Order Code RL31833
Report for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
Iraq: Recent Developments
in Humanitarian and
Reconstruction Assistance
April 1, 2003
Rhoda Margesson
Foreign Affairs Analyst
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Curt Tarnoff
Specialist in Foreign Affairs
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

---

Iraq: Recent Developments in Humanitarian and
Reconstruction Assistance
Summary
Large-scale humanitarian and reconstruction assistance programs are expected
to be undertaken by the United States during and following the war with Iraq. To
fund such programs, the President requested $3.5 billion in FY2003 Supplemental
Appropriations on March 25, 2003. In addition to food aid, initial U.S. assistance
expenditures, aimed mostly at preparations for the delivery of humanitarian aid,
amount to an estimated $154 million. Humanitarian needs of Iraqi civilians will be
met as well by the Oil-for-Food Program managed by the United Nations. Other
donors are expected to provide aid, including the European Union which has
designated 100 million euros for humanitarian relief agencies.
A post-war planning office for assistance was established in January 2003. The
Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance, staffed by officials
throughout the government, is responsible for producing plans and implementing
assistance programs in post-war Iraq. The Office is headed by retired Army Lt. Gen.
Jay M. Garner. After an initial period of U.S.-led aid activities, existing Iraqi
ministries, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and international organizations
are expected to assume some of the burden.
It is widely believed that the current humanitarian situation is worsening due to
the war. The war is disrupting critical infrastructure, delivery of basic services, and
food distribution. The International Committee of the Red Cross, currently the lead
humanitarian agency inside Iraq, is monitoring quality and quantity of medical
supplies and drinking water. Very little humanitarian aid was delivered to Iraq in the
early days of the war. Military operations and logistical problems in the south made
it too dangerous to open supply routes, and the situation was too insecure for aid
agencies to enter. Supplies, however, are beginning to be delivered through the port
Umm Qasr; the Sir Galahad, carrying humanitarian supplies, arrived on March 28.
Contracts for implementation of early reconstruction projects in such areas as
capital construction and seaport and airport administration are being selected by the
Agency for International Development. Questions have been raised regarding the
decision to limit the number of bidders for these projects to a select few American
companies. The need for immediate action and security clearances are among the
reasons put forward for this decision. Concerns are also being expressed regarding
the U.S. position on the role of the United Nations in post-war Iraq. Currently, the
United States seems to be seeking U.N. participation in humanitarian activities but
very limited U.N. political authority in Iraq. Many European leaders are calling for
the U.N. to take-over administration of a post-war Iraq.
The report will be updated as events warrant. For detailed discussion on
possible humanitarian and reconstruction aid, see CRS Report RL31814,
Humanitarian Issues in Post-War Iraq: An Overview for Congress and CRS Report
RS21454, Iraq: Potential Post-War Foreign Aid Issues. For discussion of other
aspects of the war, see CRS Report RL31339, Iraq: U.S. Regime Change Efforts, the
Iraqi Opposition, and Post-War Iraq.

---

Contents
Congressional Action: Recent Developments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
FY2003 Supplemental . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Funding for Assistance: Recent Developments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
U.S. Assistance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Oil-for-Food Program (OFFP) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Other Donors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
U.S. Aid Policy Structure in Iraq . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Humanitarian Assistance: Recent Developments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Contingency Preparations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Relief and Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Operational Status: Recent Developments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Reconstruction Assistance: Recent Developments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Reconstruction Implementation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Governance of Post-War Iraq . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

