLF), which demanded an independent Muslim state. An estimated
120,000 people were killed in the 1970s in heavy fighting between the MNLF and
the Philippine armed forces (AFP).3
Since the late 1970s, there have been two trends in the Muslim problem. The
first has been negotiations between the Philippine government and the MNLF. As
a result, the MNLF abandoned its goal of an independent Muslim state. An
agreement was reached in 1996 that created an autonomous Muslim region. This
apparent positive trend was countered by the fragmentation of the Muslim
movement. A segment of the MNLF broke away in 1978 and formed the Moro
Islamic Liberation Front (MILF). The MILF demanded independence for Muslim
populated regions and proclaimed that a Muslim state would be based on “Koranic
principles.” The MILF gained strength into the 1990s. By 1995-96, U.S. estimates
placed armed MILF strength at 35,000-45,000 in seven provinces on Mindanao. The
MILF had large base camps and functional governmental operations. Its operations
included attacks on the AFP and planting bombs in Mindanao cities. A Bangsamoro
Peoples Consultative Assembly of approximately 200,000 people was held in 1996
in MILF-held territory and called for an independent Muslim state.4
Stepped-up MILF military operations in 1998-99 prompted Philippine President
Joseph Estrada to order an all-out military offensive against MILF base camps. The
AFP captured the MILF’s main base on Mindanao and damaged the MILF militarily.
In 2001, Philippine government-MILF negotiations resulted in a tentative cease-fire.
This success was offset, however, by the break between the government and MNLF
leader, Nur Misuari. When the Philippine government opposed his re-election as
governor of the Muslim autonomous region, MNLF forces attacked the AFP and took
civilian hostages on Jolo island in the Sulu chain and in the city of Zamboanga in
west Mindanao. Nur Misuari fled to Malaysia where he was arrested by Malaysian
authorities.
Abu Sayyaf: Origins, Strength, and Operations
Abubakar Janjalani, the son of a fisherman on Basilan island, formed Abu
Sayyaf in 1990. Janjalani had become connected with a Muslim fundamentalist
3 Sales, Peter M. War in Mindanao. Asia-Pacific Defence Reporter, October-November
2000, p. 8, 10.
4 Tiglao, Rigoberto. Hidden Strength; Crescent Moon Rising. Far Eastern Economic
Review, February 23, 1995. P. 22-28. Tiglao, Rigoberto. Moro Reprise. Far Eastern
Economic Review, December 26, 1996-January 2, 1997. P. 22.

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CRS-3
movement, Al Islamic Tabligh, in the 1980s. That organization received financial
support from Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, including funds to send young Muslim men
to schools in the Middle East. Janjalani studied in Saudi Arabia and Libya and
became radicalized. When he returned to Basilan, he recruited two groups into Abu
Sayyaf (meaning “sword bearer” in Arabic): dissidents from the MNLF and Filipinos
who had fought with the Afghan mujaheddin rebels against the Soviet Union.5
Over the next five years, Abu Sayyaf staged ambushes, bombings, kidnapings,
and executions, mainly against Filipino Christians on Basilan and the west coast of
Mindanao. Its strength grew only slowly to an estimated 600 by 1995.6 Abu Sayyaf
operations declined for four years after 1995, partly as a result of the 1996 settlement
between the Philippine government and the MNLF. In 1998, AFP troops killed
Abubakar Janjalani. His brother, Khadaffy, and Ghalib Andang took command.
Then in April 2000, Abu Sayyaf began kidnaping operations further afield
geographically and aimed at foreigners, with a principle aim of extracting ransom
payments. Abu Sayyaf forces commanded by Andang, aboard fast speed boats,
attacked a tourist resort in the Malaysian state of Sabah and kidnaped 21 foreigners,
including Malaysians, Frenchmen, Germans, Finns, and South Africans. In July
2000, Abu Sayyaf seized three French journalists. It released the hostages later in the
year after it received ransom payments, including money reportedly from European
governments funneled through the Libyan government. Estimates of the amount of
this ransom range from $10 to $25 million.7
According to Philippine government officials, Abu Sayyaf used the 2000
ransom to recruit new members, raising its strength to an estimated 1,000 or more,
and acquire new equipment, including communications equipment and more fast
speedboats. Abu Sayyaf used speedboats again on May 27, 2000, in venturing 300
miles across the Sulu Sea to attack a tourist resort on Palawan, the Philippines’ large,
westernmost island. Khadaffy Janjalani commanded the operation. Abu Sayyaf
kidnaped 20 people, including three Americans. It took them to Basilan where they
were held by a faction of Abu Sayyaf headed by a volatile individual, Abu Sabaya.
Abu Sayyaf announced in June 2001 that it had beheaded one of the Americans,
Guillermo Sobero, of Corono, California. It continued to hold Martin and Gracia
Burnham, Christian missionaries of Wichita, Kansas, and Deborah Yap, a Filipino
nurse. Most of the other abductees from Palawan were freed after more ransom was
paid, reportedly as much as $1 million per person. Throughout 2000 and 2001, Abu
Sayyaf kidnaped numerous Filipinos on Basilan and Mindanao, releasing some after
ransom payments and executing others. Ex-hostages claimed Abu Sayyaf was
demanding $2 million for the Burnhams.8
5 In Mindanao, the Islamic Fundamentalist Movement Appears to be Spearheaded by the
Tabligh and Abu Sayyaf. Philippine Daily Inquirer, July 29, 1994. P. 1.
6 Richburg, Keith. Spoilers of the Peace. Washington Post, May 25, 1995. P. A33.
7 Fisk, Robert. The Double-Edged Sword of Gaddafi’s Links with the Philippines. London
Independent (internet version), August 22, 2000. Tan, Abby. Kidnappings a Blow to
Philippine Image. Christian Science Monitor, June 6, 2001. P. 7.
8 Romero, Paolo. Abus Attempting a Robin Hood. Philippine Star (internet version), July
(continued...)

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CRS-4
Connections to Al Qaeda and Other Foreign Links
The Wall Street Journal of December 3, 2001, quoted Admiral Denis Blair,
Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Pacific Command, that “we’re seeing increasing
evidence that there are potential current links” between Abu Sayyaf and Osama bin
Laden’s al Qaeda terrorist organization. U.S. officials made similar statements early
in 2003. There have been varying accounts regarding Abu Sayyaf’s relationship
with al Qaeda. It is accepted that Abu Sayyaf received funding and support from al
Qaeda in the early 1990s. Money came from Mohammed Jamal Khalifa, a Saudi and
brother-in-law of bin Laden, who operated a number of Islamic charities in the
southern Philippines. Ramzi Yoesef, an al Qaeda operative, came to the Philippines
in 1994. He and other al Qaeda operatives reportedly trained Abu Sayyaf fighters.9
Yoesef established an al Qaeda cell in Manila. Yoesuf used the cell to plan an
assassination of Pope John Paul II, the planting of bombs aboard 12 U.S. airliners
flying trans-Pacific routes, and the crashing of an airplane into the Central
Intelligence Agency’s headquarters in Langley, Virginia. Filipino police uncovered
the cell in 1995 and provided information on the plot to the C.I.A. and F.B.I.. Yoesef
later was arrested in Pakistan and extradited to the United States for trial over his
complicity in the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center.10
There is less information regarding Abu Sayyaf’s recent relationship with al
Qaeda. Filipino officials close to President Arroyo have contended that the
relationship declined after 1995 when the Ramzi Yoesuf plot was uncovered and
Khalifa left the Philippines. Civilian officials assert that there is no hard evidence
of current ties. They cite the decline in foreign financial support as a key reason for
Abu Sayyaf’s expanded kidnapings for ransom. In contrast, Filipino military officials
claim that active links exist. A secret AFP intelligence report of early 2000
reportedly asserted that Abu Sayyaf received training, arms, and other support from
al Qaeda and other Middle East terrorist groups.11 AFP officers subsequently
reported that “foreign Muslims” were training Abu Sayyaf on Mindanao to conduct
urban terrorism and that Osamu bin Laden had ordered stepped-up aid to Abu Sayyaf,
including possibly $3 million in 2000.12 In July 2001, Philippine Senator Rudolfo
Biazon, chairman of the Senate committee on national security and defense and a
8 (...continued)
27, 2001. What Ransom? Philippine Daily Inquirer (internet version), June 18, 2001.
Quezon City GMA 7 television broadcast, December 7, 2001.
9 Police Hunt for Sudanese Terrorist in Mindanao. Manila Chronicle, December 15, 1995.
P. 3. Pomonti, Jean-Claude. Al Qaeda’s Invisible Presence in Southeast Asia. Le Monde,
November 4-5, 2001, p. 12.
10 For a detailed account of the Ramzi Yousef bomb plot, see: Brzezinski, Matthew. Bust
and Boom. Washington Post Magazine, December 31, 2001. P. 15-17, 27-28.
11 Chandrasekaran, Rajiv. Terrorism War’s New Front. Washington Post, December 22,
2001. P. A1. Kurlantzick, Joshua. Muslim Separatists in Global Network of Terrorist
Groups. Washington Times, May 2, 2000. P. A13.
12 Arquiza, Ray. Interpol Alerts RP on Bin Laden’s Men. Philippine Star (internet version),
July 10, 2001. Gomez, Jim. Philippine Rebels, bin Laden Linked. Agence France Presse
report, June 20, 2000.