---

Iraq: Recent Developments in Humanitarian
and Reconstruction Assistance
Large-scale humanitarian and reconstruction assistance programs are expected
to be undertaken by the United States during and following the war in Iraq. This
report describes recent developments in this assistance effort. Given the rapidly-
evolving situation concerning these aid programs, some of these reported
developments are based on press accounts. The report will be updated as events
warrant. For detailed discussion on possible humanitarian and reconstruction aid, see
CRS Report RL31814, Humanitarian Issues in Post-War Iraq: An Overview for
Congress and CRS Report RS21454, Iraq: Potential Post-War Foreign Aid Issues.
For discussion of other aspects of the war, see CRS Report RL31339, Iraq: U.S.
Regime Change Efforts, the Iraqi Opposition, and Post-War Iraq.
Congressional Action: Recent Developments
FY2003 Supplemental
On March 25, 2003, the President sent to Congress an FY2003 Supplemental
Appropriations request, largely to fund costs associated with the war. In all, the
request includes $3.5 billion in Iraq relief and reconstruction aid, $2.4 billion of
which would be appropriated to a special Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund that
would not be affected by current restrictions on foreign assistance. Of Fund amounts,
$743 million would be for humanitarian relief efforts, including $200 million to
reimburse accounts that provide emergency food, and $1.7 billion would be directed
at reconstruction efforts in a wide range of sectors from health to education to rule
of law. See CRS Report 31829, Supplemental Appropriations FY2003: Iraq
Conflict, Afghanistan, Global War on Terrorism, and Homeland Security, for further
details.
Funding for Assistance: Recent Developments
U.S. Assistance
Initial U.S. assistance expenditures have been aimed at preparations for the
delivery of humanitarian aid. The United States has allocated $154 million for Iraq’s
humanitarian relief, food distribution, and reconstruction. Of that amount, $35
million has been spent to date on contingency planning, including $17.3 million on
prepositioning of commodities. The Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration
(PRM) at the State Department has spent $15.6 million, and $22 million has been

---

CRS-2
allocated to the Emergency Refugee and Migration Account (ERMA). In addition,
last week, the United States pledged to release 610,000 tonnes of food.
On March 20, President Bush issued an executive order confiscating non-
diplomatic Iraqi assets held in the United States. Of the total assets seized, an
estimated $1.6 billion are expected to be available for reconstruction purposes.
Oil-for-Food Program (OFFP)
The OFFP was suspended between March 18 and March 28, 2003. Prior to its
suspension, approximately $10 billion worth of humanitarian supplies were in the
process of being delivered or produced, of which one quarter covered food needs.
On March 28, the U.N. Security Council unanimously approved Resolution 1472,
which gives Secretary General Annan authority to prioritize and coordinate the
immediate humanitarian needs of Iraqi civilians for an initial 45-day period under an
expanded OFFP. The resolution authorizes the transfer of responsibility for the
distribution of food and medicine in central and southern Iraq from the Iraqi
government to the U.N. Secretary-General. Iraq rejected the resolution on March 29.
The OFFP is dependent upon Iraq’s future cooperation with the OFFP (and use of its
distribution network) and the security of the personnel working for the United
Nations once inside Iraq.1 Furthermore, a number of agencies have indicated they
plan to use the OFFP system, but how the provision of aid is to be coordinated
among multiple donors remains to be worked out.
Other Donors
The United Nations has appealed for $123.5 million to provide humanitarian
and food assistance and to prepare for post-war Iraqi relief. As of March 28, it has
received pledges of about $45 million, with $35 million received. On March 28,
U.N. agencies issued a $2.2 billion “flash appeal” for humanitarian aid to Iraq to
cover expenditures for a six-month period. Of that total, $1.3 billion would be for
food aid. The World Food Program (WFP) continues to stockpile food near Iraq. At
a European Union (EU) summit on March 20, leaders agreed to unite to provide
humanitarian aid to Iraq, but rejected explicit mention of reconstruction and long-
term aid. The EU has designated 100 million euros for humanitarian relief agencies.
International contributions have been received from other donors, including New
Zealand, Australia, Spain, the U.K., and Belgium. Others have provided assistance
to neighboring countries to ease the humanitarian burden, for example, Japan has
pledged $104 million to Jordan and the Palestinian Authority; Russia is giving in-
kind emergency supplies to Iran; and Australia agreed to ship 100,000 tonnes of food.
U.S. Aid Policy Structure in Iraq
To prepare for the use of aid, a post-war planning office was established on
January 20, 2003, by a presidential directive. The Office of Reconstruction and
1 “Iraq Threatens the Oil-for-Food Programme,” Financial Times, March 31, 2003.