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former highly decorated Marine General, cited reports from United Nations sources
that at least 50 Abu Sayyaf members were being trained in Afghanistan.13
Abu Sayyaf’s other foreign links are with individuals and possibly groups in
Malaysia and with Libya. A prominent Malaysian, Sairan Karno, helped to negotiate
the release of the hostages in 2000. Libya’s leader, Moammar Gadafi, was the key
intermediary in hostage negotiations in 2000 and 2001 involving Abu Sayyaf and
other Filipino Muslim groups. Libya was a conduit for ransoms paid to Abu Sayyaf
by European governments and other parties. Libya has been accused of aiding the
MILF, and it was involved in Philippine-MILF negotiations in 2001 for a truce.
Libya also funds Muslim schools, mosques, and other facilities in the southern
Philippines. It offered money for “livelihood projects” in its role in the 2000 hostage
negotiations. Like the prior charities of Mohammed Khalifa, this raises the
possibility that Libyan money gets channeled to Abu Sayyaf. Libya officially has
condemned Abu Sayyaf kidnapings.14
In February 2003, the Philippine government expelled an Iraqi diplomat after
Philippine intelligence organs traced telephone calls from Abu Sayyaf to the diplomat
shortly before a bombing in Zamboanga, Mindanao, in October 2002, which killed
a U.S. soldier and three Filipinos. Subsequently, Filipino officials announced the
discovery of Iraqi “sleeper cells” and the arrest of alleged members of the cells.
Links to the MILF and MNLF
Leaders of the MILF and MNLF have denied any supportive links with Abu
Sayyaf. They have criticized Abu Sayyaf’s terrorist attacks against civilians. The
MILF rejected the Afghan Taliban’s call for a jihad against the United States and
condemned the September 11 attack.15 There have been reports of links between the
MILF and al Qaeda. Singapore officials reported in January 2002 that an MILF
trainer and bomb specialist assisted the group of 13 members of Jeemah Islamiah
arrested in Singapore in December 2001 for plotting to bomb U.S. and other foreign
targets in Singapore.16 Subsequent reports in 2002, particularly of Singapore’s
investigation of Jeemah Islamiah, substantiated that the MILF provided key training
13 Nocum, Armand N. Talibans Training 50 Abu Members, says Biazon. Philippine Daily
Inquirer (internet version), July 6, 2001.
14 Mydans, Seth. Libyan Aid Helps to Free Hostage Held in Philippines. New York Times,
October 21, 2001. P. A9. Sheehan, Deidre. Buying Trouble. Far Eastern Economic
Review, September 7, 2000. P. 29.
15 Mendez, Christina. MILF Rejects ‘Holy War’ vs US. Philippine Star (internet version),
September 17, 2001.
16 Mydans, Seth. Suspects in Singapore Are Linked to Al Qaeda and Plans for Anti-U.S.
Attacks. New York Times, January 12, 2002. P. A8. Marinay, Manny B. Philippine
Military Bares MILF’s Foreign Sources of Funds. Manila Times (internet version), March
27, 2002.

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CRS-6
and other assistance in recent years to members of Jeemah Islamiah.17 Jeemah
Islamiah also was believed responsible for the bombing in Bali, Indonesia, in October
2002. Evidence showed that Jeemah Islamiah was linked with al Qaeda; its
proclaimed goal is to create a Southeast Asian Muslim state from Malaysia,
Singapore, Indonesia, and the southern Philippines.
The AFP claims that links exist and that elements of the MILF and MNLF give
active aid to Abu Sayyaf.18 There clearly is contact between Abu Sayyaf and units
of the two larger organizations in the Sulu islands, Basilan, and western Mindanao,
where all three groups operate. The MNLF’s attack on AFP units on Jolo island in
November 2001 demonstrated the proximity of MNLF and Abu Sayyaf units. A
number of MILF units operate on Basilan. Some Abu Sayyaf members were
formerly with the MNLF. Several thousand MNLF members kept their weapons
despite the 1996 agreement and operate as independent commands. Factions with
the MILF and MNLF are hard-line advocates of Muslim independence and reject
autonomy proposals; they undoubtedly would be inclined to cooperate with Abu
Sayyaf under certain circumstances.19 Moreover, the tenuous relations between the
Philippine government and the MILF and MNLF raise the strong possibility of
shifting linkages among the three Muslim groups.
Philippine Government and AFP Policies and
Operations
The basic Philippine government policy since August 2000 has been constant
military pressure on Abu Sayyaf. In September 2000, President Estrada ordered the
AFP to commit over 1,500 troops into Jolo to conduct operations against Abu Sayyaf
units that had taken the foreign hostages in Malaysia. In mid-2002, after the
completion of the U.S.-supported AFP operation on Basilan, President Arroyo
ordered more troops to Jolo with the aim of wiping out Abu Sayyaf in its stronghold.
President Arroyo had ordered the AFP into Basilan after the hostage-taking on
Palawan. As many as 4,500 troops were deployed to Basilan in 2001.
AFP operations were limited by several factors. One is the mountainous, jungle
terrain of the two islands pockmarked by underground caves. A second is the support
civilians on Jolo and Basilan reportedly give Abu Sayyaf, although recent surveys of
Muslims on Basilan suggested that many are disillusioned by Abu Sayyaf’s violence.
A third was the limited military equipment of the AFP, including an absence of night
vision and other surveillance equipment and shortages of helicopters, mortars, naval
patrol craft, surveillance aircraft, and even basic necessities like military boots. A
17 Wain, Barry and McBeth, John . A Perilous Choice for the Presidents. Far Eastern
Economic Review, October 3, 2002. p. 17-20.
18 Alipala, Inot. MILF, MNLF Aiding Abu, Military Charges. Philippine Daily Inquirer
(internet version), July 5, 2001.
19 Sheehan, Deidre. Swords into Ploughshares. Far Eastern Economic Review, September
20, 2001. P. 30-32. Lerner, Marc. Philippines Guerrilla Group has bin Laden Links.
Washington Times, September 24, 2001. P. A13.

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fourth limitation appears to have been the unevenness in the quality of the AFP. The
apparent attrition of Abu Sayyaf strength in 2001 reflected AFP successes, but there
also were failed operations. The most controversial was the failed encirclement of
the Abu Sayyaf unit holding the Burnhams and Filipino hostages in a church in the
town of Lamitan in June 2001. Several AFP units pulled out of their positions
without explanation, allowing the Abu Sayyaf unit to break out of the encirclement.
A Catholic priest and other witnesses charged that Abu Sayyaf had bribed AFP
commanders to pull units from their positions, and Filipino Catholic bishops called
for an inquiry.20 A Philippine Senate Committee prepared a report in August 2002
citing “strong circumstantial evidence” that AFP commanders at Lamitan had
colluded with Abu Sayyaf.
A fifth limitation was the hostage situation itself. In 2000, European
governments reportedly pressured the Philippine government to refrain from
“excessive” military operations while Abu Sayyaf held the European hostages. In
2002, there reportedly was similar U.S. pressure regarding the Burnhams. Arroyo
Administration officials and AFP commanders said they were restrained from air
bombing and using artillery and mortars out of concern for the safety of the hostages.
A sixth limitation was the AFP deployment of most of its forces in the southern
Philippines in the broader areas of Mindanao dominated by the MILF and MNLF.
Only a small percentage of Filipino troops was committed against Abu Sayyaf. A
final constraint was the danger of AFP operations producing a large numbers of
civilian casualties or displaced civilians. The Estrada Administration came under
criticism in 2000 over reports that the AFP offensive on Jolo caused civilian
casualties and displacement among the island’s 600,000 residents.
The Philippine government has opposed payment of ransom for hostages.21 The
reality is that the government has allowed the payment of ransom from members of
hostages’ families and from European governments through Libya in 2000.
The Arroyo Administration negotiated a mechanism for trilateral cooperation
against terrorist groups with Indonesia and Malaysia. It appears to have had some
success in securing Malaysia’s cooperation. Malaysia increased its naval patrols in
the Sulu Sea, and it arrested Nur Misuari after he fled to Malaysia in November 2001.
The Implications of U.S. Involvement
Beginning in October 2001, the United States sent groups of military observers
to Mindanao to assess AFP operations against Abu Sayyaf, render advice, and
examine AFP equipment needs. President Bush extended $93 million in military aid
to the Philippines when President Arroyo visited Washington in November 2001, and
he offered a direct U.S. military role in combating Abu Sayyaf. President Arroyo
20 Chandrasekaran, Rajiv. Rebels’ Escape Draws Scrutiny. Washington Post, September
1, 2001, p. A 18.
21 Sheehan, Buying Trouble, p. 529. See also Kyodo News Service (Tokyo) report, July 13,
2000; and the Agence France Presse report, July 12, 2000.

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insisted that the U.S. military role should be advisory and that the AFP would retain
full operational responsibility. By late December 2001, the AFP on Mindanao began
to receive quantities of U.S. military equipment. Moreover, AFP commanders
expressed frustration over the failure to rescue the hostages and suggested that they
would support President Arroyo if she sought a more direct U.S. military role.22 It
was announced in January 2002 that the United States would deploy 650 troops to
Mindanao and Basilan within a month. Support/maintenance personnel would
number 500. Special Forces numbering 150 would perform training and advisory
functions; and some of these would accompany AFP units on Basilan. U.S. military
personnel would not conduct independent operations, but they would be armed and
authorized to defend themselves.