---

CRS-3
Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA), although located in the Defense Department, is
staffed by officials from agencies throughout the government. While immediate
overall responsibility for the war and management of U.S. activity in post-war Iraq
belongs to General Tommy Franks, Commander of U.S. Central Command, the
ORHA is charged with producing plans for his use in carrying out that role. In
addition, it is responsible for implementing U.S. assistance efforts in Iraq. The
Office, headed by retired Army Lt. Gen. Jay M. Garner, has three civilian
coordinators – for reconstruction, civil administration, and humanitarian relief. Plans
formulated before the war started call for three regional coordinators – for north,
south, and central Iraq – to serve under the functional coordinators. The latter would
reportedly be mostly staffed by so-called “free Iraqis”, those who have been living
outside Iraq in democratic countries, who would act as advisors. Indigenous Iraqi
groups are expected to be formed in each province to propose assistance activities to
be implemented in their area.2
According to planners, U.S. armed forces will initially take the lead in relief and
reconstruction, later turning to existing Iraqi ministries, nongovernmental
organizations (NGOs), and international organizations to assume some of the
burden.3 The Pentagon has stated that humanitarian agencies may not have access
to all of Iraq immediately. Since October 2002, the U.S. Agency for International
Development (USAID) has also been putting together a Disaster Assistance
Response Team (DART) and is making preparations to deal with the basic needs of
one million people.
The possible length of U.S. military rule and subsequent form of U.S.-run civil
administration prior to handing over governance authority to an all-Iraqi government
are subjects of debate both internationally and within the Administration. See
“Reconstruction Assistance” section below.
Humanitarian Assistance: Recent Developments
Background
It is widely believed that the current humanitarian situation inside Iraq is
worsening as a result of the war. The amount of assistance which is ultimately
needed will obviously depend on the nature and duration of the conflict. It is
anticipated that problems could arise from malnutrition and disruption of food
supplies, inadequate sanitation and clean water, and reduced health and medical care.
The United Nations reportedly expects that nearly 40% of the Iraqi population could
2 Background briefing on reconstruction and humanitarian assistance in post-war Iraq,
Department of Defense, March 11, 2003.
3 “U.S. Military Lays Out Postwar Iraq Plan,” Washington Post, February 12, 2003.

---

CRS-4
require food assistance within weeks.4 Some argue that supplies of water, food,
medicine, and electricity are already a matter of urgent concern.5
Until it was suspended on the eve of war, U.N. and other humanitarian agencies
were providing aid to Iraq through the OFFP, which used revenue from Iraqi oil sales
to buy food and medicines for the civilian population.6 Sixty percent of Iraq’s
estimated population of 24 to 27 million were receiving monthly food distributions
under the OFFP. Sources say that families were not able to make their rations last
the full month or they need to sell part of them for other necessities – leaving many
people with little food stored in reserve and more vulnerable. Others say that the
average Iraqi has food supplies lasting a few months. Food security remains
uncertain, just as the amount of food stored in OFFP warehouses is also unknown.
Contingency Preparations
The war is disrupting critical infrastructure, delivery of basic services, and food
distribution. Aid organizations have planned for humanitarian needs amid great
uncertainty about conditions in the aftermath of conflict. They report that emergency
supplies such as water, food, medicine, shelter materials, and hygiene kits are in
place in countries bordering Iraq. Some argue that there is still a huge shortfall of
resources and funding available to help refugees. There are also concerns about the
absorptive capacity of neighboring countries, whether they can provide adequately
for these populations, and the impact of refugee flows on stability in the region. Iran,
Turkey, Jordan, Syria, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait have all publicly stated that they
will prevent refugees from entering their countries, although each continues to make
preparations for assistance either within Iraq’s borders or at transit areas at border
crossing points.
U.N. agencies developed possible humanitarian scenarios and contingency
plans. The U.N. Humanitarian Coordinator in Iraq, Ramiro Lopez da Silva, has set
up an interim logistics hub in Cyprus. Although NGOs have also been putting
together plans, the absence of international organizations and NGOs operating in and
around Iraq means there are few networks in place and there is little experience on
the ground.
Relief and Security
Military operations and logistical problems in the south have made it too
dangerous to open supply routes and the situation on the ground is not secure enough
for aid agencies to move in. Once security is established, questions remain about
delivery of aid (whether roads used by the military will be usable or whether separate
4 “Shortfall Imperils U.N.’s Iraq Aid; Funds Sought for Humanitarian Work,” Washington
Post, February 14, 2003.
5 “Agencies Fear Consequences But Plan for War in Iraq; Iraq Stocks up Food Ahead of
Possible US War.” Turkish Daily News, December 27, 2002.
6 For more information about the Oil-for-Food Program (OFFP), see CRS Report RL30472,
Iraq: Oil-for-Food Program, International Sanctions, and Illicit Trade.