This enlarged U.S. military role had several implications. Successful military
operations against Abu Sayyaf would extend U.S. successes against terrorism
beyond Afghanistan and reinforce the Bush Administration’s message to
governments everywhere that the United States is determined to fight terrorism on
many fronts. The Philippine government’s example could influence other
governments to cooperate with the United States. Success against Abu Sayyaf would
further revive the Philippine-U.S. security alliance, a goal of U.S. policy since the
signing in 1998 of a Philippine-U.S. Visiting Forces Agreement. It undoubtedly
would produce greater Philippine-U.S. cooperation against any future attempts by al
Qaeda or Jeemah Islamiah to plant cells in Manila or elsewhere in the Philippines.
Other implications, however, were complex and contained uncertain outcomes.
One was the likely heightened danger to American citizens and businesses in the
Philippines, who could be targeted by Abu Sayyaf or al Qaeda, or even by the
communist NPA. This was highlighted by the killing of an American missionary in
a terrorist bombing in Davao in southeast Mindanao on March 4, 2003.
Another implication relates to confining the mission to Abu Sayyaf. In
committing U.S. troops in January-February 2002, the Bush Administration
reportedly wanted to avoid military involvement with the MILF.23 The Arroyo
administration supported this position because it paralleled the Philippine
government’s policy of maintaining a cease-fire with the MILF negotiated in 2001.
However, the cease-fire became shaky in February and March 2003 when fighting
broke out at an MILF stronghold on Mindanao and the MILF blew up several electric
power grids on the island. The AFP accused the MILF of responsibility for a
bombings in the city of Davao in March and April 2003, although reports mentioned
other groups as possibly behind the bombings. If the tenuous Philippine government
truce with the MILF should collapse, the AFP undoubtedly would use recently
supplied U.S. military equipment against these groups and would favor a direct U.S.
support role against the MILF. The Philippine government might want U.S. training
and advice for AFP units committed against the MILF. U.S. military personnel with
22 More US ‘Advisors’ to Help Fight Sayyaf. Manila Times, January 4, 2002. P. 1.
Ng-Gadil, Mirasol. AFP Admitted that Operation Against Abu Sayyuf Bandits is Difficult.
Manila Kabayan (internet version), December 30, 2001.
23 Landler, Mark. The Temperature’s a Lot Warner but the Mission’s the Same: Hunting
Down Terrorists. New York Times, November 4, 2001. P. B4.

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the AFP could become involved in clashes with MILF or MNLF units in areas where
these groups were in proximity with Abu Sayyaf. Mounting evidence appeared in
2002 of MILF support for Jemaah Islamiah. As a result, the Bush Administration in
late 2002 considered placing the MILF on the U.S. official list of foreign terrorist
organizations. President Arroyo reportedly convinced U.S. officials not to take that
action in the interest of preserving the Philippine government’s cease-fire with the
MILF.24
The enlarged U.S. military role also carried the risk of political backlashes.
Muslims in neighboring Indonesia and Malaysia might react against the United
States, especially if the U.S. military role expanded beyond missions against Abu
Sayyaf and if it became prolonged. Influential Filipino “nationalist” and leftist
groups criticized the U.S. military role on Basilan, even though polls indicated
overwhelming Filipino public support for it and the influential Catholic Bishops
Conference endorsed it. Critics charged that the United States was plotting to restore
a permanent U.S. military presence in the Philippines. They were influential in the
Philippine government’s decision in 1991 to order the United States to withdraw
from the large U.S. military bases in the Philippines. The critics also revived
accounts of the controversial American military campaigns of 1899-1914.
The U.S. military role also has implications for a U.S. political role on
Mindanao. The Bush Administration will face sentiment and pressure to influence
the political, social, and economic issues underlying Filipino Muslim discontent: the
scope and extent of autonomy of the Muslim populated region; the role of Islam in
education; and economic development issues. As evidence, President Arroyo offered
the MILF part of a U.S. $115 million aid package in March 2003 for development
projects in MILF-controlled areas if the MILF agreed to restore the cease-fire and
sign a full peace agreement.25
Results of the U.S. Military Role on Basilan
The early proposals of the Bush Administration envisaged a large, direct, and
assertive role for U.S. forces: a direct combat role for U.S. military personnel, the
commitment of the elite Delta Force to lead operations to rescue the Burnhams,26 and
assistance to the AFP against Abu Sayyaf.27 However, negotiations with the
Philippines over the rules of engagement for the Balikatan exercise resulted in a more
limited U.S. role, as Filipino officials insisted on a non-combat role for the
Americans, operations against only Abu Sayyaf, and a geographical limitation of U.S.
24 Manila, MILF Plan to Resume Peace Talks in December. Reuters News Agency,
November 6, 2002. Gloria’s Powers of Persuasion. Far Eastern Economic Review,
December 12, 2002. p. 10.