---

CRS-5
supply routes will need to be put in place); availability of cargo and water trucks
(currently in short supply); and distribution (particularly in cities where the military
is may not have gained full control over population centers as they push north and
keep the offensive focused on Baghdad.)
Aid agencies plan to establish bases within Iraq to support relief operations.
However, they fear that receiving protection from coalition-led forces could mean an
increase in security risks for their staff because they risk losing neutrality. The EU
is also concerned about the “independence and integrity of delivering humanitarian
aid.”7 Continuing instability has prevented attempts to assess the needs of local
people and provide humanitarian assistance.
In the short term, security of humanitarian aid delivery and distribution is
becoming a matter of concern. When aid gets through, logistical problems and
unruly mobs have made it very difficult to distribute even the small amounts of aid
made available. Moreover, looting and lawlessness on the one hand combined with
some apparent bitterness towards the coalition forces on the other present additional
problems.
Operational Status: Recent Developments
The humanitarian situation continues to evolve as the war progresses. As the
war began, there were reports of Kurdish civilians either leaving cities located in
possible combat zones or attempting to safeguard their homes with sheets of plastic
against a possible chemical attack by the Iraqis. In Baghdad, civilians bought water
and canned food, converted currency, and filled gas tanks in preparation for war.
The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) is currently the lead
humanitarian agency inside Iraq. ICRC teams visited the main hospitals in Baghdad
to see the wounded and provide additional medical supplies. ICRC staff also have
continued to monitor the quality and quantity of drinking water. Telephone
communications with Baghdad are very limited, making it difficult to get new
information. In Basra, the ICRC team had restored clean water to approximately
40% of the city, although lack of water and electricity remains a serious problem. In
Kirkuk, emergency supplies have been provided to aid agencies assisting Internally
Displaced Persons (IDPs). In northern Iraq, the ICRC has continued to monitor the
condition of the IDPs and provided emergency and non-aid items to displaced
families. High food prices together with poor reserves are said to be a growing
problem. Civilian casualties have been reported by the Iraqi health minister and on
Al Jazeera TV, but no firm numbers have been confirmed to date.8 According to the
United Nations, the ICRC has been granted access to Prisoners of War of Coalition
Forces as of March 31.

7 “Keep Aid Neutral, Urges EU Relief Chief,” Financial Times, March 31, 2003.
8 As of March 27, 2003, the Iraqi Ministry of Health reported a total of 4,000 civilian
casualties and 350 deaths since the beginning of the war. U.N. Office of the Humanitarian
Coordinator for Iraq, “Iraq: Humanitarian Situation Report No. 10,” March 28, 2003.