25 Villanova, Maruichi. US has $115-M Aid Plan for MILF Areas. Philippine Star (Internet
Version), March 30, 2003.
26 Bonner, Raymond. Philippines Terror Group Seeks Money for Couple. New York Times,
March 9, 2002. p. A10.
27 Struck, Doug. Some Filipinos Cite Threats Beyond Abu Sayyaf. Washington Post, March
4, 2002. p. A13.

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CRS-10
operations to only Basilan island and the Zamboanga peninsula. The U.S. force rose
to nearly 1,300 at the height of the operation. Moreover, as the Balikatan exercise
unfolded, Bush Administration and U.S. military officials appeared to reassess their
views of the U.S. role. This resulted in a U.S. view to limit the American role even
further than envisaged in the rules of engagement negotiated with the Philippines.
It also resulted in apparent confusion and contradictions in U.S. policy.
Despite mounting evidence over MILF links with Jeemah Islamiah, the
prevailing U.S. view in early 2002 emphasized that the MILF was not in league with
Abu Sayyaf and was not anti-U.S. (MILF conciliatory statements about the United
States may have influenced the emergence of this view.) The Bush Administration
came out in support of the truce between the MILF and the Philippine government.28
Philippine-U.S. rules of engagement provided that two-man U.S. Special Forces
teams could accompany AFP companies in the field on Basilan island. U.S. military
officials in the Philippines reportedly favored an early implementation of this plan;
but some Bush Administration officials in Washington, including Secretary of
Defense Rumsfeld, developed second thoughts about this U.S. role.29 Rumsfeld did
not detail these misgivings, but several have been reported and/or seem apparent.
Command arrangements were a difficult issue in Philippine-U.S. negotiations over
rules of engagement. The Americans refused to place U.S. personnel under Filipino
command but agreed that U.S. personnel would take “operational instructions from
Filipino commanders” in the field. Rumsfeld and other officials, however, may have
had continued doubts about this kind of arrangement. Relatedly, the uneven and
sometimes poor quality of AFP units may have added to these doubts.
In mid-June 2002, the Filipinos and Americans finalized arrangements for U.S.
Special Forces in the field. U.S. Special Forces personnel would accompany only
selected AFP companies that had reached certain specified combat skills and on only
closely defined missions. Moreover, this arrangement would end on July 31, 2002,
the official termination date of the Balikatan exercise. Any extension would have to
be re-negotiated.30 In reality, the arrangements were not implemented before the July
31 deadline.
U.S. policy toward the Burnhams contained several shifts. After the U.S. offer
of the Delta Force was ruled out, American officials reportedly advised their Filipino
counterparts to exercise military restraint in order to limit the danger to the
Burnhams.31 The Bush Administration made a decision, probably in March 2002, to
support the payment of ransom to Abu Sayyaf. The payment of $300,000 reportedly
28 Lerner, Mark. Philippines: Forces Worry Conflict Will Grow. Washington Times, March
2, 2002. p. A5.
29 Chandrasekaran, Rajiv. U.S. Troops Have yet to Join Patrols in Philippines. Washington
Post, May 1, 2002. p. A16.
30 Schmitt, Eric. American Troops Will Begin Tighter Operations with Filipinos. New York
Times, June 20 , 2002. p. A13.
31 Ricks, Thomas E. and Sipress, Alan. Spy Planes Seek out Philippine guerrillas.
Washington Post, February 21, 2002. p. A1.

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CRS-11
was made by private parties, probably through intermediaries that had contacts with
Abu Sayyaf. U.S. FBI officials reportedly helped to deliver the money in April 2002.
Abu Sayyaf did not release the Burnhams. The money reportedly did not go to the
Abu Sayyaf group under Abu Sabaya which held the hostages. Instead, it went to the
Jolo-based Abu Sayyaf faction under Khaddafy Janjalani, who reportedly refused to
turn it over to Abu Sabaya.32 The Bush Administration has not disclosed what went
wrong with the ransom attempt. It has not disclosed the Administration’s position
toward President Arroyo’s rejection of a role for Libya in negotiating a ransom
payment. (Libya had negotiated the payment of ransom for nearly 30 hostages Abu
Sayyaf had taken in Malaysia in 2000.)
Following the failed ransom attempt, U.S. officials reportedly shifted from their
pro-restraint position and advised the AFP to adopt more aggressive tactics to rescue
the Burnhams. The U.S. military provided the AFP with intelligence information
that Abu Sayyaf moved the Burnhams from Basilan to the Zamboanga peninsula in
April 2002 and with key intelligence in the AFP’s assault on the Abu Sayyaf team
holding the hostages on June 7, 2002. Martin Burnham and Filipino hostage,
Deborah Yap, were killed during the fighting; Gracia Burnham was rescued.