---

CRS-6
Very little humanitarian aid has been delivered to Iraq since the opening days
of the war. For example, on March 26, 2003, two separate convoys–one to Basra,
one as part of a USAID-DART mission to Umm Qasr–distributed some food. It was
reported that on March 28, two trucks of Kuwaiti aid arrived in Safwan and since
then, a limited number of distributions have taken place. Lack of water, food, and
electricity is proving to be a problem for many Iraqis and it is unclear when supplies
will arrive. An insufficient water supply is proving to be one of the biggest
humanitarian challenges in southern Iraq. Deliveries by tanker to some towns and
building an extension to the pipeline from Kuwait to Umm Qasr are underway to
address the problem.9
Limited or no access by the United Nations and aid agencies makes it difficult
to confirm reports of population displacement. According to the United Nations,
there is a reported increase in the number of people leaving Baghdad for the
countryside.10 Checkpoints between the three northern governorates and Government
of Iraq (GOI) controlled areas remained closed, limiting population movements;
some reports estimate 5,000 people may have moved north. Internal population
movements appeared to be occurring mainly in the north. Apparently 90% of these
IDPs have been able to find local accommodation with friends and relatives. There
are concerns that the Turkish-Iraqi border region is highly inaccessible for
distribution of food aid. The WFP has started moving food from Turkey into
northern Iraq, although U.N. agencies have been encountering difficulties at the
border which has been closed for goods entering Iraq. There have been few refugees
moving out of Iraq; however, some people are gathering close to the Iraq/Iran border
in the south. Third Country Nationals (TCNs) represented the main bulk of
individuals leaving Iraq. Asylum seekers have been reported at several border areas,
but there are no confirmed arrivals. The International Organization for Migration
(IOM) and the U.N. Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near
East (UNRWA) are providing assistance to TCNs at the borders and to help them
with preparations for their onward journey to their home countries.
The now coalition-controlled port of Umm Qasr, Iraq’s main outlet to the
Persian Gulf, is a crucial gateway for humanitarian supplies. British forces continue
to sweep it for mines, but massive dredging and rebuilding is required to prepare the
port for large cargo ships. In the meantime, once the port is operational, some
sources fear that offloading will be slow and inefficient, leading to risks of delay in
the delivery and distribution of relief materials. The Royal Fleet Auxiliary ship Sir
Galahad, containing humanitarian supplies, arrived at the port on March 28. The
food will be stored in a warehouse until the OFFP can be revived. Australian cargo
ships carrying food aid have been delayed entry into the port because of the need for
further mine sweeping.
9 “Ships Arrival at Umm Qasr with First Cargo of Aid Seen as Bringing Iraq Back into
World Fold,” Financial Times, March 31, 2003.
10 U.N. Office of the Humanitarian Coordinator for Iraq, “Iraq: Humanitarian Situation
Report No. 12," March 31, 2003.