Despite these changes in the U.S. military role and in U.S. policies and the less
than successful attempt to rescue the Burnhams, the Balikatan exercise appears to
have accomplished several U.S. goals. Philippine-U.S. security cooperation was
advanced. AFP commanders viewed the U.S. role in Balikatan positively, and
President Arroyo continued to advocate this kind of cooperation. Most reports
indicate that U.S. support enhanced the capabilities of AFP units on Basilan. The
period after February 2002 saw more assertive AFP patrolling on Basilan, more
encounters with Abu Sayyaf, and an erosion of Abu Sayyaf strength, which
apparently led to the Abu Sayyaf decision to leave Basilan with the Burnhams. In
March 2003, Philippine officials estimated Abu Sayyaf strength at about 470 with
about 380 on Jolo island. Filipino officials voiced praise for the modern equipment
U.S. forces provided the AFP, U.S. intelligence information provided by U.S. aircraft
and sophisticated communications and tracking equipment, and American assistance
in planning operations.33 U.S. equipment and surveillance were important in the
AFP’s successful operation later in June 2002 in intercepting Abu Sabaya and other
Abu Sayyaf leaders at sea in which Abu Sabaya was killed.34
The Bush Administration’s initiative in offering 350 U.S. personnel to conduct
civic action projects on Basilan reportedly proved popular with the people on the
island and probably helped to neutralize public support for Abu Sayyaf on the
32 Lerner, Mark. Hostage’s Father Says Abu Sayyaf Broke Deal. Washington Times, April
26, 2002. p. A15. Bonner, Raymond and Schmitt, Eric. Philippine Officials Detail the Trap,
Set With U.S. Help, that Snared a Rebel Leader. New York Times, September 22, 2002, p.
16.
33 Gloria, Glenda M. Training Days. Manila Newsbreak (internet version, July 8, 2002.
34 Bonner and Schmitt, Philippine Officials Detail the Trap, Set With U.S. Help, that Snared
a Rebel Leader, New York Times, September 22, 2002, 16.

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CRS-12
island.35 The civic action projects (road building, medical care, and well-digging)
may have influenced a less negative reaction of Filipino Muslims elsewhere to the
U.S. military role, and the favorable Filipino media coverage appears to have helped
President Arroyo contain the critics of the United States within the Manila political
elite.
U.S. policy and assistance reinforced and possibly more directly influenced the
Philippine government’s actions against other terrorist elements in Southeast Asia.
The arrests of the Indonesian Jeemah Islamiah operatives and stepped-up cooperation
with Malaysia, Singapore, and Indonesia since January 2002 indicate an expansion
of the Philippine commitment to assist the United States against terrorist groups. In
particular, the arrest and interrogation of Jeemah Islamiah agent, Fathur Rohman al-
Ghozi, provided important information on the organization and on its plot of 2001
to bomb U.S. and other foreign targets in Singapore.36
Philippine-U.S. military cooperation after the end of the Balikatan exercise on
July 31, 2002, changed the U.S. support role significantly from that of Balikatan.
Most U.S. troops withdrew from Mindanao and Basilan, leaving fewer than 300 to
finish civic action projects and training. No U.S. Special Forces personnel were to
accompany AFP units on patrol. The total number of U.S. troops in the Philippines
was to be fewer than the 1,300 committed during Balikatan. The U.S. role was to
emphasize the training of 16 AFP Light Reaction Companies; training of AFP
personnel in helicopter night flying; and training of AFP personnel in intelligence
gathering. The United States announced in August 2002 an additional $55 million
in military aid to the AFP.37
The Jolo Decision and Resultant Controversy
A key decision for post-July 31 cooperation was whether to extend the U.S.
support and assistance role southward from Basilan to Jolo and other islands in the
Sulu group where Abu Sayyaf continued to operate. There was evidence of tough
Philippine-U.S. negotiations on this issue and possible division within the American
side. President Arroyo and Secretary of Defense Angelo Reyes voiced support for
a U.S. assistance role in the Sulus. Arroyo rebuked U.S. General Donald Wurster,
commander of the U.S. force in Balikatan, for his statement that a U.S. role in the
Sulus was not feasible because of the presence of MILF and MNLF forces on those
islands. Arroyo asserted that “the Sulu idea came from the American side” and that
negotiations with U.S. officials on this were “way above his [Wurster’s] head” with
35 Schmitt, Eric. By Aiding Needy Filipinos, G.I.’s Could Help Rout the Rebels. New York
Times, Jule 15, 2002. p. A6.
36 Indonesian Held in Manila Tells of Holy War in Asia. Reuters News Agency, September
19, 2002.
37 Embassy of the Philippines. Release No. 1 Statement from Philippine Defense Secretary
Angelo Reyes on his Meeting with US Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld on 12 August
2002. Lerner, Mark. Links With Allies Stressed in Anti-Terrorist Fight. Washington
Times, August 4, 2002. p. A6.

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the U.S. Pacific Command.38 Nevertheless, except for reported U.S. air surveillance
over Jolo, the Philippine-U.S. decision of July 2002 was not to commit the U.S.
military to the Sulus. Moreover, Philippine government officials asserted that some
of the units trained by the Americans would be used against the communist New
Peoples Army (NPA). The NPA has existed since 1968, reached a strength of nearly
30,000 in the mid-1980s, and declined to a strength of about 5,000 in 1993-1994.
However, it has revived since then and now has an estimated armed strength of
11,000. In August 2002, the Bush Administration placed the Philippine Communist
Party and the NPA on the official U.S. list of terrorist organizations.
However, the continued Abu Sayyaf bombings in autumn 2002 led the U.S.
Defense Department to reconsider the July decision regarding Jolo (pronounced
“Holo”). U.S. officials also cited stronger evidence of connections between Abu
Sayyaf and international terrorist groups. Planning and discussions with the
Philippine government were underway by December 2002. In February 2003,
Pentagon officials described a plan under which the United States would commit 350
Special Operations Forces (SOF) to Jolo to operate with AFP Army and Marine units
down to the platoon level of 20-30 troops. Another 400 U.S. support troops would
be at Zamboanga on the Mindanao mainland. Positioned offshore of Jolo would be
a navy task force of 1,000 U.S. Marines and 1,300 Navy personnel equipped with
Cobra attack helicopters and Harrier jets.39
According to the Pentagon description of the plan, U.S. troops would be in a
combat role. This and subsequent statements indicated that the SOF on Jolo would
participate in AFP offensive operations against Abu Sayyaf and that the SOF would
not be limited to using their weapons for self-defense. The U.S. Marines were
described as a “quick reaction” force, undoubtedly meaning that they could be sent
on to Jolo to reinforce AFP units. The Cobra helicopters and Harrier jets would give
AFP commanders the option of requesting U.S. air strikes in support of AFP
operations.
These rules of engagement went beyond the U.S. role on Basilan in 2002. There
was no comparable Marine and naval air capability off Basilan. The plan for SOF
to go on patrol with AFP units restricted U.S. troops to use their weapons only for
self-defense. That plan never was implemented on Basilan. Moreover, the Basilan
operation contained a deadline of July 1, 2002, whereas Pentagon officials asserted
that the Jolo operation would have no time limit.
President Arroyo and AFP commanders reportedly had agreed to the plan in a
meeting of February 4, 2003.40 The announcement of the plan caused immediate
controversy in the Philippines. Filipino politicians and media organs criticized the
38 Vuillanueva, Mirichu and Pareno, Roel. Arroyo Scolds US General. Philippine Star
(internet version), July 11, 2002. New US-Philippine Exercises Against Rebels Planned.
Reuters News Agency, July 20, 2002.
39 Graham, Bradley. U.S. Bolsters Philippine Force. Washington Post, February 21, 2003.
p. A1.
40 Nakashima, Ellen and Graham, Bradley. Missed Signals Forced Suspension of U.S.-
Philippine Mission. Washington Post, March 3, 2003. p. A12.

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plan as violating the constitutional prohibition of foreign troops engaging in combat
on Philippine soil.41 Filipino Muslim leaders warned of a Muslim backlash on
Mindanao. Filipino experts and civic leaders on Jolo warned that the people of Jolo
would not support a U.S. combat role, partly because of the history of U.S. military
involvement on the island. During the Philippine wars following the U.S. annexation
of the Philippines in 1898, U.S. forces commanded by Generals Leonard Wood and
John J. Pershing conducted extensive combat operations against Muslim forces on
Jolo, inflicting thousands of civilian casualties. President Arroyo reacted to these
criticisms and warnings by asserting that the U.S. role on Jolo would be to train and
advise under AFP jurisdiction but would not involve combat. The Bush and Arroyo
administrations decided to put the plan on hold and re-negotiate the rules of
engagement of U.S. forces. It was reported that President Arroyo decided to
postpone implementation of any plan until after a U.S. war with Iraq and that U.S.
and Philippine planners were considering locations other than Jolo.42
41 Nakashima, Ellen. Philippines Debates U.S. Combat Role Against Rebels. Washington
Post, February 23, 2003. p. A30.
42 Pareno, Roel and Mendez, Christina. Reyes: RP-US Balikatan Deal Done in One Month.
Philippine Star (Internet version), March 28, 2003. Villanueva, Marichu. More
Conservative Terms for Balikatan 03-1 Sought. Philippine Star (Internet version), March
23, 2003.

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