---

CRS-7
Reconstruction Assistance: Recent Developments
Among the key policy objectives laid out by the Bush Administration in
launching a war in Iraq is the economic and political reconstruction of the country.
At this point, only limited steps have been taken in preparation for reconstruction
programs; unlike humanitarian aid, the war must end before reconstruction can begin.
However, discussion and debate within the Administration and the diplomatic
community is on-going regarding the form of governance in post-war Iraq and
questions over the administration of reconstruction aid, including the role of the U.N.
Reconstruction Implementation
In February and March 2003, USAID began to announce the recipients of
contracts to carry out early reconstruction operations – in seaport and airport
administration, capital construction, theater logistical support, public health, primary
and secondary education, personnel support, and local governance. For this purpose,
normal public bidding requirements were waived, and specific companies which
were seen to have preexisting qualifications were requested to submit bids.
Halliburton, whose former chief executive was Vice-President Cheney, was one of
the firms solicited by USAID for a $600 million construction contract raising
concerns of favoritism and reinforcing suspicions among some critics that the war is
being fought for oil. In the end, Halliburton was not awarded the contract. Some
officials point out that only a few select firms possess the particular skills and
security clearances that would qualify them for the job specifications for Iraq
reconstruction.11 However, some observers have noted that many international
organizations and non-U.S. companies were excluded from the selection, and even
British companies were not considered despite that country’s role in the war. U.S.
officials point out, however, that time and security clearances are critical factors and
that foreign entities, potentially excluded by “buy America” provisions of law, and
other U.S. firms can participate as sub-contractors to the selected American firms.
Sub-contractors are likely to compose more than half of the total cost of each
contract.12
Governance of Post-War Iraq
How Iraq is administered in the immediate and medium-term post-war period
will strongly affect the outcome of U.S. objectives and programs. U.S. officials have
stressed the desire to return the governance of Iraq to its people as soon as possible.
Although plans for the immediate post-war period may change with evolving
circumstances, U.S. officials currently expect a “rolling transfer” of authority to an
Iraqi Interim Authority that would run ministries that affect daily civilian life –
education, health, etc. The “power” ministries – military, intelligence – would be
taken over and reformed by the U.S. military. Current U.S. plans also may include
the use of Iraqi regular army personnel to work on many reconstruction programs,
11 “Halliburton’s Links Sharpen Bids Dispute,” Financial Times, March 27, 2003,
“Halliburton Unit Loses Out on Rebuilding Iraq,” Washington Post, March 29, 2003.
12 “U.S. Agency Offers Blueprint for Rebuilding Iraq,” Los Angeles Times, March 21, 2003.

---

CRS-8
such as construction, engineering, road work and demining. “Free” Iraqis would be
assigned as “advisors” to each of the roughly 21 ministries, and the roughly two
million Iraqi civil servants, including educators and health workers, would continue
to carry out their functions, with salaries initially paid by the United States. Iraqis
would also be asked to form their own constitutional commission to devise a new
governmental structure.13
A number of European leaders, including those of France and Germany, argue
that administration of Iraq should be turned over as soon as possible to the United
Nations. They argue that prolonged U.S. military control will be opposed by Iraqis
and antagonize the Arab world. They support a role for the U.N. such as it has had
in Kosovo. This position has been significantly strengthened by the advocacy of
British Prime Minister Blair. However, prior to meeting with President Bush on
March 27, Blair indicated that resolution of the issue of a U.N. role in post-war
administration could wait. The U.S. position reportedly is that the U.N. may play a
major role in humanitarian assistance, but should have no political authority.14 The
Europeans, not including Blair, are apparently reluctant to offer reconstruction
assistance unless the U.N. is provided a lead role. The recently-approved Security
Council resolution allowing the U.N. to manage the oil- for-food funds to support
humanitarian activities was reportedly held up over the issue, although some believe
its temporary renewal is designed to allow the United States to place control in the
hands of an Iraqi interim authority once the war has ended.15 A parallel disagreement
over the role of the U.N. is reportedly taking place among Administration officials,
with the State Department arguing that a U.N.-run post-war Iraq would attract more
financial support from the international community while being more acceptable to
the Iraqis.16
13 Background briefing on reconstruction and humanitarian assistance in post-war Iraq,
Department of Defense, March 11, 2003.
14 “Blair to Press Bush over U.N. Role,” Financial Times, March 26, 2003. “U.S. Plans to
Run Iraq Itself, and is Assembling a Civilian Team,” New York Times, March 26, 2003.
15 “Blair Pushes Hard for Strong U.N. Postwar Role”, Financial Times, March 21, 2003.
“US Should Bear Cost of Rebuilding, Says Berlin,” Financial Times, March 26, 2003.
“Paris Plans to Regain Place on World Stage,” Financial Times, March 27, 2003, “Against
France and Russia, Washington Tries to Curb U.N. Role in a Postwar Iraq,” New York
Times, March 27, 2003.
16 “At United Nations, Yet Another Clash Looms Over Iraq,” Washington Post, March 26,
2003.

---